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SOME COMMENTS FROM THE SAIC GROUP ON THE ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED
AT THE ANC CONFERENCE.

1. The ANC's letter dated February 18. refers to a "discussion guide" to be used as a basis for pre-conference discussions within the movement. This document was not made available to us. Nor have we been given any special or particular information which would have allowed us to examine in depth and in a meaningful way some of the issues to be considered ~~xxxx~~ at the conference. Nevertheless we welcome the initiative taken by the ANC Executive to invite all groups and individuals outside the ANC proper to submit views and comments for the conference. This we now do following discussions we have had among ourselves.

2. The issues to be considered at the Conference are ^{undoubtedly} ~~undoubtedly~~ of the first importance: they touch on fundamental questions of political ~~xxxx~~ strategy, organisation and the South African revolution. They are of deep interest to all sections of the South African movement. We therefore hope, as we believe necessary, that at the appropriate stage the ANC will mount ~~xxxx~~ organised consultations with ~~with~~ all the de facto constituent bodies of the Congress movement with a view to discussing the confusions of Conference, to reach mutual understanding and common positions on the issues concerned and to move forward to the consideration of the problems of the practice of our revolutionary struggle and the implementation of agreed policies.

ISSUES OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE.

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3. We confess to ^a ~~substantial~~ ignorance about the present scale of the armed struggle and are simply in no position to intelligently discuss the scope for its "intensification". But there are certain policy issues which arise in this respect. In the past ^{eighteen} months or so the most visible and publicly reported aspect of the armed struggle has been the ANC's decision to despatch contingents of guerilla fighters (in company with those from ZAPU) across the Zambezi into Zimbabwe. This decision has been represented ~~xxxx~~ as a "new phase" of the struggle but what ~~the~~ tactical considerations or calculations were involved in the decision was never adumbrated to us. However the main observable repercussions of the decisions ^{of} ~~and~~ the military actions which followed were broadly, three in number:

- a. the more powerful white South African military machine was drawn ^{into} ~~towards~~ Zimbabwe to establish an armed defence/offence zone along the Zambezi; the South African authorities were able thus ^{to} ~~conduct~~ their counter-revolutionary war against ~~our~~ forces outside and ~~xxx~~ away from S. Africa proper, to reduce ~~our~~ ^{the} political impact ^{of our work} inside our country, and to press. S.A. ad

- as a ~~picture~~^{haven} of tranquility and harmony,
- b. to severely complicate the problems of maintaining the viability and security of our bases in the African states, ^{in particular of} ~~of~~ heavily straining the goodwill and support of these states for our struggle in view of ^{the} evident threats to their own position ~~arising from the forward military policies of~~ white South Africa and last, but not least, to subject the African states concerned to considerable imperialist pressure to cease providing facilities ^{to} ~~for~~ our ~~fighters~~ fighters; hence, the continued commitment of the neighbouring African states to our armed struggle ^{can no longer} ~~cannot~~ be taken for granted.
- c. we sent out freedom fighters to wage war ⁱⁿ ~~a~~ substantially alien environment of Zimbabwe. The problems arising from this ^{are} ~~is~~ examined below.

We know that efforts have been made in the recent past to infiltrate our men and forces back into S. Africa., but on what scale, with what intention and success we are wholly ignorant. It nevertheless remains true that the ^{main content} ~~essence~~ of the armed struggle since August 1967 has been the Zimbabwe front.

4. Here we would like to concentrate our attention on the third of above adjudged consequences of the ~~decision~~ decision to wage war in Zimbabwe with our guerilla forces. ^{As} ~~Against~~ a wide spectrum of formidable disadvantages, obstacles and difficulties ^(which we face) our revolutionary struggle possesses, ^{we believe,} only two advantages and it is to the fullest exploitation of these that we think the key to our ultimate success depends. These are first, the yearnings of all our oppressed peoples for fundamental change in S. Africa hence providing ^{an objective} ~~the~~ political base for our armed struggle, and secondly, we ~~have~~ ^{have} unlike the imperialists and their lackeys, ^{time} on our hands. These two factors join to take the celebrated form of the protracted peoples' war. For the South African revolution this is no trite formulation. It is dictated by the social, political and economic realities in our country and ^{by the} ~~the~~ strength of our enemy. Hence, rather than showing a willingness to pit our scarce military resources in a open confrontation with the enemy in areas and regions somewhat unfamiliar to us and among people we cannot easily address and educate with the same confidence as our own, we should at this point of time take decisive steps to shift the ~~centre~~ ^{the} of gravity of ~~our~~ struggle back into South Africa and among our people. We propose this ~~not~~ notwithstanding our support for the active solidarity policy of the ANC for the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe.

5. There can be ^{no} justification for any separation of the political tasks of mass mobilisation and agitation on the one hand and the conduct of the armed struggle on the other. Our armed forces should be ~~trained~~ trained to be as versatile in the arts of political

propaganda, political organisation and leadership as they are in the arts of warfare. Hence, immediate steps should be taken to develop all-round cadres, to be trained in the techniques of underground political work ^{and to be} ~~such that they may be~~ sent home to ^{engage} ~~engage~~ in the critical task of creating a viable, closely-knit underground political organisation linking ~~up~~ all oppressed national groups and revolutionary forces. This stands as an indispensable condition for the creation of armed groups and above all of armed bases located firmly among and with the support of our people. This is a long and arduous task which should not be subordinated or relegated because of some tactical or perceived requirement of the moment.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE MOVEMENT.

6. Given these proposals for a shift in the centre of gravity of the struggle back into S.Africa and the crucial connections between the work of political mass mobilisation and guerilla war, we are logically moved to suggest that major ^{changes} ~~changes~~ are called for ⁱⁿ the political structure of the movement -- changes which would reflect the social, racial and class composition of our oppressed ~~peoples~~ ^{which hold} and ~~having~~ the capacity ^{for} of creating ^{an adequate} the political ^{infrastructure} ~~infrastructures~~ inside S.Africa for a closely linked network of underground organisations ~~and~~ based on the mobilisation of all ^{oppressed} national and revolutionary ~~social~~ groups in the country.

7. Our ~~immediate~~ ^{immediate} concern in the matter of the movement's structure and the role of national oppressed groups in the revolution arises from our ^{responsibilities} ~~to~~ the Indian people. Being an oppressed national group, the masses of the Indian people are objectively on the side of the revolution. This is ^{as} true of the position ^{today} ~~as~~ (has been the position in the past. But certain significant, almost structural, changes have taken place within the Indian community which, ^{in our views} ~~we believe~~ adds ^{fresh} ~~new~~ urgency to the problems of our movement and in particular of the SAIC. Where once the generality of the oppression of apartheid and white supremacy provided the ^{conditions} ~~basis~~ for a more or less united Indian community on the side of struggle and liberation, today ~~the apartheid authorities have~~ ^{unwittingly} a sharper class and social differentiation marks the Indian position. The apartheid ^{authorities} ~~authorities~~ while pressing forward ^{with} their brutal Group Areas policy, have within this policy encouraged the rapid ^{development} ~~creation~~ of ^(an almost new) a class of Indian factory owners, employers of Indian labour, ^{who} ~~are~~ accumulating ^{power} ~~wealth~~ and ^{position} through exploitation ^{by} and becoming ingratiated to the white rulers, ^{they} ~~cooperate~~ with ^{apartheid} ~~them~~ through their scab Indian Councils and actively participating ^{in the status} in the process of reducing the bulk of the Indian people to wage-labourers. In the Indian ghetto areas, the mock ^{Indian} administrations created by apartheid have become the focus for ^{this} the small group of Indian exploiters to manifest political influence and power within the community, to divert the Indian masses

away from political struggle into inter-communal rivalry, to hypocritically sow fears of so-called threats of "African domination" in the light of the anti-Indian policies of such states as Kenya and Zambia, and in general to ~~misrepresent the Indian people~~ play a ~~traitorous~~ traitorous role on behalf of the enemy. But for the mass of the people, conditions of living and of labour are steadily worsening. ~~Their wrath against the system of apartheid, though in substantial respects, it remains latent, is taking an increasingly class and social aspect and is being directed both against their own exploiters and renegades and the white colonialist rulers. However it is the latter who stand in main contradiction to the Indian people as a whole.~~

8. The political and organisational alternative to the scab Indian Councils and the exploiting elements within the community who co-operate with apartheid ~~xxx~~ is undoubtedly the SAIC. But the ^{SAIC} organisation hardly exists at home, following the heavy blows it suffered through the imprisonment and detention of its leading cadres. We therefore have an urgent task to recreate the organisation and ^{to} effectively propound its policies not only as a necessary part of the proposals for setting up what we have called a political infrastructure, ^(at home) but as a means to break the hold of the Indian agents of apartheid and destroy their efforts to ^{divide} ^{between} ~~separate~~ the community from ~~their~~ ^{its} allies, particularly the African labouring masses. We ~~have~~ ^{are} ceased being unduly concerned with the ^{present} ~~juridical~~ status of the SAIC at home; we regard the organisation as having been effectively ~~and xxxxxx~~ banned. And it is ^{our} intention to commence the complex tasks of recreating it on the basis of underground organisation and leadership.

9. In the light of this analysis of the Indian position and of our objectives for the SAIC we believe that that most appropriate changes ~~to~~ ^{for} ~~an overall structure for the movement should take~~ ^(at least) encompass the following:

- a. the setting up of a supreme Liberation Front or Council to represent all oppressed national groups and revolutionary forces in S.Africa,
- b. such a front or council to prepare a programme of revolutionary struggle and of objectives, ~~such~~ ^{as} would provide a considerably more effective political basis for mobilising all sections of the oppressed people; such a programme should take into account the many changes that have occurred in the country since the Freedom Charter was formulated, and ipso facto, such a programme should be an advance on the Freedom Charter and ^{be} indubitably rooted in revolutionary principles,
- c. the council or front will have the task of co-ordinating the efforts of all its constituent bodies to re-establish their organisations in S.Africa, to ~~study and prepare~~ ^{study and prepare} a training scheme for cadres in the matters of underground activity, organisation, and survival and to be responsible for their return home.

five.

d. the council or front to be fully represented on the MK command structures so as to ensure the effective linkage of armed preparations with those of political organisation, propaganda, and leadership.

e. the membership of the council or front should be full-time working closely together, preferably in one location; this ~~extension~~ alone will ensure that it will function effectively and fruitfully.

We are aware that a Congress Consultative Committee is in existence but we do not know ^{what} ~~what~~ it had done or achieved. We are inclined to believe that it has been ^{largely} ineffective ~~if not a waste of time and effort~~. In the present conditions what ^{seems} ~~we believe~~ to be necessary is not ^{some} ~~a consultative~~ consultative machinery, but an organ commanding authority and power in the areas suggested ~~hereabove~~.

FOREIGN POLICY

10. Our foreign policy should, we believe, start off with a clear demarcation between who ^{comprise} ~~are~~ our friends, and who ^{are our} ~~are our~~ enemies. Within the range of friends, there ~~would~~ undoubtedly exist a scale of ^{their} ~~reliability~~ and firmness ^{in support of our struggle}. We should attempt to ~~do~~ ^{do} analysis of the place of all ^{friendly forces} ~~in the~~ friendly category, and the position ^{which each would} ~~which~~ occupy on this scale. On ~~this~~ basis we can, without being guilty of opportunism, extract the maximum of support, material and otherwise, from all our friends consistent with the role we give them on ^{this suggested} ~~the~~ scale of reliability. In such a context, we see certain useful roles for the United Nations, ^{and} ~~xxxxxx~~ ^{the many} for political parties and individuals in the Western countries. At the same time we should be perceptive enough to see that new and significant revolutionary forces are emerging on the ^{and extra-European} ~~European~~ political scene, forces which more closely identify themselves with armed revolution and who show a welcome ability and determination to make the issues of revolution and ^{national} ~~struggles~~ for liberation part of their politics of the street. We should not attempt ~~to participate in the disputes which mark the revolutionary left~~ to take sides in the ~~xxxx~~ polemics and disputes which mark the revolutionary left, but rather to seek the support of all on the basis of our own revolutionary programme. In this regard we can with great benefit take a leaf out of the book of our inspiring comrades of the ^{National} ~~Vietnam~~ Liberation Front of Vietnam.

11. LEADERSHIP.

11. While acknowledging the merit of experience, we believe that the complexity of our tasks ^{and} ~~the~~ essential newness of the problems our movement face ^{call for an} ~~we must~~ show an increased willingness, ^{on the part of the movement} ~~to~~ find fresh leaders, ^{especially} ~~and~~ leaders who are less associated with and

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have been involved in the non-violent period of the struggle, and to give them scope and opportunity for bringing into play the undoubted potentialities of our movement and people for political organisation and struggle.

CONCLUSION.

12. For reasons we explained at the beginning we are ~~h~~ not able to comment on all the issues raised in the ANC's letter. What we have tried to do here is to ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ indicate our approach to the problems of the South African revolution and to propose the policies which we think logically ~~xxxxxxxx~~ emerge. In summary, we base ourselves on the power of our people, but we see this power as having real revolutionary significance only insofar as our people are organised, educated and moved to action. This in turn is dependent on our policies, and in this context it is policy which is the starting point of all practical actions for the revolutionary movement.
