South Africa

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AN OLD friend wandered into my office last week clutching a batch of secret Broederbond documents dealing with impending constitutional changes and with proposals for a bill of rights. Among them is one which suggests that _ when President de Klerk decided to -order his $a\200\234$ expert study $a\200\235$ of possible constitutional models for South Africa, he already knew very well what answers he wanted. : : As it happens, I am something of an amateur authority on Broederbond papers, having worked closely with Ivor Wilkins and Hans Strydom on the massive leak of documents which led to the publication of their bestselling book, The SuperAfrikaners. I still have a box of fading membership lists under the bed.

Woefully ignored

The Wilkins-Strydom papers, woe-fully ignored by academic writers and historians (presumably because they were first published in the successful Sunday Times), gave advance notice of the constitutional and political changes that were to follow in the Eigh-

ties. The tricameral system, for example, was essentially a Broederbond idea thrashed out during the chairmanships of Wimpie de Klerk (the man who gave such a celebrated outline of policy to the DP founding congress), and Gerrit Viljoen, who now presides over constitutional reform. The latest documents â\200\224 I have no doubt they aregenuine â\200\224 show that the

Tuesday, September 26, 1989

Nesaw WiTess

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Broederbond has conducted a similar pathfinding operation for the planned constitutional changes of the Nineties.

My friend is incensed because he be-

lieves that the Broederbonders who

have assumed prominence in the DP \hat{a} 200\224 co-leader Wynand Malan, and his economics adviser Sampie Terreblanche \hat{a} 200\224 must have known what the Broeders of the National Party were planning before the election.

Only cultural?

He says the documents make nonsense of their claims shortly before the election that the Broederbond was $a\200\224$ wait for it! $a\200\224$ nothing but a cultural organisation. In fact, the documents show that as late as last June the Broe-

. derbond was most certainly a political

planning organisation, deeply immersed in the problems ing out a bill of rights and a new constitution. .

An early version of the constitutional

guidelines in my collection strugglesâ\200\231

with unfamiliar concepts of freedom, using rather quaint terminology to demand protection for at least the following rights: freedom of religion and worship, freedom of speech, freedom of privacy (sic), freedom of association,

freedom of political participation, :

freedom to form political parties, freedom of movement, free access to the courts (vrye toegang tot regbank), freedom of language and cultural behaviour, including the right to mother-lan-

guage education, and freedom of

chools o

property ownership. A later version, distributed to Broeders less than three months before the election and leaked at the time by the right wing, follows the more sophisticated proposals for a bill of rights which had in the meantime been published by the Law Commission.

Personally, I am happy to leave it to Broederbonders in the DP to reconcile, as best they can, their support for one political party while bound by solemn oaths to a secret organisation which pursues different aims. What interests me is how the Broederbond ideas fit \(\hat{a}\)200\224 or don\(\hat{a}\)200\231t fit \(\hat{a}\)200\224 the thinking displayed in the Law Commission\(\hat{a}\)200\234the right of every

person or group to disassociate \hat{a} 200\235 from other groups or individuals.

While the Law Commission recognises the right to $a\200\234$ disassociate $a\200\235$, and backs it up with the right to privacy, protection against arbitrary arrest or invasion of one $a\200\231$ s property, and so forth, itdoes add an essential qualification:

No public funds

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ Provided that if such disassociation constitutes discrimination on the

ground of race, colour, religion, language or culture, no public or state

funds shall be granted directly or indirectly to promote the interests of the person who or group which so discrimi-

 $a\200\230$ nates. $a\200\235$ In other words, you can have

your own school provided you pay for it. Perhaps you can even have your own, exclusive town, provided you donâ\200\231t col-

!ect any rates or taxes. It \hat{a} 200\231s an interestingidea.

The Broederbond plan gives the matter quite a different twist (which may explain why President de Klerk shows such an alarming reluctance to endorse the work of the Law Commission, and why he wants more studies done). I am reluctant to cite clause numbers from the documents because the Broederbond uses numbering codes to trace leaks, and I have been

- caught out before, but I translate:

Group context !

â\200\234The association of individuals within the groups for which constitutional provision is made must be voluntary. The right of individuals to associate within a group context (my italics) is therefore recognised and protected, Just like the rights of individuals who do not wish to associate within particulargroups.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ The right of a group to determine whether an individual is a member

| must also be taken into account. It is important for the Afrikaner that he, alone or in combination with other groups with whom he wishes to associate, is entitled to protection.â\200\235

The Broederbond sets the goal of

establishing a unique constitutional
 model which will provide for the creation of units (deeleenhede), which may

be either groups or geographical areas.

1 Every in@ividual will, besides enjoying constitutional protection of his own Ja^200^234 rights, have theiright to participate / s

by Ken Owe.n

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effectively, but within the context of

- his unit, in all government decisions

that affect him.

This constitutional model incorporates certain assumptions: firstly, each unit will have maximum recognition and autonomy; matters of common interest will be decided on the basis of consensus.

Secondly, the division between authority over the autonomous interests of the unit, and authority over common

-interests must be firmly entrenched.

Constitutional court

Thirdly, where conflict arises between the unit and the common interest, the issue must be decided by a constitutional court (or similar body).

Fourthly, each unit will be entitled to decide for itself the character and nature of its own internal government institutions.

Fifthly, group participation in both legislative and executive functions of the central (common affairs) government must be protected. There must be provision for consensus in common affairs, and autonomy in the $a\geq 00\geq 34$ own affairs $a\leq 00\leq 35$ of each unit.

That, in short, is the hidden agenda. It will be interesting in the coming months to see which school of thought prevails: the Law Commissionâ\200\231s universality of rights, or the Broederbondâ\200\231s sectional obsessions. The decision lies with Broeders De Klerk, Viljoen, and the rest of the Cabinet.

® Ken Qwen is the editqr'of Business Day.

rebels of celebrations of guese rule. the Mozambican ties would know fi ag children of our ictory over the :rmyrywas _due \hat{a} \200\234around Frelimo. exercise «It is through achieve a stron; ine democracy, tured grou missiles. Chissang repeats, 2 GEP offer fg, S A4 bican MAPUTO \hat{a} \200\224 Mozam . President Joaquim Cmtesd sano yesterday repea his offer to integrate In society repentant Renamo rebels. J A He was speaking at start of a military garqde, that marked the hig iversary of the start of :::zmbigeâ\200\231s war forrtmdependence from Portu- $0 \sin 201$ essed that nsform all Mozamb -tc:m}includh}g those now He said Mozambiqueâ\200\231s i t «]t is due to Frelimo tha | we won the battles and cre-

o b a $ma\200\231$.

: ::ï¬\201 ican family, so_that

 \hat{a} 200\230| the Mozambican gredp e uld i wer.

lâ\200\231otl'ne Fre-

limo Party that we will

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ We, the armed ces are here to say no to division, no to foreign domina-

jon, $\hat{a}\200\235$ he added. m: $\hat{a}\200\231$ fter the s h, he re; viewed a military parade o

t 1000 troops led by
::?,u companies of veterans
from the liberation war.

A selection of military equipment was driven past, including Soviet-manufac-

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Wreath

Also on display were the first armoured vehicles assembled in Mozambique.

Earlier, Chissano laid a wreath at the Monument to Mozambican Heroes while Fernando Ganhao, of the standing commission of the Mozambican parliament, the Peopleâ\200\231s Assembly,

read a decree from the committee attributing honours and awards to Mozam-~ bican and foreign citizens.

The committee awarded

the late President Samora Machel the Order of Friendship and Peace, first class.:

The posthumous award of the Order of Friendship and Peace, second class, was granted to all 34 people who died with Machel on October 19 1986. The nine survivors also received this award, as did a number of foreign citizens, including the executive secretary of the OAU Liberation Committee, Tanzanian Brig Hashim Mbita, and member of the British House of Lords Tony Gifford, who has been prominent in solidarity â\200\230work for Mozambique in

Saboteurs hit

Maputo lines

MAPUTO â\200\224 Sabotage knocked out the electrical power supply to the Mozambican capital during the weekend and the city was being supplied by a back-up coal and oil-fueled station yesterday, the state electric company announced. The sabotage occurred at about 7.15pm on Saturday on transmission lines carrying electricity from SA to Maputo, said a statement to the national news agency, AIM. It said the saboteurs attacked the lines about 25kms west of Maputo. AIM said electricity transmission lines from SA were last sabotaged on the

night of August 22. $a\200\224$ Sapa- e i apa

Britain for over 20 years. \hat{a} 200\224 ANO. \hat{a} \200\230

RESIDENT Truman is re-

puted to have instructed
his Secretary of State,
George Marshall (he of the
" plan): â\200\234You tell me about the

world; I'll tell you about Ameri--

can politics and what will fly.â\200\235 James Baker, the current secretary, .could use a little of the same advice from George Bush.

Last Tuesday, before he left town

to spend the weekend with Soviet

Foreign Minister Eduard Schevardnadze in Wyomingâ\200\231s cowboy country,
Baker was asked to respond to criticisms by Senate majority leader
- George Mitchell that the administration seemed a little tentative in figuring out what to do now that the old
East-West calculus no longer provided any simple answers.
â\200\234Let me address it this way,â\200\235 the
secretary shot back. â\200\234When the

president of the US is rocking along

with a 70% approval rating on his handling of foreign policy, and I were the leader of the opposition party, I might have something similar to say. \hat{a} 200235

The Washington hive has swarmed on this remark as proof that Baker is more concerned with his administrationa\200\231s immediate politica] fortunes than with thinking through what is happening in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, much less with developing strategies to meet the opportunities and dangers thereby presented. The hive, for once, is right.

In stark contrast to most of his recent predecessors â\200\224 Gerald Fordâ\200\231s Henry Kissinger, Jimmy | Carterâ\200\231s Cyrus Vance, Ronald Reaganâ\200\231s Alexander Haig and George Shultz, Baker, at heart, is a politician a^200^24 a a^200^24 fixer a^200^25 , as Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher declared when she first met him in his new role earlier this year. Managing political campaigns is what he excels at and what he apparently continues to be doing for Bush even as is he is supposed to be acting as the latter \hat{a} 200\231s chief diplomat. He may even be doing a little managing on his own account. His presidential ambitions are widely

known.

The art of the modern American

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Itâ\200\231s image-building
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SIMON BARBER in Washington

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political campaign is principally the art of identifying and avoiding problems while manipulating imagery and circumstance in such a way as to instantly gratify the voter. Expedience and the short term are all that matter. The skills and aptitudes required are very different from those $a\200\230$ needed, say, to mediate a settlement that gets the Cubans out of Angola and brings independence to Namibia or, much more importantly, to confront creatively the ideological melt $a\200\230$ down of the Soviet empire. Such things are beyond the scope of a mere political mechanic, however deft he may be. : If you were to play word associations with Baker, the first thing he would say if you mentioned SA would be $\hat{a}\200\234$ trouble $\hat{a}\200\235$. One can be quite certain of this because it is almost precisely what he did say when the subject came up at a Press conference last week. Virtually the first words out of his mouth were $a\200\234$ We caught a little flak \hat{a} 200\235 for \hat{a} 200\234congratulating \hat{a} \200\235 President F W de Klerk on his eleva-

tion. We did? Not to my knowledge,

unless you count the slightly queru-

lous manner of the journalists who

asked State Department spokesman Margaret Tutwiler to enlarge upon the post-election statement.

This says a lot about how Baker thinks. His habit of mind is primarily

defensive and narrowly tactical. When obliged to consider SA, the question he asks himself is not what

 $a\200\230$ is happening down there, how do we

see it playing out over the next

. decade or what opportunities pre-

sent themselves for our becoming usefully engaged. His instinct, as he suggested at the Press conference in aâ\200\231 different context, is simply to avoid doing anything â\200\234dumbâ\200\235, in other words, anything that might risk the presidentâ\200\231s chances of continuing to â\200\234rock alongâ\200\235 with a 70% approval rating.

This applies to the broad spectrum of foreign policy issues the administration faces. For example, in dealing with the Soviets, Baker places his highest priority on arms control. Arms control agreements play well politically. The fate of post-communist eastern Europe, a question on whose resolution the need for the arms that are to be controlled in very large measure depends, is secondary.

ith regards to SA, the Baker style means appeasing the congressional sanctions lobby because its screams flood out more moderate voices on Capitol Hill and therefore

tend to set the tone of the broader

national debate, especially since
they have the evident support of
Archbishop Desmond Tutu.;

So De Klerk is not seen. Fatuous statements are issued aping the ANC line that real dialogue cannot begin until the emergency is lifted, all parties unbanned and all political prisoners released (as though such things were not a matter for dialogue themselves). And dark official

 $\hat{a}\$ into the Press find their way into the Press

warning that the administration might try to prevent US banks from rescheduling their SA debt (a piece of uninformed foolishness, since most US banks already have). All of which may just be a sort of political body language designed to

. keep the sanctioneers happy and the

administrationâ\200\231s options open. But that is of little consolation if no strategic thinking or evaluation of consequences underlies it. And, Baker being Baker, none does.

Likewise on Angola. Here the loudest voices are those of the Unita lobby and its impressive array of congressional converts.

By any standard, it would seem in everybody $200\231$ s interest, including Jonas Savimbi $200\231$ s, to get the parties back to the negotiating table. Unita and the MPLA have both lost the war and it serves no purpose to encourage

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gain some advantage by fighting on. Accordingly, the MPLA should not be encouraged to believe US aid to Unita will be cut off, nor should Unita be permitted to conclude that it has carte blanche from Washington to prevaricate indefinitely. j Self-evident, surely, but Baker prefers to listen to Unitaâ\200\231s local fan club, even to the extent of granting an audience recently to Savimbiâ\200\231s top lobbyist, Chris Lehman, whose pleasant lifestyle now quite literally depends of the war continuing. The result? Last week, spokesman Tutwiler (incidentally, one of Ba-

- kerâ\200\231s inner circle) issued a statement

firmly opposing $a\200\234$ integration $a\200\235$ as the means of achieving a settlement and demanding instead $a\200\234$ free and fair elections $a\200\235$.

This is the equivalent of the US having publicly stated at the start of last year that the only accepable basis for an agreement on Cuban troop withdrawal and Namibian independence would have been a 12month Cuban departure schedule. Such details were up to the parties to decide, and ultimately they reached their own compromise, as it happens one the US was not entirely happy with. Chester Crocker would have preferred a withdrawal timetable a few months shorter that the 27 months finally agreed upon. However, as he was a mediator, it was not his call.

Baker, by contrast, seems to believe that the critical details of a settlement between Unita and the MPLA are his call if that is what those he has identified as the key political constituency on the issue so demand. In making that call $a\200\224$ free elections, no integration $a\200\224$ he apparently has no notion, or even interest,

- in what a real settlement might look

like. The truth of the matter is that there will almost certainly be integration. How else to describe a division between the parties of the state $200\231$ s spoils? Nor will this division take place via the polling booth. To think otherwise is a tasteless joke.

But then the fact that US foreign policy is being run as if it were a permanent presidential campaign is a tasteless joke, too. $\hat{a}\200\230$ We mean business $\hat{a}\200\231$ $\hat{a}\200\224$ State President Mr F W de Klerk.

By Garner Thomson, The Star Bureau LONDON â\200\224 The State President, Mr F W de Klerk, has played down reports that he is ready to release Mr Nelson Mandela within the next few months.

But he pledged that public protest would continue to be allowed in South Africa $a\200\224$ as long as it took place $a\200\234$ within the law $a\200\235$.

. NOTANISSUE

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ In a wide-ranging interview with the

BBC's southern Africa correspondent,

James Robbins, Mr de Klerk said Mr

Mandela himself had said his release was

De Klerk -

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plays down

b TR Q35

Mandela release stories

 $a\200\234$ not an issue $a\200\235$ at the moment.

Mr de Klerk added that statements by his Ministers on Mr Mandelaâ $\200\231s$ future had been misunderstood.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ The question of Mr Mandelaâ\200\231s role is a very delicate one which needs constant attention and which is receiving constant attention, $\hat{a}\200\235$ he said.

The timing of the release would $a\200\234$ definitely not $a\200\235$ be decided at the meeting of his Cabinet tomorrow.

The interview, broadcast here on both the BBCâ\200\231s evening newscast and more fully on Newsnight, did, however, suggest that Mr de Klerk accepted both Mr Mandelaâ\200\231s release, in principle at least, and the

4 need for accelerated change in South Afri-Vel

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ Time is of the essence and therefore we are not playing games when we raise xpectations, $\hat{a}\200\235$ he said. $\hat{a}\200\234$ We mean business.

We mean to live up to the reasonable expectations which we have created. $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 35$ Newsnight $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 31$ s later analysis of the interview reported the growing suspicion among opponents of the Government that Mr de Klerk's much-publicised liberal ap-

proach was already toughening up $\hat{a}\200\224$ and that he was offering not negotiations but only consultations.

But in the interview, given yesterday afternoon, the President said: â\200\2340ur vision of the future is that in the new South Africa no one group should dominate another.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ We should not have simple majority rule where minorities can be dominated, tl?end w%gnhould definitely discontinue the situation where a minority actually finds itself in a domm& position. $\hat{a}\200\235$

to an $a\200\234$ improved $a\200\235$ climate for negotiation, a smiling and o!1:timis-tic-sounding President claimed: $a\200\234$ It is as if there $a\200\231$ s a realisation among thinking South Africans, i of race or colour, that really the i $\201\201$ conflict

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lace jps law, was not much-S \hat{A} ¢'ise in protest- i point being made had alred. v

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â\200\230that all South Africans must get the vote, all South Africans must become part of the decision-making process, all South Africans must have a fair share in the economy and a fair share in the power of this country. What we must do is to start talking as to how.â\200\235 @ See Page 13.

The Sunday
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Sept. 24, 1989

By ZACHARY DORSEY
Staff Writer :

 \hat{a} 200\234answer to the - , frustration of

- find a publisher. $\cdot = \cdot$

Leo Raditsa, 53, recently started his own Annapolis publishing house: Prince George Street Press.

Raditsa sent his book, $\begin{tabular}{ll} & $*\hat{a}\geq 00\geq 34\hat{a}\geq 00\geq 30$ Prisoners of a Dream: The South African Mirage," to 40 or \\ \end{tabular}$

 $a\200\234\200\230$ Some of them returned the book within 24 hours," he said.

He believes it was his conservative viewpoint that caused publishers to reject the book.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ It's a kind of a defacto censorship, $\hat{a}\200\235$ he said.

After three years of research that became the 467-page book, Raditsa formed views that do not

St. John's College _

writing a book and - not being able to -

50 publishers, and all rejected it. ,

St. John's College tutor Leo Raditsa started his own publishing ! ! house because he felt the message in his book $a\200\234$ Prisoners of a publishers who reject ed it.

Dream: The South African Mirage, â\200\235

Prince George Street Pre \tilde{A} Os founded: 10 fight \hat{a} 00\230defacto censorship \hat{a} \200\231 of book =

follow the mainstream thinking on the country.

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ Raditsa $\hat{a}\200\231$ s historical essay started as an article about 1982 Senate hearings: $\hat{a}\200\234\hat{a}\200\234$ The Role of the Soviet Union, Cuba and East Germany in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa. $\hat{a}\200\235$

The hearings were held by former Sen. Jeremiah Denton, R-Ala., then the conservative chairman of the subcommittee on Security and Terrorism. The hearings came to the attention of Raditsa at a conference sponsored by Accuracy in Media, a Washington, D.C.-based ultraconservative media watchdog.

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ (The hearings) showed that what a lot of people think is progress in South Africa is

helping the communist party, $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 31$ he said.

Raditsa says in the introduction ~

that he learned a book about South Africa needed to $a\200\230a\200\230heap$ abuse on the South African government. $a\200\235a\200\231$ He doesn't think that's just.

New York Tribune reviewer Herbert London called the book $a\200\230a\200\230a$ valiant attempt at balance in a scholarly sea tormented by waves of disillusion. $a\200\235$

The Intelligence Report, a

newsletter published by the American Bar Association and the Standing Committee on Law, also gave a favorable review.

 $a\200\234a\200\234If$ the reader of this book wants to learn about the social and political complexities that face South Africa, he has picked

By George N. Lundskow $a\200\224$ The Capital was being censored by

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Publishing company with a purpose

the right volume, " \hat{a} \200\235 said

 $_$ newsletter editor retired Adm. WG Moth - o e

 $+\hat{A}$ » Raditsa is no strangerto writing and publishing, so he had

.some understanding of what it would take to publish his book.

He is the founder of i.e., The Cambridge Review and The St. - John's Review. Raditsa also is the author of a previous book,

. $\hat{a}\200\234'$ Some Sense About Wilhelm Reich, $\hat{a}\200\235$ which was published by Philosophical Library in New York.

 ${\hat a}\200\234Why$ should everything be centered around New York? 1 think towns like Annapolis should

_have a voice and make a mark,"
he said.

With the help of Carole Cunningham, a former student and now a fellow St. Johnâ\200\231s employee, Raditsa formed his publishing house in his own home.

He used about \$16,000 of his own money to have 3,000 copies of

(See PUBLISH, Page B2)

(Continued from Page B1) the book printed by a small printer in Virginia.

Since the bookâ\200\231s release in June, Raditsa said he has already sold 1,500 copies, 1,000 to Accuracy in Media and 500 to the Conmservative Book Group.

.And he has approached four or five writers who have $\hat{a}\200\234$ important books to publish that other publishers would not touch, $\hat{a}\200\235$ he said. .

Whether or not Prince George Street Press continues to publish bookg depends on how much money the first book makes. The book has already come close to breaking even, Raditsa said.

Raditsa sees a real need for small

- . publishing companies that publish books different from those coming out of New York.
- â\200\234You need to be able to make your own opinion, â\200\235â\200\235 he said. â\200\230â\200\234Why not hear the other side? "â\200\235