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Important fo; the AHC to intervene quickly. We did not want to :espone to an initiative of any of our adversaries. We took the lean and forced them to :eegond to ours. This way, our plan, the Ha:ere teclaration, gradually Became accepted as the road to geace

The neg:tiatiens process "as never seen as the only element necessary to get rid of e?ertheiu. Not only have we always stressed this, but the Declaration itself refers to negotiations at patt cf CtuEl overall struggle of the people of South Africa. Objective of the process

Et Le Luportant to remember that the aim was not merely to get the government t3 sit down with us, to talk with the legitimate leaders. The aim was to hegotzate an end to apartheid and a democratic constitution. The Declaration embraces this in its tStateneAt of Principles' where it says that, in agreement with. tie liberation movement, they believed that the outcome of such a process should be a new constitutional order based on the follotLHg principles, among ethers:

1 South Africa shall became a united, democ: tic and non-racial state.

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- 2. Ail lts people shall enJov common and equal Citizensnlp and netLORelit", regardless of :ace,colour, sex or creed.
- 3. All its people shall have the right to participate in the government and administration of the country on the basis of a universal suffrage, exercised through one person one vote, under a cornea voters roll.
- 4- Alt geogle have t.e right to form and join any golitical part? of their CthCS, provided that this is not in the furtherance of racism. '
- 5. All shall enjoy universally recognised human rights, freedoms e21 cile liberties) grotected under an entrenched Bill of Rights 6. Seuth Africa shall have a new legal system which shall garrentee equality of all before the lawn 7G South uf:;ca shall have an independent and non-racial JVdiciary.

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as effect the transition to a demecratic order including the
holding of elections.
8. July after the acogtion of a new Constitution will all armed
HOSlelties lbe deemed to have formally terninated' And only
then, would the international community lift sanctions.
Since the adoption of the Declaration, the government has removed soee cf tte obstacles to negotiations. In particular, it
Xunhanned the ANC, SACP and other organisations
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te of emergency, but retained eq ivalent
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most of the obsta cles in the way
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rresh obstacles have emerged or emerged more
doption of the Declaration. In particular,
ve violence unleashed against our people in
he country and most recently in the war on the
addition,. the failur of the state to take
to stop right wing violence and hit squads.
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also be asked, whether there is an agreed
the ANC.ah 1d th 8 government agree on what the
are. There may be agreement on the
but there clearly is not a common
type of new South Africa that should take
speech of de Klerk and Viljoen makes clear that
cist veto on majority rule- -in order to protect
is not sticking by agreements
our suspension of the armed
ck our organisati on and our communities. t is
^{\prime} 0 stop this and also, to take the process
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Tue Qecple must be mobilised and organised around the fundamental
eemancs that we make-the demand for a Constituent Assembly and an
interim government, as well a demands which must find a place in
a : "zure consuitution
EHAT 13 A COESTITUEHT ASSEMBLY?
the ANC's perspective, the entire negotiation process is
stem at the achi evement of peace, through the establishment
ew social order, under a democratic constitution.
'3 a very good, Clea er explanation of the meaning of a
t Asse -mbly in the most recent issue of Learn and Teach.
le begins by saying:
iNew onstitutions are usually drawn up when countries are "born
aim exhe. the old way of ruling is changed and a fresh
litical start is made.'
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'lle 2:43 South Africa ma. we lived under a variety of
i ns, none of which has emerge from a democratic'
. n every case, the majority of our people have been
ed from constitution-making., While constitutions 71V record rights, for black South, Africans all
1 ions have given expression to their disempowerment and
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ARC wants to put an end to this and enters the peace process
a view to the people themselves making a const itution that
heir most basic demands. This, we believe, can best be
by the election of a Constituent Assembly on the basis
on one lvote. This people's Assembly will have the
a new constitution.
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Assembly the various political parties are
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'ng to the number of votes they receive in the
r words, if the ANC gets 70% of the vote in a
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y, it will et 70 seats. If it gets only 42%
get 42 seats.
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mbly is elected by the people, then the
'will show who among the parties has
that support is. Likewise it will show who
erefore no contribution to make in building
who h as a li tle support and is unable to
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tThe first route is, that favoured by the government, where all interested parties would have a seat at the negotLating taole. IIn this respect, the process is similar to that adopted at Lancaster Housefi.e. we omit evaluation, here, of the role of outside partiesj. In the talks leading to Zimbabwean indepenaence, the British acted as mediators between the Patriotic Front oeranu(PF) and Zapu (PF) on the one hand and the Smith/Muzorewa grouping on the other. Nhile Smith's party commanded majority support amongst the whites, at that time, huzorewa, it was shown at the elections for blacks, commanded a mere 3% of the votes, with the Patriotic Front winning 97% in combination. a

The way in which the Lancaster House talks were organised did not reflect the weight of the various parties. There had to be a consensus between the PF and the huzorewa/Smith grouping. Even though the PF had overwhelming support for their basic positions, they 'had to modify these to find a compromis acceptable to the racists and puppets. They had to compromise to achieve independence through the negotiation table, but the extent of the compromise was not related to their political strength.

- '79?

The result was that the PE had to agree to their being ten reserved seats for whites for 10 years and that these could then only be removed by a tweethirds majorityfcheckj me also favours a negotiation set-up where all no matter how flimsy their support base may place at the negotiation table. This means of fakes and puppets must form part of a uture South AFrican constitution.

The ANC does not want to ram its constitutional vision dowh the threats of its opponents. At the same time, attempts to win geople over to denoctacy cannot mean an abandonment of democracy. There must be a democratic outcome to any negotiations for their to he any lasting peace. On that we cannot compromise. he can assure people who differ with us that there will be a Blane for all who respect equality and democracy, but we cannot subvert these principles, universally accepted, in order to win racist consent.

:oacl, in the South African context, means
eaeohable geople' get together as iequals'
f our . entry. The fact that there is no
phort commanded, between the puppets and
-nt, because the support enjoyed by the ARC
es of struggle for a democratic South
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; r-the ANC because it stands for people's

.. is important to note that

- it is_not only a racist refenendu:

that is undesirable, but any referendum to ratify a constitution that has already been negotiated. This is unacceptable because the role of the people is limited to saying yes or no They make no input. The constitution will not be their product. i V The thing about a national liberation struggle is that we are trying to create a new nation and one of the best ways of cementing that new unity is for as many people as possible to feel part of the victory, which a democratic constitutional order will be. To just sayiiesf is to applaud vict ries made on your behalf. But people's power means that the people themselves must show the": strength and be a real part of any victory. ' The concept of subsequent ratification means that a deal must First be struck by the iprincipal actors', before it rfoes to the people. Hhat is necessary, however, is that a deal must be struck in accordance with a freely expressed popular will that Euides the negotiators. They go to the talks with a mandate and

L that mandate cannot be fully complied with, we must know why 1nd decide whether or not the result is acceptable or whether legotiations should be resumed etc. That is what elections to a Ionstituent Assembly makes possible INTERIM GOVERHHEHT

fhe concept of an interim government is a difficult.one. The key hing is first to be clear why we need some type of transitional .uthority. Then, we can consider the scope of its duties. What 8 are saying is that the South African government cannot be in barge during the negotiation process. It is not impartial. It annot be trusted to use its powers fairly. It will in fact use ts powers, as it does now, to favour its own, narrow political terests at the expense of the democratic forces. This is llustrated by the arrest of Mac Maharaj and the removal of demnity from him, Ronnie Kasrils and Chris Hani. That is why say that you cannot be both a player and a referee. The South 7rican government is not an impartial observer but also a ruling rt? with specific goals in the negotiation proces 8 word interim means-temporary or transitional. In other rds, one is speaking about a government that is not permanent, h thsss he he s gashitnlas jab. Oncs that job ia completed its rk is over. The interim government is required to oversee, t0 pervise, monitor the process of establishing a democratic nstitution.

e concept of an Interim Government is not new. As the most cent issue of Hayibuye points Out, it has been applied during $_..V$ CV

transitional periods in many countries. Postewa: situations and transition from colonial rule to indegendence have been the most common. This is because the legitimacy of the existing order has been questioned and; also, because there has been agreement, 1n prinCLPIe, on the need to create a new order.

In some cases outside arbiters have been uses, to ensure impartiality. In others, the major parties have snared responsibility.

Another reason to have an IG has been to ensure that the authority that emerges after the transition, is made up of people with some experience in running of government. It is essential that the majority of our people, who have bee. excluded from government, get experience in executive power and government administration, before the new system, which will include them, is established.

If we fail to do this, we risk are ting conditions for maladministration. It also gives functionaries of the old state a free hand to conceal crucial information and do what they can to sabotage things before power changes hands.

Having said that, it must be admitted that there is not yet complete agreement nor total clarity in our own ranks I am therefore putting forward my own undegstanoing of this concept, which is basically in agreement with the Hayihuye article. The basic position that must be stressed 1s that the interim government is part of the process of the transfer of power to the people.

In other words, while the interim government must. ensure that there are free and fair elections for a constituent assembly, it is not unbiassed towards "democracy. It must be a vehicle for realizing democracy. Its acts must contribute towards the final dismantling of apartheid and establishment of a democratic alternative.

One of the first jobs of such an interim government would be to dissolve the existing parliament and it would rule by decree. It Would systematically eliminate all apartheid laws and all lswe that might still impede freedom of political action. The establishment of an IG means that a number of things have already happened. There must have been commitment by all parties to lfree and peaceful political engagement. In addition, all 'should accept the need for fundamental change, the creation of a united, nonrscial and democratic South Africa. There would also have had to be agreement on the mechanisms for drawing up a new constitution.

The IG would start off with a mandate to implement these a reements. The actual form that the IG takes, even its name, are issues to be negotiated. But this has to be within the 5/

amework of its being representative, acting zzpartially and the abroad commitment to facilitate the process of transitionles immediately excludes the idea that the present authorLty himses to exist in its existing form, drawing in others as nior functionaries. This was the type of set up in the zorewa internal settlement in Rhodesia. If the ANC "eretdrawn to an unchanged governmental set up we "ould be in the sahe pe of situation."

cannot allow a situation Where we share responsiblity for the d activities of the state, but have no authority to decide on s policies.

t only would that make us legitimators of apartheid, it would so involve us in immobilising our people and even seeking to me down their demands.

w an IG is composed is a very difficult question— It could be 8' major players' alone, ie the ANC and government, or it could elected, or it could comprise a' number of different players. i is again something that will be decided through gotiations and struggle. We will have to t?7 to balance the ed for legitimacy, representativity and-effectivity in trying get an adequately functioning power.

is preferable in this type of arrangement that the government ies to rule by consensus rather than majority vote._ Its term existence should be as short as possible, so that those sisting change have as little time as possible to obstruct the ansition

l of this may seem rather remote at this point in time. But e Hayibuye article puts this in perspective:

.8 rulers need to be made to realise over and over again that, then to continue governing, they rely on the consent of the armed. The liberation movement needs offensive strategies to ilg about an impartial transitional arrangement. The people, in various ways, capable of refusing to be governed by the sent administration. For instance, when the right moment es, they can declare that they will pay tax only to an IG the final analysis, an impartial transitional mechanism Will the codification of what we have won in struggle.' - FICULT QUESTIONS

now that many of the issues that I have referred to are making v people unhappy about the negotiation process People are ing whether we should continue talking in the -light of the acxs on us. People are asking whether the process has been at

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useful to us rd "heth: e have not perhaps compromised
't t h ' t
.'se that com; romise is an element in all
has to be some willingness to give and take
if one wants to achieve a settlement. The key thing remains that
any compromise that we make must be with a view to furthering the
process leading to freedom. We cannot compromise on that goal,
but we can agree to go there by a different route
he question of combromise, I think it is
t is how I see the decision to suspend the armed struggle. AT
time of the Pretoria Mlnute, the leadaership saw the armed
ggle as a blockage in the way of continuing the peace
ess. Even though it was felt that the governmentis
objections to armed st :uggle were unr easonable, it was regarded
as necessary to make this compromise in order to realize our
broader stra egli o objectives. We made a tactical retreat in
order to be in a better position for a strategic advance
Obviously there are some things that are non-negotiable. As the
Harare Declaration says of nonracial democangcy, on that there
can be no compromise. That is why it iswimportant that the
g vernment and the ANC agree h the objectives of the process,
that any settlement that does not provide for a nonracia
d moo ratio state, Will not stick.
It may be that people regard the possibility of such agreement
and agreement on the IG and CA as unlikely. To draw this
conclusion is to focus on pure reasoning. As mentioned, we need
to make the government feel the might of the people. This can be
very persuasive and make non-negotiables become negotiable. That
also applies to their making -our non-negotiables negotiable.
That is why we must use our strength. The people are our best
defence and best weapon of attack.
The apart heid regime uses all forms of struggle against us. He
must not deny to ourselves any available form of attack.
Do we continue the talks? I think that we definitely mpst do
so, with the tfuller mass involvement I have mentioned. It is
esse.tial tha we strive for peace. It is our people who are the
prime victimst of acats of war. We must force the government to
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allow free political activity and through marshalling the forces who back us , ensure that agreements are implemented and in a way

that will move speedi ly towar ds people's power.