

ANC's torture dilemma

THE ANC's embarrassment over revelations about torture and maltreatment of dissidents in detention camps is not yet over. A fourth commission of inquiry is expected to release its report in the near future and it promises to reveal more skeletons in the ANC's cupboard.


Already three reports have exposed a litany of abuse, systematic torture, assaults and murder committed regularly in ANC camps in Angola, Tanzania and Zambia in the 1980s.

Questions still remain - who was responsible? How high up in the organisation was there knowledge about the abuses? And what is the ANC going to do with the culprits?

Already three commissions of inquiry have, independently of each other, come forward with remarkably similar findings.

The three were the ANC's own commission led by Advocate Louis Skweyiya, the internationally respected Amnesty International and the Douglas Commission, appointed by the local branch of the International Freedom Foundation.

The fourth may well provide conclusive findings. It was commissioned by the ANC in the light of criticism that the Skweyiya report was an internal investigation and that it refrained from laying the blame on senior ANC leaders. The new probe is led by the highly regarded Dr Sam Motsuenyane, a well-known businessman and former president of the National African Federation of Chambers of Commerce (Nafcoc). He is assisted



CHRIS HANI: Was he a 'leading figure' in the reign of terror?

by an American judge, Margaret Gerningham, and David Zamka of Zimbabwe. The Douglas commission has implicated almost the entire leadership of the ANC-in-exile in what it calls a campaign of "unbridled and sustained horror". It says a closer look at the ANC's human rights record reveals widespread "tyranny, torture, brutality, forced labour in concentration camps and mass murder".

However, the commission's findings have been met with some scepticism because of the well-documented right-wing connections of the International Freedom Foundation, both locally and abroad. There have been questions about the foundation's close

ties with the government and the security establishment, and its South African director, Russell Crystal, has served as an appointed National Party member of the President's Council.

The ANC said the Douglas commission did not reach any significant new findings that had not already been revealed by the two other probes.

ANC spokesman Carl Niehaus said individuals should be allowed to respond to the serious allegations made against them. The Motsuenyane commission will provide them with this opportunity and final judgment should therefore be suspended until the investigation has been completed.

All three inquiries came to similar conclusions and have pointed fingers at the same establishments - the High Command of Umkhonto and particularly the dreaded counter-espionage unit, Mbokodo - "the stone that crushes".

But all the probes relied on the same witnesses, former detainees and ANC dissidents - some of them turned police informants - and belonging to an organisation calling itself the Returned Exiles Coordinating Committee (Recoc).

Nevertheless, it is apparent that there were widespread abuses prevalent in ANC camps and that senior figures in the movement either condoned them, or at least tolerated them without attempting to put a stop to human rights abuses. A major prob-

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lem facing the ANC is how to act against leaders implicated. Even its own commission has recommended that those involved in abuses "should never again be allowed to occupy a position of authority in either the ANC or a future government"

The Douglas report finds that former ANC president Oliver Tambo, who retired for health reasons, must have known details of the atrocities because the security department reported directly to his office.

The position of Chris Hani, general secretary of the SA Communist Party is less clear. The Douglas findings call Hani "a leading figure in the reign of terror". However, the ANC's own probe says the former chief of staff of MK played a decisive role in exposing abuses inside the movement and his forceful actions eventually resulted in their termination.

Two other senior officials of the ANC's military wing are also implicated. They are MK commander-in-chief, Joe Modise, who ultimately bore responsibility for the running of notorious detention camps such as Quatro in Angola, and chief of operations Ronnie Kasrils, who was allegedly present while atrocities were committed.

However, the blame largely falls on the shoulders of the ANC's intelligence section, and particularly on the xenophobic Mbokodo.

The commander of the Angolan camps, Andrew Masondo, is now the ANC's representative in Uganda and has not yet returned from exile - some say because he fears for his life. The chief of Mbokodo, on whose watch the atrocities allegedly were committed, is presently the ANC's head of manpower. ANC sources

say he is relatively "dispensable" and may be made a scapegoat for the abuses.

But the biggest concern is over the image of ANC deputy general secretary Jacob Zuma, himself a former intelligence supremo. Moreover, he was the ANC's representative in Swaziland - in essence commander of the southernmost base in ANC hands - at a time when the ANC acted ruthlessly and seemingly injudiciously against suspected "police spies" in the ranks of the Swaziland cadres.

If the allegations are proven it would be extremely difficult for the ANC to act against Zuma. His negotiating skills are indispensable to the ANC and he is the most senior Zulu in an organisation accused of being Xhosa-dominated.

The ANC's actions against the perpetrators of torture will be an acid test of its commitment to human rights and freedom in a future South Africa.

A year of reconciliation or chaos?

THE year 1993 will be critical for South Africa. It will determine whether the politicians can provide the visionary leadership that will enable the country to achieve its full human and economic potential. Unless differences can be surmounted, continuing divisions could prove catastrophic. The country's future now hangs on the knife edge between rehabilitation and chaos.

It is this awareness that has driven political parties to a series of bilateral and multilateral talks in the months since the collapse of Codesa 2. There is a determination to halt the tailspin into gloom and depression that followed the failure of Codesa 2, which began with such promise. This led President FW de Klerk to issue a set of target dates, aimed at creating a government of national unity no later than the first half of 1994.

While the detail of this timetable has been questioned by other negotiation parties, the broad outline is generally accepted. And it is to achieve this goal that parties have been so active in discussions in recent weeks. If there is little difference over the goal, a great deal of bargaining and agreement on detail must take place before its achievement is in sight.


What the timetable did was change the nature of the debate from the "what" of a future government to the "how" of attaining it. Now there is almost unanimous agreement on

the "how", and the creation of a multilateral negotiation forum can be expected by March. Inevitably, it will be named Codesa 3, although vastly different in structure from the failed Codesa 2.

Two players still appear to be excluded. The Pan Africanist Congress made what appears to be a major political blunder in claiming that its armed wing, APLA, was responsible for the savage killings in attacks on soft targets in King William's Town, Queenstown and Cape Town. PAC secretary-general Benny Alexander made the situation even worse by saying that the PAC provided funds for APLA, but had no control over what APLA did.

This isolated the PAC from other players, including the powerful ANC, which is seeking an end to political violence and a way forward through negotiation. The PAC still clings to the slogan of "One settler, one bullet", which has become a shibboleth. On the positive side, it has driven the negotiators to more speedy counter-action and accord.

On the opposite side of the political spectrum are the white right-



FW de Klerk

wingers who broadly support the Conservative Party. Following the breakaway by five members last year to form the Afrikaner Volksparty, this new party is firmly committed to negotiation, even to seeking its idealistic white-dominated homeland in some part of a future non-racial South Africa.

Other parties have placed the onus on the ANC to try and bring the PAC into the negotiation fold, while the onus is on the government to bring in the CP. The probability of success at this stage is doubtful. But in the longer term, once transitional arrangements are in place, it seems inevitable that both the PAC and CP must seek to show electoral support. This means taking part in free and fair elections, or else fading from the scene and having no influence on the shape of the new South Africa.

When constitutional negotiations do get under way, the present focus on the "how" to achieve the new SA will give way to the "what" of future government. In principle, there is agreement on setting up a multiparty transitional executive council, to advise the cabinet as the country's executive authority, but probably also to advise individual cabinet ministers on matters within their jurisdiction.

For example, the country cannot continue with compulsory white conscription for national service and only voluntary participation by others - a throwback to the days of apartheid,

which has become a bizarre form of racial discrimination against whites.

De Klerk's timetable proposes that a transitional constitution should be approved by parliament before the end of September. This would compel political players to reach agreement during the March-April Codesa 3 negotiations on the thorny issue of a federal or unitary state. This would determine the shape and composition of the constitution-making body, which would also function as an interim legislature.

Constitutional Minister Roelf Meyer said: "An election could take place not later than March or April 1994, but if we can get the co-operation of all parties in achieving the goals as set out, then obviously that date can be brought forward, even before the end of 1993. But we would not like to make that an issue at this stage. What is at issue is to resume multilateral negotiations as soon as possible."

The National Party view is that the cabinet should remain the sole executive authority. The ANC and Democratic Party, among others, believe that some form of joint control must be established over the security forces, including the SA Police and SA Defence Force, during the interim phase. The DP says the key to combating violence is placing political authority beyond suspicion.

Enormous demands have been placed on the various players to sustain their commitment to agreed and democratic solutions. The most promising sign has been the absence of malice between the major players in the run-up to Codesa 3. But the opposite has been shown by the inability of political parties to hold public meetings without violent disruption by political opponents.

The problem that all leaders face is how to build up new goodwill, trust and confidence - not only between themselves but in all sections of the population. It is clear that for multi-party negotiations to succeed, the public must be given a new vision and a new hope for the future.

Roelf Meyer commented: "In view of the circumstances in the country, all parties have a responsibility to ask themselves: What can we do to save the country to attain political stability, to attain economic growth and to ensure peace? It is not the responsibility only of a political party or two parties, but is shared across the spectrum."

How the ANC took the wind out of wayward Winnie's sails

CLOSER co-operation between the ANC and the government in recent months has led to rumblings of discontent from militant elements in the ANC. However, talk about splits in the ANC or the creation of rival organisations may be premature - the lack of a credible leader being just one of the reasons. Winnie Mandela once seemed the logical rallying figure for the militants - many of them unemployed and disgruntled ex-Umkhonto we Sizwe soldiers and starry-eyed revolutionaries. But it seems as if her influence has been neutralised by the ANC leadership through a series of carefully timed leaks about her love-life and financial impropriety in her welfare section.

After remaining quiet for an uncharacteristically long period, Winnie Mandela broke her silence at the recent funeral for veteran activist Helen Joseph. In a not-too-veiled reference to the negotiating process, she said the heroes of the struggle had not made sacrifices "in order to reach some so-called power-sharing arrangements between the elite of the oppressed and the oppressors".

And she warned of "a looming disaster" if a handful of individuals continued pursuing "a short-cut route to parliament".

Obviously stung by her remarks, her estranged husband, Nelson Mandela, and ANC secretary-general Cyril Ramaphosa issued a stern rebuke. The ANC president caustically remarked that politics was not about individual preferences and expressed confidence that he enjoyed the full support of "disciplined members" of the ANC.

In a subsequent interview, Winnie Mandela remained unrepentant, warning against the ANC's proposals for a government of national unity and emphasising that "approval at conferences" did not equate with "consultation with the masses".

However, she emphatically denied she had plans to break away from the ANC and start a new party. Rumours

have been rife that Winnie Mandela was building up a power base among militant youths - including former members of her notorious bodyguard responsible for the murder of child-activist Stompie Seipei - in areas such as Meadowlands and Orlando West.

The other source of concern for the ANC leadership is the militant leader of its Natal midlands region, Harry Gwala. Gwala, who is proud of his label as a hardline Marxist, is said to have become increasingly obstructive since the recent ambush of his close confidante, Reggie Hadebe.

After months of tension between the Inkatha Freedom Party and the ANC, ANC deputy gen-

eral-secretary Jacob Zuma and Inkatha national chairman Frank Mdlalose met twice to prepare the agenda for the long-awaited meeting between Mandela and Mangosuthu Buthelezi.

In November the ANC's National Executive Committee decided to appoint a sub-committee, led by Zuma, to meet Inkatha officials. Each of the three Natal regions had to appoint a representative to the committee.

However, only the Southern Natal region complied with the decision. Gwala sent a strongly-worded letter to Zuma vowing to defy the NEC - of which he is a member.

The ANC then sent a high-powered delegation, consisting of secretary for international affairs Thabo Mbeki; his deputy, Aziz Pahad; and negotiations commission member Sydney Mufamadi, to Empangeni to try and twist the arm of Northern Natal regional chairman Aaron Ndlovu and his secretary, Senzo Mchunu.

Eventually it was agreed that the northern region would participate in the next round of talks with Inkatha - but Gwala continued to refuse.

ANC sources say the NEC will have to rule on this challenge to its authority, but concede it will be far more difficult to act against Gwala than it was against Winnie Mandela because of the strength of his support in Natal and within the Communist Party.



Winnie Mandela

How to prevent political thuggery from holding democracy to ransom

BY this time next year a decisive election campaign should be well under way. If the time-scale proposed by President FW de Klerk - and grudgingly accepted by the ANC - becomes a reality, the various parties will be out campaigning, holding public meetings and canvassing door-to-door seeking support from the electorate.

That is the optimistic scenario.


Unfortunately, with the sobering knowledge of recent events, it is not inconceivable to paint a vastly different picture. Of meetings being broken up and speakers being assaulted. Of political parties being prevented from moving into opposition areas. Of gangs of thugs rampaging through the streets in search of those whose only crime is adhering to a different ideology. What is really frightening is that today, less than 18 months before an elected constituent assembly is due to meet to hammer out the details of a new constitution, it is impossible to predict with any certainty which of these scenarios will unfold.

No doubt all reasonable South Africans are holding thumbs that the transition will proceed in relative peace and calm. But it is not beyond the realm of possibility that SA could slide into chaos and anarchy.

A number of recent events have underscored these fears. President de Klerk was shouted down when he tried to address a meeting in Mitchell's Plain in the Cape. Two Democratic Party meetings in the Peninsula were broken up by radical hooligans chanting political slogans.

But in other areas the position is infinitely worse. In the Transvaal town of Bekkersdal, a simmering conflict between the ANC, Inkatha and Azapo is being held in abeyance by a fragile truce. In the Vaal Triangle, militant township youths are attacking residents seemingly at random.

All this begs the question: If the National Party or the DP cannot even hold a peaceful meeting in the relatively sedate Cape Flats, what are the chances of them doing it in Sharp-



eville or Boipatong? Will Inkatha's Mangosuthu Buthelezi be allowed to address a meeting in Umtata? And which brave ANC leader will be prepared to conduct house-to-house canvassing in Ulundi or Mmabatho?

In short, what are the prospects of any election being adjudged "free, fair and democratic"?

The reality is that the country is still lacking a democratic culture. Power was gained through the barrel of the gun and maintained through ruthless laws and jailings. Those who defied the regime also paid scant attention to the rules of civility - car bombs, landmines and the dreaded "necklace" for those deemed to be

'The reality is that South Africa is still sadly lacking the culture of democracy and tolerance'

collaborators became the symbols of the struggle.

In the end, all of us, oppressor and oppressed, became brutalised by the years during which apartheid was both enforced and opposed by violence.

A forthcoming study by the political science department of the University of Stellenbosch will confirm what most analysts have long suspected - that there is an alarming lack of political tolerance among the political elite. Asked to state whether they would allow rival groups to hold public meetings in their neighbourhoods, the majority of the respondents said no.

If this is the case among leaders of the community, one shudders to think what the situation would be like at a grassroots level.

Can anything be done to rectify the problem? Again, the answer is forceful leadership and accountability.

For one, it would be wrong to argue that an election should be postponed or even scrapped. It would only mean that the present uncertainty

would drag on indefinitely and would do nothing to address the important issue of legitimacy of government.

Rather, one would expect that progress with the election process - including the setting of definite target dates for voter registration, the nomination of candidates and a polling day - should go a long way towards addressing the problem of intolerance being expressed through the break-up of meetings.

Firm time schedules will concentrate the minds of political parties and force them to expend energy on canvassing their own supporters rather than on harassing their opponents.

Tackling the violence, however, will require more imaginative and forceful leadership.

■ Political groupings should meet as soon as possible to agree on a set of mutually acceptable ground rules for the election campaign.

■ A monitoring commission must be appointed - and given "teeth" to enforce agreements and act against transgressors.

■ The certainty about the position of the armed forces should be a priority. A police force that enjoys legitimacy and support from the majority of the population is a *sine qua non* for any election process.

■ Leaders will have to show in public that they practice tolerance towards their political opponents.

Moreover, it must include a willingness to meet openly with opponents. Nobody is suggesting that a meeting between Mandela and Buthelezi will provide an instant cure for the violence in Natal, but it should go a long way in setting an example to their followers that it is possible to co-exist despite deep-seated differences.

■ Although the aim should be to include as many parties as possible in the election process, it should be acknowledged that some will continue to refuse to participate. The vast majority of the population which has vested interests in rapid reform should not be held to ransom by mavericks and fanatics on the fringe.

Mauritz le Roux

WHILE the negotiation process continues, the legislative agenda for parliament this year may be relatively unexciting. However, a second session later in the year may be called to handle the results of negotiation and approve landmark legislation for a new South Africa.

Legislation already tabled gives little indication of a country in the process of tumultuous transformation. It is largely technical in nature, amending existing laws, and the focus in parliament is again likely to be on the national Budget, to be tabled at the end of March.


Presuming that constitutional negotiations are then under way, most of parliament's leading figures will be sitting around the negotiating table - and not on their legislative benches. Constitutional Minister Roelf Meyer believes multilateral talks will make it a tough year for parliamentarians. They will have to be in parliament for debates on their particular budgets, while their minds and agendas concentrate on negotiations outside parliament.

"I can foresee that once we resume the negotiation process, there will also be a lot of pressure on us to speed up the process," Meyer says. "For that reason we will have to devote almost all our time to the negotiation table. But there are certain legislative matters that will obviously flow from the negotiation process - if we succeed in reaching agreement there."

The legislation already introduced by parliament does not yet include anything in the way of constitutional reform. Nor does it include the proposed new Indemnity Bill, which the

Parliament set to pave the way to a new SA

government promised to opposition parties in October to provide for the release of right-wing prisoners on the same basis as that applied to ANC supporters by the October measure.



Roelf Meyer

Among all political parties the main concern is not about the flow of normal legislation, but when parliament can be expected to have before it the measures flowing from the Codesa 3 negotiations. The government's provisional timetable provides for this legislation to be adopted by the end of June.

It is almost certain that such an early date will not be attained. Codesa 3 is bound to experience some hiccups. Indeed, it would be extremely surprising if the process of achieving constitutional agreement was not only tortuous but fraught with delays as delegates seek mandates from their leaders.

There is a strong possibility that parliament could be recalled in the second half of the year to give legal effect to agreements and to set up a transitional constitution. This will provide the framework within which the country is governed and administered until a fully democratic govern-

ment is elected and installed. Legislation already exists to hold a multi-racial referendum. Its provisions are wide enough to allow a referendum on almost any basis agreed to at multiparty negotiations.

Other legislation already approved since De Klerk took office abolishes all racial definitions in the population register. To this extent, the foundation has already been laid for constitutional reform.

The principal new measure is expected to be a bill providing for a Transitional Executive Council, taking the form of an advisory body to the cabinet. Even if it has no right of veto, this multiparty council would have such a strong moral basis as to give it extraordinary influence over the conduct of government in the transitional period.

The political spotlight is therefore expected to bounce all year between Codesa 3, where the agreements will be struck, and parliament, where these will be translated into law. All parties in parliament, with the exception of the right-wing Conservative Party, are set to participate in the constitutional proposals, and therefore use parliament as a platform to enunciate their views and options as the negotiations proceed.

In essence, however, all will be preparing the way for the demise of the existing system and the creation of the new South Africa.

Diehards prepare to meet their sworn enemies

THE Conservative Party's tentative attempts to join constitutional negotiations are bound to reopen old divisions within its ranks and will almost certainly lead to further splits.

It is already apparent that reactionaries in the party are extremely unhappy about the decision to participate in a "planning conference" that will lead to the resumption of Codesa-style multiparty talks.

Participation will inevitably bring the CP face-to-face at the negotiating table with both the ANC and the SA Communist Party - the very issue which led to the breaka-

way of seven MPs from the party in mid-1992. In an attempt to minimise the damage, CP leader Andries Treurnicht tried in vain to draw distinctions between pre-negotiations and talks and laid down a number of preconditions - including rejection of an interim government, the scrapping of all previous Codesa decisions and the "right to self-determination".

The CP has allowed itself to be caught in a classic no-win situation:

■ If it does attend the planning conference it will have to sacrifice its central tenet of not talking to "terrorists and communists, or participating

in any manner of constitutional talks". This is a burning and highly emotional issue among diehard right-wingers and in the past any member propagating the talks option was expelled from the party.

■ Abstention will scuttle any CP efforts to organise a so-called "non-racial" rightwing alliance against the government's reforms.

Andries Beyers, leader of the pro-negotiations *Afrikaner Volksunie*, told *SA Dialogue*: "It is ironic and sad that the CP is now forced to face the issue that we tried to raise within the party ranks for almost two years."

Mystery 'army' emerges from the shadows

After years of dormancy, the PAC's military wing has sprung into the headlines. In these special reports, SA Dialogue analyses APLA's sinister campaign of terror

ON Saturday November 28 armed attackers stormed a social gathering at a golf club in King William's Town in the Eastern Cape, killing four and leaving a host of others injured. The outrage catapulted the Azanian Peoples' Liberation Army (APLA) into the headlines.

A week later, a limpet mine planted in a restaurant at Queenstown, about 150 kilometres to the north, left one man dead and 19 injured.

The attacks were not the first by APLA - a South African police submission presented to the Goldstone commission listed 41 incidents between February 1991 and December last year.

A total of 19 people were killed in the attacks, 10 of them policemen. More than 60 were injured, 17 of them policemen. Attacks were also carried out on 16 homes or farm homesteads in the eastern Free State and eastern Cape.

Until the beginning of last year, APLA attacks were generally aimed at the police, or members of the South African defence force, the rationale being that they were the "instruments of the regime" which kept the government in power and were therefore legitimate targets. Soft targets were eschewed.

Clearly, the bullish mood on negotiations at the beginning of last year saw a rethink on behalf of the PAC's military wing. Until the collapse of Codesa 2 there was every cause to believe an interim government could be in place by June with elections for an interim government under way before the end of the year.

Refusing to become involved in negotiations, the PAC was hugely exposed and could have been sidelined by a wave of negotiating fervour.

The stepping up of the armed struggle and a move to soft targets made the PAC an inviting prospect for young blacks and ANC dissidents unhappy with the direction of negotiations.

It is significant that the King William's Town and Queenstown attacks

took place when the ANC and the government were making progress in negotiations.

It is vital to realise that the PAC is split on the issue of the armed struggle. PAC leader Clarence Makwetu, his then-deputy Dikgang Moseneke, and general secretary Benny Alexander, were involved in talks with the government, subsequently broken off

The ANC was particularly tough in its response. The SA government stepped up patrols in the affected areas and appointed a committee of the Goldstone commission to investigate the question of APLA training camps, arms supplies and operational activities. The refusal of either the PAC or the Transkei government to co-operate with the commission, however, has proved problematic.

Whites who feel they have made huge sacrifices in the interests of a peaceful transition to democracy could well question whether the costs are worth it if the attacks continue.

The response of right-wing vigilantes, desperate for an opportunity to underscore the negative consequences of President FW de Klerk's reform policies, constitute an enormous potential danger.

It is not only the government which has a great deal to fear if the APLA attacks escalate and prompt right-wing revenge raids; the ANC knows that its negotiation strategy is far from popular with many members, particularly the youth, and the concept of an interim government with the ANC


and the National Party sharing power is particularly disliked.

A resumption of the armed struggle, particularly if it takes the form of attacks on soft targets, must be an attractive proposition to many young cadres.

Effectively, the only real solution in dealing with APLA and other groups which remain committed to the armed struggle is to finalise negotiations with as much haste as possible and get an interim government in place which would allow the majority within the new government to deal with fanatical fringe elements.

The speed and willingness to compromise with which the NP and the ANC are now approaching negotiations appears to indicate that both sides are well aware of the danger.

APLA'S RING OF FIRE



in the wake of the attacks.

Alexander was unaware that the attacks were being planned, as became obvious when he was interviewed on television. Moseneke subsequently quit as an office bearer of the PAC, citing personal reasons.

The APLA attacks proved a bonus for right-wing militants, who were quick to respond. There were apparent revenge attacks on blacks, prompting fears of an outright racial war.

Both factors present a threat to negotiations, although they have also had the effect of galvanising those in favour of negotiations into feverish activity.

The attacks were almost universally condemned - with the exception of Azapo and other fringe left-wing Africanists.

If the aim of the Azanian People's Liberation Army in attacking civilians was to raise its profile, it has unquestionably succeeded.

Ever since its murderous attacks on civilians in King William's Town, Queenstown and on farms along South Africa's border with Lesotho, APLA - the underground army of the Pan Africanist Congress - has featured prominently in newspaper reports and on television.

With five victims - including a 15-year-old schoolgirl - in their graves and many more recovering from their wounds, APLA commander Sebalo Phama lost little time in boosting his organisation's image. He proclaimed in a New Year's message from Dar-es-Salaam that APLA combatants would make 1993 the "Year of the Storm".

There are two puzzling aspects about APLA's surge in activity.

First, it contrasts with the long period of relative dormancy between the banning of the PAC in 1960 and the lifting of the ban by President FW de Klerk in 1990.

Second, the PAC leadership seems strangely coy about accepting responsibility for the attacks and thereby cashing in on them. Police attribute only a minute proportion of guerrilla attacks in the 1980s to APLA fighters. So, too, do most observers.

APLA's relative inactivity during the period between 1960 and 1990 drew an ironic remark from Joe Slovo, chairman of the South African Communist Party and a former chief of staff of the ANC's rival guerrilla army, Umkhonto we Sizwe.

Confronted with criticism from the PAC of the ANC's decision in August 1990 to suspend its armed struggle, he spoke scathingly of the PAC's - and, by extension, APLA's - "30-year-cease-fire" during the height of the battle against apartheid.

APLA's re-emergence came after De Klerk ushered in a new era with his decision to lift the ban on outlawed organisations and to free their leaders.

APLA's campaign started with a series of attacks on policemen - in his New Year message Phama boasted that APLA had been responsible for the assassination of 500 policemen - and then switched to attacks on white civilians or, to use APLA's parlance, "settlers". One reason for APLA's seemingly sudden appearance on the political scene may be the relaxation of the South African security forces in the wake of De Klerk's February 1990

Will 1993 turn out to be the Year of the Storm?



PAC regional chairman Ntsundeni Madzunya (centre) addresses a Johannesburg press conference in the wake of the APLA attacks

speech. Another, probably more cogent, reason may have been the partial loss of control by security forces amid the rising tide of crime and political violence.

The second anomaly relates to the PAC leadership's reluctance to admit responsibility for the attacks on civilians. Initially, PAC leaders refused to confirm or deny the attacks had been carried out by fighters, dismissing the outrage over them as a "hullabaloo".

Then, when they eventually admitted that APLA fighters had launched the attacks, they still refused to acknowledge responsibility.

Their refusal to do so is doubly puzzling because, according to the PAC constitution, APLA is subject to the authority of the PAC.

As an "autonomous organisation", APLA was "operationally independent", PAC secretary-general Benny Alexander insisted. Johnson Mhlambo, the PAC's senior deputy president, took the same line.

To pursue that line of argument, Mhlambo had to divest himself of his title as APLA's commander-in-chief. He did so during an interview in December 1992, claiming he had been relieved of his post at the April 1992 PAC conference. Strangely, however, only one day before his disclosure, the PAC's national organiser, Maxwell

Memadzivhanani, had not been aware of his change in status.

The PAC's reaction to the APLA attacks can be explained in one of two ways: either the PAC knew of, and therefore approved of, the attacks but found it politically embarrassing to acknowledge that it was pursuing a policy of terrorism. Or the PAC and/or the APLA high command - on which, Law and Order Minister Hernus Kriel claims, PAC leaders serve - has lost control of its fighters but cannot admit that its writ does not extend to them.

However, these questions raise another: Has the PAC benefited politically from the attacks? At one level the answer is emphatically no.

The attacks have been condemned by a wide range of organisations, from OAU representatives in South Africa to Western diplomats and the ANC.

But do some blacks, particularly those who are deprived and who fear the ANC is preparing to conclude an "elitist deal with the De Klerk regime", secretly applaud the killing of whites?

No respected black leader has condoned, let alone applauded, the attacks. Even PAC leaders hesitate to praise them.

But indiscriminate right-wing retaliatory attacks on innocent blacks, like random shootings at black taxis, could easily tip the balance from condemnation to approval.

Sinister tales of secret camps and money from Gaddafi

THE Goldstone commission's inquiry into whether members of the Azanian Peoples' Liberation Army (APLA) were being trained in Transkei has so far proved to be a one-sided affair.

With neither the Pan Africanist Congress - APLA is its military wing - nor the Transkei government prepared to testify, the commission has so far heard submissions only from the police and the South African Defence Force. Neither the PAC nor the Transkei are signatories to the National Peace Accord, in terms of which the Goldstone commission was established.

In its submission, the SADF said there were APLA camps in Transkei, but that they were of a temporary nature. They were "not bases in the ordinary sense", and training took place informally and often at night.

The SADF said "crash courses" had been given at some 12 venues in the Transkei since June 1990. APLA members had received training in the handling of a variety of weaponry, including pistols, AK-47s and Chinese grenades.

Details were also given of PAC funding - its main backer is Libya, which gave the organisation R42-million in 1991 alone. It was noted that Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi had indicated that he wished to become the principal backer of the PAC.

A PAC video entitled *Armed for Struggle* was also shown to the commission.

The refusal of either the PAC or the Transkei to testify before the commission left the evidence of the police and the SADF untested.

Transkei military leader General Bantu Holomisa was adamant that the Transkei would conduct its own investigation. When the South African government declined to allow Judge Goldstone to head a separate inquiry, Holomisa accepted an offer of a second judge, to be seconded by South Africa. Despite requesting transcripts of the police and SADF submissions, the PAC made it clear it would not attend the hearings.

However, it said it would view the proposed independent inquiry by the Transkei in a more favourable light.

PAC secretary for political affairs Jaki Seroke told a news conference in Johannesburg that appearing before the commission was unnecessary. The question of the armed struggle was

already being discussed at meetings between the PAC and the government, he said, although contact between the two sides was halted after the attacks at King William's Town and Queenstown.

Faced with the refusal of the PAC and the Transkei to testify, the Goldstone commission adjourned on January 11 for a week saying it would

consider subpoenaing several members of the PAC.

However, because the commission relies largely on the voluntary co-operation of all parties, it is unlikely any action will be taken should PAC members fail to answer a subpoena.


The commission also has no jurisdiction in the Transkei because it is regarded as independent by South Africa. General Holomisa has shown himself to be particularly sensitive on the question, even though he is committed to relinquishing independence and returning the Transkei to a unified south Africa.

Gert Steyn, the chairman of the Goldstone commission's sub-committee which sat in Port Elizabeth, adjourned the hearings on two occasions in the hope that the Transkei or the PAC could be persuaded to attend. The exercise proved futile.

Clearly Judge Goldstone would be reluctant to make any findings based solely on the evidence of the police and the SADF, and ultimately he may have to rely on what is brought to light by the Transkei inquiry.

South Africa has said it will make available all information at its disposal to the Transkei inquiry, including a record of the hearings in Port Elizabeth.

It is also hoping the PAC will give evidence in the light of Seroke's statement that the Transkei investigation might be seen in a far more positive light by the PAC.



General Holomisa

Rightwingers warn of revenge

APLA'S terror attacks on civilian targets have significantly increased the tension in an already volatile Eastern Cape and raised the prospects of rightwing retaliation.

In recent weeks, the leader of the militant rightwing Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, Eugene Terre Blanche, has tried to revive his flagging political fortunes with a series of public meetings in the Eastern Cape. AWB officials claim "a sudden surge in support" for the movement throughout the country, particularly in the Eastern Cape and eastern Free State where most of the attacks have taken place.

The AWB has recently revamped its "armed wing" - the Wenkommando (Victory Commando) - and has conducted a number of training camps in the Western Transvaal and Free State. Moreover, Terre Blanche has created an elite unit of the black-shirted Ystergarde (Iron Guards) reminiscent of Nazi SS units.

To grow significantly, however, the AWB would need to gain the support of mainstream Conservative Party supporters who in the past have been reluctant to be associated with the bully-boy image of the AWB. The CP has refused to embrace the AWB publicly, fearing the repercussions its association with a militant movement might have on its participation in parliamentary politics.

This policy may change dramatically as it becomes evident that majority rule is inevitable, particularly if there is an increase in violence and terrorism.

It is significant that Terre Blanche drew sizeable crowds to his meetings in Queenstown - a predominantly English-speaking town with a progressive image.

Ironically, the APLA attacks have also boosted the PAC's standing among black militants. PAC officials claim they are flooded with former ANC supporters angry at the "moderate" positions taken by the movement's leadership in negotiations with the government.

PAC general secretary Benny Alexander boasts that support in the Vaal Triangle grew by more than 5 000 in the first two weeks after the attacks and that entire ANC branches in the Western Cape defected to the PAC.

THE Inkatha Freedom Party will almost certainly return to the Codesa negotiations, ending three months of concern that it will play a spoiling role in the reform process.

Two important meetings, expected within the coming weeks, should end the months of uncertainty that started with the breakup of Codesa 2 in June:

■ The long-awaited one-on-one meeting between ANC president Nelson Mandela and IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi is definitely on. Senior officials from both sides are putting the final touches to arrangements for the meeting that is expected to ease political tensions and temper the ongoing spiral of violence, particularly in Natal.

■ A "bush summit" between the IFP and the government will help to smooth over a relationship that has been under considerable strain of late.

Such a bilateral meeting will allay Inkatha fears that it will be relegated to a minor role in coming constitutional talks while the government and the ANC decide on the major issues.

This fear was at the heart of IFP objections over the Record of Understanding reached between the government and the ANC in November. Inkatha spokesmen accused them of making "cozy deals" to the exclusion of other important players.

Soon afterwards Inkatha released its own constitutional proposals which were interpreted by experts as a UDI for the KwaZulu/Natal region. President FW de Klerk responded by saying that the proposals would have to be discussed and negotiated at a national level.

Subsequently the IFP played a leading role in the formation of Cosag (the Concerned South Africans Group) to voice concern over the Record of Understanding.

The relationship between Inkatha and the government reached an all-time low at a meeting between Cosag representatives and cabinet members in Pretoria early in December. Sources said Buthelezi launched a "vicious attack" on De Klerk accusing him of reneging on earlier agreements between the two parties.

Matters were aggravated when Constitutional Affairs Minister Roelf Meyer was reported to have said in a speech in the United States that Inkatha constitutional negotiations could no longer be delayed and that Inkatha's intransigence could cause

Setting the stage for Inkatha's early return to the negotiations



BUTHELEZI: Meeting with Mandela

it to "be left behind". Although Meyer quickly denied making these remarks, IFP fears that it might be excluded from the "A-Team" in negotiations grew.

The meeting between Cosag and the government was the first indication that the relationship is improving. Meyer's proposal that a multi-party "planning conference" be held to prepare for a resumption of negotiations is a compromise on Inkatha's demand that a "conference of review" be held to assess the Codesa process. Other government sources said the defusing of the tension with Inkatha "was the best thing to have come out of the Cosag meeting."

It is unlikely that other Cosag groups, such as the Conservative Party, will join the negotiations, "but, if needs be, the process can survive without their participation". Bophuthatswana and the Ciskei should also "come around" because of the financial dependence on SA. Three

major stumbling blocks will dominate the discussions at the forthcoming summit:

■ Inkatha's refusal to return to Codesa 3. "As far as we are concerned Codesa is dead and buried," Mdlalose told *SA Dialogue*. The IFP wants a completely restructured negotiating forum. For both the ANC and the government this approach poses serious problems. Both believe Codesa 3 should resume from the point where its predecessor broke up.

ANC negotiator Mac Maharaj explains that massive legal difficulties will arise over the status of agreements already reached if the name of the forum is changed. Moreover, he says, Codesa has generated tremendous international goodwill and all observers have urged parties to return to Codesa.

■ The status of decisions reached at Codesa 1 and 2. Meyer says his government would "naturally" abide by all decisions taken and agreements signed at previous meetings. This view is also shared by the ANC.

Questioned about this, Mdlalose said: "Definitely not. The new forum should start afresh and, although it could take cognisance of Codesa decisions, it should not be bound by them." The implication of this is that the IFP no longer considers itself party to crucial decisions taken on the creation of an interim government and a constituent assembly.

■ The remaining concerns centre on Inkatha's constitutional proposals and the question whether both the principles and the details of federalism and regional government should be determined by the multi-party negotiating forum or left for an elected constituent assembly to decide.

Inkatha favours the former approach; the ANC the latter. However, government negotiators are confident a compromise is well within reach.

There is only one way for an all-new South Africa to hit the high road

BY its very nature, political scenario planning is designed to create both dismay and elation. The problem in South Africa is that the worst-case scenarios often tend to be the most likely to occur.

The same can be said for the latest project, an 18-month effort by a team of business and political leaders and academics who produced the Mont Fleur Scenarios (named after the meeting venue). Their report takes the SA scenario a step further in that it accepts negotiations as a starting point rather than as a step towards which political groups must progress as has been the case in previous plans.

In essence, the Mont Fleur scenarios sketch four possible outcomes of the negotiating process:

■ **The Ostrich:** No settlement, no representative government, popular resistance, repression, a deterioration in the business climate, limited social spending and, in the end, a forced return to the negotiating table


■ **The Lame Duck:** An all-party coalition government, sunset clauses, preservation of elements of the old order, difficult decision-making, lack of investment and insufficient economic growth to address pressing social problems.

■ **Icarus:** A popularly-elected government tries to address all economic problems at once, huge budget deficits, rampant inflation following a year or two of high growth forcing a tight clamp on the economy, the emergence from the crisis of an authoritarian government.

■ **Flight of the Flamingos:** Macroeconomic constraints would be respected by the democratically elected government, corruption curbed, political stability, foreign investment, well-directed social investment, reduced violence, initially low growth rates but growing to average 5% over the next 10 years.

Obviously, all South Africans and much of the world's investment community would like to see the Flamingos fly, but - in spite of the ghastly alternatives - even the team members

TAKING STOCK by Barnato



say privately that the likelihood is remote. Lack of strong political leadership and apparently unstoppable violence mitigate against a "best-case" outcome in the short to medium term. However, something combining a bit of all but the Ostrich scenario is not impossible. The new government - quite possibly a coalition - could maintain macroeconomic discipline and embark on controlled and sensible social spending. The biggest problem of course would be to

The biggest problem would be to match popular expectations with limited resources . . .

match popular expectations with limited resources without losing power to a popular left-wing uprising or resorting to an authoritarian crack-down in the face of popular dissent. The public sector could play a leading role in supporting the efforts of a new government.

Clem Sunter, one of SA's leading futurologists and creator of the "High Road/Low Road" scenario, says it's crucial for SA to remain unfragmented. To do so, ordinary citizens will need to experience a gradu-

ally improving quality of life through the redistribution of knowledge and skills.

"We need a ladder of opportunity reaching from the smallest of micro-businesses to the big giants. At each rung there must be institutions offering the requisite advice and capital to take any business reaching that level up to the next rung. Then the sky is the limit for every aspiring entrepreneur."

Author and scenario-planner Frances Kendall says the route to the High Road will not be easy for SA, but believes it is possible considering the degree of consensus about the future that has been achieved in a short time from a position of extreme polarisation. She says the business community has an important role to play in identifying the political and economic structures likely to benefit the future and then putting them into place. But South Africans should beware of becoming overly pessimistic about worst-case scenarios. All over the world planners are constantly scaring people with doomsday warnings not dissimilar to those now being put forward by the Mont Fleur team.

For instance, the worst of four scenarios for the world and the US in the 1990s published in Fortune magazine looks at the possibility of worldwide social and economic collapse, civil and inter-regional war in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, possible belligerence from an increasingly powerful China, and social unrest in the US sparked by growing divisions between the haves and the have-nots.

No miracles yet from Keys

■ **FINANCE** Minister Derek Keys is due to release a 16-chapter economic model shortly before he delivers the Budget on March 17.

The model quantifies SA's economic options and strategies for growth. Business Forum chairman David Brink describes the model as "a long-term thing" which is unlikely to be dealt with in the Budget:

"The restraints are so severe there is little room for manoeuvre."

Economists have predicted that the Budget is likely to be little more than a holding operation.

"Keys can drastically reduce the deficit, but that will kill the economy," says one analyst. "He will have to address the deficit problems with a three or four-year plan."

A STRONG economy is essential if South Africa's political transition is to succeed, but economists are split on whether 1993 will see the start of the long-awaited upturn.

Opinion ranges between cautious optimism to pessimism coupled with warnings of even tougher times in the coming 12 months.

On balance, there's little to indicate a significant improvement: while inflation has dropped to an eight-year low, it remains far higher than SA's main trading partners; business failures and unemployment continue to rise; foreign investors remain reluctant to commit funds to the country without greater political certainty on the one hand and a more attractive package of incentives on the other; and an unpopular Budget is on the cards for March.

However, SA Chamber of Business president Spencer Sterling says there is reason for hope in 1993. Political leaders appear to have re-committed themselves to a peaceful settlement, and business, labour and government leaders have laid the foundations for unprecedented co-operation through the establishment of the National Economic Forum. These developments are significant enough to warrant cautious optimism for the year ahead, Sterling says.

Reserve Bank senior deputy governor Jaap Meier agrees and adds that good summer rains, the prospect of

Will 1993 see the start of SA's long-awaited economic upswing?

the commercial sector re-stocking inventories, the expectation that inflation will continue to decline, an improvement in foreign economies in general and that of the US in particular, and a series of major capital projects will re-stimulate the economy.

But he cautions that on the one hand none of the "plus-factors" as yet carry "great strength or conviction" and on the other "much of what is now being said about our prospects for 1993 sounds uncomfortably similar to our prognostications for 1992".

Sanlam chief economist Johan Louw acknowledges many of the positive factors, but believes they are not sufficient to kickstart the economy.

He sees the crucial issues as political progress, a significant reduction in violence and (linked inseparably to the first two) an increase in foreign and local confidence.

Louw does not see SA's growth rate exceeding 0.5% this year (compared with an anticipated -2% for 1992) and inflation is unlikely to reach

the magical single digit figure, remaining instead at about 11% (14% for 1992) due to inflationary pressures such as tax and fuel price hikes.

Absa economists share Louw's gloomy view. They see no substantial change on the domestic political, social or economic scene during 1993 and only moderate growth internationally. Consequently, they predict "a poor growth performance" for 1993.

The 1992-1993 Budget deficit, now predicted to be about R28bn, could fuel inflation and as such is a potential danger to the economy.

"Without a doubt, the government's management of its finances will largely determine the course of economic events in 1993," they say. "Options are limited and thorough comprehension and calculation of the effects of these options on the economy and business activity are essential."

Arguably the best prospects for the economy this year will come from massive capital projects, details of which were announced in the latter half of last year. They will generate an estimated R14bn (in 1992 values) in new investment over the next few years.

The new projects include the Alusaf aluminium smelter at Richards Bay (R7.5bn), the Columbus stainless steel project at Middelburg (R3.5bn), the further expansion of Engen's refinery in Durban (R800m), Anglo American's Namaqua Sands mining project on the Cape west coast (R1bn) and the Moab gold mining project (R1.7bn).

When complete, the projects will add more than 10% to SA's current level of fixed investment which economists say will contribute an additional 3% to economic growth.

The projects are also an effective counter to criticism that SA expects foreigners to invest in the country while local businesses are not prepared to make substantial investments themselves.

Stability remains the key

■ **FA**R Eastern investors are looking eagerly at South Africa and there have been a few nibbles. But with the notable exception of Taiwan, potential business partners have come armed with notebooks rather than chequebooks.

Apart from some investment in property, there has been virtually no new inflow of capital from the Far East and this is unlikely to change until political stability is assured.

President De Klerk's visit to Japan and Singapore last year sparked new interest in SA, but further political reform is regarded as essential - particularly by Japan - before investors commit their funds.

Japanese foreign ministry official Hisao Yamaguchi says a transitional government coupled with a decline in violence would be a major step

towards encouraging Japanese investment. Hong Kong, heading towards control by China in 1997, is another likely source of investment funds as businessmen hedge their options. Australia has apparently lost some of its attraction for Far Eastern investors and with a bit of effort they could be redirected to SA.

Cape Town property broker Errol Diamond, who recently returned from a trip to the Far East, says capital returns (10%-12%) and rental escalation (12%) on SA property are far higher than in the Far East.

He says individual investment packages from Hong Kong are unlikely to be unusually large, but lumped together they could be significant. The bulk of investment in SA from the colony will probably be by small family businesses.

Why coloured and Indian voters are flocking to join their old foes

SUPPORT for the Labour Party has plunged to such a dismal level that it is no longer a factor in the forthcoming election stakes. Labour's traditional rural coloured support has all but evaporated.

Labour's loss is clearly the National Party's gain: former Labour supporters are being recruited in droves into the NP camp while ANC sources openly admit there is no similar percolation of coloured voters into its constituency.

This was clearly illustrated at the party's December 27 annual conference where a dispute over a possible alliance with the ANC isolated Labour leader Allan Hendrickse from his political flock. While Hendrickse remains a proponent of Labour affiliation to the ANC-SACP-Cosatu alliance, this suggestion was rejected by more than 90 percent of the delegates at the conference.

It is clear that Hendrickse's ethnic party is about to fade from the political scene, although the shrewd politician himself may not.

The same fate awaits the Indian ethnic parties - the Solidarity Party of Dr JN Reddy and the National People's Party of Amichand Rajbansi. There is, at this stage, no indication of any meaningful Indian or coloured rapprochement with the ANC.

The number of disenchanted Labour Party MPs who have joined the NP has reached 44, leaving Hendrickse with a fractious group of 27 MPs compared with the 76 out of 80 elected seats Labour won in 1984.



Solidarity leader Dr JN Reddy

Reddy's ruling Solidarity Party in the House of Delegates holds 25 of the 45 seats - and there is no doubt that most will support the NP.

In the first general elections for the tricameral parliament, Labour won 76 out of 80 contested seats. In the September 1989 elections, it won 69 seats. On average, only 20 percent of eligible coloured voters went to the polls - a 'boycott' that suggested 80 percent of coloured voters rejected tricameral politics.

It is no secret that tricameral MPs have always been treated as outcasts in the coloured and Indian communities because they were perceived as perpetuating racial discrimination by participating in an ethnically-structured system. In the post-apartheid era, the pendulum has swung away from the politics of race to party politics. Thus, with the correct bait, the

NP will have little difficulty in netting the overwhelming majority of hitherto 'homeless' coloured and Indian voters.

Although most political pundits favour an ANC-alliance to win South Africa's first democratic election, NP officials - and a few brave political observers - do not rule out a NP-alliance victory.

One such political commentator is RW Johnson, a South African-born Oxford lecturer. Another is Andrew Reynolds, a South African specialist at the University of California.

Reynolds predicts the ANC will capture roughly 46 percent of the vote. Of the rival contenders for power, only the NP, IFP and the CP-Volksunie axis will obtain enough votes to cross the threshold to qualify for representation in the constituent assembly.

According to Reynolds, their percentage of the vote will be: NP - 34%, IFP - 13%, CP-AV alliance - 6,5%. Collectively they will, Reynolds believes, form an alliance under De Klerk's leadership to exclude the ANC. Reynolds's predictions are based on the assumption that De Klerk will capture a decisive majority of votes in the three minority communities - white, coloured and Indian.

Reynolds also reasons that although the black community accounts for roughly 75 percent of the total population, nearly half are under the voting age of 18 and therefore the proportion qualifying to vote is only 68 percent.

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