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SOUTH AFRICA'S DECISIVE YEAR

South Africa entered 1992 with so much promise, so much hope. The National Peace Accord had been signed. Formal negotiations for a new dispensation had begun at Codesa. The air was filled with talk of breakthroughs, of compromise and of progress on the road to a new South Africa.

But all these hopes were dashed. The African National Congress wrecked Codesa by pulling out of negotiations. Violence escalated. The National Peace Accord was repeatedly breached by some of its signatories because they incurred no penalties. Boipatong and Bisho shocked the nation and reverberated around the world. As the country was wracked by unrest, business confidence, already at a low ebb, almost vanished. The economy sank into the worst depression since 1904. Millions were unemployed. Thousands more were retrenched. The state deficit reached an unprecedented R30 billion. For the average citizen, life became intolerable, with high taxes, stagnant incomes, rising prices and uncertainty about jobs and the future. Criminal violence reached unprecedented heights with people being attacked in the streets, at banks and even in their own homes and cars. During 1992, fear and anger stalked the land. There was no peace and very little hope. In addition, the country was wracked by the worst drought this century and, far from the rainy season beginning in October bringing relief, the drought intensified.

1993 promises to be another tough year. Political and criminal violence will continue. In addition, it will be a year of argument, controversy, division and potential upheaval. There is certainly a strong temptation for State President FW de Klerk and ANC leader Nelson Mandela to reach an agreement between themselves in bilateral negotiations, impose it on others in multi-party talks or exclude those that will not accept their terms and rush into an interim government. This course of action is being enthusiastically promoted by most of South Africa's English newspapers, but not all of them.

"The national dilemma can be succinctly stated," said Ken Owen (*Sunday Times* 17/1/93). "If we take the time we need to thrash out a sound constitution, continuing violence may drag us into a Balkan nightmare; but if we rush into a jerry-built interim government of Nats and ANC, we put ourselves at the mercy of two sets of political gangsters, and may never see democracy." He then outlined the case for the interim government. The NP cannot govern without the acquiescence of the Blacks and the ANC cannot rule without the acquiescence of the Whites. Since neither can govern alone, perhaps together they may do so. This would strengthen "the centre" against pressures from both the left and the right. However, the danger is that "the two governing parties, neither of them democratic, will have every incentive to cut new deals to keep themselves in power. Chief Buthelezi has seen the danger so he is trying to secure a separate power base in a federal/confederal system before it is too late."

"Hardly anyone, it seems to me, is asking the hard questions," Owen continues. "Can an ANC-NP coalition govern without the acquiescence of the Inkatha Freedom Party? Is it better to compromise now with the IFP, or to suppress a Zululand-based rebellion afterwards? Would the SADF, demoralised and suspicious, be willing to perform the role performed in Zimbabwe by the North Koreans - the role of putting down the post-liberation challengers to the ruling party? ... The truly frightening prospect is that the immense appetites of the ANC and the corrupt machinery of patronage of the National Party will simply be combined in an interim government. The ensuing corruption would be spectacular, and ruinous."

While forcefully warning of the dangers of an interim government, Owen offers no way forward for South Africa apart from the two hints about a sound constitution and a federal/confederal system. His warning about an imposed solution leading to a Zululand-based rebellion is well founded, but why does he limit the rebellion to the Zulus? What about the Tswanas and the Ciskeians? And what about the 100 000 Whites who voted "No" in the referendum and the overwhelming majority of Whites and more than half the Blacks who oppose an interim government? The only way forward for South Africa is a federal/confederal system with a maximum devolution of power to the local level and a very limited tax structure which will ensure that the bureaucracy is cut to an absolute minimum.

YES, THERE IS HOPE FOR 1993! Disillusionment with the ANC is widespread and its revolution is losing momentum. The numerical strength of the Concerned South Africans Group (Cosag), and its alternative to the unitary socialist state proposed by the ANC/SACP, offer hope. In addition, many Christians are beginning to seek out the Biblical principles that need to be implemented in order to bring God's blessing on the land.

COSAG'S STORMY MEETING WITH THE GOVERNMENT

The first meeting in 1993's crucial negotiation process started in Pretoria on Jan 8 when a two day conference between the National Party and Cosag. The 12 member Cosag, includes the IFP, the governments of Bophuthatswana

and Ciskei, the Conservative Party, the Afrikaner Volksunie and some smaller Black and White groups. Between them, these groups represent approximately half of South Africa's Blacks and half of the Whites. Cosag was formed in protest against the bilateral Record of Understanding reached between the ANC and NP on Sept 26, 1992.

The first day of the meeting was so stormy that delegates threatened to withdraw. Cosag accusing the government of trying to "sideline" other political parties in favour of the ANC. It said in no uncertain terms that it would not accept an interim government, nor take part in a recreation of Codesa. **It flatly rejected the Record of Understanding and any other bilateral agreement between the ANC and NP.** However agreement was eventually reached and the "multi-party conference of review" Cosag insisted on to prepare for multi-party negotiations was renamed a "multi-party planning conference".

The last thing the government wanted at the talks with Cosag was a confrontation on political or constitutional issues, according to Prof Marinus Wiechers, of UNISA's Dept of Constitutional Law. His statement gives a clear indication as to why the government agreed to a multi-party planning conference. It had to have agreement at all costs. **Presumably the government understands that it has agreed to one line of action with Cosag and an entirely different one with the ANC! It is not clear when and how it is going to reconcile these views.**

"We believe there are many hidden dangers with a transitional government," said Rowan Cronje, Bophuthatswana's Minister of State and Cosag's chairman, after the meeting. "If you go to a multi-party planning conference after having reached bilateral agreements, are you going there with an open mind?" Cosag wanted all agreements made at Codesa to be declared null and void and the question of regionalism or federalism to be resolved before any elections could be held.

Many unsuccessful attempts have been made to break the unity between Cosag's members. A two-pronged attack on the Ciskei and KwaZulu was being planned by the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), and the Pan-Africanist Congress' military wing, Apla, with the assistance of the Transkei government. Ciskei leader Brigadier Oupa Gqozo said on Jan 11. He said representatives of the three groups met in Umtata a few days after Christmas. The attacks would be carried out in the name of Apla. A mass action campaign was planned for the Ciskei in February. Simultaneously armed attacks would take place. The ANC, PAC and Transkei denied the allegations.

Exercising quiet diplomacy, the United States, Britain and other EC states were promoting the case for all-party talks throughout December and pressing Buthelezi to rejoin the multi-party negotiations. They were also backing up the understanding reached between the government and the ANC in last month's bilateral talks, according to *The Weekly Mail* (11/1/93). In essence, the understanding was based on a recognition of two realities that:

- The two sides have a "shared responsibility" for leading South Africa towards an election for a government of national unity in which all "willing parties" will participate.
- A breakdown in negotiations would hasten the collapse of South Africa's already crippled economy.

ANC'S KEY STEPS FOR 1993

This year is "destined to be the year when we bring to an end the exclusive exercise of political power by the White minority," Mandela said on Jan 8 in a statement marking the ANC's 81st anniversary. Key steps to be taken are:

- A resumption of multi-lateral talks at Codesa;
- Ensuring a climate of free political activity in all parts of the country;
- The establishment of the Transitional Executive Council and its sub-structures as well as an independent elections commission and an independent media commission;
- Elections for a Constituent Assembly and an interim government of national unity before the end of 1993;
- Re-incorporation of the "so-called independent bantustans".

Announcing that the slogan for the year was **1993 the year of the first democratic elections**, Mandela appealed to all ANC structures to prepare fully for elections, although he conceded that elections before the year-end might not materialise. **However the ANC would not transform from a liberation movement to a political party before a fully democratic government had been installed.** Speed in the negotiations process was essential because the transition to democracy was the key to resolving the country's economic and social problems. He said it was due to the ANC's initiatives that foreign funding "exceeding R11 billion" had been donated to groups sympathetic to it.

Negotiations were being conducted between "the elite of the oppressed and the oppressors," Winnie Mandela, Nelson's estranged wife, said on Jan 7. Speaking at the funeral of the activist Helen Joseph, she said death may have spared her "the looming disaster in this country which will result from **the distortion of a noble goal in favour of a short-cut to Parliament by a handful of individuals**". A clearly embarrassed Nelson tried to shrug off **this extraordinary attack on the ANC leadership** as an attempt to satisfy her personal ambitions. However a **power struggle between ANC radicals led by Winnie and moderates around Nelson is said to be alarming the movement.**

ANC TORTURE CAMPS

The ANC's security arm, Mbokodo, which means "the boulder that crushes", **committed murder and tortured innocent people to extract confessions amid appalling brutality and deprivations in the camps it ran.** This was stated by the one-man Douglas Commission, appointed by the International Freedom Foundation to investigate

atrocities in ANC prison camps. Four women at Angola's notorious Quatro camp, driven insane by incessant beatings and sexual abuse, were executed. One of Mbokodo's main functions had been to spread terror among the rank and file MK members to ensure that no-one criticised the ANC leadership or questioned its decisions.

Advocate Bob Douglas said evidence by 100 witnesses of ANC camps in Uganda, Angola, Mozambique and Zambia, amounted to "a litany of unbridled and sustained horror". The first camps were founded in secret in the late 70's under the aegis of the SACP and the tutelage of the KGB. Today former camp commanders, commissioners and guards were walking around free. Several senior ANC/SACP members, including Chris Hani, Joe Slovo, Oliver Tambo, Jacob Zuma, Joe Modise, Ronnie Kasrils and Alfred Nzo, were named in the report as being implicated in torture and murder. Douglas recommended that those guilty of the offences be punished and their victims rehabilitated and compensated. The report's findings were rejected by the ANC. This report follows that of Amnesty International and an internal ANC investigation, both of which found evidence of abuses. Both the latter agreed that those guilty of atrocities should not be allowed to hold positions of power.

MOST OPPOSE AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT

A total of 74 percent of White NP supporters and 84 percent of all Whites oppose an interim government, according to a Human Sciences Research Council survey published on Jan 6. Only 43 percent of Black, 17 percent of Coloureds, 9 percent of Indians and 4 percent of Whites (1 percent of NP supporters) definitely wanted an interim government. Even among Black ANC supporters, only 51 percent favoured it. However between 98 and 100 percent of all groups indicated that they supported leaders who wanted negotiations. The HSRC recommended that more information about the implications of an interim government be directed at ordinary voters.

"The opposition to an interim government is an indication that while the vast majority of Whites still want the negotiations to continue, they do not go along with the government on important aspects of its policy," editorialised *The Citizen* (9/1/93). "The assumption that the government will take the majority of Whites with it on the road to a new South Africa may prove to be wrong if it does not take heed of the anxieties of the Whites, the opposition building up on the Right and the dangers of being seen - rightly or wrongly - to be acting in tandem with the ANC."

Only 42 percent of White men said De Klerk was doing a good job running the country as opposed to 61 percent in April 1992, according to a Omnichick poll published on Jan 14. The percentage of those in the latest survey saying he was not doing a good job rose from 29 percent to 41 percent, with 18 percent having no opinion.

TENSION BUILDS UP IN THE FREE STATE

The violence started by the PAC's Apla (Azanian People's Liberation Army) in the Eastern Cape in November spread to the Free State in December. Combined with a crime wave, the attacks have greatly increased the tensions in that province which could lead to a violent reaction. Farms in the area have been turned into forts, with windows either boarded up or covered with metal screens. Angry farmers carry firearms wherever they go.

A 15 year old school girl was shot and killed in an Apla attack on the family farmhouse on the evening of Dec 19. A Chinese stick grenade exploded against a wall, then shots were fired through the lounge window where three children were watching television, hitting the girl. The building, only 800 meters from the border with Lesotho, is in the Ficksburg area where there have been five attacks on homes since Sept 29. Three people were seriously wounded on the afternoon of Dec 19 just inside the Transkei border when men on the back of a pick-up fired at the vehicles in which they were travelling. An elderly Free State farmer and his daughter were shot and killed on December 21. His wife was critically wounded. Earlier in the year another farmer in the area was killed.

There has been a sharp increase in violent crime in the Free State in the past years, the regional commissioner of police said on Jan 15. Compared with 1991, murders rose by 11 percent in 1992, armed robberies by 24.5 percent, rape by 11.1 percent, serious assaults by 12.1 percent and vehicle theft by 14.2 percent.

Following these attacks, emergency meetings were held in Ficksburg and Theunissen on Dec 22 at which three government ministers tried unsuccessfully to pacify the angry residents. In halls filled to capacity, shouts of "dog", "traitor" and "liar", accompanied by demands for their resignation, punctuated every attempt by the ministers to speak. The farmers demanded the banning of Apla, the arrest of its leaders, the re-introduction of the death penalty and the issuing of semi-automatic weapons to farmers. They also demanded that the state stamp out lawlessness which they believe stems from a hate campaign against Whites.

If another Free State farmer was attacked or killed, a mini war would possibly break out, with farmers taking the law into their own hands, the OFS Agricultural Union president, Dr Piet Gouws, warned on Dec 23. He feared that the community would become so agitated that farmers would enter squatter camps where they believed the attackers came from, and shoot suspects. There was tremendous anger and bitterness among the farmers as a result of the recent spate of violence, he said. **"This anger is not so much directed against the Black people but more against those who have the power to do something and don't."** An AWB leaders said bluntly "My people want to fight. Right now, we are holding back their reins. If we let go all hell will break loose." **In apparent retaliation, two vehicles carrying Blacks were attacked on Dec 24, resulting in the death of a man and the wounding of three others.** Armed policemen have since been stationed on about 250 farms along the Lesotho border.

The CP would start arms training camps for members of its Home Guard units in January, CP member of Parliament, Charl Hertzog, said on Dec 30. The camps would train people in self-defence, the correct handling of weapons and anti-terrorist tactics. "The low-intensity war which is being waged against the public by the terrorist organisations can only be countered by effective people's mobilisation and it is now the appropriate time for all members of the people to participate," he said.

PAC THE SAME AS APLA

The Pan-Africanist Congress' second deputy president, Dikgang Moseneke, resigned both his post and his membership of PAC's national executive committee on Dec 16, citing work pressure from his law practice. He had been considered a top PAC strategist and had been regarded as a future leader. His resignation was seen to have put the hawks in control of the movement. The PAC denied that his resignation was a direct result of the recent Apla attacks. However it followed the admission by first deputy president, Johnson Mlambo, that Apla had been involved in the recent Eastern Cape atrocities. All PAC members were bound by the organisation's policy, which included the continuation of the armed struggle, Benny Alexander, PAC's general secretary, said on Dec 17.

PAC's entire executive committee reiterated its commitment to the armed struggle as the principle form of struggle, PAC's regional chairman for the Transkei, Gibson Matshayana, said in an internal circular dated Dec 23. He warned that if there were raids into the Transkei, the full weight of the African population would be brought to bear on the "entire White settler community". In another recent circular to regional secretaries, PAC's national organiser, Maxwell Nemandzivhanani, called on all PAC branches to give logistical support to Apla in the form of clothes and accommodation. In its New Year message, Apla labelled 1993 "The Year of the Great Storm".

The police issued warrants for the arrest of three Apla members, including its chief of operations in the Transkei, on Jan 4. They were wanted for murder, attempted murder, terrorism and malicious damage to property. All three had undergone military training outside of South Africa. The charges resulted from attacks on vehicles in the Eastern Cape. Security sources believe Apla has between 120 and 130 cadres in South Africa, more than MK had at the height of its terror campaign in the 1980s.

A policeman was killed and another wounded in Crossroads, near Cape Town, on Jan 12 when a man sprayed a police vehicle with automatic rifle fire. Apla claimed responsibility. Nine policemen were killed in the first two weeks of 1993. In 1992, 226 were murdered.

There had been 60 attacks on policemen, some of whom were off duty, in Thokoza, Vosloorus and Katlehong, between July 17, 1991 and November 1992, a police sergeant told the Goldstone commission investigating attacks on police on Jan 12. Six attacks by Apla and six by MK had been politically motivated. Investigations had been hampered by lack of cooperation from the community because witnesses "know they will be killed if they co-operate with the police."

Inflammatory statements play "an important part in stimulating violence against the security forces, particularly the SA Police, Brig Stefanus Abrie told the commission. Apla attacks claimed eight police lives last year. Apla and the PAC were one and the same. Despite its attempts to distance itself from its armed wing, Apla's activities could not be divorced from the PAC, he said. "The PAC controls Apla's entire budget, Apla is responsible for the execution of PAC's military policies and its vision of a 'people's war' and high-ranking PAC officials serve on Apla's high command." The commission was also told that the PAC had received R42 million from Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi in 1991. Apla was conducting "mobile warfare" in parts of the Free State and the Vaal Triangle.

TRANSKEI SUPPORT FOR THE PAC

Apla could use Transkeian territory for attacks on Whites in South Africa in terms of an agreement between Apla and the Transkei signed on Dec 13, 1991, according to the January issue of *Newsweek*. "In return, Holomisa agreed to provide Apla with guns and grenades" while Apla would absorb and train 500 Transkeian soldiers. Transkeian leader, General Bantu Holomisa, admitted that in 1990 senior military officers were sent abroad to seek help from ANC, PAC and other African leaders.

After the publication of a receipt, Holomisa admitted that he had been supplying Apla with pistols, which he said were for the protection of ANC and PAC leaders on visits to the Transkei, and that he would continue to do so. The receipt, dated April 1992, for 15 9mm pistols and 225 rounds of ammunition was signed by Lawrence Ntinkina, Apla's operations chief in the Transkei. He is believed to have master-minded the Apla attacks on Whites in the Border region for which Apla claimed responsibility. He was also named as the person who gave instructions for the first spate of attacks in the Ficksburg area in September 1992.

"The number of attacks for which Apla was responsible and in which 9mm ammunition was used significantly increased since April 1992," the police counsel, Francois van Zyl, told the Goldstone commission on Jan 4. Arrested Apla members had made it clear they had undergone military training in the Transkei, as individuals or in small groups. The crash courses had taken place in various places and had only lasted for a few hours or a few days. "Various attacks by Apla members on police stations and White civilians were planned and carried out from Transkei territory on the instructions of members of the Apla high command in the Transkei," he said.

Holomisa refused to support the committee of the Goldstone commission to investigate Apla activities, and appointed a commission of his own. Both the PAC and Apla refused to give evidence to the Goldstone commission.

TOP ARMY OFFICERS PURGED

Twenty-three senior army officers, including two generals and four brigadiers, were immediately retired or suspended as a result of an internal investigation into covert military activity, De Klerk announced at a hastily convened press conference on Dec 19. In addition, an unspecified number of civilian collaborators were fired. These are the key paid informers, some of whom are believed to have been infiltrated deep within the upper ranks of the ANC. Without them, the security forces are blind, ignorant of the plans the revolutionaries are making. With their support gone, their very lives are at risk!

De Klerk's action followed apparently conclusive evidence uncovered by Gen Pierre Steyn that officers and civilian collaborators were involved in criminal and unauthorised actions and had misled their commanders and ministers. De Klerk said there was no evidence pointing to anyone wanting to violently overthrow the government. He also denied that the evidence indicated the existence of a formal "third force".

The purge was aimed at ridding the security forces of elements who might pose a problem when an interim government is set up and joint control over the security forces is instituted and absorption of MK members starts taking place, informed government officials told *The Citizen* (21/12/92). Particularly targeted are Permanent Force members who had fought against Swapo and the ANC.

So great was the speed with which De Klerk acted that even the army's public relations office was not informed of the press conference. In addition, many of the officers disciplined were on holiday and were unaware of their suspension. Steyn was appointed on Nov 18 to investigate covert military actions following disclosures by the Goldstone commission of military intelligence dirty tricks.

The axed officers included:

- Major-General Chris Thirion, Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, who had a reputation of being one of the more progressive of the younger generation of generals;
- Major-General Hennie Roux, Chief of Army Intelligence;
- Brigadier Ferdie van Wyk, director of Army Communications, who master-minded Project Echoes, a clandestine operation launched in April to discredit the ANC by linking MK to the IRA;
- Brigadier Tolletjie Botha, Director, Directorate of Covert Collection, which was raided in November by investigators of the Goldstone commission, including UN personnel;
- Brigadier Oos van der Merwe, Director of Army Intelligence;
- Commander Jack Widdowson of the Navy.

None of these men, who were placed on compulsory retirement, had been "linked to any criminal or illegal activities" stressed Defence Minister Gene Louw in a statement issued on Dec 29. He named only three other officers, Colonel At Nel, Col Chris Prinsloo and Commandant Stephan Snyders, who were all put on compulsory leave. Louw said that they, together with four civilian members, would be investigated by a board of inquiry into their possible connections to "illegal and/or criminal or unauthorised activities". Another member of the permanent force was still subject to investigations.

"I do not doubt the loyalty of the named officers," said Brig van der Merwe. "The steps taken are unjustified. I believe that the Board of Inquiry set up to investigate the three named officers will find them not guilty of any illegal or criminal activities and that there will be no prosecutions." According to one source in Military Intelligence, the sudden axing of so many senior officers was having a "terrible effect on the soldiers' morale. They cannot believe what they are seeing" (*The Citizen* 30/12/92).

General Kat Liebenburg, Chief of the Defence Forces, Lt-Gen George Meiring, Chief of the Army and Lt-Gen Joffel van der Westhuizen, Chief of Staff, Intelligence, were not affected by the purge, despite their hawkish reputation and their known hostility to the ANC. The decision not to sack them can be seen as an attempt to avoid any rebellion in the Defence Force.

The purge, the biggest in SADF history, followed a series of investigations, inquest hearings and trials in which military intelligence officers were implicated in dirty tricks ranging from blackmail to possible murder. There are already indications that the next axe will fall on middle ranking policemen, especially those involved in the police's counter-insurgency unit. De Klerk's action against the senior defence force members had raised his credibility internationally and strengthened the government's position at the negotiating table, Constitutional Development Minister Roelf Meyer said in Washington on Dec 22.

The purge had been planned in advance and timed to take place during the Christmas break when the army officers were on leave and dispersed around the country, making it difficult for them to organise a coherent counter-response, according to *The Weekly Mail* (23/12/92). It was part of a deal struck with the ANC to allow joint control of the security forces and for MK members to be enrolled in the new national army. The weekly offers the following indications to support its claim:

- The purge of 19 police generals in August (see *Roca Report* no 45) as part of a drive to bring the police in line with the negotiation process.
- The Further Indemnity Act pushed through Parliament in August, needed to help ease officers out.
- The November raid on Military Intelligence's Directorate of Covert Collection in November by Goldstone investigators which provided the pretext for setting up the probe headed by Gen Pierre Steyn.
- A top-level meeting between senior MK and SADF officials in early August, brokered by the National Intelligence Service, which generally carries out the will of the cabinet.
- December's "rationalisation" measures which include the retrenchment of 6 000 middle ranking officers and their replacement by 6 000 volunteers (see *Roca Report* no 48).
- Following the purge, Defence Minister Louw announced a total restructuring of intelligence, indicating that further axings were imminent and opening the way for MK intelligence personnel to be absorbed.
- The statement by Siphwe Nyanda, MK Chief of Staff, praising the purge and indicating that it was clearing the way for joint ANC/government control of the army.
- Mandela's statement, made before the purge, that he envisaged MK officers in SADF command posts in the first half of 1993.

REACTION TO THE PURGE

De Klerk's acknowledgment that "serious malpractices and activities that undermine organisations and events originates from the security forces confirmed what the ANC had said for a long time," the ANC said on Dec 20. "There is clearly a third force operating within the security forces and it was exactly because of such a third force that the ANC suspended negotiations in 1991." By describing the steps taken as "clearly only the tip of the iceberg", it indicated that more heads will roll. The ANC has repeatedly called for the dismissal of van der Westhuizen.

"We welcome the steps taken by De Klerk to discipline members of the military implicated in illegal activities," said US State Dept spokesman Richard Boucher. "President-elect Bill Clinton's administration is expected to be less patient with the political mavericks of southern Africa than his predecessor." Most Western governments shared his views, according to *The Weekly Mail* (8/1/93).

"I have never before seen a government destroy its own power base such as this one is doing," said former chief of Military Intelligence, Gen Tienie Groenewald (*The Weekly Mail* 23/12/92). "While the country is steadily moving towards complete chaos, the government has effectively neutralised the SADF's intelligence capabilities by removing the eyes, ears and nose of its defence forces."

The SA Air Force retired its fleet of nine C-160 Transal transport aircraft on Jan 8. Already phased out are the F1 fighters, the Canberra bombers, the Buccaneer strike aircraft, the Bosbok and Kudu utility aircraft and the Super Frelon heavy transport helicopters. Before the end of 1995, 28 Mirage FIAZ aircraft are to go. This will leave only 24 Cheetahs which, military experts say, have almost no air-to-air capability and a limited strike capability, and between 60 and 70 Impala light attack aircraft, in addition to transports and helicopters.

Equipment levels in the SAAF are hopelessly inadequate, according to Helmoed Romer-Heitman, South African correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*. The heavy transport aircraft would scarcely be able to service one battalion of soldiers and the fighter fleet would be hardly be a deterrent. Ground forces would be left without close air support. It could take up to 10 years to get the air force battle ready from its existing levels.

NEWS IN BRIEF

- The team that helped Bill Clinton win the American election would soon be arriving in South Africa to help the ANC hone its election strategy, general secretary Cyril Ramaphosa said (*Sunday Times* 10/1/93). The ANC had budgeted R300 million to fight the election. Mandela will attend Clinton's swearing-in ceremony on Jan 20 at the invitation of the Congressional Black Caucus. De Klerk has not been invited.
- Over 10 000 prisoners would be released from Jan 18 because of overcrowding in prisons, Correctional Services Minister Adriaan Vlok said on Jan 6. His statement brought an outcry from the police and legal fraternity because the early release increased the already high crime rate and undermined the legal system.
- Shortly after it started, a Democratic Party meeting in Gugulethu, near Cape Town, on Jan 11 was broken up by a large group claiming to be Azapo and PAC supporters. It was the second DP meeting in non-White areas of the Western Cape to be broken up in a month. Under the prevailing circumstances, free and fair elections this year were a pipe dream, said DP MP Robin Carlisle.
- An exclusive clothing boutique in Sandton City closed early recently, reports *The Weekly Mail* (8/1/93) after being informed that "a very important shopper" wished to shop there. The lady, unnamed but described as "a large, fiftyish, controversial and currently-on-trial, erstwhile political leader from Soweto", arrived accompanied by bodyguards. Her bill came to "well over R50 000".

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