

## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

### THE DOMESTIC LINE FUNCTION OF INTELLIGENCE

It is essential for any organization that wishes to function as effectively as possible to define its line function as clearly as possible. This not only creates a sense of purpose that gives direction to production, it also motivates the personnel corps in that employees have greater certainty about what they have to do, it optimizes the utilization of mail resources and, in the case of the civil service, it reduces friction with other departments when overlapping occurs in other fields. Overlapping results in unnecessary duplication, which is not only detrimental to costs, but sometimes gives rise to such conflict between parties that the effectiveness of

government management is seriously damaged.

A further advantage of setting specific line-functional boundaries is that when overlapping occurs as a result of certain activities (for example, in the intelligence field) the party on whose field it "encroached" does not feel threatened. it will therefore not immediately jump to the conclusion that another institution is trying to take away its work. It is safe in the knowledge that when the overlapping of functions occurs it is an arrangement of expediency. When begins it to take on the character of permanence the aforementioned party can always

appeal to its line-function.

The true definition and maintenance of the relative autonomy of line functions is an ordering principle and non-obedience has a seriously disruptive effect on effectiveness. However, it is just as important that the mutual cohesion between the line functionaries is

a high priority and that, without the necessary co-

ordination, the joint achievement of objectives by the government will disintegrate. Attempts by line  
functionaries can neutralize one another so that no  
progress is made.

With "line function" is meant those categories of activities that are unique to a specific organization, in other words the central element that distinguishes the performance of its primary task from that of any other organization in the government set-up. If an institution cannot claim any such uniqueness, it must  
be incorporated into another existing organization.

The question is: what is an intelligence organization's unique line function that distinguishes it from any other State department and to which it can attribute its independent right to existence? In other words: what unique expertise / skill does a domestic intelligence worker offer the State that is not available elsewhere in the government sector? In the reflection on this matter one should take good care that the external circumstances are taken into account. The prescriptions by legislation and the line-functional responsibilities of other State departments are some of the most important factors to be considered. The intelligence service does not have the freedom to define its task in isolation and to manage it as it thinks fit. This could give rise to bureaucratic clashes that could eventually neutralize  
the total line-functional task of the service.

The practise of intelligence is not a unique function. This also applies to security intelligence. Other departments also do it. At first glance it appears as if an intelligence organization's uniqueness is possibly in the national (integrating) character of  
its intelligence practise. However, in some other

countries the function of national integration (instead of purely co-ordination) is undertaken by committees of line functionaries or by structures to which staff are "parcelled out" / seconded. However, if this is accepted as a line function, it would mean that the uniqueness of expertise to be found in the intelligence structures would be that of integration (the ability to form a total picture from separate events). This would then mean that only a few persons would be necessary to process the line-functional input. The other question is: how does one collect co-ordination? The existence of a unique collection

capability therefore also hangs in the balance.

An organization (which could even be a committee) to manage co-ordination as a line function undoubtedly has the right to existence, but then it will have to be a small group that specializes in the co-ordination

of something. The question is: what - is that

something?

With respect to the situation within the RSA, that something, the right to existence of intelligence, can be found in its co-ordination of and expertise with respect to conflict in the broadest sense of the word. In order to maintain national security in all its aspects a government needs management intelligence in order to create stabilities and to allow prosperity to thrive. Management intelligence forms the basis of government decision-making and serves as the basis for long-term planning and for determining priorities. The entire State economy participates in the provision of this management intelligence. In the economic field there is the State President's Economic Advisory Board, for example, in which the private sector is also involved, while the staff support (including the intelligence basis) is provided by the Bureau for

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Economic Advisory Services.

The question is posed: in the midst of all these institutions that help to promote national security, what is intelligence's unique contribution? It is a fact that the Service cannot duplicate the input of other roleplayers. The danger of duplication arises when the view is held that the intelligence infrastructure for maintaining and strengthening national security only comprises security intelligence. Extensive information is required for the prosperity dimension of the maintenance of security and some matters can only be placed in the same category as security intelligence - in an "artificial" manner.

It is possible, by means of ingenious arguments, to place anything that happens in the country in a security context. However, if other interest groups start doing the same thing it could give rise to a pretty confused situation. The economists, in turn, could, for example, try to give all events an economic flavour. It is well known that there are some of them

who have already tried to do so.

However, this must not be oversimplified. The central point is that some matters are intrinsically of greater security importance than others and that these "other" categories should not take up too much of the security functionaries' time. The time has long been ripe to do that which has to be done and do it well. The aforementioned must be understood very clearly. It is not being stated that no notice should be taken of matters that do not have direct security relevance. The idea is actually that these matters should be taken into account, but not managed.

"Managed" means that collection and expert processing

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of matters that fall within the line-functional field of other departments.

Important: management intelligence to ensure national security is composed of security intelligence as well as prosperity intelligence. In the RSA there is no organization or mechanism to bring about . an integration. It is definitely not the task of intelligence. The role of intelligence can be equated with that of the Bureau for Economic Advisory Services and other advisory bodies, boards/councils, forums, departments, etc. that could provide the government with advice in their line-functional fields (including

supplying information) to ensure national security.

Intelligence has its own niche in this market, and that is security intelligence;, in other words one of the two arms of management intelligence. This security is specifically has a bearing on the stability dimension, which includes all elements of the State's power base, namely the security forces, politics (including good administration), the economy and the social field. (Note: it is important not to equate the security forces element, as has been done in the past, with the security dimension. This gave rise to the problems in the 1980s when attempts were often made to solve problems in the political and socio-economic fields by means of the security forces. The mistake was made to think that a security solution

is equivalent to the security forces handling a

matter.)

To get back to a previous assertion: making sense of intelligence is found in the practise of intelligence with respect to conflict, in other words regarding the stability dimension of national security. Herein lies

its uniqueness. It is practical and it complements

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prosperity intelligence, and together they form the full intelligence basis for management decisions by the government. To a certain extent intelligence is the conflict advisor to the government. It is the task of this organization, amongst other things, to warn the government of any security or security-related problems that could stand in the way of good government in the future. It is its task to create scenarios that could advise the government regarding strategic choices to be made to try to overcome the identified obstacles. The Service's line function is therefore defined primarily in terms of support for the government in its governing function and not in the first place for the executive handling of specific problems. The Service is therefore not focused on operational support for events, although such support could actually be provided when

circumstances require.

If conflict expertise in the security field is accepted as the specific line function of the Service this means that researchers, for example, should, in the first place, be schooled in conflict analysis and conflict resolution and that this expertise should be made available to the government to identify (analyze) overall (national) or segmental (functional) conflict-generating tendencies. The researcher is therefore, in the first place, not an educational expert, for example, who is making his expertise in this field available to the government (for this he must join the education departments), but a conflict expert who advises the government regarding security-relevant conflict in the education field. His uniqueness lies in differentiating the line function of any other department. He must also possess the expertise regarding conflict resolution to be able to develop

scenarios that could advise the government with

respect to solutions to conflicts. Merely to possess the expertise with respect to the development of scenarios is not an exclusive intelligence task and it can also be of assistance to other disciplines. The intelligence practitioner's ability to develop

scenarios must always be conflict orientated and have security relevance.

A too narrow definition of conflict in the security context should be guarded against. It is often wrongly reduced to purely an analysis of the physical

confrontation between opposing parties. True conflict

analysis involves exposing the nature, the dynamics,

the extent and the mutual cohesion of all factors

(human as well as natural) that destabilize (subject

to conflict) a situation/community to such an extent

that it requires extraordinary security attention or

could require such in the future.

Physical conflict is the convergence point (moment of meeting) of deep-seated moving forces (tendencies) when opponents use coercion (real or implied) or wish to upset it to perpetuate a conflict. This visible manifestation is usually observable within the line function of a particular department or departments and is handled by the institutions concerned. It is the task of the conflict expert to make well-contemplated conflict analyses available to the line functionary to handle the problem. The line functionary does not have a "natural" aptitude for taking the conflict dimension into consideration in the execution of his line-functional activities. For this reason he needs an advisor to support him. One who can be of advice to him regarding the opponent in the conflict, as well as the historical course of the current situation in a security context, together with expertise regarding principles involved in the dynamics of the conflict

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situation in question (for example, by comparative examples of similar situations elsewhere). The latter category of expertise also implies scenario development. The client (who will be a State department in most cases) will find it useful to be advised about how similar conflicts progressed elsewhere and about the principles that were the basis of finding successful solutions (resolution). This should not be a mere extrapolation of the current events measured against successful models elsewhere. It should involve the development of options on the basis of ground rules for future-orientated research,

with the qualification that it must be conflict-centred.

This extensive approach to conflict means a multidisciplinary approach. This requires a strategic,

tendency-orientated institution that concentrates on

the forest rather than on the trees. The trees (violence, terror, breaking the law) are the responsibility of the line-functionaries. It would naturally be advantageous (and increase his

authoritativeness) if the intelligence practitioner was a specialist on one or more plant species in the forest. However, this is not the reason why he is employed. He is there to handle the forest as an ecological system and herein lies his uniqueness. To carry the metaphor further: it can be anticipated that in some cases the generalist also has to be a specialist where no line functionary will accept responsibility for a specific plant species or where he is not able to do research on this species. When the specialist field is entered it should be a temporary arrangement until a line functionary accepts responsibility.

The conflict analyst's field of interest is therefore



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wide. In his reflection (analysis) with respect to a particular conflict situation not only the immediate causative factors | / actions should be taken into account. They must be embedded in the total structural cohesion (systems approach) of the circumstances that include the structural and dynamic (current) problematic situation. it is only by the development of a vision of the problem as a whole that it can be handled fund&amentally and that not only the symptoms (acute conflict manifestation) can be

addressed.

Scenario development is the highest sport of intelligence studies. It is a refined science (art) that requires exceptional ingenuity, common sense, creativity and gut feeling on the part of the intelligence practitioner. Circumstantial factors and current events must be used as the basic ingredients for the development of handling/management options for the government . which the advantages and disadvantages are argued in such a way that the best (correct in principle and feasible) course of action can be decided wupon. In this respect the overall cohesion of all the factors (variables) that could

have an effect on the situation, must be taken into

consideration.

(Note: The counter-intelligence function: has deliberately not been taken into consideration here. The foreign intelligence function and the ground rules for application in this regard differ from the

domestic function.)

Scenario development does have a passive and active side, however. Passive scenario development is primarily projections for the future that concentrate

on the ilinterackFien between circumstantial factors.

The active approach also takes into account pro-active action by the government. When hypotheses of possible government actions are formulated and scenarios are built around them, the government is actually advised about strategic choices and this also serves, in a certain sense, as advice on combatting methods

prescribed in Act 39 of 1994.

The intelligence practitioner who is skilled in conflict analysis and conflict resolution must be thoroughly grounded in the strategic planning process in order to be able to understand his unique role therein and to make an (indispensable) contribution in

this regard.