NOT FOR PUBLICATION

AN ANALYSIS OF THE CHANCES OF THE EARLY GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA

BY THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY AND TWO MORALLY-JUSTIFIABLE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVICES, AVAILABLE TO THE NATIONAL PARTY,

TO PREVENT THAT FROM EVER HAPPENING

Two seat-by-seat analyses of the 1981 General Election results, interprete d in the light

of recent happenings, including the formation of the extremist Conservative Party (the CP)

under the leadership of Dr. A.P. Treurnicht (Dr. T.), are to be found towards the end of this

paper. I respectfully suggest, however, that, for those figures to be appreciated fully, what

precedes them should be given a fair reading.

Way back in 1962 or 1963, it was possible to predict in outline, but not in detail, what

in 1982 has happened in South African politics. It then became obvious to some of my friends

and to me that the right-wing National Party (the NP), and the Afrikaner s olidarity upon which

it was founded, would disintegrate at some time in the 1960's or early 19 70's. Our time

slotting was wrong.

This was my own reasoning: South Africa had become a republic in 1961. All that was

needed thereafter, for the rot to set in, was for the middle-of-the-road United Party (the UP) to

disappear finally from the political scene. I anticipated that, when that occurred, there would

be a grouping of all the moderates, i.e. a "separating-out".

Do not for a moment believe that the old UP did not for many years provi de a home, of

sorts, for a considerable number of English-speaking right-wingers, who would have been

happier in the NP, or that the NP itself was not a long-time refuge for ma ny Afrikaners with

relatively moderate views. People in the past, more than today, voted according to their an-

cestry and home language prejudices and not according to personal convictions. There were

a few exceptions to be found within the UP, but not many. Today, on the c ontrary, several of

my English-speaking friends openly "confess to being Nationalists". Had they done that 20

years ago they would have been ostracized by the society which surroun ded them.

On the basis of our beliefs, some of us had also hoped, from the early 196 0's, that the

"unified moderates", necessarily formed around those in the NP, would one day gain the power

of government and thereupon set about making the many constitutional changes which, in

our view, were both desirable and advisable. By the way, it continues to puzzle me why, with

the "need for change" being so widely talked about, there is so little, ex pressed, agreement

as to what should be done. I suspect that this is because people refuse to accept the obvious,

when the obvious is painful. Each, instead, seeks around for a hopeful al ternative, away from

the direction where the truth is easily discernible.

Tragically for South Africa, the demise of the UP took much longer than we had hoped it would.

The delay in its departure from the political scene has had, at least, thes e two important consequences:

(1) Rnodesia has passed out of White control and the unrest, both on Sou th Africa's border

and within the country, has increased greatly. These and other events, such as a change

of mood of the Blacks towards the Whites, have considerably strengthen ed the emotional appeal of the "White laager".

(2) The time available for change, which can be effected only by the "uni fied moderates".

has been reduced by the period of delay. The key date, "when the balloon will go up",

is anybody's guess; but, had the UP "put up the shutters" 10 years earlier than it did,

South Africa would have had that much more time in which to seek a pea ceful, perma-

nent solution to its problems.

near so.

That sad delay cannot now be remedied; but the lesson, of the double mag nification of problems, which delay can cause, should be kept constantly in mind. Tim e was always "of the essence". It is now even more so. It is, in fact, in my view, "now or nev er" - or very

To understand what lies behind the split in the NP early this year and, mo re importantly,

what is likely to occur in the future struggle for parliamentary power in So uth Africa, one

must always remember that Afrikanerdom was not originally based upon a concensus of pol-

itical opinion. It's raison d'etre, and continuously motivating force since, were the Afrikaners

understandable detestation of the British, going back principally to the W ar of 1899-1902.

Incidentally the Afrikaners should have observed from that tragedy, and their own reaction to

it, that "if one sows the seeds of hate, one reaps hate". They chose to ig nore the obvious.

Instead they have humiliated 80% and more of the country's people for over 35 years - wil-

fully. Óne wonders what crop the Afrikaners, now that it is their turn, expect to reap.

So - the early cry among the Afrikaners was: "Unite so as to get the Brit ish Government

out of South Africa". From 1961, it became "Stand together, because the UP is the successor

of the British". Die verdomde "Sappe"! Differences of political opinion did n ot matter at all.

Of course, in the late 1940's, the NP did see the possibilities of capitalising upon the traditional,

almost genetic, racialism almost all South Africans carry with them through their lives in

varying degrees, and made some party-unifying mileage out of the emotional appeal of its

official "apartheid" policies.

Anyway, the UP did finally die and a new era has dawned. The NP today, even after the

recent split, still contains three groups: (i) the thinking "moderates" (ii) the "come-hell-or-

high-water diehard right-wingers", who are smallish in number and tempor arily remain within

the NP because of the habits of established loyalties, and (iii) the "unthin king middle", I believe

much the largest group. Which way the middle decides to go in the next f ew years will be

crucial for Prime Minister P.W. Botha (Mr. B.) and the country as a whole. "Decides to go" or

"is pushed" or "is frightened into going". Or all three.

The somnolent middle cannot now remain in the middle because the support it used to

get simultaneously from left and right has virtually disappeared. It must now split. Those

making up the middle will soon have to undergo the novel experience of thinking for them-

selves and choosing between opposing alternatives, one intellectually based, the other emo-

tional and the few real extremists left in the party will soon move out.

The future of South Africa is thus much in the hands of a group of Whites, relatively small

in proportion to the total number, who have long been conditioned to responding to emotional

stimulii and are unused to intellectual arguments. It is painfully obvious, surely, that the bulk

of "the middle" will drift towards Dr. T. rather than towards Mr. B? If you do not see it that

way, I suggest that you are guilty of wishful thinking.

Now let us look at the 1981 General Election results and anticipate what ef fect the split

and other events will have upon them:

TOTAL NO. OF "/. OF VOTES SEATS WON CAST NP 131 57.0 NRP (New Republican Party) 8 7.8 TOGETHER 139 64.8 PFP (Progressive Federal Party) 26 19.4 NCP (National Cons. Party) - since absorbed by the CP - and others - 1.7 165 86.9 HNP (Herstigte Nationale Party) - 14.1

165 100.0 The holding of 83 seats gives a majority of 1.

To keep the record straight, since the 1981 election, - (i) the CP has part ly absorbed

the HNP and is in the act of absorbing the balance of it; and (ii) some 18 or so of the 131 NP

M.P.'s have left the party to form that CP, giving, at the time of the split, the reason that they

were completely opposed to Mr. B's proposal of some vague "healthy power-sharing arrange-

ment with the Coloureds and Indians". Whether or not something else was behind their de-

structive act is immaterial. Nor does it matter who is to blame for it. The fact of the split is

very material indeed.

Let us accept that the Coloureds and the Indians, together, now total around 4,500,000

i.e. that they are about equal in number to the Whites, and that the total Black population,

including those in the Bantusbans, runs to around 18,000,000. These figures are accurate enough for this review.

The Indians and the Coloureds cannot easily be unscrambled from the n on-Bantustan

omelette, so it now seems they are to be given their own parliaments-of-some-sort, with

limited powers, exercised strictly under White veto and control. The Blacks living outside of

the Bantustans, i.e. in the same areas as the Indians and Coloureds, are

not to be given the same "privileges". They are to look to their "homeland" rulers for everythi ng.

The Government ignores the fact that the main Bantusan, that of the Zul us numberina

near 5.000.000, is a phantasy, that only four, economically "wonky", Ban tusans have re-

sulted from the separatist idea, and there are probably more Blacks living outside of the

whole area designed to fall within the Bantustan concept, than within the e Bantustans them-

selves - and living outside the Bantustans permanently. One wonders iu st how much resent-

ment is being built up, against the day of explosion, by the millions of Blac ks in S.A., living

without real rights and in poverty, in and outside the proclaimed areas.

Dr. T. and Co. believe that for the Whites to survive they must never, not now, not ever,

concede even the smallest vestige of power to any non-White. They belie ve that, what the

Whites have, they must hold by force - for ever. By the way, I was surprise d to find, during a

recent visit I made to South Africa, that quite a few wealthy English-spe aking Whites agreed

with this extremist view. They also took the line that moral considerations do not matter at

all, that preservation of possessions and privileges matter immensely and that "survival" is

the all-exclusive consideration.

Dr. T. and Co. point to what has occurred to South Africa's north and sa y "Do you want

that to happen here? That is what power-sharing leads to!" They are right, of course, to stress

the general difficulty people of different racial groups have of permanent ly sharing power

equitably. But they are wrong in assuming that power, in reality, cannot be fairly shared at all.

Moreover they disregard the event that power may have to be shared, willynilly, - or

even worse that the Whites may one day be denied even a share of that power.

Power has of course, been shared successfully for many years by groups of different

ethnic origin and diverse cultural customs and religions. Under certain con ditions, I agree.

Switzerland suggests itself as the best example of this. So it is well worth looking at the main

factors enabling Swiss Germans, Swiss French and Swiss Italians to live together permanently in harmony:-

- (1) The three groups are all culturally developed;
- (2) The general standard of education of all the Swiss is high;
- (3) The groups, and the individuals making up each, have a developed de gree of tolerance of one another and of understanding one another's problems;
- (4) They live in loosely-separated groups, but without firm boundaries and without any restriction on movement or on intermarriage;
- (5) They learn one another's languages:
- (6) They accept the concept of a single nationhood and have a single pat riotism; and
- (7) Their constitutional set-up accords with their needs.

For power-sharing in South Africa, then, to operate permanently on some thing even re-

motely resembling this successful basis, not 100% or 90% or 80% success fully but with a

modicum of success, a great effort will need to be made to create in Sout h Africa the above

set of conditions - yes, to the maximum extent possible in the full time available. I realise

that the Swiss conditions cannot be duplicated but any progress made in the right direction

will soon help greatly.

So briefly:

- (i) the NP believes in unmeaningful power-sharing.
- (ii) The CP in none.
- (iii) the NRP does not know what it believes and matters not, anyway.
- (iv) The PFP advocates a federal power-sharing arrangement with check s and balances and

guarantees, written into a constitution. Well and good but, personally, I do not set great

store on pieces of paper. I place my trust in the good will of the people who have the

power of rule. Without that, pieces of paper are worthless. However the PFP has no

hope, whatsoever, of ever winning enough seats to gain parliamentary control. But -

could it one day hope to wag the dog, the NP, to which party the course of events must

soon make it the tail? We shall see.

(v) The HNP will have lost all its members to the CP before the second g eneral election from now, if not by the first.

In Parliament, the NP has 113 members; it has a great majority on its own . Add in the 8

NRP and the 26 PFP members, and the total becomes a formidable 147 t o face the 18 CP

members of the House. On the face of it, the CP's future looks bleak. That is "on the face

of it". I interpret the developing reality very differently. Let us do a little de lving.

Firstly, the Bantustan concept could well blow up in Mr. B's face at any time. It has been

doomed to failure from its conception. It is hopelessly unfair and too ung enerous.

To hope to get away with giving 15% of the country's total land to 72% of its total people,

as a permanent settlement of the division of rights, was, and remains crazy. A 10-year-old

would say: "That is unfair. Do not accept it." Ask any you know! Moreover . some of the

Bantustans are blobs on a map. Surely, if one offers a distinct ethnic group the dignity of

independent nationhood, the two indispensible pre-requisites are (a) an easily identifiable,

distinct land-mass, in one unbroken piece, and (b) sufficient land, and an adequate industrial

base, to meet the needs of the number of people concerned. Numbers alw ays matter. In the

case of the division of assets they are literally of vital importance. Total means must relate

to total needs. And vice versa.

There is no way, at all, that power-sharing with the Blacks, on a Bantusta n basis, can

remotely hope to succeed without a trebling or quadrupling of the "largess e" of land and in-

dustrial base. You say that that would be politically and economically "impossible". I agree -

but, it you admit that, then you should at once work for the abandonment of the Bantustans

concept. And the sooner the better, having regard to the relatively high bi rth-rate and the

numbers and the resultant poverty there.

Secondly, I believe that the future permanent distribution of power in So uth Africa between

the Whites, Coloureds, Indians and Blacks will not, anyway, be determined by the Whites,

but finally at some time by the Blacks alone, no matter if the Whites, Coloureds and Indians

do join forces. No, I did not come by this belief casually. The facts say tha

t if things go on as

they are, the Blacks will take over - in a generation or so. They will then decide all. The CP

can tell the electorate to "vasbyt" - but any time gained will cause a delay not a prevention.

Any interruption of the inevitable will be finite and the state of the Black/ White relationships

exacerbated, beyond imagination, by the interim years of Bloodshed.

In the light of the inevitability of a Black take-over of power, one must sug gest that future generations of White South Africans will, one day, curse their forefathers, and particularly those of our time, for their foolishness and cupidity, and for having close

those of our time, for their foolishness and cupidity - and for having close d their eyes to the

for all now to

writing on the wall. It is there, in black in large letters on a white background, for all now to

read. They in the 21st century may well one day curse you who read this for not having

tried with all your strength to make their lot, and that of their descendant s for generations

to come, so much better than it, for them, has turned out to be.

I reluctantly left South Africa several years ago. I have no axe to sharpen . During the

50-odd years I spent in the land of my birth before leaving, one of my hob bies was political

analysis, based upon a mathematical study of actual election results. Hen ce my interest.

I now live, happily indeed, in Australia.

Incidentally the Australian federal system generally works well and could, I believe provide

a useful pattern for the Republic.

I recently spent a most interesting and informative three months' holiday in South Africa.

After six years' unbroken absence.

Yes, in answer to your question, I did find many changes but, regretfully, they were less

numerous and less wide spread than my South African friends had predicted they would be.

Moreover, what had not been done and should, in my view, have been done, impressed me even more.

Yes, some manifestations of "pelty apartheid" had, happily, disappeared. Also, what is

of prime importance, because economics and politics are so intertwined, there was obviously

"more money around" than in 1976, the date of my last visit. This was evidenced by the

noticeably better standard of dress enjoyed by many of the urban non-Whites and the increased

number of vehicles in their hands. Often hazardous hands. But, keep no thing back! Some

non-Whites did tell me that they were better off financially and less discontented. On the

other hand, many told me that "not enough" was being done for them - or "quickly enough".

These were mostly Blacks. I also sensed that many of them were concealing much that they had on their minds.

What did, however, inpress me even more were the following:

(1) The gradual assimilation of so many non-Whites into the economy, part icularly into

sales, clerical and service positions. However, I could not avoid reflecting in this regard

that economic integration = political power and that deep economic integra tion will =

deep political power.

(2) The almost unanimous support for the NP I surprisingly found among a number of Indians

to whom I spoke. They much prefer the "devil they know ... ", They are fea rful that

the Blacks will one day "take over the country". The Durban "riots" of 194 8 have left

an indelible memory on their minds. They want the NP to rule.

(3) The divided attitudes of the Coloureds. Some thought as the Indians do. Others ex-

pressed hate for the NP, because of the humiliations "apartheid" regulati ons continue

to cause them regularly in their daily lives. Totally unnecessarily, of cours e.

(4) Most important of all - the impact made upon me by the great increas è in the number

of non-White faces, particularly Black, on view everywhere, vis-a-vis the number of

White faces. This struck me in both the urban and rural communities. I al so noticed

much less subservience towards the Whites by the Blacks than previously. Their atti-

tudes reflected a sense of newly-felt manhood, of feelings of equality as persons recently

discovered, not without traces of understandable exuberance at times. Some of my

friends did say to me: "The Blacks are becoming very cheeky," as if che ek was a White

prerogative - when of course it has no place anywhere! The effect of all t his was to

create in me an awareness of the very strong tension which runs through South African

life today. I found fear of the Blacks and dread of what lies ahead wide spread. Some

Whites have a "let-them-come" attitude. Both sentiments indicated the pr esence of

factors which detract from the quality of life. I would here remind you that the quality of

life is more than eating well and living in opulence in a comfortable home, with the help

of one or more domestic servants.

Friends kept asking me "How long have we got?" I did not ask "for what?" I knew that

answer. Others warned me to be careful where I went. I found some of t he homes in

some cities had been turned into high-walled fortresses, a few even guar ded by security

men with dogs. I came to the final conclusion that I personally was aware of the tension

so strongly because I had been out of South Africa for so long and because, where I

live, there are no tensions at all. The presence of the local dog-catcher is the limit of

our excitement! To confirm what I mean, let me add that I was, unsolicitou sly told by a

South African friend, who had just returned home with her husband from a three months'

holiday in Australia, both Afrikaners: "What impressed us most is that life there is so

very relaxed, compared with here." I knew what she meant.

Please do not think that I am labouring this "tension thing" unduly. I believ e it to be very

meaningful to people called upon to make sensitive political choices bet ween centre

and right-wing parties. Tension could be the deciding factor. Moreover, it is a destroyer.

For example, firstly, it blinded the Rhodesians to opportunity. They paid the price for

not accepting the terms offered to them on "H.M.S. Tiger", in 1967 or the reabouts.

Secondly, their army was not defeated in the military meaning of the word , but the

tension of a prolonged seemingly unending war ultimately destroyed the will of the

people to continue fighting.

I accept that if you have a Black/White problem, you must have some ten sion. But why

aggravate it by hate - causing divisive governmental policies which must have the

effect of aggravating that disunity? Thus, what the Government does, or does not do, will

decide the level of national tension and which way important votes will go . And the

greater the tension, the smaller the spark needed to "set off the explosion".

Anyway to revert to the impact of numbers, I came to see that the Whites , as a whole,

are, in reality, playing a less and less significant role and the non-Whites , as a whole, ob-

servably, a more and more significant role in the TOTALITY of National life. Power is already

slowly passing, all the while, out of the hands of the Whites into the hand s of the non-Whites,

without anyone noticing it. Don't kid yourselves! It is happening; slowly. P robably it was

also my absence which made me realise this truth, which appears to go u nnoticed by the

Whites. Astonishing! Right under their noses!

Time, I reflected is, of course, completely on the side of the non-Whites, as a whole, and on the side of the Blacks, in particular.

Let us now extrapolate the latest population figures, in all their starkness, so as to see the problem in true perspective.

In thirty years' time, in the year 2012, the make-up of the country's popula tion will be something like this -

around 6/7,000,000 Whites around 7/8,000,000 Coloureds

around 40,000,000 Blacks around 4/5,000,000 Indians

give or take a million or two.

By then the Blacks will have increased in number by the equivalent of that of, plus or

minus, 20 SOWETO'S, each of a million human beings. Try to picture t hat: 20 more SOWETO'S.

Not 1, or 2, but 20 - needing for example, to help you grasp it more clearly , at least, 4,000

new schools! Each with 1,000 pupils.

By then, it is responsibly predicted, the country's gold and other mineral p roduction will

have become greatly reduced. There will be less income and more to shar e in it. By 2012,

the total capital outlay in buildings and plant, needed to enable a single extra non-White to be

employed in industry, will run to an astronomical sum.

The economic burden on the country, in 2012, will be very near unsupportable. Where

can South Africa hope to find the funds needed to create employment for , and to house, and

to educate, the above vast population?

A great number of the country's present 22 million non-Whites lack employment and

adequate housing. They generally live in poverty, with the scantiest of back-up social ser-

vices. By 20^2 these 22 million will have become around 50 million.

If, the burden is supportable at all, and, remember, whoever rules will have to do the best

he can, it can be so only as a result of a great reduction of the standard of living of the Whites.

Recall what a depressing effect on the economy the recent fall in the gol

d price to near \$300

an oz. has had. Picture little gold to sell coupled with more than twice the present population.

The effect will represent, loosely, what the country will be like economical ly in the year 2012.

Halve everyone's present income and you would be left with an optimistic assessment of what is likely.

Moreover, do not regard the year 2012 as being far, far away. It is only as distant from

1982 as 1952 - about the time, many will remember, when the late Mr. J.G. Strydom became

Prime Minister. If you do not remember that, I hasten to assure you that the year 2012 is,

historically speaking, "tomorrow". And the year 2042 is "the day after to morrow". Many of

you under the age of 35 - very probably near one-half of today's White population - wil still

be alive by 2042 and living under a government controlled by a Black majo rity. ^By then, the.

Black population alone will be near 80,000,000. That's the equivalent of almost 60 SOWETO

TOWNSHIPS extra. Yes, 60. Needing 12,000 schools more than are nee ded today.

No, I am not being melodramatic. I am wilfully pulling off all the bedclothe s, so that you

can see clearly the whole body of facts and ponder their implications. Do n't turn away. Look at them.

"But", you ask, "What about the Coloureds and the Indians? Will they not support us

against the Blacks?" My replies are: "What have you done, or are you doing, to earn their

support?" and "If they do, when they finally see that a Black take-over of power is imminent,

will they not then desert the Whites? If you were in their shoes, wouldn't you?"

No, there is NO escaping the inevitable.

i emigrated from South Africa solely because of moral considerations. I realised that I

no longer wanted to be a part of the South African system. I was oppose d to the Government's

racialistic policies AND I saw no prospect of timeous change. I add, in ho nesty, that I also knew

that, if I lived long enough, which is doubtful, I would, one day, equally dis like what an ill-

prepared Black government would probably feel inclined to do to the Whit es.

But, having bared my soul, let me now add this:-

I have not ever believed, nor do I now believe, that it would generally do the people of

South Africa - White, Black, Coloured and Indian - any real and lasting g ood to hand over the country, right now, to the non-Whites in general or to the Blacks in particular.

I am completely opposed to that.

Instead, I do advocate, and advocate as "vital", using that word in its strongest sense,

(i) that the NP should NOW accept the inevitability of a complete take-ove r by the Blacks at

some date in the foreseeable future, and (ii) that the NP should carefully plan so to arrange

things NOW that there will ultimately be a bloodless hand-over, rather than a bloody take-over.

It HAS to be EITHER a hand-over OR a take-over. What you now have in South Africa cannot go on for much longer!

SO. WHITE SOUTH AFRICANS DECIDE NOW, IN ALL SANITY AND PRUDENCE, TO PREPARE FOR AND NOT FIGHT AGAINST THE INEVITABLE.

No, it is not a simple choice between "having cold feet" and "fighting to the death". There

is another option open. That is that the government should accept the in evitable and now

work out a time-table of wise and sensible preparations for the day of hand-over.

Reader, please give some thought to these questions of mine: "When do you anticipate

that the Blacks will take over power in South Africa, if things go on as the y are? In 20, 30,

40, even 50 years' time?"

You say you cannot make a guess because the future is unpredictable. Ye s, I agree, an

event such as World War III could delay the passing of power but it could not prevent it. But

is delay, accidental or wilful, really desirable, taking an objective view? The "last few years" are going to be dreadfully unpleasant anyway.

I suggest that some specific date has NOW to be chosen, and worked to, honestly and

faithfully. One cannot leave the planning open-ended, or play it by ear a ny longer. The matter

is far too serious for that. And time short enough.

I advocate that 1st January, 2012, be at once accepted by the NP as HAND OVER DAY and

that, from now on, the national will be applied strenuously to utilising wise ly and fully the

interim 30 years for preparing the whole community for living as harmoni ously as possible together.

You think, do you, that the Blacks, Coloureds and Indians would not no w accept some

such arrangement as this? If you do, then why not ask some of them? Why not get a reaction

from people like Chief Buthelezi and Bishop Tutu?

I believe that the bulk of the non-Whites also dread the uncertainty of the short-term future.

They presently lack, completely, any real hope of meaningful change. Sure ly they will gladly,

and gratefully, seize an opportunity, which must be beyond their present expectations? Would

you not, in their circumstances? Then, expect them to. They are, strang e as many White

South Africans will find the thought, as human as you are, even if many a re less sophisticated.

Now, how to prepare for the inevitable?

Regarding the practicalities of what is needed, I believe that there are, a t least, FOUR

ESSENTIAL MEASURES to be taken timeously.

I shall explain them briefly:

(1) All discriminatory and divisive legislation, without exception, must be removed from

"the Statute Book". Some, such as the denial of the right to own propert y anywhere,

without restriction, immediately. The rest in phases. All within five years . The removal

of influx control, in particular, might well be, spread over this five year per iod to give

the Government time in which to set about providing adequate housing for the massive

inflow of rural Blacks, into the urban areas, which can be expected. The Bantustans

will, of course, be dismantled - or remain as they are if they so choose; but it is im-

possible to see any of them resisting an offer of re incorporation into a uni fied, federal

South Africa, which can offer only comparative benefits and the promise of alleviation

of poverty.

(2) By educating Whites and non-Whites in an understanding of each oth er's needs.

hopes, fears, problems and aspirations and in the requirements of citizen ship and

tolerance. This will be an on-going process. Violence, of course, of any form will merit,

and be meted very severe punishment. No matter its source.

(3) By undertaking to give, and by giving, the same opportunities of a for mal and technical

education, at all levels, to all members of all groups as soon as is practically possible.

The planning and bringing to fruition of this undertaking will need time; but the aim

must be to spend, in hard cash, within the shortest time possible, the sa me on the

education of every Black, Coloured and Indian child as on the education of a White child.

Don't throw up your hands in horror and ask "Where are the funds for all this to come

from?" From the only source possible - from various forms of regular taxat ion, in-

cluding a hefty WEALTH TAX, steeply graded so that those who have ben efitted most

from the past will contribute most to the securing of the future. Brutal taxa tion is going

to hurt like hell; but the alternative would hurt very much more. Besides, the Whites

will be getting peace of mind in return for the surrender of portion, only, of their wealth.

Those with great wealth, are, on the evidence, most in search oi ua oi mi; - lyway.

(4) By setting up a federal state, having a constitution which alloweo all those ^Whites)

already on the voting roll to remain there - for the reason that rights, once given,

cannot be removed - and which put all new voters, without differentiation and aged

18 and more, onto the common roll, subject to an educational qualification test. Yes

qualification by education only and not in addition by virtue of earnings a nd/or property

ownership. Yes, Whites, Blacks, Coloureds and Indians on the same common roll, all

having absolutely equal rights within and without Parliament.

This is the crux.

The qualification MUST be so fixed - i.e. phrased, calculated and designed , that parlia-

mentary power will, ultimately and inevitably, pass out of White control and into the

hands of an elite group of Whites, Blacks, Coloureds and Indians in or around the year

2012. A good computer - provided it had not been made in the Platteland! - could

no doubt, calculate, fairly accurately, now, what that qualification should be.

As I see it, taking all factors into account, the qualification must be base d on education

only, as it is only in education that one can hope to achieve anything like "a universal"

norm." This would promise to produce, in due course, a real democracy based not on

"one man, one vote" but on "one educated man, one educated vote." That is quite a

different kettle of fish. And the new constitution could, for what it is worth , provide

for the protection of minorities by stipulating that a majority of, say, 80%, in the new

House of Assembly, would be needed to approve any amendment of the c onstitution.

Of course, one can never legislate successfully against the possibility of the use of

guile or of force, including military power; but History does show that for ce does not

flourish where government is good. On the contrary, the need for it may be argued,

when basic government is bad and there is no other remedy whatsoever a vailable.

All to happen by 2012? Yes, as I feel that 20 years would give insufficient time for the

necessary preparations; 40 years could be too long to ask the non-Whites to wait. Don't be

horrified. Think only of the logical alternative - government forever, by in adequately

equipped Blacks from 2012 or thereabouts, if not before.

At the moment, South Africa is making the same tragic mistake as the Brit ish did in

pre-independence days in Rhodesia, Uganda and some other African countries - not preparing

the argument for

adequate!*/ for Black rule. Whether Black rule is taken or given, the logic of the argument for

tlte proper preparation of the new holders of power is the same. On the o ther hand, I do be-

lieve that all non-Whites, given the opportunity of proper education, have t he capabilities to

govern fairly and well. What they will need to be able to govern properly, they must be given

in ADVANCE.

I do not believe that Mr. B. is oblivious of the above facts or, in his heart of heart, will

not admit the logic of my proposal. However his own apparently (notice t he underlining please)

insoluble problem, whatever his private convictions are, is a practical one - how to resist

the demands of an ultra-conservative movement within 83 key rural and b lue-collar-worker

urban seats. He cannot, he wrongly believes, do very much at all, meani ng give much

at all, without jeopardising his parliamentary majority. Normally remembe r, the second ob-

jective of any government, somebody once said, is to be re-elected; and the first of its ob-

jectives is to see that nothing interferes with its, second objective! Why should the NP be

different?

Mr. B. sees himself as sitting on the horns of this dilemma right now, and if no remedy is

sought, his successors will sit on it over the years ahead:-

Whatever change is obviously good for the future of South Africa as a whol e is, in its

consequences, obviously, bad for the future of the NP and is, obviously, g ood for the future of the CP.

That's the inevitable result of the CP's being 100% against change and u nder the present constitution.

Yes, the opposite also applies:

Whatever is obviously bad for the future of South Africa as a whole, i.e. NO MEANMGFUL

CHANGE, is obviously in its consequences good for the future of the NP and is, obviously bad for the future of the CP.

It is probable that the NP will feel itself driven to having to put party befo re country - and

doing what amounts to little or nothing. On the other hand, if Mr. B. mak

es no meaningful changes, he will provoke internal unrest and that, in turn, would benefit t he CP. Thus either way, it seems to me, the CP can expect to gain from the NP's action or in action in the near

"What", you say "If Mr. B. should make changes which are intended to a ppear meaningful

but, in fact, are innocuous?" Then he will be adjudged guilty of the sin of having split Afrik-

anerdom and the NP down the middle without good cause. Moreover, as a result, he would

have exposed many of his own staunch MP supporters, his friends in Parli ament itself, to a

possible loss of their seats. That would be unpardonable.

Yet, taking the overview, that is, probably, his less worrying way out, his own choice of

the lesser of two evils. So expect much fanfare to help make meaningles s concessions look

meaningful - but which will convey no real political clout. For the short t erm anyway.

â~... â~... â~...

future.

Here is the FIRST SCHEDULE;-

SEATS WHICH WILL, ALMOST CERTAINLY, BE CONTESTED AT SU BSEQUENT ELECTIONS BY THE PFP AND THE NP ONLY: BASED UPON 1981 GENERAL ELE CTION RESULTS:

Swing Needed NP & NRP to give seat to NP Seat Won/Lost PFP 1981 seats won by NP and PFP 131 26 1981 seats won by NRP 8 -TOTAL 139 26 0%-0.9% Durban Central and Pietermaritzburg South + 2 - 2 1%-7% Albany and Berea + 2 - 2 8% Pietermaritzburg North + 1 - 1 9% 144 21 10% Capetown Gardens and Bez Valley + 2 - 2 11% Green Point and Walmer + 2 - 2 12% Pinelands + 1 - 1 13%-14% 149 16 15% Edenvale + 1 - 1 16% 18% 150 15 19% Wynberg and Pinetown + 2 - 2 20% P.E. Central + 1 - 1 21 %-22% 153 12 23%-24% Groote Schuur + 1 - 1 25%-26% Bryanston and Constantia + 2 - 2 27%-2 8% Hillbrow + 1 - 1 29%-30% 157 8

31 %-32% Seapoint and Johannesburg North + 2 - 2 33%-34% Houghton + 1 - 1 35% 36% Parktown + 1 - 1 37%-38% Sandton + 1 162 - 1 3

Yes, a 38% swing would leave only THREE LITTLE PIGGIES TO GO TO MARKET!

Now, as to the SECOND SCHEDULE:-

SEATS WHICH WILL, ALMOST CERTAINLY, BE CONTESTED AT SUBSEQUENT ELECTIONS
BY THE NP AND CP ONLY:

NOW, AT LAST - What are the actual mathematical chances of the CPs one day gaining a parliamentary majority?

That depends nn the "mechanics of the swing".

To achieve power, Dr. T. and Co. need 83 seats out of the present (again I ask you please to note the underlining) total of 165.

What is behind the underlining?

It arises from a secondary question, I asked myself and which no one, but I, to my know-

ledge. appears to have given any thought: "How can Dr. T. and Co. legitimately, and with

moral justification, be kept out of power permanently, even if they do win 83 seats, in fact

many more than 83 seats?" No, I am not crazy. I shall explain all in good time.

Before I began my visit to South Africa in January, 1982,1 had already b ecome, in general terms, a "pro-P.W. Botha man", meaning I saw that he merited support.

Late in 1981, a thoughtful friend had sent me brief summary figures - but n o details -

of the 1981 General Election results. I then roughly concluded from them that the HNP -

remember that its successor, the CP, was, at that time, no more than a twi nkle in Dr. T's eye!

- would probably win over 60 seats at, maybe, the second or, almost certainly at the third general election held after 1981 - given the normal development of events

in Southern Africa.
This, I guessed, with an eye on the actual figures, would leave the NP wi

th about 71 seats plus 8 from the NRP, together making 79 seats. 26 PFP seats plus 60 HN

P seats = 86 seats, so that the PFP would then have the balance of power, certain as it was

not to gang up with the HNP. Anyway, HA! HA! HA! at that situation!

But, working onwards from what for the Afrikaners would be a politically disturbing dis-

tribution of power, I came to see that such a strange arrangement would a lmost certainly

drive a considerable further number of supporters of the NP into what was still to be the HNP

at the following election, so that, at the third or fourth general election a fter 1981, the HNP

would win the 83 plus seats it needed to govern South Africa. The thought was horrifying.

But that was all PRE- the March 1982 split. From Mr. B's viewpoint, thin gs are now much

worse, as a result of the CP's taking over the mantle of the HNP, than they were before.

I think most would agree that Dr. T. has at least as much charisma and charm as Mr. Jaap

Marais, who, by one of those laughable quirks of fate, actually stood again st him at the last

election. Moreover, Dr. T. is surrounded by several people of standing and political stature,

which Mr. Marais has not been. Thus the CP can be expected to grow at a faster rate than the

HNP would. And, of course, as the CP grow, the NP shrinks. It has become a different game of Jukskei altogether.

I do not believe that there is much of a chance of logical change in South Africa with the

NP in control - but at least there is a glimmer of hope. Yet, in reality, can one foretell the

future with any confidence? The older I get the more I have come to realis e that "things that

can't happen do happen!" Think of how the unexpected Falkland Islands War is saving the

bacon of Mrs. Thatcher's party. A wave of national emotion has taken it f rom the bottom to

the top of the polls. In a month!

Moreover, that glimmer of hope would glow if events should create a set of circumstances

in which the NP should need the support of the PFP to give it a combined majority against the CP.

We are about to see if that situation is a possibility.

On the other hand, if the CP ever once gains a pariiamentary majority, the tiny light at the

end of what must seem to many mttons, to be a long, long, tunnel - but ne vertheless a light

- would be extinguished. For ever.

So, whilst in South Africa, I made a point of obtaining, from a newspaper o ffice, photo-

stats of the 1981 General Election results, seat by seat, for detailed study on my return to

Australia. It now appears to me as if four or five results were omitted from what I was given

but I, nevertheless, have enough information for the following two analyses, I have made:-

- (i) To show the swing, on a percentage basis, needed to transfer PFP sea ts into the hands of the NP; and
- (ii) To show the swing, on a percentage basis, needed to transfer NP sea ts into the hands of the CP;
- the analyses both being made on the following assumptions, which I believe to be soundly based:-
- (a) That, as a result of the split in the NP, there will be no further swing towards the PFP,

as occurred at the last election, but that, on the contrary, there will be a swing back to

the NP. My reasons for this conclusion are that there are now widely-held feelings

among English-speaking voters that "P.W. Botha is trying, at last, to do something and

should be encouraged" and "The NP will need all the support it can get to keep Treur-

nicht and his supporters out."

- (b) That the NRP, if not soon absorbed by the NP, will before long become its full partner and virtually one with it.
- (c) That the NP and PFP will have a pact for the PFP to refrain from the fray, where the CP puts up a candidate in any seat. A plague on both their houses, if they do not!
- (d) That the CP will inherit all the HNP votes, fairly soon, and at the lates t by the time the

second election from now is held.

(e) That, on the sacred rule of "keeping the anti-Treurnicht vote intact", I have awarded

to the NP, in straight CP-NP contests, the NRP and PFP votes cast in 19 81.

Swing Needed to give seat to CP

Seats Won/Lost

Total

1

Cum.

Total

1

3 4

26

39

3 12

3 15

3 18

4 22

6 28

3 31

4 35

4 39

49

60

65

74

80

84

86

87

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0%- 4% Ermelo
5% 12%
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13%-16% Waterberg, Middleburg, Barberton

17%-18% Frankfort and Bothaville

19%-20% Brits, Ventersdorp and Losberg

21 %-22% Stilfontein, Schweizer-Reneke and Carltonville

23%-24% Lichtenburg, Standerton and Roodepoort

25% Bethal, Witbank and Pretoria West

26% Sasolburg, Meyerton, . and Nigel

27% Vryburg, Wonderboom, Leydenburg, Parys,

Overvaal, Heilbron 28% Newcastle, Keodoespoort and Smithfield

29% Durban Point, Delmas, Ladybrand and Fauresmith

30% Uitenhage, Vryheid, Gezina and Pietersburg

31%-32% Vrede, Innesdal, Welkon, Primrose, Vredefort,

De Aar, Brakpan, Virginia, Klerksd'p, Bethlehem 10

33%-34% Craddook, Kuruman, Aliwal, Queenstown, Potgirust

Witteburg, Alberton, Winburg, Vereeniging,

Kempton P., Krugersd'p 11

35%-36% Kimb. North, Prieska, Kroonstad, Humansdorp,

Vander Bijl Park 5

37%-38% Sunday's River, Umfolosi, Brentw'd, Mosselbaai,

Namaqual'd, P.E. North, Modderfontein, Germiston,

Gordonia 9

39%-40% Algoa, Boksburg, Graaf-Reinet, Oudtshoorn,

Bloem Font'n East, Pmbg-South 6

41%-42% Worcester, Klip Rivier, Bloemf'n West and George 4

43%-44% False Bay and Malmesbury 2

46%(+) FROM THIS POINT SEVERAL MORE SEATS, UN-

CONTESTED BY THE HNP AT THE 1981 ELECTION,

APPEAR LIKELY TO PASS INTO THE HANDS OF THE CP.

So, a 42% swing would give the CP a parliamentary majority, in seats in which probably

less than 35% of the present Voters (all White) live. Remember that the W hites in turn are

only about 15% of the total population of South Africa and you will then see that the CP could

get power with only about 5% of the support of ALL RACE GROUP members. A unique democracy!

What degrees of swing are likely at the first and second elections from n ow?

Bear in mind that every "renegade" from the NP to the CP or "convert" from the NP to

the CP, as your mind runs, counts twice. As one loses, the other gains. B ut, new voters count only once.

The total support for the CP/withdrawal of support from the NP, will depend upon the following:

- (1) MOST IMPORTANTLY, WHAT THE NP
- (i) says;
- (ii) does not say;
- (iii) does; and
- (iv) does not do;
- both inside and outside of Parliament.
- (2) PROBABLY, LESS IMPORTANTLY, but no one can foresee the future or even try to anticipate the intensity of feelings (remember, emotions will decide) produced by any of the following possible events, which will have JOINT and SEVERAL effects:
- (a) Events indicating unrest within South Africa and, in particular, those re sulting from the growth of the Black trade union movement.

- (b) Events on South Africa's borders.
- (c) The degree of pressure for change brought on South Africa by foreign countries.
- (d) The strength or weakness of the South African economy, as without adequate funds to relieve Black poverty, and to provide what else is needed positive ly, unrest will increase rapidly.
- (e) The strength of the emotional appeal offered by the CP in their "only r eal laager" argument, remembering that Mr. B. has already been labelled as a "Prog " by an irate CP M.P.
- (f) Most importantly, the grass-root supporters which Dr. T. and Co. have already taken with them from the NP. I guess at least 25%, perhaps as high as 4 0% of the NP.
- and (g) Other influences, I may have overlooked, and which you may re member.

These are all possible major, not minor, influences.

o have given

Figures like the "4,000 students at Pretoria University", who were reported to have given

Dr. T. "a tremendous ovation" suggest that support for the CP is going to be frighteningly high.

This agrees with my own gut interpretation of the situation, taking into a ccount the animus which pervates the South African White political soul. I believe, as I earlie r said, that few

Whites there are born without some sort of gene of racialism. They are "n aturals" for the CP!

What one should also remember is the effect of the PFP's near-certain su pport for the NP in the case of a showdown with the CP: for example:

A Swing of Gives the following CP from NP to CP Seats (i) 34% 60 (ii) 36% 66 (iii) 36% 66 (iv) 38% 75 (v) 40% 81 (Vi) 42% 85

Gives Made up A Swing of NP & NRP- of, say, the following PFP (counted (a) NP & NRP and from PFP all together) (b) PFP seats to NP (a) (b) 105 84 + 21 8% 99 78 + 21 8% 99 84 + 15 16% 90 78 + 12 20% 85 73 + 12 20% 80 72 + 8 28%

In examples (ii), (iv) and (v) the PFP has the balance of power. In the ot her examples, it has not.

My instincts tell me that the PFP will probably be reduced to around 15 se ats asa result of the second erection from now, losing the first eleven seats, listed by name, on Schedule No. 1 - assuming a 16% swing from the PFP to the NP, by no means a fanciful figure. I fear it could be much higher.

Nevertheless, whilst it survives, at all, the PFP will continue to play a hig hly important

role.

At some stage, as the above examples show, it may, for a short period, have the power

to exert a weighty, if not a decisive, say in the actual architecture of the country's consti-

tutional future. Perhaps it may even be able to enforce the adoption of som e, if not all, of my

FOUR ESSENTÍAL MEASURES. Qui sait? Whilst there is life, there is ho pe.

So, my gratuitous, unsolicited,

and no doubt, unwanted, advice for all South African Whites is this:

(1) VOTE FOR THE PFP AGAINST THE NP

OR

VOTE FOR THE NP AGAINST THE CP.

one or the other, depending entirely on what particular contest there will be in your own

local constituency, forgetting all your past loyalties. And yes, put in some REAL WORK

for the party, no matter which one it is, in your constituency, to which log ic says you

must give your vote (a) to keep the PFP "in" against the NP or (b) to keep the NP "in" against the CP.

- (2) GIVE GENEROUSLY TO BOTH NP and PFP PARTY FUNDS and G IVE TO THEM REGULARLY.
 Remember they are fighting a common foe.
- (3) SPEAK OUT FOR THE FOUR ESSENTIAL MEASURES SET OUT ABOV

E. They do not, at the moment, have a snowball's hope in Hades of being adopted: but, if the

ey are forgotten, there will be no chance at all of their eventual adoption. LATER MAY B E TOO LATE.

BUT LATER IS BETTER THAN NOT AT ALL.

Keep the BINGO figure of a 42% swing in your mind. I remind you that this has been

mathematically calculated - and is the position even after crediting the NP with the NRP and

PFP votes in these seats, based on the 1981 figures. 42% is the rosiest in terpretation.

Not the worst.

The sizes of future polls will also be vital, but at their influence I cannot guess. I do anticipate polls will be very high.

You ask what I personally predict?

A great deal depends upon the lapse of time allowed until the first electio n, from now, is called. Mr. B. has until 1986 by which to do this. I wrongly predicted, in M arch, that he would call an immediate election. As I saw it, and still do, the time to strike at the CP was/is:

(i)

AND

(ii)

During its early, formative stage, when it is, both from the organisational and financial viewpoints, at its weakest:

Whilst it is still at loggerheads with the HNP, whose candidates would sure ly split the anti-NP vote considerably in many seats.

It is still not too late for Mr. B. to call a General Election. Because of the reasons given above,

I firmly believe that the swing from NP to CP at an election, held almost at once, would almost

certainly reduce the number of CP members in the House. I guess from 1 8 to around 9.

However, it is certain that the result at the second election from now will be very different

indeed whether or not the first election is delayed. By then, there are unlikely to be any

HNP candidates in the field.

Now take another look at my SECOND SCHEDULE. The seats which the CP seem destined

to win, sooner or later, are rural or blue-coliar-worker seats, in which ther e are relatively few

Indian or Coloured residents. Thus, even if the Indians and Coloureds - by some miracle or

mistake! - should be put on the common roll - and not merely given their own debating

chambers - they would not be of any help to the NP. They would be of he lp where no help

was needed, unless more urban constituencies were created to provide for their numbers.

But, of course, putting the Coloureds and the Indians onto the common roll would provide Dr.

T. with most effective ammunition to fire at the NP.

All subsequent elections in South Africa are certain to become unbelievab

ly bitter feuds

between the CP and the NP, fueds such as have never been seen before . The CP will have

and will make the most of an almost irrestistible emotional appeal to the un thinking. It will

accuse the NP of having destroyed the laager, which it, the CP, is "rebuilding". It will not

help the NP to argue that "the laager will not provide a permanent solution ". That is an

intellectual argument and intellectual arguments always have had, and always will have, a

dismal track record in South Africa.

The NP, having preached "NO POWER-SHARING WHATSOEVER" for 40 y ears, or so, must

now pay a price for this and its other sins. "It could perhaps vary its policie s a little", you

suggest. No, I believe that, in emotional-reponse terms, this is a plain POSITIVE/NEGATIVE

situation. Of course, one may change one's views on ANY matter but on e must always take

the full consequences of that decision of change.

What is more:- The NP cannot now avoid a changing of its own basic image and character.

It will willy-nilly become a sort of "NEW U.P." but, fortunately, without the "SAPPE" taint.

The PFP will remain out on a limb and the CP will take over the right-win g role, which used

to belong to the NP. Sadly, one must recall that the old UP had not any real policy for the

permanent solution of the country's problems - will the "New UP" be differ ent?" - and that

the party on the extreme right in South Africa seems always destined to win in the long run.

UNLESS .. . There is A BIG UNLESS, one which would give a new shape to the whole

of South Africa's constitutional future and which WOULD give the NP the parliamentary

strength it needs to proceed confidently with very great changes, including those I have

proposed. But first we must look at one other important factor and I must "Make my guess".

In my calculations I have ignored the new voter, i.e. the first-time voter. It is important to

consider "the way to vote" which will be indoctrinated into the young ove r the years ahead.

They will be indoctrinated, of that be sure, for indoctrination has been the NP government's

policy since 1948. How chickens come home to roost!

Those who will vote in 1985 or 1986 (say), for the first time, are now be tween 14 and

- 18 years of age. Those who will vote for the first time in 1990 are now ag ed from 8 or 9 to
- 13. A great number of these young Afrikaners, many of whom live in the k ey 83 seats, will

be exposed to the great indoctrinating influence of their teachers and of their churches for

many years to come. Remember that the Afrikaner Teachers' Federation, at Bloemfontein

recently, and the Dutch Reformed Church, since the split, have both indic ated support for

the CP, and not for the NP as previously. The stars strongly favour the CP! Expect the

indoctrination to be near 100% for extremist views.

Nor am I certain that the English-speaking first-time voter will not support the CP, if givsn

a CP candidate in his constituency. The new army call-up regulations must make it clear* to

one and all, that the nation's leaders expect much and continuous, future racial unrest. This

surely will produce an emotional sub conscious response of opposition to power-sharing in

all the young, irrespective of their ancestry.

Finally, to make the roughest of guesses, I would, quite unscientifically, if I had to make

any predictions at all, come up with these:-

(i) If an election is delayed until 1985 or 1986, assuming the HNP had by then become

defunct, I foresee a 35% to 40% swing. That would give Dr. T. and Co. between

65 and 80 seats. Please do not forget that I am guessing. I suspect that I could be

underestimating the danger, and every 1% swing over 35% does matter a great deal.

Schedule No. 2 shows that.

(ii) At the second election held in 1990, say, I would guess at a swing of 45% plus, based

on the 1981 figures. That would give the CP control of South Africa's destiny. Full

control. For a long, long while. They would see to that.

That is UNLESS ...

... UNLESS THE PRIME MINISTER TAKES THE BULL BY THE HO
RNS AND PERFORMS AN
ACT OF STATESMANSHIP TO GIVE HIMSELF PERMANENT AND C
OMPLETE FREEDOM OF
LEGISLATIVE MOVEMENT AND THE POWER TO DO ALL WHICH SHO
ULD BE DONE.

AND THEN, HAVING THE POWER, DOES ALL WHICH WISDOM DEM ANDS HE SHOULD DO.

Yes, there are some devices open to him by which he can put the hope of power out of

the reach of Treurnicht and Co. for all time. Let me explain what I have in mind, after I have

first recorded my regret that what I now propose will have the effect of making the NP less

dependent on PFP goodwill and support than otherwise. Sorry, PFP me mbers. You do deserve better. But que sera sera.

The two devices I have in mind, moreover, have strong moral foundations - in fact

they both appear morally irresistible. That should bring cheer to Mr. B's heart and give

strength to his arm. I must here admit that these devices came to mind on ly during, and as

a result of the writing and re-writing of this paper. They had not occurred to me before.

This is what I respectfully propose for the attention of The Honourable the Prime Minister,

of whom I hope, sooner or later, to catch the personal eye:-Sir,

I refer you to what I have written above. I believe it to be both full and fact ual.

The key figure of 83 seats in parliament can be raised to any figure you choose -

provided you act in good time, meaning the sooner the better - in this fash ion:-

(1) You accept and act upon the principle of creating X number of parlia mentary

representatives for the Coloureds and Y number for the Indians, WITHI N THE

PRESENT HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY ITSELF. What you do outside the Hous e will be

of no real help in the strange circumstances which now prevail in the Republic.

What the NP needs is more safe seats in the House.

These representatives of the Coloured and Indian communities could be chosen from the racial groups concerned, by the groups through their ow n par-

liaments. Or Whites could represent them. Or you could have some Colo ureds.

some Indians and some Whites as representatives. A number could perhaps be

nominated by the Government. Whom you choose is not material, provided they

support you fully and consistently against the CP. Their number in the Ho use is

vital. They will guarantee you power, and continued power, to do what I have outlined.

How many of such representatives would be morally justifiable?

Bearing in mind that the Coloureds and Indians are roughly the same in to tal

population numbers as the Whites, and that the Whites have 165 parliam entary

representatives, I suggest that up to 165 Representatives for the Colour ed and

Indian communities could logically be argued as being inexcessive. So, choose

as many as you like, up to 165! The number could be varied to suit the n eeds

of the changing situation; and they could later be phased out as the need for

them was reduced.

You have a whole new world Prime Minister, opening up before you! It is there for the taking!

(2) You indulge in some reverse "gerrymandering". In the past the NP gave a

false value to a rural vote vis-a-vis an urban vote. We all know that such gerry-

mandering was basically very suspect morally. I thus, cannot see any objection

at all to your now restoring its true value to an urban vote, thereby reducing the

number of "dicey" rural seats and increasing the number of "safe" urban seats.

Personally I believe that all votes should have the same value and - anot her thought

worth pursuing? - that there should be proportional representation in Parl iament. But,

you Prime Minister, and not I, are in the driver's seat; and for that I am tha nkful. I

envy you not at all.

Of course, you have every right to question my cheek, in telling you what to do. Yes.

I am an ex patriate; but I plead against that, - that I am what I am and that what counts

in the final analysis is that it is not I who speak but the facts themselves.

Moreover, it would not have been necessary for me to compile and present them

in this paper if I had known that there was someone in South Africa who w as willing

to look reality, and its unavoidable consequences, fully in the face and record his

findings. I have found time in my retirement to do this.

Speaking of consequences, there is a French proverb which goes somethi ng like

this, in free translation:

"One must accept the consequences of what one chooses to do or not to do."

You, or whoever succeeds you in the leadership of the NP, will have the respons-

ibility of making a simple choice and must accept the consequences of the at choice.

To accept the inevitable or not to accept it? That is the question.

But please bear this in mind:

It will not matter much at all to the people of South Africa in the long run, IF

- (i) You have the power of government: and
- (ii) You choose to follow a course which disregards the inevitability of the Blacks'

one day taking control of South Africa and the need to prepare for that da

That is much the path which the CP would follow, so the consequences wi

very similar. The only differences would be that, with the CP having legis lative power.

blood would flow much sooner, more strongly and for much longer.

However, the end result would be the same.

I respectfully ask you to give some consideration to what I have written.

I wish you and all the peoples of South Africa well.

Yours truly,

JOHN WILKINSON

Voila!

JOHN WILKINSON,

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NSW, 2256 AUSTRALIA 25TH JULY, 1982