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FIFTH SESSION OF THE FOURTH KWAZULU LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

CONTINUATION OF THE

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BY THE CHIEF MINISTER

MARCH 1987

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Mr. Speaker, Sir, Honourable Members, there is a great deal of glib and careless talk about getting all the conflicting groupings in the country around a conference table. And in this context it is repeatedly and rather glibly said that the ANC must be part of the solution to South Africa's problems, as though they are waiting in the wings and only require some mediator to bring them and the South African Government together. Very complex issues are involved. The South African Government itself is not ready to go to a conference table. As I pointed out earlier, negotiations to end the South African crisis and establish a new democracy with a new constitution will not be a once-only thing where various parties arrive to sit around a table and end up signing a document. Negotiations in our circumstances are going to take the form of a political process which will fashion and reconcile as it proceeds. Fierce political battles will have to be waged during the process of negotiation to test that which is being negotiated among the country's various population groups. Negotiations will also have to make a two-pronged attack on the South African problem. On the one prong there will be negotiations from the bottom upwards and on the other prong there will be negotiations from the top downwards. Some very prominent South Africans do the commencement of the kind of negotiations which are inevitably going to be faced with here, a grave disservice when they talk about the ANC being part of the solution which they themselves have not really begun to comprehend.

There is too much glib talk about the ANC's involvement in the

settlement of the South African issue which only serves to legitimise the politics of violence which is right now being employed to ensure that the process which will ever-increasingly

take the form of negotiations, is destroyed.

I put on record, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, my view that real negotiations about the future of our country must be negotiations in which it is possible for every shade of political opinion to participate. It must be possible even for the ANC Mission in Exile to join all other forces of change who will be involved in the negotiations for change should they so desire. If they do not desire to do so, then the negotiating process will continue without them. In fact, Mr. Speaker, I am so insistent upon there being chairs for the ANC Mission in Exile around a negotiating table, that I have in carefully worded and categorical statements said that I would not be prepared to enter the proposed National Council unless Dr. Nelson Mandela, Mr. Zeph Mothopeng and other political prisoners were released from jail. I dream of the day when Dr. Mandela is free to choose what political purpose he wishes to serve in open public life in our country. I campaign for his release constantly and I do not do so on condition that he shares my platform. I have publicly stated that if the people wish it to be so, I would serve on his platform. I want him freed,

whether he stands with me or whether he opposes me. None of us

dare dictate what Dr. Mandela will or will not do when he is

released from jail. :74\\

The ANC Mission in Exile is worried about the National Council. 1In a Radio Freedom broadcast interview on the 16 November 1986 with Chris Hani, the Commissar of Umkhonto we Sizwe and a member of the National Executive of the ANC Mission in Exile, he was asked a question about the National Council and in talking about it, he said that it was still-born because despite the fact that Mr. P.W. Botha talks about having the majority of Black people with him in

what he was doing, he would find nobody to serve on the National Council. The interviewer then said: "But Gatsha has expressed a readiness to participate if Nelson Mandela is released and participates." Hani answered by saying:

"Well he has expressed that willingness to participate. I

think he is just using Comrade Nelson Mandela to justify his back-peddling. I think when he said he was ready to participate he was just making that statement not realising the depth of opposition to any form of collaboration with the

prÃ©sent government. There is no way, Comrade, that our people

are going to collaborate with Botha. Botha cannot preside over change in our country. He is responsible for the problems we are facing. Botha must go. He is just wasting

time by, you know, thrashing out solutions. He cannot solve anything. He is responsible for the mess in our country. We say Botha should go. People like Gatsha Buthelezi are

wasting their time by participating in Botha's futile

experiments, because the majority of our people are objecting to those experiments. Supposing Mandela is released, Mandela won't participate in the National Statutory Council. No member of the ANC will ever participate in that National Statutory Council. The majority of our people won't participate. Gatscha will be alone there. He will be isolated. He will be driving those beautiful cars and getting a fat salary, but he will be just doing it as an individual. And he must be careful of the verdict of our people and our people have been known to pass the right verdict against anybody who collaborates with the regime."

There we have it, Mr. Speaker, yet again. The slanderous distorting attacks on me personally. But I have read this quote so that Members can hear Chris Hani dictating to Dr. Mandela. Chris Hani may be authorised by his executive to make statements that the ANC will never participate in the National Council but the people of South Africa will wait for Dr. Mandela to make up his own mind once he is free. I have never made it a condition that the ANC Mission in exile itself participates in negotiations before I am prepared to do so. I only insist that it must be made possible for them to do so before I will do so. Black democracy must be liberated and it cannot be liberated while we have people like Dr. Mandela in jail: Once he is released the ANC Mission in Exile becomes his responsibility. He must be freed so that he can either join with

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it in the armed struggle or join in the democratic process here in this country, where the real struggle is taking place.

Mr. Speaker, I want to quote from another broadcast on Radio Freedom from Addis Ababa. It was made on the 15 January this year

and Oliver Tambo speaks when he asks: g

"Is it possible today and in the future to enter into negotiations with self-confessed enemies of democracy with the aim of creating a democratic South Africa?" He answers his own question: "It has one conclusion and one conclusion only. No negotiations are possible until all those concerned accept a move to create and build a democratic South Africa. That democratic transformation is the necessary condition for the solution of all the problems that face our country and our region."

Mr. Speaker here we have a terrible misunderstanding of the South African situation and the real purpose of the politics of negotiation. Mr. Tambo wants the victory to come first and then as he repeatedly says, the only negotiations he is prepared to enter into are negotiations for the handing over of power to the people. I say we will have to negotiate the victory itself and that is why I see negotiations as a political process. There are some people who come away from discussions with Mr. Oliver Tambo and his colleagues in the National Executive convinced that the ANC Mission

in Exile could be drawn into negotiations. If they are right, the

ANC Mission in Exile would not continue to insist that they will continue perpetrating acts of violence while they negotiate. The world over we have seen the necessity of violence ceasing before negotiations begin. Right now we need to be negotiating about negotiations while we remain in the midst of violence, but I for one, Mr. Speaker, would not be able to negotiate with anybody who was maiming and killing Inkatha members while the negotiations are taking place. And I think this is a point that the international community must take note of. There will never ever be only two parties at the negotiating table. It is simply wishful thinking to think of mediating to bring only the ANC Mission in Exile and the South African Government together as the only prime actors in the politics of negotiation. The South African Government was not elected into office by Black South Africans and they cannot

negotiate our future on our behalf.

Some people get so carried away that they fall victims to their own propaganda. The South African Government is the de facto and the de jure government in this country and the minute the word negotiations about the future of South Africa, you spell out the necessity of the South African Government being involved. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, weâ\200\231' did not elect the Government into office. It remains the de facto and the de jure government of the country. The central purpose of the struggle for liberation has

always been to gain Black entry into the democratic process by

which governments are elected. The whole point of non-violent democratic opposition is to achieve this end. Mr. Speaker, we have not declared war on the South African Government because such a war can not be won. We have also not declared war, Mr. Speaker, because wars do not produce democracies. It is for the people of South Africa to decide whether to negotiate with the South African Government and I have a very powerful mandate, Mr. Speaker, to do just this the very day the Government makes it possible. The ball is in the Government's court but, Mr. Speaker, I say very clearly to the international community that if they stand with the South African Government which has endorsed BlackASouth Africans out of the parliamentary system and put pressure on the South African Government to endorse me out of national negotiations about the

future of our country, then every effort will come to naught. 45K;

Mr. Speaker, just as we have not elected the National Party, neither have we elected the ANC into being the legitimate government of South Africa in exile. There will be no negotiations with the Government in which we are not involved. When very prominent South Africans trot off to Lusaka to have discussions with the ANC Mission in exile without consulting us, and return to urge the Government to negotiate with the ANC, again without consulting us, they spurn whatever we are doing to bring about change through non-violent means. Mr. Speaker, this is why I call for the release of Dr. Nelson Mandela, Mr. Zeph Mothopeng and other political prisoners. Let the Black people of South Africa decide

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for themselves who will negotiate on their behalf. Just as I would not negotiate the future of our country with anybody while Dr. Nelson Mandela and Mr. Zeph Mothopeng languish in jail, I will not tolerate anybody taking the gap, so to speak, Mr. Speaker, and negotiating behind my back. There must be a diplomatic quid pro

quo in this.

Mr. Speaker, Sir, Honourable Members, our commitment is very deep and I have found it necessary to say before and I repeat today, that the final act of de-legitimising non-violent, â\200\230democratic opposition to a Government which the Black people of South Africa do not want, will be the endorsement of me and Inkatha out of negotiations at the national level. We could then, Mr. Speaker, not be held responsible after whatever settlement is put into

practice. Mr. Speaker, I would go to the bush in those

circumstances. :71\\

Black democracy is shackled in South Africa, Mr. Speaker, and there is too little recognition for this fact in very high government circles in the West. I personally valued what the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group attempted to do in South Africa. I do " not believe what they did was a dismal failure, because I never expected an outcome much different to the one we saw. They made two fundamental errors of judgement, Mr. Speaker. One was that

they completely under-estimated the time factor which would

necessarily be involved in negotiations in South Africa. It shows

a tactical error of judgement to impose the time restraints that they did impose on success. The other error of judgement, Mr. Speaker, was that they were primarily concerned with getting the South African Government and the ANC Mission in Exile together. They, of course, did say, Mr. Speaker, that I must be there at the negotiating table but the world must know that I cannot accept my position on some negotiating guest list which is drawn up for those who must come to be witness and to participate in the real negotiations. The only negotiations that take place in this country are negotiations between the leaders that the people want to represent them and the South African Government. Why, Mr. Speaker, does the ANC Mission in exile not abandon its violence for a long enough time to return to this country and to set up a legitimate democratic base from which they can prove the extent of their support? War is not a once-only option and they could always go back to Lusaka or wherever they have come from and resume hostilities. That, Mr. Speaker, would be the very shortest possible route to the armed victory which they have thus far so dreamt about. If they did this, Mr. Speaker, they could return to the armed struggle if negotiations failed to gather the total backing of the international community. Mr. Speaker, the ANC Mission in Exile was never mandated to do what they are doing. A do not believe they will now be mandated to do what they are doing, but I would have no problems in my leadership role even if the

people did mandate them to do what they are doing. I am simply the

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servant of the people, Mr. Speaker, and Honourable Members know that I take my instructions from the people. If the people instructed its leadership to abandon failed negotiations and return to the bush, they would be instructing me to do the same.

The hideous internecine Black-on-Black confrontation comes from the fact that any political Tom, Dick or Harry can crow like a little cock from any dunghill and be annointed as a true leader by the media. When we talk about negotiations in South Africa we must also talk about the necessary steps which must be taken before negotiations can get off the ground. Testing Black opinion is one of these steps.

Mr. Speaker, I want to deal with one other aspect of the politics of negotiation)â\200\231LI agree with my brothers and sisters in exile that

it was the South African Government which thrust the violence we now see on us by banning the ANC and the PAC. It was repeated acts of State brutality and political intimidation which put the match to explosive Black anger. One of the important roles which Western governments could play is the role of mediator working to define the kind of State violence which must cease before the ANC can be expected to drop violence in favour of negotiations. I cannot see how we can negotiate about the future of our country if State violence keeps Dr. Mandela, Mr. Zeph Mothopeng and other political prisoners incarcerated in jail. That is political violence, Mr.

Speaker. State violence interferes with the freedom of political

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association. Western Governments could in fact draw a line between police action which is law-keeping action, and police action which

represents the strong-arm tactics of the National Party.

I am very sure, Mr. Speaker that a very substantial accord could be reached among White South Africans themselves about what to accept and reject lin this mediation I am suggesting. While the international community does not clearly distinguish between legitimate and lill-legitimate State violence, they can have no answer to the ANC's claim that the South African Government must drop violence first. Mr. Speaker, negotiations must be about the need to have new lilegislation in this country, enacted by a different kind of parliamentary set-up. Those are the end products of negotiation. Negotiations start with an existing state of affairs and move to a better state of affairs. I could negotiate while the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act remain on the Statute Books because their removal will be on the agenda. If the ANC Mission in Exile is ever to be drawn into

negotiations, they will have to adopt the same attitude.

Mr. Speaker, there are very important realms in which we can now begin working to establish the circumstances of really meaningful negotiation. Those circumstances do not exist now, and the international community must recognise that fact. They do not exist because the Government and the ANC are both avoiding

negotiations and making claim and counter-claim as to why they are

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right in doing so. I am avoiding negotiations and I leave it to the international community's judgement to decide whether my avoidance

is reconciliatory or confrontationist.

No matter how difficult it is, Mr. Speaker, we must move towards the negotiating table. We must begin moving now. There is a ripeness of historical time which demands that we do so. There is a fluidity now which could be turned into circumstances which are propitious for negotiations. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, it is a simple truth of South African political life that the State President and his Cabinet do not in fact know where they are going. They have not got a plan, Mr. Speaker. They are in a holding position, desperately hoping something will emerge. We must influence what will emerge, Mr. Speaker. There is now knowledge, Mr. Speaker, in Government <circles that the grand dream of Verwoerdian apartheid has failed. There is consensus, Mr. Speaker, that we need constitutional change. There is consensus, Mr. Speaker, that the South African Government needs to evolve a formula acceptable to Blacks for the inclusion of Blacks in first, second and third tier government. However different the preconceptions of the various political groupings in this country are about how to include Blacks, there is at least consensus that they need to be included. Mr. Speaker, there is now wide recognition that the terrible economic straits South Africa is in

is a consequence of apartheid. There is wide acceptance for the

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fact that economic performance is very adversely affected by the lack of confidence people have in South Africa's ability to solve its political problems. All this, Mr. Speaker, adds to the fluidity of the South African situation which we have never had

before.

This fluidity is expressing itself in the ferment in National Party thinking itself but the greatest contributing factor to the fluidity of the South African situation flows from the fact that even the State President with all the power at his disposal can no longer do what he wants to do. In actual practice, Blacks have a veto right over the actions of the State President. His National Council will fail, Mr. Speaker, if we do not participate in it. Local government will fail, Mr. Speaker, if Blacks do not participate in: it The constitution has failed, Mr. Speaker, because Blacks do not participate in it. There is only one way in

which the State President can go down in history as a man of great

achievements. He has no alternative but to develop an accord between Black and White. He has had the courage to put himself in the hot seat from which he announces the need for reform. However

ill-defined his meaning of reform is, history will judge him on the extent to which he now begins defining reform. If he cannot define reform in such a way that he draws Blacks into the reform process, history will judge him as not man enough to do what he set out to do. However the South African Government blunders right now in

attempting to limit the scope of reform, there is a fluidity we

have never seen before. The State President could in fact still become the first head of a South African Government to put South Africa on the road to a glorious democratic future and it is still possible for the State President so to conduct his affairs that his memory will be revered in the way Abraham Lincoln is revered in the United States. But, Mr. Speaker, even if he does not do this, the South African situation remains fluid because the State President will be rejected by his own people because of his failure. There is a groundswell demand building up for the State President to move

faster towards reform. That demand can only accelerate. i~\201x:

The State President is not facing a squabble in the National Party and it will not be possible for him to be all things to all men and keep some kind of truce. There is something, Mr. Speaker, very inexorable about the movement of thought in South Africa. The forces demanding change are very real and the longer real change is delayed, the greater the prospects are of these forces becoming a

veritable flood-water which will burst the gates.

Radical change is now an inevitability and the question simply remains whether radical change will come through democratic means or through violent means, but come it will. Nothing I am saying, Mr. Speaker, indicates that the State President has yet made the break-through. The politics of prescription which are the root cause of every ill in our country, continue. Black democracy

remains shackled and White politics continues to act out of the

kind of fear which precludes wisdom. We are in an eleventh hour situation but the cookie must crumble one way or another in this

eleventh hour, and we, Mr. Speaker, will be there whichever way it crumbles.

Mr. Speaker, it is against this background thinking that I believe the international community has a very important role to play as we bring about change. I have conceptual problems with the argument which says that democratic procedures have failed and therefore there is no alternative but to resort to violence. I say violence has failed and that therefore now we have no alternative but again to resort to democratic options. In the new fluidity now evident in South Africa these options are ever increasingly the more viable options. I do not feel the need here to go into detailed reasoning to back up this statement. I make the point only that if we are to achieve an interim position from which we can launch the final shaping of South Africa, we must be prepared to compromise away from the winner-takes-all demand. If we are not going to be involved in a winner-takes-all situation in the very foreseeable future, and if we have to strive for an intermediate goal, we have to learn from past experience.

I do not regard the EPG's attempt to bring about a negotiating position in South Africa as a failure. I see it as a first venture in exercising the Commonwealth's international responsibility

towards South Africa. I think the lesson that we must learn from

the CEPG experience lis that in future attempts to establish negotiating positions must be rooted in an ongoing participation in things that are happening in South Africa. I do not use the word 'change' because change as a concept for me implies a movement towards giving Blacks formal constitutional power. Things are, however, happening and in this sense there is change. It is tragic that the CEPG report terminated its involvement in the ongoing attempt to establish a negotiating position in which both the South African Government and Black leaders can participate. I believe that it is possible to do this even now. Could the Commonwealth not have the courage now to reconstitute the EPG and involve it in an ongoing attempt to bring about the degree of consensus that talking lis necessary which will prepare the ground for both the South African Government and Black political groups to work towards a negotiating agenda.

I understand that the Eminent Persons Group was constituted in a situation made very difficult by Commonwealth countries not being able to agree on a final approach to South Africa. I am aware that there must have been in the minds of the eminent persons in the group the need to test the water, so to speak, and some Commonwealth countries may now be satisfied that the Commonwealth should have adopted a far more aggressive stance in the first place. For them the EPG experience may serve to justify their scepticism. The EPG wisely or unwisely had to pursue its

objectives with a threatening attitude of harsher measures to come

than the limited sanctions agreed to if the South African Government did not make significant moves to meet the EPG half way. This was inherent in the message that they brought from the

Commonwealth.

I believe there is no shame for Commonwealth countries to recognise that the EPG did not achieve the objective of establishing a negotiating climate in the country and for the Commonwealth to reconstitute the EPG with the longer and more far-reaching objective of participating in events in the forefront of the interface between South Africa and the external world. The Eminent Persons Group has the distinct advantage of having had discussions inside South Africa. They will not have to start from scratch, so to speak. As a group they could re-establish contact with Pretoria and could re-establish further dialogue with the ANC. They could also re-establish contact with other Black groupings in South Africa and could be involved in the definition and re-definition of negotiating positions until there was sufficient common ground between all the parties. This would justify the EPG's continued

existence.

I am aware of the fact that it is now being suggested in some circles that foreign participation in the negotiating process in South Africa could take the form of, say, Britain and Malawi

undertaking to carry a Pretoria perspective to, say, the

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Governments of Mocambique, Zimbabwe, Rumania, which would in turn table an ANC position. This internationalisation of the

preparatory work necessary before negotiations begin in South Africa is perhaps vital. It has in it the same recognition of the need for shuttle negotiation which I have already briefly outlined in my paper last year to the Mini Commonwealth Conference in London. It lis in the interests of the Commonwealth that progress be made in South Africa which justifies the re-inclusion of South

Africa as a respectable member of the international community.

I argue the merits of shuttle diplomacy associated perhaps with a permanent secretariat in South Africa which can be constantly in touch with developments as they occur. ' There have been developments since the EPG presented its final report. The South African situation is dynamic and it is constantly shifting and constantly requiring new insights and perspectives. The full weight of the representatives of foreign countries already in South Africa could be mobilised to support such a secretariat I am suggesting and ensure full international participation in urgent

attempts to steer South Africa away from a final violent holocaust.

Whatever events lead to real negotiations taking place, there is a need to pay more attention to the kind of negotiations which can in all realism be expected. Thus far a great deal of media prominence has been given to the prospect or otherwise of a Lancaster House-

type negotiating situation emerging in South Africa. There has for

many years been talk of the need for a National Convention in South Africa and when one mentions the words negotiation about the future of South Africa, people leap naturally to the conclusions of a round-table conference at which the South African Government and other political groupings take their place to determine the kind of constitution that South Africa should have. The ANC has a clearly stated position that it is only prepared to negotiate about the handing over of power to the people. If we accept a winner-takes-all philosophy that position would be understandable. Negotiations about the future of South Africa may not necessarily be negotiations that work from the top down.

I believe in fact that it is more likely that final success in negotiating a settlement which will re-introduce South Africa as a respectable member of the international community will follow on negotiations which work from the bottom upwards. Negotiations must have a give and take element in them and in our South African circumstances anyone who hopes to negotiate with the South African Government with it capitulating and negotiating about abdicating does not found his or her thinking on the South African realities. If we cannot expect negotiations in the context of a capitulating South African Government handing over power, we must work towards negotiations which work upwards from local, regional and provincial levels to national levels. The former kind of negotiations could only become a reality once the South African economy has been broken and the military might of the country has been drastically

reduced. Necessary conditions for successes in this direction are quite out of anybody's sight. We must now look at negotiating from the bottom upwards.

Mr. Speaker, Sir, Honourable Members, I cannot over-emphasise the need that there is to prepare for negotiations wherever it is

possible to do so and to commence with negotiations. We must get the negotiating process off the ground and we in this Assembly, Mr. Speaker, have been doing just this. When this Assembly called for the establishment of the Buthelezi Commission in 1980, it did so at a time when the old guard National Party Cabinet was in a crisis and the National Party itself was in ferment. You will remember that it was in September 1978 when Mr. B.J. Vorster vacated the position of Prime Minister as a result of the Information scandal. And in 1979 people like Dr. Andries Treurnicht and Dr. F. Hartzenberg were given Cabinet posts. In 1980 when this Assembly adopted a resolution establishing the Buthelezi Commission, Mr. P.W. Botha was still in the process of consolidating his power within the National Party and revamping the administrative machinery of the Civil Service. At that stage, Mr. Speaker, there was no indication whatsoever that the State President would be departing from the already existing commitment of the Government to establish a common federation of Southern African States. There was everything indicating that political apartheid would be

deepened and tightened with further legislation. It was most

j acceptance could never have been forecast when the Buthelezi
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Commission came into being.

After we had negotiated the acceptance of a Joint Executive Authority in KwaZulu/Natal, we did not rest there. We set about continuing the process of negotiation by establishing the KwazZulu/Natal Indaba. The Indaba sat for eight solid months and has now produced constitutional proposals which we will be looking at during the course of this Assembly sitting. In January this year, the Central Committee of Inkatha passed the following

resolution:

"The Central Committee of Inkatha has always been aware that the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba was not dictated to by our President and Inkatha. It was an Indaba of the people and was broadly representative of Black, 1Indian, Coloured and White residents in KwaZulu and Natal. Just as every other political Party and the Government of South Africa will have to weigh up the Indaba proposals in the light of their own sense of history and their own commitments to their aims and objectives, so will 1Inkatha and the KwaZulu Government have to do the same. Such weighty matters cannot be rushed into.

We therefore resolve:

H To establish a sub-committee of the Central Committee of Inkatha to prepare an assessment of the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba proposals which can be laid before this vyear's

Annual General Conference and which can also be 1laid

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before the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly before it completes this year's Session.

2 To request our President and the Secretary-General to pursue all avenues of discussing the Indaba proposals and their implications for practical politics with South Africa's major Black, Coloured, Indian and White political groupings.

3e We urge every leader in Inkatha not to prejudice any possible endorsement of the Indaba proposals by pronouncing prematurely on them or speaking in the name of Inkatha before the full process of Inkatha's democratic decision-making has had time to make the final assessment a solid and lasting Inkatha assessment.

4. We appeal to every White political Party contesting the forthcoming general election not to make the Indaba

proposals a political football for Party political gain.

I would like to place this resolution in perspective for the sake of posterity. Mr. Speaker, Sir, I would have robbed the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba of its inherent value if I had made it my own Party political instrument. At no time during the workings of the Indaba did I dictate to it, and I was meticulous in my avoidance of influencing the Indaba. Those who represented Inkatha in the Indaba deliberations did no more and no less than every other delegation had the right to do. They argued, they reasoned and

they sought accord. The accord which they sought would not have

been worth the paper it was written on if it was not a genuine accord. The Indaba belongs to the people of KwaZulu and Natal. And like every other organisation which sent delegates to the Indaba, Inkatha has to examine what its delegation did there, and we have to pronounce on the constitutional proposals. Mr. Speaker, we have a track record of being serious and honourable in our commitment to the politics of negotiation and let no one doubt the sincerity of our motives when we refuse to leap into the Indaba

proposals and pronounce without thinking.

I constantly stress that should I ever become involved in the National Council, I would only do so if I was free to test what was being negotiated against the will of the people. Negotiation is a process. In our circumstances negotiators who think they can go to the negotiating table and return to the people with a fait accompli, will be heaping awesome problems on their heads. The Indaba I believe wisely chose to work behind closed doors. The process of consultation between the delegates to the Indaba and to the people they represent must now begin. It is that process of consulting the people about the Indaba which will finally give whatever Indaba proposals finally emerge, the legitimacy which will be needed to make them powerful. I will not short-circuit that political process which will add the power of legitimacy to that

which is being negotiated.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, we have to continue with our intention to consult the people. It - is not our fault that the State President called a Whites-only general election. When one does something properly, there are times in which one cannot do two things at the same time. White South Africans most certainly are now faced with having to make up their minds about the Indaba proposals while at the same time they have to make up their minds where they stand in the general election. The resolution of the Inkatha Central Committee therefore calls on all Parties concerned not to make the constitutional proposals of the Indaba a Party political football in the forthcoming general election campaign. It would do the Indaba proposals a damage if the Progressive Federal Party and the New Republic Party were to attempt to wrap the Government over the knuckles about the proposals themselves. I ask for time in which I myself can deeply deliberate on the Indaba proposals as they are now formulated. Inkatha has asked for that time, and the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly asks for that time. We must therefore grant the Government the time that we ourselves need.

It was therefore with some dismay that I found that the Indaba proposals were bandied around in the No Confidence Debate earlier this year. And, Mr. Speaker, I issued the following press statement to clarify my position.

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PRESS STATEMENT

Yesterday, Tuesday, 3rd February, The State President, Mr. P.W. Botha, Mr. C.J. Heunis, Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, Mr. Stoffel Botha, Minister of Home Affairs and Communications, and Mr. George Bartlett, Deputy Minister for Economic Affairs, entered the No Confidence debate to fire salvos at the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba proposals. It is tragic that they did so. The proposals were presented to me on Friday, 23 January and the Central Committee of Inkatha had already by then adopted a resolution urging me and Inkatha's leadership not to pronounce prematurely on the acceptability or the unacceptability of the proposals. The resolution also called for the establishment of a sub-committee which could lay a carefully considered assessment before Inkatha's Annual General Conference which will be held in the middle of the year, and to lay before the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly before it rose towards the middle of the year. Further, the resolution urged every White political Party contesting the forthcoming general election not to make the Indaba proposals a political football for Party political gain. This was a reasoned and very responsible approach to the task which every political group in the country should be tackling with the same sense of responsibility.

The South African Government's swift rejection of the Indaba proposals in the No Confidence debate lamentably yet again is evidence that the National Party regards its own Party political position as more important than South Africa itself. It is just not possible for the South African Government to have made a detailed and responsible analysis of the proposals before rushing off to the No Confidence debate to reject them. It is also not possible for the Government at this stage to have any clear insights into the acceptability of the proposals as they are formulated at the moment. The results of the general election itself in this region of South Africa will not produce any indication of the acceptability of the

proposals to the general public.

In rejecting the proposals, the National Party fired salvo after salvo at the PFP accusing it of involving the Indaba proposals in its general election campaign. This is precisely what the National Party did by the way they handled the issue in the No Confidence debate. The Government's approach to the Indaba proposals has therefore been both unenlightened and precipitous in favour of Party political

propaganda.

We have yet to see how the current election campaign unfolds. There is, however, every indication that the State President is going to attempt to present a tough, no nonsense image to

the White electorate to disguise the fact that after the election he will be facing exactly the same intractable political problems that the National Party approach to Government policy generates, as he faced before the election. When all the fanfare of the election has gone, we will be exactly where we were before. We will then continue to have a Government which regards negotiation as no more than seeking

consensus for what the National Party has already decided.

There was no negotiation before the people of the region of KwaZulu/Natal had the Natal Provincial Administration dismantled and had the Regional Services Council system foisted on them by prescriptive politics. The State president and the National Party must clearly understand that negotiation for me and the vast majority of the people of the KwaZulu/Natal region must be negotiations leading away from the politics of prescription. This is where the whole exercise of the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba has great significance. We demonstrated beyond any shadow of doubt that Blacks, Whites, Indians and Coloureds can get around a table and negotiate positions which break away from the sterility of apartheid and neo-apartheid dictates. This is where the real value of the Indaba lies.

Mr. C.J. Heunis made the absurd point that all the Indaba did was to emphasise the need for the Government, government

institutions, political Parties and groups to be the final negotiators on constitutional issues. Mr. Stoffel Botha said he rejected efforts by "the PFP/NRP alliance and other organisations such as the Indaba Support Group to categorise the electorate into pro- and anti-Indaba groups." How else does one test the acceptability of far-reaching proposals other than by attempting to promote them among the general public? I fear that it is simply a case of the National Party not wanting any real test of public opinion on issues which fall outside their Party political framework. I am angered by this Government's intervention in the democratic process whereby the people of the KwaZulu/Natal region are reaching out for consensus.

I want to make it very clear that the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba was not my Indaba. The Indaba flowed out of my initiative of establishing the Buthelezi Commission but it was Blacks and Whites across a significant political spectrum who began running with the ball to negotiate a Joint Executive Authority for this region and once consensus was reached on that issue, ran again with the ball to seek consensus about a joint Black, White, 1Indian and Coloured legislative authority. The Indaba belongs to the people of KwaZulu and Natal. The Indaba does not seal my fate nor in any way prescribe alternative options or tactics and strategies. As a political leader I will give the Indaba proposals the detailed and grave consideration

that they merit, and having done so in the context of establishing mechanisms for my colleagues and the people of KwaZulu to do likewise, I will abide by the consensus which evolves.

I will also now abide by the consensus on how we should

respond to the National Party's rejection of the Indaba proposals before they could be properly evaluated. I itkd not be stampeded into premature action and those who now will tend to argue that the rejection of the proposals by the Government further makes out the case for violence in politics, are mistaken.

The Indaba process has made the Government at least pause and think. Mr. C.J. Heunis describes the "process" involved in the Indaba as having held "so much promise." Mr. Stoffel Botha who shot from the hip to reject the Indaba proposals before Parliament was convened, says "the National Party however had a strongly pro-Indaba attitude as far as the principles of negotiation was concerned. He said "While rejecting the present proposals as they stand, I firmly believe negotiation must continue." Mr. Heunis said that he and the Government were committed to consulting all groups in Natal about further reform in the region and that it would not prescribe solutions within regions as long as the solutions took cognisance of the realities of society in the region.

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However ham-handed the Government has been in rejecting the Indaba proposals "as they stand", the Indaba has proved that when consensus begins evolving between people on the ground in

a region, the Government is forced to tread warily.

Black South Africans are entitled to be deeply sceptical about the Government's ability to lead in the process of reform. We are only too well aware that the Government shies away from establishing a real democracy in this country. Localisation every Black South African who is angered by the National Party's politics of prescription to re-double his or her efforts to bring the kind of pressure to bear on the Government which will make them succumb to the real demands for democracy. The Indaba exercise showed yet again that non-violent, democratic opposition to apartheid and the seeking of consensus about alternatives to apartheid can be the foundations for real politics in this country.

I make these points within an over-riding awareness that none of us have any real idea of just how long we have yet got before the continued inability of the Government to lead in the reform process destroys the goodwill on which the politics of negotiation ultimately depends. I will abide by my people's decisions in this regard.

MANGOSUTHU G. BUTHELEZI ULUNDI

CHIEF MINISTER KWAZULU 4 FEBRUARY 1987
PRESIDENT OF INKATHA

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I am not going to be bulldozed into making premature personal assessments of the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba's constitutional proposals. Mr. Speaker, I will in due course be calling on Honourable Members of this Assembly to debate the Indaba proposals. Every Member will be provided with a copy of them and because the proposals have such very far-reaching implications for us and for every Authority and group in the KwaZulu/Natal region, the debate we have must be a detailed and informed debate. I see no reason why this debate should take place before the general election on the 6th May. When it comes to consulting the people about issues which will affect their very future at the social, political, economic as well as constitutional level, we dare not be slap-dash about what we are doing.

Let me, Mr. Speaker, only make one point. Lest there be any friend who feels that the time that we really do need in which to consult the people before we make final pronouncements about the constitutional proposals, is unfair to his or her earnest pursuit of the acceptance of the proposals in his or her own <circles, let

me give you just one example of why I need the time.

In the proposals themselves local governments will be constituted as an integral part of the constitutional machinery and procedures of the proposals. Local Authorities in the context of the

proposals include traditional Authorities, that is Tribal

Authorities. Tribal Authorities in essence are democratic

~Authorities which serve the communities they serve on the basis of consensus politics in those communities. The Indaba proposals will ; radically alter the circumstances in which these communities pursue consensus politics which makes hereditary positions of authority t democratic positions for the people. Everywhere in Africa, f government after government has found it necessary to include Tribal Authorities in the local decision-making process and in the â\200\230 administration process. It was as recently as the 18 March this : year that a press report said that Ghana's government is making a i major effort to win the support of its influential tribal chiefs. Members will remember that Flight Lieut. Jerry Rawlings seized Ã© power in 1981 and launched the ruling Provisional National Defence

| : Council and set about establishing People's and Workers' Defence Committees to sweep away the old order of administration. It is reported now that Ghanaian diplomats and officials say: "The Chiefs are the key to mobilising local enthusiasm. The Government has realised that Chiefs must be included in the revolution for it

i to succeed." The Executive Secretary of the Committee for the

Defence of the Revolution which replaced the People's and Workers'

Defence Committees is quoted as saying: "Chieftancy is basically Ghana's culture. In the villages, you can only talk to people | through the chiefs." Thus, Mr. Speaker, even in revolutionary

Ghana recognition is being given to the important role that Chiefs

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political development.

KwaZulu has Chiefs in far-flung places and we have to consult local communities everywhere about the Indaba proposals which affect them so directly. I do not intend going to KwazZulu Chiefs with a fait accomplis. Honourable Members of this Assembly, Mr. Speaker, will be intensely aware of the need that there is to carry the full weight of the support of the Chiefs with us when we return to the

KwaZulu/Natal 1Indaba to acquaint it with our full response to the Indaba proposals.

I know that there is such a thing as political time and that this has different dimensions for different groupings. I understand the enthusiasm of those who are campaigning amongst the White sectors of our population to have the Indaba proposals widely accepted. But the proper political process of consultation that we, Mr. Speaker, in this Assembly must adopt cannot be aborted prematurely because we have not had the time to consult our people properly before we respond to White, Indian and Coloured demands for greater haste.

We will be considering the Indaba proposals from two points of view; as the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and Inkatha we will be considering them in consultation with Black South Africans. But, Mr. Speaker I face the reality that I have very important and far-reaching constituency support amongst Indians, Coloureds and

Whites. While Whites will be consulting with Whites, Indians will

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be consulting with Indians and Coloureds will be consulting with Coloureds, the very spirit of the Indaba does not confine their consultation to any one race group. The Indaba process, its politics of negotiation and its idiom was reconciliatory between race groups. I â\200\234widl â\200\230â\200\234eonsdlt â\200\234inâ\200\231' that: Bpirit and idiom.

Immediately, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I am faced with the fact that South Africa is having a Whites-only general election on May 6th. I will not be able to pop up like a political jack-in-

the box on May 7th to give a pronouncement on the Indaba proposals.

Inkatha lis an intensely democratic organisation. It is a totally trustworthy organisation because it is responsibly run, it is responsibly led and it is responsibly supported by the masses. As the President of Inkatha, answerable to Inkatha, I would not dream of going to the Annual General Conference in the middle of this year, and presenting members with a fait accomplis of what we had decided on their bÃ½half. The resolution which Inkatha's Central Committee adopted instruct the Central Committee to prepare an assessment of the Indaba proposals which can be laid before both the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and before the Annual General Conference. There lis no way that I can short-circuit this vital process of consultation.

The South African Government has indicated that it wants consultation with KwaZulu and the Province of Natal about the proposals. Those consultations will take place because we must do

everything conceivably possible to preserve the politics of negotiation in the Indaba. The Indaba proposals are the result of negotiations working from the bottom up and the Indaba itself has never attempted to make people believe that they dictate to the Central Government about the role which the Indaba proposals themselves recognise must be fulfilled by the Central Government. Thus, whether we are talking about consultation between ourselves and the people; or we are talking about consultation between ourselves and the Government, it must be accepted that consultation is going to take time. It must also be accepted that the final formulation of proposals for the constitutional development of first and second tier governments in this region of South Africa, must be given political legitimacy. It is the perceived legitimacy or otherwise of the proposals we make that will determine, for example, how many powerful allies we have got at the end of the day among West European and North American governments. Apartheid has been internationalised and the question of illegitimacy here of

developments here in this country has international connotations.

Today, therefore, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I am doing no more than placing the Inkatha Central Committee resolution about the Indaba constitutional proposals in perspective. We will in due course be debating the proposals in details.