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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON  
POLICY, INFORMATION AND DEFENCE, FOR THE PERIOD  
JANUARY - JUNE, 1987

ARUSHA, TANZANIA.

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON  
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OBJECTIVE:

1. To review and analyse the situation so as to draw up conclusions and recommendations for consideration of the Standing Committee.

INTRODUCTION:

2. It was yet another eventful period with many developments and incidents occurring in rapid succession. The racist South African regime further escalated its barbaric suppression of the peoples of Namibia and South Africa while intensifying its acts of unprovoked aggression against the Frontline and neighbouring States.
3. Having failed in its attempt at reforming the system of apartheid, the Pretoria clique has retreated right back to open brute force: intimidation, blackmail, child imprisonment, indiscriminate and cold-blooded massacres, and various other forms of atrocities. All things considered, the racist regime's record of violation of human rights has already surpassed that of the Nazi Germany.
4. On their part, National Liberation Movements and other dynamic anti-apartheid Organizations inside South Africa continued to improve upon their tactics and efficiency: the new strategy being to know the enemy more while adopting the tactic of defending by attacking. The idea is to extend the areas of activity to the enemy's soft spots.
5. The Report attempts to throw some light on the progress and successes recorded during the period under review while also touching on broad and specific shortcomings which would need more attention, not only of the Executive Secretariat and National Liberation Movements, but also of the Liberation Committee and the entire OAU.

6. The Southern African situation has been treated in a little more detail because recent experience has shown that the role of the Frontline and neighbouring States is vital in the war against the Pretoria regime - the arch-enemy of freedom, justice, peace and stability in Africa.

7. The issues in the Report are discussed under the following sections:-

- (a) Political Matters
- (b) Defence and Security
- (c) Information and Publicity Services.

#### N A M I B I A

(a) Political Matters:

8. Since the convening of the Forty-seventh Ordinary Session of the Liberation Committee in Arusha, some six months ago, no progress has taken place with regard to the Namibian independence process.

9. What has been on the increase is the racist South Africa's State terrorism, carried out by the so-called South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF). The increased atrocities, however, have further enhanced the fighting spirit and determination of the Namibian People under the leadership and guidance of SWAPO. Despite the difficult circumstances, SWAPO continued to win victories in the political, diplomatic as well as in the military fields.

10. It is almost ten years since the UN Security Council Resolution 435 was adopted. Yet a peaceful solution to the Namibian independence question remains as remote as ever. The reason for this continuous stalemate and impasse is the same as was reported to the Forty-seventh Session - the double standard of the Reagan Administration, supported by Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Government.

11. With the return of Margaret Thatcher to power, and the apparent shift of position by the US Senators, it would be unrealistic to anticipate any better understanding from Washington, London and Bonn on the Namibian independence process.

The UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978):

12. Todate, the UN Security Council Resolution 435 remains the best approach to the Namibian independence issue. Paradoxically, the very authors of the resolution are the ones who are working double shift to sabotage its implementation. Any consideration of a negotiated settlement of the Namibian conflict should take into account the fact that the only chance of achieving a just and honourable peace and internationally recognised settlement, is the unconditional implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978).

13. There is ample evidence that, inside Namibia, a cross-section of sober and far-sighted Namibian Population looks at Resolution 435 (1978) as the best solution to the independence issue if a long and protracted war was to be avoided.

OAU Commitment:

14. The contribution and commitment of the OAU to the struggle for immediate independence of Namibia began with the creation of the Liberation Committee. Having realised the difficulties being encountered in the implementation of the UN Resolution 435, the Organisation redoubled its efforts, Leaders of the Frontline States met frequently to review the situation in order to draw up new strategy and tactics, the Africa Group at the United Nations stepped up its activities over the Namibian issue.

15. In 1981 the Liberation Committee adopted a document known as Arusha Plan of Action on Namibia. This was followed by the Accra Programme of Action (1985), the Lagos Declaration on Southern Africa (1986). Copies of these documents are available and can be supplied to delegates on request.

16. The situation in Namibia no longer calls for adoption of new Plans of Action, or search for new strategies. It demands the implementation of the existing decisions, Declarations and Resolutions. It is a question of saying one thing and doing the same thing. At the UN and other international fora, OAU Member States should speak, act and vote as one. As shown by past experience, joint efforts by OAU Member States usually produce positive results.

The Situation inside Namibia:

17. The prevailing situation inside Namibia is favourable. Seeing themselves pushed to the wall, the People are determined, mobilised and politicised. SWAPO is alive and active all over the country. The youth and students are in a revolutionary mood. Without the presence of occupation troops, the interference by the Reagan Administration, and the manipulation by the Governments of Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, the People of Namibia would sweep to victory and assume their genuine nationhood.

18. On the other hand, the so-called interim government imposed by the racist South Africa in June, 1985, remains dormant and inactive. Being paid for no work, the puppets constitute an institution for the exploitation of the People of Namibia. They are used as agents of confusion to delay the process for a genuine independence.

19. On 13th February, 1987, the Interim Puppet regime announced its intention to "move towards a greater degree of formal autonomy from South Africa". In this connexion, two additional Ministries were to be created: one for internal security and the other for internal co-operation. In addition, a range of paraphernalia of a sovereign State would be adopted.

20. It is an absurd pretention that the puppet Interim Government could take charge of internal security in Namibia where even the racist South Africa, with a force of more than 100,000 troops and a daily expenditure of millions of rand, are finding it an up-hill job to cope with.

The So-called Development Aid:

21 It is understood from reliable sources that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, through its Ministry for Economic Co-operation, has embarked upon a project known as Development Aid for Namibia before independence. This Aid is partly channelled through the so-called Interim Government and partly (secretly) to various firms and institutions owned or run by white Namibians (mainly of German origin).

22. The "Development Aid" is usually financed or co-financed through private channels by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.
23. The so-called Development Aid being given to Namibians of German origin by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, is a cause for concern. This kind of aid, dished out according to colour and ethnic origin, is no better than an extension of apartheid. It does not serve the interest of the white community.
24. This issue has been raised with the Bonn Government by the SWAPO leadership. But the Federal Republic of Germany should be made to understand that they are planting seeds of racial conflicts the responsibility for which they alone would bare.
25. It is to be hoped that the source of the so-called Development Aid is not from neo-Nazi Organisations now campaigning for a whites-only election in Namibia, followed by a UDI.

(b) Defence and Security:

26. The racist Pretoria regime continued to strengthen its military presence in Namibia, pouring in more combat troops in the so-called operational areas. Apart from the manoeuvres to consolidate the capabilities of the South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF), the Pretoria regime has escalated its "Africanisation Strategy" within the force itself, the aim being:

- (i) To dispel the impression and belief that white South African troops were fighting to prevent the establishment of a black majority government in Namibia. To portray SWATF as a Namibian National Defence Force, an increasing number of black Africans are being drafted into the racist forces. The Ovambo and Bushman Battalions, for example, are known to be black fighting units.
- (ii) To create a potent force for the future destabilisation of an independent Namibia.

27. The morale of young conscripts, however, is said to be low and declining. Created in 1980 after the adoption of UN Resolution 435, SWATF, whose strength is estimated to be 23,000 troops, is an integral part of the South African Defence Force in Namibia. Members of SWATF, in conjunction with other forces of occupation, have been notorious in their indiscriminate assaults against innocent civilian population, many of whom are killed or maimed. The puppet troops camouflage as SWAPO fighters looking for food or shelter. Once they are allowed into the homesteads, the cold-blooded massacre begins.

28. Meanwhile, the Pretoria regime is convinced that a cessation of support for SWAPO by Angola would bring an end to the 20-year old guerrilla war in Namibia. UNITA bandits are undergoing military training and conducting operations along the Namibian-Angolan border. UNITA bandits continue to receive logistical support and operational advice from South Africa. Weapons and financial aid are pouring in from the United States of America.

29. In pursuit of its wild dreams in Namibia, it is envisaged that the racist regime would perpetuate the following:

- a. Consolidation of military machinery and infrastructure in Namibia;
- b. Attempt at large scale offensive operations deep inside Angolan territory so as to expand the "buffer zone" and to pre-empt SWAPO offensive;
- c. Training and arming of UNITA bandits and to provide them with logistical back-up;
- d. Harrassment and escalation of atrocities on SWAPO supporters in Namibia with the aim of isolating the Organization and eroding its mass support.

The War Situation:

30. SWAPO has continued to launch direct and indirect attacks on military targets in Namibia with encouraging results. Acts of sabotage on

strategic targets continued to increase while the morale of young white conscripts in the armed forces continued to decline. The number of armed operations carried out by SWAPO in the last six months reflect a higher stage of guerilla offensive.

31. A summary of military activities conducted by the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) during the period under review is contained in SWAPO's Report. The following, however, are a few of SWAPO drawbacks in its military operations:-

- a. It is difficult for SWAPO's Military Wing, PLAN, to provide necessary logistic back-up to operations inside Namibia due to the following factors:-
  - (i) Occupation of Southern Angola and Northern Namibia by South African troops and UNITA bandits;
  - (ii) Shortage of trucks.
- b. In view of the afforesaid difficulties, PLAN is forced to overstretch its limited resources in its effort to provide protection to its supply lines;
- c. PLAN is still faced with operational needs. The Executive Secretariat, within its resources, has been attending to some of these needs.

#### SOUTH AFRICA

##### (a) Political Matters:

32. The situation inside the racist South Africa was climaxed by the whites-only elections on 6 May, 1987. The commemoration of the 11th Anniversary of Soweto Uprising also received wide coverage, despite the total press censorship by the Pretoria regime.

33. On individual basis, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the 1985 Nobel Prize Winner, continued tirelessly, but successfully with anti-apartheid campaign. Winnie Mandela and her children and associates were subjected to further harassment and intimidation by the fascist forces, acting on behalf of the Pretoria clique.

34. Meanwhile, other individuals like Gatsha Buthelezi of the Kwa-Zulu Bantustan and Mahlatsi, the so-called Mayor of Sebokeng, redoubled their anti-people activities. It means that Gatsha Buthelezi is now being systematically groomed as the Savimbi of South Africa.

The Whites-only Elections:

35. On 6 May, 1987 elections were held in the racist South Africa, involving only the tiny white minority population, while the vast majority black population stood by and watched as uninvited observer. It was toy elections but with interesting if not intriguing results.

36. For reasons best known to Botha, the apartheid State President, the racist elections were summoned abruptly and suddenly - long before the mandate of the existing apartheid parliament was to end.

37. The motive behind the early elections was not quite clear. But the following possibilities were speculated:-

- a. To curtail the ever increasing power, influence and independence of the armed forces;
- b. To obtain a bigger majority to boost up Botha's evaporating political image;
- c. To impress the international opinion, particularly the Reagan Administration and US Legislators and Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Government that apartheid is still popular and acceptable to the voters;
- d. To check the spate of resignations and desertion of politicians, professionals, intellectuals and armed forces personnel;

- e. To restore the confidence of the white population, many of whom were packing up and fleeing the country for fear of the unknown;
- f. To project the apartheid National Party as the best alternative between the black nationalists and the Afrikaaner extremists.

Surrounding Circumstances:

38. The surrounding circumstances before, during and after the whites-only elections were tense. Before the elections the racist forces carried out raids in Botswana and Zambia. Hit squads and sabotage elements were despatched to other neighbouring States. More acts of aggression and intimidation were directed against the People's Republic of Angola.

39. To justify its criminal and unprovoked aggression, the Pretoria clique concocted lies that heavily armed ANC men were gathered in Lusaka, Zambia, on their way to disrupt the elections. In desperate efforts to cover up its premeditated plans to attack the Frontline States, the regime summoned the Ambassadors and envoys from Western countries and asked them to appeal to the Frontline States to prevent the ANC from proceeding to disrupt their elections.

40. The indigenous majority population did not stay idle on the issue of the whites-only elections. Youth Organizations led the campaign for non-racial elections: The National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), the South African National Students Organization (SANSO), South African Youth Congress (SAYC), etc.

41. Some thirty (30) white women (members of the so-called Black Belt Group) took to the streets to denounce the whites-only elections. They also protested against arrests, detention and imprisonment of children.

42. During the election campaign, some independent candidates delivered some messages which, a few years back, would have been considered unpatriotic if not treason by the Pretoria regime. This was an indication

that some individuals within the racist society were now learning to call a spade a spade.

43. Although it was a foregone case that the apartheid National Party would be returned to power, the whites-only elections did not deliver the goods that the Botha regime had anticipated. They ended up with a reduced majority and a reduced confidence.

44. By reducing the majority of a senior Cabinet Minister Chris Heunis to a mere 39 (thirty-nine), the performance of Dennis Worrall, the former racist South African Ambassador to London, cannot be classified as the work of a mediocre or a coincidence. It had a message to carry.

45. The Liberals were the obvious losers in the racist election. However, if the apartheid regime and the white minority have ears to hear and eyes to see, they should take some lessons from the performance of the independent candidates. By gaining a few more seats, the Afrikaaner Ultra-extremist Conservatives merely satisfied their psychological ego without gaining any political weight.

46. It was anticipated that after being "voted" back to power, the Botha regime would adopt even more extreme stand in the pursuit of apartheid and racial segregation. This would be in keeping with the trend set as far back as 1910 whereby each successive white minority regime develops the racist policy of apartheid to a new peak.

47. Following the whites-only elections, the Pretoria regime became more oppressive internally and belligerent externally: Clampdown on mass organisations was intensified. There was further tightening of legal and judiciary "loopholes" to give the Botha regime more absolute power.

48. After his election "victory", P.W. Botha felt like topping it up with a few propaganda gimmicks, one of them being the infamous visit to some black townships: Sharpeville, Soweto and Sebokeng.

The visit to Sharpeville was more of an insult to the local people than mere political propaganda. Although it might be possible to forgive, the people of Sharpeville have never forgotten the cold-blooded massacre of innocent, unarmed and defenceless people in 1960.

49. The objective of Botha's visit to Sharpeville and Seboken was partly to bluff the International Community that the apartheid regime, with its election victory, was now prepared to negotiate with moderate black leaders. But the so-called moderate black leaders carry nobody's mandate - least of all of the local people they are supposed to represent.

50. To enable Botha to proceed with his so-called goodwill mission, maximum security measures had to be evoked. Even then the two townships and the surrounding areas were like ghost towns during Botha's visit.

51. In general, the outcome of the May 6 whites-only election in the racist South Africa pointed to the following:-

- a. It revealed a crack within the ranks of racist National Party.
- b. The Ultra-extremists came out with a few more seats. What practical use they could make of this gain remains to be seen.
- c. The outcome underscored the demand by the black majority for popular elections: An immediate one-man-one vote in a united and non-racial and democratic South Africa.
- d. It demonstrated an increase of independent thinkers and radicals within the white community.
- e. It reflected diminishing confidence in the Liberals. This is just as well. In an explosive situation such as the one prevailing in South Africa, there is no room for fence-sitters. It is a situation where liberalism becomes irrelevant.
- f. The result of the election has made the Botha regime more nervous and uncertain, resorting to random use of the armed forces. This could cause the racist army to gain more prominence in the day-to-day handling of the affairs.

Eleventh Anniversary of Soweto Uprising:

52. The 11th Anniversary of the Soweto Uprising (16 June, 1976) was commemorated in a fitting manner inside South Africa. Elsewhere in Africa and abroad, the occasion received due attention.
53. On the occasion, the President of the ANC, Comrade Oliver Tambo, issued a strong statement calling for massive revolt against the fascist regime. In Soweto itself, not less than  $1\frac{1}{2}$  million black people staged massive demonstrations, strikes, protests and other acts of civil disobedience.
54. The PAC issued a strong statement on the occasion, urging the people of South Africa to carry on the patriotic spirit of the Soweto victims.
55. Besides political rallies and fiery church sermons, the occasion was marked by one of the biggest stay-aways in the country's history. Businesses were paralysed. Commuter trains to Johannesburg and other big cities moved empty, while the cities themselves were deserted.
56. After the 16 June, 1976 uprising, thousands of youths and students left South Africa, many of them for unknown destination. However, since September 1984 when the current rebellions triggered off, the youths and students have stayed home to fight from within. It is due to this type of determination that the 11th Anniversary of Soweto Uprising was commemorated with political maturity.

State of Emergency:

57. The state of emergency, declared by the apartheid regime on 12 June, 1986 was extended on the eve of its **First Anniversary** (12 June 1987) for another twelve months, if not for an indefinite period.
58. Apart from extending the period of the state of emergency, the Botha regime took further high-handed measures to "close the loopholes", meaning further tightening the grip and introducing more stringent measures.

one of the first "loopholes" to be mended or modified were measures that had been nullified by the Courts of Justice. These were re-introduced and amplified.

59. The new state of emergency has not only filled in some technical gaps but also widened the scope of operation of the racist security forces. The duration of arbitrary arrests which formerly was fourteen days has now been extended to thirty days without charges or warrants of arrest. Detention can be prolonged indefinitely only by decision of the racist Minister of Law and Order. The discretionary (unlimited) powers extend to any member of the racist security forces.

60. The actual situation is that since the apartheid National Party usurped power in 1948, South Africa has been in a perpetual state of emergency.

61. This being the case, the exercise of imposing, lifting and reimposing of state of emergencies within the last few years, is a futile and useless effort.

(b) Defence and Security:

62. As anti-apartheid struggle escalates in South Africa, the racist Pretoria regime has become even more aggressive and violent in its frantic efforts to sustain its survival. The military is now occupying a crucial position in decision-making. The racist regime is now heavily dependent upon the use of military force to impose its authority within South Africa and Namibia and to destabilise its neighbours. Since the racist South African Police could no longer handle the growing spiral of internal resistance, the racist regime is increasingly deploying the military in the so-called "emergency areas". To cope up with what it calls revolutionary onslaught, the racist regime continues to expand its military forces. Under its long-term re-armament programme, the racist South Africa has begun to build its own submarines and surface ships which would

be equipped with advanced types of weapons, including cruise missiles with nuclear war-heads. It has been reported that the mass production of Impala Fighter-bombers and helicopter gunships is proceeding at a rapid pace. The production of G-5 and G-6 self-propelled howitzers which can fire chemical or nuclear projectiles is also being expanded. All this is an indication that the apartheid South Africa is preparing itself for a long and serious military confrontation.

63. The racist regime seems to be convinced that the solution to its dilemma lies not in the dismantling of apartheid, but in a military show-down with opponents of apartheid within the country and neighbouring States. In the words of President Botha, the regime will continue to face adversity from a position of strength. This position was reiterated by Defence Minister General Magnus Malan when he once summed up the role of the regime's security forces in the perpetuation of apartheid. He said, "the security forces would protect South Africans by allowing no build-up of revolutionary activists in neighbouring States, and by clamping down on such activities inside the country, whether terrorism or political agitation". Apart from open aggression such as commando raids in neighbouring States, the racist regime has been waging clandestine warfare against members and sympathisers of the National Liberation Movements. The so-called "death squads" have been responsible for the murder and disappearance of many people inside South Africa and in the neighbouring States. The vigilantes who began to emerge in early 1986 constitute a front for the regime's terrorist activities.

64. There are indications that the racist regime is determined to continue or intensify their acts of violence in efforts to achieve its strategic ambitions in Southern Africa. In this connexion, the military would play a crucial role. To be able to achieve this objective, the apartheid regime would most likely act along the following lines:-

- a. Redouble repressive measures inside the country;
- b. Introduce qualitative and quantitative changes in the armed forces so as to enhance their capabilities,

- c. Increase support to MHR and UNITA bandits to enable them sustain their criminal activities in Mozambique and Angola, thus diverting attention from the real problem inside South Africa;
- d. Continue surprise air and commando raids, and sabotage activities against the National Liberation Movements in neighbouring States;
- e. Increase clandestine activities, including secret assassination, against members and sympathisers of the National Liberation Movements.

65. All these measures would be complemented by intensive psychological warfare, particularly propaganda campaign against the National Liberation Movements and the neighbouring States.

Armed Activities:

66. The armed struggle in South Africa has been yielding encouraging results. Mine blasts and bombardment have been increased in various areas. One such blast took place in a residential area reserved for the regime's ministers. There have also been more attacks on installations and positions of the apartheid security forces.

67. The results of the bomb explosions which took place in Johannesburg after the whites-only elections were so devastating that the racist regime retaliated by launching commando raids in neighbouring States. Landmine explosions on farm and strategic installations have also had telling effects, prompting the South Africa Agricultural Union to work out a short list of security recommendations for farmers to protect their properties against guerrilla attacks. Members of the regime's Navy Citizens Force and Air Force part-timers have been called up to undergo counter-insurgency training in the racist South African Army, to prepare them for deployment in townships where there are unrests. The exercise

implies that the racist army and police have proved inadequate to deal with the spiralling popular resistance in the country.

68. Although there have been considerable achievements in the armed activities, the National Liberation Movements are still faced with serious difficulties, such as long lines of communication between their men in the field and the command structures based outside. Infiltration of people and arms into South Africa is another delicate problem. These difficulties could be attributed to lack of strong rear bases. As a result of the difficulties, National Liberation Movements are forced to sustain armed activities under very adverse circumstances which, on some occasions, have resulted into serious setbacks. On the other hand, acts of indiscipline by some cadres of the National Liberation Movements have caused serious concern on those in a position to assist, leading to erosion of confidence and sympathy.

#### SOUTHERN AFRICA

69. The liberation war in Namibia and the struggle for the eradication of apartheid in South Africa cannot be considered in isolation of the overall situation in the Central and Southern African Sub-Continent. To sustain or advance the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, the role of the Frontline States is vital.

70. The tragic and mysterious death of the late President Samora Machel last year, the frequent aggression against the Frontline and neighbouring States, the slaying and kidnapping of innocent South Africans in neighbouring countries under the pretext of hot-pursuits or pre-emptive strikes are a clear demonstration that the entire region is in a state of war imposed by the racist South African regime and their supporters and allies.

71. Shortly before and after the whites-only elections, the racist regime took it upon itself to launch consecutive attacks on Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Some of the attacks were direct raids and the others were in the form of sabotage or clandestine activities.

72. The racist South African raid on Livingstone, Zambia, on 24th April, 1987, claimed the life of four (4) innocent Zambian citizens; and the commando strike in Maputo, Mozambique, on May 29, 1987, against civilian targets resulted in the killing of three (3) innocent Mozambicans. In both cases none of the identified victims were either South Africans or members of the ANC.

73. The raids before the whites-only elections could have been intended as intimidation to facilitate peaceful condition inside apartheid South Africa during the so-called elections. The aggression carried out after the election might have been meant to impress the white community, especially the Afrikaaner extremists, that the Botha regime had no intention to compromise on the apartheid system or fraternise with neighbouring black States.

74. These criminal acts of aggression aside, the Pretoria regime in collaboration with their friends, continued to dish out assistance to bandits and puppets to enable them to continue their opportunistic acts of genocide and destabilisation of the Frontline and neighbouring States.

Warning by Non-Aligned Movement:

75. As far back as September, 1985, the Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned States meeting in Luanda, Angola, from 4 - 7 September, 1985, analysed the situation in South Africa and noted with deep concern the continuing state of war in that part of the Continent. They warned that the racist Pretoria regime and its agents were not only the root-cause behind this explosive situation, but also were directly responsible for other crimes which threatened international peace and security, namely: aggression, terrorism and mercenary activities. They stressed that there could be no peace, stability or security in Southern Africa until apartheid was completely eliminated. The Ministers noted further that apartheid, declared a crime against humanity and an affront to universal conscience, has its roots in the same racist and bellicose ideology which provoked the Second World War, causing untold deaths and destructions. They also

expressed grave concern that this inhuman system was being aided and abetted through economic, financial, military and diplomatic assistance given to the Pretoria regime by those Western countries, many of which were victims of Nazi aggression.

76. The warning was sounded in the year 1985. Today, in 1987, the situation in Southern Africa has grown from bad to worse. The threat to peace and security has become real. To arrest the situation, concrete action is needed urgently. Declaration of solidarity and solidarity by the International Community should be supplemented by concrete action on the part of the OAU.

Missions to the Southern African States:

77. During the review, the Executive Secretariat undertook three missions to the Frontline and neighbouring States as part of the efforts to maintain regular contacts with Member States of the region. The first priority of each mission was to express sympathy with the authorities and the peoples for the hardship they were experiencing as a result of their geo-political position, and to pay tribute to them for the valuable sacrifice they were making for a noble cause.

78. The Assistant Executive Secretary in charge of Political Affairs, Information and Defence led one mission to Angola, Botswana and Zambia from 22 April - 6 May, 1987. A second mission, led by the Assistant Executive Secretary in charge of Administration and Finance, visited Swaziland and Lesotho from 10 - 16 May, 1987. The third mission which covered Zimbabwe and Mozambique, was conducted by the Executive Secretary between 14 - 17 and 23 - 27 June, 1987.

79. During the various missions, the Secretariat's delegations were afforded high level contacts with host Authorities in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior, etc. The delegation to Angola and Zambia also met members of the leadership of the ANC and SWAPO.

80. As a result of the discussions with the authorities and representatives of the National Liberation Movements in the countries visited, the Executive Secretariat was able to draw the following conclusions:-

- a. That the relationship and co-operation between host countries and the National Liberation Movements remained close and cordial;
- b. That the authorities of the Frontline States were determined to continue to offer any possible assistance to the National Liberation Movements until Namibia is free and apartheid is eradicated;
- c. That there was need for closer and regular contacts between the Frontline States and other Member States of the OAU, particularly with regard to establishment of diplomatic missions in Gaborone, Maseru, Maputo, Harare and Mbabane;
- d. That the need for concrete assistance to Frontline States has become even more urgent;
- e. That it would be advisable for leaders of the National Liberation Movements to foster closer contacts and co-operation with the host authorities on matters relating to security and handling of refugees. Greater efforts should also be exerted to enhance and sustain the confidence of the local population.

81. Matters concerning bilateral relations between Member States and the National Liberation Movements, aimed at promoting the struggle, have been brought to the attention of the National Liberation Movements' leadership.

82. Meanwhile, recent events tend to generate some hope for an improvement of the situation in Southern Africa. Exchange of visits between leaders of the Frontline States has become more frequent. The state of high tension seems to be giving way to the state of closer co-operation.

83. Another important development in the region is the apparent improvement in the defence capacity of some Frontline States. If this trend was to be enhanced or improved, the random and unprovoked aggression by the racist South Africa would no doubt be kept in check.

Assistance to Frontline and Neighbouring States:

84. For the advancement of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, the survival of the Frontline States is vital. Yet the plight of these countries cannot be alleviated through mere solidarity declarations or symbolic gestures. There is an urgent need for practical and concrete measures at this critical moment. In this connexion, the concrete assistance being given to Mozambique by Tanzania and Zimbabwe is worthy of appreciation and high praise.

85. The need for assistance to the Frontline and neighbouring States is accepted almost universally. So many resolutions and declarations have been adopted to this effect. But when it comes to implementation, the story is different.

86. The assistance to the Frontline States should be directed towards improvement of their defence capability. Without adequate security and stability, any economic or financial assistance would flow down the drain. This matter, however, could best be handled on bilateral basis, between the Frontline States and other OAU Member States.

The Plight of Children:

87. The plight of children in Southern Africa deserves more attention than it is receiving. Given the fact that the whole of Southern Africa is in a war situation, it is to be noted that children, women and the aged usually constitute three-quarters (75 per cent) of the victims of such conflicts.

88. The plight and misery of the children languishing in the racist jails in South Africa are, of course, beyond comparison. They are like

animals herded together in a cage. One pertinent question is, why have the apartheid fanatics decided to act so ruthlessly on children at this time? Or, are the children suspected of plotting to change the apartheid system by revolutionary means?

89. But the condition of children in the rest of Southern Africa is just as deplorable, be they in Soweto or victims of destabilisation activities of UNITA and MMR bandits. The situation extends far afield to other nearby states where resources and commodities vital for children's welfare and well-being have dwindled because of the escalating cost of defence and security.

90. Schools are destroyed and children made homeless through bombardment and plunder. Hospitals and dispensaries are the targets of raids by the racist forces as well as local bandits.

91. Apartheid has been universally condemned and so have the racist South Africa's military involvement and incursions into the neighbouring States. But the extent to which the apartheid South Africa's economic disruption and destabilisation have seriously affected the lives, health and welfare of the children in Southern Africa, has hardly been appreciated.

92. Naturally, the peoples and societies in Southern Africa care about their children. The late President Samora Machel of Mozambique repeatedly referred to his country's children as "the flowers that never wither". Yet in 1986 alone the number of Angolan and Mozambican children under the age of five, whose lives were lost as a consequence of war and destabilisation, was conservatively estimated at 140,000.

93. The state of over ten million children under the age of five who live in the countries bordering the racist South Africa is not only grave, but getting worse. They are caught up in externally-motivated and supported conflicts and destabilisation which they are too young to understand or counter.

94. In December, 1986, the UN General Assembly pronounced itself on the issue through its Resolution 41/199 on Special Assistance to Frontline States.

95. By pronouncing itself through the above Resolution, the UN at least registered its concern over the issue. The OAU should not merely show its concern but seek practical solution. It should press for the implementation of the above-mentioned UN General Assembly Resolutions.

96. The Standing Committee may wish to recommend that the plight and appalling condition of the children in Southern Africa, resulting from the policy of apartheid, aggression and destabilisation by the racist South Africa, be taken up by the higher organs of the OAU.

97. There is need for effective and universal campaign against arrests, detention, torture and imprisonment of children by the racist South Africa. Those who support the vehicles of conflicts and destabilisation such as UNITA and MMR bandits should be made to understand that they are contributing to the plight of millions of children.

Refugee Problem:

98. The refugee problem is one of the most disturbing issues in Africa where the bulk of the world's population is to be found. Although the greater percentage of refugees in Africa originate from independent African countries, a good number of them, nonetheless, are from the liberation war zones - South Africa and Namibia.- to be found mainly in Angola, Tanzania and Zambia.

99. These refugees, whether they are sympathisers of the National Liberation Movements or not, do not directly fall under the responsibility of UNHCR. Yet the Movements themselves, who cannot shun the responsibility over their own people, have very limited facilities.

100. The problem of refugees from non-independent territories has so far received little attention, though the hardships they pose to the neighbouring States are enormous. The OAU should pay tribute to the Government and people of Angola, Tanzania and Zambia for their generous sacrifice and contribution. The three countries have surrendered or set aside large chunks of land for use by refugees from Namibia and South Africa. National Liberation Movements, particularly the ANC and SWAPO, should be commended for the good use they are making of the offer.

101. The refugee problem in Africa ranks high on the priority of activities of the OAU. For this reason, the Co-ordinating Committee on Assistance to Refugees was established to deal with the issue. The Co-ordinating Committee held its 17th Ordinary Session in Monrovia, Liberia, from 24 - 26 March, 1987. The Executive Secretariat of the Liberation Committee was represented at the Conference by the Assistant Executive Secretary in charge of Political Affairs, Information and Defence.

102. The Session was attended by high-ranking officials of the Liberian Government, the UN system as well as experts and personalities representing various Organisations in and outside Africa.

103. During its deliberation, the Co-ordinating Committee on Assistance to Refugees, inter alia, examined the main causes of refugees in Africa. Some participants expressed the view that drought, famine and poverty were the root-cause of the refugee problem in Africa, forcing the affected population to flee from their countries of birth to seek "better pasture" elsewhere.

104. This again is a situation where the OAU Member States could relieve the countries neighbouring South Africa by providing asylum for refugees. As the liberation war intensifies, the refugee problem would continue to

escalate, with possible adverse effect on the liberation struggle. In this connexion, the Executive Secretariat maintains close liaison with UNHCR and other UN Agencies as well as some reputable humanitarian organizations.

105. The Conference also reviewed the possibility of holding in one of the Frontline States, an International Conference on the Refugee Situation in Southern Africa. In this connexion, Ambassador Dede, the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Political Affairs, drew attention to the OAU Council of Ministers Resolution CM/Res.99(XL) adopted at the Fortieth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers in 1984, calling for the holding of an International Conference on the refugee situation in Southern Africa, the activities of the racist South African-backed armed bandits in Mozambique and Angola as well as the destabilising policies of the Pretoria regime.

106. The Committee requested the OAU General Secretariat to conduct consultations with the Frontline States and seek assistance of the UN Secretary-General and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in determining financial and material implications of holding such a meeting.

107. As the central issue of the Conference would include examination of the activities of the racist South Africa and the situation in Southern Africa, a region which is vital in the struggle for the liberation of the remaining part of Africa, a close follow-up by the OAU Liberation Committee would be advantageous. What is of interest to the Liberation Committee is the role of UNHCR on Non-Governmental Organizations in assisting refugees from Non-independent and apartheid dominated territories.

CANARY ISLANDS

108. There has been no development during the period under review worth reporting. However, some communications have been received from Dr. Cubillo, Secretary-General of MPAIAC, who is now reported to be living inside the Canary Archipelago. Since Dr. Cubillo's actual address is not available to the Secretariat, it is difficult to establish direct contact with him.

109. The General feeling over this issue, however, is that the question of the Canary Islands should not be associated with one person only. It is the people of the Canary Islands who should be assisted in their effort to attain independence.

LA REUNION

110. The Secretariat was unable to obtain any fresh information on the activities of political organizations inside La Reunion. It is to be noted that the general opinion over this issue has always been there. It would be futile for the Liberation Committee to prop into the situation in La Reunion without the effort of the People of La Reunion themselves. The Secretariat is still carrying out further investigations and it is hoped that a meeting of the Sub-Committee on La Reunion would be held soon to review the situation.

GENERAL INFORMATION

(a) International Conferences:

111. Many international conferences and seminars in support of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa were held. Among them were: The UN Council for Namibia, held in Luanda, Angola from 18 - 22 May 1987; Conference of World Council of Churches held in Lusaka, Zambia, from 4 - 8 May, 1987; AAPSO Conference on Military collaboration between Apartheid South Africa and Israel, held in Helsinki, Finland, from 22 - 24 May, 1987.

112. In most of these conferences and seminars, many resolutions and declarations were made, but as mentioned earlier in the report, the problem now is not how many resolutions and declarations are passed. The question is, how to implement them.

(b) OAU Day - 25th May:

113. On the occasion of the Africa Liberation Day, the Executive Secretary inter alia, called upon the Reagan Administration and Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Government to desist from the double-standard of shouting about peaceful settlement of Namibia and South African situation while they are the very people who apply veto during UN conferences. He also reiterated the need for the OAU Member States to speak with one voice and vote as one group on matters pertaining to African liberation struggle.

114. On this occasion the Secretariat addressed communication to all Member States, inviting them to organise activities to mark the OAU Day. In this connexion, there were responses from only five (5) Member States, i.e. Algeria, Angola, Benin, Kenya and SADR.

115. The Standing Committee may also wish to note that 1988 will be the 25th Anniversary of the OAU Liberation Committee. The Secretariat is exerting effort towards a fitting commemoration of the occasion.

(c) Visitors to the Secretariat:

116. During the period under review, a number of distinguished visitors called at the Executive Secretariat. Among them was the Diplomatic Advisor to the French Government, Mr. Fernand Wibaux. The visit of Mr. Wibaux was of special interest as it tended to indicate a change of position on the part of the Government of France.

INFORMATION AND PUBLICITY SERVICES

(a) Dissemination of Information:

117. One of the decisions taken by the Forty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Liberation Committee, with regard to dissemination of information on the liberation struggle in South Africa and Namibia, called upon the Executive Secretariat and National Liberation Movements to provide OAU Member States with recorded programmes to be broadcast and projected on their radios and televisions.
118. To implement this decision, the Executive Secretariat has requested and obtained from the National Liberation Movements some information for dissemination.
119. The Executive Secretariat has also received pro forma invoices for the sum of US\$ 4,000-00 for dubbing equipment. A request is submitted in the report of the Standing Committee on Administration and Finance for approval.

(b) Library:

120. There is need to rehabilitate and expand the Library at the Executive Secretariat, the ultimate aim being to render it a more reliable documentation and research centre on African liberation struggle and the

role played by the OAU in the emancipation of the peoples of the Continent. However, it is high time the general public and particularly research workers were provided with facilities such as libraries and archives to enable them to plough into the history of African liberation struggle since the creation of the OAU.

(c) Printing Unit:

- 121. The Printing Unit continues to provide valuable basic training to cadres of the National Liberation Movements. It also assists them to produce their own information and propaganda materials, and other publications pertaining to the liberation struggle.
- 122. Since the installation of this Unit in 1978, the machines have been working constantly without proper service and expert maintenance. It has now become necessary, after such a long service, to carry out a thorough overhaul, and replace the worn out parts, if the valuable service of the Printing Unit is to be maintained.
- 123. As the pre-occupation of the Liberation Committee is to render maximum service to the National Liberation Movements, it is necessary to adopt a new approach to improve the information and publicity of the Movements and their combatants.
- 124. To improve upon the working environment, the Executive Secretariat has sought and obtained approval of the Prime Minister's Office for the expansion of the area where the Unit is accommodated so that all the machines and equipment could be stored in one place, in order to facilitate proper supervision and effective training of the cadres. The Executive Secretariat is grateful to the Government of Tanzania for this generous offer.
- 125. In 1985, the Executive Secretariat received a consignment of printing materials as assistance from UNESCO. This stock is now almost exhausted and a bulk purchase is necessary to avoid a drastic interruption of the printing service.

126. The projected reorganisation of the Unit as well as the overhauling of the machines, including bulk purchase, have been estimated at US\$ 35,000.
127. A request to that effect is contained in the Report of the Standing Committee on Administration and Finance.
128. The Standing Committee may wish to give sympathetic consideration to these requests for financial allocation.

#### CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

129. With reference to the information contained in the Secretary's Report and those of National Liberation Movements, and having heard the statements of the representatives of the ANC, PAC and SWAPO, the Standing Committee on Policy, Information and Defence may wish to consider the following proposed recommendations:-

#### NAMIBIA

- (a) That all OAU Member States be called upon to redouble their efforts and increase pressure on the Western Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, in particular the Reagan Administration and the British Conservative Government, with a view to make them change their negative policy of blocking the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978);
- (b) That OAU Member States should fulfil their declared commitment by fully implementing the Arusha Plan of Action, and other OAU decisions and resolutions, particularly the following:-

- (i) Contribution to the Emergency Namibian Liberation Fund as stipulated in the Plan of Action;
  - (ii) To invite the Africa Group at the United Nations to further intensify its efforts and put more pressure on the United Nations in order to induce the Organisation to find a way for immediate implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978);
  - (iii) All OAU Member States to comply effectively with OAU Resolutions on the severance of all trade, economic and diplomatic links with the racist South Africa;
  - (iv) OAU Member States to use the political and economic influence with the Western Countries, particularly the United States of America, Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany; to ensure Namibia's rapid transition to independence;
- (c) That the ever-increasing atrocities and acts of barbarism, committed by the fascist occupation forces, particularly in Windhoek and Ovamboland; be strongly condemned. In this connexion, the Western mass media - the so-called champion of fair dissemination of information without fear or favour; be similarly condemned for their conspiracy of silence on the atrocities being committed in Namibia by the apartheid occupation forces.
- (d) That all OAU Member States should deny the UNITA bandits any kind of assistance or recognition, including transit facility for materials or personnel. For such assistance only adds to instability and destabilisation of the neighbouring States, thus covertly becoming an added hindrance to SWAPO's operational progress;

- (e) That the Liberation Committee should reiterate its denunciation of the puppets of the so-called Interim Government and declare them enemies of Africa, since they are agents of the Pretoria regime - the arch-enemy of Africa. This reiteration and declaration would be timely and relevant, in view of the recent treacherous activities of some of these puppets;
- (f) That the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany be called upon to drop the so-called Development Aid to Namibia before genuine independence, as this would bring nothing but conflict among the Namibian communities;
- (g) That immediate and adequate measures be taken to make the US Senators understand that their decision to discontinue assistance to some Frontline States, pending their denunciation of "violence and necklace" was ill-conceived. It should also be made clear to the US Legislators that the OAU regards this kind of intimidation and blackmail as an open support for South African domination of Namibia and Apartheid.

SOUTH AFRICA

- (a) That the whites-only elections be denounced, rejected and declared irrelevant;
- (b) That the renewal of the state of emergency be condemned;
- (c) That Botha's visit to some black townships after the whites-only elections be condemned and declared an act of provocation and humiliation;

- (d) That the People of South Africa, particularly workers, students and youths, be commended for commemorating the Eleventh Anniversary of Soweto Uprising in a fitting manner. In this connexion, tribute should be paid to National Liberation Movements for guiding the people to mark the occasion with political maturity;
- (e) That the National Liberation Movements, especially the ANC and other dynamic and patriotic anti-apartheid Organisations, be commended for their achievement in the struggle for the total demolition of apartheid. In this connexion, puppets and Bantustan chiefs like Gatsha Buthelezi, should be denounced and denied any recognition;
- (f) That, in view of the good progress being made in the war against apartheid, National Liberation Movements be given more material and financial assistance to enable them to clear the way for a majority rule in South Africa.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

- (a) All OAU Member States to reaffirm and put into practice their commitment to the defence of the Frontline States, in accordance with the 1976 Mauritius resolution of the OAU Assembly of the Heads of State and Government;
- (b) All OAU Member States to implement all relevant OAU resolutions on strengthening of the defence capabilities of the Frontline States;
- (c) OAU Member States to be ready to give immediate and effective response to any eventual appeal from SWAPO and

the Frontline States which may feel their sovereignty and territorial integrity were being threatened by the racist South Africa's acts of aggression;

- (d) That the Frontline, neighbouring and other States in Eastern and Southern Africa be commended for the close co-operation and valuable assistance they continue to accord to National Liberation Movements and the Executive Secretariat in the course of discharging their duty towards the total liberation of Africa;
- (e) That assistance to Frontline States should be directed towards improvement of their defence capability and economic survival. To be realistic and practical, such assistance would better be conducted on bilateral basis.
- (f) That the responsibility of the plight of millions of children in Southern Africa, caused by the racist South Africa's policy of aggression and destabilisation, be placed on the shoulders of the Pretoria regime and their supporters and allies, particularly the United States of America, Britain, West Germany, Italy, Israel and Japan;
- (g) That the problem of refugees from Namibia and South Africa, be given more attention. To this end, the OAU Refugee Commission and the UNHCR should be requested to study the matter closely;

Meanwhile, Angola, Tanzania and Zambia should be commended for the heavy load they are shouldering with respect to refugees from Namibia and South Africa.

GENERAL SITUATION

- (a) That an Ad Hoc Sub-Committee composed of Ambassadors of Member Countries to the Liberation Committee resident in Dar-es-Salaam be set up for the purpose of assisting the Executive Secretariat in organising and drawing up a programme for the commemoration of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the OAU Liberation Committee. The financial implication of such a plan would be submitted for consideration of the Standing Committee on Administration and Finance;
- (b) That as far as practically possible, successive Chairmen of the Liberation Committee should visit the Frontline and neighbouring States, as well as some other OAU Member States, to acquaint themselves with the situation on the ground and be able to keep other OAU Members States abreast with the actual situation in front;
- (c) That National Liberation Movements be requested to deploy more efforts and increase their vigilance against the escalation of infiltration within the National Liberation Movements by the racist South Africa.

BACKGROUND TO RESOLUTION 435 (1978)

1. Resolution 435 (1978) is a resolution of the UN Security Council approving the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation made by the so-called Western Contact Group of Five and, at the same time, approving the report of the UN Secretary-General for the implementation of the proposal and authorising the establishment of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to assist the Representative of the Secretary-General to carry out the mandate conferred upon him, to ensure the independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations.
2. The Resolution 435 (1978) was adopted almost sixty (60) years after Namibia became a so-called mandated territory with an international status. It is now about 68 years since the inception of the mandate system but the "Sacred Trust of Civilisation" relating to Namibia remains unfulfilled.
3. With the termination of the First World War (1914 - 1918) and in terms of Article 119 of the Peace Treaty of Versailles, signed on the 28th June, 1919, a defeated Germany ceded to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all its rights and titles to its former colonies, including South West Africa (Namibia).
4. Some time before and subsequent to the end of the war, there was a clash between the self-interest and higher moral values of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. In the end, however, a compromise was reached in terms of which the principles of non-annexation and international accountability were accepted for all the former colonies, including South West Africa (Namibia). These principles were embodied in the mandate system provided by Article 22 of the Covenants of the League of Nations.

Conflicts:

5. Although the Namibian problem was not solved up to the demise of the League of Nations in 1948, the battle lines were already drawn for the conflicts between the apartheid South Africa and the United Nations in the post-1946 era.

6. The first confrontation took place when, in 1946, South Africa asked the United Nations Organization's consent to incorporate South West Africa (Namibia) as a fifth Province of South Africa. When this request was refused and the more aggressive National Party came to power in 1948 in South Africa, and 1950 in Namibia, it proceeded to denounce the mandate, proclaiming that the mandate had ceased to exist and began to deal with Namibia as a colony or fifth Province. This high-handed move was strongly resisted and in 1958, nationalist Movements such as SWAPO had already laid the foundation for a protracted liberation war.

7. It is a tragic paradox to note that whereas President Woodrow of the United States of America was the real propelling moral force behind the mandate system, Ronald Reagan, the current President of the USA, has joined the racist South Africa to frustrate and sabotage the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) and the fulfilment of the "Sacred Trust of Civilisation". The linkage of Cuban troops in Angola with the implementation of the carefully worked out UN Plan for Independence of Namibia only demonstrates lack of seriousness and objective perception of the issues involved.