

6m 8/032/0221/2

Repression

book. "He is about 30 years old, talkative, heavily built, with a little moustache, a Black Angolan recruited to the South African special forces unit who says he came to Mozambique about two years ago with explosives and a mission to kill me."

Military Intelligence Involvement⁸

Two men claiming to be from Military Intelligence were yesterday caught snooping around the Pretoria home of Lawyer Mr. Brian Currin, one of the key figures involved in exposing the activities of alleged assassination squads. An anti-apartheid activist, Mr. Ronnie Watson, said yesterday that a man who tried to kill him in Gaborone in May 1987 claimed he was acting for the Military Intelligence branch of the SA Defence Force (..)

Military Intelligence has been linked to the probe into the alleged hit squad killings of University of the Witwaterstrand Academic Dr. David Webster and SWAPO attorney Mr. Anton Lubowski. (...)

Death Squads Use Chemical Warfare⁹

Alarming questions are beginning to emerge from the assassination squad scandal about the use of

chemical warfare and what might be described as the "Rhodesian connection" with the SA security services ... Evidence pointing to a link between the Rhodesian conflict and the SA assassination story also emerges from similarities in the methods used, notably the use of poison.

Capt. Coetzee has disclosed a number of incidents in which poison was used in an attempt to murder political activists (...) Poison was one of the most horrific aspects of the Rhodesian war. Its use, by the Selous Scouts, first emerged from the memoirs of the former head of the <Rhodesian> CIA <Ken Flowers>. In his book *Serving Secretly* he described how the Selous Scouty impregnated clothes with poison which were then distributed among would-be recruits of the ZANU liberation army (...).

Footnotes:

- 1 ANC Newsbriefing, Volume Thirteen, 1/11/89
- 2 Newsweek, 27.11.89
- 3 Recce = reconnaissance squad
- 4 SADF = South African Defence Force
- 5 SouthScan, 8.12.89
- 6 SouthScan, 8.12.89
- 7 SouthScan, 8.12.89
- 8 Star, 6.12.89
- 9 Weekly Mail 1.12.89

Who Murdered Webster?¹

David Webster, the white anti-apartheid activist who was assassinated last May in Johannesburg, was apparently murdered by members of the South African military-intelligence service.


His former wife Glenda admitted this week that Webster had been a member of the banned African National Congress (ANC) and had done research on the connection between the South African military and the right-wing Renamo rebels in Mozambique. At the same time it was reported that the 31-year-old former policemen Ferdinand Barnard, who is being detained in connection with Webster's death, is apparently a member of the military-intelligence service. The suspect was allegedly also involved in the murder of Anton Lubowski, the prominent white SWAPO member, last September in Windhoek.

...In addition, last week a former member of an elite unit of the South African army, Mervyn Malan, went public. He has declared that his special unit carried out a number of invasions into countries that border South Africa, as well as attacking anti-apartheid activists within the country. Malan is at present in the Netherlands, where he has applied for political asylum.

...Obviously there are still, despite all official denials, groups that carry out illegal actions. Last Saturday on the outskirts of Soweto, unknown persons attempted to kidnap Mohammed Valli Moosa, General Secretary of the United Democratic Front (UDF), the largest anti-apartheid alliance.

Footnotes:


- ¹ excerpt from "Ermordeten Todesschwadronen Webster?" ("Did Death Squads Murder Webster?"), "tageszeitung" (Berlin), Dec. 6, 1989



South African Defence Force

Division of Military Intelligence (DMI)

This information includes material on the organization, priorities and personnel of the Division of Military Intelligence (DMI) of the South African Defence Force SDAF). It is based on documents recently received by the editors of Top Secret



This structure is based on a secret document of the South African Military Intelligence Service recently received by the editors of Top Secret

Military Intelligence Division of the SADF:

Personnel (extract)

Chief of Staff Intelligence:
V Adm AP Putter

Chief Director Military Intelligence:
R Adm WN du Plessis,

Director Southern Africa

SSO West Front

DO Angola Military:
Maj P. Thirion
Lt A Nel

DO Angola Politics:
Col Soussa
Maj P Thirion

DO SWA Military:
Capt T Dreyer
Lt R Collins

DO SWA Politics:
Cmdt E du Toit
Mid T Botha

SL West Front:
Lt CL Fouche

SSO East Front

DO Zimbabwe Military:
Maj Fourie
Capt Muller

DO Zimbabwe Politics/Economics:
S Lt Brummer

DO Mozambique Military/MNR:
Maj du Preez
Capt Hanekom

DO Mozambique
Politics/Economics:
Lt Tenes
2Lt D Terreblanche

DO Zambia/Tanzania/Malawi:
Lt Claassen, Lt J van der
Westhuizen

SL East Front:
S Lt A Kruger

SSO Home Front

DO Terrorism/ANC & PAC:
Maj C Dreyer
Maj Niewoudt
Capt Potgieter
Capt van den Heever
Capt L Delport
S Lt M Strydom
Co K Smit

DO Subversion:
Maj A Rossouw

DO Church Affairs:
Lt T Meintjies

DO Countries:
Capt J Schoeman

SL Home Front:
S Lt M van Rensburg
CO L Louw

(Abbreviations:
DO = Desk Officer
SL = Subject
Librarian
SO = Staff Officer
SSO = Senior Staff
Officer)

SADF Military Intelligence Division: Intelligence Priorities

The SADF's Military Intelligence Division has a list of specific intelligence priorities for its desk officers and subject librarians. This list provides an indication of the enemy's areas of concern and the organization of the information processing section of

MID. It is presented here in the organizational order of the attached tables.

I. Sub-Division Military Intelligence

A. Directorate Southern Africa

1. West Front

a) Angola Military

1) All open information with reference to military affairs.

b) Angola Politics

1) A Cuban increase or withdrawal from Angola and the possibility they will be replaced by another force.

2) The activities of the resistance movements with specific to UNITA/SWAPO friction.

3) Meetings/Cooperation between the MPLA and resistance movements.

4) Cooperation between the MPLA and SWAPO.

5) Western involvement in Angola with specific attention to activities of the western Contact Group and Portugal.

6) Eastern involvement in Angola with specific attention to USSR strategy and the closer relationship between Angola and the PRC.

7) The struggle between radical and moderate factions in order to ascertain whether the Soviet Union is strengthening its grip on Angola.

8) The refugee problem in Angola. Establish specifically what the local population's attitude and disposition is with regard to the MPLA government, the various resistance movements, SWAPO and other terrorist organizations and the South African security forces.

9) Food provisioning by foreign countries.

10) Medical services and health conditions.

11) Profiles of key personnel.

c) SWA Military

1) All open information with

reference to military affairs.

d) SWA POLITICS

1) Cuban withdrawal.

2) UN Resolutions with respect to SWA/Namibia.

3) Statements by Sam Nujoma, OAU and African countries (so-called Front Line States) with regard to independence of SWA/Namibia:

a) Possible UN election and planning.

b) Continuing armed struggle - statements by SWAPO in this connection.

4) General and specific internal situation and links between:

a) Political parties

b) SWAPO

c) Churches

5) Political support for and links with SWAPO by Western, African and East Bloc countries as well as organizations such as the UN and Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

6) USSR strategy towards SWA/Namibia.

7) General recruitment of support and training with regard to SWAPO (Meetings, conferences etc.)

8) Personal details/photos of SWA/Namibia political leadership figures.

9) SWAPO presence in foreign countries role of office, personnel, addresses, links with other organisations.

2. East Front

a) Zimbabwe Military

1) All open information with reference to military affairs.

b) Zimbabwe Politics/Economics

1) The relationship between ZANU and ZAPU.

2) The relationship between ZANU and Rhodesian Front.

3) The formation and training of youth brigades.

4) Soviet involvement.

5) Presence of ZIPRA refugees in Zambia and Botswana.

6) Possibility of a one party state and reaction of other political groups to this.

7) The fuel situation in Zimbabwe with specific reference to quantities, routes and ultimate destination.

8) Shortages of products which cause friction between the population and government, such as foodstuffs, tyres, water etc.

9) Economic help from and co-operation with West- and East Bloc countries.

10) Progress of the SADCC.

11) Success of the Transitional National Development Plan.

c) Mozambique Military/MNR

1) All open information with reference to military affairs.

d) Mozambique Politics/Economics

1) Intrigues and divisions within the Central Committee.

2) Personal information on all Central Committee members.

3) Political approaches made by the Mozambique government towards the West- and East Bloc.

4) Anti-RSA statements by Machel and other Central Committee members.

5) West- and East Bloc diplomatic presence.

6) Details of corruption.

7) Trade agreements with West- and East Bloc countries (Details).

8) Details of trade and transit

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CHIEF DIRECTOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE	R Adm WN du Plessis
DIRECTOR SOUTHERN AFRICA	
SSO West Front	
DO Angola Military	Maj P Thirion
	Lt A Nel
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SSO Home Front	
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	Maj Nieuwoudt
	Capt Potgieter
	Capt van den Heever
	Capt L Delpert
	S Lt M Strydom
	CO K Smit
DO Subversion	Maj A Rossouw
DO Church Affairs	Lt T Meintjies

Secret DMI document

goods to and from Mozambique and the RSA, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania.

9) Details of strong and weak points in the economic sector.

10) Details of economic corruption.

11) Details of medical, educational and religious practices.

12) Cultural agreements, exchange and training of Mozambican students in East- and West Bloc.

e) Zambia

1) What is the composition, role and function of the Central Committee of UNIP, with special reference to the formulation and content of security and defence policy regarding the RSA and its interests.

2) Is there any increase or decrease in anti-UNIP sentiments in Zambia against the backdrop of the 1983 elections? Here the nature and scope of ex-UPP, ANC, ZCTU activities is of particular importance.

3) Is there any real threat to the authority of Kaunda in particular and UNIP in general?

4) What system - Economic/Political/Social - if neutralized or destroyed, would result in the lowering or lessening of the threat from Zambia against the RSA or its interests.

f) Tanzania

1) Will Nyerere maintain his dominant role in the Front Line States, or will his influence wane?

2) What is the nature and scope of the Tanzanian commitment to the FLS?

3) What is the nature and scope of the effect of political, economic and social factors on the military-strategic policy of Tanzania in respect of the RSA and its interests?

4) What is the effect of fluctuations in the following strongpoints of Tanzania on the military threat against the RSA:

a. International sympathy and resultant availability of aid.

b. Membership of SADCC.

c. Well-organized and influential (in Africa) diplomatic service.

d. Traditional leadership of Nyerere as well as stable tribal relations in Tanzania.

g) Malawi

1) What is Malawi's situation on the political, diplomatic and economic fronts in the light of its South African connections?

2) To what extent is Malawi influenced by MNR activities in Mozambique?

3. Home Front

a) Terrorism: ANC & PAC

1) Strategy and internal activities.
2) Contacts, political and military activities.

3) Facilities and personalities.

b) Subversion

1) Student organizations (NUSAS/POLSTU/SUCA)
2) Subversive organizations (AZASO/AZAPO/COSAS/COT/B SMA/BSS/MWASA/MYO/PEBCO)

c) Botswana

1) Soviet involvement.
2) The political aspirations of Brig. Ian Khama.
3) Assistance to the ANC.
4) Personal details of political leaders.
5) Western/Eastern involvement.
6) Western/Eastern involvement.

d) Lesotho

1) Soviet involvement.
2) Support for BCP/BNP amongst students.
3) Economic assistance from abroad.
4) Economic situation.
5) Support for the ANC.
6) Eastern/Western involvement.
7) Personal details of leaders.
8) Refugees from South Africa.
9) Economic/agricultural projects.

e) Swaziland

1) Power struggle between prime minister and Rv. Dlamini
2) Contact with ANC leaders.
3) Attitude towards ANC.
4) Relations between government and VSDF/RSP.
5) Refugee situation.
6) Eastern/Western involvement.
7) Relations between population and ANC.

f) Ciskei

1) Power struggle LL Sebe/XC Sebe.
2) Power struggle LL Sebe/L Magoma.
3) Links between L Magoma and Transkei.
4) Economic assistance from abroad.
5) Visits abroad.

g) Transkei

1) Visits abroad.
2) Economic assistance/co-operation from abroad.
3) South Sotho problem.
4) Possible successors to Matanzima brothers.

h) Venda

1) Links between Gilbert Bakane and President Mphahlele.
2) Contacts with foreign countries with regard to economic aid.
3) Black power activities amongst the youth.
4) Possibility of a general election.

i) Bophuthatswana

1) ANC influence at UNIBO.
2) Activities of Rowan Cronje.
3) Israeli influence in Bophuthatswana.
4) Economic co-operation with West Germany.