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Hithd"a:n.

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by â\200\230hr-â\200\234Ã@ffâ\200\230

It was

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ii; :1: was agreeet that in the future SA scae f

agency cast existing: their savers must

curtazled and suajec: to a biil cf rights.

â\200\231NME Canalssion. 1&3 unanimaus that

inasdlatel? be withdra"n frcz Vacal

It was

that lezzslazli¬\201n shows:

?eccrzct tne cartying cf any uaapâ\200\230ns. T:

precess cf ilsarzament must accur.

in :52 Row; term it was felt :hat a:auu

involves :: th.:r own Â§0â\200\230:~in .

'ft was feit that in post-a;artheid 53 tner

be the same need far high ievéis cf pÃ@lgcin

is :sw because

agreed

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responsibiliizy and pa_ticipatio: 3J3
the
addressed â\200\235Hrnugh tb- increased prtz
22321523 and schools.

coâ\200\234:-x:

social

crime

cf

skatic

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develop-ent of female DF personnel.

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ï¬\201Ã©iÃ© 1
;tÂ¢:tâ\200\230on cf conscientious objection and/or alternatiï¬\201
~;:c fall away with the accepted lack of conscripticr.

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Ã©jte 2

as discussed in the text were discussed fully. Agreement
net always achieveÃ©, but the text contains the majority

sJ cf the Coanission.

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iiaglfrged that

>EFQRT Q? THE'CGHMISSION QR INTERNAL SECURIT?â\200\231
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threats

stopping

technical

disarmament

The true timetable of political Change will be-determined by political possibilities and expediency
in the pace of change, there are real and serious
threats to the negotiations process
These
included â\200\231Inkatha,
white-
mobilisation and many' speakers mentioned
themselves 9
We considered mechanisms containing
as

these threats such
licences, Banning the Carrying of guns_and disarm-
gun
off duty police.
preferred.

right-wing
the police

However political

â\200\230intervention
concentrated on the mechanics of this intervention

in policing had been accepted

was
the Groote Schuur agreement published
u

joint monitoring of security forces was discussed.
The view was expressed that the role of this monitoring
agency could develop into an interim administration as
more and more political decisions are jointly decided and
implemented.

It was felt that the state of emergency indemnity for
security forces should be immediately revoked
Both the police and the defence force have to be strictly
subordinate to and controlled by civilian authority, such
as a parliamentary committee-
Police should receive improved crowd control training
with minimum force

disarmament

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a.
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c.
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33. The principles underlying joint monitoring include:
the inclusion of as many groupings as possible
must reach to the lowest possible level
should have same power of enforcement
The commission was unanimously opposed to
the
creation of a paramilitary force
for
national
security
politically discredited forces should never be used
to control unrest
responsibility
devolved to the local popular level
MDH marshals have gained much experience in crowd
control. This experience should be drawn on to
control political gatherings. The possibility of
using returned MK soldiers in this process was

enforcement

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substantial reduction {50%} in force levels
leadership corps -) professional soldier3*
foot soldiers would serve on short-term basis and
then be put on reserve
commando system scrapped
no conscription; system: to be phased out

Step: to be integrated (from now)

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reduction in defence expenditure

reduction

commitments

declaration of cease-fire

1}

2}

Citizen

Force

3K: no guerilla actions sabotage, etc
 SADF: troops out of townships; no search and
 kill operations
 process of political sensitising {information and
 education} in both armies
 commencement in SADF of affirmative action
 establishment of a Joint Commission on integration
 and nature of future Defence Scheme {with SADF, H
 and experts?
 training of black soldiers enhanced and recruitment
 of blacks with higher levels of education
 greater SAP liaison with communities
 reintegration
 armies
 dissolution of homeland administrations:
 return
 of
 transition but should happen as quickly as possible
 provision of facilities to ME {with SAG assistance
 and facilities}
 promotion of senior HE soldiers into senior command
 and control positions of new army
 formalisation of armed forces of other part:
 :
 PAC and AFB}: either integration or demobilisation
 INTEGRATION
 new name, symbols, uniforms, etc

{timing -depends

bantustan

process

{linked

ME

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3590RT Q? COMMISSION ON RAMPOLY PGLIC?

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First, discussion of name of commission: alternatives suggested
 were manpower; personnel, labour and manpower. Majority accepted
 manpower:

Commission held 3 number of questions. Some were discarded
 as falling ' ' him the ambit of other commissions. The questions
 will be listed with answers.

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1.

Eternitnent

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5.

Present SADF, HE and other existing military fa
asked to volunteer to centinue serving in a new
Defã@nEEâ\200\230PdrÃ@e

A volunteer Defence Force was envisagbi.

no

conscription

It was felt that there would be :3 shortfall cf
personnel.

active

recruitment and other incentives.

This _w0uld

overcome

by

be

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Deracialisation.

the

Africanisation of :heâ\200\231Defence Force was seen. Hcrit
must also be a criterion.

promote

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aulti-rncitl or non-tgcigl

.a.

The new BF should be non-racial but comĩ¬\201ĩ¬\202eration
should be given to geographic realities.

Intsgrntion 0t SADF. HR. PAC. Qto.

a.

The new D? is not only the product of hnÃ@gration
of existing forces. It is seen as the startcf atnew
DF. Consideration will be given to pretkms r; k,

experience and training.

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Political Action in the D?

a.

the

net

DF\200\231 members should

The new\200\230

belong to any

particular-political party but are entitled to their

'own political opinions and

right to vote

according to their conscience.

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Political orientation. A programme of personnel

orientation with the objective of promoting within

the DF\200\230 aims of national unity and patriotism, must

be implemented as a priority.,

Democracy within the DF. This is assured by the \200\2303

being

21 civilian

authority,

elected

government. Acceptance of new rules and regulations

to ensure the rights and protection of personnel,

control of \200\231

democratically

firm

the

namely

under

the

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etc.

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Language policy

a.

This would have to be the accepted policy of the
state.

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?glare {preaurv:ticnl or ptrzennal

'3,

Regotiations with varicus

Spiritual.

religious

bodies to recommend what \$ort of chaplahtserVice

the DF should have to cater for the pasumal and

spiritual neeÃ©s of the members. Freedom of:~ligion

is assured.

Cultural.

promoted to show its richness.â\200\230

Provision 0f socialeelfare protection forgmrschnel

and their families.

Medical benefits for membeâ\200\234s and fahilies.

interaction

cultural

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Free

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Trtinin:

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4W_ï~\202ï~\201gw_*iith~regard Lo-training'and bea:ing in aindthe need

to maintain the-highestzof standards, systeaatic and

intensive all~round training shculd be prswided.for

all DP personnel. This is in line with afï~\201rmative

action and U111 ensure that all South Africans from

whatever language group or epucational limel can

'play their part and develop~ta top Levels afthe new

3?. Special attention needs to be.paid to the

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JOINE'PRESS STATEMEET OR 333 IDMSA-ANC CONFERERCE OR â\200\230?38 5U?URÂ£
OF THE SECURITY ARI} DEFENCE IR 8011?? AFRICA'; W? 23 * 8?, LUSJLEA
The fbllowing press communique was agreed t: unaninously by the
delegates:

'The fivemday Idasa-ANC conference on â\200\230T.e ?utu - 5f Security and
Defence in South Africa" was regarded by all p p.icipants as ax
event of considerable importanCe, which helped
'l debate and

provide ideas on the nature of a future defence:

in South

Africa and on the security needs of the country not in the present transition period and once a negotiated settlement is reached.

It brought together two delegations of South Africans who shared a common concern about the need for peace and security in the post-1994 South Africa. The one delegation consisted of about 53 members and leaders of the ANC and Umkhonto we Sizwe, including 16 members of

The Other

Commission of Truth and Reconciliation, including SADF, Citizen

forces, former or retired officers of the Permanent Force-officers of the armed forces of Transkei, Ciskei and Venda. academics and -economists on military-related affairs. SADF conscripts, members of the End Conscription Campaign and church leaders. The home delegation was not homogeneous and included a range of views on the issues under discussion.

Executive Committee-

AEC National

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"homeland areas,

In the course of the five days the Conference topics elicited vigorous debate and some sharp exchanges. Differences emerged over questions such as the histories and rules of the SADF and Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed struggle, the military-industrial complex and the number of units such as 32 Battalions. In general, however, by the end of the final day, delegates arrived at a high level of consensus on most of the issues relating

to a future defence force

in South Africa. For example delegates expressed support for the need in 2002

the negotiation of a mutually binding cessation of hostilities between the contending military forces, for the ending or phasing out of the present system of military conscription, for Umkhonto we Sizwe to return to South Africa as soon as negotiations permit, and on the need for the eventual integration of the SAUF, the

and any other

military forces,

in order to form a new defence force in South

Africa. In addition there was consensus that a smaller defence force was needed and that it should be oriented towards protecting the territorial integrity of South Africa. There was also agreement that Mutumburg trials were inconsistent with the spirit of negotiations and should not

be a factor in a future non-racial

South Africa, but that this commitment does not exonerate people from participation in future atrocities they may commit. There was also agreement the transition period in South Africa should, as far as possible, be managed by South Africans themselves.

Delegates further agreed that a future defence force should be accountable to parliament, should be politically non-partisan, non-racial in nature and should work towards a system of recruitment and promotion on merit alone. Unanimous support was expressed for the view that a future defence force required a programme of accelerated affirmative action, but that this should be carried out with due regard to the maintenance of standards.

Umkhonto 200\230we

Sizwe

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Three 53231331033 33Â» an the fourth day of the conference:

Hanpouer Palicy

The creation of a national defence force ~ what will happei-\201
to the existing nilitary forces?

Internal security; the reLationship with the goljce and th:
democratic political process.

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attached.

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the conclusions

ttcessaril reflect th views of all participants in the cotferenc4
er of the conmissions themselves, and are rather expressicng 5â\200\231
C&nsensus or majority opinion within the commissions; While t!
r&pctrts of the first two comaissions did net attract controvefi-\201y.
several

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particular, the recoaaendation of the thir commission with rezarc
ts 32 Battalion was controversial. The majority'of delegates agreed
that 32 Battalion should beâ\200\230withdrawn immediately from Ratal. and
that its disbanding shouLi be investigated, though differences
remained on what the conclusions of this investigation should be.

38:2gateÃ@ agreed that future contact between themselves and the
Jrganisations they represent should be pramoted as part of the
svrcess"i-\201fâ\200\235 reachingâ\200\230â\200\234Â§â\200\234jï-\201Stâ\200\2345andâ
\200\2345Â§Ã@aceful settlement to South
A ricaâ\200\231s problems.

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debated.

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A.

REPORT OF THE MISSION ON THE CREATION OF A NATIONAL FORCE

There was acceptance that there will be integration of Umkhonto we
Sizwe (MK), SANDF and other forces at some time in 2002 in same manner.

1.

Principle: related to Tutu's 2002/234; new 3.2 Defence Force

a.
b.

c.

d.

a,

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3.

non-racial. open to all citizens
primary role: protection of territorial integrity
cf SA
will uphold democratic values of SA and will be fully
accountable to parliament
,
appointments and recruitment must (ultimately) be
based on merit alone
will adhere to the Geneva Conventions and all other
applicable international treaties and agreements
that govern the conduct of warfare
SA shall be committed to develop a nuclear-free zone
in Africa and the surrounding oceans
new Defence Force will
organisation with high standards of efficiency

be a professional type

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Structure

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arm? - conventional

counter-insurgency (civilian)

Airforce
Navy
Special Forces

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