

SDIP/1007/5 SOUTHSCAN Vol 2 No 17 13.1.88

# Inside the JMCs

Notes from a secret meeting between businessmen and generals throw light on the inside workings of the Joint Management Committees

Not much is heard of P W Botha's "total strategy" since the evident failure of the policy in the face of mounting Black political anger and resistance in the 1980s, writes a correspondent.

Yet leaving the label aside, many of its key features remain firmly within government thinking, and more significantly, in the many areas of political engineering embarked on in the past few years.

Total strategy was meant to win support for apartheid from the oppressed communities, but Botha's political reforms precipitated nationwide township uprisings. The intention remains nonetheless, this time to be achieved through Joint Management Committees' (JMC's) efforts to pump resources into "hot spot" townships.

Pretoria hopes to pre-empt uprisings by a top-down method of meeting local grievances and ensuring adequate "communication and education", while firmly avoiding negotiation as a means to resolve conflict.

This upgrading takes place in the context of several other pillars of the original total strategy. These pillars, erected and maintained by the National Security Management System, are the co-ordination of all government departments in opposing community resistance, centralization of power in the military, and attempts to co-opt big business into supporting apartheid.

The current NSMS strategy is a strategy of containment at a local level. It is a reaction to the challenge posed by the growth of democratic organisation, not a blue-print to resolve the economic or political crisis in SA. NSMS deals in conflict-management, not resolution.

While national political reform is on the back-burner, restructuring at other levels - notably the spread of JMC structures and the new Regional Services Councils - proceed apace. Now, new insight into the strategy has come to light with the leaking of notes taken at a secret meeting between South African businessmen and Botha's generals in March 1986, published for the first time in *Southscan*.

## A general's strategy to 'eliminate the revolutionaries' in the townships

A confidential briefing by Major General C.J. Lloyd to SA businessmen has come to light with the leaking to *Southscan* of notes taken at the meeting in March last year.

They offer new insight into the counter-revolutionary strategy currently being devised within SA's shadowy National Security Management System.

According to the notes, Lloyd, who is chair of the State Security Council secretariat with 100 full-time officials from the various intelligence services, pulled no punches in making cold-blooded reference to the need to "eliminate the revolutionar-

ies" in the townships, and in calling on business to contribute to countering areas of dissatisfaction identified by the ANC.

Lloyd argued that the ranks of the "enemy" are very small, consisting of trained, committed, active revolutionaries. These people must be identified specifically, and the security forces must exercise care not to "incur the wrath of the masses" by eliminating uncommitted, non-revolutionary members of the community "by accident."

This elimination process is coupled with a far-reaching programme intended to win support from township communities. Lloyd argued

that the ANC had identified education, housing, health care, and freedom of movement as areas of dissatisfaction. The contribution of the private sector is crucial if solutions to these problems are to be found within a reasonable space of time, he argued.

The security forces must also protect the masses "against intimidation", communicate a realistic new future to them, and protect the institutions of government. All these processes must be backed by self-criticism by the government, and correction of its failings, he argued.

According to the notes,

Lloyd preceded these points with an analysis of revolutionary strategy in SA. He argued that "for the revolutionary movement to be successful" it needed logistical support through established front organisations such as "Cosat NECC, UDF et al". The "revolutionary plan" envisaged a development from winning individual rights to the evolution of a one-party state like Zimbabwe and final conversion into a "classical Marxist state".

Lloyd holds that participants in the revolutionary strategy believe it can be achieved without full-scale

continued on



## General's strategy

continued

armed conflict. Instead, they envisage mass action (civil disobedience, strikes, unrest) combined with armed action (urban terrorism and guerilla raids). This would lead to ungovernability and the development of separate power blocs from the logistical bases of front organisations.

He cautioned his audience that liberal businessmen and academics were seen as valuable allies in bring pressure to bear to allow the establishment of these power blocs. The ANC intended to undermine the credibility of official power instruments (Government, SABC, military and police) and the ECC, liberal media, international organisations, student groups, and liberal businessmen would be solicited to take part in this.

Under these circumstances, and with sufficient insurrection, the SA government would become irrelevant and capitulate. The establishment of people's power would follow shortly thereafter.

Security force counter-revolutionary strategy was targetted at the Government (self-criticism and correcting shortcomings) and the enemy ("command, coerce and eliminate"). For the "masses", their support had to be won over through communication and education about what the white community was attempting.

The notes report that Lloyd went on to describe how the National Security Management System had been developed to "manage and marshall the resources of the country". He claimed this to be working very well in many areas, singling out Mamelodi, Alexandra, and New Brighton as leading examples.

Lloyd told the meeting that the system operated at national, regional and local levels, and involved the security and private sectors.

It acted to satisfy the welfare of the masses, change and influence their psychological attitudes, and maintain security.

# The widening powers of the Security Management System

The powers of the NSMS have been significantly extended since the declaration of the first State of Emergency - leading the Black Sash to argue that a "creeping coup" has taken place.

Effective power has been shifted decisively away from the white parliament, and even from the Cabinet and the Nationalist Party caucus. Instead, power now lies firmly in the hands of the State Security Council, and its extensive network of Joint Management Centres, whose influence reaches down to the level of every township.

The State Security Council meets before every Cabinet meeting. It advises the Cabinet on the basis of information synthesised from the JMC's extensive and co-ordinated intelligence networks. There are 12 JMC's nationally, and 650 sub-JMC's. Mini-JMC's are planned for each township. These will set up Community Liaison Forums to liaise with local capital, the local authorities, and with collaborative chiefs in the rural areas. JMC members are appointed by State Departments, and each JMC is representative of the security forces and those state departments concerned with welfare issues.

All JMC's are chaired by military men. The sub- and mini- JMC's are chaired by SADF or SAP commandants. The sub-JMC's also have a Daily Monitoring Committee. This operates as an executive, meets daily, and is on 24 hour standby.

The JMC's have three sub-committees, mirrored at all levels. There is a joint intelligence committee, (GIK-Kom); a political, economic and sociological committee (PES-Kom); and a communications

committee (KOM-Kom).

The "Kom-koms" feed the Bureau of Information with the official unrest reports.

In an interview with the Weekly Mail, senior officials from the SSC

described the information GIK-Koms deal with: "They don't worry about intelligence for the whole country. They worry about their areas: so many stones were thrown this morning, there is a shortage of water here, electricity lines have been blown down by strong winds there. This is the type of intelligence they plot." The political, economic and social committee, PES-Kom,

document, entitled "Strategy for the collection of arrear rental and service charges", revealed strategies involving business, community councils, development boards and the security forces. PFP researcher James Selfe also believes the Kom-Koms may be involved in the disinformation tactics used repeatedly in the townships. The SSC officials interviewed by Weekly Mail said this was theoretically possible, but highly unlikely. When asked if the JMC's could put out anti-boycott pamphlets, for example, they said "I suppose

**'We divide things between welfare and security. If people in the welfare area can prevent a crisis, it doesn't become a security matter'**

deals with problems of rent, services and the provision of facilities. The two SSC officials explained how they work:

"We divide things between welfare and security. If the people in the welfare area can prevent a crisis, it doesn't become a security matter. If they don't, invariably it will become a security matter. If we don't see that the people have what they need to lead a decent life, obviously someone is going to riot."

Formally, the role of the JMC is to bring socio-economic problems to the attention of the relevant authorities.

But it seems likely that their role is more directly interventionist. The Weekly Mail exposed a document which showed that the JMC's were co-ordinating a national strategy to end the rent boycott. The

they can, but it would be damn risky. If you do things like that, it must be done covertly. And I have never heard of a committee doing something covertly." What the officials did not mention, however, is that all participants in the NSMS must take an oath of secrecy, which makes them subject to penalties under the Official Secrets Act.

When challenged about the role of the JMC's in parliament, General Malan insisted they have no executive powers. But while the JMC's have no officially-authorized budget, they do not seem hampered by lack of funds.

At a mini-JMC meeting in Bonteheuwel, newly-recruited teachers and a priest were told "money is no object" in implementing their policies.



The state has learnt some new tricks since the township uprisings. The State's security strategists have identified that economic grievances were often the spark igniting political unrest. Now, state strategy aims to short-circuit political resistance in "hot-spot" areas by removing the most burning economic grievances. Major General Wandrag, of SAP Riot Control, pointed to the potential for this in a presentation to the Institute for Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria: "School boycotts in black townships in Pietermaritzburg were brought to an end more by paying attention to the grievances of schoolchildren. A major grievance was lack of textbooks. A small capital outlay in good time could have saved the state and the department millions of rands. "The misappropriation of school fees also causes parents and children to be up in arms against the department. If the department concerned exercised better control over teachers and headmasters, this would contribute significantly towards a decrease in riots and disorder among black youth." Maj Gen Wandrag also argues: "The outcome of this struggle will not be

## Key townships targetted for upgrading

determined by weapons alone. If this had been the case, I would not have any fears, because the communists are bent upon avoiding military confrontation. "They prefer to foment domestic grievances - real as well as imagined - and to instigate the country's inhabitants to full scale insurrection and revolution. "The only way to render the enemy powerless is to nip revolution in the bud, by ensuring there is no fertile soil in which the seeds of the revolution can germinate." To nip revolution in the bud, the state plans to pour resources into upgrading key townships. Alexandra, Mamelodi and New Brighton have been targetted as "hot-spots", because of the depth of resistance and strenght of structures of people's power built by these communities. The process of upgrading goes hand in hand with a massive security force presence, and ongoing assaults on democratic organisation. General Malan believes local-level upgrading will stem the

demand for political rights. "The big question is how many black people are actually only interested in their own material needs - housing, food, work opportunities, clothes, bread and butter, and so on. There are actually only a few that are really concerned with political participation. I think that for the masses in SA, democracy is not a relevant factor. They are just concerned with meeting their own material needs." The state's attempt to buy off political demands with economic upgrading is being devised and implemented through the National Security Management System. While the NSMS strategy means a dramatic increase in the state's contribution to the costs of social reproduction, the security forces still rule the townships through the barrel of a gun. NSMS upgrading is aimed at boosting discredited local authorities, and goes hand in hand with the vicious destruction of democratic organisations. In this context, it seems unlikely that alleviating

short-term material grievances will win hearts and minds, or remove the issue of political rights from the agenda. The NSMS also has some limits on its finance. The state cannot simply shrug off its R36 billion foreign debt or its commitment to police and defence spending. But while the NSMS strategy needs massive financial support from the private sector, the co-operation of capital is not guaranteed at this point. Being identified with the NSMS and apartheid is increasingly considered a bad risk with low returns, by sectors of the business community. According to one researcher, the state hopes that taxes from the Regional Services Councils will help make up the shortfall. As RSCs are established and consolidated, so it is anticipated that JMC's will also operate from this base. Through them, JMC's will be able to offer deals to business, through which they gets private sector aid for upgrading, in return for awarding lucrative contracts, and agreements on deregulation and privatisation.

## Three case studies in social control

### Alexandra

JMC strategy in Alexandra township is held up as the model for Mini-JMC's nationally. Alexandra is a target township because of its high levels of militancy and the strength of organs of people's power, in the form of block committees and street committees.

When the Alexandra Town Council collapsed in April 1986, these structures became the *de facto* local government. Alexandra also built advanced levels of unity between organised workers and the youth - identified by the ANC as the two "most revolutionary sectors." Phase one of the mini-JMC strategy was to crush democratic structures in Alexandra, through security

force action. Many local youth, civic, street committee and trade union activists are on trial for treason, or in detention. Troops still occupy the township, and there have been seal-and search operations, roadblocks, the installation of high-mast street lighting, and the use of "World War Two" searchlights to light up the township from nearby high ground. The security sub-committee in Alexandra meets every 24 hours to plan its next move. Alongside the security committee are the Social and Economic subcommittee (SEM-Kom) and the Communication subcommittee (KOM-Kom). According to a confidential briefing by Major General C J Lloyd in March last year,

the three are linked under Lt Gen K G Kukard of the S A police at Randburg who chairs the mini-JMC. Chair of SEM-Kom is Steve Burger, who also happens to be the government-appointed Administrator of Alexandra. Through him, the SEM-Kom controls a R90 million urban renewal programme, to be completed by 1990. KOM-Kom keeps residents informed and seeks their co-operation. It distributes cartoons depicting the "comrades" as the "bad guys" in the guise of rats, who say and do stupid things, while the "good guy", called Alex, is a friendly sensible fellow. The mini-JMC reports to the Johannesburg sub-JMC, whose boundaries correspond to those of the Witwatersrand command,

which in turn reports to the national State Security Council working committee, chaired by the Deputy Minister of Law and Order, Roelf Meyer. The Alexandra mini-JMC has a Community Liaison Forum that meets with private enterprise, the local authorities and community groups in the Alexandra town hall. In 1985, private enterprise took the upgrading of Alexandra into its own hands, with the establishment of the Alexandra Development Fund. The Urban Foundation's upgrading model was followed, and money was raised from local capital. Its board was made up of Alex community councillors, with Sam Buti, Mayor of Alexan-

*continued over*



## Case studies

*continued*

dra, as its figurehead. It is likely that local capital is now co-operating with the JMC, being drawn in on an ad-hoc basis.

### Bonteheuwel

In Bonteheuwel, the JMC is trying to undercut UDF-affiliated organisation.

Bonteheuwel is a working class "coloured" area. Intensive street battles with the security forces were fought when the State of Emergency was introduced in Cape Town in 1985.

Detention swoops and house to house raids continue, but there is a notable change of state tactics in Bonteheuwel. Street lights are up, trees have been planted, roads paved, drainage installed, and sports facilities

upgraded. There are also plans to build a day-hospital and an old-age home.

The Bonteheuwel Civic Association first became aware of the new tactic in June 1986. In an interview in New Era, a Bonteheuwel Civic Association

activist said: "Some school principals, teachers, a social worker and some church officials were called to a meeting by Major Kotze, (an SAP Station Commander) to discuss the school situation. They were

asked to find out what the students wanted, and how the schools could be improved," a Civic Association activist said. The local Labour Party MP, and police and army officials were also at the meeting.

At later meetings, participants heard that the government was willing to improve township conditions.

"They were told that they now had money, they could plan anything. Money wouldn't be a problem."

Demands of organisation are being met, and organisations have had to respond. "These improvements are things that our organisations and the

people have wanted and have been fighting for since 1981." But Pat McKenzie, the Labour Party MP, was getting all the credit. At

first, the improvements were rejected. But now they are being claimed as victories, on the basis that without the militant struggles of the last two years, they would not be happening.

"From the feedback we get from the community, we found that people are not fooled. The Labour Party gave out

food parcels in Kreefsgat, the poorest section of Bonteheuwel, but when we went there, people

said "OK, fine, we'll go to Pat McKenzie for food parcels and houses, but that doesn't mean we support his party."

However, UDF activists in Bonteheuwel fear the implica-

tions of this new tactic. But if it had been implemented before 1984, the problems would have been worse. However, the anti-tri-cameral election campaign in 1984, and the experiences at the hands of the security forces in the State of Emergency have created a strong base of politicisation in their community.

However, consolidation of organisation remains very difficult. "Repression has made it almost impossible to hold mass meetings. Even house meetings and door-to-door work has been made more difficult - 200 police reservists have been settled in different streets to report on political activities.

"In one section, they even went door-to-door to ask people to be informers ... We will be in trouble if we don't consolidate. If we can't consolidate that mood of militancy, and solidify the people's support in organisation, we can't prevent the JMC's from pulling the mat from under our feet."

### Atlantis

According to PFP researcher, James Selfe, the JMC dealing with the West Cape township of Atlantis believed the residents' association was "creating a revolutionary climate." The JMC's counter-strategy included the organisation of food parcels for the hungry, and soccer tours for the children. KOM-Kom organ-

ised pamphlets and newspaper coverage to publicise this, and SEM-Kom ensured that discredited politicians from the Coloured Management Committee were seen at the forefront, and were given credibility.

### UDF attacks Thatcher

The United Democratic Front has objected in advance any visit by British prime minister Margaret Thatcher to South Africa, reports a correspondent in Natal.

Indications that she would corner imprisoned African National Congress leader were relaxed were missed this week by UDF co-president Archie Gumede. Thatcher indicated she was looking for a gesture from the South African government to justify such a trip.

"Mrs Thatcher's call is a headache. Even after Mr Mandela has been released from prison she would not be welcome by us", he said.

"We cannot understand her attitude towards those in exile who are supporters of sanctions against Pretoria government", he added.

### S.African award for Chilean

South Africa has decorated the outgoing Chilean military attaché, Fritz Ladevig for promoting relations between the two countries, according to reports.

Ladevig was given the Order of Good Hope class three by the South African army chief Gen. Liebenberg. Last month it was revealed that a Chilean army officer wanted by the US in connection with the assassination of a South African administrative councillor in Pretoria from 1985 until last May.

According to the Johannesburg newspaper *Business Day*, a Chilean military officer suspected of involvement in the disappearance of 14 Cuban left wing political figures in 1966 had also served in Pretoria.

Southscan Ltd, PO Box 724, London N16 5RZ, England. Telex: 933524 GEONET G (Box:Geo2:Southnews)  
US: Electronic address 718 852 2662 (full duplex 300/1200 baud 8-N-1)

ISSN 0952-7524

Subscriptions (cheques payable to Southscan):  
UK/Europe - Institutions £85; Individuals £30 (sterling or equivalent)  
US/Canada - institutions \$150; Individuals \$50 (includes access to database)

Copyright reserved in all countries



# AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL

## CONTENTS

- MOZAMBIQUE/SOUTH AFRICA: THE SPECIAL FORCES BEHIND RENAMO
- BURKINA FASO: MORE TROUBLE AHEAD
- WEST AFRICA: THE MEN OF POWER
- FRANCE: PRESIDENT OF AFRICA
- POINTERS: SOUTH AFRICA/IRAN, GHANA, ALGERIA, SUDAN, MALAWI, ZAIRE

## Mozambique/South Africa: The Special Forces behind RENAMO

The 28 November attack on a civilian motor convoy travelling on the main highway north from Maputo brings to some 400 the number of travellers killed on the same stretch of road in RENAMO attacks in two months. Shortly before, in July, occurred a massacre of 400 civilians at Homoine. RENAMO has stepped up its use of atrocity as a deliberate tactic since mid-1987. It is hard to escape the conclusion that this has been done for political reasons, with the approval of the South African military men who control RENAMO.

Hundreds of miles to the west, near Bulawayo in Zimbabwe, the 26 November massacre of a white missionary community marks another atrocity, whose authorship is unclear. The killers are most likely to have been Ndebele dissidents opposed to the Harare government. But some people in Harare have alleged that the attack was the work of 'Super-ZAPU', diehard opponents who are supported by South Africa. They have no connection with Joshua Nkomo. And it is true that South African support for 'Super-ZAPU' has increased since May 1987. The terrible example of RENAMO shows just how formidable a weapon sponsored destabilisation can be. It is cheap, easy to run, and deniable.

The common denominator in both RENAMO and 'Super-ZAPU' is their relationship with South African military intelligence and Special Forces. Despite South African denials, there is abundant evidence that RENAMO is run by South Africa, as George Shultz and Dr Chester Crocker of the United States government have both accepted. Crocker describes RENAMO's current position as 'primarily the work of outsiders - South Africans and private Portuguese elements'.

South Africa recruits and trains RENAMO fighters and supplies them by air, sea and land. South African Special Forces sabotage experts undertake missions inside Mozambique which are beyond RENAMO's technical competence, and these are then attributed to RENAMO.

Some observers consider that South Africa's purpose in sponsoring RENAMO is to leave Mozambique in a state of chaos rather than to instal

RENAMO as a 'friendly' government. Hence it is important for Pretoria to prevent RENAMO from becoming enmeshed in negotiations with the Maputo government, as some RENAMO supporters - and also the Mozambican bishops - have been urging. However if RENAMO succeeds in cutting Mozambique's transport links, as it is attempting, it is hard to see how the Maputo government can avoid negotiation of some sort.

RENAMO in the field consists of a number of independent war-bands of whom the leader is Afonso Dhlakama. Many leaders are deserters from the army of the Maputo government or its guerrilla precursor. Relations between field commanders like Dhlakama and the South African and Portuguese backers of the movement are ensured by exiled Mozambicans operating out of Malawi, Kenya and South Africa (AC Vol 28 No 6).

The key to RENAMO's political and even military strategy is to be found in the South African security establishment, in particular at military intelligence headquarters, at Special Forces' headquarters in Voortrekkerhoogte near Pretoria, and in the operations room of Five Reconnaissance Regiment at Phalaborwa in the eastern Transvaal.

South Africa's Special Forces are now one of the dominant factors in the geopolitics of southern Africa. Their task is to run South Africa's secret wars using techniques of clandestine activity first developed by the Portuguese authorities in colonial Angola and perfected in colonial Rhodesia. Only in Angola itself have external operations been entrusted to South Africa's conventional forces (AC Vol 28 No 23). In effect the Special Forces are the operational arm of South African military intelligence, which wrested control of the secret service establishment in the early 1980s after a protracted struggle with its civilian counterpart the National Intelligence Service, formerly known as the Bureau of State Security (BOSS).

RENAMO has been so successful that it is perceived by some as a genuine liberation movement. It has acquired the support of Ndauspeakers in central Mozambique and eastern Zimbabwe who are



dissatisfied with their governments. In the case of Mozambique, now in a state of advanced decay, others join RENAMO simply to avoid starvation. In Ndauspeaking areas RENAMO can count on the cooperation of local chiefs and of the important spirit mediums who provide the blessing of the ancestors.

The fact remains that, according to South African sources, RENAMO's logistical nerve-centre is at Phalaborwa, the garrison-town on the edge of the Kruger National Park which is the home of Five Recce, the South African Special Forces unit which runs RENAMO. It is in the plantations around Phalaborwa that RENAMO recruits are trained. It is here, and in Special Forces' headquarters at Voortrekkerhoogte, that supplies are organised. And it is from here that Five Recce commandos travel to Mozambique themselves for sophisticated sabotage jobs. They receive support from the air bases at Louis Trichardt and Hoedspruit and the electronic eavesdropping centre at Maripскоп.

The Special Forces, some 5,000 strong, form an autonomous unit under Major-General K. van der Waal. Their last commandant, Major-Gen. André 'Cat' Liebenberg, went on to become army chief, a position he still holds. Each of the five existing reconnaissance regiments has its own commandant, normally of the rank of lieutenant-colonel. Each has its own headquarters although there are also Special Forces detachments at operational outposts like Rundu in the Caprivi Strip, and permanently stationed with Dr Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces in Angola.

The Special Forces have to operate with the maximum of discretion, so as not to embarrass the Pretoria government. The importance of their task, and the secrecy required to do it, gives the Special Forces a great deal of power. They have become so influential as to mount clandestine operations as far afield as Britain, where a South African spy ring was run by a Special Forces officer, Major Johann Niemoller, formerly of Five Recce (AC Vol 28 No 22). Niemoller had earlier helped to negotiate a secret treaty with a sovereign government, of the Seychelles, in 1982.

Another telling illustration of the Special Forces' considerable operational autonomy was in October 1987. Wim Holtes, executive director of the South African Trade Organisation, had urged foreign shippers with goods destined for South Africa to unload at Maputo after floods in Natal had cut the railway line from Durban to Johannesburg. Twice in the next few days Special Forces saboteurs working alone or with RENAMO destroyed bridges on the main South Africa to Maputo railway line, in one case within five kilometres of the border. South African cooperation with Maputo may appeal to businessmen, but it is not part of the military plan.

#### THE RHODESIA CONNECTION

The vital component of the Special Forces, in regard to operations in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, is veterans of the Rhodesian Special Forces and the Selous Scouts. In 1979-80 Rhodesian units moved to

South Africa en masse and were incorporated into South Africa's Special Forces under the command of South African officers. Some, like Selous Scout commander **Ron Reid-Daly**, did not like their new masters and eventually moved on to take up posts in the homelands. Today Five Recce, whose prime task is to run RENAMO, is composed of about 750 people including about 500 blacks. They include former Selous Scouts and former troopers of Bishop **Abel Muzorewa's** personal guard, many of them Ndebele-speakers. There are also many ex-Mozambican Portuguese. The unit has air, sea and land specialists and its own medical and sabotage experts, so it is well suited to combined operations.

Five Recce is not the only Special Forces unit used in support of RENAMO and, reportedly, for undercover work in Zimbabwe. One such is the unit led by Col. **Breytenbach**, a brother of the well-known poet **Breyten Breytenbach**. This unit formerly worked with Rhodesian security forces under the label of E-squadron. It is based at Louis Trichardt. Thirty-one battalion, an irregular unit of the South African Defence Force like its sister-unit 32 'Buffalo' battalion in Angola, contains many Zulus and is based at Duku Duku.

Other recce units contain British, US and Australian mercenaries. They have been known to train with foreign special forces including Israeli and Italian. South African Special Forces' training school is in Durban.

Special Forces' units and military intelligence officers charged with the task of external destabilisation circulate documents on a 'need-to-know' basis, and appear not to inform civilian politicians of much of their work. Nevertheless some documentary evidence has emerged. The biggest haul is the documents found at Gorongosa in central Mozambique in 1985, when Mozambican and Zimbabwean forces overran RENAMO headquarters there. These revealed the extent of RENAMO training and supply in South Africa. In 1984 a white South African army conscript, **Roland Hunter**, leaked secret documents to the African National Congress (ANC), which in turn passed them to the Maputo authorities. Hunter was working as personal assistant to Col. **van Niekerk**, a military intelligence officer who worked with Special Forces in Namibia and Mozambique. Among documents which Hunter copied and passed to the ANC was a complete list of Special Forces personnel and details of their order of battle. At that time military intelligence had four departments concerned with external destabilisation, one each devoted to Angola, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Mozambique.

South African agents captured in Mozambique confirm these connections. **Jaime Mondlane**, a Mozambican national captured in March 1987, claimed to have been recruited to South African military intelligence while he was working in South Africa and to have worked as an interpreter to Maj. **André van Rooyen**, recruiting for RENAMO. He was introduced to Afonso Dhlakama at Nelspruit army base. Another man captured in Maputo, allegedly on a sabotage mission, was **George Alerson**, an Angolan-born member of a South African Special Forces unit.

Evidence concerning destabilisation in Zimbabwe




was made public during the trials of members of Super-ZAPU in Zimbabwe. They described having been trained by Major Calloway, a former Special Branch officer working for the South African Military Intelligence Directorate. He ran a training camp in the Mona Hills near Messina and supplied weapons to the Super-ZAPU people.

Some sources in Harare claim that the Bulawayo massacre of 26 November was perpetrated by a Super-ZAPU force led by Morgan 'Gayigusu' Sango, part of a band infiltrated into Zimbabwe from South Africa in October. However, no South African connection can be regarded as proven.

Super-ZAPU is hardly a significant force at present, but the example of RENAMO is a worrying one. Since RENAMO's expulsion from its Malawian bases in late 1986 (AC Vol 28 No 23), the light-armed and mobile RENAMO fighters have changed their sphere of operation. They are at present operating in two main theatres. One group, supplied from the Transvaal, is active in Gaza Province. Another is now infesting Inhambane, attempting to cut off Maputo from the rest of the country. A northern contingent, supplied by South African air-drops from the Comoro Islands as well as by sea, is operating in Niassa and Nampula Provinces and threatening the previously peaceful Cabo Delgado. French intelligence sources, reported in the *Indian Ocean Newsletter*, have confirmed South Africa's use of the Comoros as a base. Mozambican government forces have captured parachutes of US manufacture which, they say, are of a type supplied to South Africa. Eye-witnesses along the Mozambican coast testify to boat-landings as well. In recent operations in the south RENAMO units have been well-equipped and well-armed, much better than their ragged FRELIMO opposite numbers.

RENAMO always use Eastern bloc arms. Some of these they capture from FRELIMO. Others are supplied by South Africa from stocks captured in Angola. South Africa is also known to have purchased Eastern bloc arms directly from Rumania.

RENAMO itself was invented by the Portuguese secret police in colonial Mozambique, along lines pioneered in Angola by the colonial security chief Dr São José Lopes. It was perfected by the Rhodesian intelligence chief, the late Ken Flower, as what he used to call a 'pseudo-terrorist' unit, to report on the activities of ZANLA guerrillas operating out of Mozambique. In the Rhodesian establishment RENAMO liaised with the Selous Scouts, a dangerously maverick unit which was not above carrying out massacres which it could then attribute to its ZANLA and ZIPRA enemies.



⊕ Air bases used by South Africa in logistical support for RENAMO

All these relationships now find themselves reproduced on a larger and more dangerous scale in South African clandestine operations. The relationship between Five Recce at Phalaborwa and the RENAMO warlords is one which has existed unbroken for some 12 years, often involving exactly the same people on each side. The question to be asked is whether the South African military establishment is out of control ●