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A BRIEFING ON DR M G BUTHELEZI, INKATHA AND THE CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION

AUGUST 1988 %

### INTRODUCTION TO DR MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI

Dr Buthelezi is the President of Inkatha and the Chief Minister of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. His ancestry is traced back to the founding fathers of the Zulu nation and through his mother he is descended from a long line of illustrious Zulu Kings.

The male line of succession in the Buthelezi clan (of which he lis the hereditary Inkosi, or Chief) traditionally provided successive Zulu Kings with advisors, generals and prime ministers.

Dr Buthelezi first showed his opposition to any form of independence for the Zulu nation when he served as counsellor to the then Paramount Chief, Cyprian, in the 1950s and 1960s. At this time the South African Government wanted to impose a Territorial Authority (as a first step towards making KwaZulu an independent country). Dr Buthelezi succeeded in delaying this move until 1970 when the Government made the status mandatory.

With the creation of the Zulu Territorial Authority, Dr Buthelezi was soon afterwards elected Chief Minister of the KwazZulu Legislative Assembly, which was created in 1972.

At that time he declared the biggest enemies of his people to be malnutrition, poverty and ignorance and pleaded for a comprehensive system of free education which was essential to all Zulu development. He saw this as a vital part of the process of political emancipation. His priorities have not altered since then.

Dr Buthelezi is separated from his political opponents such as the ANC/COSATU/UDF grouping not by his attitude toward apartheid (which they all abhor and insist must be scrapped) but by the means by which he sees apartheid being removed.

For Dr 'Buthelezi violence is not an acceptable means, whether morally . or - tactically, @ to. . rid +/South Africaof  $\hat{A}$ ¢ the system of apartheid/separate development. Negotiation is fundamental to his political strategy. To take on a system as militarily powerful as South Africa's by force is to attack the Government at its formidably strongest point. The weakest point of the present

Government is the malfunctioning apartheid system whose contradictions become more obvious by the day, so much so that the Government's own supporters are in a ferment as they seek  $\frac{3}{200}$  alternatives. This is what Dr Buthelezi believes will open the door to negotiation.

In a speech delivered in March this year, Dr Buthelezi made the following crucial remark.

"There lis no prospect of even the medium term survival of apartheid. We do not have to pay awesomely prohibitive prices to bring about its final eradication. There is already such a total economic interdependence between Black and White 'that apartheid has become dysfunctional even for the State."

The linternal dynamics of the country's economy and its inexorable impact on the dissolution of apartheid as Black consumer power increases has given Dr Buthelezi powerful practical reasons for operating from within the structures of the KwaZulu Government.

DR BUTHELEZI'S SUCCESSES

His firm and principled but nonviolent stance has had remarkable results, some of which are listed. Dr Buthelezi has:

Thwarted every Government attempt to manipulate KwazZulu into accepting so-called independence and in so doing has halted forever apartheid's programme of creating separate states for the various population groups. Apartheid has floundered ever since.

Established Inkatha, the largest membership-enrolled political organisation ever to have been formed in South Africa.

Campaigned against the present tricameral Parliament (which represents Whites, Asians and Coloureds but not Blacks) when it was introduced by way of a referendum in 1983. So successful was the discrediting of the racially structured tricameral system that it has never functioned properly.

Appointed the Buthelezi Commission which in its final report made a significant contribution to the concept of powersharing in South Africa, starting at regional level.

Allowed the KwazZulu Government to co-convene the acclaimed KWAZULU/NATAL INDABA which brought together for the first time many disparate but representative organisations and political

parties to formulate non-racial constitutional proposals for the KwaZulu/Natal region. KwaZulu and Natal are inextricably interlinked geopolitically and the Indaba has recommended a far-sighted and democratic new constitution which reflects the unity of the region and provides for a multiracial legislature

Accepted the formation of a multiracial JOINT EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY for the combined area of Natal/KwaZulu. This is the first time in. - South' Africa that such a multiracial administration has been implemented. It consists .of five members each from the Natal Provincial Executive Committee and the KwaZulu Government and although it has no legislative powers it will jointly administer certain services.

Campaigned against the politics of prescription, rejecting a Central Government plan for KwaZulu to participate in Regional Services Councils, a scheme for metropolitan local government which would be a prop to the discredited tricameral Parliament.

Prevented the cession of Ingwavuma, a district of KwazZulu, to Swaziland. Dr Buthelezi opposed the South African Government's attempted cession in a legal battle which went as far as the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. The South A African Government lost the case.

INKATHA YENKULULEKO YESIZWE (INKATHA)
THE NATIONAL CULTURAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT

This lis the largest membership-based political movement ever in South Africa and probably the largest on the continent of Africa.

It was established in 1975 and now has about 1.6 million card-carrying members, distributed nation-wide. Inkatha is strongest in the KwaZulu/Natal region which is where it was founded. It has members from every Black group and has the largest Youth Brigade and Women's Brigade in the country. It is not solely a Zulu organisation, as sometimes portrayed by its opponents. It was started in the Natal/KwaZulu Region amongst Zulus, where it's leader is based, but it has a large membership of non-Zulu speaking Africans.

Inkatha lis a democratic organisation with freely elected lleaders who are accountable to the rank and file. Every Inkatha member is - eligible for election to leadership positions.

A source of strength is the organisation's discipline and tight structure, with a network extending to branch, regional and national levels.

The supreme body of the Movement is the Annual General Conference where elected delegates determine policy and provide the leadership with mandates.

INKATHA'S VIEWS ON CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL ISSUES

### APARTHEID

Apart from the ruling National Party and the ultra-right wing Conservative Party, which is the Official Opposition in Parliament, all other major actors in the South African political scenario have set as their target the complete removal of apartheid.

### REFORM

Certain reform measures away from apartheid were implemented by the South African Government between 1979 and 1986. They include:

Blacks being granted the right to freehold property in wurban areas, except where they are excluded by the Group Areas Act.

The abolition of Influx Control (the  $\Pass\ Laws$ ), greatly increasing the mobility of Blacks.

Abolition of the Mixed Marriages Act (prohibiting marriage across the colour line) and Section 16 of the Immorality Act (similarly prohibiting sexual liaisons across the colour line).

Legal recognition of Black trade unions and their inclusion in the process of industrial relations.

Hotels and restaurants and many public facilities now being overwhelmingly open to all races in most parts of the country.

Abolition of the PROHIBITION OF IMPROPER POLITICAL INTERFERENCE ACT. It lis now possible to form multiracial political parties. The only reason why Inkatha remains a black organisation is because the Government has not repealed the Population Registration Act, which makes it impossible for people of various races to vote in the same Constituencies.

While these reforms away from apartheid have been made by the Government, three fundamentals of the apartheid (separate development) policy remain. These are:

The Group Areas Act which designates land which can be legally owned and occupied only by people of a particular race group;

- The Population Registration Act which categorises South Africans in terms of race;
- The 1913 and 1936 Land Acts which (subject to relaxations mentioned below) prohibit Blacks holding land freehold. Blacks are able to occupy land in designated "reserves", but this is communally held lland, not freehold. Also in .  $\hat{a}\200\230$ the:  $\hat{A}\$  Townships

It is axiomatic that fundamental, long-term reform is impossible until the Government is prepared to eradicate separate development/apartheid by the removal of these measures and to confront the major issue of power-sharing.

The recent Government "reform" attempts to establish a NATIONAL COUNCIL, which lis intended as a forum in which Black and other leaders can negotiate with the Government about constitutional reform have all but collapsed. The Government's unwillingness to make a statement of intent or produce an agenda has so far meant that no <credible Black leader is prepared to consider serving on the Council. The Government has reserved 19 of the 36 seats on the Council for itself ie. to ensure a voting majority.

Significantly, Dr Buthelezi will have nothing to do with any such Council; he refuses to negotiate a constitution until, amongst other conditions, the former leader of the ANC, Dr Nelson Mandela, Mr Zeph Mothopeng of the PAC and other political prisoners are released and given the choice of participating in the Council or not.

Inkatha believes that unless the Black body politic is unshackled, it will be impossible for the genuine Black leaders to participate in the National Council. This coincides with Dr Buthelezi's position - that he does not see Inkatha as being the only actor in the 1liberation of Black South Africa. He is on record as saying that all Black and White leaders with constituencies should participate in common negotiations regarding the future South Africa.

The present constitution is unacceptable to all political 1leaders outside of the ruling National Party. Yet the Government persists in attempting to seek a solution within its racially based framework, and all solutions proposed so far have excluded Black South Africans from central power.

Acceptable change requires an acceptance that South Africa as one country has a new constitution based ideally on universal franchise in a unitary state. 1Inkatha is flexible, however, and prepared to

consider options such as federalism and the protection of the rights of groups formed by free association (not based rigidly on race). The model decided on has to'be the outcome of negotiation by all concerned.

# THE MEANS TO SCRAP APARTHEID/VIOLENCE

The  $^\prime$  real issue: facing the country is discovery of the most acceptable means to undermine apartheid and force the Government to Scrap= s ,

Inkatha rejects violence as a political instrument. in. 25. years the so-called armed struggle has achieved nothing. The scale. of violence required to dislodge the South African security forces would be such as to devastate the country, lleaving nothing for the NECLOLSs Attempts at violent revolution merely accentuate intergroup antagonisms.

Inkatha believes Black South Africa will be liberated by its own upward mobility within an increasingly integrated socio-economic system. This is a process which is already under way. As Black purchasing power begins to increasingly direct the economy and Blacks begin to take more positions of responsibility within the economic system, the present ruling Establishment will be forced to seek political negotiations to adjust to the new realities. '

# BLACK DISUNITY

Dr Buthelezi has repeatedly warned that some forces in Black politics seek to bring down the Government by making the country ungovernable. These forces are not interested in reform but in the collapse of the Government, regardless of how that is brought about or how long it would take the country to recover from the resultant anarchy. They appear to desire power at any cost.

While ideological and tactical differences account for the considerable schisms between, for example, Inkatha and the ANC, the Government has also played a divisive role. Some significant Black leaders with minority support have been co-opted into the trappings of statehood in the so-called independent homelands.

Deep rifts between Africans, Indians and Coloureds have been caused by White-created political structures such as the tricameral Parliament.

A propensity among certain Blacks to strike out in rage and despair at those who should be closest to them is often the direct result of poverty and extreme destitution caused by apartheid. Inkatha leaders have felt great anguish as a result of the violence and have gone to extraordinary lengths to re-establish calm.

Inkatha sees it as imperative that Black unity be fostered to exploit the debate within the White electorate as to how far the Government should go with reform and how quickly it should be introduced.

Black bargaining power in industry, the consumer market and even the financial market has grown to powerful levels. Unity must be sought to further bolster this latent strength.

One of Dr Buthelezi's fundamental positions is that unless Black South Africans unify behind the need for a multi-strategy approach and strive for liberation across broad fronts, internecine conflict will cripple and ultimately destroy the will to achieve one country

with one destiny for all its peoples.

# OTHER INKATHA POSITIONS

- o Inkatha rejects and condemns apartheid and the "homeland" policy of the Central Government. It opposes the present tricameral parliamentary system (where separate houses represent the Whites, the Asians and the Coloureds, but not the Blacks) and campaigned vigorously against it when the plan was put before the White electorate in a referendum in November 1983.
- 2. Inkatha rejects violence and the so-called armed struggle, which are supported by the African National Congress-in-exile and other extra-parliamentary groups. Inkatha believes

violence will not destroy apartheid because it attacks the South African Government precisely where it is strongest. Nor is it morally justifiable. The Black struggle for Jjustice surrenders the moral high ground by becoming involved lin wanton violence, mainly between different Black groups.

3. Inkatha rejects the imposition of sanctions or foreign disinvestment as a .tdctic. against  $\hat{a}$ 200\230sthe South African Government. Where effective, such measures cause Black

unemployment and suffering. They also retard the 1liberation struggle because Inkatha anticipates emancipation through the rising prosperity of Blacks, not from their impoverishment. Sanctions and disinvestment are likely to create a mood of defiant beleagurement among Whites, to the political benefit of the parties of the extreme right wing.

Inkatha believes that a wunitary state with a government elected by universal franchise would be the ideal. However, it is realistically prepared to negotiate alternatives such as a federal system with protection of the rights of groups as well as . of 'individuals - so long .as groups are formed by free association and are not rigidly based on race.

Inkatha believes in a multi-strategy approach in Black politics, no single organisation.being entitled to claim sole and authentic representation of the Black majority. Inkatha condemns prescriptive politics from whatever quarter and seeks Black unity and co-operation on the basis of minimum consensus over tactics and strategies.

Inkatha consequently does not regard itself as the sole actor in bringing about change in South Africa, nor does it demand that other organisations take instructions from it.

Unlike the ANC and the UDF, 1Inkatha does not regard the - liberation of the Black people in South Africa as an end in itself. Inkatha believes liberation has to be achieved in such a way that Blacks are offered a Wetter future. To smash apartheid without clear and realistic consideration of what is to replace it could leave Blacks even worse off than they are at present in some countries, and Mozambique is an object lesson.

Inkatha deplores the re-imposition of the state of emergency, which lis a reflection of the Government's failure to involve South Africa's real leaders in meaningful negotiation. It deplores the action taken to silence and stifle the activities of certain extra-parliamentary political organisations. The action is a retrogressive movement away from the normalisation of Black politics, without which genuine Black leaders will not be able to enter negotiations with the Government and without which there will be no political settlement. Inkatha equally deplores the irresponsible and violent actions of certain Black organisations which provide the Government with a pretext for continued rule by emergency decree.