ANOTHER VOICE

ELSON MANDELA in jail is likeâ\200\231

a stone in the stomach of the South African body politic â\200\224 if we donâ\200\231t cut it ott, we will go â\200\230through troublesome waters, and may even drown.

But to make that incision so that the body litic does not get inamed $\hat{a}\200\224$ therein lies the rub.

Let us go back and see where the â\200\234Free Man-delaâ\200\235 idea comes from. It has been mooted by various organisations for some time. One personality who has been pressing for it is Chief Buthelezi. But donâ\200\231t forget Kaiser Matanzima did the same.

It was the State President, however, who made it a central theme when, at the opening of Parliament last year, he said that Mandela could be released if only he would renounce violence.

In the meantime, the EPG have said it, so has Sir Geoffrey Howe on behalf of the EEC $\hat{a}\200\224$ and still nothing happens.

Why should he be released, though?

In the first place he is an old man, so there are humanitarian reasons. But also his being in jail has blocked every attempt by the Government to get black leaders to come forward and discuss a new dispensation.

And with the National Council up in the air after this week \hat{a} 200\231s NP Natal congress, it is time to again think seriously about the issue.

The Government is aware of the conundrum. Why, then, does it not call the ANCâ\200\231s bluff and release Mandela unconditionally? It is a question of face â\200\224 it has to be saved â\200\224 and also, how can he be released without it appearing as though Pretora is giving in to pressure? ° But there are other questions.

Surely, the argument

We have a play

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waiting to

open. But

while Mandela

is in jail, we canâ200231t even get

R the curtain up

runs, if Mandela is released he will hold a mass rally, there will be disorder, maybe a terrible escalation of violence, a further harsh clampdown, and matters will be worse than before.

And Mandela would be back in jail \hat{a} 200\224 this time

 \hat{a} \200\230under the emergency reg-

ulations and not because a judge sent him there.

Or Mandela could leave the country and form a

overnment-in-exile. t would be a further unacceptable development.

Or, probably worse, his safety could not be guaranteed. In the present violent situation, somebody might assassinate him and the Government would be blamed.

That is the Governmentâ\200\231s position. If, however, one accepts that it is
serious about releasing
â\200\230Mandela and getting the
National Council off the
ground and staving off the
worsening sanctions
drive, one should perhaps
stand back a little from
the problem and kick

some ideas around with other involved parties.

The other scenarios could look like this: :

In the first place, it is a miscalculation that Mandela is the most senior ANC man in jail, or that pressure is only about getting him out â\200\224 or that his release would somehow divide the ANC, because there would immediately be a power struggle between him and Oliver Tambo.

Although the lines of command are not all that clear, Mr Tambo was elected deputy to the late Albert Luthuli and is, therefore, the most senior elected ANC leader. And still is.

Also, that Nelson Mandelaâ\200\231s most â\200\234senior position was that of Transvaal chairman â\200\224 thus one of four vice-chairmen. His

. seniors are certainly Wal-

ter Sisulu, who was national chairman at the last legal ANC congress in

1959, and Govan Mbeki, ;vlho was secretary-gener-

And these last two are

in jail with Mr Mandela â\200\224 whose name has been up front because of his command at the time of his trial of the military wing of the ANC. And because the ANC focused its campaign on him, because his name was better known.

The campaign, then, is for the release of all political prisoners, Mandela being only one of them.

It is not impossible that the release could be finessed, if handled in this manner: his release, and that of his compatriots, is

_not done simply by Pre-

toria opening the gates of Pollsmoor.

The matter has first to be discussed thro a third party $a\200\224$ with Oliver Tambo? $a\200\224$ so that arrangements can be made to contain possible violence, that is assuming the ANC can control al the violence, or most of it.

It requires a third party trusted by both parties, can be done behind the

| HARALD PAKENDORF

scenes, need not become public, and a timetable of sorts should be agreed to.

The Government can .

et around its condition or Mandelaâ\200\231s release b saying that prisoners wi be released into a peace-ful atmosphere (or some similar wording), the ANC gets agreement for the prisoners to hold some public meetings in the major centres, and the prisoners then leave the country.

One would then expect | them to travel the world to make their points â\200\224 which would not be different from what the ANC is already doing. -

Then the former prison-

ers could be recalled to Lusaka for consultation with the external ANC and come back into South Africa to operate here much in the manner in which Mrs Mandela does.

Make no mistake, all of this means that the Government will have spoken to the ANC. But also that the ANC will have had dealings with the Govern ment.:

And also that the ANC will, in fact, have an internal wing which, while not legalised in form, will be so in practice. And it will mean that a whole new political game will have started.

A risky one, true, but running the risk of not doing it has so far meant an increase in lawlessness, in sanctions and a deepening of the South African crisis. -

Not only that, but the Mandela issue has bedevilled any chance of a consultative process being launched.

e need to engage the ANC in that & , not because it is the only other political actor in the play, but because it is one of the actors. And the others wonâ\200\231t come forward without the ANC.

Keeping political prisoners in jail has stopped the play from opening at all. Another look at the whole issue is seriously needed if any real negotiations about a viable future constitution are to get off the ground.

SUNDAY TIMES, August 17 1988

Sunday Times

THE PAPER FOR THE PEOPLE

Yes, but is this.

f

all were geti¬\201ng?'

RESIDENT BOTHA this week

repeated his celebrated state-ment that South Africa had out-grown the outdated concept of apartheid $\hat{a}\200\224$ and then did nothing to prove it.

His address to the National Party congress raised serious questions about his will, or ability, to take the reformt programme to its logical conclusion. Where it did not actually contain backsliding overtones, it sent disquieting signals that he has no plans to move much beyond the point reached in June.:

For example, the Group Areas Act, although it is to be more $a\200\234$ flexibly $a\200\235$ applied, will stay. (When will politicians learn not to use the word $a\200\234$ never $a\200\235$?)

This odious law is the very fundament of entrenched apartheid. Any government that wishes to be taken seriously when it claims that the concept is outdated simply dare not flinch from its total abolition.

Scrapping it will not lead to overnight, mass migration of people between suburbs. Among all groups there is a tendency to gravitate to residential areas of like cultural interests and economic class. So why keep an insupportable statute which codifies in law what other societies leave to human nature and econormics?

There was, too, a stubborn commitment in Mr Bothaâ $\200\231s$ speech to the concept of group, as opposed to

individual, rights. Power, he insist-

ed, must remain divided as well as shared.

No-one can take away from the President the credit he' deserves for initiating a bold U-turn out of the cul de sac of apartheid. It would, therefore, be sad and hugely damaging to his place in history if he now funks the final steps to escape from it altogether.

Is this merely a tactical pause, or an excessively cautious response to the old, inevitable story

of the De Tocqueville dictum, that.

the most dangerous moment for a previously repressive government comes when it embarks on reform? 5

The truth is that the Govern-

ment cannot forever keep the lid on dissent and black aspirations by

declaring a never-ending state of |
emergency. If the suspension of |
civil liberty has any utility at all, it |
is a means of buying time for com- |

pletion of the reform programme. Mr Bothaâ $\200\231s$ unwillingness even

 $a\200\234$ to hint at his vision of the ultimate

future â\200\224 Is it federal? If so, how federal? And why unearth daft and discredited notions of â\200\234city statesâ\200\235 â\200\224 leaves one wondering whether such a vision exists at all. Does he have any viable plans beyond the tricameral Parliament, local government of byzantine, Heunissian complexity, and a National Statutory Council which no credible black leader will join?

1f not, we should be told. Orhave we been told?

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BY congressâ\200\231s end, théâ\200\230» -
National Party organ-*
-~ isers would have been
better advised to take!
. down the keynote â\200\234For
freedom and stabilityâ\200\235
'SUNDAY TIMES, August 17 1986
a\200\230posters from Durbana\200\231si . . o
ones. S
They should have read a\200\234So
what did you expect?\hat{a}\200\235 -
The fourth federal congress of &
the National Party this week was"
the second in a two-part drama. :
for Southern Africa.
The first part :
Sunday, May 18, this vear when'
.South- African security forces
struck symbolically at the ANC in-
Lusaka, Harare and Gaborone.
South African Defence Force: :
commandos then told the world to; -
take a running jump; mortars and - -
rockets. are local vernacular and
best understand.
This weekâ\200\231s National Party con- -
gress was Part 2.
" It dealt, however, in signals and /reform he could
ot believeing
symbols, not for the world but for
ourselves, and was couched in the
same idiom of resistance and, yes, =
truculence. It is not by chance
that President Botha made no ef-
fort to convey the most importan
parts of his message in English. ¢
A little history gives the back- !
ground to what happened (or, if \star
you are less initiated, what did
not happen) when 1 800 delegates
from the ruling party got togeth-!
er.
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Here two concepts are useful: !
one is the idea of adaptive re-
form and the other is the concept i
of fundamental reform.
Adaptive reform is what Presi- â\200\224
dent Botha is all about. It entails
changes to the basic apartheid
dogma so as to clean up some of
its grubbier elements, admit al-
lies of other races and create a ! 1
; rejected, macho
climate for further change.
ADAPTIVE
= ecsmen 6 HOW painful it
~must have been
 for him to live
withinflated
Pretoria, rightly or wrongly, be- L B
lieves it is the one our neighbours;
was scripted onâ\200\231
â\200\234 fl;brxh whereby the Government
eâ\202¬gan genuinely negotj
. about power distriby i
sis of the free
but not radical, opposition. :
It has not worked thus far, and
for many reasons. Only two are
really important,
. First, the National Party, hay-
Ing once discovered a\200\230a\200\234reforma\200\235
showed itself to be the adolescent
on the first date. It did not know
what to do. When the suitor was
responded. .
The was then un-
â\200\234Forceâ\200\235
. leashed and, much in the manner
of a bull-terrier with a firecracker-
But two things remain invie- -.tied to its tail, rushed around sa-
late: political rights must be exer-
cised through race groups, and
white (read National Party) domi-
nation must not be allowed to slip.
The dilemma is how to share
power without losing it; in pursuit
of its solution Constitution Minis-
ter Chris Heunis has burnt much
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midnight oil. The process of adaptive reform could conceivably have once lurched over into fundamental revaging almost everybody. All the opposition had to do was keep - tossing in an occasional match. Second, the radical leftwing opposition groups in this country believed, incredibly, that a little international huff and domestic puif would topple the Government. They pushed it to unconscionable lengths and the Govern-_expectations of = unwisely. MYOPIA The UDF and its cohorts still owe the nation for that unpardon-; able act of tactical myopia. : But this is all by way of history. - The point is that when President Botha came to address the fourth federal congress of the National Party this week it was a vastly different congress to the third, the one in Bloemfontein four years ago when it launched its new constitutional plans. Purified of its doubting Tho-. mases and fifth columnists, \hat{a} 200\230the party could four years ago believe in a future; a complacent Chris . Heunis could then quaff a beer in the .Pressroom knowing he had taken the party. H The delegates at this week $\hat{a}\200\231s$ conference still have faith, a touching kind, and probably more than their leadership deserves, but little vision. In recent years _ ment inevitably retaliatÃ@d sav- -- agely and, the future may prove, r their: leaders have heen saying ! and, instead, have tried. to- feel..

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\hat{a}\200\230what is going on..., - i
The process of adaptivi =
has, under the exigencies of preg-»j
sure and circumstance, speeded .:
up and the old verities have tauen; .i:
toibe E%gâ\200\230?md by semantic flatn-
lence. ormâ\200\235, through the min-
istrations of the party techno--
crats, now means whatever one:'
- hopes or fears to make of it.. .-,
- REACTIONARY
- Where the progressives would%j,
once have sought toâ\200\231 ease their;
party ttl; lrough adaptive. into fun-
damental relorm, they now:find]
S m i
the difference between a\200\234the tu
still achingly t; nde. The pr:cg'so?g
stubbed toes on- thev
¢ . crash-barriersâ\200\231 er mbyo:nmt,h;i
â\200\230confused supporters: orvi g too?
much, where to a\200\224. - agvery:
weary leader, - '-r{
ppsien ;gatperm!uspeoj_;j;
- 'cozggrl;?rilâ\200\230tr:a?sngnergjgiiba;y â\200\230
% a { <
P SO BRI,
by being nice to foreign AT
g;ent; one alio has notl;'il;zggt: fgsne
! Ing nasty i \hat{a}200\231 i
~ \xjelatio n\hat{A} y in one\hat{a}\200\231s domestic \hat{a}\200\230
The main elements 3
sketch: rehabilitation
tired old ideas of race-based ¢j
d - cit;
States, . Co-operativeâ\200\235 structurez
af:?x!;i gzitsmall{h ghetto-ised politics
e ¥S the heavy hand of se.
The upsides were left to Minis-
ters: a possible a\200\234Bill of R?&a\200\234ta\200\231ssi\201
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(whatever that may mean) and

- elections to establish black representation (watch the UDF fluff this one {oo). %

Listening to President Bothaâ\200\231s laboured delivery oneâ\200\231s sympathy lay deeper than simply for a sore throat. How painful it must have been -over the past two years to live with the inflated rhetoric and expectations of a reform in which he could never believe and had, in all truth, never sought to propagate.:

In party quarters it has long been said, sometimes maliciously by Transvalers, that President Bothaâ\200\231s interests were always parochial: get the coloureds back into politics and leave the rest to a successor.

President Botha, I believe, this week; }) oke straight from the heart. He has deliberately halted his cavalry short of the gully; will not take them across to voluntary association_in pelitics and to fundamental reform.

When his adaptive reform policy fell apart, his Tuesday speech (some wags-call it the best speech of 1978) was the inevitable consequence. It has been a long time in the waiting. -

-SECURITY

He had seen the future through the Eminent Persons Group and in the heightened expectations flowing from his own colleagues $200\231$ persistent and casual abuse of the word $200\234$ reform $200\231$ And he has walked away.

Constitutional change will continue through the National Statutory Council with or without the main players; it is the Namibian internal settlement option and will, in all probability, fail.

If he was thus unable to offer his party a vision, what could he give?.. He sold it security, primor-

ially presented by his Ministers of Police and Defence. If he could not show his followers a blueprint of the future, he could at least assure they would not be killed in their beds.

Most delegates $\hat{a}\200\224$ indeed most whites $\hat{a}\200\224$ would settle for that after the obfuscatory politics and mounting violence of the past. The paradoxes between reform and repression no-longer discomfort.

resident Botha used the word $\hat{a}\200\234$ freedom $\hat{a}\200\235$ 36 times in the first five pages of his speech while police outside the pavilion took action in connection with peaceful demonstrators that could not initially be reported because of the emergency.

But what did you expect?

Does SA

SUNRDRY

THE plaza is Yale Universityâ\200\231s focal point. It used to be called Beinecke Plaza, but that was before Winnie Mandela City was erected.
Winnie Mandela City, strategically placed in the centre of the plaza, is a â\200\230â\200\234shantytownâ\200\235 inhabited and run by a very determined, very active group of Yale students who are demanding their universityâ\200\231s divestment from com-

panies who do business in -

South Africa.

The â\200\234shanty townâ\200\235, meant to deface the erisp, shimmer-ing beauty of the plaza and thus bring to the attention of the Yale community the true horror of South Africaâ\200\231s real squatter camps, is, in fact, not aesthetically unpleasing.

To the divestment campaignersâ\200\231 credit, rather than discouraging potential supporters with a holier-thanthou morality and ascetism, the movement Jas attracted widespread support by offering a vision that is a combination of outraged â\200\23160s activ-

ism and swirling day-glo $^{\prime}$ 60s fun.

This is not, bowever, to belittle the campaign of the students. They are, for the most part, motivated by a strong, sincere belief that apartheid and the present South African regime are morally reprehensible and should not be supported in any way by their university (a bastion of liberalism) or by their country (which is, after all, the â\200\234land of the freeâ\200\235).

Their devotion to the cause, however (a devotion which has eclipsed, for many of them, the importance of their studies â\200\224 a rarity at Yale) has another motivation as well, one that is slightly

more questionable.

At a rally following the administrationâ\200\231s entirely unnecessary and insensitive destruction of Winnie Mandela City (due to the unauthorised addition of 2 monument com-

reall

â\200\230L â\200\230 S
memdraling South Africaâ\200\231s
dead), David Montgomery, a
member of the Yale faculty
and one of Americaâ\200\231s foremost labour historians,
shouted across Beinecke/
Boesak Plaza to hundreds of
strangely pensive students:
â\200\234This has been a bad year for
dictators!

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ We toppled one in Haiti, another in the Philippines and by the end of the year will have toppled a third in South Africa $\hat{a}\200\235$ $\hat{a}\200\224$ this from a sworn enemy of the imperialist Reagan!

Even those Americans who decry, even today, Vietnam; even those Americans who are offended to the core by Reaganâ\200\231s Central American policy, those Americans who have bumper-stickers saying â\200\234Boycott South Africa, not Nicaragua!â\200\235, have the same â\200\234foreign policyâ\200\235 as their despised President â\200\224 the policy that they â\200\224 simply because the Americans, because they

are the founders and the per-

petuators of the world \hat{a} 200\231s greatesi democracy \hat{a} \200\224 have

matte

1n

the right and the power to free the world, to change things according to their own, American, sets of values.

Those hundreds of students standing at the rally (the biggest one I have seen at Yale) had a lot to be pensive about.

The rally was a far cry from those I have witnessed on South Africa campuses,

and the reason was obvious .

â\200\224 try as hard as they could to
make the divestment issue
emotionally charged, they
could not remove it from the
very intellectual, very distant plane it occupies in the

average Yale studentâ\200\231s mind.

The gap between the theat-

(ABL

By MARK GEVISSER | Clty?

a South African student at Yale]

nie Mandela

ricality and the reality of South Africa was made most obvious to me in the speech of one of the students at the

same rally: $\hat{a}\200\234$ The Yale $\hat{a}\200\230$

administration $200\235$, she shouted, : $200\234$ is just like the South African ! police! They removed us" forcefully from our shanty,!

Does it matter how theatrical their campaign is, or if they are, raising the consciousness of their fellow students?

. These questions were put to me a year or so ago by Brooke Baldwin, a graduate student who was, for the most part, largely responsible for getting the divestment campaign off the ground.

I was speaking to her at a

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24-hour â\200\234Vigil Againsi Apart-
from Winnie Mandela City! â\200\224
' They destroyed our home!â\200\235
I could not take her self-"
righteous appropriation of
other peopleâ\200\231s pain very seri-
ously. 2
She, unlike the squatters at
KTC or Crossroads, has a
warm bed in one of Yale's
fortress-like colleges to go
home to, protected by a
locked gate from the real-
S.jxigs of New Haven, Ameri-
caâ\200\231s seventh-poorest city, and
from Dixwell, the depressed
,'black neighbourhood only
three blocks away,
And yet, one of the most, '
! prized possessions of the dij-
' vestment campaiga is a tele-
.-gram from Bishop Tuta,
. which was blown up and pos.
tered all over the c'am:zs,
\hat{A}»saying!: \hat{a}\200\234Keep up \hat{a}\200\230the good
- work!
\star . The question to be raised
: here 'is, therefore, does it -
. matter whether the Yale stu-
dents are laying their lives on .
"the line orwot?, . .
heidâ\200\235 outside Woodbridge
Hall, the administrative of-
fices of the university.
Thé spectacle there horri-
fied \bar{\text{me}} \hat{\text{a}}\200\224 some students
were dancing o songs like
â\200\234Special AKAsâ\200\235, â\200\234Free Nel- '
sqh Mandelaâ\200\235 and Peter Ga-
brielâ200\231s â200\234Bikoâ200\235, while others
were dotted around candles
byrnt into the concrete pav-
inig of the plaza like camp-
fires, snuggled under sleep-
/ing-bags, drinking wine and
" smoking pot,
- L a South African, was
deeply offended â\200\224 nobody
- seemed to be giving a thought
#to the injustices and horrors
of my country, and I voiced
- my reservations to Baldwin,
{ a woman I have always re-
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! spected for her knowledge $\hat{a}\200\234$ -and sincerity. $\hat{a}\200\230$ i She told me that she too i was disappointed with the behaviour of most of the stu-

- dents, but explained the tac"tical _ importance of

sensationalism in any political mass movement.

Another activist made it clear to me that what was important was that the Eeft in "America had finally found something around which to. coalesce, something that was soâ\200\231 distant, so clear-cut, so â\200\234black and whiteâ\200\235, that people who usually disagreed on things closer to home cquld find common ground. South Africa, its people and pioblems, did not really mattci at all. 3

If campaigns like thai at Yale do exert pressur¢ on South Africa to speed up theâ\200\231 collapse of apartheid, then I must support such cumpaigns.:

I cannot, however, subscribe to a morality $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 30$ that sirikes me as a second wave of imperialism, the imperialism of Yale students, armed with lapel buttons siying $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 34$ Divest NOW! $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 35$, who, in their quest for political correctness and moral ascendancy, are re-colonising my land and my people.

17 August 1986 - No. 1239

nalitikfg Bonogaysrny â\200\230% 4â\200\230 | 1 | | B . ppt gald a dâ\200\230 n\:%i¬\201 ge SbuthAfrica being ?ï¬\201%m 'mtg"fw states, each roughly equal in geographical extent. OIS Ed ARR . domestic product, The partition plan has been discussed both in the Federal Republic _of Ger-3 - /o *aiany, Wher® 1t has been mentioned more than once in the Hamburg weekly Die Zeis, and in countries ranging from Augtralig and Holland to Mgggand France, PR loH g W i¬\201 ;arji¬\201;?rfgm';zi¬\201? {an and the Washington Post have dealt withythe, prapas &Pt hury | g Erut AT IR T printed in South Africa and the proposal taken yp Dy OUPEr EXPET s, il il ., -Ablack South African.newspapel, the City Press, wrate last autymn thet expeiis tracked by tha South, African government had drawn up & plan for. ia, thresfold carve-up of tha eewmary., L i _y Rightwing extramist (St groups. presumably; with scent.. influencé, have called fora; "white homelandâ\200\231, jn the heart of South Africa. ¢ iyl oA ngther, somewhat, mysterious South * African group, the, Organisation, for, the Independence , of 1 South-West, JAfrica, calls ~fori an! a\200\234independenta\200\231y Cape .pro-, > VNG, s i Tapp] putidl â\200\234ain T L (R La R e ;1 South Africeâ\200\231s leading businiess gxecutive, Gavin Reilly of the Anglo-American mining. and, dndystrial; .corporation, te pentlxx.described.partition a4 the $a\200\234$ final golution. e aptit 1 uiy J4L0 Al aibe] Count Lambsdarff, agrees.., View ed irom outside, he writes, .partitipn weuld appear 10, be an ASRaurd: solution. By if soasosiattonal demogracy. falied ta WOk inSouth Afriga, which seamed likely, 1 he whites must be offered a.yefuge. i/ The consociational approach, a3 pror

posed.forHouth Afrigp inthe Federal Republia by, B groupef vesgarchers headed Ay Theodor Hanf.in Freihurgs envisages enltural; and - Jinguistia (aYlonONL) . far vyhites and blacks, assured minority ights; and, &; quest Sor, cgusenius on al! fundamental decisionsagi, wilealais M

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i Lembedprti,.
EE9. cad â\200\230.:5%;¢ BORC

rhe 1984 South Afrivdn â\200\234constittic incorporaies individual features taki from this debate, but amounts to no mot

clationalism. $\hat{a}\204$ ¢ " > 7 :

thary what has beeri termed â\200\234sham conso-

The partition proposal musi, Count Lambsdorff says, differ fundamentally from 'the South-Africansâ\200\231 â\200\234homelandâ\200\235 concept, which from the' outset has, ke the hpartheid policy, been v naccaptable.

The alm must be- to ensure, in power policy 'terms, the' right of white and \hat{A} ¢o-loured South Africans 10 survive and so td' prevent '@ civil war he sees as an increasingly distinct possibility. - . "The outcome \hat{a} \200\230of a clvil war would be \hat{f} e¢ from clear; the Afrikaners had \hat{a} \200\231 succeeded \hat{a} \200\230at the turn of the century in keeping the British Empire at bay for four years in'thi Boer War, " \hat{a} \200\231 i + They were still not prepared to abandon powet yoluntarily. 80 an approach needed to be taken that went further than conventional ideas T

Partition would not resuit'in a'divided dation. as in Germany or Korea, because no such nation exists. b fi vy

Count Latnbsdorff referred to an "Afrikdner 1sraelyâ\200\235 probably in'the western CapeÃ@' province, adding that Palestinian claims 1o have had their'land Siolen from them' and' not to have been granied stateheaod of their'own did not exactly apply by â\200\230dndlogy inâ\200\231 this-'¢ade! â\200\230Yet -partition

Continued on page s * /"""

?ho! $\hat{a}\200\230\$ Syen Simo ATy \hat{a} ¢ 7

S et ke vat i L b akd

- 4 TAT

- SOUTH Africa for the last

*ten years $\tilde{a}\200\224$ -since $a\200\234$ the sg-called Soweto riots $a\200\224$ has been. in a state of violent

equilibrium in terms of which black resistance is unable to-overthrow the Government, but at the same time the Government is unable to eliminate violent revoit.

If foreign media coverage is to be believed, this basical-

ly stable equilibrinm has

_been upset, and the overthrow of the Government is but a matter of time.

Last year, and during the first half of this one, the balance certainly swung against the Government.

Emergency Mark II is now sacceeding from the Gavernment $200\231$ s point of view. Violence is diminishing and the balance of power $200\224$ never fundamentally upset anyway $200\224$ bas swung back in the Governmeant $200\231$ s favour. .

Serewing-down the lid on resistance is oaly part of the reason, however. Sheer weariness among towaship dwellers $\hat{a}\200\230$ is aaother, compounded by a backlash

- against the disruption caused to the man, woman and child in the street by demands for consumer boycotts, stayaway and the like.;

If security forces had displayed more sympathy and sensitivity to ordinary black people, such a backlash would have materialised much sooner than it did.

Obviously, however, screwing down the lid is a short-term expedieant. It was screwed down in 1960 after Sharpeville, only to be blown off in Soweto 16 years later.

A combination of security clampdowns and reform action held the lid down after 1976, but it has been blown off again with even greater

~violence barely eight years
later.

Grudging
On this model, the Government has no more than three

to four years to get to grips with the basic causes of poli-

tical violence in South Africa -

 $\hat{a}\200\224$ unemployment, and the continued exclusion of biacks from political rights.

Will it seize the opportunity now presented or will it squander it?

Seizing it requires a much more decisive and whole-hearted approach to reform than the grudging and dilatory attitude that has been so much in evidence until now.

It is astonishing how decisively the Government can act when it really wants to: witness how it sledgehammered the recent amend-

" ments to the Public Safety and Internal Security Acts on to the statute book, or how swiftly the State President overturned the courts last month when they tampered with some of the emergency regulations.

An even more teiling ex-

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By JOHN | KANE-BERMAN

Director of the South African Institute . of Race Relations .

ampie is how, in the short space of eight years since the UN arms embargo was imposed in November 1977, the Government built up Armscor and the huge South African arms industry.

How strikingly this contrasts with its abject. failure to get to grips with the black $a \geq 00 \geq 30$ housing crisis. When the Government wants to make guns, it goes ahead and speedily does so. But when it comes to black housing there seems to be an utter failure of wiil.

When the Group Areas Act was pat on the statute book nobody gave a fig for local option, but now, when pressures are mountiag for its repeal, the Government goes all coy and develops a sudden interest in the wishes of local authorities.

If the dilatory approach to reform could be abandoned, there is a great opportunity to give the ordinary black persen in this country some hope and some material berefits.

There is now probably little that the Government can do which would satisfy those who are now dictating Western policy towards South Africa.

Baut there is a great deal it still can do to meet the de-

mands of black South Africa, which is a different constituency $\hat{a}\200\224$ and one which, unlike the outside world, has .a powerful moral claim.

Part of the package is that Group Areas, the Land Acts, -Separate Amenities, the odious citizenship laws and the Tricameral Parliament will have to go.

That is the opportunity. Will the Government seize it? » The State President, as the conservative leader of a conservative party, is ideally placed to do the job â\200\224 to cast himself in the mould of a Benjamin Disraeli.

Beacon

I am not a total pessimist on this issue. After a couple of footfaults, the Wiehahn reforms went through and were implemented.

One might have said the same about the comprehensive repeal of the pass laws $a\200\224$ but we now have to reserve judgment until the Department of Home Affairs resolves its identity crisis and decides that it does not want to be the Department of Bantu Administration and

Development after all.

- On the question of political and constitutional reform, there is a beacon of light

•

beckoning across the desolate landscape: the KwaZalu-Natak Indaba, which I am privileged to serve as deputy chairman.

Tweo points can be made

aboat; this spectrum of opinion: at the indaba the first is that it is little short of a miracle that in the midst of the polarisation and the violence that has been taking place in South Africa, organisations representing so diverse a range of viewpoints can meet for constitutional discussions at all. %
- â\200\230The second is that impressively wide as the spectrum of viewpoints is, it is not as wide as it might be.

Ou the one hand, the National Party is present in an observer vapacity only â\200\224 although with full speaking sx;lghts, which ;it exercises â\200\224

d on the other the words $a\geq 0$ \ 234African National Congress $a\geq 0$ \ 235 are not among those adorning the desks of the various delegations. - g 3 This is obviously a disadvantage, but it is not what one might call a fatal flaw.

I have no doubt that the formula for a second-tier goverocment that the Indaba wilt eventually come up with will find broad, and even enthusiastic acceptance by the great majority of people â\200\230in Natal. Ultimately this is what counts.

The Bill of Rights recently agreed upon by the Indaba'is its first major breakthrough. For South Africa it is:a watershed, because there is no other constitutional document in the countryâ\200\231s history adopted by so wide a spectrum of interest groups.

Some of the key provisions

of the Bill of Rights are: ® Equality of everyone be fore the law without any di

* tinction on the grounds o

race, colour, language, se

religion, ethnic or social ori gin, property, birth, politica other opinion, or economic

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ or other status. $\hat{a}\200\231$

As Entitlement of everyone to own and occupy prope: anywhere in the province and to freedom of movement and residence within its borders.

-+ @ Entitlement to freedom

of opinion, expression and as sociation. :

@ Access to due processe:
of law, including the bringing
of a writ of habeas corpus.

Of course, the Indaba i cerned only with the province of Natal, and this Bill of Rights will be binding only on organs of government in Natal. 2

Ultimately what the f:ountry needs is a national Bill of Rights which is enforceable against the legislative and executive arms of govern-

. ment at central level.

Such a Bill of Rights, along with a democratic coastitution for South Africa as a whole, would need to be adopted by a national indaba at which representatives of the full range of South African political opinion would be represented, including leaders and organisations. now in prison, or in exile. .;

Incidentally, it is a pity
that the Western powers let
slip an opportunity to facilitate this at the Tokyo summit.
in May.::

Crunch

South Africa had sought an assurance that if it released Nelson Mandela, as the West demands, and if this precipi-

tated an upsurge in violence, as Pretoria fears, and it then took steps to curb the violence, it would not be punished by the West. The proposal got nowhere, however.

The Indaba was not put together by a group of outsid-ers, eminent or otherwise. It did not come about becaunse Western governments held a pistol to anybodyâ\200\231s head; it is a wholly home-grown South African initiative. L 1

I suppose that oune of the things we also need in South Africa is a latter-day Galileo to explain to Mr Heunis that in the real world the earth revolves around the sun and not round the Department of Coustitutional Development and Planning.

If the Government treats the Indaba in the disdainful fashion in which it treated the Buthelezi commission, then it will snuff out this beacon of light.

One can only hope that it is capable of learning by its | previous mistakes. y

 \hat{A} ® Excerpts from an address during a panel discussion organised by \hat{a} 200\230the | Young Presidents \hat{a} 200\231 Organi- { sation at Mala Mala yes- | terday.

f } EMERGENCY,

CP Correspondent
THE cracks discovered in the
governmentâ\200\231s emergency. regu-

Workers' were forced oven wider this week by the Natal Supreme Courtâ\200\231s ruling that the regulations allowing for arrest and detention were invalid.

Since this judgment - which secured the release of UDF official Lechasa Tsenoli - many relcases have taken place and many more individual applications for release are coming 0 court,

The State has already lodged an ap{ \hat{a} \200\230x:nl against the judgment and the matter could be heard in the Bioemfontein Appeal Court soon. -

But before the appeal court could examine the ruling, Law

 $a\200\230$ and. Order Minister Louis le

 $\hat{a}\200\230Grange \ \hat{a}\200\230made \ his- displeasure clear - saying the government did not accept it and would$

ersâ\200\235 Union,

have been arrested.

STATE TRIE) | HE EMERGEN(

. hinted at new regulations. to..

lations by the Metal and Allied | Union last 'month

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ to the $\hat{a}\200\230$ Maritzburg – Court.

fight every application. He also *

Mayekisoâ\200\231s last words: Goi fo SA will mean going bac

METAL and Allied Workers' Union general secretary $200\231$ Moses Mayckiso presently detained under Section 29 of the Internal Security Act $200\224$ recently visited Sweden at the invitation of the Swedish Metal Work-

While there, he was interviewed by the union's magazine, Merallarbefaren, on the state of emergency and its effects on union activities — and, in particular, on what would happen when he returned to SA. Two days after the interview was published, Mayekiso arrived at Jan Smuts ~ and was detained under the emergency regulations. The interview is probably his last before he was held.

Iis children dre hiding with relatives und his wife (above, right) has gone . underground. Many of his union $200\231s$ organisers

Moses Maycekiso left South Africa the day beforeâ\200\231 the emergency was declared - and feels it's not safe to go back.

- . $\hat{a}\200\234My$ life is in danger in SA, $\hat{a}\200\235$ he says. $\hat{a}\200\234To$ go back would be going straight to jail.
- . Despite his fears, he says he will return as

soon as possible. He is needed in SA.

When in South Alrica, he lives under

close the gaps - $a\200\230$ possibly .10 effectively - bar any ' further court-ordered releases, \hat{A}^{c}

Natal, after the Congress of SA Trade Unions and seven other unions brought an application upreme

Cosatu asked for the release

of all 22 because the Tsenoli ~

ruling had set a precedent in Natal. The unions also asked for a number of documents and

 \hat{a} 200\230records to be returned to them, Union officials claimed the |

police in northern Natal were not arresting members because

they were a threat to the public

safcty or security, but because the police wanted to get rid of the unions, The officials said

their work was totally ham-

pered by the police who had arrested so many of their members, and who walked in and out of the offices as if they owned

the same bed,
Apart {rom his union

mittee ~ a fact which

State's interest. in him,

He iÂ\$ working in a -practical iWway to reorganize Alex peopley their own problems - socia

people took over:

apartheid system.

ES

*" Amiong thosî freed (his wîsk were 22 unionists in northern -~

severe stress and doesn't sleep tWo

is also chairman of Alexandra Action Com-

1, ministrative and political, Itâ\200\231sâ\200\2313 learning democracy and prepari South Africa. he points out. £

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ The structures aré similar to those of the union ~ 95% of the people $\hat{a}\200\231$ ifi $\hat{a}\200\231$ Alex a workers, $\hat{a}\200\235$ Mayekiso says. b e

 $\mbox{$\hat{a}$\200\234}\mbox{During the unrest last winter.}$ munity councils. were chased

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ Residents in each street handled thewr own garbage collection and sadm?fter-vices. They learned they were able to Nandle their own matters, $\hat{a}\200\235$ he says. @ 3

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ In Alex, people $\hat{a}\200\231$ s courts are $\hat{a}\200\230$ held at different levels. We believe every crime has: a ground i the capitaistic system uid the

o them. \hat{a} \200\235, % e

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% lo ch
lenge Uwusaâ\200\235â\204¢, -
" Cosatu asked the the
court to
- order the polic\tilde{\mathtt{A}} \texttt{O} to return union
\tilde{a}\200\230atid records confis-
cated during raids Tast month,
It also asked the court to stop
police harassing them:\hat{a}\200\231
Cosatth Jawyers: were
be releaséd;
court hearing that the 22 would The State al\tilde{\text{A}}\textsc{0}\textsc{0} agreed 6 r
onge the police had caopied: the
papers !hwwÃ@ded-â\200\230 Pwi fad
Among unionists released
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originally challenged the emer-
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a\200\234es were flocking to court; a full
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state of war = and then it's difficult to say -
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50 theysr hm:}f what is right and a.way of "â\200\230gcnglqg â\200\234their &&f free. i ayekiso. S8 L SNt s piganda that blacks kill blacks is fiot {rue: Today there arc only:Oppressors. \hat{a} 200\234dnd oppressed ~ the battle is between them. There are blacks and $a\200\230$ whites on both . Colourâ\200\231 doesn't â\200\230make a bigâ\200\231 differ-* Alex is now governed by its inhabitants, . says Mayckiso - even though attempts are often made 10 brÃ@ak the strong organisation . â\200\234vigilantes start fights. Big meetings are â\200\234anned. But people know. what democratic & \Wapgier $\hat{a}\200\234$ trnctures hoy waris in $\hat{a}\202$ Tuiure SA, $\hat{a}\200\235$ " bt he concludes. 50 G the m.ht: for Iaï¬\201yeï¬\201"l@ have they last Lawyers for the 22 said some " ever, they could not give any ' And while lawyers for detain-Natal Supreme Court bench was hearing a new application by newspapers challenging the validity of government e strictions; st A Most of the major SA Eng- 5 rought the' application in - Vor which they argued that the reg: Gering looks on. Press went beyond w- inefie er ol the me | $a\200\231m$ g mm; $a\201$ el faced by $a\200\230$ (hg rgument â\200\234has been ad: © Several editors involved plication said in i the s that their puburaed until Monday. .~ Sydricy Kentridge, argu-~ â\200\234court pa or the newspapers, said $_$ lications would lose heavily the seizure of copies of the _if an cdision should be coniSowetan last weghend was * Tiscated. . a8

Qic({rh'ii must b\$\tilde{A}\$0 educated so they | By \$IBUSISO MNGADI used by the system. We only s &) | EGED ANC guerrilla

Gordon Webster, sprung
from ~ Maritzburg's Edendaleâ\200\231 Hospital after bein
to do with peolecklacing happens when .a_

Rt::icq. was trajned by a
icemin on how lo use.
arms and explosives..

icemin on how 10 use.
arms and explosives.. |
* 7Fhis cldini â\200\230was made
Port Natal Security Branch,
divisional. commissioner

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ wrong. These people are deadâ\200\230 s children, $\hat{a}\200\235$ says |

an affidavit in'the Durban Supreme A(\hat{a} 200\230our \hat{a} 200\230}y \hat{a} 200\2311his _wo \tilde{A} ©k \hat{A} « X

ply 16 An urgent application made by Lucille Webster

rom detention of her adorney husband, George Web-

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Brig Johan van Niekerk in.

Lechasa Tsenoli

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tin examplé of the kind of

Y

2 I T 3 ik . 5 shaking hands with laywer Malcolm Wallis - while Leonard { In other ; de"v)clopmcnu pellate Division's decision. this weck: ; H
@ Johannesburg lawyers
were told to let aboutâ\200\231 25
applications basÃ@d on emergency regulations 3(1) and

Tise o $\hat{a}\200\230$ = stand down nplil the Ap-Sprung ANC suspect 'was

3(3) - invalidated in Natal

trained by SA policemanâ\200\231

trained Webster, nccorqing

ANC member when he'

A® The application declar-'
ing the detention of teacher
Dehran Swart invalid was
gnstponed to August 22.
wart was detained on June
26 for allegedly possessing
subversive stickers.

He denied 4 statementâ\200\231 by l.uci_llle Webster that her Rl S was detad

-10 the brigadier, recogi

4

 \hat{a} 200\234wounded in a shootout with

The affidavit was in re- i

against the Law and Order. Minister ' for the relcase $\hat{\mathbb{A}}^{\circ}$

 $st\tilde{A}@r \hat{a}\200\224$ brother of Gordon .

/' The {?oï¬\201ccn; lun yjâ\200\224"an',

him in a photograph given

 $a\200\2301$ o him by security poiice

after the shootout,

A photograph of Gordon Webster was sent 10 a

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ member of the SAP who Jidentified him as an ANC

tetrorist he had trained in the use of arms, explosives

and other general terrorist acts at \hat{a} 200\230the Pango Base in \hat{A} ¢

Angola, â\200\235 Van Nickerk said. he brigadicr added that he did not want to identify the policeman os it would

endanger his life, i
I tween

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ The policeman whe gave me wiis iinformation is experienced and reliable and in my opinion one can

reiv on his information. \hat{a} \200\235 he .

said,

S d in order to $a\200\234$ fush out $a\204$ his brother, Gordon.

Maritzburg Security
Branch policeman Capt Jacobus Vorster said â\200\234investigationsâ\200\235 revealed George
Webster was involved â\200\230'in,
guerrilla activities,

He said that after a series | of arrests, interrogation of those arrested led to the arrest of Robert McBride on July 17, {

McBride is alleged to be the head of an ANC cell.

During interrogation be-

uiy 17 apd 520,

MieBride aiiegedly told the & captain of George Webs TR ster's involvement and ac-! 0 e, tivitics, Vorster said. -

Sudgc Page isima

SuaEc the application with costs.ig