

NYM/001/0004/49

7.11.92

CONTENTS

VOL. 1, NO.2

November, 1992

SPECIAL ISSUE

A GLIMPSE INTO PRESIDENT-ELECT CLINTON'S FOREIGN POLICY AND THE PEOPLE LIKELY TO BE HIS INSTRUMENTS OF EXECUTION:

ANTHONY LAKE - FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR FOR THE CLINTON CAMPAIGN

MICHAEL CLOUGH - ADVISOR ON SOUTH AFRICA FOR THE CLINTON CAMPAIGN

**SOURCES : FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE (FBIS)
JOINT PUBLICATION RESEARCH SERVICE (JPRS)
PeaceNet - INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL COMMUNICATION**

THE CONTENTS OF THIS NEWSLETTER DO NOT REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE EDITOR.

SDI= Selective Dissemination of Information

NVM/201/5024/49

7.11.92

Copyright 1992 The National Journal, Inc.
The National Journal

October 17, 1992

SECTION: FOREIGN POLICY; From Here To The White House 1992; Vol. 24, No. 42; Pg. 2361

LENGTH: 2946 words

HEADLINE: Internationalist Clinton

BYLINE: BY CHRISTOPHER MADISON

HIGHLIGHT:

Bill Clinton's foreign policy? He says as that as President he would exercise America's leadership role in the world through economics and diplomacy.

BODY:

Amid the preelection rumors and jockeying over who might get what plum job in the Bill Clinton Administration, some of the most telling speculation has centered on the matter of who might be Secretary of State.

The prevailing Washington wisdom had been that Clinton's choice would be Warren Christopher, the Los Angeles lawyer who headed Clinton's vice presidential search effort and who was deputy secretary of State during the Carter Administration.

In recent weeks, however, Christopher's name has evoked a visceral response from Clinton's conservative supporters, many of whom are freshly returned to the Democratic fold after supporting Ronald Reagan and George Bush. "Those who see foreign policy as I do -- Scoop Jackson Democrats -- would be strongly opposed to Christopher," said a Democrat who counts himself a Clinton man. "He would be seen as the living exemplar of Carter Administration foreign policy."

The anti-Christopher sentiment highlights two important realities about Clinton's foreign policy views and how he might carry them out as President.

A contributing factor in Clinton's political success so far has been his skill at steering the party back to the center on foreign policy with his pro-defense, pro-intervention-abroad views. In the process, he mended one of the party's most troublesome rifts left over from the Vietnam era and gained the enthusiastic support of a wing of the party that since 1972 had withheld its backing from several Democratic presidential nominees.

But Democratic liberals have not disappeared. They mounted a respectable if unsuccessful challenge to President Bush's Persian Gulf policies in 1991, and continue to demonstrate the House and Senate leadership ranks on many national security and foreign policy issues.

More to the point, perhaps, Clinton's foreign policy team includes prominent liberal operatives from the Carter Administration, and Clinton's speeches contain broad hints of a concern for human rights that often echo Carter.

NVM/331/3554/49

7.11.92

The National Journal, October 17, 1992

Would Clinton's foreign policy favor the idealistic Carter ways or an updated, post-Cold War Democratic version of realpolitik? Probably some blend of the two.

NOT MANY DRAMATIC CHANGES?

A handful of visiting German politicians recently called on Lee H. Hamilton of Indiana, the second-ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, seeking intelligence about the prospective foreign policy of a Clinton presidency.

The Germans, like most Europeans, seek continuity in American foreign policy. Hamilton tried to be reassuring. Clinton's policies wouldn't differ much from Bush's, he said, with two obvious exceptions -- Clinton would place a greater emphasis on human rights, and he might be more skeptical about free trade.

"There would not be a radical change in American foreign policy," Hamilton reiterated in a subsequent interview. "Bill Clinton is an internationalist, he recognizes the importance of a strong military and open markets. A Clinton Administration would be based on the important foreign policy principles since World War II."

Besides comforting Europeans nervous about sudden shifts, Hamilton's analysis may also be designed to certify to the American voters that Clinton wouldn't be a risky choice.

As Clinton adviser Samuel R. Berger put it in an interview: "There is an essential continuity in American foreign policy, and that is an important launching point. Clinton is an internationalist, as is Bush."

But Clinton represents change as well. If he wins, he would be the first American President born after World War II and elected after the Cold War. And he would take office with limited expectations about his foreign policy plans and performance. As a governor of Arkansas, for example, he has been on the front lines of domestic, not foreign, policy, in stark contrast to Bush.

Clinton's election might signal that Americans want their President to concentrate on domestic affairs, not diplomacy. Because of an apparent shift in the national mood, foreign policy has played only a minor role in the presidential campaign, which has focused almost exclusively on the faltering U.S. economy.

"This President did spend inordinately too much time on foreign policy," Hamilton said. "Under Clinton, there clearly would be a better balance between foreign and domestic policy."

In tune with the apparent national mood swing, Clinton's foreign policy, as outlined in speeches and interviews over the past year, is at least a third domestic in emphasis. "If we're not strong at home, we can't lead the world we've done so much to make," Clinton said in a December speech at Georgetown University.

"His first priority will be to make ourselves strong at home, to have greater influence abroad," Berger said.

The National Journal, October 17, 1992

Beyond strengthening the domestic economy, Clinton has laid out two other high-priority goals -- restructuring the military to meet post-Cold War challenges and supporting democratic movements around the world.

Beyond these somewhat traditional goals, Clinton has embraced a secondary tier of initiatives that more vividly suggests a reordering of priorities. Clinton advocates increased emphasis on such multilateral institutions as the United Nations, greater efforts to control the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and more attention to a whole new set of foreign policy concerns, including the environment, population control and refugees.

Taken as a whole, Clinton's policies suggest a paradox, or at least a neat foreign policy trick: He is calling America home to work on improving the economy and at the same time is saying that he will continue to exercise America's leadership role in the world, not necessarily through military involvements but through economics and diplomacy.

It's internationalism, but clearly the post-Cold War variety. His call for continued U.S. leadership in the world is driven in part by a fear that American isolationism would grow if the President doesn't articulate a strong, clear rationale for America's involvement in the world.

In the Oct. 11 presidential debate, for example, Clinton disagreed with Bush about the number of American troops that should remain in Europe. "There certainly are dangers there," Clinton said. "I simply don't believe we can afford nor do we need to keep 150,000 troops in Europe. . . . One hundred thousand or slightly fewer would be enough. . . ."

Clinton has given the activism an economic flavor, both because of the opportunities for growth and jobs inherent in world trade and also because of the need to protect jobs that depend on trade.

Clinton's activist foreign policy is consistent with his political roots. He rose to Democratic prominence partly through the auspices of the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), a think tank established by moderate-to-conservative Democrats in 1985 to counter the dominance of the party's liberal wing.

Key members of the DLC, among them Clinton, Sens. Charles S. Robb, D-Va., and John B. Breaux, D-La., Reps. Les Aspin, D-Wis., and Dave McCurdy, D-Okla., supported Bush's military action in the Persian Gulf. DLC stalwart Will Marshall is an occasional Clinton foreign policy adviser.

Throughout the campaign, Clinton has emphasized a willingness to use American force overseas when needed. "We can never forget this essential fact: Power is the basis for successful diplomacy," Clinton said in an August speech in California. "And military power has always been fundamental in international relationships."

That sort of rhetoric has helped to persuade many moderates and conservatives to return to the Democratic fold. In a symbolic move on the eve of the Republican convention last summer, nearly two dozen so-called Reagan Democrats signed an advertisement in The New York Times supporting Clinton.

"Gov. Clinton offers a foreign policy that is coherent and firm, yet infused with democratic spirit; that can overcome the isolationist temptation that

4

The National Journal, October 17, 1992

threatens both our national security and our domestic economic prosperity," the ad said. It also noted that Clinton "supported increased pressure to end the rule of Cuba's Fidel Castro . . . and resisted those at home -- and in his own party -- who proposed reckless cuts in our national defense capabilities." Both of these concerns are crucial to pro-defense Democrats.

DUELING ADVISERS?

Clinton also has a corps of liberal advisers, which includes Hamilton; Berger, now a trade lawyer with the Washington law firm of Hogan & Hartson; Anthony Lake, a Carter State Department official who during a stint in the Johnson Administration became a prominent opponent of the Vietnam war; and Nancy Soderberg, a former staff assistant to Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, D-Mass.

And in at least one area, human rights, the Carter-era policies are firmly on Clinton's agenda.

Clinton's views on China present a stark contrast with the Bush Administration's. Rather than evoke the human rights buzzword, however, Clinton has neatly packaged China in a pro-democracy wrapper. "There is no more striking example of President Bush's indifference toward democracy than his policy toward China," Clinton said recently.

In an effort coordinated with the Clinton camp, Joseph R. Biden Jr., D-Del., a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, took to the Senate floor in early October to deliver a blistering attack on Bush's human rights policies. "Does not the coddling of the 'Butchers of Beijing' -- along with the 'Butcher of Baghdad' -- demonstrate for all to see that moral blindness has become virtually a hallmark of the President's foreign policy?" Biden asked.

The potential for conflict between Clinton's liberal and conservative advisers arises in part because it's not clear yet to whom he listens more. "He is a man who takes advice from all segments of the party," said a Washington think tank analyst who has had dealings with the Clinton campaign.

Attempts to identify a single "first among equals" have been unsuccessful. A number of foreign policy experts have suggested that the most important voice Clinton hears is that of Lake, an experienced theorist whose career extends back to the Vietnam era and who now is a professor at Mount Holyoke College.

Berger, in the view of some campaign-watchers, plays a role that's important but subordinate to Lake's, coordinating the flow of ideas and speech drafts to Clinton and the campaign's top strategists in Little Rock. Other analysts, however, suggested that Berger is the most important adviser, with Lake and Michael Mandelbaum, of the Johns Hopkins University and the Council on Foreign Relations, filling out the key trio.

According to a source, Berger, well-connected in Democratic Party circles and part of the foreign policy Establishment, is "clearly in charge," with Lake more concerned with operational details and Mandelbaum a conceptualizer.

But no matter who's on first, this trio is arguably the most important source of policy advice for Clinton.

The National Journal, October 17, 1992

Mandelbaum, an expert on East-West relations, was described by several colleagues as "pragmatic" and not tied to the old left-right battle lines. He met Clinton while both were studying in England in the late 1960s.

Berger, who is very much at home in the rough and tumble of Washington's political and policy skirmishes, met Clinton in 1972 when both served on the presidential campaign of George McGovern. Lake met Clinton through Berger. (Berger served under Lake on the policy planning staff at State.)

Despite the trio's close ties to the nominee, some independent foreign policy experts question whether any of the three possesses the clout or stature to be Clinton's Secretary of State or his national security adviser.

Likelier Cabinet faces may be found among Clinton's network of House and Senate foreign policy contacts. Clinton has drawn heavily on the work done by Aspin, McCurdy and Sen. Sam Nunn, D-Ga., in his proposals for restructuring U.S. defense needs, and he is said to consult regularly with Hamilton on a broad range of foreign policy matters.

Another voice in the Clinton foreign policy circles is Leon Fuerth, top foreign policy aide to Clinton's running mate, Sen. Albert Gore Jr. of Tennessee. Fuerth's role raises a larger question. "The real question is, what role will Gore play in foreign policy?" a Washington think-tank executive asked. According to several reports, Gore, a member of the Armed Services Committee whose roots are in the party's moderate-to-conservative wing, participates in the Clinton staff's daily telephone discussion on foreign policy.

LEFT, RIGHT, CENTER

Given this rich variety of advisers, some specialists have been forecasting pitched battles between the left and the right. Early this summer, for example, a moderate Democrat whose ideas were being solicited by the Clinton camp, said, "My concern is to get to Clinton and try to steer him away from the positions that are residual leftist positions" on such issues as Latin America and defense spending.

In time, however, this Democrat said he was surprised to find the old left-right, Cold War fault lines largely irrelevant.

"I don't think you can define it as a center [versus] left dichotomy. The demise of Communism broke that," McCurdy said. "What you see now are almost technical disputes over, for example, how you view the international economic components. I can see tensions developing between the mercantilist crowd as opposed to the open-trade types, but it's somewhat historical."

"It's been difficult for the campaign to make the point that policy is not being driven by doves from the Carter Administration" who are in nominal control of the campaign, a conservative involved in the campaign said. "Tony Lake is trying to show that Clinton is listening to the moderates, not just to the liberals."

"I think these [Clinton] people have a keen sense that the old foreign policy structures and ideas are no longer valid," said Penn Kemble, a senior associate in the Washington office of Freedom House, a New York City-based human rights group. "The old Cold War fault line is really gone. There are people I know

The National Journal, October 17, 1992

who still have an anti-interventionist, moral-example view of U.S. foreign policy, but you can't predict on the basis of the past how these people will react" to current issues. He added, "Clinton has to avoid making choices on the basis of these old concepts."

"What we have been engaged in is an effort to define the center," Clinton adviser Berger said. "Because of the end of the Cold War, America's role in the world has to be thought about freshly. Clinton has brought together people who have disagreed in the past, but who come together now in agreement."

Still, the seams sometimes show. Clinton's most recent foreign policy speech -- a muscular attack on Bush's alleged indifference to fledgling democracies around the world -- given in Milwaukee in early October, included an unusual number of caveats and qualifiers.

Some foreign policy analysts suggested that this was a vivid reflection of the potentially conflicting advice that Clinton is receiving. Even in attacking Bush's China policy for ignoring human rights, for example, Clinton backpedaled to say he wasn't trying to "isolate" China. "We should use our relationship and influence to work with the Chinese for a peaceful transition to democracy," he said.

At another point, Clinton said he supported continued foreign aid, an unpopular program in Congress, but also said it should not be at the expense of lost American jobs. And while the United States should support democracy vigorously abroad, he said "it need not divert us from the pressing need for economic, educational and social reconstruction here at home."

Clinton also reiterated his support for Bush's conduct of the Persian Gulf war, but bracketed it with criticism of "the Bush Administration's appeasement of Saddam Hussein before the war and . . . its callous disregard for democratic principles after the war."

Elsewhere in the Mideast, Clinton said, he would continue Bush's Arab-Israeli peace process, which has drawn praise from most foreign policy quarters, but there in a pro-Israel tilt: "The Bush Administration has sometimes treated the conflict between Israel and its Arab states as just another quarrel between religions and nations, rather than one in which the survival of a democratic ally is at stake."

Even in Latin America, where Bush has quietly shifted policies to encourage democracy and U.S.-Latin economic ties, Clinton endorsed the efforts while harking back to Carter-era dichotomies. "Our efforts to strengthen the fragile democracies in the region are still directed too much toward central governments and to help the wealthy," he said.

Finally, in calling for a human rights policy that does not "coddle dictators," Clinton added: "This does not mean embarking on a reckless crusade. Every ideal, including the promotion of democracy, must be tempered with prudence and common sense."

Those ambiguities and potential conflicts are not likely to be resolved quickly if Clinton is elected. Only after a President Clinton makes his appointments and then confronts concrete policy choices would the details of his foreign policy become clear.

The National Journal, October 17, 1992

The ultimate caveat, after all, is that outside events help to shape a presidency about as much as the theories and principles established beforehand. No one can foresee the challenges the United States will face in the new era, or how the President and the nation would respond.

GRAPHIC: Picture, Clinton adviser Samuel R. Berger, America's role needs to be rethought. John Eisele

Copyright 1992 International Herald Tribune
International Herald Tribune

October 12, 1992

SECTION: NEWS

LENGTH: 1254 words

HEADLINE: Clinton's World View: Sticking to Basics

BYLINE: Paul F. Horvitz

BODY:

Anthony Lake, a foreign policy adviser to Governor Bill Clinton, is professor of international relations at Mount Holyoke College. He served under Henry Kissinger on the National Security Council staff and as State Department director of policy planning under President Jimmy Carter. Mr. Lake spoke with Paul F. Horvitz of the International Herald Tribune.

Q. How would a Clinton foreign policy compare to President Bush's?

A. Let me begin with how a Clinton foreign policy would be similar to a Bush foreign policy.

The first point is that there are basic American interests in the world and basic American commitments. A Clinton administration would, I would hope, continue essentially along the same lines in important respects.

For example, Governor Clinton has emphasized the importance of working for open markets. He has supported trying to complete the Uruguay Round. He has come out for the North American Free Trade Agreement, while arguing that there need to be some improvements. And even during the primaries, when some of the others in his party were appealing to protectionist sentiments, Governor Clinton refused to go along.

Secondly, Governor Clinton recognizes the importance of maintaining very strong defenses. The Clinton defense budget over the next five years totals \$1.36 trillion compared with a Bush defense budget of \$1.42 trillion - not a large difference.

Third, the governor has said he will maintain the American commitment to strong alliances and our friends abroad. He has emphasized his commitment to building on whatever progress is made in the Arab-Israeli peace talks, and we would maintain our commitment to Israel.

Q. And the differences?

A. The changes revolve around the fact that we are in a new post-Cold War era and that we ought to be designing American foreign policy to meet the challenges and opportunities of that new world, rather than simply continuing in various ways the policies of the past.

The new world will be a world that is much more competitive economically, a world which will have new kinds of security dangers and a world of rapid

International Herald Tribune, October 12, 1992

change, for example in the surge of democracy and in changes in the environment. From this you derive three major emphases of Clinton's foreign and defense policies.

The first is that he is very serious when he says that our first foreign policy priority has to be the restoration of our domestic economy, so that we can bring more to the table on issues like aid to Russia and show the kind of American leadership that we must. Also, it means that when we're urging our partners in the Group of Seven to make domestic economic changes for the sake of our communal health, that it's clear that the United States is prepared to do the same thing.

A second difference would be not so much in the levels of defense spending but how you spend it. Here, Clinton has emphasized shifting the priorities more toward mobile forces and reductions in two areas: one, moving to around 100,000 troops in Europe, which would more likely fit the realistic threats. And, two, changing the focus of the Strategic Defense Initiative toward a ground-based, limited program and away from the space-based, larger system.

The third difference involves democracy and the environment. On the environment, Governor Clinton was very critical of the failure of the administration's leadership before the Rio Conference to try to work with the Europeans and others to negotiate agreements that President Bush could support.

On the role of democracy, what Clinton is saying is not that we have to embark on a democratic jihad which would try to reshape the world in our own image. What he is saying is that there is a new reality - that brave men and women are struggling for democracy within their own societies. To fail to support those people is not only to betray our own values but is to make American diplomacy irrelevant to one of the important realities of the post Cold War era.

Q. How will a President Clinton convey that he is prepared to wield American military power?

A. He has said that anybody running for president has to think very carefully about this and ask himself whether he would be prepared to use force. There is no doubt in Governor Clinton's mind that he would be, and he has said that. He has said that he would prefer that we use force in a multilateral context but that he would use it unilaterally when necessary.

Q. Would you foresee changes on nuclear weapons issues?

A. There would not be a marked change. Governor Clinton supported very strongly the agreement by President Bush and President Yeltsin at the Washington summit. I think you would see a greater effort on nuclear nonproliferation, and he has talked about trying to strengthen the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency's inspectors to carry out inspections. And he has also talked about a phased approach to a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

Copyright 1992 The New York Times Company
The New York Times

March 22, 1992, Sunday, Late Edition - Final

SECTION: Section 4; Page 3; Column 1; Week in Review Desk

LENGTH: 1859 words

HEADLINE: THE WORLD: Setting Aside Fears;
Africa Finds Reasons to Hope for Democracy's Future

BYLINE: By MICHAEL CLOUGH

BODY:

On Tuesday, white South Africans voted to give President F. W. de Klerk a mandate to end white rule. By a surprisingly large 2-to-1 margin, they approved a measure endorsing negotiations already under way to create a nonracial, democratic constitution. This result marks a historic turning point for Africa.

Many South African conservatives and sympathizers abroad have long argued that democracy cannot succeed on the African continent. They point to the dismal results achieved in the first three decades of the independence era: In country after country democratic constitutions were torn up or ignored. Power was concentrated in the hands of dictators of varying degrees of brutality. Corruption flourished. Economies were destroyed. Civil war and famine became endemic. The litany of horror stories cited by conservatives is often exaggerated. As many Africans have argued, the positive side of the African story is seldom told in the West. Many African leaders have struggled against tremendous odds to find ways to help their people survive and develop.

Nevertheless, the conservatives have a point: By almost any measure, the first wave of experiments with democracy in Africa -- beginning with Ghana's independence in 1957 -- failed.

Over the last decade, conservatives have repeatedly used the failure of democracy in Africa as an argument against majority rule. They warned that the end of apartheid would cause a rapid deterioration in living standards. Instead of democracy, majority rule would open the way for black domination or, as many white pundits were fond of saying, "One man, one vote, once."

A majority of South African whites undoubtedly share these fears. Yet, on Tuesday, they voted to take a chance that the conservatives were wrong. They did so for two reasons. First, and most importantly, they have been forced to recognize that white rule has failed just as dismally as black rule; and, second, they have been given reason to hope that with the end of East-West competition, the world has changed in ways that will make it possible for democracy to succeed in South Africa and in the rest of Africa.

The defenders of apartheid were always well informed about the latest foibles and misdeeds of every petty black tyrant north of the Limpopo River. Newspapers in South Africa closely followed the career of Africa's worst dictator, Idi Amin of Uganda. And businessmen in Johannesburg could always be counted on to recite the economic disasters that had followed independence in Mozambique, Zaire, Zambia and other countries where they operated. At the same time, most whites seemed strangely uninformed about the failings of their own country.

//

The New York Times, March 22, 1992

In fact, one of the most striking things about the history of the first independence era in Africa -- 1957 to 1990 -- is how closely developments in South Africa paralleled those in other parts of the continent.

While South African leaders perceived themselves as democrats, they presided over a de facto one-party state. After coming to power in 1948, the National Party quickly rigged the electoral system to insure that other white parties would have great difficulty challenging its political monopoly. As black protests began to mount in the early 1960's, Pretoria banned the African National Congress and other opposition parties and imprisoned many prominent black leaders, including Nelson Mandela.

The consequences of one-party rule by a small minority were the same for South Africa as they were for most other countries on the continent: Political opposition mushroomed. Thousands of blacks went into exile. Banned parties sought out foreign patrons willing to provide the arms necessary for them to launch guerrilla wars. And violence and repression intensified.

Following a resurgence of black protest in the late 1970's and early 1980's, the security establishment usurped many of the normal functions of government. After President P. W. Botha declared a state of emergency in 1985, South Africa became a quasi-police state with tens of thousands of opposition leaders in jail.

Despite white perceptions of their country as a productive free-market economy, South Africa has followed an economic course not all that different from its neighbors to the north. Like other parties in Africa, the National Party used its political power to construct a large centralized state. Large sectors of the economy were nationalized in order to provide jobs for Afrikaner workers. A mind-boggling array of regulations was passed to protect the privileges of South Africa's white tribe. As in the rest of Africa, the South African Government's attempt to use economic policy to promote the interests of a narrowly based minority produced dismal results. Weighed down by a bloated bureaucracy and education and labor policies that made it difficult for blacks, who constitute about 80 percent of the population, to be productive citizens, the South African economy stopped growing in the 1980's.

These political and economic trends, combined with growing pressure from the international community, caused President de Klerk to make his historic decision on Feb. 9, 1990, to release Nelson Mandela, lift the ban on the A.N.C. and other opposition parties and begin negotiations to end apartheid and white rule. And it was a dawning awareness that any attempt to halt the process of change would accelerate these trends that caused South Africa's whites to vote "yes" in Tuesday's referendum.

Are there grounds for believing that, despite the experience elsewhere in Africa, South Africa's experiment with democracy will succeed? To answer this question, it is important to understand the changes that have occurred since most African countries became independent in the early 1960's.

In many ways, the early 1960's were a uniquely bad time to begin building democracy in Africa. The cold war was just beginning to heat up in the third world. Both the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, and the American Presidential candidates in 1960 -- John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon -- believed that Africa was a potentially critical battleground in the East-West war. Newly

The New York Times, March 22, 1992

independent African states were pressed hard to choose sides. Neither superpower championed democracy. Instead, both Washington and Moscow rushed to support any leader willing to pay lip service to their cause and vote the right way in the United Nations. African leaders quickly discovered that they could destroy their countries' economies and brutalize their populations and still count on a steady flow of foreign aid and military protection. With the end of the cold war, this is no longer the case.

In all the discussions surrounding the wave of democratization that has swept Africa over the last three years, not enough emphasis has been placed on the importance of the decision by Moscow, Paris and Washington to abandon their old clients. African populations did not suddenly discover that their governments were corrupt and repressive. They had known that for years. And they did not need developments in Eastern Europe to convince them of the need for transitions to democracy. What changed was that the superpowers stopped propping up their oppressors, causing a sudden shift in the internal balances of force in their countries.

Soviet withdrawal from Africa forced the Government in Angola to agree to hold multiparty elections and it prompted President Mengistu Haile Mariam to flee Ethiopia. Changes in American policy precipitated the collapse of dictatorships in Chad, Liberia and Somalia. Both President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, who on Friday banned all political meetings, and President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire are now fighting for their political life against mounting odds because they can no longer count on Western support. Without the safety net provided by foreign support, African leaders at long last have no choice but to turn to their people for support.

The Building Blocks

At the same time, the essential building blocks for civil society -- committed, honest and pragmatic leaders and a healthy civil society -- are now much more in evidence in Africa, especially South Africa, than they were in the early 1960's. Despite independent Africa's failures, over the last three decades it has succeeded in producing a multitude of well educated, talented individuals who are able and prepared to guide the continent.

At independence, many African states were dominated by a single leader whose right to lead was established by the fact that he was one of a small handful of people in his country to have an advanced education and international contacts. Such was the case with Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya and H. Kamuzu Banda in Malawi. Today, the situation is quite different. In South Africa, for example, even Nelson Mandela has had to accommodate himself to the fact that there are a whole host of leaders within his own party who are able and prepared to question his authority.

Just as important is the development of a strong and diverse network of associations and non-governmental organizations that are in a position to check the power of the central government. In the 1960's the few such organizations that existed in Africa were quickly captured by the state. That will not happen again. In South Africa today, the hundreds of organizations -- unions, associations, self-help groups and others -- that have sprung up inside the country to combat the socioeconomic side of apartheid are actively developing strategies to insure that they are not smothered by a post-apartheid state.

13.

The New York Times, March 22, 1992

Finally, the prospects for democracy in South Africa are better today than for the rest of Africa in the 1960's because of what Africans and others have learned from the failures of the last three decades. As is evidenced by the discussions that have gone on under the sponsorship of groups like the African Leadership Forum, there is a consensus among African leaders that democracy, human rights and government accountability are essential for development.

There is also a surprising degree of consensus on the need for growth-oriented economic policies. The discussions under way in the working groups established by the Convention for a Democratic South Africa on a new constitution and the economic policies of a post-apartheid state reflect the new mood of pragmatism that has swept across Africa.

None of this guarantees that democracy will succeed in South Africa or other parts of the continent. Three decades of failed black and white rule have left a bitter legacy. Millions of Africans have died. Bitter wars still rage in Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia and the Sudan. In South Africa, apartheid and the struggle to overthrow it have created immense bitterness and a "lost generation" of black youths who now lack the skills that will be required to take full advantage of a transition to democracy.

But the prospects for democracy in Africa are now unquestionably brighter than they were three decades ago, if for no other reason than that Africans now know all too well the costs of the failure of democracy.

GRAPHIC: Photos: Congo, 1960: Patrice Lumumba, deposed as first Prime Minister of the Congo (now Zaire), under guard in 1960. (United Press International); Kenya, 1964: Jomo Kenyatta, having led the struggle for independence from Britain, is sworn in as his nation's first President Dec. 12, 1964; his wife, Njira, and Chief Justice Sir John Ainley attend. (United Press International); South Africa, 1990: President F. W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela, the African National Congress leader freed from prison, meet to begin three days of talks. (Associated Press)

SUBJECT: POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

NAME: CLOUGH, MICHAEL

GEOGRAPHIC: AFRICA

Copyright 1992 Newspaper Publishing PLC
The Independent

October 23, 1992, Friday

SECTION: INTERNATIONAL NEWS PAGE; Page 12

LENGTH: 640 words

HEADLINE: Clinton to place foreign affairs in safe hands

BYLINE: From JOHN LICHFIELD in Washington

BODY:

Washington - A nemesis-inviting guessing-game - Who Gets What Job in a Clinton administration - is in its third or fourth round in Washington. On the domestic side, the names pile up like autumn leaves. On the foreign policy side, four or five names keep appearing at the top of the heap, writes John Lichfield.

Secretary of state, it is confidently predicted, would be one of two men, both dependable and uninspiring: Warren Christopher, deputy secretary of state under Jimmy Carter, now practising LA law; or Lee Hamilton, Democratic Congressman from Indiana, a noted anglophile and senior Clinton foreign affairs adviser.

These are "the kind of old family retainers you turn to if you want to do nothing challenging and keep out of trouble," said one Democratic official. "They're safe, obvious," said one former Reagan administration foreign policy adviser. "They tell you that Clinton wants to put foreign policy in dependable hands and get on with his domestic agenda. Clinton can't afford another Bay of Pigs because of incompetent staffing."

But a veteran Democratic insider, and friend of Warren Christopher, believes neither man is in line for the job. "Christopher is too soft for the top job. He's an ideal number two. In any case, he wants to be attorney-general, not secretary of state. Lee Hamilton is in line to be chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in the next Congress. I'm convinced both he and Clinton think he can do more good for a Clinton administration by staying put."

So who will be the first Democratic secretary of state since Ed Muskie 12 years ago? "Quite frankly, there is no obvious candidate with the charisma and prestige and experience to be immediately acceptable, both at home and abroad," says a Kennedy-vintage Democratic foreign policy expert. "More than any other position, maybe, 'state' shows the vacuum of Democratic talent after being out of executive office for so long."

One theory gaining ground in Washington is that Governor Clinton - who likes to surround himself with quality, likes surprises and has promised a bipartisan administration - might offer the State Department to Colin Powell. General Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Gulf war, national security adviser to Ronald Reagan, is hugely respected in both parties. He has never revealed his political leanings but people who know him well suspect he has ambitions to run for president one day - as a Democrat. Another dark horse candidate for secretary of state is said to be Senator Bill Bradley of New Jersey.

The Independent, October 23, 1992

The new secretary of defense would most probably be Congressman Les Aspin, chairman of the House of Representatives Defense Committee. Mr Aspin is said to be reluctant to leave such a powerful job to become a mere defense secretary but the voters of Wisconsin may remove his luxury of choice. Mr Aspin's re-election campaign is in trouble. He may be one of the senior victims of the anti-incumbency mood terrifying congressmen of both parties this year.

The most likely candidate for national security adviser - the president's personal consultant on foreign affairs - is Anthony Lake, chief of planning in the Carter State Department. Mr Lake is regarded as highly clever, experienced and pragmatic (not unlike Brent Scowcroft, the incumbent). Another possibility is said to be Michael Mandelbaum, professor of foreign affairs at Johns Hopkins University, a Clinton chum since their student days in England.

For director of central intelligence - at a time of intense post- Cold War teeth-gnashing over what the CIA is supposed to do these days - there are two principal contenders. Dave McCurdy, a Democratic congressman and chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, or William Crowe, chairman of the joint chief of staffs