Comrades and Friends

The greatest historical failure of our times was the inability of successive white regimes to destroy and liquidate the ANC.

Despite a thousand plans aimed at dismembering us and rendering our

Movement

ineffective,

we

grew

both

in

stature

and

effectiveness. Our survival and growth as a fighting force is the major victory

that

our

people

have

scored under

difficult

conditions of illegality. In that time, as well as fighting the regime, we prepared our people to play a meaningful role in a 5?

87% /§Dme /010% /c

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liberated South Africa.

This we did by encouraging our youth to go to school wherever they were. And in 1979, we founded the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College in Morogoro, Tanzania. When we approached the Tanzanian government with the idea of a school, they readily gave us land on which SOMAFCO stands today. Mualimu is here. We, therefore, ask him to convey our heartfelt gratitude to the Tanzanian people for the gesture they have extended to our people. Education will

forever remain the other leg of our struggle. 12. The beginning of the $1980 \hat{a} \geq 200 \geq 31s$ witnessed the maturing of both the subjectiwwa and objective factors in. favour of $CRHâ\200\230$ peopleâ\200\231s Victory. As we were poised for great leap forward, we designated the 1980 \hat{a} 200 \hat{a} 231s the " Decade of Freedom. " We proceeded to

designated the 1980â\200\231s the "Decade of Freedom." We proceeded to call upon our people to make South Africa ungovernable and apartheid unworkable. To this call our people responded in their thousands. Everywhere in the country, popular organs of peopleâ\200\231s

constitutional principles on the basis of the Freedom Charter. In our View these principles would be a basis for a national debate on the new constitution. We, therefore, hoped to initiate a process whereby the new constitution would emerge from the people themselves. Through these and other initiatives, the ANC increasingly defined the terrain and tempo of our struggle. We thereby provided overall leadership to the country.

13.

However,

enemies

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struggle,

particularly

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the

international front, were far from vanquished. Diabolical schemes aimed at undermining our offensive had to be nipped in the bud. To this end, we initiated a process of wide ranging discussions within the ANC, between the ANC and the Mass Democratic Movement and between the ANC and the OAU and, in particular the Frontline states. These consultations resulted in the adoption of

the

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Harare Declaration by the OAU in 1989. The nonwaligned Movement endorsed the Declaration which was later adopted by the United Nations albeit with some modifications. We had secured our rear

succeeding

to

by

establish

а

common

international

on

the
resolution of the South African problem by peaceful means. What
is more,
'Hme Harare Declaration was INN: an imposition, but Âf1
beacon
which
emerged
from
the
people
of
Southern
Africa
themselves.

14.

Comrades and Friends

I was struck down by a stroke on the eve of the adoption of the

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manifestation of our practical solidarity with our sister people
in the Frontline States. In this regard, our combatants together
witll their Zimbabwean. comrades acquitted. themselves well
in
battles against
the> combined Smith euui VOster forces.
They
carried out their mission gallantly and valiantly. We salute
9
Basil February and his fellow comrades who lie buried in the soil
of liberated Zimbabwe. However, at the conclusion of the Wankie
and Spolilo campaigns, our problem of re~establishing the ANC
__ inside remained essentially unresolved.
0.9.
\hat{a} \geq 00 \leq 30^{\circ} Given our Wankie experience, it became necessary for us to meet.
Thus, in 1969 we had our First National Consultative Conference
ill Morogoro Tanzania.
Conference was
to
take
stock of
the
kâ\200\235 totality of our experience and, on the basis of that, map out the
\hat{a}\200\234\&er &u(iway forward. Morogoro became a land mark and a turning point in
our
struggle.
Ιt
was
that
Conference
which
produced
comprehensive document on the strategy and tactics of the ANC.
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Reporting tocnuéSecond National Consultative Conference in 1985, the National Executive made the following observation about Morogoro:

9′

Out of Morogoro came significant results, the most important being the re~orientation of our Movement towards the prosecution and intensificathmn of our struggle inside South Africa, the restoration and reinforcement of unity within our ranks enui

the integration «of all revolutionaries 'within.

the

external mission of the ANC."ll2EfEfj;QÂfEL}ÂfLQEEE_EEJE§EEEEQHip of the ANC to all South Africans, regardless of the colourfof

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we had to elaborate principles upon which the constitution of a
democratic state would be founded.
17.
In response
to
these,
we
issued.
an, NEG
statement
in
1987
outlining conditions under which we would be prepared to enter
into
negotiations
with
the
regime.
Αt
the
same
time
we
commissioned
the
1Hâ\200\234)
Constitutional
Committee
â\200\230ha
begin
elaborating constitutional principles on the basis of the Freedom
Charter. It was our View that such principles would constitute
a basis for a national debate on the new constitution.
Weâ\200\231.
therefore,
hoped
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initiate

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process

whereby

the

new

constitution would emerge from the people themselves. Through these and other initiatives the ANC increasingly defined the terrain and tempo of our struggle. In this manner we provided overall leadership to the country.

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18.

However,

enemies

of

 $(MHâ\200\230$

struggle were

far

£31m} vanquished.

Diabolioal schemes aimed at sabotaging our struggle had to be nipped in the bud. To this end, we initiated a process of wide ranging discussions within the ANC, between the ANC and the Mass Democratic Movement and between the [HMS and the OAU enui,

in

particular the Frontline states. These consultations resulted in the adoption of the Harare Declaration by the OAU in 1989.

19.

Comrades and Friends

I was struck down by a stroke on the eve of the adoption of the Harare Declaration. My report should, therefore, end here.

In

historical fact. But to be able to make the type of contribution we made, time and again we had to strengthen ourselves through a process of internal reorganisation. It was in this context that in 1969 we held our first National Consultative Conference in Morogoro Tanzania. The objective of the Conference was to take stock of the totality of our experience and, on the basis of that, to map out the way forward. Morogoro became a land mark and a turning point in our struggle. Conference produced a comprehensive document on the strategy and tactics of the ANC. The document emphasised the need to activate all the motive forces of our struggle. These forces were identified as blacks in general and, Africans in particular. The working class was seen as having a leading role to play in the struggle. In this regard, we reaffirmed the supremacy of political struggles.

Reporting tocnuâ\200\230Second National Consultative Conference in 1985, the National Executive made the following observation about Morogoro:

U

Out of Morogoro came significant results, the most important being the reorientation of our Movement towards the prosecution and intensificatbmn of our struggle inside South Africa, the restoration and reinforcement of unity within our ranks enni

the integration (If all revolutionaries 'within. the external mission of the ANC.

Η

The significance of the decision to open up membership of the ANC to all South Africans should be

IISTATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS COMRADE OLIVER R. TAMBO
TO THE ANC NATIONAL CONFERENCE
JOHANNESBURG ~ JUNE 1991

The Deputy President, Comrade Nelson Mandela
Members of the National Executive Committee
Members of the Internal Leadership Core
Regional Convenors and Members of the Regional Leadership
Commanders and Combatants:of our glorious army, Umkhonto we Sizwe
Leaders of the Mass Democratic Movement
Excellencies Members of the Diplomatic Corps
Fellow Delegates, Comrades and Friends
Compatriots

0.0.

It is my singular honour and privilege to welcome each and every one of you to this first legal ANC National Conference inside South Africa after decades of us not being able to do so.

We

welcome you with boundless joy, especially you delegates, who, represent hopes and aspirations of millions of our people across the length and breadth of our country. We welcome you convinced that you have come here propelled by a burning desire to end apartheid tyranny sooner rather than later.

0.1.

It is my pleasant task to make a report back to our Movement, our people and country, on the mission we were assigned to do outside the country, more than three decades ago. I present this report on behalf (yf the National Executive Committee and nwr fellow returnees, both the living and the dead. At this stage, I want to express my hope and wish that the remains of J.B. Marks, Moses Kotane, Florence Maphosho, Elijah Makhathini, Eli weinberg, Dr Yusuf Dadoo and countless more martyrs of our struggle shall soon be brought back home so that they, too, can lie side by side with

their ancestors. This is the least we can do to honour the memory of the heroic men and women who,

gave their all

so that a

most spectacular assaults on the enemy, such as the attack on SASOL. Thus, the great lie of the invincibility of the apartheid fortress was laid bare. Our people began to see cracks onthe fortified walls of the laager. 0.9. At the beginning of the 1980 \hat{a} 200 \hat{a} 31s both the objective and subjective factors were maturing in favour of a people's Victory. We, therefore, designated the 1980â\200\231s the "Decade of Freedom. " As we grew in confidence, we called Luxni our people 1K) make South Africa ungovernable and apartheid unworkable. Our people responded to this call in their thousand s. Everywhere in the country, popular organs emerged, challenging the hegemony of the structures of apartheid. The UDF and COSATU were formed. Thus we entered a period of dual power in the countryn The government was forced \hat{a} 200\230UD impose the state of emergency. International confidence ill the Viability (H? the apartheid state, plunged to its lowest level. As the crisis of

the apartheid state increased both in scope and content, Western governments began to court the ANC. For the very first time an official ANC delegation was received in Washington. 10. It was against a Climate of heightened confrontations between our people and the enemy that we held our Second National Consultative Conference at Kabwe in 1985. Conference was

therefore characterised as the Council of War. Amongst the many

positive decisions of this Conference, was the decision to open

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conclusion.
wish.
to make
few observations:
We
did not
surrender when the going got tough. We did not tear ourselves
apart because of lack of progress at times. We were always ready
to accept our mistakes and ready to correct them. Even in bleak
moments, we were never in doubt regarding our ability to win
freedom for ourselves. We are in no doubt now that the people\hat{a}\200\231s
cause shall triumph.
20.
I now declare this first ANC National Conference inside South
Africa in three decades, open. The National Executive Committee
is accordingLy dissolved.
12
am sure
I[
speak for ImggP aï¬\201 nnf
colleagues when I say that we shall always be ready to serve our
Movement in whateVer capacity. May I also take this opportunity
to thank all those who have made my Presidency a worthwhile
experience for me personally.
Amandla !
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particularly England we succeeded in encouraging the formation of a pâ@werful anti-apartheid Movement whichâ $200\230$ helped to swing public opinion against the regime. Our position in international

organisations,

like

â\200\230Hua non~Aligned Movement,

11m: Afroâ\200\224Asian

solidarity organisation.and so forth.became unassailable. By 1974 the General Assembly of the United Nations was able to refuse the credentials of the South African representative despite strong resistance from the West.

0.7.

13m / ,0â\200\234qu

Comrades and Friends

If we managed to register early Victories on the international front, internally we were not that successful. Between 1963 and 1967

communication

with

the

inside

was

very

minimal

and

unreliable. Our underground had been dealt a crippling blow by the Rivonia arrests. On the other hand, the entire subâ\200\224continent was still firmly in the hands of imperialist powers whoâ\200\2302 connived and collaborated with Pretoria against the liberation Movement.

We had trained cadres whoâ\200\230é were languishing in camps with little prospects of returning home. Following discussions within the Movement,

we

decided

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send
the
Luthuli
Detachment
into
Rhodesia, with instructions that they were to fight their way
back home.
0.8;
So,
in 1967 a combined force of Umkhonto we Sizwe and ZIPRA
crossed the Zambezi into Rhodesia. This marked the beginning of
what was known as the Wankie*Spolilo campaigns. As well as being
an
attempt
resume
the
struggle
inside,
this
was
а
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Harare Declaration. My report back should, therefore, end here. In concluding I wish to make a few observations: We did not surrender when the going got tough. We did not tear ourselves apart because of lack of progress at times. We were always ready to accept our mistakes and

Even in bleak

to correct them.

moments, we were never in doubt regarding our ability to win freedom for ourselves. We are in no doubt now that the people \hat{a} 200\231s cause shall triumph.

15.

It is now my pleasant task to declare this first ANC National Conference inside South. Africa in.a period of thirty years, open. Accordingly, our National Executive Committee stand dissolved. I am sure I speak for all my colleagues in the NEC when I say that we shall always be ready to serve our Movement in whatever capacity. May I wish you all the success in your deliberations. Lastly, I want to, most profoundly, thank all those who, made my Presidency an unforgettable experience for me personally. Let us march to Victory.

Amandla!

their skin, was a giant leap forward towards true non~racialism within the ANC.

From Morogoro we created the Revolutionary Council whichi¬\201hwas Charged with $\hat{a}\200\230$ Hna responsibility'<mf prosecuting $\hat{a}\200\230$ the struggle

inside the country. We later replaced the RC with the Political Military Council. The PMC was answerable to the NBC and, under 2.

its leadership, forward machineries were established. The post 1976 era witnessed a rapid reâ\200\224emergence of the ANC inside the country. Amongst the many factors which contributed to this

development were the collapse of Portuguese colonialism and the June uprisings of 1976. As a result of the June uprisings, many young people reinforced the external mission.

10.

(ha the other lunui,

the independence of Angola anui Mozambique

created new possibilities for our struggle. Angola provided us with military bases and we opened up the eastern front. The steadfastness

of

the

Frontline

states

proved

decisive

in

enhancing our striking capacity. The independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 further consolidated $a\200\230$ Hue strength $ci\200\231$ the anti $\200\alpha$

struggles

in

our

region.

Thus,

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the balance
of
forces
was
irrevocably Shifted in our favour. Key leaders of the Frontline
states Ihave
joined.
us
today,
â\200\230ha once
more,
reaffirm
their
unflinching support for our cause. We are grateful to them and
to their people for all they have done for us. Never shall we
forget the support they rendered and continue to render to us.
11.
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the membership of the National Executive Committee to all South
Africans
irrespective
of
the
colour
of
their
skin.
We
,therefore,
became, second to the SACP, the first truly non"
raoial political Movement in South Africa. The other important
decision. was
to
strengthen democratic practices within the
Movement by holdingzaDki¬\201jxnmi¬\202.Conference after every five years.
Above all we resolved to rally to the defence of our people by
intensifying the struggle on all fronts.
11.
By the time of the Kabwe Conference we had succeeded to place the
issue (If
the transference (i¬\202?
political. power firmly (HI
the
agenda. This reality was beginning to be recognised by the far
sighted sections of thexi¬\202mthaoommunity who, began Unseek us out
£3.
and engage us in discussions regarding the future of the country.
On the other hand,
as our people defiantly unbanned the ANC,
contacts between the inside and the outside were intensified. In
the circumstances, the need for us to address conditions under
which we would be ready to negotiate the democratisation of the
country became more than urgent. Of equal urgency was the whole
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question of the nature of the state we wanted to see replacing
the apartheid state.
12.
ha response we
issued EH1
NBC
statement
:hi
1987
outlining
conditions Luuknâ\200\230
which.
we
â\200\230would
in;
prepared.
to
enter
into
negotiations with the regime. At the same time we commissioned
the
ANC
constitutional
committee
to
begin
elaborating

seen in

its proper perspective. Addressing a public meeting between 1955 and 1959,

I was asked a question as to whether I

would accept a membership fee of eight white comrades who, wanted to

join the ANC.

I could not accept the money because the

practice at the time was that whites should join the Congress of Democrats. Even though constitutionally anyone could be a member of the ANC, practice at the time militated against this. In this sense, Morogoro was a giant

leap forward towards

true nonâ\200\234

racialism within the ANC.

7 0 1

From Morogoro we created a special body with the responsibility of prosecuting the struggle inside South Africa. This body was called the Revolutionary Council and we later replaced it with the Political Military Council. The PMC was answerable to the National Executive. Under its leadership,

forward machineries

were established. Slowly but with increasing success we began to revive cnuâ\200\230 structures inside 11m; country. Ti¬\202nus, our presence

amongst our people was re*established.

0.8.

The greatest historical failure of our times was the inability of successive white minority regimes to destroy and liquidate the ANC.

Despite a thousand plans aimed at

dismembering us and

rendering our Movement ineffective, we grew both in stature and effectiveness, particularly in the post 1976 era. Our survival and growth as a fighting force is the major Victory that our

people have scored under difficult conditions of illegality. By 1981 units of Umkhonto we Sizwe, were able to mount some of the

3.

burning desire to make this Conference the last one we ever shall have to hold in bondage.

0.1.

This Conference is not only unique because it takes place in South Africa after an absence of three decades, but also because of its representativeness, its South.Africanness. Given.the Cloud of uncertainty hanging over our country like a dagger, given the ever rising climate of confrontation fostered and perpetuated by enemies of peace and democracy, given our peopleâ\200\231s impatience with oppression, decisions that will emanate from this Conference must inevitably burden.Soutthfrica and, indeed ourlentire region with.oonsequencesci¬\2027historical magnitude.IRnâ\200\230congregatedi¬\201within these four walls is the voice of reason, the voice of freedom, the voice of peace, the African National Congress.

0.2.

Comrades and Friends

In line with our democratic traditions, I now present a report back to our Movement, our people and country, on the mission we were assigned to do outside the country more than three decades ago.

I present this report on behalf of my colleagues in the

Executive,

my peers

and

fellow combatants

in

the

external mission, both the living and the dead, and indeed on my own behalf. Because the history of the past thirty years is as vast as the road we have traversed hitherto, one can but only mention $landa^200^24marks$ in our report.

0.3.

We left the country in the early $1960 \hat{a} \times 200 \times 231 \hat{s}$ on the instructions of the NEC.

(kn? brief was to establish the external mission in order to win friends for our struggle and thereby isolate the

all that Zambia could offer, but he also saved my life when I was taken ill. Thank you comrade Kaunda. Thank you Zambia. 15. Our 1985 Conference took place against a Climate of heightened confrontations between our people on the one hand and the regime on the other. The regime sought to create divisions amongst us by resorting to all sorts of schemes including attempts to draw a wedge between the youth and the old within the ANC. None of â\200\2301â\200\2305; these diabolical schemes succeeded. Amongst t many p081tive decisions, Conference desided to open up the membership of the 1' each) 2A NEC to all South Africans. We, therefore, became, second to the SACP, the first truly non raoial political Movement in South Africaâ\200\235 â\200\230We Eihmo resolved â\200\230ha strengthen democratic ;praotioes /0 within the Movement and to rally to the defence of our people by intensifying time struggle inside. Above EHJ. emerged. from Conference as a united Movement, much to the shame of

our

adversaries.

By the time of the Kabwe Conference we had succeeded to place the issue (H?

the transference CH?

political. power firmly (N1 the

agenda. This reality was beginning to be recognised by the far sighted sections of the white community whoâ\200\230.began to seek us out and engage us in discussions regarding the future of our country.

More importantly, contacts between democratic forces inside and

intensifiedâ\200\235

outside ihad

In

the «circumstances,

the :need

to

address conditions under which we would be prepared to negotiate $Hr \hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 34$,

democratisation of the country became more than urgent. Equally,

difficult, given that internationally and regionally the balance of forces was still predominantly in favour of apartheid forces. 1 THN3 entire subâ\200\224continent was still firmly ill the hands $\circ f$ imperialist powers who, oonnived and collaborated with Pretoria against the liberation Movement. Our cadres had to pass through colonial Mozambique and colonial Rhodesia before reaching the borders of South Africa. That was the time when wars of independence in the Portuguese colonies and Rhodesia began in earnest. We took advantage of this and decided to send the Luthuli Detachment into Rhodesia with instructions that they were to fight their way back home. This was also a manifestation of our practical solidarity with the people of the Frontline states. In this regard, our combatants acquitted themselves well in battles against the combined Smith and Voster forces. Though the detachment never succeeded to reach home, they had carried out their mission gallantly and valiantly. We salute Basil February and his fellow comrades who lie buried in the soil of liberated

Zimbabwe. However, at the conclusion of the Wankie and Spolilo campaigns, our problem of reaestablishing the ANC inside remained essentially unresolved.

0.5.

bn.the international front things looked different. If successive white regimes managed to contain our initial efforts to relocate inside the country, they dismally failed to do so on the international front. From the very beginning we made modest but

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doubt about what we believed,
what we were working for;
no
Ν
hesitation in political aims. The uncertainty arose from the
blows we had received. "
0.3.
It was in those Circumstances that we took.a calm resolve to meet
the challenge headâ\200\224on, for the cause we stood for was greater
than ourselves. We did not indulge in selfâ\200\224pity and personal
admonishment for having dared to challenge white supremacy. On
the contrary, we acted sustained by the knowledge that we were
representatives cī¬\201â\200\231ia great euui noble people. We rose â\200\234U3 the
challenge fully conscious that a people with a proud history of
resistance
such
as
ours
would
expect
no
less
from
their
progenitors. As a result, our determination to fight on became
stronger than ever; for we strongly believed in the justice of
our cause â\200\224 a cause of a people destined to be free some day. It
mattered not how long it would take us to reach that day.
Ιt
mattered not how much pain and suffering we would have to endure
before we too could be free men and women. We were going to be
free and, we shall be free.
0.4.
What was the key question that we had to address in the early
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â\200\2311960â\200\231s

our

The external mission had to launch and sustain an all round offensive internally and externally. In.other words, we had to transfomn the external mission into 61 fully fledged ANC, operating: in conditions of illegalityn

In this regard,

efforts to re~establish internal structures proved to be very

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power
emerged,
challenging
the
erstwhile
hegemony
of
the
apartheid structures. In 1983 the UDF was born and a year later
COSATU was formed. Thus we entered a period of dual power in the
country. By 1985 the regime was forced to declare the state of
emergency. As the crisis of the apartheid state deepened,
so
plunged international confidence in its Viability . And for the
very first
time an official ANC delegation was
received in
Washington.
13.
Evenzmsvwamade these impressive gains, areas of failure remained
many and varied. For instance, the fact that many cadres spené
long: times
confined 'U)
time barracks
anui underground houses
without ever seeing action, was one such failure. We could have
sent more people to school than we actually d1?) this was also
a failure.
Ιt
was â\200\230with
the
Viewr of
resolving some CH?
our
subjective weaknesses and thereby strengthen the Movement, that
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we oonvenedcnuéSecond National Consultative Confefence in Kabwe, Zambia, in 1985. 14.

Wm, / Pane /cDI \hat{a} 200\231i \hat{a} \200\2314IC

Now that President Kaunda is here,

I want to say a few words

about this towering Champion of the African revolution. It was because of him that the ANC and Lusaka became synonames. We cannot talk of our struggle without talking about the nerve centre of that struggle M the Republic of Zambia. It is thanks to President Kaunda,

the government of Zambia and indeed the

Zambian people, that today I am making the kind of report back that I am making. Not only did comrade Kaunda give our struggle

COMRADE OLIVER R. TAMBO

TO THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONFERENCE

DURBAN â\200\224 1 JULY 1991

Dr Nelson Mandela, Deputy President of the ANC

Dr Kenneth Kaunda, President of the Republic of Zaubia

Dr Robert Mugabe, President of the Republic of Zimbabwe

Mualimu.Nyerere, Distinguished.Leader of1"\202uaRepublio of'Tanzania

Members of the National Executive Committee

Regional Leaders

Commanders of Umkhonto we Sizwe

Exoellenoies Members of the Diplomatic Corps

Distinguished Guests

Fellow Delegates

Comrades and Friends

0.0.

It is my Singular honour and privilege to welcome into our midst some of time most distinguished African leaders (ï¬\202? our times. President Kaunda, President Mugabe and Mualimu Nyerere will be properly' introduced,

lnine

1};

just

â\200\230ha give

them cnuâ\200\230 warmest

embrace on behalf of the ANC, the entire South.African people and indeed (Ml my cwnl behalf. Welcome 1x3 this your (WWI home dear brothers.

We welcome you With boundless joy, especially you delegates, Whoa represent hopes and aspirations of millions of our people across the length and breadth of our strife torn country. We welcome you conscious of the fact that you have come here propelled by a

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to the challenge fully conscious that 61 people with aa proud
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Mme.
Q.\r\cx\err\cia\202¬
â\200\231voâ\200\230dcx.â\200\230
tke.
Wnowkaokge
TLâ\200\230aA
Peefii
history of resistance such.an3 ours would expect IN) less from
their progenitors. AS a result, our determination to fight on
became stronger ti¬\202mul ever;
for vne strongly believed ill
the
justice of our cause \hat{a}\200\224 a cause of a people destined to be free
some day. It mattered not how long it would take us to reach that
day. It mattered not how much pain and suffering we would have
to endure before we too could be free men and women.
0.5.
The fundamental question that VW3 had to resolve ill the early
1960â\200\231s was lunv best 'h) transform CMUâ\200\230 resolve iJHx) practical
struggle. It became clear to us, particularly in the post Rivonia
era, that we had to launch and sustain an all round offensive
internally and externally. To this end, we travelled extensively
and simultaneously began to train our cadres in countries like
Tanzania,
Ethiopia,
Egypt,
and
Congo.
Demands
of
the
day
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necessitated the transformation of the external mission into a fully fledged ANC, operating in conditions of illegality. 0-6.

PW. 15W 6/th

Initially we put more efforts into our international work. If we hoped to raise the necessary resources for the struggle, we had to unite the world behind the ANC. But also the regime had to be isolated in order to be weakened. From the very beginning we made modest though steady'gains in this regard. We found ready friends in the Socialist countries who rendered us solid support. The newly independent countries of Africa, Latin America and Asia threw ti¬\202mi¬\201jâ\200\230

full

weight

behind (MM? struggle.

Ihl

the

West,

democratic South Africa freed of oppression and fear could be born.

0.2.

I left the country in 1960 on the instruction of the NEC. My brief was to establish the external mission of the ANC and to awaken the international community to the plight of our people. Anticipating the banning of the ANC, the NEC had decided that if such banning was to materialise, the external mission which I was to head would take responsibility for kall the internal and external fronts. We went to Beohuanaland where at best we were treated with suspicion and at worst with outright hostility by the British authorities. We soon learned that we had to confront this hostility throughout the western world.

Within days of our departure, there was a massacre at Sharpville followed

by

the

banning

of

the

ANC

and

other

political

organisations. Our worst fears were confirmed when our leaders

were

captured

at

Rivonia

and

later

sentenced

to

life

imprisonment. These events left us with a sense of deep shock and revulsion. We felt lonely and abandoned in a hostile world. No

one has more aptly portrayed our then situation than Hilda Bernstein. In her words, 0′ There came a time when it seemed as though the ground was no longer firm beneath our feet; as though the world had tilted and we were uncertain about each step. But this was not only personal concern. The same sense of disorientation. existed in ti¬\202ma organizations within which. worked. It was not so much a loss of direction, there was no

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steady gains in our endeavour to isolate the racists and create
a reliable Iwmuâ\200\230 base for (NH? struggle.
111 this
regard,
the
Socialist countries ledlnrthe Soviet Union.gavetu3solid support
from the very beginning. The newly independent states of Africa,
Latirl America and .Asia
threw
their fii¬\201J-
weight
behind our
struggle.
In the West,
particularly England we succeeded in
encouraging the formation of a powerful anti~apartheid Movement.
This helped swing public opinion against apartheid. Our position
in international organisations, like the non*Aligned Movement,
the .Afro~Asian. solidarity' organisation enni
so
forthâ\200\235
became
unassailable. By 1974 the General Assembly of the United Nations
was
able
to
refuse
the
credentials
of
the
South
African
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representative despite strong resistance from the West.

0.6.

It must be mentioned that the positive role of the Fiontline states proved to Ema crucial iiâ\200\231luyt decisive 511 enhancing our striking capacity. Tanzania did not only provided us with our first external Head Quarters, she also provided us with training facilities for our soldiers. We later moved the Head Quarters to Lusaka where it has been until our return home. In this regard, the

independence $\mbox{ci} \mbox{$\sim$}\$

Angola euui

later

Zimbabwe,

irrevocably shifted the balance of forces in favour of the anti~colonial struggle in the sub-region.

0.7.

Comrades and Friends

Our contribution to the liberation of the subâ\200\224continent is

а

apartheid state, and secondly, we were to create a reliable rear base for our struggle. Though the decision that I was to leave was taken in 1959, due to logistical problems I only left in 1960. By that time the Sharpville massacre had taken place and the ANC had been banned. As a result, the NEC directed the external mission which, I was to establish and head, to assume overall responsibility in prosecuting the struggle both inside the country and abroad. At the time we believed that we would not be outside the country for more than five years. In the event, we stayed for thirty years. went t.o Bechuanaland from where Ι proceeded to Tanganyika where Ι met Mualimu for the first time. From Tanganyika I went to Tunisia and then Ghana. Thus began our

international crusade to win friends and isolate the racists.

Inside the country the leadership was preparing for the armed struggle which was launched in 1961. Our efforts were therefore oomplementaryn

However,

this (tHi not

last

long em;

our IHigh

Command was arrested in Rivonia in 1963 and later sentenced to life imprisonment in 1964. Rivonia was a severe blow which took us years to overcome.

0.4.

Given these forbidding Circumstances, we took a calm but firm resolve to meet the challenge headâ\200\224on, for the cause we stood for was greater than ourselves. We did not indulge in self-pity and personal

admonishment

for

having

dared

to

challenge

white

supremacy. On the contrary we acted sustained by the knowledge that we were representatives of a great and noble people. We rose