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'IHE Anglican Church is outraged by the restrictions which the Minister of Law and Order has placed on the Natal president of the United Democratice Front, Mr Archie Gumede, the Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town said in a statement yesterday.

The Most Reverend
Desmond Tutu said.that
for more than 18 months,
Natal and national church
leaders had been trying to
bring to an end the con-

flict between political rivals in the province.

 ${\rm \hat{a}}\200\234During$ this period the government has

acted

IRAS sk

Outragedâ $\200\231$ by

only to hinder the process, never to help it. It has refused to contemplate an independent inquiry into the causes of the violence and it has imposed restriction orders affecting one of the parties to the talks.â\200\235

Archbishop Tutu said last week a fresh peace initiative involving Inkatha and the UDF-Cosatu alli-

â\200\224

ance appeared to be bogged down in a dispute

over a venue for talks. â\200\234Our churchâ\200\231s Provincial Synod sent a delega-tion of bishops to talk to both sides and, minutes before the synod ended last Thursday, we heard of aqh apparent break-

â\200\234throug

 \hat{a} \200\234Now, two days after

the Release Mandela

Campaign.

They also restrict him from talking to the Press, addressmg public gatherings, and helping to prepare any material for publication.

Mr Gumede is also restricted to his house in Clermont between 8pm and Sam. Sapa.

talks about peace were to have started, Mr Adriaan Vlok has restricted the activities of Mr Gumede, one of the strongest voices for peace in the region. We cannot interpret this as anything other than a deliberate attempt on Mr Vlokâ\200\231s part to perpetuate the divisions which have caused such frightful bloodshed in Natal.

 \hat{a} 200\234It is essential that the government abandons its partisan approach to the violence in Natal as a matter of the utmost urgency. Mr Vlok has shown in negotiations over hunger strikers that he is amenable to reason. If he does not display this quality now, history will judge him and his colleagues very harshly indeed for their contribution to the terrible killing, maiming and destruction taking place in Natal, \hat{a} \200\235 the statement said.

Mr Gumede, was served with restriction orders on Monday. The ord were served on Mr Gumede at his home in Clermont, | Durban. -

The orders were served on Mr Gumede at hisy home in Clermont, and prohibit him from playing any part in the UDF and

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More than 1 300 people have been kitled in the province this Abaut hoines have been destroyed, leaving cloge to 100000 people hameless during the Past two years,

Responding to g UDF-Cosaty letter an their objections to ilund! as & yenue, Ine

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ta/UDF alliance in Maritzburg dmvr clos:

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Jpseriously injured.

provocation could trigger the bloodiest fighting -

the province's four years of political violence has

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protest was cailed in the wake of this week's...

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Jabu Ndlevu in & ¢ & gunand arson altadk on

burg home lasg weelk: -0

Her huisband labulani and their daughier Nobuhie; 13, died in the attack. Her nzphew Thahane, 24, wae

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attack on two women on Friday
men armed with guns paty
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peided following an impasse over the venue for the
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ind Opinion

Andy Young Wasnâ\200\231t Alone

A USS. Ambassador Says He Met the PLO 35 Times

By Lally Weymouth

job as U.S. representative to the United Nations for violating American policy not to engage in diplomatic contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organiza-

I n August 1979, Andrew Young lost his g

tion. But new evidence has emerged that .

Young wasn't alone in talking to the PLO at that time.

John Guather Dean, former U.S. ambassador to Lebanon, says that during the same year, he heid frequent meetings with

senior PLO officials 'in Beirutâ\200\224with au-

thorization from then-Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Indeed, in a series of recent interviews, Dean revealed that while heading the U.S. Embassy i Lebanon between October 1978 and June 1981, he held 35 officially sanctioned meetings with PLO officials. b

Laily Weymouth writes regularly about foreign affairs for The Weshington Post.

Dean claims that among his PLO contacts was Yasser Arafatâ\200\231s top aide, Khalil el-Wazir, This official, knowm as Abu Jihad, was in charge of PLO military operations and he was a special enemy of the Israelis (who assassinated him in Tunis last year). But. Dean sees him differently. He describes Abu Jihad as â\200\234a soldier and a well-trained officer who kept his word with me and was helpful to the U.S.â\200\235

Dean recently left the State Department after serving as ambassador to five Thailand and Lebanon. He says he decided to make public his PLO contacts because \hat{a} 200\234the credibility of the PLO is in question \hat{a} 200\235 and he wants to boister it by showing from his personal experience that there is \hat{a} 200\234an-other side \hat{a} \200\235 to the- PLO. ,

The Dean contacts add a new chapter to the saga of Americaâ\200\231s secret relationship with the PLO during the 1970s and early $'80sa\200\224a$ period when the United States maintained an official policy of refusing to

See DEAN, B3, Col. 1 \hat{a} \200\234

DEAN, From Bl

reocognize or negotiate with the guerrilla organization. Deanâ $200\231s$ revelations also help explain why Israel is so wary of American assurances in the current peace process. Thereâ $200\231s$ a fear in Jersualem that new Amer-

 $a\200\234$ ican guarantees $a\200\224$ like the old policy of no

contact with the PLO \hat{a} 200\224may prove unreliable.

" Cyrus Vance confirms in an interview that he authorized $Dean \hat{a} \geq 200 \geq 31s$ meetings with the PLO in Lebanon and says the purpose of the meetings was to discuss embassy security in Beirut and release of U.S. hostages in Iranâ\200\224but not to discuss political or diplomatic issues. Thus, argues Vance, the Dean meetings were not a violation of the pledge made to Israel by Henry Kissinger in 1975 not to negotiate with the PLO until it $a\200\230$ recogni Israel $a\200\231$'s right to exist, since 'there wer \hat{A} ® no political discussions and it was political discussions that were banned. $a\200\234$ There was a loophole, $a\200\235$ says Martin Indyk, head of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. $\hat{a}\200\234$ These contacts were

Andy Young Wasnâ\200\231t Alone

going on on â\200\230security grounds.â\200\235â\200\235 Indyk explains that successive American administrations looked on the 1975 Kissinger pledge as a restriction on their room to maneuver and tried continuously through various intermediaries to get the PLO to accept Kissingerâ\200\231s terms for U.S, recognitionâ\200\224a process that finally culminated last December when Arafat publicly accepted U.N. resolutions 242 and 338 and Israelâ\200\231s nght to exist.

The Dean meetings, says Indyk, appear to be $a\200\234$ the first case in which you have strong reason to believe [State Department officials] were maneuvering around the assurances. $a\200\235$ A source close to Kissinger puts it this way: $a\200\234$ They [the State Department] were always maneuvering themselves around the agreement, into a position of contact with the PLO. $a\200\235$ (The CIA maintained its own secret contacts with the PLO on security issues during the 1970s, through a separate intelligence channel.)

Dean speaks about the PLOâ\200\231s role in pro-

tecting him as U.S. ambassador to Lebanon as if he were describing a friendly foreign government, rather than a terrorist organization. Yet according to anti-terrorism ex-

perts, it was Arafatâ\200\231s group that just a few years earlier had murdered the American ambassador to Sudan, Cleo Noel, on March

2,1973.

" $\hat{a}\200\234$ When I wished to travel through Lebanon to support orphanages [and | old-age homes, I worked with every faction including the PLO, $\hat{a}\200\235$ says Dean. He recalls that he would tell the PLO where he wanted to go and $\hat{a}\200\234$ they $\hat{a}\200\231$ d advise whether this was safe or not and send an armed escort. $\hat{a}\200\235$

The Dean channel played an important role after the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was seized in November 1979 and American diplomats were held hostage. Vance says he told Dean $a\200\234$ to get the message to Arafat to help us get our hostages out. $a\200\235$ Arafat, eager to gain diplomatic credit for releasing hostages, soon went to work.

Since the PLO was helping provide security for Ayatollah Khomeini at the time, $a\ge00\ge34$ was not irrelevant to be talking to them, $a\ge00\ge35$ says William Quandt, a former member of President Carter $a\ge00\ge31$ National Security Council staff. Harold Saunders, who was assistant secretary of state for the Near East and South Asia during the Carter years, also confirms that there were meetings between U.S. officials and the PLO to discuss the hostage crisis.

 $a\200\234$ The PLO had helped provide security for Khomeini $a\200\231$'s people in Paris and there was a senior PLO official in Tehran, $a\200\235$ says Saun-

ders. He adds that the State Department $\hat{a}\geq00\geq34$ informed the government of Israel as to what we were doing. $\hat{a}\geq00\geq35$ He says the hostage discussions were within the scope of the 1975 Kissinger commitment.

With Arafatâ\200\231s help, says Vance, â\200\234we got 13 hostages out.â\200\235 The group, including five women and eight blacks, was released Nov. 19 and 20. Recalls Vance: â\200\234I sent my thanks to Arafat. I am very grateful we got 13 out.â\200\235 Saunders adds that after the 13 hostages were released, the Carter administration â\200\234continued to communicate with the PLO in regard to [the remaining] hostages.â\200\235

Dean says that Abu Jihad was deeply involved in the effort to release U.S. hostages in Iran. This humanitarian role was galling to some American and Israeli officials, who knew of Abu Jihad's role supervising Fatahâ\200\231s military and clandestine operations against Israel. According to Israeli sources, for example, Abu Jihad directed an attack against the Savoy Hotel in Tel Aviv in 1975

in which 11 Israelis were killed and an attack on a bus near Tel Aviv in March 1978 in which 33 Israelis died. He also controlled the PLO network on the West Bank and Gaza and the flow of PLO money to those regions.

Dean says he was not the first Ameri.an

ambassador to deal with the PLO. $\hat{a}\200\234$ There .

had been cooperation before I came, especially in finding out about the assassination

of Ambassador Meloy,â\200\235 he says. (Francis Meloy Jr. was serving as U.S. ambassador to Lebanon when he was killed on June 16, 1976, by a radical Palestinian faction, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.) According to Dean, Arafatâ\200\231s Fatah operatives helped recover the body.

An important difference between the Dean contacts and Andrew Young's meeting with the PLO in New York, says Vance, was that the Young meeting wasnâ\200\231t authorized by the State Department, and that Young -initially lied about it. â\200\234You canâ\200\231t have your own people not telling you the truth i says Vance.

But Rep. Mel Levine of California takes a more critical view of the Dean contacts in Beirut. $\hat{a}\200\234$ You don $\hat{a}\200\231$ t have 35 meetmgs that are not viewed as negotiations, $\hat{a}\200\235$ he says, addmg that when you $\hat{a}\200\234$ have an explicit p \hat{A} ¢licy on which a number of other assurances are based, people have a right to assume you are adhering to the policy. This [the-Dean meetings] contravenes the policy of the U.S. government. $\hat{a}\200\235$

An Israeli official questions whether the U.S.-PLO meetings even accomplished their goal of helping helped American security. â\200\234The value of American commitments is rather low,â\200\235 this official says. â\200\234Hy-pocrisy and diplomacy are traditionally European staples. The U.S. public wants straight talk and straight actions.â\200\235

: 1093!'.3 : $a\200\230$ Pressed on the need for black labour in a CP-controlled South Africa, Dr Treurnicht said: â\200\234We accept the interdependence in the economic sphere. $\hat{a}\200\235$ He-said he believed the CP already had the majority of white support in the Transvaal and the $a\200\234$ prospects are very good for an overall majorityâ\200\235. Dr Treurnicht leaves London on Tuesday for Paris and Geneva. His itinerary here had been shrouded in secrecy, presumably to foil antitheid activists. reurnicht's trip is irently aimed at ting him to voters in dnternational man. -

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By Chris Whittield

LONDON: Britain was

given a rare taste of

South African Conserva-

tive Party politics yes-

terday when it heard Dr

Andries Treurnicht say $\hat{a}\200\224$ ingWHeRS O RETHGE infe-

rior \hat{a} 200\234but they are differ-

entâ\200\235,

In his first live interview here the CP leader told radio listeners the $a\200\234$ main thing $a\200\234$ "self derermination of various peoples and the rights af people to protect their own community life $a\204$ ¢

Dr Treurnicht arrivesd here on Friday on a 14day sweep across Europ< and immediately piunges into a series of privats meetings. Early vester-day he was in the BBC Radio 4 studio.

He outlired the CP': separate developmen: pelicies and its support for the $a\200\234$ national states $200\235$.

He denied a suggestion that his party would remove millions of biacks from white areas. â\200\234These people have setiled in certain areas and we are forced to admit they are there and to give them their own local goyvernment. maybe even up 0 city status.â\200\235

And he said the CP $\hat{a}\200\234$ would not necessarily , bring back apartheid in post offices. cinemas anrd restaurants $\hat{a}\200\231$.

Asked why. as the turn ofithe century ap- - proached, he felt it necessary to separate peopie. Dr Treurnicht said: â\200\234Be-cause even in the vear 2000 tnere will be sepa- rate peoples. there will be Afrikaner people in South Africa. a broaderâ\200\231 white community. there will be Zulus in Zululand. QwaQwa ...â\200\235

A!andlz: gâ\200\230.'é a ssuâ\200\230mvm"e" . Secret deal to free Mandela

® Margaret Thatcher is on the verge of concluding a secrel deal for the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela, reports The Sunday Express,

It says that the deal, which comes after months of intense behind-the-scenes pressure from Britain, will free the jailed nationalist leader in September.

It adds that the South African government, which has refused to release Mandela until he formally rencunces violence, is desperate (0 regain international respect ability and has agreed to drop its pre-condition,

However, it says, Mandcla has apparently given his assurance that he will do all he can to prevent an explo- | sion of violence.

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: MRS THATCHER is

on the verge of one of

the most stunning
_ diplomatic triumphs
- of her career, with the
. conclusion of a secret

deal in South Africa to release Nelson Mandela unconditionally in September.

The deal, which comes after months of intense behind-the-scenes pressure from Britain, involves Mandela,

National Pearty leader fa

oeee.

FOREIGN NEWS and WEATHER

ritain in secret deal to release

by MICHAEL TONER in London

and JOHN MacLENNAN $a\200\230Z$ r*:?,.mpwsi¬\201 Town

that Mandela must formally renounce viclence

With the prom1 e of uncora ditional release, Mandela has apparently assured Mr de Klerk that he will do all he can to prevent an explosion of violence in the townships if he is freed.

Crucial Once he is allowed home he has told the National Part

has told the National Party leaderâ\200\224who takes over from P. W. Botha as State President in Septemberâ\200\224that he will issue a statement calling

F.W. de Klerk and Zulu | for calm and national recon-

- leader Chief Buthelezi. Last weekend Mr de Klerk ¢

told Chief Buthelezi privately that the decision to free Mandela had already been made.

The South African Government, desperate to regain international! respectability, is ready to drop the condition

cxlxatlon

Though this is not a condition of the release it 1s the crucial factor which could allow Mr de Klerk to fend off attacks from his Right-wing critics.

Mrs Thatcherâ $\200\231$ s part in the

deal, which could transform the South African political scene, will be underlined

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when Mr de mem *«rm't.s Bri-

tain later this montt

The Prime M; mwrr will be

the first world leader to be told officially of the lanea\200\235 which is still being iept

firmiy under wraps in South Africa itself.

Mr de Klerk is refusing to answer any fuestions on the subject. Last week he told a TV interviewer that he wished to discuss the matter with Mrs Thatcher â\200\234one to oneâ\200\235 pefore he made an announce-ment.

Government sources in South Africa think it vital Mrs Thatcher should throw her weight publicly behind the new initiative.

Mr de Klerk will also be seeking support from President George Bush before seri-

ous talks open between the .

apartheid regime and black parties.

The 1mpend1ng breakthrough will be seen in White-

andel

o Shehasbeenlsolatedmthe

European Community in her

a hall &s a trivmphant vindication of Mrs Thatcherâ $\200\231s$ lonely

stand against worldwide eco-

nomic sanctions being
imposei on Pretoria.,
Weight

Commonwesalih and in the

conviction that the South
Africans should be persuaded |
rather than bullied into

change.

That stand-~undertaken at some political cost to Bri-tainâ\200\224has meant that the Prime Ministerâ\200\231s advice has carried real weight in the South African Government's | efforts to get itself off the | hook.:

After last weekâ\200\231s talks between Mr de Klerk and Chief Buthelezi, the scene is now set for & major negotiation on South Airicaâ\200\231s constitutional future, beginning before the end of the year.

Neither Buthelezi nor any other significant black leader could possibly enter talks with Mandela still held.

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Zulu/Natal Indaba - has praised M; F 3 e Klerk, Inkatha hae ronsistently op
been taken, with the Govarn. new NP leader, for his conoli. possd,
ment backing off from earif- iatory line. , Chief Buthelez! digelosad
ar policies, Chief Buthulez! diseloged { when he and Mr De
This wesk, Natal MEC in & speech vesterday thataix Kierk mo: he Kiined the im. | :
Peter Miller annouiosd thse days after hiz May 27 meer. pression that Mr De Klerk i
the Government would be Ing with Mr De Kierk, the a^200^234 really did want (o talka^200^235
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suspanding the Introduction latter kad backag oif from wanteg te move !waz'd::
of the can roversial Regional the Governmentâ\200\231s [nsistance meaningful negotlations,
Services Councils in Natal that it would implemaent â\200\234That is progress in any-
The intention was 10 re. RSCa in Nara] tmmediately. pogy's language " ne zaid,
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an Services Boards ne otiat- tha Inkaths Centra) Commit- ther one swallow made &
ed at the (KwaZquzsdatal,) te2 in Ulundl, Chief Butheles! BuMmer
Joirt Executive Authority. stopped short of saying Mr Chief Buthelezt sald he { &
The move has been warm- De gleerk had overruled M- might maet Mr De Klerk | al
Iy applauded by Chiaf Man- Heunie, tha outgoing conat- 8gain â\200\234in the not-toc-dlgin
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Govt may free Ma

John Maclennan
THE Governmest has acvepled that Mol
Mondets mnst be released unconditi
in order to start t4'ks with reai black leaders, and il is ready wdo g0,

This bas emerged from beeakt talks between NF jeader Mr $\hat{A}Y$ W de Klevk and Chief Minister Mangosothy Buthelesi,

In the best, o meeting. called at Mr de

Klerk's requesi, the man who will be the next State President oo sraiged rola. thons with the most iowporiant black keader out of prison and agreed on guidelines for farther talks.

- These major developments have been discussed at both NP cavces and Cabioet Yeval and prowide aces whe i Mr de Klerk eontd play before the Septeanber Â\$ clections,

A senice NP sowrce sail the Cabinet would weigh various factors, wanging from the state of warest \hat{a} 200\2300 oleetion \hat{A} ¢ g b velopiments, in setticg: 4 rebease date.

It is expected that My de Klerk will make & general and quatified statement of intent and that the party will use this as He main st of its carmpaign o show the Government really can and wilf deliver on reform. Mandeta is likely to be released

eaias AN BOTONARCL ALY G S T i

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Jusst after the election,

Pritne Minister Margaret Thatcher is expected to be of the full game Plan wien she meets My de Klerk in London later this mrocih. The same yessage will be conveyed to Vresident Georpe Bosh if the NP feader can Seeure a roecting with him,

For oow Mr de Klek s refuging to answer questions an the subject. Fle told an interviewer for (fe Christian Science Monitor television service he wanted 40 discuss the L5500 \hat{a} 200\234one 10 o wilh Mrs Thatches flrst,

His meetings with Mrs Thateher and [OS sibly \hat{A} ¥ evident Bush and the public reaction af hese Lwy most impertant Western lead ers will also provide e NP with thye o joT electioneering fillip i needs to drewn oriti-

sm- that it bas failed to get talks going, thal H is ruining fhe SoOnomy s cannot oOt gui cormaplion,

A senior Cabinet Mmister has : drschosed $a\200\224$ in confidential falks with black leaders $a\200\224$ that the Government is satisfied Mandeta will support negotiations if he is refeased without the pre-roadition requaring hixs rejection of dwolenee.

Mandela is expected to IHay a vital Leidg tng roke. He is the anly black leader with the

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ndela after election

eharisma and standing to reach across ihe rdeclogical gaps which divide olacks,

% Chief Butheles this week dischosed how 4 vilal decision by Comstitutional Affairs.
Minister Chris Hemnis to press on with Regional Services Councils for Natai had been vhanged dramatically just six days after.
Chief Butheleaiâ\200\231s â\200\234for-rangingâ\200\235 diseussioes with Mr de Klerk, reports Sapa.

Addressing a2 meeting of the Tnkatha Maiemal Colbral Liberation Movement in \mid ! lundi, Chief Buthelez: siopped shot of say- \hat{A} \$

M e Rk had overruled Mr Hemmis, -

Un May 34 Mr Heaois rejerted a kwraZutu dewsand for a moratorim on the intro. $a\200\234$ uction of RSCs, which lnkaths opposes.

tinef Buthelz vevealed that when he and Mr de Klerk met in Durban oa May 27 fus impression was that Mr de Klerk wainted o mave lLowards meaningful megotia-

Hons in & way his predecessors had pot.

As â\200\234proof of the puddingâ\204¢, be said. Natal MEC Mr Peter Miller announced the Gov erment was delaying the introduction of RS5Cs in Natal and would hopefully replace temn with Metropolitan Services Boards which had been negotiated at the EwaZu-la/Natal Joint Executive Authority.

o | Poete-et