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Background:

The objectives which guided work around the Inkatha issue warn the inllnwingn ._.w

% Exposed the violent nature. :4 th. ahganilmtn an opposed to the image it was pFUSamting-a! talldwtng a principled strategy of nDn-vinlenci '

% Expose it! reactionary nature to the people and the world

% To isolate it from its natural allies - in buaiHW\$B,

press, iDERal circles and interationally

to win over these within the community who had

traditionally supported Inkatha - older people and chiefs

to strengthen the alliance with CDSATU

to win space for the democratic movement to operate - by

isolating Inkatha ' I

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Developments up to March 'EB:

Talks with Inkatha:

See the South African Labour Bulletin (v51 13 Na 3 and No 4/3) T Jartha hanhgwmund. The punitive ranchod5wau that Inhmthn had withdrawn from the peace talks hDQted by the Chamber at Cammerca, beCQUQE it insisted on a national level talk. After consultation, the UDF and CDSATU agreed to this and propogals for an agenda, warn lubmatted in Inkatha via the Chamber in mid_January. In early February local UDF leaders Nara dataihad and On the 24th the UDF was banned. Inkatha did not reply to date in the propogelg #dr talks. In fact they have lied by suggesting in the press that the UDF is refusing to talk. In early March the UDF applied to Vlok for a lifting of restrictions on the UDF and its leadership to enable it to proceed with peace talks. Vick acknowldged receipt at the memmrahdu, but does not respond to the applicatinn.

The lagai strategy: h .3

By March, ten temporary interdicts were in operation against Inkatha warlords. There was also a lot of concern on the part of Judges about the lack of prosecutions.

At the diplomatic: lavhlx

Grant concern was being shown by the press - editorial comment was being made about the lack of action by the State against the warlords. Big business was severely embarrassed - van Uytrecht's exposure of Inkatha leading to his eventual sacking from the Chamber of Commerce delegation to the peace talks. The Aesmcam delegatiah to Ulundi apparently aevunalv criticisat Euthelezi.

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Role of the State: "t'wun n&- a ' h n.m -www-w'h"H

A severe wave of repression launched. Over a thousand UDF members and supporters detained. Hundreds of police and army

reinforcements brought into the areas. Hitskonstabels deployed in

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Pietermeritzburg - many of them exposed as Inkatha members.

Security farce: were playing a mere prominent rule in the
vxelence - buttreeeing Inkatha 4ercee mere aggressively. This
together with the huge scale a! detentions, police raids and
security #erce action: eqninit the defence :emmittee weakened
the defence of the communities severely. These state ectiune were
necessitated by the Fact that the vigi)antes were on the retreat.
The e4\$eet wee ta esteblieh an artificial balance in the
situation. The violence subsided and the death toll declined tn
reach its lowest level in March/April.

Estate of organisation en the greund:

Caeardinatinnl

Serious weaknesses developed with youth leadership detained and
tensions among these that remainEd. UDF leadership detained and
restricted. CDSATU/UDF ce-ordination breaks dawn due ta leak at
initiative by both sides. '

Reasons for the recurrence of the violence in Juhe/Julyl

% The Inkatha forces regreup within their "etrengholdw"

% They gain confidence, because the :ellapse ef the criminal
cases given them a #eeling of greater immunity

% Pressure on the caps eases and so they teel able te play a mere
interventionist rule again. #_w

h In some areas, particularly those with little previous history
of ergenisatlnh, a :embih5ffbnau\$ ymutH milftentyi'immeturity
and lack of leadership led to actions by the youth which
antagunieed certain sections of the EDMMUHityn Theee
contradictions opened the way for Ihkath to "recapture" these
areas, by working with disgruntled membghe ef the cemmunity.

CUBATU'S LEGAL SETTLEMENT WITH INKATHHx.

Content cf the eettlementx

In brie\$, the settlement provides for the fellewing:

t The creatien o? a complaints adjudication beard, which
will hear eases brought by members of the community
against Inkatha er CDSATU. (tee documents)

% A jeint declaration by CDSATU and Inkatha condemning
violence, practices such as torced recruitment and
committing themselves tn werking for peace

% The dropping 04 e number of intehdict actions, with the
allegatiene being reierred tn the complaints adjudication
heard

It eheuld he hated that CDSATU did net cenaaptualiee this
settlement as a "peace accord", altheugh - me Will be explained
below " a current within CDSATU wee arguing strongly at this time
in favour D? a peace eccerd with Inhatha. This gruuiping saw the
legal eettlement es an important step tewards such a
comprehensive peace eor'etement and as an important ccampcmen't raf-

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such an agreement.

Factors leading CDSATU to settle:

Legally, there were problems with the interdict actions, because of intimidation of witnesses and the length of the applications. CDSATU was worried 'because of the real possibility of losing the interdict applications.

They were also arguing that the legal strategy was entering a 'dead-end' and that different and quicker procedures had to be found;

% There was a resurgence at Inkatha orchestrated violence throughout Natal. Some within CDSATU were urging CDSATU leadership to enter into a peace agreement with Inkatha.'

They felt that there was a need to "gain space" for CDSATU. They also felt that the UDF had been effectively smashed and could not play a role in this process.

Criticisms of the settlements

Criticism of the settlement was levelled from a number of different quarters: from the ground, from within CDSATU and the UDF leadership. The central criticisms were:

% Processes of consultation were completely inadequate - UDF and community structures were not consulted at all, and even within CDSATU, local and national structures were not properly consulted.

% The legal settlement was not placed within the context of a broader political strategy. As a result, some of the central thrusts of the original strategy were lost: for example, the weakening of the UDF, the lifting of restrictions on UDF leadership, the release of detainees and freedom to organize within the community is a precondition for peace but was not mentioned at all in the settlement. Similarly, the demand that the warlords be arrested was also lost.

% Because of this, Inkatha and its supporters were able to present the legal settlement as a "peace accord".

Effects of the settlement:

% The image of CDSATU leaders shaking hands with Inkatha leaders generated anger within the community. The youth interpreted this as "CDSATU selling out". This created severe contradictions in the CDSATU-UDF alliance.

It provided a platform for Inkatha to improve its severely tarnished image. It was projected in the press as being an equal partner with CDSATU in sorting out the "problems" of the area.

% It served to draw attention away from the problem of the warlords, at least for the time being.

It served to obscure the role of the "state" in the conflict.

& It could make it appear as if the UDF is not a significant factor in the situation. Alternatively, it has already

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happened, UDF can be blamed for any continuation of violence - ie it was not party to the "apartheid". Also the UDF is projected as being intransigent and not interested in "peace".

Analysis and critique of the settlement:

The image of Inkatha as a peaceful organisation opposing apartheid was severely dented earlier in the year. Its major allies - the liberal press, the business community and imperialist powers were becoming severely embarrassed and publicly critical. Its strategy of forced recruitment had the effect of actively turning the community against it - throughout Natal! I

This loss of support led to a strategic rethink on the part of Western governments - ie America, Britain and West Germany and even within Inkatha. It was now obvious that Buthelezi could not contend for leadership of the national liberation movement. Their objectives were now 1) to improve Buthelezi's image and 2) to project him as a legitimate partner in the liberation alliance against apartheid. Hence they had to improve Inkatha's relations with the mainstream liberation movement, ie UDF/COSATU/ANC. These pressures reflected themselves in the growing political tension within the leadership of Inkatha. w

The state having experienced the power of the COSATU/UDF alliance and also concerned that Inkatha was losing the war, was determined to smash the alliance. It attempted to do this initially by detentions, repressing the banishment of 24th February. JMC pamphlets calling on "workers to unite" against the "Charterists" to regain control of COSATU were widely distributed to shop stewards. These pressures reflected themselves in a resurgence of the workerist tendency within COSATU. The workerist argued that there was a need for the union movement to retreat from politics and confrontation with the state. This was necessary to win "space" for COSATU. This was the context in which certain elements within COSATU were arguing for a settlement with Inkatha - without the UDF.

COSATU's settlement with Inkatha played into the hands of these ruling class strategies. It is therefore no coincidence that the BABC, the state media and Ilahga discussed Uhale Erwin shaking hands with Dhlame, projecting the image of peace between COSATU and Inkatha. Representatives of imperialism were also enthusiastically backing the settlement, American and German consular officials canvassing support for it within the ranks of the UDF. Whilst the state is interested primarily in seeing a settlement between COSATU and Inkatha and thus breaking the UDF/COSATU alliance, the imperialists are more concerned to build a relationship between Inkatha and the liberation movement. They therefore went the UDF to come into the "accord". Maggie Thatcher's offer to mediate between the movement and Inkatha else fits into this broad strategy.

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1. Background - Overview of developments to March

Guiding objectives

2. CDSATU settlement - analysis and critique

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3. Analysis of conjuncture - 0533ttlve Conditions

main contradictions

possibilities for intervention

4. Objectives, overall thrust of strategy . different aspects:

Leg :1

diplomatic (business,

imperialist. liberals,

press)

organisation -

community,

coordination

propaganda _ mass. press

our allies - CDSATU.

churches ,

talk:

5. Proposals - Maggie

5. Analysis of the present conjuncture

3.1. Objective conditions

3.2. Main contradictions

3.3. Possibilities for intervention

3.1. Objective conditions

5.1.1. Inkatha support declines :

Inkatha's support on the ground continues to decline. Although UDF

forces have been severely weakened by the repression it has been

able to successfully defend those areas under its control. In some

of the " Upper Area: " Inkatha has been able to sustain its

presence by being buttressed by security forces. However it has

not been able to win over the people there. Its continuous 1635 a\$

support in Pietermaritzburg was dramatically shown by its failure

to get more than 10 000 people at the Shaka day meeting in

Taylor's Halt. They were expecting 60 000. The majority of these

that attended the meeting came from outgirda Pietermaritzburg.

3.1.2. Divisions between Inkatha leadership and Chiefs/Warlords:

There is clear evidence that divisions exist between

Official Inkatha structures and the Main Chiefs & Warlords in

PME areas. Increasingly these chiefs are disavowing Ulundi

(non attendance of Dhlomo's Peace meeting 5. The Chiefs main

concern is to regain control of the ground. They are doing

this by the only viable method viz. armed recruitment-and-then

attacking those that oppose them. For these chiefs any

accommodation of the UDF only threatens and undermines their

(own existence. Inkatha \$15 under increasing pressure - a tn Shah'-

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044 its vinlant image .It has to persuade these Chiefs
/warlnrds to change tack and presant a more paaceful
image.This seams to be the main cause of the conflict
between Ulundi and its Warlards. _g

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3.1.3. Inkatha dependent on forced recruitment for support:

Whilst Inkatha is increasingly being forced to discipline
its recalcitrant Warlords (Dhlamo calls up Fmb Chiefs tn
Ulundi) it is almost tatally dependant on them to praduce
its supporters.It is this very need of Inkatha tn increaSE
and defend its aupport base that lad the Chiefs to embark
upan a forcad recruitment drive.Tha Chiefs :annat use any
other mathad (eg,Patronage) ta gain Support 55 they dc not
have anything to give. '

Thus Inkatha's (Dhimma's) call 4hr Peace can only remain
rhetarical.They do not have the Political will or capacity to
implement such an agreEmant.

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3.1.4. warlords an arm 9f the security fnrces:

As theae Chiefs and Warlords hava come into diafavour by
some Leaders in Ulundi the Beaurity Forca: (JMC':) have
strengthened their relationship with tham.Theaa Security
\$orcas have a mars clearer cuincidence n4 interest with the
Narlords/Chieis -: to maintain thw Status mum and Smash tha
UDF.Thus there has been increasng collusion between these
Chiefs and the Security For:es.The Warlords Btill run free.

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3.2. Contradictions ,_.u .

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%FUNDAMENTAL CDNTRADICTIONsn-"ud- .t. . I Eh --.'nw"mh-h"UW
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1. Inkatha/KLA'B lo:atian within the state structures

All state survices are mediated through HLA structures in
KwaZulu. As there is very little distinction between Inkatha and
MLA paeplc'a grievauhes are azrectad at these structures - in
educatiun, health, pensions etc. Inkatha has utiliged these
structures ta obtain patronage and :aarce support. However, the
fact that thage structures are unable to pravida the regourmes ta
serva the needs of tha penple has ensured that this strategy
backfired.

2. Erusian o4 Inkatha's Tribal base

urbanizatiimh increasing working class nrganizatiunX resistance
to taxation

Inkatha's continued dependence on tribal stucturaa tn maintain
:nntrol

SIZIE-

#MAIN CDNTRADICTIONB

1.1NKATHA - AN ARM OF THE STATE APPARATUS

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Inkatha Chieia and Warlords have become almost tuta\$ly dependant an the state (security forces) \$or their axiatancu.They have in turn became the tan) or direct arm of the state strategy to smash tha UDF and prevent it tram taking control nvar these areas.lnkatha at tho same time is under incrHasing prnssure by its allies to appear to be a genuine #orca opposed to Apartheid and a legitimate part Of the Liberation Allianca.Imparialist forcaa are pressurizing Inkatha tn make overture: tn UDFXCUSATUKANC in an attempt to be racugnizad as a legitimate partner in the LIEERATIDN ALLIANCE.TOheEduEEEE in this taak Inkatha has to distance itsalf from thokgtatatand SacunitymEurcas....t-u h3.2.3-2.INKATHA'S DECLININB SUPPORT IN THE FACE OF INCREASING PRESSURE ON IT TO PROVE ITS CLAIMS THAT IT ENJDYS MASS SUPPORT Inkatha'a #ailure to attract the 60 000 people at the Shaka day Meeting demonstratud it's declining support.A Survey conductad by the state recently showed its suppct ta be at about 32 ammgst tha tountrys Blacks. This lack pf imppart weakens Buthelazi's capacity to retain his main allies and weakens his claim to have a significant roli within the national liberation struggle. The more the vnluntary sappart far Inkatha declinea, the more it has to rasart to coercion _ bqt this has the contradictnry efect of reducing the valuntary support still turthar.

3.2.3.3.INKATHA'8 INTERNAL DIVISIONS BEGIN TO MATURE

% Divisions in the leadership .

% Divisions between Inkatha strudtures and its Local 'Chiets and Warlords.

4.8tkategl: thrust

%EKpDSE the clnsa relationship batwaen Inkatha and the state (an arm of the state).Belnq part 04 the Apartheid system it cannot oppase it (the state).As Inkatha is it's instrument in the local areas (to maintain the status qua and act against tha Udt 3 the State cannot x will not act against it.

tShow the rapidly declining support nf Inknthaa its continued dependence on tribalism for support; its inability tn control its membership 9r tn disciplins (act against) them ;the autharitarian nature of its leadership (the cause of serious divisiums in tha leadership) -in short an organization in DECLINE unworthy of support by its main allies viz,Big Businesss and Imperialism.

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4.2.Paace Talk:

It 15 clear fram our analysis that Iakatha is under pressure ta improve it'g image .It muEt be teen to be reasunable and willing MI-qh F .. "...t , ..t. Hu-If

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to talk peace. It also needs to be recognized by the Liberation movement as a genuine force opposed to Apartheid. Yet because we have argued it but

we cannot implement any peace agreement on the ground

% cannot act against its Chiefs and Warlords

% cannot tell not approach the Apartheid State

Inkatha wants to talk to the ANC so that it can claim a similar status to the ANC in the Liberation Alliance. It wants the ANC to recognize it as a genuine force opposed to Apartheid.

The question of talks and "space" reconsidered : -

Some people (in CDSATU) have argued that it is necessary for us to talk to Inkatha in order to gain space for the democratic movement. In our assessment "space" is highly unlikely to be achieved

in this way. For Inkatha Chiefs & Warlords to accommodate

UDF/CDSATU in "their" areas in order to allow UDF/Cosatu to take over CONTROL over these areas since the only support they have is that

gained by coercion. They cannot allow this. Thus they will not

implement any "Peace Agreement". Furthermore UDF comrades are

reluctant to allow Inkatha people to return to those areas that

they have "won" with their blood in the struggle against Inkatha Warlords.

Inkatha has still not replied to our proposal for talks at

National Level. They have not said anything about our application to Vlok to continue with the Peace Talks.

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We're still prepared to talk to Inkatha Provided:

& they discipline the Warlords by acting against them

% they act against Apartheid

The ANC Should only meet them if they are prepared to accept that the ANC is the Leader of the Liberation Alliance in the country.

The ANC (perhaps together with the Churches) should offer to

chair a meeting between Inkatha and the UDF/Cosatu.

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On the question of talks: there is the need for a new initiative.

We have already presented our proposals for talks to Inkatha.

Inkatha has not yet responded. These talks are about the current violence in Pietermaritzburg and elsewhere and the concrete steps

required to bring about a cessation of violence. Ideological

issues should not be on the agenda. These talks should be

distinguished from attempts by Inkatha to talk to ANC(UDF/CDSATU)

in an attempt to achieve recognition and political

conciliation.

Our view is that a clear distinction should be made between these

two types of talks. We should continue to call for peace. We are

still prepared to talk to Inkatha to start peace. However, we

should proceed with the talks only on the basis of the proposals

that we submitted to Inkatha via the Chamber of Commerce: 1) the

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talks can only proceed if all national and local leaders of UDF/CDSATU are free to participate 2) all restrictions on the UDF/CDSATU should be removed to allow them to freely consult with our people. The importance of the process of consultation has to be underlined - firstly because leaders cannot resolve the conflict which is taking place among the people on the ground. A lasting peace is only possible if the people are involved in all the processes of the talks. Secondly, the deep wounds inflicted on our people by Inkatha and its collaboration with the state has made our people suspicious of any talks with Inkatha. Their participation and consent is vital for the success of any talks. A possible way to proceed with the talks on the violence, is to ask Maggie to make it possible for the ANC to chair these talks between UDF/CDSATU and Inkatha. Instead of Maggie mediating between the ANC and Inkatha she could be asked to ensure that Inkatha first resolves the problem of violence with the UDF. The ANC does not require her to mediate between it and Inkatha. She should persuade Botha to stop his collaboration in the violence, and to lift the restrictions, bannings and the emergency thus enabling the peace talks to proceed. She should also put pressure on Buthe/Lezi to cooperate and not put obstacles in the way at the peace PFDCOSB.

National reconciliation with Inkatha is only possible, and is dependant upon the above process being completed or substantially underway. Without Inkatha's willingness in practice to stop its and the state's violent aggression against our people any national reconciliation is illusory and impossible. In any event, any attempts to proceed with talks at this level has to be put in the people's discussion and debate. This approach also seems to be impossible if we are not to be consulted and requires the lifting of all restrictions on our organisations and leaders. Inkatha alone has to prove its willingness to become in practice a genuine opponent of apartheid.

JOINT MEETING HELD BETWEEN COSATU/UDF ON 28th OCT '88

(brainstorming session with National and regional reps on both sides)

1. General analysis. The analysis set out above was presented and accepted by Cosatu.

2. Thethers proposal to intervene in the Inkatha issue. It was agreed that her visit was clearly intended to rescue Gatshe and Batho in particular. We were opposed to any attempts by her to pursue a mediation.

3. Analysis of Peace settlement. Cosatu accepted the criticisms presented above. Viz. '

a. Lack of consultation with UDF

b. The Agreement was not utilized to the maximum advantage of the Dem. May. i.e. use of the agreement to gain political space for UDF/CDSATU and divide Inkatha.

4. Main Thrust. It was agreed that the main thrust of the strategy should be to expose the relationship between the state (HIP, SADF

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,JMC)and Innkatha x warlorde.The perelell strategy eheuld be centinue with the " peace preceee"

The telleving issues were raised tar discueaien and further consultatian with Aiiiliates.

1.Extentending the Ceeatu legal agreement to the rest of

Natal-ia extending the Jurisdiction at the Ajudicatian

Beerd.UDF cannot participate until it ie Un-Reetricted. Our view is that the beard eheuld not be extent 'eu until it pruvee to be a useful instrument to eanpee InLaetha. Assegqrs agpelnted by Cneatu eheuld be in consultation with UDF.

2.working Committeexs. The idea of joint working committees at Netienal ,Regional and Local levels suggested by Ceaetu wee accepted. . -

3.Explelt the Divisions within Inkethe.It was agreed that different approaches and tactlce need to be employed in dl-Fterent local areas to further divide Inkatha This strategieing to be dune in the Juint werking committees.

4.It was agreed that Cesatu would send 5 memorandum to Oscar Dhlema taking him up an hie euggeetipn that the UDF should be included in the Legal Settlement.Coeatu to argue the Peace is nlny pueeibla ii the UDF 13 invelved in the peace preceee inviting Inkathe to make jeint representations to the 5tete(with Ceeatu3tn lift the restrictions en the UDF am that it 15 Free ta participate. .

5. Churches. Cesetu tUDF to consult and fully brie; the churches about the above strategy. .

6. Dossier on Pelicetlnkethe Collusion. Cosetu lawyers are templetj a report at this fer the PME area. we felt that this res eerch te be extended to the whole of Natal as soon a: pereeenal can be #eund.This report should be presented at a briefing eeeeimn wit? Distinguished members at the legal fraternity and subsequently with Embaeey D%titinle.

7.Organizational Problems And Structures.Ceeatu comrades pointed nut the weaknesees in eur etructuree at-lecal level in particular which made it difficult For them to consult and implement any strategies at a lezel IeVel. A wurk .hep of arltlviviete te be held to discuss these problems.

8. Joint Meeting with CheatuXUDF.Thie te be held with the Df4lcial structures in the Region and taken up by the Joint natienal exacutive.

?.JDINT MEETING WYTH ANB.It was that this meetig should be held with UDFhCDSATUX end the CHURCHES attending.Coeatu tn bribg its whale National executive 30 people) end UDF to bring reps tram ell ite regmne .It was telt that euch a meeting was ner:eessery and should be used to discuss wider issues that cancern the whole Demecretic Mavement.This meeeting to be tentatively set for the lw5th at DECEMBER.Besatu has emeeting with the ILO during this etime.

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This code should apply to all people who ere in leadership position. in the Union.
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they be shorslearnrls or oil iclals.
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that person short: that helshe is out tit to he I lender.
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conflict it Inst he tepoited to the lleloe.
Foe do no! liecuss the llniun's business with other organization. or 3min
shoot the (him).
Loyalty to the Union inrludes the peogle in It. If you hove prohlene "lth
someone in the Union. fuu Inst resolve it with that person or within the
Union. I
' Sometimes there no conflicts of oneltf within the Union. that your '
loy-lty to a particular pemon. or factory. toyaltg to another person
or structute lo the Union. In such cases you I!!! elven he glide! try diet
is II the Interests of the organization a: e whole.
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