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"I try to be a man of peace, but if people tempt me, i can be a thunderbird." -

PW Botha, the Rubicon Speech

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INTRODUCTION

Public policies cannot be fully comprehended unless there is an understanding of who formulates policy and how policy decisions are taken. This chapter will attempt to sketch in broad outline the basic decision-making structures of the state (1). Four key decision-making formations will be discussed: the Office of the state President (05?), the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning (DCDP), the National Security Management System (NSHS) and Foreign Policy establishment (2).

This chapter will argue that the OSP is the nerve centre that presides over a highly centralised state form. This Office has grown increasingly dependent on the security establishment which has, in turn, emerged as the central coordinator of policy formulation and implementation. To demonstrate this, we will trace complex chances in the way decisions have been and are being made in the executive levels of government and the state. No state remains unaffected by its environment. The structure, strategies and nature of the state are always the product of an inter-action between state institutions on the one hand and societal, class and communal forces located in society at large on the other. In the South African context, the state is forced to manage a crisis that is quintessentially determined by the conflict between an enfranchised white minority and a disenfranchised black majority. How this fundamental question is resolved will determine the nature of the transition to a non-racial democracy.

Any major social force wanting to implement policies designed to either maintain the status quo, implement gradual reforms or introduce fundamental structural changes is going to have to come to terms with the state and the power it wields. An analysis of the decision-making structures of the state and how these have changed will facilitate more precise answers to some fundamental questions:

1. Is the current state structure capable of effectively implementing the reform policies of the National Party Government?

2. Can the current state structure be used to implement policies that go beyond the current policy parameters of the NP government?

3. To what extent is the current state structure an obstacle to the realisation of fundamental structural change?

DIMENSIONS OF THE STRUCTURE

Before analysing in detail the inner workings of the decision-making structures, a brief sketch of the general structure is needed. It is arguable that for a country of 30 million people, the South African state system is unique in its complexity. This is most starkly evident in the multiplicity of racially determined representative structures. There are eleven parliaments or national assemblies; 1190 members of parliament and national assemblies; 206 cabinet ministers; Five state presidents and ten prime ministers. (Sundg1_5tit, 2.10.1988). The 1,7 million people required to run the state machine work in about 150 Government departments. It has been calculated that by August 1986 there were 18 departments of health and welfare, 14 departments of education, 14 departments of finance or budget, 14 departments of agriculture or agriculture and forestry, 12 departments of works and housing, 13 departments of urban affairs or local government, 9 departments of economic affairs or trade and industry, as well as 5 departments each of foreign affairs, transport, posts and telecommunications, labour and manpower, law and order or police, defense or national security, 3 departments of justice, 1 department of mineral and energy affairs and 1 department of environmental affairs and tourism (Savage. 1986:28). This bureaucracy consumes a salary bill that alone cost nearly R30 billion in 1988, i.e. more than half the R53 billion national budget or about a quarter of the country's GNP for 1988 (Savage,

1986:9). To fund this structure, the state received an income of R42 billion of which a hefty R24 billion comprised direct taxes on individuals and companies. According to Rand Merchant Bank chief economist Rudolph Gouws, the near tripling of the tax levels over the last 26 years to pay for the public sector has directly contributed to the massive decline in personal savings relative to personal disposable income over the same period (quoted in Jacobsohn, 1988).-

A total of 1 679 000 people are employed in the public sector (Commission for Administration, 1988:2). This is equal to 16,1% of the 10.5 million economically active people in the country (Ibid.:3). Four out of ten whites work for the state. This vast pool of personnel is employed by departments for general affairs (e.g. Department of Constitutional Development and Planning), administrations for own affairs in each house of parliament, the 4 provincial administrations, parastatal institutions (e.g. CSIR, HSRC, 3Aas, universities and National Parks Board), the public services of the self-governing territories (excluding the 'independent' bantustans), SA Transport Services, Posts and

Telecommunications, local authorities, agricultural control boards and public corporations (e.g. ISCOR, ESKOH, SABC) (Ibid.:2-3).

Not all state officials are paid directly by the exchequer. Posts and Telecommunications, SATS, local authorities and agricultural control boards generate their own funds to pay their personnel. Of the total 1,6 million public sector employees, 943 861 are paid out of exchequer funds (Ibid:4), i.e. from the National Budget (3).

THE MAKING OF THE BOTHA STATE

In his first major policy speech on 28 September 1978, after his election as NP leader and Prime Minister, PW Botha referred to the need for "efficient and clean administration". The highly complex and disorganised decision-making structures of the pre-Botha state, the 1980 HMTLEeneL9_u_aatJmlJiaLm argued, "makes it difficult for the central executive machinery to act swiftly and effectively to solve problems and crises" (RSA, 1980:49). By restructuring state decision-making structures, "a more manageable machinery of government to meet new challenges and crises" could be created (RSA, 1980:63). Writing in 1980, the then Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office, J.E. du Plessis, defined this problem in these terms:

"The special circumstances in South Africa and the increasing sophistication of the challenge on the country on all levels of society, that in the areas of politics, the economy, security and community life, requires a sophisticated scientifically planned and well coordinated policy framework" (du Plessis, 1960:112-3).

The re-organisation of the state decision-making structures was one aspect of what became known during the early 1980s as the "total strategy" programme (for a more comprehensive discussion see Swilling and Phillips, 1988). Originating in the security establishment (see section 4.3) and the "verligte" wing of the NP which produced the 12-Point Plan (5), this programme aimed to coordinate and centralise reform policies and security strategies while streamlining and rationalising the bureaucracy. The reform policies of the early 1980s were supposed to restructure four basic social arenas: the workplace, the city, the regional political economies and the constitutional order.

Five components of the broadly defined executive branches of the state were re-organised between 1979 and the introduction of the new Constitution in 1983:

1) the Department of the Prime Minister was turned into the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and given extended powers

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exercised through its various "planning branches"

(4) responsible for all key aspects of policy making (see Cloete, 1983);

the National Intelligence Service (NIS) replaced the Bureau of State Security;

cabinet committees, working groups for cabinet committees and a cabinet secretariat were introduced (see du Plessis, 1980);

the state departments were re-organised and reduced in number (see RSA, 1980) and a new department, the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, was created to manage the macro-planning of reform policies (see Cloete, 1988);

the Senate was abolished and a Presidents Council (PC) established to work out a new constitutional dispensation (see Worral, 1961).

the State Security Council was turned into a powerful policy-making body and a complex national, regional and local system of committees was set up underneath the SSC - the so-called National Security Management System (NSMS) (see

Selfe, fn; Geldenhuys and Kotze, 1983) (see diagram);
or

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The reorganisation of the central decision-making structures prepared the way for the Executive Presidency that was created by the 1983 Constitution (see Schrire, 1984 for the best account of this process). There were three distinctive features of this first period that need emphasising. Firstly, the "oresidentialisation of the premiership" (Schzire, 1986:151) to place prior to the transfer of de jure executive powers to the office occupied by Pw Botha after the new constitution was introduced. The Prime Ministers that preceded Botha never had their own department or staff.

Secondly, "oresidentialisation" involved the centralisation of decision-making. During the early 1980s, there were two reasons why Botha moved quickly to centralise power around his office. Firstly, this was a necessary part of the overall "total strategy" programme aimed at "coordinating" state actions in order to counter the "total onslaught". Secondly, Botha needed to compensate for the weakness of his position in the NP because of the strength of the more conservative Transvaal party (Schrire, 1984:10; see also Geldenhuys and Kotze, 1985b:32). It was not simply a coincidence that the two most powerful cabinet ministers that PW Botha placed at the centre of the new restructuring and reform processes were Orange Free State NP leader Alwyn Schlebusch and PW's number two in the Cape NP, Chris Heunis. In the early 1980s Heunis was responsible for the planning branch in the OPM and in that capacity was centrally involved in the reformulation of constitutional, economic, industrial, social and physical planning policies (see Cloete, 1988). Schlebusch was Director in charge of the Programme for Rationalisation of the Public Service and then became chairman of the Presidents Council in late 1980.

Thirdly, a new set of interests developed access to the decision-making structures. During the Vorster era, white labour, the Broederbond, the churches and afrikaner cultural groups enjoyed fairly easy access to the state. However, from 1978 they found themselves being progressively excluded from channels of influence and communication. Instead, big business, the universities, conservative foreign influences and technocratic think-tanks became increasingly influential in the policy-making process. Some black lobbies - bantustan leaders, urban councillors and parliamentary parties - also developed some tentative access points to the executive. PW Botha and his office that became the central mediator of these newly influential interests.

The following diagram is the official map of the formal executive institutions for "own" and "general" affairs:

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THE CURRENT EXECUTIVE DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS

There are three basic executive structures at central state level: the cabinet, State Security Council and the Office of the State President (OSP). As far as the government is concerned, the State President and cabinet are constitutionally accountable to parliament. The State Security Council (SSC) is presented as nothing more than one of the four cabinet committees. The cabinet is defined as the "final decision-making body" at central level (see Stemmet, 1983; Roherty, 1984). This view has been questioned by numerous writers who have tended to argue that the cabinet is effectively subordinated to the SSC and does little more than rubber stamp the latter's decisions (Geldenhuys and Kotze, 1983; Grundy, 1988; Evans and Phillips, 1988; Seeqers, 1988; Frankel, 1984; Cock and Nathan, 1989; and Swillinq and Phillips, 1988). Both these views have ignored the power, role and centrality of the OSP. Instead, we will show that although the second position is basically correct in its analysis, it has failed to recognise that it is the OSP that dominates executive decision-making and that it is the central coordinator of the security and welfare arms of the state.

The OSP lies at the centre of all the most important policy processes in the public sector. No major macro-policy decision is taken without the President's personal approval or direct involvement in its formulation. As political scientist Sam Huntington's 1981 proposal in England that the "route from a limited unitary democracy to a broader multi-party democracy could run through some form of autocracy" (Huntington, 1981:20) has become an accurate reflection of the policy process (see also Devenish, 1978; Dean, 1985). The Executive branches of the central state have come to be tightly coordinated by the OSP. This was achieved by subordinating the executive structures to the OSP and then transferring key executive powers directly into itself.

The Cabinet decision-making system was introduced in the early days of P.W. Botha's administration. Three cabinet committees were introduced: the Social, Economic and Constitutional Cabinet Committees. These committees comprised cabinet ministers and senior departmental officials. Working Groups were constituted for each cabinet committee comprising all the officials who were members of the cabinet committees and other senior officials. (Before the creation of the DCDP in 1982, the chairmen of the "working groups" were also the chairmen of the "planning - branches" in P.W. Botha's Office.)

The cabinet committees were created with three purposes in mind: (a) to transfer some of the decision-making burden from full cabinet meetings to the smaller cabinet committees which were given decision-making powers for this purpose; (b) to make officials more accountable to Ministers and the cabinet by bringing them into the cabinet decision-making process; and (c) to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of cabinet decisions by establishing the cabinet secretariat (see du Plessis, 1980). Whereas before 1982 cabinet tended to debate policy options and cabinet committees were significant forums for discussion between Ministers and officials, this changed. The NP split in particular removed dissenting voices from the cabinet. During 1986-88, a marked trend towards the increasing centralisation of decisions became evident. Under the direct influence of the Director-General of the OS, Jannie Roux, top departmental officials have been removed from the three so-called "welfare" cabinet committees, i.e. the committees responsible for social, economic and constitutional matters respectively. The Working Groups were disbanded and a "Welfare Secretariat" established to run the cabinet committees and determine their priorities. This secretariat is directly controlled by Jannie Roux. The OSP, therefore, can determine the agenda, influence and scope of the cabinet committees. Although their decision-making powers still formally exist, they would not dare issue directives on a major policy issue to the autonomous state departments for action without first getting Presidential approval.

The establishment of the Welfare Secretariat as the key coordinator of social, economic and constitutional policy coincided with the transfer of these tasks out of the DCDP (more on this below).

Jannie Roux's role in ensuring the removal of officials from the cabinet committees cannot be under-estimated because he turned himself into the most powerful Director-General in the process. Nor can PH Botha's style and personality be ignored. Policy debate in the cabinet has declined as he gradually became the most dominant influence on cabinet deliberations. "No one will dare challenge his views", one well placed source pointed out. The o. mcumemtej Leann;

The USP consists of a number of committees, advisors, secretariat and Ministries that deal with public administration, public expenditure priorities, constitutional affairs, economic policy, socio-economic development ("welfare"), Propaganda and national security. There are also secretariats for (a) conditions of service of political office bearers; (b) matters relating to the Presidents Council; (c) cabinet and cabinet committees; (d) liaison between Parliament and the State President; (e) liaison on special matters related to Namibia; (f) -10-

Presidential actions; (g) press liaison; (h) and the administration of the running and staffing of the OS (Chitum, 1988:28).

The decision-making structures that centre around the OS and ensure the implementation of public policy via the tri-cameral parliament, state departments, Advisory Councils and NSHS can be mapped out as follows:

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The State President's Men

A small group of men in the 059 have accumulated power by controlling the flow of information to the President. These men are the staff of the 059. Because of insufficient information, the precise role and function of the President's social, economic and constitutional advisors employed directly in his Office will not be discussed in detail. They make comments and recommendations on policy proposals, but only when they are asked to do so by PW Botha.

By far the most significant man in the OSP besides PW Botha is its forty-seven year old Director-General, Jannie Roux. Roux is a registered clinical psychologist with a Ph.D from Pretoria University. He was Deputy Commissioner of Prisons from 1976-1980; in which capacity he visited the Robben Island prisoners at least twice a year. In 1980 he was appointed head of the social "Planning branch" in the OPM and then Deputy Director-General of Internal Affairs in 1981. He has been Director-General of the OPM and later the 059 since 1982.

Economic Advisory Council and CEAS

As far as the business community is concerned, the process of presidential centralisation has been most markedly felt in the area of economic policy-making. Originating in the 1960s, the Economic Advisory Council (EAC) became, during the early 1980s, a key body for coordinating state and private sector economic

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policy inputs. Chaired by Dr. Simon Brand, it included the director-generals and top officials of several state departments, representatives of organised commerce and industry, individual businessmen with enough status to have been invited in their own right (e.g. Sanlam director Fred du Plessis), and several university-based or public sector economists. According to one ex-member, the decision-making process was constructive for two reasons: firstly, the committee enabled top economic experts, businessmen and officials to debate and reach agreement on proposals that they all knew would be directly fed into the 059; and secondly, it provided a forum where private sector interests and officialdom could reach consensus on key economic principles (interview, no. 51). The secretarial work for the EAC was done by an influential team of experts employed by the Central Economic Advisory Services (CEAS) under economist, Jan Dzeier. In mid-1986 PW Botha changed the entire composition of the EAC. Firstly, he got rid of the representatives of organised commerce and industry and appointed in their place twenty-nine top businessmen in their personal capacities (e.g. AM Clewlow, Ron Lubner, RA Plumbridge, JH Kahn, PR Horkel, PM Searle, FJ du Plessis, J. Berardo and J. Ogilvie-Thompson). Secondly, except for a handful of top officials" he removed most of the state officials and academics and made Dr. Human from Federale Volksbeleidings the new chairman. These two changes have been widely interpreted by officials and businessmen alike as a down-grading of the importance of the EAC vis-a-vis economic policy-making (interview, no. 51). Instead, the locus of economic decision-making has shifted into the State President's National Priorities Committee.

National Priorities Committee

The Priorities Committee was established in terms of Act 119 of 1984 and includes the State President (chairman), Ministers of Finance and Constitutional Development and Planning, the chairmen of the three Minister's Councils, members of the Minister's councils responsible for financial matters and additional Ministers that can be co-opted by the Committee (e.g. the Minister of Transport is a member) (see Hansard, 1984: column 11274ff.). Although the Act defines the terms of reference of the committee in rather wide and general terms, it nevertheless confined itself initially to assessing priorities for public expenditure and how these could be reconciled with private sector investment priorities. However, with the removal of officials from the welfare cabinet committees and the gradual imposition of constraints on the scope of policy issues these committees could discuss, the OSP started transferring responsibility for all

public expenditure to the Priorities Committee. The growing pressures on public financial resources coupled to the security-linked policy decision to upgrade the townships contributed to the centralisation of public expenditure policy.

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The Priorities Committee is now responsible for the design of the budget and ongoing monitoring of public expenditure patterns, i.e; how the economic cake is apportioned and consumed. It is here, for example, that decisions on how to fund the JHC coordinated township upazadina proarammes will be made. Not surorisinalv. the orooosals of the Priorities Committee carry an enormous amount of weiaht ln the cabinet and the Minister's Councils. By all accounts, the influence of the EAC has become minimal. The fact that the Central Economic Advisory Service under Jan Drever. currently located in the Department of Finance, acts as its secretariat sugaests a close link between the economic olanners in Finance and the Priorities Committee. However. if it is recalled that Pw Botha announced a 15% increase in ouble servant salaries costing R3 billion while the Minister of Finance was abroad (CithenJ 27.9.88), then question marks certainly do hand over the relationship between the OS? and the Department of Finance.

Similar tensions exist over funding for township upgrading. The 55C and OSP have been known to take decisions on upgrading projects without civing the Directorate of Urbanisation (in the DCDP) the resources to give effect to these decisions. when the Priorities Committee resolves this by allocating defense budget money for unqzadlnq via the JHCs, then this also creates tensions because it can facilitate the marginalisation of the Directorate for Urbanisation from the upqradlna process.

In short. durina 1987-88 economic policy making came under the direct control of the state President and his staff. We should exnect the National Priorities Committee to become increasingly important as the economic constraints on public expenditure tighten.

Commission for Administytation

After comlnq to power, Pw Botha seized on the strategic sianificance of the Dublic administration for (a) consolidating his own oower-base in the state, (b) realising the objectives of reform. and (c) streamlining private-Dublic sector relations. To achieve these objectives, Botha used the CFA as an instrument that has, over time, developed into an extremely powerful body accountable directly to him. The Commission for Administration Act of 1984 established the CFA as a statutory body that, in its own modest words, "does not have power as such, but has considerable authority" (Commission for Administration, 1988b:9). The CFA defines its task in terms that underlines its importance: "It is the Commission's task to out the Government's envisaged constitutional changes into practice. This entails establishina an administrative infrastructure to achieve the Government's goals through public administration." (Commission for Administration. 1988b:8)

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The CPA, which falls under the responsibility of the Minister the OS? entrusted with Administration and Privatisation, Dr. D de Villiezs, can use three mechanisms to ensure the implementation of its policies: it can "advise", "recommend" 0 "instruct". In the case of "advice", a Minister or his departmental head can respond to the proposals at their own disczation. although it is unlikely that a CPA proposal with t President's weight behind it will be ignored. A "tecommendatio however, is stronger and must be carried out within six months unless the President or the CPA amends or rejects the proposal Finally. if a Minister or departmental head is given an "instruction". then he is obliged to carry it out "immediately' (Commission for Administration, 1988bz9). It is not inconcievable, therefore, that this in effect gives the top officials of the CFA create: authority than the average Mlnist over how Dolicies are implemented. '

The CPA, with its 1000 emolovees, hlthy developed computerise management techniques and newly constructed R103 million Pretoria Head office (Sunday.Times, 23.3.88), is the Executive President's instrument for qivina effect to government policy every level. The CFA examines every memorandum that goes to cabinet for consideration and attaches its own assessment of t

organizational, administrative and personnel implications of the proposal. This effectively gives it the power to say whether a policy is workable or not.

The CFA has been directly involved in the organisation of state restructuring, e.g. scrapping of the Development Boards Provincial Administrations, establishment of local government structures, re-organisation of the DCDP, assessment of the :01 of the NSMS and no less than 211 other investigations into problem areas in the public service during 1987 alone (Commission for Administration, 1988b). Furthermore, it consults with its so-called "Panel of Business Leaders" that comprises Messrs. W.A.H. Clewlow, R.J. 6055, C. du P. Kuun and Dr. P.R. Morkel. (The Privatisation programme received most of the attention during these consultations with businesspeople.)

Given the CFA's enormous power over the structure of the state, it is not surprising that "privatisation" is not only one of the CFA's top priorities, but a special Minister in the USP is responsible for coordinating the relationship between administration and privatisation.

The CPA maintains that it carries the responsibility for balancing out national security priorities with the state's ability to provide basic services and stimulate the economy (Commission for Administration, 1986:15). This link emerged in the urban development sphere during 1988 when state officials pointed out that some of the funds generated by privatisation would be used for financing township upgrading projects - a

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decision the priorities Committee would presumably make (see South African Institute of Race Relations, 1988a and 1988b; interview no. 52).

In consultation with Departmental Heads and the Panel of Business Leaders, the CPA completed 28 investigations into activities that could be privatised by the end of 1987. By late 1988 it had extended this investigation to every government department and by the beginning of 1989 was ready with a report on how the privatisation programme could be made fully operational. Beside its policy implementation functions, the CPA's central role in the privatisation programme points to the rising importance of this institution in the policy-making process.

The Information Ministry: PW's slave Octopus

Dr. Stoffel Van Der Herwe, the current Minister of Information, Broadcasting and the Film Industry in the Office of the State President, was appointed to this newly created position in March 1988. The Bureau for Information, established on 17 September 1985, falls under this Ministry. Its function was candidly defined by the Head of the Bureau, Dave Steward:

"Effective communication between a Government and those Governed can be promoted only by continuous efforts at thoroughly informing people about government policy, in other words, about the way the government is running the country and intends to resolve national issues."

(Bureau for Information, 1988:13)

The Bureau has three Chief Directorates: Planning, Liaison and Media Production. The Chief Directorate Planning promotes the "Government's reform policy" via "effective communication action at national level". It aims to coordinate all the communications activities of all government departments via the Bureau's participation in the Communications Committees of the JHCs and NSMS and according to an integrated long-term communications programme. An enormous research department constantly churns out statistics, opinion polls, evaluations, etc, to back up this communications system (Bureau for Information, 1987:4-6).

The Chief Directorate Liaison was designed to establish a range of "Grassroots" liaison networks between the "people" and "the Government" - the so-called Joint Liaison Forums of the NSHS at regional and local level. "The directorate's most important duty", the Bureau points out, "is to liaise with opinion-makers and groups". e.g. "youth groups", "women's organisations", businessmen and "leaders of the various communities" (ibid). The Bureau's twelve regional offices are responsible for carrying out this task. In addition to "liaising with the grassroots" this directorate's news service is PU Botha's source of daily news and information (Bureau for Information, 1987:81).

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The chief Directorate Media Production produces a wide range of publications and communications packages that together, according to the Bureau, have a readership of 2,5 million people (Bureau for Information, 1988: 19). In February 1988 Stoffel van der Hezwe told parliament that during 1987 the Bureau produced 96 publications. This included five regularly produced magazines (e.g. South African Panorama, South African Digest), forty-six one-off ad hoc publications (e.g. Tuynhuys, The National state of Emergency, South African Profile and various Year Books), and forty-five regularly produced Publications for black township dwellers (Hansard, 23 February, col.73-77; Hansard, 24.5.88, col. 1554-1555). The township publications are 'seen as part of the "winning-hearts-and-minds" campaign that was launched after the Emergency was declared in 1986.

The enormous expense incurred by the state to fund the activities of the Bureau and the SABC were justified by Bureau Head Dave Steward on the grounds that when the majority of the electorate elects a party that then becomes the government, "that party now has the right to use the machinery of state to implement its policies." "I readily admit", he continued, "that the Bureau propagates Government policy. ... Propaganda is nothing but communication aimed at influencing the opinions of a target audience." (Bureau for Information, 1988:15-16)

National Intelligence Service

Virtually nothing is known about the NIS other than the importance of its head, Dr. Neil Barnard. Barnard was appointed head of the NIS in 1979 (when it was temporarily called the Department of National Service - DONS) at the young age of 30. Since then his influence has grown considerably to the point where he is now a confidante of the state President. He was recruited from the University of the OFS by OPS NP heavyweight Kobie Coetzee, the then Deputy Minister of Defense and National Security and a key man involved in the re-organisation of the intelligence service.

Judging by the size of the new building being constructed for the NIS in Pretoria at a cost of R58 million (SundaJLlimii, 23. 3. 88), the NIS has a large staff. The usually reliable Afxiga anjigential newsletter estimated there are 5000 NIS employees. Reliable sources say that much of NIS work involves the gathering, sorting and evaluation of information obtained from the media, the security forces, the public and diplomatic service and thousands of informants located in all sectors of society. Although Neil Barnard is reputed to be a confirmed "hawk" and supporter of the "counter-revolutionary warfare" position advocated by Military Intelligence, there are a number of second-level NIS officials who share the more flexible opinions of senior officials in the DCDP and Foreign Affairs. Some of them, for example, opposed the decision to ban the 17 extra-parliamentary organisations in February 1988.

NIS has shown up at unlikely places. An NIS-linked person put out feelers to the ANC in 1987 and it was NIS officials who surrounded Govan Mbeki on the day of his release. Barnard - along with SADF chief General Geldenhuys, Military Intelligence head Major-General Van Tonder and ex-security police boss General Johann Coetzee - was part of the delegation led by Foreign Affairs Director-General Neil van Heerden during the early stages of the Angola-Namibia peace talks in 1988.

The power of the NIS lies in the fact that it is the final stage in the intelligence evaluation process and that its location in the OSF ensures that its evaluations, intelligence and information carry enormous weight amongst the people who make decisions. By-passing the NIS on major policy issues is, according to some sources, extremely difficult.

National Coordinating Committee and the National Joint Management Centre

The role of the OSF as coordinator of the dual welfare and security components of the state was, until the activation of the 1986 State of Emergency, reflected in the functions of the National Coordinating Committee (NCC). This committee handled the information, decisions and activities of the welfare and SSC secretariats under the direct purview and control of the President and his staff. In 1986 it was chaired by Eli Louw, the then Minister of Transport and the third most senior Cape Nationalist after Heunis and Botha. The deputy chairman was the then Deputy Minister of Defence, Adriaan Vlok.

When the NSMS was fully activated in mid-1986 with the declaration of the Emergency, the NCC was disbanded and replaced by the National Joint Management Centre (NJMC). The NJMC is charged with the direct task of managing the Emergency on a daily basis and has direct and immediate access to the State President. It is chaired by the Deputy Minister of Law and Order, Leon Vessels. Its Head Quarters are located in Tuynhuis, the State President's residence (AIC, 1986). I

This location of the most important coordinating function firmly at the heart of the NSHS effectively means that the OSF is now more firmly rooted in this institutionalised system of crisis management than ever before. This is why it is possible to talk about the dominance of the security establishment in the policy formulation and decision-making processes. As from mid-1986 onwards, the OSP and the NSHS became mutually reinforcing organs of executive power. This does not mean, however, that the OSF has been swallowed by the NSHS. In the minds of those that run the OSF, the NSHS has emerged as the most effective means of governing under a permanent State of Emergency.

PW's Style

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Personality and style are important - use Star review and Gel a Kotze and Pottinger '

The National Security Management System

The period since the declaration of the state of emergency in June 1986 has seen the return of "total strategy", but this time in a new form as a "total counter-revolutionary strategy" (V10 1988). The National Security Management System (NSMS) is the structure of unified command which has been activated to co-ordinate the implementation of this new strategy. Although seen silently in the wings right at the outset of the post-1978 period of bureaucratic rationalization (Selfe, 1987), the NSHS was not initially fully activated or turned into the nerve centre of state action that it has now become. Instead, it was created as a fall back in case the formal civilian structure collapsed proved unable to govern the country on its own. During the heyday of "total strategy" in the early 1980s the officials who staffed the NSHS, to quote one senior state official, "were just keeping the seats warm." (Interview, August 1986)

The "total strategy" reforms had unintended consequences that triggered unprecedented waves of mass resistance to apartheid (see Swillina and Phillips, 1988; and Botaine, 1988b). After a period of extended reform when the DCDP still held the advantage within the state, the USP shifted its ground and turned to the tactics and strategies of the security establishment. T

result was the full-scale activation of the NSMS - in the words of one ex-security policeman, "when the moment came, all we needed to do was to hit the switch" (quoted in Newsweek, June 1988).

"Hitting the switch" meant turning the NSHS shell into an effective crisis management machine. As will be shown below, the 1986 organisation of the NSHS was, in the words of a reliable government intelligence source, "found to be lacking as far as its communication and control channels were concerned, apart from the fact that it was designed to: a totally different function and was not geared for the day-to-day running of the Emergency" (AIC, 1986:13). The new strategic deployment of the NSHS "structured as a separate arm of Government" (AIC, 1986:14) involved:

(a) the establishment of a new structure of centralised command under the direct purview of the USP, i.e. the NJHC (AIC, 1986);

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(b) the deployment of new security personnel in key oostlons in the system (Aftlca_Confidential, 10.11.1986, 8.7.1987, 10.6.1987, 17.6.1988L

(c) a vast Increase in the numbers of Deoole drawn Into the system at Jnc, sub-JHC and mini-JHC level (Boralne, 1988a; Seeders. 1988; Ehilllos and Swilllnq, 1988; Swllllnq and Phillips, 1988);

; and

(d) the imposition of a new theory of state action, i.e.

"counter-revolutionary warfare" in order to "wln-hearts-andemlnds" ("WHAH") (see Department of Military Intelliaence, 1987; Swllllnq and Phillips, 1988; Africa Confidential, 17.6.1988; Bavnham. 1985).

The "counter-revolutionary warfare" oostlon replaced the "counter-insuraency" ("COIN") perspective that former security Dolice chief General Johan Coetzee Droounded in the early 19803. In an address to the Institute of Strateglc Studies In 1981, Coetzee isolated five key elements of "counter-insurgency" (Coetzee. 1981). These were:

8 "a dynamic oollcv of chance" to "make the RSA a dlfflcult taraet to Din down for assault";

8 "a clear political objective ... to ensure a free, independent and united country".

' "brooaqanda ... directed at the counterinsurgents, the population and the insurgent";

9 the avoidance of conflict and defuslng of "explosive situations"; and

8 "an effective Information organlzation and spy network".

"Counter-insutgency", he said, "15 based on the cornerstone of information o: Intelllqence." Yet by mld-1986 it seemed to many in the security establishment and elsewhere in government that the "dynamic policy of change" embodied in the reformist policies pursued in the 1978 to 1986 period had failed to defuse conflict. Declmatlon of the spy network through attacks on informers, moreover, had undone the very cornerstone of "counter-insurgency". To Increaslngly assertive security hardliners, the democratic onenlng which reform previously provided had to be closed and "counter-insurgency", with Its bias toward political solutions based on Good Intelllqence, had to be leolaced with a far more thorough-qclnq and coordinated Drogramme drawn from comnaratlve studies of revolutionary conflict.

"Counter-insurgency" was seen to have no answer to the unprecedented scale of the 1984 to 1986 uprising, or to the powerful local and international pressures for fundamental change. By mld-1986, the hardllners' advocacy of an alternative strategy deslaned to smash opposition and rebuild support bases for the state enabled them to force the scuttllnq of the EPG Mission In Hav_1986 and the declaration of a permanent national state of Emerqency.

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Unlike "counter-insuraency", which concentrated on Intelllqence aathetlng while leaving politics to the clvillans, "counter-revolutionary war" involved the security establshment in counterlng the revolutionary strategy at every polnt.

(Department of Military Intelllqence. 1987) It relegated the politics of reform to a matter of at best secondazv Importance, to be dealt with at some Dolnt in the future. The immediate task was to secure the security of the state; or as 3 DH! booklet put It: "To defeat the revolutionaries and ... regain the Initiative." (Department of Military Intelllqence, 1987:7)

The new "counter-revolutionary" strateglsts - the so-called "secuzocrats" - proceeded from three basic points of departure (see Vlok quoted In The stat, 19.8.1988; Vlok, 1988; Afrlca-International Communicatlons, 1986; Glllomee, 1986):

9 law and order must be restored before reforms can be introduced;

' soclo-economlc development (or "social reform" (Botha, 1988bl) must precede political reform (see Botha, 1988a);

t constitutional development must bealn at local level and oceed upwards.

Firstly, "re-establishlng law and order" involved the declaration

of what has effectively become a permanent State of Emergency and the detention of around 30 000 people, the banning of 34 organisations, widespread vigilantism and the silencing of leaders and alternative newspapers.

Secondly, a large-scale socio-economic upgrading programme has been launched in the most troublesome black townships.

Thirty-four of the most volatile townships have been earmarked for special attention (Schuster, 1988). About 1800 urban renewal projects are currently in progress (SABC Comment, 17.6.1988) in approximately 200 townships countrywide (Schuster, 1988). No precise total expenditure figures for the upgrading programme have been given by the authorities. The sources of funding of both infrastructural services and housing include the Development Bank, Regional Services Councils, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, Provincial Administrations, South African Development Trust, South African Housing Trust, Urban Foundation, private sector companies, Department of Finance, local authorities and the South African Defense Force. The Deputy-Governor of the Reserve Bank, Jan Lombard, estimated in 1988 that R4,5 billion per annum is needed until the year 2000 to finance a large-scale "settlement programme" for blacks. This, he argued, was R3,3 billion more than the R1,2 billion currently invested in this area by the public and private sectors (Lombard, 1988).

The 1001c of the Strateav implied that it was only once security actions had run their course, Grievances had been addressed and municipal Government restored, that political reform would again become an issue on the agenda (Republic of South Africa, 1988; Botha, 1988; various quotes by security officials in Swiliina and Phillips, 1988; Schneider, 1987).

The "counter-revolutionists" argued that to be successful the security-uorade strateav had to fall under centralized command and be tightly coordinated. Their chosen instrument was the NSHS. The most decisive institutional expression of their new ascendancy in the state was the dissolution of the National Coordinating Committee and the transfer of its functions to the National Joint Management Centre (NJMC) in the heart of the NSHS. For the first time the security establishment was entrusted with the coordination of both security and welfare decision making functions.

Through the NSHS and under the direct Guidance of the 05?, the NJHC coordinates state action at all levels. The NJHC has a "Nationale Staatskondisie, Ekonomiese en Maatskaplike Komitee" ("SEHKOH") to coordinate welfare policy and a "Gesamentlike Sekuriteits Komitee" to coordinate on a daily basis a range of security strategies.

The State Security Council (SSC) is at the apex of the NSHS. It brings together the most important of the cabinet ministers and the country's security chiefs. Its regular members are the state president (the chairman); the minister of defence; the ministers and directors-general of the departments of law and order, foreign affairs, finance, constitutional development and justice; and a few politically important cabinet ministers such as FW De Klerk.

The security officials on the SSC are the chief of the SADF (General Jannie Geldenhuys) and the chiefs of the army (Lt-General Kat Liebenberg), navy (Vice-Admiral Glyn Sutherland), airforce (Lt-General Jan van Rensburg) and medical services (Lt-General Daniel Knobel); the directors of the National Intelligence Service and of military intelligence (Neil Barnard and Lt-General CJ van Tonder); the commissioner of police, Major-General Hennie de Witt and the chief of the security police, Major-General Johann van der Herwe; the director of security legislation, Andre Bosch, and the director-general of the state president's office. Dr Jannie Roux (Afrigg anjidential, 8.7.87). of the 23 permanent members of the SSC other than the state president, twelve are security men. The SSC is also able to co-opt onto itself for the purpose of specific discussions any other cabinet minister, senior civil servant or even industrialists such as the chairman of Armscor. It meets fortnightly, on a Monday night, the night before cabinet, which meets on a Tuesday. It assesses, from a security perspective, all executive decisions of state and decides on matters as

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fundamental as the Angola-Namibia peace settlement and the "invasion" of Botswana - a "foreign country" - to rescue its president from a coup bid.

The SSC is backed up by the four legs of the NSHS. The Work Committee, which provides expert backup to the SSC, consists of the heads of Government departments represented on the SSC and the heads of the other three cabinet committees (the committees for social, economic and constitutional affairs, now subsumed under the welfare secretariate). Suported to the Work Committee and the SSC is given by the secretariate of the SSC. The personnel of the secretariat are drawn from the following departments: SADF - 70%, Mrs - 20% and Foreign Affairs -10% (Sheldon, 1986:5 and 17; Africa Confidential, 8.7.1987; Grundy 1983:15). It is responsible for intelligence interpretation, strategic communication ("the war of words") (Van Deventer, 1983:8), strategy formulation and administration of the security management system. Co-ordination of planning and implementation of policy occurs in thirteen inter-departmental committees. These cover virtually every field of social activity in the state, illustrating the all encompassing interpretation security strategists have given to the SSC's defined role of advising the

Government on the formulation and implementation "of national policy and strategy in relation to the security of the Republic." (State Security Council Act of 1912) The thirteen committees cover: manpower, security services, civil defence, transport, security, national supplies and resources, government fundings, the national economy, telecommunications and power supply, science and technology, community services, culture and political affairs. (Selfe, 1987:155) Taken together, their brief is virtually without limits. As the definition of security has broadened to include the management of most conceivable problems and processes, so the official designation of the system itself is beginning to change to signify the National Management system (Ebersohn, 1988:19; Republic of South Africa, 1988:58). This reflects the fact that the NSMS is no longer regarded as simply a temporary measure, but that this "structure could become a permanent feature of Government" (AIC, 1986:13). The real lifeblood of the NSMS is its fourth leg the network of over 500 national, regional, district and local Joint Management Centres (JMCs). The NJMC coordinates the activities of both the welfare and security secretariats above it, while attempting to ensure the smooth functioning of the hundreds of committees below it. The latter include:

- ' eleven JMCs which divide the country into management regions corresponding to SADF area commands and, roughly, to the nine economic development regions;
- ' sixty odd sub-JMCs, with some having borders that correspond to the Regional Services Councils; and
- ' at the local level somewhere between 250 and 500 mini-JMCs and Local Management Centres which co-ordinate state action in almost every settled community in the country.

These co-ordinating structures bring together: military, police and civilian officials. usually under the chairmanship of the ranking military or senior police officer. The functions of a JMC and the essence of the counter-revolutionary war strategy are apparent in each JHC's committee structure. Although there are frequently local variations in their precise makeup most, whether they are the NJMC, regional JMCs or local mini-JHCs, have four functional committees and a coordinating executive with representatives of each on it. These four committees are the intelligence committee, the security committee, the welfare committee and the communications committee. In many ways, the functions of these committees mirror the concentration of power at the highest level in the OPM, which centralizes a similar set of functions: coordination (through the NPC and power of the presidency), intelligence (through the NIS), security (through its domination of the SSC), welfare (through the privatization portfolio and welfare secretariate) and communications (through the media and broadcasting portfolio).

The intelligence committee gathers and interprets the intelligence on which co-ordinated state activities are based. Staffed by representatives of military intelligence, the security police and the National Intelligence Service, it seeks to promote unity of effort between these traditionally competing intelligence agencies. The security committee, the repressive arm of the NSHS, acts on the intelligence provided by the intelligence committee. Staffed by a combination of riot police officers, military officers, security branch officers and officers of the municipal police, of the komsomols, and OZ commando and civil defence units, it coordinates the implementation of security strategies laid down by the SSC. The welfare committee, on the other hand, takes responsibility for co-ordinating the functions of the civilian administration. Though at the national level this includes the coordination of, for example, constitutional and labour issues, at most levels welfare implies a particular concern with local upgrade programmes. Its membership consists of officials of the various non-security state departments, eg roads, education, welfare, health, constitutional development, transport services, the Provinces' community services offices. More than anything else the welfare committee tries to prioritize development projects, cut red tape, unblock bottlenecks and generally ensure that things get done.

The functions of the security committee and the welfare committee - the two essential arms of the system - encapsulate the overall intentions of state security strategists. These are to use the words of Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok, to "take out", "eliminate" or "annihilate" activists on the one hand, while on the other "addressing grievances." (Schneider, 1987)

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The overall national security management strategy, implemented in Hamelodi and elsewhere: is sold to the public via the fourth of the JHC's committees, the communication committee (Komsom). The Komsoms are run by the Bureau for Information, though SADF communications operations (comos) personnel and public relations Detachment from other Government departments do play some role. There is sometimes a clear overlap of personnel between SADF and Bureau officials. The Bureau's national head of planning and research, for example, is a senior military intelligence officer Major-General PJ Groenewald (Africa Confidential, 8.7.1987). Komsom attempts to do three things. Firstly, through the co-ordination of lectures, television programmes, pamphlets, newspaper articles and the publication of local newspapers it aims to explain and justify action taken against activists and opposition organizations. Secondly, Komsom aims to ensure the maximum publicity for welfare type projects and government supporting "counter-organizations". Wherever possible credit for JHC co-ordinated programmes will be taken by "civil bodies" such as Black Local Authorities. At the same time the sincerity of state reforms is widely publicised both inside and outside the country. The third apparent function of the Komsoms is the

co-ordination of disinformation via a variety of media forms, pamphlets and townshio Graffiti (see orceedings of End Conscription Committee vs Minister of Defence, case number 88/2870 CPD; Africa Confidential. 8.7.1988; Barber, 1986; Sivotula, 1989:70-94).

The JHC svstem interfaces with the public informally through talks and lectures on the nature of the counter-revolutionary war oiven by JHC officials. The head of the strategic communication branch of the SSC secretariate once claimed to have given "about a thousand lectures" on the system in a six vear period (Worsnip, 1988:98). A more formal relationshio between the public. the business community and the security system is being formed throuah a network of Joint Liaison Forums, Joint Liaison Committees and Defence Manpower Liaison Committees (Demalcoms). These allow the security establishment to market their strategies to influential members of the public and to broaden their informal source: of information.

The secretariate of the SSC is the only part of the NSHS which employs full time staff. This in fact is one of the major strenqths of the system. At all other levels it relies exclusively on officials co-ooted from the various state deoartments themselves. This means that decisions and recommendations of the NSHS at all levels are the decisions and recommendations of senior officials of these departments, rather than being ooliev imposed from the outside. Just as it is hithw unlikely that the cabinet will override the carefully considered and security assessed decisions of the 556, so it is equally difficult for any single government department to ignore plans

formulated in the JHCS. In a 1986 interview the head of the strategic communication branch of the ssc secretariate explained why:

"Sav for instance somebody will Dick up there is a necessity for a new school in a certain area, or to build another classroom. The JHC will bring it to the attention of the responsible official of that education department... If it doesn't fall within his powers he will have to go to his head office. At his head office they will be working on a priority list for budgetary issues and that new classroom might be number 20 or 30 or 40 on the list. But they are not necessarily aware, not being an intelligence department, of the urgency... They can decide we are going to build it in five years time... this JHC who initiated the whole thing can send it up to us and we can liaise with the department, convincing them of the necessity to build the school now and not next year.

if we cannot do it the matter will go higher to a working committee where the director-general of that department will be and they will convince him there... or they can go right up to the highest body, to the cabinet. So we in the system can assist from the regional level to the top to persuade them from a security point of view that this is necessary. And this is exactly what is happening." (quoted in Horsfield, 1988:105-6)

The Department of Constitutional Development and Planning: From Reform Flashlight to Isolated Wreck

Since its inception, the DCDP has been the undisputed flagship of reform. It has come to be closely identified with its Minister and leader of the Cape NP, Chris Heunis. Heunis presided over its establishment and worked closely with PH Botha during the pioneering days of the early 1980s and the high reform period of 1982-85. Since early 1986, however, it has lost its pre-eminent position of influence within the executive. By 1988 the fortunes of the DCDP had reached their lowest ebb.

The origins of the DCDP lie in the rationalisation programme initiated by PW Botha in 1979. Cloete identifies four phases in the development of the DCDP: 1980-82; 1982-85; 1985-86; and 1986-88. Each phase corresponded to a distinct role, level of influence and organisational structure of the DCDP.

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Phase 1: 1980-82

The five "planning branches" for economic, physical, social, constitutional and scientific planning that were established in the OPM in 1980, laid the basis for what became the DCDP in 1982 with the full weight of the OPH behind them, these planning branches were able to improve unprecedented levels of inter-departmental co-operation for the purposes of coordinated policy formulation (Cloete, 1988:222) during the 1979-82 period. Responsibility for the coordination and functioning of the "planning branches" fell under PW Botha's reform henchman, Chris Heunis - the Minister of Internal Affairs at that stage. The technocrats in the "planning branches" said they used their position in the OPM to get things done, but reported in fact to Heunis (interview no. 12).

It was during this phase that crucial macro-planning frameworks were either developed in outline or fully completed by the "planning branches", e.g. the Economic Development Plan for the RSA (1978-1987); the Industrial Development Programme; the constitutional foundations for what later became the new 1983 constitution and guidelines for the Constellation of Southern African States. "During this period", Cloete argues, "the Office of the PM was thus a small but wide-ranging planning organisation without executive powers that included all facets of government policy" (Cloete, 1988:23).

Phase 2: 1982-85

The Department of Constitutional Development and Planning was created in August 1982 under Minister Heunis. The "planning branches" were transferred from the OPH to the new department and

were re-named Chief Directorates. At the same time, a new Chief Directorate for Constitutional Development was created which was given extensive executive functions. This Directorate replaced the NP and the cabinet as the primary initiator of political reform policy.

During this phase, the emphasis was on coordinated macro-planning of reform on all levels of society, i.e. economic, physical, social and scientific. Constitutional reform policy proceeded from the assumption that it could not be implemented in isolation, but "must be seen to take place on all levels" (Cloete, 1988:224). Some of the first major planning projects undertaken by the DCDP during this early phase included: the establishment of the State President's National Priorities Committee; the Regional Economic Development Programme; the National Physical Development Programme; the Community Development Plan; the National Population Development Programme; an Urbanisation strategy and a Scientific and Development Programme for South Africa.

These initiatives were counted to the DCDP's leading role in all the other major reform initiatives of the time, i.e. the implementation of the 1983 Constitution; restructuring of Government functions on all levels under the guidance of the Commission for Administration; the establishment of the new parliament, Ministers Councils and Own Affairs Administrations; the planning of provincial restructuring and the formulation of a new Bill on Provincial Administration; the re-organisation of local Government for the purposes of the investments by the Council for the Coordination of Local Government Affairs; the formulation and implementation of the Bill on Voting Rights for Local Government Bodies of 1984 and the Regional Services Council Bill of 1985; formulation of government policy with regard to "powersharing" with black people (including the planning of what this would mean for political structures and processes, citizenship) and so on); involvement in the secretariat for the Special Cabinet Committee on the constitutional position of black people; participation in the multilateral system with the National States: investigation into the Prohibition of Political Interference Act.

Phase 3: 1985-86

In late 1984, responsibility for urban areas legislation and regulations was transferred from the then Department of Communications and Public Works to the DCDP. Following the 1985 cabinet reshuffle, from 1 September 1985 responsibility for all aspects of the black communities outside the "self-governing states" was transferred from the Department of Cooperation and Development and various other departments to the DCDP - this belated the death knell of the infamous all-powerful Verwoerdian "Native Affairs" empire.

It is arguable that by the end of 1985, the decision-making power and influence on reform policy of the DCDP and its Minister had reached its zenith. The transfer of authority over all black affairs to this department was the institutional expression of a significant change in reform policy between December 1984 to late 1985 - a shift that extended the reform policies well beyond the parameters of the original "total strategy" framework (see Swilling and Phillips, 1988). There were, in fact, five critical moments that resulted in the extension of this framework: in November 1984, Minister Heunis announced that Black Local Authorities were to be included into the proposed Regional Services Councils. In May 1985 Stoffel van der Herwe published his National Party pamphlet entitled "... and what about the Blacks?" which argued that homelands were a failure. In September 1985 PH Botha announced that citizenship would be restored to all Africans residing permanently in "South Africa". In late 1985 PH Botha conceded that the tri-cameral parliament was not the final solution, merely a step in a process. And finally, in September 1985 the Presidents Council published its report on urbanisation

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which culminated in the December 1985 statement by Heunis that blacks would be given freehold property rights and in the 1986 Abolition of Influx Control Act.

All these policy shifts - which eventually were publicly expressed at the 1985 HP congresses and the 1986 special Federal Conference - were initiated, formulated and packaged by planners in the DCDP (interview nos. 7, 8 and 12; also see Cloete, 1988; Cobbett, et. al., 1988; Morris and Padayachee, 1988; Swilling and Phillips, 1988). They were shifts that culminated in specific changes on July 1 1986:

- 1. influx control was scrapped;
- 2. the white provincial councils were scrapped and multi-racial executive committees introduced;
- 3. all community councils became fully-fledged black local authorities under the direct responsibility of the DCDP and not under the Administration Boards;
- 4. Administration Boards were scrapped

and their functions transferred to the new provincial administrations; ' and the rlaht to award permits in terms of the Group Areas Act to blacks was transferred from the DCDP to the orovincial administrations.

During the followina two vears. Regional Services Council (RSC) leqlslatlon was passed and amended and 16 RSCs established, 13 of them in the Transvaal.

In early 1986, Chris Heunis must have looked back on the 19805 and reflected with satisfaction on how hlqh hls star had risen during the reform era. Talk of him as the "crown prince" sealed what was apparently a water-tight position. However, the storm clouds were gatherlnq and by July he had fallen from favour. Before dealing with this, It is essential to discuss Heunis' relationship with PW Botha ln qreater detail because here lies an important secret as to how decisions on reform issues were made durlnq the 19803.

As pointed out earlier. it was Heunis. Schlebusch and PW Botha who worked out the reform component of the overall "total strateav" framework that the securitv planners had establshed as the frame of reference for all state strategic planning.

Heunis depended heavily on the technocrats ln the "plannlnq branches" before 1982 and then the Chief Directorates ln his DCDP after 1982 for well researched. technically sound DoIICY proposals (Cloet. 1988). This aave them enormous power. Schrlre -29..

identifies two reasons for the influence and power of senior officials: firstly, officials have a "monopoly of expertise" over policy issues. Ministers, who are "political generalists", are forced to depend on officials for defining problems and formulating solutions. Secondly, officials are involved in the implementation of policy and therefore can identify problem areas before these come to the attention of the Ministers (Schrire, 1986:146-7). One vivid example of the influence of officials in the DCDP is how they changed the language of reform. As the writers of the Minister's speeches, officials can subtly adjust and over time change key terms. For example, the meaning of constitutional reform was consciously changed from the early 1980s phrase of "joint responsibility for general affairs" to "joint decision-making over general affairs" during the 1983-84 period and then to "power-sharing" in the 1985-86 period. After formulating and refining policy positions in discussions with his officials, Heunis would then take the matter straight to PW Botha (interview nos. 7 and 12). The only way a given policy could be accepted and implemented was if Heunis caucused privately with PW Botha before saying or doing anything else. If PW Botha was convinced, they would work out how best to take the matter further. Their first step would be to get it through the relevant cabinet committee and then through cabinet and the SSC. It was tacitly accepted in these forums that if Heunis had reached the stage of being able to present proposals to the cabinet (or SSC), he must have already obtained the President's backing. This was a strong incentive not to oppose them. Once the cabinet, cabinet committees and SSC had accepted the proposal, it would be referred downwards to the NP caucus study groups and then to the relevant standing Committee for approval (interview nos. 7, 2, 14, '3). (Even the proposal required a shift in the overall NP policy framework (e.g. the need to enfranchise Africans at higher levels), then the process was more complex because it would mean piloting the proposal through the NP congresses - a process that could only be achieved by carefully manipulating the various opinion-forming centres in the political establishment. e.g. the press, university think-tanks, security circles and business. According to one NP MP who did not want to be named:

"Informal lines and pressure points are the most important during the early stages when you're trying to get a policy issue onto the agenda. But once you manage to influence thinking at the top, then the decision-making goes downwards through the formal channels. The caucus and the study groups are where you listen to what has been decided at the top. The crucial issue is how you reach the Minister and how you get other pressures and other people to reach him. The groundwork, the culture, must be created beforehand

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When finally the issue
this common culture must already
be there. Only then will the decision go your way."
otherwise you achieve nothing.
is raised in caucus.

the personal relationship between Heunis and
the thread on which the DCDP hung the whole
reformist project. As long as the OS? was committed to reform,
this fragile relationship acted as the conduit to: reformist
policy-making between the DCDP and PW Botha. One well placed
source described this when he said: "The informal exercise of
power is the lifeblood of the system." Once this broke down in
the face of mass black resistance to apartheid and the efforts
to reform it from above, Heunis's privileged access to the
political system effectively broke down and so did the reform
policy process.

The point is that
the President was
Phase 4: 1986-88
fundamental factors that do towards explaining
the relationship between Heunis and PW

challenges from bel

There were three

the eventual ruuture in t

Botha. Firstly, by 1986 mass-based oooulax

were makino it impossible for reform policies to be imolemente (see Swillina and Phillips, 1988; Swillina, 19883; Morris and Padavachee, 1988; Bham, 1989). This failure was interpreted by Botha as a sian that contrary to his early promises, Heunis he failed to persuade blacks to supocrt reform. Instead of Heunis promises that more reform would dowse the flames of resistance the "counter-revolutionarv" strategies propagated by the secur establishment became increasingly more appealing to PW Botha a unrest in the black communities mounted.

Secondly. in April 1986, fundamental differences of opinion between PW Botha and too officials in the DCDP ooened up on th issue of "city states". After Pw revived this idea publicly in early 1986, Heunis continued to insist that the city-state opt Dre-determined at best or contradicted at worst the new policy inciuding africans into "higher levels of decision-making" via the neqotiation process.

Thirdlv, by the end of 1985 it was clear that Allan Hendrickse was not ooiing to olav parliamentary politics in the way that Botha intended. To build a modicum of leoitimacv, Hendrickse actino in a way that, in Botha's eves. made him a major spanne in the works. 9w Botha blamed Heunis for this challenge to his policies and authority. As one well placed source put it: "Heu was the father of the tri-cameral parliament and during the ea reform period he oromised PH that if Hendrickse and Rajbansl c in they could be controlled. This proved to be a mistake. Thes quvs came in and after an initial period of playing the game t started to become independent operators. This made it impossib for PH and the cabinet to have their way in cabinet or in the standina committees." (interview no. 7).

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The most dramatic indication of Heunis' exclusion from the policy process came when EPG Mission was scuttled in Hav 1986 after the SADF mounted its three-onged bomb attack on the capitals of three front-line states. Heunis claimed that he first heard about the bombings on a news broadcast the morning he and other senior cabinet ministers were supposed to meet the 396 emissaries to discuss far-reaching negotiation proposals (Boraine, 1988a). From early 1986 onwards, Heunis no longer had the access to PW Botha that he previously enjoyed. As one source put it: "He presented reform policies to the cabinet cold with no knowing what would happen. obviously he not opposition and that was when the DCDP started slipping."

The fall of Heunis resulted in the restructuring of the DCDP under the supervision of the Commission for Administration. It started with the transfer of (a) social planning functions to the Department of National Health and Population Development; (b) scientific planning to National Education; and (c) the Central Economic Advisory Service (previously the economic "planning branch") and Statistical Services to the OSP. From 1 November 1986, the DCDP was divided into two basic components; (a) all socio-economic planning was put under the Department for Development Planning, and (b) all constitutional planning functions were brought together under Constitutional Development Services.

The welfare secretariat under the auspices of the OSP took over responsibility for the coordination of welfare policy. The NJMC, in turn, became the real nerve-centre of macro-coordination of all welfare and security policies.

The ex-Chief Director of Constitutional Planning, Fanie Cloete, criticised this dismembering of the DCDP when he said "the concept of integrated planning within one department was unfortunately dropped" and went on to point out that it is a fact that "inter-departmental planning is not as effective as intra-departmental planning" (Cloete, 1988:27-8). The point, however, was not simply a mistaken approach to planning. The real issue was how decision-making power was being restructured, centralised and rooted more firmly in the NJHC and NSMS.

The transfer of macro-policy coordination from the DCDP to the welfare secretariat and NJHC was followed by attempts by the OSP to intervene more directly in the affairs of the Department via key appointments to the Deputy Ministership. In June 1987 Botha appointed Stoffel Van Der Herwe as Deputy Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning with the explicit mandate to initiate constitutional negotiations with black leaders. Presumably this meant that the chief Director of Constitutional Development Support, Joq Van Tender, and the Director, Kobus Jordaan, were instructed to report to Van Der Herwe on the

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progress of their work. This move was interpreted as a decision by PW Botha to intervene directly in Heunis' terrain via Van Der Merwe, a man he is known to trust.

In March 1988 Van Der Merwe, having failed to initiate any negotiations with credible leaders of note, was removed from his post and appointed Minister in the OSP entrusted with the more straightforward portfolio of Information, Broadcasting and the Film Industry. Roelf Meyer was transferred from his post as Deputy Minister of Law and Order (and hence Chairman of the NJHC) and appointed Deputy Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning. What is significant is that Never was not given the same negotiation brief that was given to Van Der Herwe. In fact he was said to be more interested in re-organising the DCDP because it had no coordinated lines of command or accountability. He contrasted the DCDP to the more disciplined and hence effective structures of the NSHS that he had grown to appreciate while he chaired the NJHC (interview no. 54).

The final blow to the constitutional planning wing of the DCDP came in October 1988 when the security clearance of two top officials, Fanie Cloete and Kobus Jordaan, was withdrawn over the head of Heunis. This effectively removed two of the most innovative thinkers in the policy-making processes in the state and cleared the way for a very different conception of reform to

that which had been evolving in the DCDP. Two quotes capture this difference, one published in April 1988 in the 1987 Annual Report of the DCDP and the other from Magnus Haian in mid-1986:

"Constitutional Dianning is still aimed at reforming the status quo with a view to establishing a democratic dispensation which will afford all citizens equal political rights. ... The core issue of this debate is that one part of the population wants to be accommodated as a group in the constitutional structures and the other does not." (RSA, 1987)

"The important question is how many black people are merely interested in satisfying their material demands - housing, education, job opportunities, clothing, bread and butter etc. There is presently only a limited section which is really interested in political participation. I think for the masses in South Africa democracy is not a relevant factor." (Magnus Halan quoted in Die Suid-Afrikaan, Winter 1986)

PH Botha came down on one side of this debate during the 1988 Natal NP conference when he said: "As far as I am concerned. I am not considering even to discuss the possibility of Black majority Government in South Africa" (Botha, 1988a).

The constitutional planning departments of the DCDP were not the only ones to feel the penetration reach of the security establishment backed by the OSP during the Dost-EPG era. With the

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full activation of the NSMS in 1986 the JHCs began to usurp the role of the urbanisation and development planners in the DCDP. In March 1987, for example, Magnus Malan announced that he had taken "personal responsibility" for urbanising projects in Alexandra, Mamelodi, Bonteheuwel and New Brighton. "I want to see", he said, "to what extent I can better the living conditions of the people, to what extent I can get the people to accept the Government so that they don't break with the authorities and drift into the hands of the terrorists" (quoted in Boraine, 1988:1). There is evidence that the mini-JHCs controlling this process have excluded the DCDP from some welfare committees. This interference by the security forces in the operational sphere of the DCDP did not go unchallenged. In May 1986 Heunis read the writina on the wall and told Parliament: "I want to emphasize that it is the Government's standpoint that it is not and cannot be the aim of the security forces to take over state activities but that it is the responsibility of the security forces to create conditions within which other state activities can function properly within the social and political spheres" (Heunis, 1986:103 - our emphasis). In the final analysis, the clearest example of the decline of the DCDP is the fact that PW Botha hardly ever mentioned the words "reform" and "negotiation" in his speeches during 1988. Instead, when he talked about the National Council during his Budget Vote speech in April to parliament he said this structure would be "created and developed to effect deliberation and decision-making on the basis of consensus" (Botha, 1988b:182). His talk referred to "deliberations", "dialogue", "talks", "consultation" and "social and economic reform", but not "negotiation" or "reform".

PW Botha's new tone reflected the discourses of the security establishment which proceeded from the assumption that all those who refuse to talk to the government were by definition violent revolutionaries and hence targets of repression - a view that Heunis publicly rejected in July when he acknowledged "extra-parliamentary conduct" as long as it was "by way of constitutional methods ... The choice is not simply for or against violence" (see Heunis, 1988a).

In short, the life and times of the DCDP reflects the trajectory of reform. With its origins in the "planning branches" in the OPM in the early 1980s, the DCDP rose to its heyday during 1984-85 and then fell from glory as it was dismembered when the Emergency was declared. The heart of the DCDP was always its macro-coordination function. When this function was finally ripped out and transferred to the NJHC in 1986, the DCDP effectively lost its privileged place in the corridors of Power. It remains to be seen whether the DCDP will re-emerge under a new state President at the vanguard of a revitalised reform process.

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The JilkiDS. M-Eeg ionaljovreign .PQlLCllLBethHLILtuHAHLanLDQE. The making of foreign policy has only been tenuously accountable to parliament during the post-war period. Secrecy has been the hallmark of foreign policy formulation in South Africa. This is in large part due to the Government's long held belief in the need for confidentiality about the country's foreign relations, belief rooted in the fact that its apartheid policies have been almost impossible to defend in the rest of the world. This secrecy has become a bureaucratic habit which does to both the formulation of policy and its implementation. It has sometimes had serious political consequences, particularly in the cases of the information scandal of 1978, the unsuccessful invasion of Angola in 1975 and the backing provided for the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR) following the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980. Details of all three of these foreign policy initiatives were covered up, hidden and denied - in the case of Renamo for over seven years - before any public acknowledgement or accounting of these policies was given.

There have never been regular white papers on foreign affairs presented in Parliament, nor has there been any other form of continual reporting on foreign affairs to Parliament. (Geldenhuys, 1984:58) opposition calls for a parliamentary standing committee on foreign affairs have always been rejected

also on the around of the need for secrecy. (Geldenhuys, 1984:5
Parliament's role in the conduct of Foreign policy has therfoze
always been extremely restricted.

One further consequence of the tendency toward secrecy is that
Foreign policy making has for a long time been very much an
internal state affair, with little outside input. Even the
National Party caucus has no policy making role in Foreign
affairs. It is said to be "little more than a forum for the
(state president and Minister of Foreign Affairs to explain
Government policies and actions and to mobilise support if
necessary." (Geldenhuys, 1984:59) There is little caucus
discussion or debate on foreign policy issues and even
information provided to the caucus is frequently provided ex DO
facto; "the caucus is simply confronted with a fait accompli."
(Geldenhuys, 1984:60) As far as the National Party study group
on foreign affairs - the third largest study group after
security and racial affairs - is concerned, the leading academic
analyst of the foreign policy making process, Deon Geldenhuys,
concluded in 1984 that the majority opinion of members of the
study group was that it was no more influential in the
formulation of policy than the caucus as a whole. At best, the
felt, it provided a sounding board for the minister. (Geldenhuys
1984:61) Among senior officials in the Department, Geldenhuys
reported, the study group was "neither kindly nor highly
regarded." (Geldenhuys, 1984:63)

Under Vorster's administration key foreign policy decisions were made without even the DFA being consulted. For example, the DFA only heard of the SADF's first major offensive into Angola in 1975 when the Portuguese Government handed South Africa's ambassador in Lisbon a note of protest over the action. (Geldenhuys, 1984:79) Moreover, the Department of Information's countless secret projects all operated beyond the DFA's control or sphere of operations. Geldenhuys sums up both the Information and Angolan ventures as revealing an obsession with secrecy, the confinement of political decision making to very few people, the lack of inputs from interested parties within Government (notably the DFA), a corresponding absence of a system of inter-departmental checks and balances and the prime minister's lack of clear direction and control. (Geldenhuys, 1984:89) According to Maanus Halan it was the Angolan debacle of 1975 in particular which motivated the most important source to the development of a National Security Management System so as better to coordinate Government action (Halan, 1980). The systematisation of the NSHS has ensured a more regularised policy formulation process. In the field of foreign policy, this has provided the DFA with a permanent and structured position in the decision making process. Somewhat paradoxically, however, in itself this does not mean that DFA formulated policies are any more likely to become the policies of state. This is because the DFA is only one of a number of formally equal participants who provide inputs to the NSHS.

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(Source:
Sheldon,
1986:14)

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Figure X indicates the position of the DFA in the Foreign policy decision-making framework. The figure rests on an analytical division of the decision-making process into three major phases - pre-decisional, choice (or decisional), and implementation (or post-decisional). All Government departments make inputs in phase 1, but the most significant are those of the DFA and of the security and intelligence establishments respectively. One of the most important characteristics of this phase is said to be intense competition and conflict between the various intelligence organisations (Sheldon, 1966:4). The crucial phase is phase two, the decisional phase. The key structural position here is that of chairman of the SSC Secretariat and the Working Committee. Both positions are filled by the same man, the Secretary to the SSC who is currently SADF Major-General Charles Lloyd. Geldenhuys and Kotze (1983:40) referred to this position as that of the "Gatekeeper" and Grundy (1983:17) emphasised the ability of whoever fills it to "influence policy extensively." Lloyd has formerly held the post of commanding officer of the three most important SADF Commands - SWA Command, Northern Transvaal Command and Natal Command - as well as the position of head of the SADF's recently created special division of Internal Security. His predecessors in the SSC were Lt-General Pieter van der Westhuizen, the former chief of Military Intelligence and present ambassador to Chile, and Lt-General Andre van Deventer who commanded the 1975 SADF Angolan invasion. All have been military men with little sympathy for "dovish" foreign policy advice. The integration of the security and foreign affairs establishments parallels the transformation of domestic decision-making under the NSMS which we discussed earlier. But this is not to say that the Department of Foreign Affairs has become a mere tool of the security planners or that Pik Botha has become second fiddler in the foreign policy orchestra. State restructuring and bureaucratic centralization in the PH Botha era have had ambiguous consequences on the Department of Foreign Affairs. Despite SADF control of the support structures to the SSC, for example, it cannot prevent the minister of Foreign Affairs or his Director-General from presenting proposals directly to the SSC, thus by-passing the Secretariat and Working Committee. Thus the SADF majority in the Secretariat may be just as likely to produce inter-departmental antagonism and conflict as it is to ensure SADF control of foreign policy. (Sheldon, 1986:7)

Though it was subordinated to military prerogatives when the going for the military was good, and rumours abounded of little love lost between the ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs. 1988 saw the DEA come very publicly into its own. As it did so, surprising reports emerged that "superhawk" Magnus Malan had transferred his alliances in the National Party leadership stakes to the arch "dove". Pik Botha. The reasons behind the change in the fortunes -33-

of the DFA - and possible for the change in Malan's approach to Foreign Minister - lie in the military retreat from Southern Africa following the battle for Cuito Cuanavale. This marked a turning point for the military inspired Angola policy (Herbst, 1988; Younghusband 1983; Davies, 1969a and 1989b; see also editorial comment, *cjtggn*, 22.2.89) while on the other side of the coin the SADF's role in Mozambique began to attract opposition at the highest level in the West. Successful negotiations under the auspices of the DFA concluded the conflicts over Angola and Namibia and a trickle of development aid even started to flow to neighbouring Mozambique.

The DFA has regained some of the influence over Southern Africa foreign policy that it enjoyed during the early 1980s. This was reflected in its role in formulating the Grand Constellation of States idea (Sheldon, 1986; Geldenhuys, 1980; Uys, 1988). But its failure to win Frontline support laid the basis for SADF orchestrated policy of "destabilisation" (Davies and O'Heara, 1989). The State President has undoubtedly played a central role in these policy shifts. As chairman of the SSC and the ultimate executive authority in the state, "PW Botha has played

hls blessing to whlchever of the comoetina GIOUDS have presentm most persuasive araument." (Sheldon, 1986:16) However the NSH which is intended to regularise policy formulation and imolementation and coordinate a coherent set of policies, has n been able to overcome the fundamental differences which exist 0 foreian policy between these two main orotaqonists. In the las Elve vears this has had some bizarre consequences, Dartlclularly continuing policv differences toward Mozambique.

Foreign Affairs urainq combined with Western pressure and South African business interest in the Mozambican market produced the Nkomati accord in 1983. The capture of the MNR's Goronaosa bas central Mozambique in 1'85, however. revealed that the South At military had not abided by the accord's requirement that aid to HNR be stooped. The so-called "Vez diarv" discovered at Goronao contained embarrassing details of SAD? suooort for the HNR. It quoted then SADF chlef Constand Viljoen as advising the HNR "no be fcoled by the schemes of Pik Bctha because he is a traitor", (quoted in Sheldon, 1986:10) and contained other references to Botha as beinh a "Soviet nark" and a stooqe of Chester Crocker. (Davies. 1989b)

A recent example of public co-ooexation over Mozambique between departments was the R10 million of "non-lethal military aid" delivered to the Frelimo Government in November 1988. Accomoan the shipment, which was landed at Beira harbour, were three den ministers. Wynand Brevtenbach (Defence), Kobus Meirina (Foreian Affairs) and George Bartlett (Economic Affairs). (\$9ythern_Aiz Report, 2.12.1988) Yet widespread alleqatlons of SAD? (and SA suooort for the MNR continue unabated (Davies, 1989a and 1969b; Weekhlad. 27.1.1989: Citizen, 22 2.88). If true, they call int question Defense Minister Hagrus Halan's newly stated commitmen "stable. prosperous and developlnu nelqhbour" (Halan, 1988).

The most startling allegations are made in the usually well informed Africa Confidential. It reported in September 1988 that the Department of Military Intelligence was pushing ahead with a new strategy to rebuild support for the HNR after the damning US State Department Gezon Report which attributed 100 000 deaths and widespread brutality to the HNR, and compared it to Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge. Under the auspices of Military Intelligence chief Major-General van Tondet (who is said to regard Pik Botha as "a traitor at worst, naive at best") and Special Forces Commander Major-General van der Heide the image of HNR leader Afonso Dhlakama as a charismatic crusader is said to be being nurtured at a training base in the Transvaal where he is learning how to "speak, dress and behave" when dealing with journalists and foreign dignitaries. The MNR's ideological nerve centre is said to be at Phalaborwa where recruits are trained (Africa Confidential, 2.12.1987). HNR press releases are allegedly written in the operations room of Five Reconnaissance Commando in Phalaborwa, for release in Lisbon. Africa Confidential describes one tell-tale illustration in October 1987 of what it calls the "considerable operational autonomy" of the special forces as follows:

"Him Holtes, executive director of the South African Trade Association, had urged foreign shippers with goods destined for South Africa to unload at Maputo after floods in Natal had cut the railway line from Durban to Johannesburg. Twice in the next few days Special Forces saboteurs working alone or with Renamo destroyed bridges on the main South Africa to Maputo railway line, in one case within five kilometers of the border. South African cooperation with Maputo may appeal to businessmen but it is not part of the military plan." The outlook for South African foreign policy making in the next few years remains murky. The 1980s have been characterised, if anything, by a shifting but continually contradictory balance between Foreign Affairs: "moderation" (though minister Pik Botha has not been averse to threatening military action) and extremist militaristic policies. It is not so much a matter of the carrot or the stick, but an ongoing combination of both for reasons that seem to have little to do with the target state's responses. This contradictory balance may have been temporarily resolved in south western Africa, but even this seems endangered if there is any truth in recent reports that an MNR-type "counter-revolutionary" force is being created by the SADF in northern Namibia.

CONCLUSION

At the outset of the Dane: we posed three fundamental questions: -40..

structure capable of effectively

' is the current state

mechanisms of the National Party

implementing the reform:

Government?

' can the current state structure be used to implement policies that go beyond the current policy parameters of the NP

Government?

' to what extent is the current state structure an obstacle to the realisation of fundamental structural change?

This review of decision-making structures and policy-making processes has suggested that by 1988 the Office of the State President had become the epicentre of a highly centralised state power structure. This Office was able to take over the coordination of the different arms of executive decision-making and prepare the ground for "securocratic" rule. Many of our interviewees agreed with the reform planners of the early 1980s that the concentration of power in the hands of a "Great Legislator" was necessary to manage a process of top-down reform in a conflict-ridden society (Huntington, 1981). But in fact political reform had almost come to a halt by 1988. In the process, the OS? tightened its hold on executive power, distanced itself increasingly from public debate over political solutions and threw its resources into crisis management. This shift from "Great Legislator" to "Great Manager" of the "securocratic state"

evolved alongside proposed constitutional solutions that the DCDP had increasingly begun to recognize as unworkable. In particular, constitutional negotiations, power-sharing and the group-based "own affairs"/"general affairs" distinction had all become unviable policies.

Sami Terreblanche's imagery captured the nature of the Botha state when he wrote last year

"During the past decade, Botha's bureaucratic and 'securocratic' structures have been superimposed on all previous forms of apartheid, great Elysian buttresses built to keep the crumbling edifice in an upright position." (Terreblanche, 1988:26)

For the state to become effective as the NP government's instrument for implementing political reform, the ODP will have to regain its place as the vanguard of white society's search for a constitutional formula that shares power but protects white group interests - i.e. "power-sharing without domination". This is what will be required to cross what Schlemmer called a key "threshold":

"... the government's reforms have brought it to a threshold. Beyond this the issues of real power and white 'subsystem' self-determination are starkly exposed." (Schlemmer, 1988:52-3)

The reformers in the NP base their hope on the belief that the state will be able to make this transition despite its current Dreoccuoation with "crisis manaaement". Imolicit in the decision of those who finally broke from the NP Government is the considered conclusion that as long as state Dower remains as hiahly concentrated in the OSP and as deeply rooted in the immediate task of fiohtina a "counter-revolutionary War". the state will be an obstacle to chance rather than a facilitator of the desired transition to a non-racial democracy.

Once reformers have defined the state as an obstacle rather than a vehicle for extended and meanianul reform, they-are faced with the contradiction cf having to accept that the only way reform can be achieved is bv Dressurising what has been defined as an obstacle into acceptina the need for movino beyond the parameters of aovernment oollicv. There are three Dossible aooroaches reformers can adoot. Firstly, they can attemot to take control of the state via an electoral victory that would allow them to form a Government. This parliamentary road is the defining feature of the liberal oooosition. Despite Great optimism in PFP circles in Hav 1987 and currentlv amongst the Worralltes in the Democratic Party, there is no evidence that this strategy will recieve more support from the white electorate than in the past.

Secondly, liberals can oressurise the state directly, usually via oranaised business (e.a. the Urban Foundation) or through moderate black formations (e.q. Inkatha). Although important successes have been achieved bv this stratecv (e.o. with zegard to influx control and in 1988 on Group Areas). it has equally often met with failure (e.q. the fate of the Natal-Kwazulu Indaba and the squatter bills). Thirdlv, liberals can choose to throw their lot in with the extra-oarliamentary movements which exert Donular Dressure on both the oovernment and the state. This more long-term strateav is aimed at chanaina the system directly rather than via incremental shifts in policy. Although it is uncertain how this has affected the state, it has chanced extra-Darliamentary Dersoectives on how alliances for chance can be built between white establishment arouos and the black onoosition.

The formation of the Democratic Party, the growth in significance of business lobbies (e.q. Private Sector Council and Consultative Business Movement) and the emergence of radical white pressure Groups (e.q. Five Freedoms Forum) are indicators of a more determined effort amonust liberal and reformist aroups to mobilise aqalnst both the Government and state.

Finally, it is clear that the oraanisations that represent the black majority have very little chance at the moment of either over-throwina the state or forcing the state into accepting the need for a aenuine all-Darty negotiated settlement. In an interview conducted in Auaust 1987, Minister Heunis said: "You only neaotiate when you have no ootions left - and there are still oeoole in mv Government that think we have options." The -42-

township uogradlnq and slow

bottom-uo constitutional reform are seen as substitutes for the widespread call for a neaotiated settlement and remains the state's policy towards the question of black political rights. "elimination of revolutionaries",

In short, the state will probably not be able to resolve fundamental problems within the framework of government policy. Nor will it be easilv moved bevond these parameters by liberal and reformist lobbies located outside Government. It is also unlikely that mass-based oocular challenges from below will detonate the collapse of the state. It follows, therefore, that the current structure of state power and the policies pursued by its executive are an intrinsic Dart of the Drolonged violent stalemate that lies at the heart of the South African political dilemma.

NOTES

FOOTNOTES

1. This concern with decision-makinu structures flows from the new scholarly interest in "how the internal state dynamics shape the oollicv formulation process" (see Helliker's review, 1988:12)

It means accepting Wilmot James' suggestion (1984) about the utility of Weberian concerns for state organisation without abandoning extra-state determinants rooted in civil society (for General "managerialist" accounts of the state in the classic tradition see Bell, 1973; Dahrendorf, 1959; Giddens, 1984). For studies of state decision-making processes see Lindblom (1980) and Allison (1971). This chapter, however, will not attempt to explain in rigorous analytical terms the composition and strategies of the various decision-making structures in terms of class or communal interests rooted in civil society. That is a task for a longer more detailed work that examines state decision-making in its full social context. For recent works on the structure of apartheid that point to the need for the integration of political economy and decision-making studies, see Wolpe (1988), Lipton, (1985), Hindson, (1987) and especially Greenberg. (1987). The best works are a trilogy of recently completed Oxford D.Phil.s by Posel (1987), Dubow (1986) and Lazar (1987). The emerging "local Government" literature has paid considerable attention to decision-making processes (see Humphries and Totemeyer, 1988). This was also a key theme at the conference on Perspectives on the Contemporary South African state, Centre for Policy Studies, February 1989.

The "State Structures and Strategies" research project was inaugurated by the CPS in March 1988. It was coordinated by Mark Swilling and assisted by Mark Phillips. A total of 54 recorded interviews were completed, with approximately 25 done personally by the authors. The interviewees fell into the following categories: NP Members of Parliament, Conservative Party members of Parliament, National Democratic Movement Members of

Parliament, state officials. full-time NP officials, academics (including those who were previously state officials or advisers to the President's Office) and journalists. The documentary sources included newspapers. Hansard, official HP publications, speeches of government representatives, publications and annual reports from state departments, academic journals. unpublished papers and memos, and notes obtained from officials, journalists and other researchers. None of the interviewees and individuals who made available their notes will be identified for obvious reasons. Sannette Roos, Anton Roscombe, Beatrice????,???? and???? assisted in the collection and collation of information.

3. In 1987, exchequer personnel broke down into the following categories: 250 846 labourers, 249 377 educators, 88 770 nurses, 140 740 security personnel and a further 214 128 employees employed in 520 occupational classes (Commission for Administration, 1988:6).

4. Chairmen of "planning branches" in 1980 were as follows:

Security: General A.J. van Deventer

Science: Dr. A.P. Buraer

Economic: Dr. J.P. Drever;

Physical: W.F. Visagie

Constitutional: Professor L. Rautenbach

Social: General J.P. Roux

Administrative services: P.C. van Rooyen.

It is important to note that the chairmen of the planning branches were invariably chairmen of the working groups.

5. The 12 Point Plan:

"1. acknowledgment and acceptance of the multinationalism and minorities in SA;

2. acceptance of the principle of vertical differentiation with the built-in principle of self-determination on as many levels as possible;

3. creation of constitutional structures based on geographical areas which are consolidated as far as possible with the proviso that parts of these areas may choose to become 'independent';

4. division of power between whites, coloureds and Indians with a system of consultation in matters of common interest;

5. acceptance of the principle of separate schools and communities where possible; 1

6. removal of hurtful and unnecessary discrimination;

7. the interdependence of SA 'states' in economic and other areas;

8. the pursuit of the creation of a constellation of states;

9. opposition to interference in SA's internal affairs;

10. pursuit of a policy of qualified neutrality in clashes between East and West:

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11. maintenance of effective decentralisation-making and honest administration; and

12. maintenance of free enterprise system as a basis of economic and financial policy."

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