sent in their demands of the kind of South Africa they wished to live in. $\hat{a}\200\235\ <294>$ 

CMIJUne 25/26, 1955, the Congress of the People took place in Kliptown, near Johannesburg.

About 3,000 people, despite

roadblocks and cordons, attended.

These were workers and tmmuka

unionists, peasant and traders, intellectuals and clerks, men and women, youth and students, of all colours and ethnic groups, (?hristians, Moslems, Hindus, Communists and non-communists.

Ιt

was the most representative gathering in the history of South Africa.

Chief Albert Lutuli, Dr Dadoo, Father Trevor Huddleston
were honoured with the traditional award "Isitwalandwe
/Seaperankoe" which has since become the highest honour in the
ANC.

This gathering adopted the Freedom Charter and subsequently the annualcxmmerences of the various organisations in\_the Congress Alliance (the ANC, the South Afrdxxuiâ\200\230lndian Congress,â\200\230 the Coloured People's Congress, the Congress of Democrats and the South African Congress<af'Trade Unions) also adopted it.

Thus

the Freedom Charter became the common programme enshrinimgfi $\neg$ \202ma hopes and aspirations of all the progressive people of South Africa.

I

What is the Freedom Charter?

What is the essence of the

demands in it?

How are these demands to be realised?

The Freedom Charter is a statement ef aims.

TWmaxnethod of

achieving these aims, the farces of change, the strategy and tactics is spelt out clearly (not in the Freedom Charter but) in the 1969 Strategy and Tactics Cocument Of the ANC which we fix:

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CHAPTER SIX

DEFIANCE AND NEW STRATEGIES (1949â\200\2241960)

The Defiance Campaign and the Congress of the People

The radicalisation of the ANC cannot correctly be attributed to a specific event or incident.

Overall it was a process

covering a period of time and to which significant landmarks are readily recognisable.

One of these landmarks was the  $\hat{a}$ 200\235Defend

Free Speech" convention which was organised by the Transvaal ANC, Transvaal Indian Congress, the African People's Organisation (predecessor of the Coloured People's Organisation) and the Johannesburg DistrictCXmmuttee of the Communist Party in March 1950.

Dr James S Moroka, the ANC President  $\hat{a} \geq 00 \leq 224$  General chaired the meeting.

Militant demands were adopted: freedom of speech,
movement and organiSation, land and the ending of the colour bar.

The meeting called for a general strike on May 1st.

The workers

responded enthusiastically and virtually all industry on the Witwatersrand came to a stop.

The government banned meetings and gatherings on that day and le the evening the triggerâ\200\224happy police Opened fire on young Africans in Alexandra killing and woumï¬\202ing over 30.

In May the

Unlawful Organisations Bill (Suppression of Communism Act)\wu3 enacted and the ANC called for an emergency conference in Johannestunxg.

volunteers.

All were arrested and brought to trial
(Regina vs. Walter Sisulu and Nineteen others). Moroka
elected to be defended apart from the others by his own
lawyer.

This in itself cost him much prestige.

But

the real damage was done when at the end of the trial, his lawyer entered a separate plea in mitigation ... the lawyer argued that Dr Moroka enjoyed good relations with neighbouring white farmers, and that he had helped financially with the education of the white boys ... â\200\231The leader of Congress disassociated himself from his fellowâ\200\224accused; he appeared unready to go the whole way in defiance, and he asked Whites to shield him from the consequences of white laws, and from the consequence of his own stand.â\200\235 <291>

This  $\hat{a}\200\235$  process of disassociation  $\hat{a}\200\235$  of Moroka from the ANC was accompanied by another "process of disassociation" of the masses from Moroka.

He was ousted and the masses chose Lutuli as President-General.

Iki¬\201kme his election as President-General of the ANC in December 1952, Chief Lutulu was ANC President in Natal and Chief in the Groutville mission area.

The Secretary of

Native Affairs summoned Chief Lutuli and expressly asked him to choose between remaining chief<3r a leader of the ANC.

Не

refused to resign from Congress and refused to resign his Chieftainship.

He was immediately deposed  $a\200\235$ by his refusal to surrender had enormously enhanced his reputation throughout black South Africa. $a\200\235$  <292>

Lutuli's presidency was characterised by activity and

«383â\200\235

Stellenboschq 51 little wineâ\200\224farming town in the Boland about 30 miles from Cape Town, the legislative capital of South Africa.

Stellenbosch is a unique town that features prominently in the hisUmqrof oppression in South Africa.

It is named after the

only Coloured Governor in the history of South Africa â\200\224 Simon van der Stel who took over control of the Cape from Jan van Riebeeck, the Dutchman who established the first white settlement in South Africa.

It is also the town where Dr Malan, the former Prime Minister and "father of apartheidâ\200\235 lived and from where, together with other leaders of tmermmzruling Nationalist Party, he gave the world the term  $\hat{a}\200\235$ apartheidâ\200\235.

It is at Stellenbosch, at the

University named after the town, that the former Prdhmari¬\202insiter

Dr Verwoerd, the "father of Bantustansâ\200\235 received his educaticmh academic and political.

It is also at Stellenbosch, the town that feeds Afrikaner nationalism, that POQO was first introduced to the world. (322) This was in April 1962.

A number of African farm labourers

were sentenced in the Stellenbosch Magistrate's Court for
lattempted murder.

It was said that, acting on the instructions

of their "leaders" MnCEQKszwn, they had sharpened car Springs and made pangas for them  $a\200\235$ in preparation for an attempt to murder the farm foremah and his family, set fire to the farmllmlildings and then march to Stellenboshch, firing buildings on the way $a\200\235$ .

This was the first time POQO  $\_$  as a movement was heartlcaf  $\tilde{\ }$ 

\at least outside\_Stellenbosch or rather the Western Cape.

The

term itself means  $\hat{a}\200\235$ pure $\hat{a}\200\235$ <br/>or in political terminology  $\hat{a}\200\235$ we go it alone $\hat{a}\200\235$ .

It is closely connected with the rise of African  $\hat{A}$ «410 $\hat{A}$ 200 $\hat{A}$ 224 $\hat{A}$ 

nationalism.

 $\hat{a}\200\235$ Umtopiya poqo" referred to the  $\hat{a}\200\235$ true Ethopians" in the early black church history in South Africa and TMvAfrika poqo $\hat{a}\200\235$  was supposed to have the same connotation.

Though this was

the first indication that there existed in South Africa a movement whose cry was  $200\235$ kill or be killed $200\235$  it was "not until months after the trial that it became possible to establish a definite pattern of thought and activity of the P000 movement  $200\235$ . <323>

It is true that in the Western Cape there was some cooperation between POQO and PAC.

Ehi¬\202: things were not running smoothly.

POQO consisted of young men from among the unemployed as well as the low-paid African workers â\200\224 especially the farm labourers of the Western Cape: Paarl, Stellenbosch, Wellington and Worcester.

At one stage, there was a cell in De Aar but that soon collapsed.

They were a frustrated and desperate lot who believed, fanatically, that black domination must take over from white domination.

At one time, these two groups were rivals:

POQO opposed bitterly those PAC men who operdi¬\201ziflirted with the white Liberal Party and its members and P000 called them 
â\200\235Katangeseâ\200\235 ~ the treacherous ones who are playing the same role as Moise Tshombe in the Congo.

The POQO group had no economic policy, no programme, no set of aims orkxi¬\202jefs except an ingrained belief in 'African exclusiveness'.

iDt rejected cooneration with other population groups, believed that only the African can liberattati¬\202ue country and regarded white participation in the struggle as anathema.

By 1963, when Leballo made his press conference â\200\235revelation" that POQO iu PAC, POQO was on the decline.

It had no mass base.

~411â\200\224

of police prevented the people from entering Zeerust;.

women

coming from Gopane were baton~charged and beaten up by the police; some people were unable to get to Zeerust for medical treatment  $\hat{a}\200\224$ 

a large number of them went to Bechuanaland (now

Botswana) where they were treated at the Lobatsi Hospital.

This commission was a one  $200\224$  man commission  $200\224$  a certain H Balk  $200\224$  a Native Appeal Court Judge, and as such an employee of the

Native Affairs Department: the Department most involved in the

troubles!

There was no agenda, no one to lead evidence and in addition no crossâ\200\224examination of witnesses was allowed; the evidence was practically useless; anyone could say anything.

The Government, the supporting Chiefs and their protagonists unanimously blamed the ANC for all their troubles.

The reason

being given was that the people gave the  $a\200\235$ Afrika" salute: the false impression and suggestion being that  $a\200\235$ agitators $a\200\235$  incitei $a\200\235$  the people.

The government supporting evidence went even further

\* the legal advisors were attacked \(\hat{a}\)200\224 the same legal

representatives were constantly appearing for time people.

?Niis

was sinister enough but what was more "distressing  $200\234$  and  $200\235$  disheartening" was that most of the people accused were defended in such a manner that they were acquitted! (343)

Things came to a climax in September: the women who had their  $a\200\235$ reference books" for nearly a year and now thoroughly disillusioned, decided to burn them.

There were no benefits

derived from them.

They were either useless or would txasted as instruments of oppression.

This was in Gopane.

Pass burning

## episodes!

The police came to arrest a handful who had been pointed out by the lcoal Chief.

All women in the area joined

e425â\200\224

â\200\224 Verwoerd was then the Minister of Native Affairs and later

Prime Minister of South Africa).

It appears that already in

January 1957 the order for Moiloa's deposition and deportathmi had been snnyL The incident on April 4, was a result of his

stand (Mi the pass issue.

The people were horrified â\200\224 deposition

and deportation!

The Government on the other tunuicihi¬\202 not even

bother to do it in writing!

The Zeerust people working in Johannesburg chartered two

buses and 'went homeâ\200\235 on April 12.

Ι

The people from Johannesburg

called a meeting in the Kgotla (the public meeting) on April 14  $a\200\224$  the meeting turned out to be a court at which those who were believed to have betrayed the chief were  $a\200\235$ tried $a\200\235$  and sentenced to deattu

'The police intervened.

That evening whilst on their way

to Johannesburg about 100 people were arrested; 25 were detained and charged with  $a\200\235$ incitement to murder and attempted murder" and  $a\200\235$ a most rare charge - crimen laesio majestatis ~ usurping the functions of the state $a\200\235$ . (342)

Five were convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to imprisonment ranging from three to five years; some were given a nominal fine for holding unlawful gatherings amiti¬\202merest were discharged.

The Post Office at Linokana was closed; tine school was boycotted because the teachers' wives took out passes (it was subsequently closed down by the government); the railway bus was  $<\bar{r}\202$ iscontinued and more arrests for  $a\200\235$ holding unlawful meetings $a\200\235$  or burning passes were made.

The pass issuing unit was reinforced by a special squad of police from Pretoria, under the command of the notorious Sergeant Van Rooyen; the squad did not fall under" the local command, but remained a lamzunto itself.

SWMS was a

~423â\200\224

2

 $1941^1944$  revoltâ\200\235 <329> is a case in point.

The Witzieshoek

vigilance Association in Johannesburg and in Harrismith (the closest town to the area) played a similar role.

It was in close

contact with LeifHIDQha Sechaba (Guardian of the Nation) in the

Orange Free State "and consultations took place between these

organisations throughout the crisis situation of 1940â\200\2241951â\200\235 <330>

The immediate causa belli

was the 1936 Natives Land and

Trust Act Act which sort of â\200\235received" the 1913 Native Land Act. One of the most prominent leaders in the interâ\200\224war rural revolt period was Alpheus Maliba the â\200\235unsung hero of rural resistance in the Northern Transvaal, and a man of remarkable bravery, leader of the Zoutpansberg Cultural Association in Johannesburg, and of the associated Zoutpansberg Balemi Association in the Reservesâ\200\235.

In December 1939, the Johannesburg

district Committee of the Communist Party'- he was a Communist Party and ANC member  $\hat{a}$ 200\224 published a pamphlet by him: "The Conditions of the Venda People $\hat{a}$ 200\235.

In this pamphlet, Alpheus

Maliba analysed the socio~econimic structure, political organisationical the Venda people, education and government programme and concludes:

 $\hat{a}\200\235$ Firstly, the land must be taken from the rich and must be returned to the people, together with the Crown Lands.

Secondly, the mines must be taken from the mineâ\200\224owners, and must become the property of the peeple to use t0 their own advantage.

Thirdly, the Poll Tax, Dog Tax, dipping fees, 'Licences for chopping trees, grazing fees etc.,which serve only  $\hat{A} \ll 418 \hat{a} \times 200 \times 224$ 

land question and the regime's attempts to impose its will.

The reallocation of land and the process of removing

families from existing holdings and cattle culling posed

tremendous problems for the regime.

Hence the resort to the

imposition of government<appointed chiefs and headmen to solve
the problenmx</pre>

rlâ\200\230he measures introduced to effect the new scheme went under the names of land reclamation schemes, land consolidation schemes and cattle culling schemes.

The real

problems were that the Africans had been deprived of land to plough; starvation and disease decimated the population and compelled men and youths to emigrate to the mines, farms and towns to eke out a living. (345)

This led to socio-economic

problems and indeed a dead end: married men who had no arable allotments could not be granted residential sites in the farming areas of the reserves and men who own stock and have no arabhe allotments were being denied opportunities to rear and graze Stock on the communal pasturage.

In short, the peasants were

being diSpossessed of the arable allotments they hold if they had no adequate means to work them.

What were the powers and role of the chiefs under the new conditions?

In compliance with the Bantu Authorities Act, the Promotion of Self-Government Act aimed at turning all chiefs in the

reserves into despotic ruthlees agents and fli¬\202i¬\201li¬\202i¬\201â\200\231(i¬\202lViding the

Africans into small  $\hat{a}\200\235$ manageable

ethnic groups: this division was

not only among ,he African people as a whole but amont Afican ethnic gtrnuus (or what was called "tribesmenâ\200\235) themselves.

The

head of a â\200\235Bantu Authorityâ\200\235 was the chief or headman; two or more

You have dislodged a boulder,

You will die.â\200\235

The regime could only enforce the passes in 1963.

The very

fact ti¬\202uat it took the regime 50 years to extend their hated pass laws to African women testifies to the calibre of our women; their oganisational talents and courage.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE PAN AFRICAN CONGRESS ("PAC") (1959~1960) The PAC has been making a lot of noise internationally and  $\hat{a}$ 200\224 this is interesting 9 very litle inside the country.

]H::is our

duty to put the record straight, to tell the story of what is the PAC, what do they want to achieve and what methods they used.

We

confine ourselVes to the first two years of their existence ~ after all they did not live longer than one year in South Africa. But like all naughty children, the effects of their â\200\235infantihe disorderâ\200\235 are still with us today, especially here outside the country.

â\200\230

But

Since the  $mid a \200\2241950$ 's, especially eafter the adoption of the Freedom Charter and the establishment of the Congress Alliance, a small minority within the ANC started to grumble.

iï¬\202ueir voices

and intentions became obvious at the Transvaal Provincial conference of the ANC which was held tnuhar the auspices of the National Executive Committee at Orlando, Johannesburg, on November 1stâ\200\2242nd, 1958.

They tried to  $a\200\235$  pack  $a\200\235$  the conference with their supporters obviously with the aim of  $a\200\235$  seizing power  $a\200\235$ .

these annwnï¬\201xms failed to qualify as delegates. They tried to  $^{\sim}402^{\sim}$ 

professional women of South Africa; and

\_

bring about the emancipation of women from the special disabilities suffered by them under laws, customs and conventions and strive for a genuine South African democracy based on complete equality and friendship between men and women, and between each section.â\200\235 <308>

Two things need to be said about these develOpments:

The Federation of South African Women united women of

a)

the women saw the struggle for women's emancipation as an inseparable aspect of the struggle for national liberation; that the opression of the women - as Blacks, workers and women - was a product of a system which had to be destroyed in orderix3emd the threeâ\200\224fold burden of their suffering; and

b)

different nationalities and cultures on the basis of an unequivocal commitment to the liberation struggle.

Ttgether with the Women's League with which it intimately worked and whose membership played a leading role in it, the Federation expressed an organisational unity which, in many respects was a prelude to and anticipated the broader unity which was tc-ehcompass the Congress movementiat the historic Congress

As we said before, the racist government wanted to introduce passes for women.

What is a pass or â\200\235reference bookâ\200\235 as they euphemistically called it?

This is a thick 48 paged document

with a hard black cover.

of the People 1h 1955.

Six and a half by three inches.

Tï¬\202wa

document must be carried by every African man or woman in Soutti

that no convincing evidence had been led to show that the accused had conspired by illegal, unconstitutional and violent means tc> overthrow the state.

This was a defeat for the racist government which had clearly hoped to decapitate the movement and thus deprive the people of leadership and direction.

It was yet

another indication of the lengths to which the racist regime was prepared to go to stifle the national liberation struggle and smash the organisation.

'This victory was acclaimed throughout

South Afrdxxaeas a victory for democracy although a victory obtained at great cost bar the trialists.

Many had lost their

jobs during the long trial, others had their businesses ruhuai and other still could no longer assume their legal practices.

One of the important facts to emerge from the Treason Trial was the undoubted popularity of the people's leaders among the people.

Iait, more importantly, the failure of the court to find communism in the Freedom Charter was a great vindication for the fact that the Freedom Charter is a document for national democratic revolution in South Africa.

The boycott campaign, strike movement

and women's demonstrations

During the whole period of the Treason Trial, the ANC began in earnest to sharpen the weapon of mass direct action which throughout the fifties took on the forms of boycott, mass demonstrations of women and political strikes through ttmaxinique form of the stay~at~homes.

The 1953 Nata]<3mvw'wwsraised the issue Of the boycott to  $^{\sim}394^{\sim}$ 

in the face of the gravest injustices the ANC never once abandoned the principle that all those who had their home in the country of Africans were welcome, provided only that they accepted full and consistent equality and freedom for all.

In this the ANC was not

merely bowing to history and reality but believed that it was correct in principle to make their position clear.

Over and over again in the face of manifest inhumanity, tine ANC absolutely refused to be provoked into abandoning its democratic principles.â\200\235 (296) Taking these historic realities into consideration, the democratuzgndhciples of the ANC became the cornerstone of our movement -

fin: the national liberation of the African, Coloured and Indian.

These became the most fundamental and essential tenets for the building of a revolutionary uniaxifiont of all democratic antiâ\200\224racist and antiâ\200\224fascist forces in South Africa.

'The ANC made it clear that nobody is excluded by reason of race or colour.

It therefore rejected totally all racist ideas; expressed the consistency of the ANC in its nonâ\200\224racial and anti-racist approach and offered an alternative to the reactionary philosophy of apartheid.

There was no compromise

with racism.

By stating that  $\hat{a}\200\235$ no government cen.justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of the people" and ti¬\202uat "our people have been robbed by a form of government founded on injustice and inequality $\hat{a}\200\235$ , the Freedom Charter makes a  $\hat{a}\200\234387\hat{a}\200\224$ 

boycott and demanded an investigation into the conditions of farm labourers.

The boycott was a success and reforms were introduced.

Many of these boycotts were so successful that companies were forced to negotiate with the ANC and SACTU.

Most important

from the point of view of the freedom movement was the organising aspect of these campaigns;

the degree to which they answered the

most immediate demands of the people;

the drawing of the people

cmmld relate directly, and the demonstration to the people and the regime and the capitalist class ci'the immense power which the organised force of the oppressed and exploited wielded.

Whereas the boycott campaigns led at the most to victimisation of individual leaders and activists in the form of banning orders, the stay at homes brought down the might of the state on the class of workers, their leaders and their

into the mainstream of political acthmicniissues to which they

Government and the class of owners stood united to smash the move for the withdrawal of labour tnlxmorkers.

The

organisatirnus.

threat to the entire exploitative system could not be tolerated, eukicxxevery occasion during the fifties, in the past the only answer of the state and the bosses was to resort to naked violence to suppress the strike movement.

This all started with

the May Day strike of 1950 1J1\M1ich 18 Africans were shot dead and many more injured.

The week-long staymatwhome (March 1958) was brutally smashed as police entered homes, confiscated and destroyed provisions and intimidated strikers to return to work.

In addition, the

white  $\frac{200}{224}$  owned press, even the  $\frac{200}{235}$  liberal  $\frac{200}{235}$  dailies like thw Rand Daily

Sizwe which is not only attacking the enemy but  $\hat{a}\200\235$ neutralising" the PAC influence.

The Peasants' Revolt

We have already discussed the wars of conquest and dispossession and the resultant wars of resistance.

These were;

automatically led to the formation of the ANC and the campaign against the 1913 Native Land Act.

The land questitnilnas always

been closely associated with both the rural and urban black population in South Africa:

"Campaigns in the large towns not only had echoes in the rural areas, but were at times superseded by the struggles in one or other Reserve.

This was a natural

cxmwequence of the interconnection of land and labour issues and the continuous movement, at least of menfolk from the country to town and back.

More than this, the

reaction was sx><3ften against legislation which aimed to tighten the control on labour, and on its movement, that the same problem appeared at both ends of the labour market  $\hat{a}$ 200\224

in the Reserves and in the

towns.â\200\235 <328>

There are mummy examples of this process. The activities of the Zoutpansherg Cultural Association in Johannesburg and its associated Zoutpansberg Balemi (Ploughmen) Association in the Northern Transvaal which  $\hat{a}\200\235$ played a prominent part in the  $417\hat{a}\200\224$ 

period of terror for the people.

The dramatic raids in the night (well known in the cities but unknown in the countryside) led to the trial.euxhsing out of the events of April 13 which ended in September 1957.

Shortly

after the conclusion and very suddenly ~ an indecent hast£2- it was announced in the Government Gazette that the Government intended holding a Commission of Enquiry into the cauSes of unrest in the Groot Marico District.

The people were not

notified about the Commission.

The Government supporting Chiefs  $\hat{a}\200\224$  who were lined up and ready to proceed with their evidence on the day in question  $\hat{a}$  knew.

The people responded.

They organised a petition amongst the

peOple calling on the commission to recommend, amongst other things, the return of the deposed Chief, Moiloa; tine reâ\200\224opening <3f the school.euui post office at Linokana and the supsension of the issue of  $a\200\235$ reference books" (passes) to women.

THMMJsands of

signatures to the petition were obtained in the space of a few days.

Depsite the short notice given, the lack of publicity and the lack of transport, large crowds of people managmxi to attend the opening session of the commission.

There were so many.

There was no room in the Native Commissioner's Court for them all to be accommodated.

Special arrangements were made for an outside arena.

After a week4 {i¬\202ue police were out in full force to prevent people coming to the so~called public enquiry; Havard aeroplanes swooped down on the area to intimidate the people and road blocks~424~

In fact, it was terrorising the people in the townships and locations:

Groups of POQO members have conducted campaigns of terrorism against the African people, forcing them to pay 'a joining fee' of 25 cents.

Those who refused

were assaulted and their homes were stoned at night.

In Langa, Paarl and Stellenbosch, the residents of the locations formed vigilantes to protect themselves from the organised terrorism of POQO.

Instead of euï¬\202iieving

a following with this method of organisation, POQO instilled fear and hate into the hearts of the people. $\hat{a}\200\235$  <324>

This article in Fighting Talk - published a few months before Leballo's press conference - stated:

a\200\235Both groups (PAC in the Western Cape and POQO) have little or no contact with the soa\200\224called 'headquarters' of the Pan Africanists, neither do they have contact with PAC abroad ... POQO is not a national organisation.

It is confined to the Western Cape,

although people who have similar views and beliefs can be found throughout the country.

It was not formmxi on

the orders of the PAC's national leadership but was an inevitable reaction of young men driven by deSperation into 'action  $\tilde{}$  virtually any action'.

Leaders are not

chosen on political mirit but on physical strength.

~412~

them.

"If they are guilty, we are also.

You must arrest us

allâ\200\235.

Well over 200 of them were taken to Zeerust.

Chaos

pmevailed at the charge office.

Women and children overflowed

into the yard at the police station and the police were pratically begging the women to leave. (344)

Vï¬\202uat is important about these incidents in Zeerust â\200\224 which we have reported here in a fairly detailed fashion â\200\224 is that where there was no chief (as in Linokana) or where the chief had taken a "neutralâ\200\235 attitude to the government as at Braklaagte and not tried to impose himself on the will of the people, there was no trouble.

fi¬\202matrouble arose in those areas where the police incited the chiefs to intimidate the people.

This was evidenced

during the Christmasciuï¬\201xmtmhces in the Groot Marico District. Those chiefs who opposed the government and represented the will of their people were either summarily deposed or the Government  $\hat{a}$ \200\235usurped the powers of the Chief".

In Zeerust what began as

demonstrations against passes for women and deposal of a chief turned into a resistance against Bantustans.

There were similar incidents and developments in other areas  $a\200\224$  Sekhukhuneland (now Lebowa), Natal, Witzieshoek and Pondoland. The immediate causes of the violence that erupted in these areas were local grievances centering around the Government's attempts to impose Tribal Authorities in districts and regions which were either willing, or could be persuaded to carry out government policies.

ii¬\201ns was however,ti¬\201mzpolitical reflection of issues
much more closely related to the rural people's economic
well~beihg,ti¬\202mzattempts ofti¬\202maregime to limit and control the

number anmi size CH? land allocation to the peasant families, the  $^{\sim}426 \mbox{\ensuremath{\upalpha}\ensuremath{\mbox{\ensuremath{\upalpha}\ensuremath{\mbox{\ensuremath{\upalpha}\ensuremath{\mbox{\ensuremath{\upalpha}\ensuremath{\mbox{\ensuremath{\upalpha}\ensuremath{\mbox{\ensuremath{\upalpha}\ensuremath{\mbox{\ensuremath{\mbox{\ensuremath{\upalpha}\ensuremath{\mbox{\ensuremath{\upalpha}\ensuremath{\mbox{\ensuremath{\ensuremath{\mbox{\ensuremath{\mbox{\ensuremath{\mbox{\ensuremath{\mbox{\ensuremath{\mbox{\ensuremath{\mbox{\ensuremath{\mbox{\ensuremath{\mbox{\ensuremath{\mbox{\ensuremath}\ensuremath{\mbox{\ensuremath}\ensuremat$ 

people were largely ANC members who were confused by PAC false propaganda and misinformation.

Many leaders of the ANC spent lots of time explaining to its membership and the community at large about the essence and character of the PAC.

Meetings were held, leaflets were

distributed and articles were written.in progressive journals.

One of them was Dan Tloome.

He wrote a series of articles on the

subject of PAC in Fighting Talk.

In the first of this series he

revealed another aspect of the PAC, namely lies.

He wrote:

'Wmve the Africanists anything to offer besides cheap

and vulgar abuse of the Congress leaders?

Yes, they

have lies.

Big lies and littLe lies, lies of a truly

breath-taking audacity". (320)

There are many of these lies.

One of these lies is that

POQO is  $\hat{a}\200\235$ an underground code name for the PAC" as Matthew Nkoana says. (321)

Indeeï¬\202,:H:vms no other than Potlako Leballo, in a

characteristic fashion, who revealed at a press conference in Maseru, Lesotho in 1963, that PAC is one and the same as POQO. There are two problems with this declaration.

Firstly, it is not

true but even if it were true, why should a  $a\200\235$  leader of a movement  $a\200\235$  reveal a "codename" in a press conference at a place of safety and security for himself?

What about his  $a\200\235$ followers $a\200\235$  ir1

the country  $a\200\235$ underground $a\200\235$ ?

This brings us to the question: what is then POQO?

Iï¬\202arhaps

one should start by giving a background to its emergence in 1962  $a\200\224$  not h11959 when the PAC was formed.

It all started in

~409â\200\224

radicalisation of the ANC.

He was a farsighted man.

Не

campaigned vigorously for the adoption of a more militant approach.

This demand for axmare militant approach in the pursuance of the South African liberation struggle meant the creative implementation of the 1949 Programme of Action.

It was

K Matthews (293)

South Africa we want.

during Lutuli's presidency that the ANC involved masses of people in direct struggle.

This orientation towards mass participation

transformed the ANC into a mass based movement  $\hat{a}\200\224$  the oppressei-202 people were involved directly in the struggle for freedom

embodied the process of radicalisation and the principle that the oppressed people had the right to fight for their freedom.

Even in the field of ideas there was noticeably a shift, a radicalisation.

At the annual conference of the Cape ANC in Queenstown in August 1953, Professor 8

articulated the idea of a Congress to draw up a Freedom Charter, i.e. convening a mass repmesentative gathering of men and women of all national groups in the country to decide about the future

At a meeting of the ANC, South African

Indian Congress, (ki¬\202tmred People's Organisation and Congress of Democrats, gnxashi¬\202ed over by Chief Lutuli himself (held in March 1954, hiti¬\201m Lower Tugela to enable Chief Lutuli to attend) it was decided that meetings be held all over the country, in urban and rural areas, whose aim would be the collection of the people's demands and their grievances which will be forwarded to the organisers for incorporation in a people's charter of rights, the Freedom Charter.

The preparation for this gathering took over a year and

 $200\235\$  iterang/nnillions of people participated in the campaign and  $200\224384^{\sim}$ 

We, the people of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know: that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all people; that our people have been robbed of birthright to land, liberty and peace by a form of government founded on injustin\201xna and inequality;ti¬\202mn:cmr country will never be prosperous or free until all our people live in brotherhood enjoying equal rights and opportunities; that only a democratic state, based on the will of all the people, can secure to all their birthright without distinction of colour, race, sex or believe; and therefore, we the people of South Africa, black and white together â\200\224 equals, countrymen and brothers - adopt the Freedom Charter" <295>

The significance of this preamble  $a\200\224$   $a\200\235$ South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white  $a\200\235$   $a\200\224$  becomes very clear and even topical.txmiay when Africans are losing their South African citizenship and being granted Bantustan citizenship.

At the

Morogoro Conference in 1969, the ANC made an analysis and evaluation of the Freedom Charter and stated ti¬\202uat the conflicts in South Africa have largely centred on the relationship between the Africans and the Whites and that the Coloured and Indian people are, like Africans, oppressed by the dominant white minority.

The statement further emphastaed the ANC principle:  $\frac{200}{224386}\frac{200}{224}$ 

i

embrace an emxnumnic dimension.

Congress was mandated to embark

immediately on the boycott of selected business undertakings with a view txy forcing ti¬\201myn to accord civil treatment to their black customers;

to force them to improve the conditions of work of their black employees and to provide opportunities for their training and technical advancement; and, most important, for the payment of higher wages to their black staff.

The subsequent

boycott campaigns against the PUTCO bus service ui¬\202mmi fares were increased (the 1957 Alexandra bus boycott), the potato boycott as a protest against the inhuman work and living conditions of agricultural workers on the farms; the campahyiikuâ\200\230a.national minimum wage for black workers; the boycott of all cigarettes produced by the Rupert Group whose brands were such popular cigarettes as Rothmans and Pieter Stuyvesent, all had their origins in this initial call.

Talking about the potato boycott,

it should be remembered that Gert Sigande and Rev. Michael Scott made disclosures about the illâ $200\224$ treatment of African farm labourers hlgxi202ato and maize farms in the Transvaal.

The

linemployed

Department of Native Affairs and Ministry of Justice together with the South African Police had devised a schenmn

Africans or petty offenders were induced to accept labour on farms.

These people were sent to notorious farmers who could not <get any labourers because of their cruelty:</pre>

the farm labourers

were forced to dig potatoes with their bare hands;

the  $\hat{a}\200\235boss$ 

boysâ\200\235 would beat thewltnnzil they died;

they were locked up at

night to  $a\200\235$ protect $a\200\235$  them from escaping;

they were kept in

overcrtwmkai badly \wmitilated Fults; slept on filthy sacks with lice, etc.

That is why the ANC conferwwune<"-\202ecided on a potato  $$\rm M395^{\sim}$$ 

distinction between oppressor and oppressed and â\200\235directs
attention of the people to the source of their oppression, and by
focussing accurately on the question of state power presents a
profoundly revolutionary challenge to the existing orderâ\200\235. <297>
Writing about the Freedom Charter, Sechaba said that it
â\200\235lays a basis and is a precondition i¬\202it further development and
radicalisation of our revolution;
its implementation will

presuppose and demand the destruction of the white racist regime and the abolition of national, cultural, religious and language

pmivileges of Whites over Blacks.

This will encompass the

equality of all ethnic groups â\200\224 large or small, black or white the satisfaction of their national rights and feelings,
traditions and customs, aspirations and emotions, characteristics
and features and the development of their languages and culture,
and interâ\200\224ethnic contacts .. " <298>

The journal goes on to say:

â\200\235This entails the injection of hatred for the enemy and all that he stands for; imbuing the masses with a revolutionary consciousness and this should be accompanied by stimulation of national pride and identity, assertiveness and patriotism which are associated with the revolutionary traditions of antiâ\200\224colonialism and antiâ\200\224imperialism of all our people and ethnic groups and their positive contribution to the struggle for social progress ...â\200\235 <299> â\200\224388~

socialist document, Mandela warns against such erroneous notions:
"Under socialism the workers hold state power.

They

and the peasants own the means of production, the land, the factories, and the mills.

All production is for

use and not for profit. The Charter does not contemplate such profound economic and political changes.

Its declaration 'The People shall Govern' visualises the transfer of power not to any single social class but to all the people of this country, be they workers, peasants, professional men, or petty bourgeoisie". <305>

The racist government "replied" to these demands of the people by arresting the entire leadership of the Congress movement  $200\224$  156 of them - and charged them withITMI¬\202iTTeason in December 1956.

The basic contention of the state was that the Freedom Charter was a blueprint for a violent revolution and forceable and unconstitutional and therefore illegal overthrow of the state and its replacement with a communist society.

The Treason Trial lasted a protracted total.§xariod of four and a half long, tiring, years, tying down the leadership to interminable hearings and causing grave problems for the maintenance of the direction and pace of the struggle.

In 1961,

all the accused were acquitted and discharged.

The presiding

Judge Mr Justice Rumpff admitted in his judgment that the state, in his view, had failed to establish that the Freedom Charter was in any possible interpretation, a communist document and secondly  $393\hat{a}200224$ 

Africa, above the age of 16.

Failure to produce the pass on

demand means onâ\200\224theâ\200\224spot arrest.

The document serves the ends of

the Apartheid rules in South Africa ~ to regulate the movement of Africans to restricted areas; to determine where an AfricancxMi or may not be employed; where he can live; where his dead body may or may not be buried and even to determine who one's wife or husband should be!\_

The ANC had issued directives to all its branches to take up and fiercely resist the issuing of passes to African women.

ANC women's League in particular, in collaboration with the Federation of South African Women, began organising for a massive Icampaign.

The Annual Conference of the ANC held in December,

1955, paid a great deal of attention to the women's antiâ\200\224pass struggle.

The report of the National Executive Committee stressed that the pass laws were the most burning grievance of the people.

The statement went on:

 $\hat{a}\200\235$ we who know the suffering the pass laws have brought to us over the decades will not tolerate the extension of this hated system to our women $\hat{a}\200\224$ folk.

We warn the

The

government: making women carry passes will be like

trampling on the tail of a puff adder". (309)

And the rmm<t few years' fierce anti~pass resistance proved just that!

On March 11th, 1956, the Transvaal Region of the ANC Women's League organised a meeting to commemorate March 8th ~ the International Women's Day.

Prominent on the agenda of that

â\200\224400~

meeting was the issue of passes.

It was from the same meeting

that a resolution to march to Pretoria was unanimously adopted by the over 2,000 delegates present at the meeting.

Despite difficulties created by the regime to prevent the women from staging their¢demonstration which had been declared illegal, 20,000 women filled the amphitheatre of the Union Buildings, Pretoria, on August 9, 1956.

They quietly stood

there, while the leaders of the demonstration went up to the offices of the three Ministers.

But none of them was to be

found.

The Union Buildings has always been a hive of activity and:U:is remarkable that on that day the state machinery had been brought.tx>ea halt, not a single soul was to be seen inside the building!

In spite of the â\200\235nonâ\200\224admission" sign that had been put up<miti¬\201mzdoor leading to Prime Minister Strijdom's office, the gallant leaders, Lilian Ngoyi, Helen Joseph, Lily Diedericks, Rahima Moosa and Sophie Williams marched in and left the bulk of petition forms with his secretary.

thieï¬\2021.there were more than

100,000 signatures.

Outside the 20,000 strong women's gathering

sang in one voice:

â\200\235Strydom, wathint'abafazi

Wathint'imbokodo

 $Uzakufa a \ 200 \ 235$ 

Translated:

 $a\200\235$ Strydom, You have touched the women

You have struck a rock

~401â\200\224

"tribes" could combine to form a \(\hat{a}\)200\235Bantu Authority\(\hat{a}\)200\235.

The

Government decided the minimum or maximum of councillors to serve in these  $\hat{a}200\235$ authorities $\hat{a}200\235$ .

Government officials or Bantu

Commissioners had a rhi¬\202HLtm)attend all the meetings or even to cancel any appointment of headman or chief; they could even cancel any appointment of a councillor with whom they were (iissatisfirxi for vardxmis reasons.

Many chiefs were banished to

remote areas in the 1950's for refusal to be party to these schemes, says Govan Mbeki. (346)

The powers and the role of chiefs were changing under the conditions of the 1950's.

The chiefs now had powers of

banishment which the racist regime had taken for himself and now wanted to bestow on the present day chiefs.

In the olden daysâ\200\234

the chiefs were ultimately responsible to their people ami¬\202 retained their powers only so long as they were considered satisfactory for the people.

The racist regime on the other hand

is not responsible to Umalmkican people, whom it represses and its power over them rests on the strength of the police and ni¬\2021itary more than on the African people's acquiescence, while the chiefs are responsible not to â\200\235their subjectsâ\200\235 buttx>the racist regime which appoints them.

These were some of the issues agitating the people of Pondoland in the Transkei.

The wholeearea rose up in revolt tc>

the regime's schemes.

The repression from the regime took on the

proportions of a fullscale war as armoured cars, helicopters,

police and regular troops were deployed.

In Pondoland, the

intensity of resistance and repression took on ti¬\201ma<3haracter of

guerrilla struggle by the peasants.

Vâ\200\234:

mntire areas came to be

a428~

Freedom Charter in March 1956.

Chief Lutuli says:

This

'Vrt was, It may say, necessary that this should happen, since there were principles embodied in the Charter policy.

I sent a note to the Conference which ratified the Charter urging delegates to discuss very fully such things as, for instance, the principle of nationalisation  $200\235$ . 303

By adopting the Freedom Charter the ANC committed itself in black and white and in precise terms to what it stood for.

ewvvisaged new society was conceived not in vague terms but specifically on the principle of the common ownership of wealti $\neg$ 201x by the community.

Writing about this aspect of the Freedom Charter, Mandela stated:

"It is true that in demanding the nationalisation of the banks, the gold mines and the land, the Charter strikes a fatal blow at the financial and gold-mining monopolies and farming interests that have for centuries plundered the country

but such a step is absolutely imperative and necessary because the realisation of the Charter is inconceivable, in fact impossible, unless and until these monopolies are first smashed up and the national wealth of the country turned over to the peopleâ\200\235. <304> In case some people think that the Freedom Charter is a â\200\224392â\200\224

The demand for the transfer to the ownership of the peOple of the "national wealth, the heritage of all South Africans" and â\200\235mineral wealth beneath the soil the banks and monopoly industry" demonstrates the antimonopoly character of the Freedom Charter.

The significance of the emphasis on the people as opposed to the individualistic, capitalist system cannot be overâ\200\224emphasised. What this means is that the seizure of political power is meaningless without economic and social emancipation; it is impossible to think of the envisaged democratisation of the internal and foreign policy in a new South Africa without the destruction of state monopoly capitalism.

Though the paramount question in our country is the advocacy

Though the paramount question in our country is the advocacy of equality of different ethnic groups and the impermissibility of all privileges in this respect, the Freedom<in\202muter was not unmindful of our internationalist commitment.

## It states:

â\200\235South Africa shall be a fully independent state which respects the rights and sovereignty of all nations;

South Africa shall strive to maintahivmmld peace amj
the settlement of all international disputes by
negotiation â\200\224 not by war;

Peace and friendship amonst all our people shall be

secured by upholding the equal rights, opportunities and status of all;

The people of the protectorates  $\hat{\mathbf{A}}^{\mathsf{w}}$  Basutholand,

Bechuanaland ami¬\202 Swaziland ~ shall be free to decide for themselves their own future;

The rights of all peoples of Africa to independence and  $200\224389200\224$ 

Action.

The PAC rejected cooperation with other sections of the countryï¬\202ss pOpUlatiINl because they preferred to be a â\200\235mouthpiece of the African people" and not of the â\200\235people of South Africaâ\200\235. Before answerdxug these accuations â\200\224 and therefore put the record straight â\200\224 it is worth pointing out that the Freedom Charter'cxnrhï¬\202 not be the bone of contention and the cooperation between the ANC and the other population groups could not be the cause of differences because these elements accepted the Xumaâ\200\224Dadoo-Naicker Pact of 1947 whichâ\200\230mas ratified and endorsed in subsequent ANC annual conferences.

These PAC adherents

participated in the defiance Campaign which involved all population groups.

This campaign was planned by a Joint Planning mencil consisting of the representatives from the ANC and the SAIC and the plan was then approved at the Bloemfontein Conference in 1951.

In its preani¬\202i¬\201ha, the plan categorically states that South Africa belongs to allni¬\202m3live in it, and before and during the (xmnpaign itself, the ANC and the SAIC invited all who love democracy, irrespective of race, colomr<or creed to participate in the defiance of unjust laws.

Those who later became PAC

members dhiTKNLObjeCtIKHTdid they condemn the preamble to the plan or the prosecutitni<1f the campaign in alliance with other  $\frac{200}{235}$  nona $\frac{200}{224}$  fricana $\frac{200}{235}$  groups in the country.

Therefore it is correct to conclude that the reasons for their breakaway lie elsmi¬\202xnxn

But before we analyse the roots

and reasons for this phenomenon  $a\200\224$  hvhxrh it was a phenomenon  $a\200\224$  let us state the obvious fact that African nationalism has always been a contradictory phenomenon with different and at times  $a\200\235404...$ 

Mail, and the Government  $200\224$  owned broadcasting station, pumped out a verdix 7202 ale barrage of half  $200\224$  truths and lies to demoralise the strikers.

The same tactics by the regime and its supporters were pursued at the time of the Republic strike in May, 1961.

All

meetings were banned throughout the country and our field workers were trailed and hounded by members of the Security Branch.

General mobilisation was ordered throughout the country and every available white man and woman was placed under arms.

Mandela

assessed the stayâ\200\224at-home in the following words:
"The response was much less than we expected but we
made solid and substantial achievement.

Hundreds of

thousands of workers stayed away from work and the country's industries and commerce was seriously damaged.

Hundreds of thousands of students and school  $\mbox{ci} \mbox{$\sim$} 202\mbox{$i$} \mbox{$\sim$} 202\mbox{$\sim$} 202\mbox{$i$} \mbox{$\sim$} 202\mbox{$\sim$} 202\mbox{$i$} \mbox{$\sim$} 202\mbox{$\sim$} 202\mbox{$ 

Once more, Nelson pointed out, the role of the press and radio was that of attempting to break the strike and support the Government.

The Women's demonstrations

In an earlier chapter of this book, we discussed the struggle of the women against the introduction of the passes. This struggle continued throughout the decades and found its climax in the 1950's.

The women were more organised by then.

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controlled and administered by the leadership of the peasant people  $\hat{a}$ 200\224 Intaba (the Mountain).

At the same time, the leadership

of the resistance movement, in an effort to prevent their isolation, established contact with the ANC for aid and solidarity.

The Ganyile brothers, Anderson and Mthethunzima, were among the prominent leaders of the resistance.

The ANC

leaders, especially from Port Elizabeth, Govan Mbeki being the most prominent held many meetings with the resisters in the dark forests of Pondoland.

Even the ANC Headquarters in Johannesburg sentsmi¬\202saries.

headquarters, we want weapons). <347>

T T Nkobi, now Treasurer-General of the ANC, remembers those midnight meetings when you saw nothing but a cigarette or 2011 (rolled tobacco) light and people speaking almost simultaneously: "Xelela undlunkulu, sifuna izixhoboâ\200\235 (Tell

In 1960, the leaders of the resistance organised a mass demonstration of 50,000 people in Bizana, the capital of Pondoland, at the same time presenting a list of their grievances and demands ~ demands which echoed the Freedom Charter and rested in the declaration that the peasants will stop at nothing short of representation in parliament.

The<acceptance of the Freedom

Charter by the Pondo resisters did not only indicate that the Freedom Charter is an answer to the interests of the poor peasants whc>are crying for a land reform ~ it was a vindication the shmi¬\202xztruth that the Freedom Charter is a people's C0.1.

charter whose demands reverberate far beyom $\[ \frac{202'}{\sqrt{201}} \]$  politics  $\[ \frac{200}{235} \]$  far beyond ANC membership.

Massive repression, an inability to sustain the high level of struggle and organisation required, and important lack of the  $^{\sim}429^{\sim}$ 

economic rights of the peopleâ\200\235 there was another aspect to the policy of the PAC that one can call a "semantic revolutionâ\200\235:  $a\200\235$ sometimes one feels sheer anarchy is loosed upon the world of languageâ\200\235. (314)

Robert Sobukwe, the first President of the PAC, found it difficult to resist the temptation to  $a\200\235$ manipulate" language.

Αt

the "inaugural convention  $200\235$  of the PAC, he told his followers that  $200\235$  multi  $200\224$  racialism" is "racialism multiplied which probably is what the term connotes", (315) and by implication that was what the ANC and its allies stood for.

And he went further:

a\200\235Politically we stand for a government of the Africans for the Africans by the Africans, with everybody who owes his loyalty only to Africa and accepts the democratic rule of an African majority, being regarded as an African.

We guarantee no minority rights because
we are fighting precisely that group exclusiveness
which those who plea for minority rights would like to
perpetuate.

It is our view that if we guaranteed individual liberties, we have given the highest guarantee necessary and possibleâ\200\235. (316) There are problems with this speech.

As for the

formulations in this quotation, they are dangerous to say the least.

Here the word  $\hat{a}^200^235$ African $\hat{a}^200^235$  means all things to all men.

Ιt

is all subjective: you need to owe loyalty to only Africa and 'Haccept democratic rule Ci an African majority" then you are an African!

But why did they close their doors to  $a\200\235$ Africans of  $a\200\224406$ -

â\200\235Yet, these truths should not blind us to the fact that there are men and women amongst them who genuinely believe that the salvation of our people lies in a fanatical African racialism and denunciation of everything that is not African.

And such a policy is

not without its potential mass appeal.

It would be

unrealistic to pretend that a policy of extreme nationalism must, in the nature of things, always be unpopular.

The people are quick to detect the insincerity of the mere demagogue, and they have confidence in the courage and wisdom of their tried and trusted leaders.

Ihn: in a country like South Africa,
where the Whites dominate everything, and where
ruthless laws are ruthlessly administered and enforced,
the natural tendency is one of growing hostility
towards Europeans.

In fact most Africans come into political activity because of their indignation against the Whites, and it is only through their education in Congress and their experience of the genuine comradeship in the struggle of such cuganisations as the Congress of Democrats, that they rise to the broad, nonâ\200\224racial humanism of our Congress movement.

With a State policy of increasingly barbaric repression of the African people; with the deliberate destruction of every form of normal human contact between peoPle from different population groups; and with the I systematic banning and isolation of the convinced and ~415~

Maliba stuck to his post and continued to mobilise his people against the apartheid reginmu

In late August 1967, he was

detained by the security police under the Terrorism Act and taken to Pretoria Central Prison for interrogation.

Three weeks later,

on September 19, 1967, he was reported to have committed suicide in his cell. <336>

The struggle of the peasants was carried on by Gert Sibande,

the  $a\200\235$ Lion of the East $a\200\235$ , in his country $a\200\224$ wide campaign for the embetterment of the lot of the farm $a\200\224$ labourers, mainly potato diggers in ti $a\200$ mali $a\200$ lastern Transvaal in the 1950's.

The South

African white farmers have had labour difficulties for a very long time.

Their refusal to provide decent conditions on the farms and a living wage to their employees led to a chronic shortage of labour.

Farm labour contractors Operated through government labour bureaux.

Labour bureaux regulations so

tightened that the African worker was bound hand and foot by restrictions on his freedom of choice of job, and the regulations and pass laws were being used to keep up a steady supply of cheap, forced labour to the farmers.

In the 1950's there were peasant revolts all over the country.

The peasant uprising in the Zeerust area is worth looking at.

Charles Hooper has given an account of the events in Zeerust in 1957; <337>

So did Fighting Talk <338> â\200\224 a movement's

journal and Govan Mbeki in his  $\hat{a}\200\235$ The Peasants' Revri $\frac{1}{202}$ if', a review  $\hat{A}$ «sf the lot and struggles of the rural masses, especially in the Transkei. <339>

In short, what; gnxa: ipitated the conflict was the issue of

the passes bavmmmn inlqnw/villages in the Groot Marico  $\tilde{\ }$ 

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individuals who are in need of money;  $rla^200^230his$  will have

to be changed.

Unless the tribal organisations

represent the people when misfortune befalls numbers of them, they will bring very little benefit to the people as a whoha.

The tribal organisations must cooperate with the African National Congress, with the African trade unions and with the Communist Party in order to struggle for improvements in the conditions of the people.â\200\235 <332>

Maliba was not just a theoretician; he was a practical politician: "For Maliba it meant inevitable arrestâ\200\235 auui for the years to come he seemed to leave one prison only in order to face fresh restrictions, until eventually forced to leave the area or face deportatMMIimiJUne 1944." (333)

Mailba formed a General

Workers' Union which was associated to the Balenizummmdation.

He organised a strike in October 1943 and in a clash with the troops at Messina the workers forced at gunpoint either to return to work or be arrested.

The following April, Maliba organised a
May Day demonstration at Louis Trichard.

He was not granted

permission to do this and was once again charged: â\200\235At this stage
he went underground and was hunted for months." <334>
We relate this story of Maliba because it shows the dynamic
vitality of the contacts between the rural population and the
urban dwellers;

of the ANC and CP; Of the contact of the various rural areas: from the late 1920's the CP "maintained contact with the Basutoland peasant organisation Lekhotla la Bafoâ\200\235 (335) and.
'Hï¬\202espitrulï¬\201wa banning of the Communist Party and the ANC, Alpheus \*420~

the length and breadth of South Africa.

Thus ti¬\201uarmasses of the

oppressed gmxnphe were successfully mobilised for the March 31st

Anti Pass National stoppage of work.â\200\235 <318>

However, on March 21,  $\tilde{}$  ten days before the start of the

campaign  $\hat{a}\200\224$  the PAC  $\hat{a}\200\235$  issued a treacherous call to the people to go

and stand outside police stations.

To dupe and confuse our

people, the 'leaders' of this organisation said that the call was

being issued by the Congress  $\hat{a} \geq 200 \geq 24$  a generic title for the African

National Congress among political circles in South Africa".

What

happened in Sharpeville and Langa is well known  $\hat{a}\200\224$  69 dead and many more injured.

Writing about these Sharpeville incidents

Jack Simons remarked:

â\200\235Taken by itself, the campaign did not amount to much.

Only at Sharpeville and Langa was there a big response

to Sobukwe's appeal.

PAC's action was smaller than the

recent upsurge at Zeerust, Cato Manor, Windhoek or

Paarl.

It was the shooting that made March 21st;ea red

letter day.

The shots echoed round the globe, caused a

Banic in ruling circlesL sent the share market

rocketing downwards, unleashed a storm of criticism of racial policies, produced the\_State of EmergencyL

Erecipitated the banning gÂt\_the\_ANC and PACL and

changed life for many people.â\200\235 <319>

This is not to say that the ANC does not sympathise with

those who hmi¬\201:relatives and friends at Sharpeville and Lahga; on the contrary the ANC has more reason toxmmni¬\201xti¬\202cause these  $\hat{A}$ «408 $\hat{a}$ \200\224

There is no organisational cohesion, no constructive thinking in POQO.

POQO activities, although used to an

extent by the PAC abroad for its propaganda value, are

in fact an embarrassment to them. $\hat{a}\200\235$  <325>

These were desperate young men who, because they had no

legal way of fighting the laws of apartheid, were looking for new

ways of struggle and this was a search for inspired, but

responsible leadership; for sacrifice but not rmuailess suicide;

militancy not wild recklessness.

When Leballo claimed P000 to be PAC, tmaxmas confirming Dan

'Tloome's assertion that the PAC "have lies. Big lies and little

lies, lies of a truly breathtaking audacity." (326)

One of their lies was that the ANC Leadership was

 $\hat{a}$ 200\235infiltrated $\hat{a}$ \200\235 by communists and yet from 1952, the ANC leadership

was as follows (Dan Tloome was the only one who was a former

member of the CP):

ANC NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 1952â\200\2241960

1952â\200\2241955

1955â\200\2241958

1958

Chief A J Lutuli

Chief A J Lutuli

Chief A J Lutuli

President General

W M Sisulu

O R Tambo

D Nokwe

Secretary General

Dr S M Molema

Dr A E Letele

Dr A E Letele

Treasurer General

â\200\224413~

political acts and record and not by the denunciations of the racist regime.

After all, communists and the SACP had always been on the side of the suffering oppressed Blacks in their struggle for liberation.

The communists had become proven allies

in the black man's struggle for freedom and independence.

It is important to note that the growing strength of the ANC has its roots deeply embedded in the huge reserves of mass support for the liberation struggle to be found anmnug the South African people and that as the pace of the struggle increases and widens, sormnmaand more sections of the people are inevitably knxmmght into the struggle.

As they come to reinforce our ranks our strength will be reinforced.

In 1951, the Coloured people were hard hit by the introduction of the "Separate Representation of Votersâ\200\231 Bill" which sought to disenfranchise Coloured men in the Cape.

In the

same year,ti¬\202unrformed the â\200\235Franchise Action Council" and over 15,000 Coloured people marched through the streets of Cape Town and converged on the Grand Parade.

This campaign enjoyed the

warm support of the ANC and the South African Indian Congress.

Preparations were being made for the direct participation of the masses of the oppressed black population  $\hat{a}\200\224$  the Defiance Campaign.

In the implementation of this policy, the ANC in 1952 called for a massive campaign against all unjust and racially discriminatory hmmu

This was on July 29 when African, Indian and Coloured representatives from the three organisations met in Johannesburg and agreed to recommend to their respective conferences a campaign of peaceful resistance.

A Joint Planning

Council was established and Moroka, Marks and Sisulu represented

the ANC; Dadoo and Cachalia, the South African Indian Congress.

Although this campaign was primarily an ANC campaign, it was all~embracing and involved all the democratic forces within South Africa.

The Defiance Campaign was directed against all racially discriminatory laws.

But its immediate targets were:

The Pass Laws; Stock Limitation; Separate

Representation of Voters Act; Group Areas Act; Bantu

Authorities; and Suppression of Communism Acts.

The Defiance Campaign, in which over 8,000 volunteers of all nationalities defied the laws and went to prison, represented a new phase in the South African liberation struggle.

Ιt

established two principles:

First'Uunxzcan be no liberation of the oppressed without sacrifice and readiness to face imprisonment.

The political

consciousnesscī¬\202ftī¬\201m Blacks, through the Defiance Campaign, was raised to understanding that imprisonment is part of the legitimate process towards liberation;

imprisonment - in the

context of political struggle - was one of the inevitable paths towards liberation.

It had to be recognised ti¬\202uMlâ\200\230freedom could not be achienmxi if the leadership as well as the membership was not prepared to fight, go to jail and even die for the principles in which they believed.

The second important principle that the Defiance Campaign established was the fact that the liberation of the oppressed people in South Africa can only come about as a result of extra-parliamentary struggle.

Our duty as an Oppressed peOple is

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antagonistio and divergent trends and tendencies.

These

<i¬\202ifferences of opinionwere not a new phenomenon in our movement</pre>

 $\hat{a}$ 200\224 at times, the source of these differences was external in

origin, i.e. outside our ranks as a liberation movement.

The PAC trend was not the first nor the only cnua to emerge  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right)$ 

h1ti¬\202ma1950's.

There was Bhengu's Bantu National Congress, the

"National Mindedâ\200\235 bloc, which called for a "purified Bantuâ\200\235

organisation and no cooperation with Indian and other population

groups.

Even Dr Xuma, who was instrumental in the late 1940's in

laying a foundation for unity between Africans and Indians,

alleged that the ANC had "lost its identity as a national

liberation movement with a policy of its own and a distinctly

African leadership". <312>

Analysing the policy of the PAC as propounded by P Nkutsoeu

Raboroko, Duma Nokwe, then Secretary-General of the ANC, stated:

"A striking feature of their policy iszuxssilence on

the fundamental political and economic rights of the

people.

Do they accept the principle of adult

universal suffrage?

Would they distribute the land and

wealth of South Africa to all?

Or do they believe that

only the Africans, as indigenous, are entitled to

fundamental political rights?

Do they avoid any

concrete policy on these questions precisely because

they refuse to be committed one way or the

other?â\200\235 (313)

Besides this  $\hat{a}\200\235$ silence on the fundamental political and

~405â\200\224

means to confront and withstand the enemy assault led to the defeat of the revolt but left behind a residue of courage and experientfmsxwlich Govan Mbeki summed up as follows: the success of the struggle against white rule can only be achieved if a strategy is adopted that would organise and mobilise\_city and country dwellers to support and participate in such a struggle. He pointed out that what the ANC had been preaching in theory had been proved in practice by the rural people at great cost to human life and at great suffering.

What is more the peasant

revolts of the fifties produced a resounding impact both on the thinking of Congress leadership and the peOple themselves.

These

were the revolutionary potentials of the peasant massest <348>  $^{\sim}430^{\sim}$ 

The ANC Women's League (formed in 1943 and inaugurated at the 1948 ANC Annual General Conference) set itself the following tasks:  $\hat{a}\200\235$ Apart from their duties asnmembers of the ANC, women members of the Congress have special additional duties and responsibilities: (a) to arouse the interest of African women in the struggle for freedom and equality; and assist the widespread organisation of women; (b) to take up social problems and issues affecting women; and RH to carry on propaganda against Apartheid and discriminatory laws among African womenâ\200\235. <307> This was in the early 1950's. Another significant organisathmmi¬\202.development, which played a fundamental role in raising mass participation of women, was the formation of the Federation of South African Women in April 1954. The Federation was formed iinmesponse to a growing need that women felt for an organisation which would: "â\200\224 Embrace all women irrespective of race, colour or nationality; â\200\224 help to strengthen, build and bring together in joint activity the various women's sections in the J\_ibenfatmjry' m<>verner1ts arid catfierâ\200\230 wcnneri's organisations;

express the needs and aspirations of the

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hCDUSâ\202¬3*VJiVEBS,
waage (aarruers,
peaasarits eahd
~398~
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break time conference by force  $a\200\224$  for the second time they failed.

They withdrew to form a new organisation.

In April 1959, the PAC

was born.

It is worth noting that the founding conference of the PAC was held  $a\200\235$  the luxurious premises of the library of the United States Information Service (USIS) in Johannesburg ... Thus the dark schemes of American imperialists' subversion of the successful development of the national liberation revolution against apartheid fascism were clearly exposed to the light of day. <310>

What were their  $a\200\235$ grievances $a\200\235$  and demands? They claimed  $a\200\235$ to be the direct heir and legitimate successor to the original Congress which was founded in 1912".

Ui¬\201ns they

justified by a  $a\200\235$ discovery $a\200\235$  that the original Congress died in

"diedâ\200\235 in 1953 "with the birth of the (multi-racial) Congress

Alliance, and was finally buried in December 1957, with the

incorporathmuci¬\201 the Charter into its new constitution.â\200\235 <311>

PThe Freedom Charter was incorporated into the ANC constitution

in 1958 and not 1957]

They accused the Congress Alliance of

lysing  $200\235$ a union of exploiters and the exploited  $200\235$  and the ANC was supposed to have  $200\235$ betrayed the material interests of the African peoplem

'They have sacrificed these interests upon the political

altar of an ungbdly alliance, an alliance of slave owner, slave

driver and slave  $200\235$  and the African members of the Congress Alliance amxaâ $200\235$ self-confessed lackeys and flunkeys of the white

ruling class and the IFKHJHIIHQIChant Classâ\200\235.

The ANC was led,

they said, by a  $\hat{a}200\235$ white pseudo~leftist directorate $\hat{a}200\235$ .

By adopting

the Freedom Charter, thy ANC repudiated the 1949 Programme of

~403â\200\224

self government shall be recognised and shall be the basis of close cooperation".

This declatitn1<3f principle is more topical today than it was 30 years ago.

The barbarous aggression against and invasion of Angola by ti¬\201mzxxM3ist hordes of the Bothaâ\200\224Malan regime makes the need for the implementation of the Freedom Charter more urgent.

This double crime of colonisation and misuse of Namibia (which does not belong to South Africa) has once more "vindicated the assertion that the international responsibility of our movement is closely interconnected with our national mission whose essence is the liquidation of the racist fascist regime". <300>

The formulation that  $\hat{a}200\235$ South Africa shall be a fully independent state  $\hat{a}200\235$  is an expression of the realisation by our movement that racist South Africa is not a  $\hat{a}200\235$ fully independent state  $\hat{a}200\235$   $\hat{a}200\224$  something which needs to be heeded by some African states which are seeking a raproachement with racist South Africa.

Mayibuye, an ANC Bulletin, commented:

 $\hat{a}\200\235$ This demand was not included purely for the sake of form, for the emphasis is cbearly on the words 'fully independent  $\hat{a}\200\231$ .

iTt must be remembered that the Freedom

Charter was adepted by the Congress as far back as

1955, and it is noteworthy that even at that time when

most of Africa was still ummer the colonial heel, the

Congress of the People was aware of the dangers of

neocolonialism ~ hence the emphasis on the words 'fully

~390â\200\224

independent'.

all nations." <301>

Recent events in Africa have tragically

demonstrated the need for such programmatic clarity.

There irsrua need to emphasise that a democratic South Africa which desires to be fully independent shall by the same token respect the rights and sovereignty of

'Fhere were no illusions amongst those who drafted the Freedom Charter.

They were aware that these demands will not come about on their own  $\hat{a}\200\224$  they will have to be fought for, hence the formulation:

"And we pledge ourselves to strive together sparing neither strength nor courage, until the democratic changes here set out have been won".

And repeats for emphasis:

"let all who love their people and their country now say, as we say here: THESE FREEDOMS WE WILL FIGHT FOR, SIDE BY SIDE, THROUGHOUT OUR LIVES, [HWUI.WE HAVE WON OUR LIBERTY".

In other words, the Freedom Charter "demands that South

Africa must come out of the imperialist camp and join the

connmuriity <of Eretmiom (ind {Deacueâ\200\2241CM/ingy pecmales (3fthe)) the

worldâ\200\235. (302)

 $\hat{a}$ 200\230These were the demands of the people.

The ANC ratified the

~391â\200\224

to fight by all means possible including extra $\hat{a}\200\224$ parliamentary methods.

That meant that our struggle went beyond petitions and legal deputations and delegations.

The struggle was a ci¬\202uallenge

against the state and could only effectively be conducted outside the legal mechanism of the state.

The Defiance Campaign proved to be an effective form of training disciplined volunteers and mobilising the masses in  $nona^200\224violent$  action.

It transformed the character of the ANC,

strengthened the leadership and attracted many new recruits  $\hat{a}\200\224$  the membership of the ANC rose from 4,000 to 100,000  $\hat{a}\200\235$ with many times that number of politically conscious supporters  $\hat{a}\200\235$ . <290>

Ιt

stimulated the growth of militancy within other black organisations such as the Coloured People's Organisation and the South Afrdxxui Indian Congress.

The Defiance Campaign also

immijated the emergence of the Congress of Democrats  $\hat{a}\200\224$  a white organisation committed to Congress policy.

The Defiance Campaign

was the implementation and further strengthening of the Xuma-Dadooâ\200\224Naicker pact which laid the foundation for African and Indian solukuï¬\202ty and called on the Coloured community to join this alliance.

Durimgenmiafter the Defiance Campaign the leaders of Congress were arrested and a crisis emerged.

A J Lutuli has this

to say about this  $a\200\235$ crisis $a\200\235$ :

 $\hat{a}\200\235$ While the Defiance Campaign was entering its last weeks, the African National Congress was confronted with an internal crisis.

The Presidentâ\200\224General, Dr

Moroka, had earlier been one of a batch of twenty

Communiist Party and the South African Trades and Labour Council. Dr Dadoo called for unity and the need to  $a\200\235$ forget the past differences  $200\235$ .

Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu spoke in the same vein.

It was at this meeting that O R Tambo madeati¬ $\202ue$  prophetic words:

 $a\200\235$ Today it is the Communist Party.

Tomorrow it will be

our trade unions, our Indian Congress, our APO, our

African National Congress.â\200\235 <289>

<3n June 26, 1950, the ANC called for a one day strike throughout the country in protest against the Suppression of Communism Act and against the shooting of 18 Africans by the police on May 1st, 1950.

This was called the National Day of

iProtest and Mourning and.was the beginning of the commemoration of June 26  $^{\sim}$  a date which later became significant in our freedom struggltaauui later called.South African Freedom Day.

The ANC's

enlightened defence of the right of the Communists to organise their own legal Party was (and unfortunately remains) unparalleled among the national liberation movements in Africa.

We are now talking of 1950.

Those days the ANC Umi¬\202<airadical

position:nitfe context of the politics of 1950.

It should be

remembered that  $a\200\235$  communism $a\200\235$  had always been misrepresented to the African community as a  $a\200\235$  deadly evil $a\200\235$ .

For the ANC to rise above

this narrow view and defy the Suppression okammmnism Act ami $\neg \202$  thereby associate itself with the defence of the Communist Party to exist in South Africa was both radical and revolutionary.

The

ANC had realised that communists are to be judged by their  $a\200\224379*$ 

w Z Conco

Dan Tloome

A Hutchinson

J Mafora

L Massina

C Mayekiso

L Ngoyi

J Nkadimeng

D Nokwe

M Rokaoana

R Resha

O R Tambo

M B Yengwa

National Executive Committee

W Z Conco

A Hutchinson

J Mafora

L Massina

P Mathole

Z K Matthews

C Mayekiso

L Ngoyi

J Nkadimeng

D Nokwe

M Rakaoana

G Sibande

T Tshume

M B Yengwa

W Z Conco

L Massina

Z K Matthews

C Mayekiso

P Molaoa

0 Mpeta

T Mqota

L Ngoyi

%â\200\230§j>-Mr Nyembe

A Nzo

R Resha

G Sibande

O R Tambo

In a penetrating article on the PAC Sisulu pointed out that the PAC sought to impose the experience of other African countries to a totally different situation in South Africa.

Due

to differences of historical development and present conditions,

[African liberation movenmmms in many other parts of the African

continent did not find allies in their struggle among other

population groups.

The PAC unfortunately mistook this or

"misunderstoodâ $\200\235$  or distorted this to imply or mean that Africans oppose such alliances on principle.

They were negating our

experiences anuicmr contribution to the African revolution and therefore moving against the tide of history and the African revolution.

The PAC, Sisulu said, Luwaï¬\202 Afioanism as a sort of escape from discipline, the hard slogging day to day work,anm3 the personal dangers which face the ordinary Congress member. On

a warning note, Sisulu concludes:

«414»

Dutch, English or even Indianâ\200\235 or other extraction? Was it  $rmir\202$ :

Madzunya, one of their leaders, who once said: 'kauï¬\202iite man is sincereâ\200\235? (317)

The dangers with the PAC policy is that this "majority

nationalismâ\200\235 which does not take into consideration the interests

and aspirations of  $\hat{a}^200^235$ minorities  $\hat{a}^200^235$   $\hat{a}^200^235$   $\hat{a}^200^235$  guarantee no minority

rights" ~ would lead to  $a\200\235$ minority nationalism $200\235$ , exclusivism,

breaking the broad democratic front of patriotic forces which the ANC was building.

They were pushing everybody into his ghetto

anui therefore making it.easy for the enemy to rule and ruin the people.

There is no class analysis; the interests of the masses are completely ignored; all that they say is to  $a\200\235$ guarantee individual liberties $200\235$  which are regarded as  $200\235$ the highest guarantee necessary and possible $200\235$ .

Individual guarantees for

whom?

Perhaps for the African "merchant classâ\200\235 â\200\224 a term they like to use in reference to the Indians.

As for the struggles of

all oppressed people in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and even EurOpe it is regarded as irrelevant because Sobukwe emphasised "loyalty only to Africaâ\200\235.

In the praticalâ\200\224political field they did not excel except in sabotaging ANC initiaties ~ the examples are so many, we shall confine ourselves to the one which is wellluKWNIthroughout the world: the Sharpeville massacres.

.As early as December 1959, the ANC had finalised its plans for launching a nationwide campaign of massive resistance against the fascist regime.

This campaign was to take the form of national stoppage of work, burning of passes, etc.  $\hat{a}\200\235By$  March 1960, the ANC's massive campaign was already underway throughout

to drive the people to work, must be abolished.

Fourthly, the power of the Native Commissioners and of the Native Affairs Department, as well as the useless 'Native Representation Council' mustlxeaï¬\202xï¬\202ished and the people must be given the right to vote for Africans to represent them, and to administer their affairs.

Fifthly, agricultural schools must be started to teach up-to~date methods of farming, and modern implements must be provided by the government.

Sixthly, individual land tenure must take the place of tribal tenure so that competition will be encouraged, and the farm workers will have the incentive to improve their land.

Lastly, unity must be established between the Venda people and all other African tribes, so that they must struggle together against.restrictions and Oppresshm1 which affects them all equally." <331>
In this pamphlet Maliba goes on to make concrete suggestions:

â\200\235At present the Venda people are very poorly organised.
Without organisation they have no way of putting
forward their demands.

The first task is organisation.

The people have their tribal organisations, the African National.(kmugress and the Communist Party.

All these

organisations are still weak.

The tribal organisations are usually afraid of politics , and only help

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fervent anti~racialists among the Africans from political activity, there is no knowing what the future will hold." <327>

He went on to say that the PAC has thus far failed "but their mere appearance is an urgent warning to all democratic South Africans.

The Africans have set a wonderful example of Exi¬\202itical wisdom and maturity to the rest of the country, but they are not perfect, any more than any other community of men and women sorely beset.

ihicmmtain circumstances, an emotional

massâ\200\224appeal to destructive and exclusive nationalism can be a dynamic and irresistable force in history ... It would be foolish to imagine that a wave of black chauvinism, provoked by the savagery of the Nationalist Party (and perhaps secretly encouraged and financed by it too) may not some day sweep through our country.

thlif it does, the agony will know no colour-bar at all".

We have quoted at length from this article by Sisulu because it goes to the core of the matter;

it points out the

socioâ\200\224economic roots and the backing by reactionary forces of the nationalism of the PAC and indicates that this phenomenon is not accidental but endemic in the society and will disappear with the ciisappearance  $tir\202$ fcualonialism and apartheid in South Africa.

In

fairness to Sisulu, it should be stated that the article was written in 1959, when the PAC was just emerging, before the innumerable splits and murders, desertions into the Tmeuskei and other Bantustans before the PAC  $\hat{a}\200\235$ degenerated $\hat{a}\200\235$  into what it is ~ a toothless bulldog.

It was before the formation of Ukhonto we

<sup>~416</sup>â\200\224

Zeerust District, i.e. Leeufontein, Braklaagte, Gopane, Motswedi, Witkleigat, etc. in April 1957.

The Government aimed at

 $\hat{a}\200\235$  slipping in passes through the back door  $\hat{a}\200\235$   $\hat{a}\200\224$  to avoid big cities and to start with the  $\hat{a}\200\235$  ignorant Africans  $\hat{a}\200\235$ .

But they misjudged

the situation.

The rural people had contacts with the urban population.

'The Government started at Linokana and neighbouring areas.

The Native Commissioner, a certain Richter, called on Chief

Abraham Moiloa to order and if necessary compel, the women to
take out the "reference books".

The Chief was not prepared to do

this.

He was threatened by Richter.

When he was asked to

address the people he did so but made his position clear.

On

April 1, 1957, a handful of African women came to take out passes but the majority refused.

Gallichan, a white shopkeeper who lent his premises for the purposes of issuing passes was boycotted and "according bolmns own evidence his takings for April dropped to practically nothing". <340>

(Hmi¬\201i Moiloa was informed to convene a meeting on April 4,

1ENY7 at which the Chief Native Commissioner for the areaxmm $\mbox{in}\mbox{202d}$  address the people of Linokana.

This he did.

Αt

'this meeting, Chief Moilca $\tilde{a}\200\235$ was told to get off the chair as he was no longer Chief.

He was also tohi¬\202 that he was to leave the area withirl114<jays to go to Venterspost and that he was not to return without the permission of the Commissionerâ\200\235. (341)

It should be stated that  $a\200\235$ complaints $a\200\235$  about Chief Moiloa go as far back as 1952 (but were enquiried into officially in November, 1956).

One of the charges was that he said on one

occasion:  $\hat{a}\200\235$ Wie die hel is Verwoerd?" ( $\hat{a}\200\235$ Who on earth is Verwoerd? $\hat{a}\200\235$  ~422 $\hat{a}\200\224$ 

f