

This is Sohyo  
Japanese Workers and Their Struggles ,  
SOHYO



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Japanese Workers and Their Struggles  
SOHYO

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4500 --w \_MM

3,596

4000 2.2, ,W. , , , , 2 77 Upper Organizations A

3500 . , \_ . . \_ / / / \_ / \_ / / / / / / / - - - 7 -

3000 -##-- - , , , , , 7, 7

2,182 W, ,2

2500 " ' Fomr " " ' ,

1,067

## UNIONS WITH

NO AFFILIATION

077'

( THOUSAND )

(1) Total Number of Workers: 40,550,000

Total Number of Organized Workers: 12,471,270

Rate of Organization (Presumed): 30.80

(2) Organizations:

0 SOHYO(GencralCouncil of Trade Uniunx

of Japan) . . . . . 4,568,826

1' ) ( ) M1' i I ( Jupzmcsc Confederation of Labour) ..... 2,181,903

SIHNSANIHC'I'SU (National Federation of Industrial

Organizations) ..... 63,997

0 CHURI'ISUOREN (Federation of Independent

Unions) ..... 1,391,346

0 Unions Affiliated to Upper Organizations Other than

Above Cntrcs .....	3,595,887
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0 Unions with NO Affiliation .....	1,0673%	80
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(us :11 30 June 1981. Source: Labour Ministry, Labour Statistics)

## CONTENTS

### CHAPTER 1 POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF JAPAN

#### AND WORKERS) LIFE .....

1. Basic Data about Japan .....
2. Economic Characteristics of Japan .....
- (1) National Income and Industrial Structure .....
- (2) External Relationship OfJapanesc Economy .....
- (3) M(mopolies and Dual Structure .....
- (4) Low Growth Rate and New Problems .....
3. Characteristics of Japanese Politics .....
- (1) Reactionary Tradition and Postwar Reforms .....
- (2) Continuing Conservative Rule .....
- (3) International Relations .....
4. The Conditions of Japanese Workers .....
- (1) Traditionally Low Level ofThcir Conditions .....
- (2) Labor and Life under Recession and Slow  
Economic Growth .....

### CHAPTER 2 SOHYO ITS ROLli IN THIC JAPANESE TRADE

#### UNION MOVEMENT .....

1. Trade Union Movement from Prewar lo Poslwur Days .....
2. History of Sohyo .....
- (1) Founding ()fSohyo 2lnd Sohyok Program .....
- (2) OrganizationalDevelopment .....
- (3) Historical Review ofSohyo Activities .....
- a. Wage Struggle .....
- b. Struggle to Reform liconomy, Society and  
Politics .....

9

()

10

IO

10

12

14

16

16

I7

19

19

I9

44

## CHAPTER 3

### THE PRESENT STATE OF JAPANESE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT AND ACTIVITIES OF SOHYO ..... 58

#### 1. Sohyo and Present State of Japanese Trade Union Movement . 58

##### (1) A General Picture of Trade Union Organizations . . . . 58

##### (2) Sohyots Organizational Picture ..... 59

#### 2. Direction of Activities of Sohyo and Other Japanese Trade Unions ..... 66

##### (1) For the Protection of the Living of Workers ..... 66

##### (2) Changes in Social Structure and the Role of Trade Unions ..... 70

##### (3) For the Establishment of Basic Labor Rights, Especially the Rights to Strike ..... 76

##### (4) Unification of Labor Fronts ..... 76

##### (5) Peace and International Solidarity ..... 80

##### (6) Toward the let Century ..... 82

## APPENDIX

### Constitution ..... 99

### List of Sohyo-Afflliated Labor Organizations ..... 118

### List of Regional Labor Councils

## CHAPTER 1 POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF JAPAN AND WORKERS' LIFE

This booklet is to introduce to you the most powerful national labor organization in Japan, Sohyo, or the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan. As the largest trade union federation with a 4.5 membership, Sohyo has been, and is, conducting struggles to defend the workers' life in all its aspects. Guided by its proper policies and inspired by militant spirit, Sohyo and the mass movements related to it play a major role in the political and economic life of Japan today. First, let us take a glimpse into the land, politics, economics, and workers' conditions in Japan in order to help understand what Sohyo is doing.

### 1. Basic Data about Japan

Japan is a long chain of islands located in the northwest of the Pacific. This archipelago consists of 3,900 islands, the main ones being Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu and Okinawa Islands strewn over a vast distance from north to south. Japan's land area is approximately 370,000 square meters, but only 30 per cent of the area is flat land. As of 1975, 116,920,000 people lived in these islands (57,490,000 of them men and 59,430,000 women). While the per square kilometer population density is 316 persons, the country's urban centers have 7,712 persons per square kilometer, the highest density in the world.

Japan is an Asian country. It has as its distant neighbors across the Pacific Mexico, the United States of America, and Canada, and its closer northern, western, and southern neighbors are the Soviet Union, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China, and the Philippines.

The Kuriles are Japan's proper northern territories, but the Soviet Union has been claiming its sovereignty over them ever since the end of World War II. The Japan-USSR Joint Communiqué issued in October 1956 stated that Habomai and Shikotan Islands would be reverted to Japan after a peace treaty has been signed by the two countries. But the territorial

issue involving the Kuriles remains unsettled.

Okinawa Islands at the southernmost tip of Japan were under the U.S. administration for many years in the postwar period. Though they were returned to Japan in April 1972, the huge U.S. military bases and installations there are retained intact. in violation of the aspirations of the broad sections of the Japanese workers and people. Okinawa remains a vital link of the U.S. global strategy.

## 2. Economic Characteristics of Japan

### (1) National Income and Industrial Structure

Japan is a highly developed industrial country. By way of statistics, Japan's gross national product in 1980 totaled 235,000 billion yen (approximately \$1,036,200 million at the year's average real exchange rate, or 226.7 yen to the dollar). Japan places third in the world on the GNP list, following only the United States and the Soviet Union.

In the same year, Japan had 57,080,000 people in labor force. They were composed of 15,680,000 self-employed persons and their family members (27.1 per cent), 37,710,000 employees (66.1 per cent), and 1,410,000 unemployed (2.5 per cent). These figures show that the overwhelming majority of the population are employees and their families. The industrial composition of the employed population is illustrated by Table 2. As the table indicates, most of the employed population in Japan are in the secondary and tertiary industries, an indication that Japan is a highly developed industrialized country. In addition to the diminishing share of the primary industry work force, a new noticeable tendency of declining secondary industry employees and increase in tertiary industry employees has emerged since the latter half of the 1970s.

### (2) External Relationship of Japanese Economy

While Japan thus has all the characteristics of a developed industrial country, the international environment surrounding the Japanese economy is different from that of the European countries and the United States. Unlike the United States or the Soviet Union, Japan is not a continental

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country with vast natural resources to make it self-sufficient.

Japan is devoid of natural resources to support its highly developed industrial level. According to 1978 statistics, Japan depends 100 per cent on import for supply of bauxite, mineral phosphate, natural rubber, raw cotton, and wool. It is highly dependent upon foreign sources for the supply of such staple industrial and energy materials as crude oil (99.8 per cent), iron ore (99.5 per cent), copper ore (97.5 per cent), salt (85.5 per cent).

With regard to foods, Japan's dependency on foreign sources is more than 90 per cent for wheat, soybeans and sugar though it is self-sufficient in rice supply. These circumstances have imposed on the Japanese economy dependency on processing trade. In other words, Japan imports raw materials and exports manufactured goods. In fact, more than 80 per cent of the ships, cameras and weaving machines produced in Japan are exported. The export rates are about 60 per cent for sewing machines, television sets, and synthetic textiles, 50 per cent for cars, and 40 per cent for steel products.

This pattern of dependency on export dates back to the early period of Japanese capitalism. Historically, capitalism grew in Japan on the basis of poor peasant masses and low waged workers. Consequently, the domestic final consumption market remained narrow. In addition to this historical factor, the need to import most of the raw materials created a peculiar system of reproduction, and this in turn oriented most of the Japanese business corporations toward foreign markets. The widely known Sogo Shosha (integrated trading firm) special to Japan is a product of this strong export-orientedness of Japanese business.

Japanese business firms have drawn its international competitiveness basically from their low labor costs. While the low labor cost contributed toward aggrandization of profits and activation of investments, it kept domestic demand relatively small. This last factor makes business even more foreign market-oriented. This vicious circle still remains to today. This is also why Japan often emerges as a disruptor of international economic order, and this same process negatively affected the living standards of the Japanese workers and people in general.

Another characteristic aspect of Japan's international environment is that unlike European countries, Japan is not surrounded by homogenous

national economies of about the same economic structures and of similar levels of national income. Politically, some of the Japanese neighbors are socialist countries and others are ruled by military dictatorships. But they are alike developing countries. Itself a developed industrial country, Japan is surrounded by developing countries. This particular economic circumstance denies Japan the possibility of benefiting from a regional economic integration of the European type. Nor has Japan's trade union movement been influenced by workers' movements in neighboring countries. Recently, however, some of Japan's neighbors are rapidly industrializing. Moreover, Japan is developing serious economic friction with advanced industrial regions. All these place Japan under increasing influences of international economy.

### (3) Monopolies and Dual Structure

Exerting dominant influence upon the Japanese economy are a series of oligopolies. In the steel, automobile, energy, chemical and other major industrial branches, several giant companies hold sway. They exert immense influence upon politics, and are amply protected by the government. They are in a position to determine all aspects of the national economy in accordance with their interests. Of course, the economic power of oligopolies is common to all advanced capitalist countries, but in the Japanese case, the formation of oligopolies has some distinct features. In the first place, corporate groups of oligopolistic formation should be mentioned. In the pre-World War II period, Japan had so-called "zaibatsu" groups as the dominant economic power controlling the entire economy. "Zaibatsu" groups were organized around rich families. The Fuyo and Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank (Mitsubishi) families among others, and the holding companies owned by these families controlled major companies in main industrial areas. After the war, the zaibatsu as such was dissolved. But taking the place of zaibatsu were new corporate groups built around leading banks (Mitsubishi Bank and Fuyo Bank for instance) which played the role of headquarters for the respective groups. Sogo Shosha (integrated trading firms) are responsible for domestic and international trade on behalf of all the major industrial branches covered by their respective groups. Each corporate group thus comprises major companies from different industrial branches.

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Corporate groups are thus organized as organic business bodies. Firms organized into each corporate group are closely interconnected financially and personnel-wise, and the group mobilizes its integrated power in investment in pioneer industries as well as in overseas expansion. These corporate groups in fact command gigantic economic power. In the meantime, coexistence between Zaibatsu-affiliated big companies and pre-modern medium and small enterprises has characterized the Japanese economic structure ever since the pre-war period. This dual structure originated in the fact that industrialization in Japan started later than in Europe. After World War II, Japanese capitalism embarked on the course of recovery, but in this process, the dual structure was not overcome but survived through reorganization. Until the middle of the 1960s, Japan had huge latent unemployment amongst peasantry and self-employed population. This in spite of relatively low official unemployment statistics in that period. Under these circumstances, pre-modern medium and small enterprises could survive taking advantage of the low wages and long work time that prevailed under the pressure of large unemployment. A large wage gap between major enterprises and medium and small enterprises such as does not exist in other advanced industrial countries persisted in Japan, and though this wage gap was significantly squeezed in the 1960s, it never ceased to exist. On the contrary, the wage gap has recently begun to widen again. Nor is there a nationally uniform minimum wage system in Japan although the trade union movement conducted long-term struggle for it. Oligopolistic corporations organize medium and small firms where wages are low as their subcontractors, and obtain special profits by this practice. The dual structure goes beyond this subcontract relationship. Big enterprises bring this discriminatory structure right into their plants by directly hiring temporary or part-time workers (who often do the same jobs as regular workers) and subjecting them to inferior and discriminatory working conditions. The strong competitiveness of Japanese companies, it is true, owes partly to their high technological level. But it is also true that their success in reducing labor cost largely owes to this shrewd utilization of the dual structure.

#### (4) Low Growth Rate and New Problems

The Japanese economy is accredited to the best economic performance of 311 the slump-hit advanced industrial countries. It is true that the Japanese economy achieved an amazingly high growth of annually more than 10 per cent in real terms from the 1605 through the early 1705. Though this growth period saw a fairly high price increase, disruption of environment and other serious problems, Japan was able to come close to Europe and the United States in material terms and achieved nearly full employment as far as official statistics were concerned. In that period, the wage level also rose by an average of more than 5 per cent in real terms each year. But this economic growth phase came to an end in the wake of the first oil crunch in 1973. The second oil crisis followed in 1978. At the end of the 1705, the Japanese economy entered into a new stage entailing a number of difficult problems.

The economic growth rate has signally lowered from the preceding growth period as Table 3 indicates. Especially after 1981, the annual growth rate has been constantly in the range of 2-3 per cent in real terms per annum. The actual growth rates have been significantly lower than the governments earlier medium-term projection of 5 per cent per year. At this stage, two causes can be identified for this decline in growth rates. The first cause is stagnant domestic demand, especially final consumption demand. As is later examined fully, the real disposable income of working families has been decreasing year after year. This is partly because the wage growth rate has lowered and partly because in the absence of price-scaled income tax cuts, working families are compelled to pay even increasing income taxes. Sohyo and all other trade unions are unanimously demanding income tax cuts. But the government not only failed to take steps to expand the purchasing power of the masses. On the contrary the government in 1982 decided not to raise the salaries of the public sector workers. Furthermore, working together with big business associations, the government attempted to freeze wages of the private sector workers as well. The government thus practically imposed an incomes policy upon the masses. This being the case, domestic demand is kept low. In the meantime, Japan's exports, which had been vigorous until 1980 and were partly responsible for mass unemployment in western

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countries, began to drop in 1981 in the wake of a simultaneous recession affecting all advanced industrial countries. This came to circumvent the export-dependent growth pattern of the Japanese economy.

With economic growth slowed down, the working conditions of Japanese workers are deteriorating and their living standards pressed down when unemployment is increasing. (Their working conditions will be examined in more detail in later chapters.)

It should also be pointed out that the state finances of Japan face a serious crisis when economic activities are flagging. Rapid economic growth was overshadowed already after the 1973 and 1978 oil crises. It is recalled that after the first oil crunch, the Japanese economy suffered an unprecedented setback, but at that time, the government was still able to take the traditional stimulating policy of generating effective demand artificially. It was a policy mix comprising financial measures and increased public investments, and at that time, public investments were still able to be met by a corresponding tax revenue. Since 1975, tax revenue has fallen short of the necessary public investment requirements. Moreover, the scale of slump that emerged was too large to be cushioned by the size of public investments that could be afforded by the state budget. Furthermore, the preceding Tanaka Cabinet had already committed large public investments to the limit of state treasury. All in all, the government had to begin to issue deficit state bonds to make enough public investments to create effective demand. (Fig 1) Deficit bonds issued since have accumulated until the total bond balance reached a staggering 82000 billion yen in 1981. If bonds issued by local governments are added, the Japanese governments public debts amount to 100,000 billion yen. The current Japanese GNP being 250,000 billion yen the state bond balance as it stands is equal to 30 per cent of GNP. This means that the Japanese government, including local governments, owe about 1,000,000 yen to each Japanese citizen.

The huge state debts in the form of state bonds are the consequence of the governments stimulating policy measures. However, state debts could have been relatively easily overcome if economic growth were rapid enough, for the state tax revenue would have then been correspondingly large. But it so happened that the government started to issue deficit bonds precisely when the economic growth rate began to lag and when

stimulus no longer served to invigorate economic activities. Under these circumstances, state bonds, once issued, only added pressure to the state treasury, and this set of circumstances has led to the current fiscal crisis. Faced by this situation, the Liberal Democratic government attempts to resort to an administrative reform? By this are meant cuts in social security, medical service, education, transportation and other public services as well as a wage freeze for public workers. But these measures only serve to further lower the living standards of the people and to emaciate economic activities in general.

### 3. Characteristics of Japanese Politics

#### (1) Reactionary Tradition and Postwar Reforms

The Japanese policy has its particular characteristics which are distinct from those of European countries and the U.S. Japan underwent a sort of bourgeois revolution in 1867-68, but that transformation almost lacked the modern democratization process which European countries had gone through. The new rulers were sons of the same old warriors' class (samurai) who established an authoritarian regime with the Emperor at the top. The parliament (Diet) was established in the 1890s, but its power was restricted. It was only after World War I that the first party cabinet was organized and as late as 1925 that universal suffrage (for men only) was introduced, enabling working class parties to obtain parliamentary seats. But soon the Great Depression occurred, bringing a fascist-type political rule in its wake. After 1931, Japan under militarist influence started full-scale invasion of other countries, and a military rule was established by 1940, under which political parties were totally neutralized. Generally speaking, the Japanese ruling group until 1945 was never fully challenged by democracy. Under this reactionary political rule, Japanese trade union movement and workers' parties were mercilessly repressed. It was only after the end of World War II that they could start full-scale activities. In industries, feudalistic elements remained steadfast, and labor-management relations too were shaped in a despotic and status-based vertical formation, instead of governed by the modern concept of contract.

In a series of industrialized European countries, workers' parties (Labor Parties or Social Democratic Parties), linked with trade union movement, assumed power in the post-World War II period. These countries were gradually transformed into welfare states. Even where workers' parties failed to come to power, great progress toward democracy was made as no government could hope to manage the country without coming to some terms with trade union movement in politics and economies. It is true that in Japan, too, a democratic system comparable to the European model as far as its formal aspects went was introduced in the period of US. occupation following the end of World War II. The Japanese Constitution promulgated in that period, for instance, is a legal masterpiece Japan can be proud of to the test of the world. The Japanese ruling groups time and again attempted to revise the Constitution to attain their reactionary goals, but as far as the text of the Constitution is concerned, the Japanese working class movement has frustrated all such attempts so far. But mere formalistic democratization never succeeded in truly democratizing the mind and policy of the Japanese ruling class. Especially after the Cold War became aggravated, the US. Occupation actively supported the reactionary political groups and monopoly enterprise managers. Encouraged by this move, the authoritarian and reactionary groups loyal to their prewar traditions regained their power. Japan became independent in 1952 with the enforcement of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, but the conservative politicians have demonstrated their reactionary and militaristic attitude by, for instance, picking a war criminal as prime minister. or attempting to abolish the peace clauses of the Constitution. This reactionary and authoritarian mentality finds its clear expressions, for instance, in the attitude of the conservative politicians and Supreme Court judges who refuse to recognize the public corporation and public service workers right to strike.

#### (2) Continuing Conservative Rule

Japan in fact has been ruled for more than 30 years since 1948 by these conservative political groups. It should be pointed out that since 1955 when all the conservative parties merged into the Liberal Democratic Party, Japan has had no change of ruling parties. The conservative politi-

cians, over more than a quarter of a century, have been pursuing anti-labor policies, in close partnership with giant corporation leaders, high officials of administration and judicature and with the majority of media leaders. To keep their political rule secure, they have allocated unproportionately many Diet seats to constituencies dominated by the conservative forces; they also have received colossal donations from big business to buy votes; they also have been utilizing the corporate management systems for their electioneering campaigns.

The opposition parties have not been effective enough to counter this situation. The leading force of the opposition has been, and is, the Japan Socialist Party. This party, founded in 1945 inheriting the diverse worker party traditions in the prewar period, for a brief period in 1947 became the leading force of a coalition government. The party got split into the right and left factions in 1951-55; it was dealt a blow in 1959 by the creation of the splinter Democratic Socialist Party. But in the main, the party, bucked strongly by Sohyo, remained practically the single effective opposition party from 1950 through the early half of the 1960s when the Communist Party had but very few Diet seats. But since the 1111(13608, the Opposition has begun to diversify, with the Komei (clean government) Party backed by a religious force, the Democratic Socialist Party supported by Domeit and the Communist Party increasing their Diet strength.

The Japanese political situation also started to change in the T705, especially after the oil crunch in 1973. The new situation was characterized by mounting public criticism of the Liberal Democratic Government for its failure in economic policies attempts to increase taxes, and corruption and intra-party factional strifes. Under these circumstances, prime ministers since 1972 had to change at an interval of two years on an average, and the Liberal Democratic Party suffered major setbacks in the 1976 and 1979 House of Representatives elections. For some years, the Diet forces of opposition about matched that of the ruling party. But the Liberal Democratic Party again achieved an overwhelming victory in the simultaneous Upper and Lower House elections held in June 1980, and the Suzuki Cabinet that came to power subsequently carried out starkly reactionary policies long on the agenda of the Japanese conservatives, the major ones of which were rapid buildup of the military to make Japan

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a big military power and welfare cuts. The Nakasone Cabinet, assuming power at the end of 1982, stepped up this set of policies in a more obvious manner. These moves however are being countered by the growing offensive of the opposition parties and the masses of people. As of 1983, factors prognostic of a political change are growing. Table 4 shows the party-wise composition of Diet seats.

### (3) International Relations

The Japanese conservative political groups in 1951 concluded the Japan-US. Security Treaty simultaneously with the Peace Treaty. thus offering Japanese military bases to the United States. Later, in 1955, Japan restored diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Diplomatic relations were established in 1977 with the Peoples Republic of China. Nevertheless, the Japanese conservative politicians have been consistently following a pro-American policy. With the coming to power of Mr. Ronald Reagan. the US. government started to step up its pressure on Japan for rapid military buildup. and the Japanese military budget. under this pressure is being increased fastest of all expenditure items despite the serious Fiscal crisis faced by the country. Strong concern has been expressed about this military buildup as a clear sign of revival of militarism in Japan. Particularly strongly alarmed by the Japanese military program are Japan's neighboring countries including ASEAN countries which Japan regards as its allies. In the economic area, Japan is developing more serious trade friction with other countries, European countries. among others who are compelling Japan to take new measures to accommodate with them economically.

### 4. The Conditions of Japanese Workers

#### (1) Traditionally Low Level of Their Conditions

For many years Japanese workers have been suffering from low working conditions, far worse than in other advanced industrial countries. The modern industries that first developed in Japan were silk reeling and spinning industries, where a vast number of poor peasants daughters were

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mobilized, severed from their native villages. The presence of a large number of surplus population in rural areas helped capitalists to hire workers at low wages. The first Factory Law in Japan took effect after 1910, but until that time, Japanese women workers had been subject to 12 hour work days and two-shift systems covering full 24 hours. The working environment was abject, and more than 10 per cent of the women workers would contract tuberculosis within several years after hiring and had to return to their home villages sick. The working conditions for male workers, employed mainly in the machinery industry, were basically no different. In principle, they were paid the amount of wage barely enough to sustain their single life. To support their families they had to work extra for many hours. Following the outbreak of World War I, heavy industrial and chemical enterprises felt they had to take some steps to keep workers, turnover to a minimum. Thus they introduced a new wage scale called the seniority wage system and some intrafirm welfare systems as well. But the life-long wages remained exorbitantly low. Moreover, it was only a limited number of workers who could expect to be employed by these big enterprises.

The low working conditions of Japanese workers did not change drastically after World War II ended. Japanese capitalism embarked on the path of rehabilitation in 1949 dismissing a large number of workers. The vast unemployment thus created helped preserve the low working conditions of Japanese workers and accelerated the process of building up "dual structure" on a new basis as was earlier explained.

But the post World War II-period had a decisively important factor that had been absent before: the emergence of mass trade union movement. Especially since 1950, the presence of Sohyo has enabled the Japanese working class to display its potential in resisting unilateral decisions of capital to curtail the working conditions. Even so, Japanese workers have never become free from their low working conditions. Especially, the workers at medium and small enterprises and temporary workers pressed to the bottom of the dual structure continued to suffer from low wages in spite of Sohyo's year-long struggle. In the absence of an effective minimum wage system, their miserable working conditions have not been overcome to today.

As we see later, Sohyo organized its First Spring Struggle (Shunto) in 1950

1956 (preceded by a prototype organized in the previous year). It was in that year that the Japanese economy entered the so-called super growth period. The Japanese economy began to grow at the highest pace of all developed industrial economies. Though Japan suffered from a benign recession later, the super growth lasted until 1973 as the most salient feature of the entire postwar Japanese economy. Why such a rapid economic growth was achieved is explained in many ways. Some of the explanations given are that Japan succeeded in applying the most advanced technology precisely because its technological innovation started later than in other advanced countries, that a special fiscal policy implemented mainly by the Bank of Japan effectively worked; that at the outset of super-growth powerful state protection was provided to facilitate trade expansion and to lubricate international movement of capital; that the military expenditures remained relatively low partly because of powerful resistance by Japanese workers, enabling a large portion of state funds to be funneled for the creation of industrial infrastructure. But it must be pointed out that the basic cause for Japan's economic super growth was the low labor costs of the Japanese industry. The Japanese ruling groups, on their part took a variety of measures to keep the labor costs low. Here let us examine the vicissitudes of the Japanese workers in the supergrowth period, or from around 1955 through the early 1970s.

(a) Employment Trends

The employment trends in this period are shown by Table 5. Employment remarkably expanded in this period. The number of employed persons in the sectors other than agriculture and forestry more than doubled from 15,440,000 in 1955 to 36,170,000 in 1975. Until that period, independent farmers used to carry a heavy weight in the Japanese population, but their place was taken by the employed population in the process of rapid economic growth. The employees became the overwhelming majority of the population by the middle of 1970s.

The employees are broken down by industries as Table 6 illustrates.

As statistics from 1960 through 1970 indicate, the number of employees grew particularly in the secondary industry centering on the manufacturing and construction branches as well as in the tertiary industry. In the manufacturing industry, employees increased particularly rapidly in the

automobile and electrical machinery branches. This indicates that Japan in that period not only industrialized itself but also became one of the modern industrialized countries. With total employment growing, demand for modern labor force with high technological training increased, and even a shortfall of young labor force emerged in the 1960s. The rate of unemployment by government statistics stayed in the neighborhood of 1.5 per cent.

But the general increase in employment did not guarantee stable jobs to all of the Japanese workers: (1) the energy revolution that began toward the end of the 1950s victimized coal miners, causing most of them to lose jobs; after the mid-1960s, the economic structure began to modify, again causing many to lose jobs; for instance, many textile workers lost jobs following competition of developing countries; and most of the unemployed were not assured of proper reemployment opportunities such as would give them their pre-unemployment wages; (2) the life-time employment system prevalent in Japan virtually took on the character of a premature retirement system as the average age of population ascended; moreover, the pension systems supposed to ensure decent living for retirees far from complete, the overwhelming majority of retirees had to seek new jobs; but the job opportunities for them were few even during the supergrowth period, making their reemployment extremely difficult; and this subjected even the successful ones to extraordinarily low wages; and (3) to meet their labor shortage, many employers recruited a tremendous number of marginal workers from rural areas as seasonal workers and mobilized many housewives as part-time workers. These workers, organized into the lower stratum of the dual structure, were generally paid very low; although their daily wages rose at certain times, they were denied severance pays, paid holidays and other intra-firm benefits; they were also in a rightless position concerning employment as the employers retained their right to dismiss them any time by refusing to renew contracts.

#### (b) Wages and Living Standards

It is true that the wage level conspicuously rose during the economic growth period. The average monthly wage (cash-paid wage) grew from 18,624 yen in 1955 to 177,212 yen in 1975. Wages climbed largely

thanks to the the Spring Struggle led by Sohyo. By conducting spring struggles, Japanese workers succeeded in raising their nominal wages, and partly due to the exchange rate fluctuation from the pre-1970 rate of 360 yen to the peak rate of 200 yen to the dollar, the Japanese workers' statistical wage level has come to exceed the levels of a series of European countries.

But the effect of this nominal wage boost upon the life and work of Japanese workers has been greatly cancelled by several factors.

One of such factors was the rapid rise in productivity. In the same period when wages rose, violent business rationalization drives were carried out centering on technological innovation intensification of labor. In the latter half of the 1950s, the productivity increase rate exceeded the wage growth rate. At no time up to now has the wage growth rate been above the productivity increase rate. For this reason, labor's share in value added, which in the 1950s declined to the lowest level of all advanced industrial countries has never improved all through the supergrowth period. Another factor was the rising price index. The consumer price index continued to rise annually at 4-8 per cent in the 1950s, keeping the real wage increase rate lower than the nominal wage increase rate.

The third factor pertains to wage differential. The specially Japanese type seniority wage system subjected young workers to unreasonably low wages while the dual structure imposed discriminatorily low wages on medium and small enterprise workers. These two wage gaps narrowed in the early half of the supergrowth period partly owing to labor shortage and partly thanks to trade union efforts. But in the latter half of the 1960s, the gaps ceased to close. For instance, the wage gap between workers employed at enterprises each with 500 or more workers and those at small enterprises each with less than 30 workers got frozen at a ratio of 100 to 60. If fringe benefits workers at big enterprises are entitled to are counted, this gap is even wider. Also, the number of temporary workers rapidly increased during this supergrowth period.

The fourth factor concerns the changing mode of living that created new difficulties for workers' livelihood. The consumer life of working people, it is true, changed for the better during the supergrowth period in the wake of the rapid expansion of the productive forces. Consumer demand for cars, color-TV sets and air conditioning equipment maintained a high

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level, and working people became enthusiastic about obtaining their own houses. Working families also tried to send their children to high schools, the high school goers ratio exceeding 90 per cent. Working people saw their living standards in real terms improve and social disparities dwindle simultaneously. While the personal consumption level thus ascended, the social framework of living failed to improve. This reflected the drastic gap between the burgeoning private equipment investment and slow growth in public investment. Public funds were committed preferentially for the purpose of accelerating private capital accumulation. Since the workers living in contemporary society depends more and more on state socioeconomic policies, this failure posed new difficulties to working people. Thus long- and medium-range livelihood difficulties such as involved post-retirement livelihood guarantee, housing and education emerged as serious problems for the working people.

Most of the European countries, after World War II, followed the policy of social equity, centering on expansion of transfer income through progressive taxation and minimum livelihood guarantee for all people. In Japan, however, the fiscal program has been implemented mainly to facilitate rapid capital accumulation. While business corporations gained big profits thanks to a low level of labor's share in value added, the corporate gains were never adequately redistributed through tax channels. The progressive tax curve was not steep enough. It is true that the minimum taxable income was raised as inflation proceeded, but the tax rates were not revised. For this reason, the tax burden gradually became heavier on the average income families. Against this background, the actual tax burden shouldered by the masses is far heavier in Japan than in other countries despite Japan's relatively low ratio of tax to GNP.

Furthermore, the social insurance benefits including unemployment insurance, benefits and old age pensions remain small. While some advanced industrial countries are transferring 25 per cent of the national income for income redistribution purposes, the ratio has not reached even the 10 per cent level in Japan. Thus, Japanese workers are hardly protected from old age, unemployment, sickness and accident risks, and therefore they have to make preparations for post-retirement security, accidents and other mishaps for themselves. They are thus compelled to save for themselves. The high savings ratio in Japan reflects Japanese workers' situation.

social poverty.

Most of the advanced industrial countries in Europe have laid as much emphasis on the creation of social infrastructure related to people's livelihood as on economic development. In this effort, the European governments have been making great efforts in the area of medical services, urban planning and housing programs. In Japan, however, public investments have been oriented mainly toward the buildup of industrial infrastructure (land reclamation for industrial sites, road and port construction etc.) which helps only to expand private corporate profits. Allotment of resources is grudged for the arrangement of proper social infrastructure assisting workers' living. In this highly developed industrial country, there are frequent reports that acute patients have died for the lack of first-aid clinics readily accommodating them. Such occurs even in big cities. The space of parks, the ratio of sewer system-equipped houses and the number of welfare service workers per population all stay extremely low.

In addition, business enterprises during the rapid economic growth period were reluctant to increase outlay for the prevention of industrial accidents, industrial diseases and pollution. While actively internalizing the benefits of external economy created by public investments, business enterprises were letting out internal diseconomies caused by their production processes into the environment. Thus, the living environment of urban workers deteriorated seriously during the supergrowth period.

## (2) Labor and Life under Recession and Slow Economic Growth

In the present stage where we have experienced two oil crises, the labor and living conditions of Japanese workers are further worsening. Under the global inflation caused by the deepening crisis of the international monetary system, the Japanese government around 1972 took a policy of overheating economic activities, which, given a spur by the oil crisis in 1973, set loose a frantic consumer price spiral. Sohyo and the majority of workers and working people thereupon delivered a mighty counterblow at this policy, giving a menace to the conservative rule which had enjoyed stability since 1955. Under this pressure, the government was compelled to adopt a set of policies stabilizing the price situation. But the

t25\_

gross demand-suppressing policy, taken in this context, only served to reveal the essential narrowness of the domestic market and the relative excess in production capacity - the situation prepared by the preceding excess investments and the selective growth of the heavy and chemical industries. At this juncture, Japanese heavy and chemical industries sought their way out in export, but their effort to increase export created international antagonisms. Moreover, with the float system at work, this caused the yen appreciation. This again jolted all industrial branches excepting the most advanced export sector. Faithful to its tradition, the Japanese government reacted to this by taking steps to expand the domestic markets of heavy and chemical industries. Thus, in fiscal 1978 the government compiled a large budget with a deficit amounting to 37 per cent of its size. In the same year, the second oil crisis cropped up. In reacting to this crisis, however, Japan is said to have developed the best and most exemplary economic performance of all the advanced industrial countries. In fact, the consumer price growth rate in the post-second oil crisis years was more moderate and the real economic growth rate tolerably higher than after the first crisis. But some serious problems were already lurking. The economic growth in real terms attained in that period was dependent mainly on promotion of exports. Exports continued firm in tone even after 1979, but domestic demand sagged due to slow growth of peoples income. The fiscal crisis also became more serious as the state finances had already depended heavily on issue of deficit bonds. This crippled the governments capacity to create demand by fiscal means. In the latter half of 1980 a "consumption slump" set in, and in and after 1981, exports slackened under the influence of the worldwide recession. All these pressed down Japans real growth rate to a low level.

In this economic situation, Japanese workers are confronted by a new crisis affecting their lives and work. This crisis is manifest in several areas.

First, concerning the employment situation, unemployment jumped the moment the recession set in. The number of permanently employed workers in the manufacturing industry dropped by one million from 1973 through 1977. The "fully unemployed" as the government statistics define them exceeded 1,000,000 in 1977, reached 1,260,000 in 1981, and increased further in 1982. The unemployment rate is declared 2.5 per cent

h26\_



or so. As the government statistics tend to minimize actual unemployment, the real unemployment rate is believed 4 per cent or so. Many workers are still losing jobs on account of increasing corporate bankruptcies and all-body-slimming measures of business firms. The tertiary industry used to absorb some labor force in the latter half of the 70s but its capacity to absorb labor is coming to a limit. Japanese workers, under these circumstances, are haunted by the fear that they may lose jobs any moment. Once they lose their jobs, they cannot expect to be adequately protected by social security. Their chances of finding new jobs are extremely poor.

With unemployment increasing month after month, the workers feel more and more insecure about their current jobs. As was already explained, Japanese employers have been raking in extraordinary profits by exploiting a layer of underprivileged labor force. Under this system, the temporary, subcontract and part-time workers have been suffering from insecure employment. When recession arrived, they were the first to be fired. But unemployment is now spreading to the main body of permanently employed workers who used to enjoy relative job security under the life-long employment system. What happens now is that many permanently employed workers are being dismissed to be replaced by workers of unstable and temporary status. In the past year, employees increased by 600,000 but the majority of them are part-time workers. Japanese workers thus are suffering not only from dismissals but also from ubiquitous instability of employment.

With regard to working time Japanese workers have long been suffering from far longer work week than in Europe and the United States. This has served to boost the competitiveness of Japanese products. Even taking big enterprises, only 30 per cent of them give their workers two days off a week. It is true that the working time was shortening until 1975 thanks to the struggle of Sohyo and other trade unions. But since 1976 to the year the recession became acute, the working time has begun to be prolonged again. This reflects the management policy to keep employment at a minimum level and to increase production by making the already employed workers work long beyond rated hours. While the Labor Standard Law guarantees paid leave for all workers, actually an atmosphere inhibiting workers from exercising this right has been artificially generated at workshops so that the workers do not fully take the legally guaranteed paid holidays. Also,

the fact that the basic wages are virtually frozen by reason of recession impels workers to do extra work to obtain overtime premiums. The long work time in Japan is condemnable because it limits freely disposable time of workers to a bare minimum. But now under recession, the long work time also causes the further worsening of the employment situation. The government, despite Sohyo and other unions' strong demand for shorter work time, has taken no effective steps to get the working time reduced or to guarantee two off-days a week for all workers.

As regards wages, the wage increase rate has conspicuously dropped, despite the unions' struggles, since the recession started. It is true that a high nominal wage increase of 32.9 per cent (by Labor Ministry) was achieved in 1974, but the nominal wage increase rates in the subsequent years have remained low: 13.2 per cent in 1975, 8.8 per cent in 1976, 8.8 per cent in 1977, 5.9 per cent in 1979, 6.7 per cent in 1980, 8.8 per cent in 1976, and 7.0 per cent in 1982. Since the consumer price index climbed in the meantime, the annual real wage increase rate since 1973 has hovered in the range of 1 to 3 per cent. The average disposable income of working families in this period did not improve at all on account of spreading unemployment, lack of adequate tax adjustments, and raises in social security premiums. Especially in 1980 and 1981 the working families' real disposal income made minus growth in absolute terms. As the above figures are the averages covering all working families, the real disposable income of many working families must have certainly absolutely diminished.

Concerning other aspects of workers' life, it should be said that price spiral hits hardest the pensioners and other social security grant recipients. Sohyo and other unions of course carried out struggle to get social security improved and did obtain the degree of improvements in benefit that corresponded to the price growth rates. But in a country where the social security systems were still backward, the gains of this struggle were too small to be called a qualitative improvement. The defects in the social infrastructure, manifest already during the supergrowth period, have not been removed. On the contrary, the social infrastructure building programs were cut back under the subterfuge that revenue sources were being drained.

On the issue of labor rights, both the administration and judiciary

have become more reactionary than ever since the recession started. The government, with the support of the Supreme Court, has refused to retract a ban on the public workers, right to strike. In handling labor disputes, the Supreme Court has handed down one verdict after another negating the right of workers and giving top priority to the "maintenance of workshop order."

m29\_

## CHAPTER 2 SOHYO - ITS ROLE IN THE JAPANESE

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### 1. Trade Union Movement from Prewar to Postwar Days

Japanese capitalism began to develop with the Meiji Restoration of 1868. This capitalism, however, followed a path of development that is clearly distinguishable from that of European capitalism. European industrial capitalists emerged from among the people in their confrontation with peerage and merchant capitalists, or in other words European capitalism developed from below. But in Japan, it was the United States and European powers who forced the country to open its doors, and this external pressure forced Japan into the capitalist path of development when the urge for capitalism from below was still weak and immature. In this particular situation, Japanese capitalism developed on the initiative of the government, or by coercive force exerted from above.

Under the strong government protection, modernization proceeded rapidly in the areas of spinning, mining shipping and railways transportation. Heavy taxes were exacted from the peasantry in order to obtain the necessary funds, and the rural areas teeming with indigent tenant peasants, served as the vast source of supply of cheap labor. The rural areas were constantly plagued by latent unemployment. Japanese capitalism took advantage of these prevailing miseries, and the perpetuation of this situation required the government to carry out cruel authoritarian measures of repression against peasants and workers.

In spite of repression, development of capitalism generated workers' struggle. The first full-scale efforts to build trade unions were made in 1801 but this initiative was smashed by repression. Unionizing efforts were reinvigorated with the outbreak of World War I leading to the establishment in 1921 of the First national union federation, Japan Congress of Labor (Stlnmei). But before the union movement became strong enough, serious internal strife and consequent splits weakened the movement. The government's splitting maneuvers coupled with repression were further strengthened in the 1930s, and on the eve of World War II, or in 1930e

1940, all trade unions were banned.

Until 1945 (in a sense until today), the Japanese trade union movement thus had to make it its priority task to combat the authoritarian government's repression. Before the war, 1931 was the year when the largest number of labor disputes occurred and when the rate of unionization was the highest, but even in that year, the unionization rate remained a mere 8 per cent.

Japanese capitalism thus established itself exploiting the extreme poverty of peasantry and workers. In other words, its domestic market was very narrow. Consequently, Japanese capitalism right from its beginning sought to depend upon overseas markets, and on that score depended on the military to secure foreign markets by force. Capitalism in Japan thus assumed strongly militaristic characteristics.

This structural contradiction inherent in Japanese capitalism came to a head under the impact of the Great Depression of 1929. The government launched thorough repression against fighting peasantry and workers, and started war of aggression against China which later spread all over Asian countries. By that time, Japan had already turned Korea into its colony. The war of aggression, expanding year after year, brought on untold sufferings to Asian people, workers amongst others. Ultimately, Japan itself was bombed by the US. air force and was reduced to debris almost completely. Atomic bombs were dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan surrendered on August 14, 1945.

Following the end of World War II in 1945. Japanese trade union movement made an explosive growth, fueled by pauperization of workers and under the US. occupation policy of ~~ltdeinocratizationfl~~ The Confederation of Industrial Trade Unions (Sambetsu). under the influence of the Communist Party, and the Confederation of Labor (Sodomei) backed by the Socialist Party, were the two parallel national union federations that were formed in that period. In the immediate postwar period, Senbetsu was the hegemonic power. But the Cold War started in 1947 and the US. occupation changed its occupation policy, stepped up repression upon trade unions. Opposition to the Communist domination of unions also became strong amongst union members. Power struggle within the union movement culminated in 1948-49. the years in which the capitalist economy began recovering.

Sohyo emerged out of this intra-movement struggle as a new body expected to unify the divided Japanese labor fronts. Following its founding in 1950, Sohyo practically became the main current of the Japanese trade union movement.

Regrettably, Sohyo today does not rally under it all organized labor in Japan. In the process of formation of Sohyo, some unions, while sharing Sohyo's view that political parties' intervention in trade union affairs should be opposed, disagreed on organizational matters, and for this reason founded their separate federation, which is called the National Federation of Industrial Organizations (Shinsambetsu). Also, those Sodomei member unions which did not join Sohyo at the beginning later joined hands with those intra-Sohyo unions which criticized Sohyo and withdrew. They formed the Japan Congress of Labor (Domei). The Federation of Independent Trade Unions (Churitsu Roren), which is another national union center, comprises only private sector workers. All told, there are four parallel national labor centers today. The rate of organization in Japan and the memberships of the four national centers are given in Table 9. Below, we shall sketch Sohyo's history and its organizational characteristics.

## 2. History of Sohyo

### ( 1) Founding of Sohyo and Sohyo 3 Program

The inaugural convention of Sohyo was held on July 11 and 12, 1950. Represented in this convention were 15 unions —, Sodomei National Railway Workers Union, All-Japan Seamen's Union, Japan Teachers Union, Japan Coal Miners' Union, Japan Broadcasting Workers Union, All-Agriculture and Forestry Ministry Workers Union, Japan Postal Workers Union, Nippon Mining Workers Union, Federation of Prefectural and Municipal Workers' Union, Federation of Silk Reeling Workers' Unions, Federation of Metropolitan Government Employees' Unions, Heavy Electrical Machinery Industry Workers Union, Finance Ministry Employees' Union, and the General Federation of Construction Workers' Unions. Also attending as observers were 17 other unions, including the Electric Power Workers Union, All-Japan Express Workers Union, the Sulfur Industry Workers Union (later the Japanese Federation of Synthetic Chemistry

Workers' Unions), and Nippon Steel Yawata Workers' Union (later the National Federation of Iron and Steel Workers' Unions), most of them later to form the core of Sohyo. The participants were claimed to total four million. According to the Labor Ministry, Sohyo had 19 affiliated unions with a total membership of 3,150,000 as of the end of 1950. Debate at the inaugural convention was heated. And the convention adopted a basic program, constitution, immediate action program, a policy to strengthen organization, immediate struggle policy and a declaration. The basic program has remained unchanged to today. The program states in its preamble:

The General Council of Trade Union of Japan aims to defend and improve the working conditions of workers by the united strength of all free and democratic trade unions in Japan, to enhance their economic, political and social status. push forward the democratic revolution under way in Japan for the eventual establishment of socialism, and to attain economic prosperity, freedom and independence for the nation, thus contributing to the creation of a society where freedom, equality and peace prevail.

The following points were emphasized in the body of the basic program:

1. Trade unions should defeat all outside attempts to interfere with their internal affairs either by the government, employers or any other bodies. They should also be completely independent of, and free from, political parties. Under the existing circumstances, trade unions should not confine their activities to economic areas, but at the same time, trade unions should not be used as an instrument of struggle for political power.
2. Trade unions, in order to protect the interests of workers, should fight, mobilizing all its potential and implementing their right to unite, right to strike and all other advantages in their hand. But the trade unions should not accept the destructive ultra-left movement organized for the purpose of disrupting economic stability and prosperity of society.
3. Under specific conditions, the employers and workers may have to cooperate, but the principle should be recognized that the interests of the working class are essentially incompatible with those of the capitalist class as long as the employment relationships based on exploitation of labor continue.

4. For the liberation of the working class it is important that the working class acquire political power by constitutional means. While differences between the political parties and trade unions should be always borne in mind, the trade unions should actively cooperate with those political parties which aim to achieve socialism by peaceful and democratic means

5. A path to world peace must be paved by uniting all free and democratic trade unions in the world.

In the immediate action program the following action goals were set out: (1) raising real wages and establishing a minimum wage system; (2) opposing capitalist iiscrap-and-buildii policy and realizing full employment; (3) revising labor laws in the interest of workers and establishing the basic labor rights; (4) immediate conclusion of progressive labor contracts and full implementation of the Labor Standards Law; (5) expansion of the uneniploytnent securhy scherne and estabhshrnent of propersocialsecurb ty; ('6) establishing the principle of same work, same pay for both sexes; (7)taxleduchon Rniwoddngpeopm;(8)equalopporuuunesofeducahon

For all; (9) democratization of administrative structures; (10) democrat- i/ing business management and socialization of major industries; (11) expansion ol' employment through pmmotion of key industries and public works: ((12) utilization of marine resources on the basis of the principle of Heedont ofingh seas;(13) pronunion Of hec nude ugng JapaneyrHag gnpe Abe Hm pnggmnlahldown Sohyokinndmtelhw ofacnon as fouows:(14)accunudunngstdkefundsuntlemabhgungalaborbank;(15) organising joint struggle with peasants, Fishermen and medium and small businessmen: (1(1) effort to organize industrial unions; (17) strengthening u ptuiheal pal!) (n 1)urch edtose goulis to reahze sociahsni by peaceful untl democratic menus and Sohyok cooperation with such a party or parties; and (18) utitiiliution at an curly time with the ICFTU. In the last part of the progmtm reference was made to Sohyois immediate political objective: er prmnnotc the conclusion of an overall peace treaty and tight hn eaHy independence of Japan where Heedont and equahy wUl be guaranteed."

Though they have later been slightly modified, these demands contained in this initial LIL'UOII program basically remain valid even now. They are the basic demands tor the fulfillment of which Sohyo has been .e34\_



struggling consistently. The item concerning early affiliation with the ICFTU was cancelled by the second Sohyo convention in 1951. This was because Sohyo came to judge that trade unions should not side with any of the Cold War parties but should promote international solidarity among 2111 trade unions. This line stemmed from Sohyo's stance of positive neutrality? Following this principle, decisions concerning affiliation with international organizations were left to the judgement of constituent industrial unions. At the moment most of the major Sohyo unions are members of International Trade Secretariats of the ICFTU while some member unions are affiliated with Trade Union Internationals of the WFTU. Upholding the basic demand of Japanese workers, Sohyo thus began its development amidst great expectations held by workers that it would grow into the core of unified labor front in Japan.

## (2) Organizational Development

Since its founding, Sohyo has undergone organizational vicissitudes. As was already explained, Sodomei played an important role in the formation of Sohyo. After Sohyo was founded, the majority of Sodomei members decided that Sodomei should be dissolved and that its member unions should form new industrial unions jointly with non-Sodomei unions. But the minority unions in Sodomei opposed dissolution, withdrew from Sodomei's convention in December 1950 and by themselves founded a new organization which again was called Sodomei. It is this Sodomei that later became the base upon which today's Domei was formed.

In the meantime, Shinsambetsu, which was part of the Minshu democratization movement opposing Communist control of unions, insisted that Sohyo should be a loose liaison federation. In Shinsambetsu's view, the proposed Sohyo organization was too solid and centralist. When Sohyo was founded, Shinsambetsu withheld its attitude and did not join it. Shinsambetsu at the end of 1950 temporarily joined Sohyo, but again it became independent. Though its membership is small, Shinsambetsu has continued until now as an independent national union center, Sambetsu Kaigi, the main current of the Japanese trade union movement in the latter half of the 1940s. was hit by serious repressions before

m35\_

and after the outbreak of the Korean War (disbandment of Zenroren of which Sambetsu was the core and the so-called Tied purge?) The Electric Power Workers Union and some other major Sambetsu unions withdrew to join Sohyo. Sambetsu thus was reduced to shambles. Immediately after Sohyo was founded, Sambetsu levelled charges against it, declaring that Sohyo was a union led by divisive elements and social fascists. In Sambetsu's words, Sohyo was a detachment of the international union Splitters, ICFTU. But most of the unions under the wing of Sambetsu later joined Sohyo, and though Sambetsu continued until 1958, it completely lost its foundation as a national trade union organization. The founding of Sohyo was significant not merely as the creation of a new national center. From the beginning, Sohyo promoted reorganization of unions into industrial unions. It was one of unifying unions by sub-industrial grouping. Sambetsu chose the idea of industrial unions by greater industrial grouping, such as the greater metal workers' union or the greater chemical workers' union, consequently the number of industrial unions affiliated with it. Sohyo wanted to react more flexibly to the given industrial structure and the government industrial policy classification by grouping unions operating in smaller business areas such as iron-steel, electrical and shipbuilding, each of which had its own commodity market. This principle was applied to the organization of the major private sector workmen. Thus, iron-steel unions were organized. These unions in fact soon became the mainstay of the Sohyo organization. The formula of unionization by sub-industrial grouping was accepted by private business unions too. The Federation of Office-Industrial Workers' Unions, for instance, was organized on this formula after Sohyo was founded. These new industrial unions were friendly to Sohyo, but did not have their own independent status. In 1956 they formed the Federation of Independent Trade Unions (Churhso Roren) (Thuritsu Koren now considers itself the third largest union center following Sohyo and Domei. Although Sohyo has promoted unionization of the sub-industrial unions, this principle was not thoroughly implemented in all areas. For instance, workers at the National Railways, Telecommunication Corpo-

ration and other mammoth public corporations formed their respective unions. They consist only of the employers of these corporations and some other workers employed by related enterprises. On the other hand, the National Council of General Amalgamated Workers Union (Zenkoku-ippan) unifies a wide range of workers not definable even by greater industrial classification. At the outset, the industrial unions accepted as their basic units of affiliation factory-based units, but later many of them came to accept enterprise-based unions.

Sohyo soon began to accept more industrial unions as its members.

The membership of Sohyo industrial unions generally increased though some major unions such as the Electric Power Workers, Union. Japan Coal Miners, Union and the National Railway Workers Union lost some membership due to divisive maneuvers or else to the downfall of their industries. According to a survey by the Labor Ministry, the membership of Sohyo unions as of the end of June each year stood as follows: 15 unions, 2,760,000 in 1950; 37 unions, 3,090,000 in 1955; 57 unions, 3,750,000 in 1960; 63 unions, 4,250,000 in 1965; 62 unions, 4,280,000 in 1970; 165 unions, 4,570,000 in 1975, and 65 unions, 4,550,000 in 1980. All through this period, Sohyo topped the list of all national union organization in the size of membership.

This does not of course mean that Sohyo's organization has been developing without obstructions. After the conclusion of the Peace Treaty in 1952, Sohyo conducted action against the government's scheme to pass a repressive bill through the Diet. About the same time Sohyo's leading industrial unions, Japan Coal Miners, Union and the Electric Power Industry Workers, Union, were waging a militant struggle for wage hikes. Following these struggles, the All-Japan Seamen's Union, the Textile Workers Union and other industrial unions raised the voice of criticism of the Sohyo policy. Regrettably, these unions withdrew from Sohyo, and joined the remnants of the former Sodomei to establish Zenro. Zenro later became Domei. But Domei's membership has never reached half that of Sohyo.

Around 1960, maneuvers backed by management became rampant to split Sohyo unions and create splinter unions. The splitting plots were particularly serious and tenacious in the Japan Coal Miners Union, the National Railway Workers Union and the Paper and Pulp Workers Union

For instance, splinter unions were created at the height of powerful strike opposing dismissals. Their intervention often obstructed workers' victory. In the 1960s when the Japanese economy was growing in high gear, no major enterprises could dream to wipe out Sohyo unions whose activities were getting vigorous. Therefore they concentrated on turning Sohyo unions into company-unions. Especially the big enterprises enjoying monopoly profits wanted to tame the unions by paying premiums and other fringe benefits to workers in accordance with the degree of loyalty to the company. The fact that Japanese unions were organized in accordance with (enterprise facilitated this effort. Under these circumstances, Sohyo unions could not organize in the newly created heavy and chemical industrial branches, especially their advanced plants built in large numbers from the 1950s through the 1960s. Consequently, the weight of Sohyo unions is still small in these industries.

Japanese employers used the tactic of making company unions in the major private industrial sectors and resorted to outright attacks, often aided by the police, on unions in medium and small industries. Management also imposed restrictions on labor union rights and resorted to administrative disciplinary action against public service workers and public corporation workers.

Generally, the employers interfered with the voting process of union executives and took various discriminatory actions against union activists. Despite these attacks, Sohyo maintains the widest-spread and most powerful influence in all sectors, both public and private, and at enterprises of different sizes as the only union organization capable of effectively defending the interests of Japanese workers.

### (3) Historical Review of Sohyo Activities

How has Sohyo, thus founded and strengthened, been conducting its struggle? Let us outline Sohyo's struggle area-wise.

#### a. Wage Struggle

When Sohyo was founded the Japanese workers were keenly anxious to obtain higher wages ; high enough to guarantee their decent

living as human beings. Wagehike was Sohyds main demand together with stability of employment. As do all unions everywhere, Sohyo, too, has been strenuously fighting for wage increase, ever since its inauguration, to meet worker51 livelihood needs.

As partically explained already, the wage situation in the 19505 and 19605 in Japan had the following salient features:

( i ) The absolute level of wages was extremely low in the 19505. The hourly wage in Japan in 1951 was 19.3 cents as compared with 167.3 cents in the United States, as the Labor Ministry admitted. According to a reliable study, the Japanese workers were then receiving wages so low that their physical living standards had to go down month after month. In order to complement the low wages, workers had to do overtime work, and this made the working time exceptionally long. This also led to the deterioration of the employment situation.

( ii ) Also, there was no job-wise universal wage rate in Japan. Instead, each enterprise had its own wage system. This factor, multiplied by the presence of the dual structure, created serious wage disparities among enterprises. Under these circumstances, a vast number of workers had to accept a wage level lower than the already low general level.

( iii ) In the 19605, Sohyo conducted the spring struggle against the background of the growing economy, and the struggle gradually pushed up the wage level. Even so, the pace of wage growth was slower than the rise in the profit rate, keeping laborls share in the value added in Japan at the lowest level of all advanced industrial countries.

This imparted specific characteristics to the wage struggle organized by Sohyo and other unions. First of all, the wage struggle had to strive to raise the wage level that would enable workers to tteatll sufficiently. In other words, wage demands had to be formulated primarily reilecting the life-long livelihood needs of the workers, rather than considering the skill of the workers and quality of work. The worker's cost of living generally rises with his age as he gets married to form his family and as his children grow. Therefore, efforts were made to universalize the level of wages paid under the seniority wage system (the system under which the wage rises in accordance with the duration of service at the same company under the life-time employment system) and also to get raised the wages paid in ae-cordance with seniority wage scales. But the traditional seniority wage ,39\_

system did not help raise the already low wages of young workers, and therefore, quests were made for new wage formulae helpful to raise the young workers wage level. The employers, faced by the unions wage increase demands, first tried to confine wage increase to the so-called irregular and periodic wage increase? From the end of the 50s through the early 1960s, they attempted to introduce a sort of individual prescription of wages, or a specially Japanese type of trades wage, based on job and trade evaluations which are to be made by management of individual enterprises. In evaluating the performance of workers, the management would use as a criterion each worker's degree of loyalty to the company. Sohyo consistently insisted, as opposed to this type of subjective evaluation, that the wage should be first of all determined in consideration of the livelihood needs of the workers with a view to enabling the workers to lead a decent human life. Sohyo declared that though some wage differential by job categories may logically exist, the priority consideration should be given not to this factor but to the guarantee of workers living. Partly owing to this pressure of labor, the age-related wage gap has narrowed significantly in the past two decades though the gap is still large. Also, trade union efforts succeeded in making the wage disparity between white-collar and blue-collar workers smaller in Japan than that in advanced European countries.

Secondly, the wage struggle in Japan involves special difficulties because the formation of unions in accordance with enterprises keeps the powers of wage decision basically in the hands of management of the individual enterprise. To obtain a wage hike workers must exercise their bargaining power using their readiness to strike as the pressure. But the unionists organized in accordance with enterprises suffer from a duality of identity: on the one hand they are employees of a particular enterprise and on the other hand they are members of the camp of labor sharing common demands. If the union at a specific enterprise stages a strike displaying its militancy, the union members immediately begin to apprehend that (during their strike rival enterprises might eat into their enterprise's market share. If the union should win a larger wage increase than workers at other enterprises, the winners immediately have to worry that their enterprise may lose competitiveness. In fact, employers always take advantage of this weakness of the union when they attempt to split it.

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Sohyo from the beginning has made many attempts to overcome this weakness. The Coal Miners' Union and the Federation of Private Railway Workers' Unions in particular conducted exemplary united struggles overcoming their weakness already in the early half of the 1950s. In 1955, a joint struggle organization was organized with the participation of eight unions including the Coal Miners' Union, Federation of Synthetic Chemical Workers' Unions, and Federation of Private Railway Workers' Unions. There a new formula of wage struggle was invented — the formula of uniting many unions beyond industrial barriers and of concentrating their struggles in the same period of the year, spring, to fight for wage hikes demands. In 1956, the year in which Japan went into full gear for economic growth, these unions, joined by public corporation workers, unions, organized their joint office in Solids headquarters in order to organize a united wage struggle. This was the beginning of Spring Struggle continued until today. In 1959 a spring struggle committee was set up with the participation of Churitsu Roren and other independent unions. In the same year, the Federation of Iron and Steel Workers' Unions, which had had the practice of negotiating wage hikes at a different time of the year, decided to join the spring struggle.

The employers and the government assumed hostile attitude toward this development. The employers, labor control headquarters, Nikkeiren, declared that only "circular wage hikes" would be acceptable, rejecting all demands for increase in basic wages. When this diehard policy proved bankrupt, the employers, especially private railways and chemical companies, tried to destroy workers' united wage struggle by imposing on the unions "peace agreements" (prohibiting strikes for several years) in exchange for minimal addition of premiums to the existing wages. The government on its part perpetrated violent repression in and after 1957 upon all public corporation workers, dismissing and suspending not only strike leaders but also strike participants. For some time after 1958, the government denied these public corporation workers' right to form associations by refusing to negotiate with them. The pretext used here was that the unions with dismissed workers in the leadership were illegal bodies. Despite these repressions, the spring struggle developed last after 1960. For many years, workers obtained annually more than 10 per cent basic wage increase thanks to spring struggles (though there were some

-41-

exceptional years). In 1963, Sohyo began to demand that the wage level in Japan be raised to the West European level and adopted the slogan of drastic wage increase. In 1964, the Prime Minister was compelled to declare, under heavy pressure applied by private and public sector unions, that from that year on the government would refer to the newly attained wage level of the private sector in determining wages for public service workers and public corporation workers. The spring struggle gains also began to be used in the same period as the criterion for the calculation of the wage portion of rice-selling farmers' income when the government determined its purchase price of rice. The spring struggle thus became a built-in income-determinant for all segments of the Japanese working people. Domei (Zenro was turned to Domei in 1964), which had been denouncing the spring struggle strategy, virtually began to participate in the spring struggle by staging its differently named wage struggle simultaneously with the spring struggle.

The spring struggle has thus been carried out every year with Sohyo as the core and mobilizing almost all trade unions. That the struggle of this type is conducted every year is an outstanding feature of Japanese wage-hike struggle, a phenomenon never seen in other advanced industrial countries where struggle for renewal of labor contracts is conducted once in two or three years. That almost all trade unions participate in a single united struggle for higher wages is also a remarkable characteristic of the Japanese union movement. As the result of spring struggle, Japanese workers won some important gains from the latter half of the 1950s through the 1960s, some of which are described as follows:

(i) Thanks to the spring struggle, Japanese workers every year obtained a fairly large wage hike. The annual spring struggle wagehike rates are shown in Table 8. As the figures indicate nominal wagehikes and as the commodity prices rose 3-8 per cent per year in the 1960s, the figures do not directly indicate the degree of improvement of workers living. Also, as the labor productivity in Japan grew more rapidly than the wages in the 1960s and climbed at the same pace as the wagehike rate in the early 1970s, labor's share in value added dropped in the 1960s and later was frozen at a low level. Even so, the annual real wage increase rate continued over 7 per cent. As wagehike rates in Europe and the United States were relatively low until 1967, Japanese workers succeeded in fast narrowing

642v



their wage gap with their brothers and sisters in these countries. Table 7 gives the Labor Ministry's international wage comparison. The nominal average wage in Japan was 18,300 yen when the spring struggle was started, but 20 years later it grew to 177,200 yen, about a 10-fold increase. (The real wage trebled in the same period). It was through the spring struggle that Japanese workers for the first time could approach the living standards of other advanced industrial countries.

(ii) The fact that the Spring struggle was participated in by the overwhelming majority of organized workers in Japan and that the participating unions unified their demands and periods of struggle forced enterprises to give about uniform wagehikes to the workers. Though the final wage decision was still in the hands of individual firms' management, the unions made efforts, through collective bargaining and united strikes, to obtain about uniform wage increase in the same industry. Consequently, wages in Japan came to be decided virtually by the wagehike standards laid down by Spring struggle. Wage decision thus has been freed from arbitrary judgment of individual enterprises, and this has helped the formation of a social level of wages.

The spring struggle in this manner has become an indispensable factor in the life of Japanese workers. With this fact, the third characteristic of the wage struggle in Japan emerges. Even if the spring struggle secures higher wages for the big private enterprise workers and public corporation workers, the dual structure will remain intact unless numerous low-waged workers at the bottom of society benefit from it. Their low wages will also serve as a pressure on the general wage level. In order to overcome this, Sohyo adopted its wage program in 1952 and has made it its priority task to fight for the establishment of a minimum wage system. Since the 1957 spring struggle, Sohyo has been attached as great importance to this task as to wagehikes at individual firms. The spring struggle committee affiliated unions frequently conducted united strikes on this issue. Especially, the National Metal Workers Union, its unit member unions and many other enterprises, carried out persistent struggle for this goal. This struggle had the effect of wiping out extremely low wages in all areas.

Under the pressure of this struggle, the government instituted a law called the Minimum Wage Law. But this law amounted only to a recom-

mentation that employers have mutual consultations among themselves to decide on local minimum wages (the so-called businessmen's agreements). This law even could have the effect of perpetuating low wages. Sohyo therefore had to continue its struggle for a genuine minimum wage system in the 1960s. In the middle of the 1960s, the government had to abolish the businessmen's agreement system and switched it to a comprehensive local minimum wage system, under which the Labor Ministry prescribes a minimum wage level for each area. Even so, this new system still fell short of a nationally uniform minimum guaranteed wage system applicable to all industries, which Sohyo and other unions demanded. Moreover, the wage levels prescribed by the Labor Ministry were still too low. To overcome this situation, Sohyo, jointly with its member industrial unions, prefectural and local labor councils, promoted local struggles in all prefectures so as to push up the local minimum wage levels and to reform this system itself.

As this development shows, Sohyo ever since it was formed has been consistently engaged in struggles. Upholding demands rooted in workers' living, let the raising of the general wage level and for the removal of wage disparities by means of a proper minimum wage system. In order that all workers be ensured a truly human, decent living. Not that all its demands have been fulfilled. But Sohyo is proud that it has achieved important, if not spectacular, successes. The wage struggle today however faces many difficulties as we see later.

#### b. Struggle to Reform Economy, Society and Politics

Sohyo and the affiliated industrial unions have been fighting strenuously not only for higher wages but also for shorter working time, two-days-off-a-week, improvement of social and intraenterprise welfare and employment guarantee. In defending and improving the economic life of workers, Sohyo and its member unions have played an important role. In this sense, Sohyo has abided by the basic promises it proclaimed when it was founded. It is performing the basic trade union duties up to all trade unions in this society. Nevertheless, the mouthpieces for the employers' camp and class-collaborationist trade union leaders have been charging Sohyo with loyalty to a specific ideology and with biased political commitment.  
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mitments. These charges are utterly unwarranted. Rather, it has been, and is, Sohyo's basic thinking that if the lives of the workers are to be protected, Sohyo should not confine itself to traditional trade union areas but should intervene - of course on the basis of a broad consensus of the majority of the workers - in the economic and social structure of the country. In fact, if Sohyo did not choose this path, it would be neglecting its minimum duty as a trade union. This posture of Sohyo is derived from the general state of affairs prevailing in all advanced industrial countries as well as from the special Japanese situation. The founding convention of Sohyo emphasized that given the reactionary nature of the Japanese employers and the conservative government, trade unions should act vigorously in the political arena if only to defend the economic life of workers. This thinking was reconfirmed in 1960 as the concept of Japanese-style trade unionism<sup>ii</sup> # and has been carried over to Sohyo today. Convinced that Sohyo should strengthen its cooperative relationships with workers' parties whose demands and policies basically coincide with Sohyo's, Sohyo has forged close ties of mutual support with the Japan Socialist Party, the party rallying socialists of diverse trends (excepting for some periods in which the ties were weakened). In the same spirit, it cooperates with other parties on an issue-by-issue basis. The basic thinking underlying this attitude is that workers' rights should be promoted and peace and democracy defended and developed by all means. The following are the major Sohyo-organized struggles in the political arena in the past 25 years.

( i ) Struggle for the Establishment of the Basic Labor Rights

When Sohyo was founded, the Japanese public service workers' right to unite and to make collective bargaining remained crippled and their right to strike prohibited. The government instituted a mediation and arbitration system in the early 1950s, claiming that this system would compensate for the deprivation of their labor rights, but the government refused to properly implement even this system. In protest, the National Railway Workers' Union and other public corporation workers' unions resorted to the so-called "law abiding tactics," the tactic to refuse overtime work and other "go-slow" tactics by strict observation of safety rules.

These tactics were effective especially at a time when Japanese public corporations did not employ a large enough work force to keep its facilities fully running. By resorting to these tactics, Japanese public workers conducted their struggle for higher wages in and after 1951. Later, in 1953, they moved a step ahead by resorting to partial strikes.

The government and the public corporation authorities reacted to this first by dismissing strike leaders. Though they expected they could pacify the unions in this manner, they soon found that it was an utter miscalculation. From 1957 when the public corporation workers grew into the main force of the spring struggle, the government began to take disciplinary action even against rank-and-file strike participants. The National Railway Corporation and the Postal Ministry also declared that should the railways and postal workers unions elect dismissed leaders to executive positions, they would refuse to negotiate with them, regarding the whole union as an outlaw organization. Simultaneously, the authoritatively resisted this policy of negating their legitimacy. Especially, the postal workers, struggle conducted from 1958 through 1959 had an outstanding significance. By this struggle, the Postal Workers Union earned a nickname - "labor right specialist."

The outmoded reactionary attitude of the government and public corporations invited international denunciations. They were palpably violating ILO Convention No. 87 by negating the public workers' right to unite. The struggle for labor rights conducted by Soltyo in the early half of the 1960s, backed by international support, developed into a campaign for the ratification of ILO Convention No. 87. The convention at long last was ratified in 1965 though the domestic legislation enacted for the implementation of the Convention was so defective that it even posed new difficulties to the unions. However, it cannot be denied that the ratification represented the progress of the public workers' struggle for their right to unite. But even with regard to the workers' right to unite, the Japanese government's reactionary policy was not ended with its acceptance of the Convention. For instance, the government still refused to heed the widely guaranteed in many advanced industrial countries. Following the ratification of the ILO Convention, the focus of the

struggle for the labor rights shifted to the public workers' right to strike. Meanwhile, public workers, especially public corporation workers under Sohyo, greatly strengthened their capacity to carry out strikes. Since 1965, public corporation workers' strikes during the spring struggles have become almost an accepted social practice. With this development coupled with the mounting pressure of public opinion, the court of justice began to declare in their rulings that strike leaders and participants are not punishable under the Criminal Code provisions. But the trend was reversed in the 1970s and recent years. The Supreme Court ruled that strike leaders were punishable under the Criminal Code. Extremely discriminatory labor policies against Sohyo unions were the authorities' reply to the fortified struggle of public corporation workers whose capacity grew fast from the latter half of the 1960s through the early years of the 1970s. The most typical attack of this kind was launched by the National Railway Corporation against the two Sohyo unions, namely, the National Railway Workers Union (Kokuro) and the Motive Power Workers Union (Doro). In an attempt to wipe out these unions, the railway authorities denied the unionists opportunities to take promotion exams. Moreover, the authorities discriminated against them in wage hikes. This was a veritable yellow dog treatment. But Kokuro and Doro repelled this attack successfully supported by Sohyo as well as by the Socialist, Komei and Communist parties. Thus, they not only got this attack stopped but also won further victories by winning for their members a practical seniority system. Following this victory, all public corporation workers' unions went all-out for the recovery of their right to strike. Pressed by their struggle, the leaders of these corporations had to promise that the right to strike would be conditionally given to their workers. But the ruling Liberal Party never changed its representative attitude. In 1975, the national railways, postal and telephone and telegraphic workers conducted a powerful eight-day strike from November through December. 1975, swaying the economic and political world. But this issue has not yet been settled. It continues to be a keen point of political antagonism between the Sohyo unions and the Liberal Democratic government.

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(ii) On Employment and Livelihood Guarantee Systems

Generally speaking, most of the advanced industrial countries especially those with social democratic parties in power, made it their national goal to establish full employment and institutional guarantees for the livelihood of working people. There, livelihood guarantee has about been established. Since its founding, Sohyo has been consistently fighting to catch up with the level of unemployment countermeasures and livelihood guarantee already attained in these other countries. This effort however, clashed head-on with the structure of the Japanese economy and politics.

When Sohyo was organized, the government was conducting a drastic disinflationary policy. Cities were filled by more than one million unemployed workers. Aside from them, there was invisible unemployment, estimated at 10 million. The Korean War started in June, 1950, bringing on a temporary war boom, but following the ceasefire, a drastic recession hit the economy, causing some big and many medium and small enterprises to go bankrupt, and prompting many firms to dismiss their workers. All this occurred in a country where a life-long employment system is at work. Under this system, workers, once losing their jobs, cannot expect to find tolerably good jobs, and even if they are reemployed, their working conditions usually are seriously cut compared to the pre-unemployment time. This being the case, the period in which Sohyo was established saw tierce anti-dismissal struggles at individual enterprises, often having strong impact on the whole society.

In the early half of the 1950s, Sohyo mobilized broad segments of unionists to support individual anti-dismissal struggle, raised money for them and supported them in other ways. Also, Sohyo adopted a "Labor plan" and recommended that the government carry it out to overcome unemployment. The plan proposed that Japan's trade structure, heavily dependent on the United States, should be rectified and that mutually beneficial orderly trade relationships should be established with all countries including socialist countries.

No general improvement occurred in the employment situation even in the latter half of the 1950s when rapid economic growth started. Sohyo had to confront the discriminatory employment policy of enterprises, \$48.-

directed against temporary workers and subcontract workers. Also, the so-called energy shift from coal to petroleum was carried out in the period until the early years of the 1960s. This caused many coal miners affiliated with the powerful Japan Coal Miners' Union (Tanro) to suffer from unemployment. Sohyo, together with Tanro, insisted that the government should attach more importance to coal as a precious domestic natural resource as did West Germany and Britain. The government turned down Sohyo's demand. This was confirmed in 1973 when it proved Sohyo had been right. But it must be remembered that around 1960 the government was dead-end on the coal industry. The confrontation over the coal mining policy culminated in the dispute at the Miike colliery of Mitsui Coal Mining Co. This strike lasted for 10 months from 1959 through 1960. Although the government was against the conclusion of a new Security Treaty with the United States, the Miike colliery was one of the best coal mines in Japan. Also, the union on the mine (a member of Tanro) was known as the strongest in Japan. Management of Mitsui Coal Mining Co. arbitrarily named union activists for dismissal in their attempt to raise productivity and to weaken the union. This triggered an unprecedented serious strike. The employment declined sharply, and resorted to their usual practice of splitting the union. The splinter union members were sent into the mine as scabs. The Miike union held out and continued unflinching struggle supported by demonstrators. The union was mobilized by Sohyo and Tanro. Occupied the hope of the mine, obstructing shipment of coal produced by scabs. Management hired rightwing gangsters, who attacked the picketers and killed one worker. The government, aiding the employers, threw several thousand riot police into the scene to remove the picket line. The dispute threatened to develop into a bloody clash supposedly to cause many to be killed or wounded. The Central Labor Relations Commission. The National Labor Union, which intervened in this late stage of the dispute. The Miike struggle in 1960, coupled with the anti-treaty struggle, grew into the largest scale labor struggle in the postwar period. Although the union side failed to get the dismissal plan retracted, the struggle dealt a heavy blow at the employers. Under the impact of this struggle, the em-

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employers of not just coal mining enterprises but also in other industries began to hesitate to name the workers they wanted to dismiss, and came to prefer a milder form of recruitment of voluntary retirees" when they wanted to abate employment. After the Miike struggle, Sohyo, Tanro and the Socialist Party jointly launched a struggle for policy change. Though this campaign calling for a change in the coal mining policy, failed to impose a major change on the government's energy program, some concessions were won in the areas of professional training for ex-miners, their reemployment, and provision of housing for them. These measures, though minor in themselves except as the beginning of more significant later development represented Sohyo's effort to wrench off benefits for the unemployed in areas other than unemployment insurance.

In the latter half of the decade, the economic supergrowth generated its own problems. The first of such problems is the soaring prices of commodities. The economic growth certainly was accompanied by a rise in productivity, but the industrial branches that grew fastest were dominated by big corporations, whose mutual relationships gradually changed from competitive to collaborative. In the meantime, major enterprise mergers occurred as was typified by the creation of Nippon Steel Corp. and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. Prior to these major mergers, the employers always exerted their full pressure to wipe out Sohyo or independent unions (operating at one of the partner firms) to see to it that the unified firms have only Domei unions. With this oligopoly formation being strengthened, the Bank of Japan printed as much paper money as the big enterprises required to make their big equipment investments. The strengthening of oligopolies plus the increased issue of banknotes caused the general price level to climb. The price spiral cut down the real wages, negatively affecting many aspects of workers' living.

The second problem generated by the economic supergrowth was the deterioration of the living and working environment. It must be noted that the rapid economic growth itself was made possible by the undue concentration of colossal investments in production processes. This was done at the sacrifice of social infrastructure needed for people's living. And the equipment investments that were made so hastily and on an enormous scale in turn brought about rapid destruction of environment. Many working people died of pollution. Far more were suffering



from physical troubles caused by pollution. In the process of rapid growth, many workers moved to Tokyo and Kansai areas where no proper houses were available. Sewer systems, traffic, medical and educational services remained poor.

Establishment of proper social security also became a pressing need.

It was as late as the early 1960s that medical insurance and old age pension schemes covering all citizens were established in Japan. But as these systems were partly integrated with corporate labor control systems, many parallel schemes had to exist side by side in confusing mutual relationships. Also, the amounts of benefits were too small as under the old age pension schemes.

Fully aware that its mission is to defend the living of all working people, Sohyo decided that it should not confine its activities to the areas of genuine trade unionism - the areas of wages, working time and labor rights. Sohyo had to demand that the government carry out extensive institutional reforms in all areas affecting the life of working people. Sohyo organized struggle for these reforms. The first campaign in this context was launched in 1970 as livelihood-related struggle. Following this, the extraordinary convention of Sohyo in 1971 adopted a new spring struggle policy, which emphasized, along with the traditional demands for drastic wage hikes and a minimum wage system, a series of more extensive demands such as improvement of the annuity system, full pollution preventive measures, tax reduction for low income citizens, expansion of social security programs and the scrapping of the planned revision of medical systems. In 1973, the Spring Struggle Committee carried out an epoch-making strike on April 17 on the single issue of pensions. Sohyo's People's Spring Struggle line is a natural outgrowth of these preceding struggles.

Japanese labor is organized, as was already said, into four separate national labor federations. Sohyo has been calling for joint action of the four union centers, while emphasizing Sohyo's own contribution. The need for joint action of the four bodies is increasing against the background of spreading job insecurity and social equalization of people's life styles. It is this objective condition that keenly calls for joint action of all workers. The four organizations in 1973 got together to formulate their unified demand list, and in 1975 agreed to demand the enforcement of a

law providing for a national minimum wage system. The 1976 common demands presented by the four bodies concerned mainly unemployment problems and the 1977 demands were for tax reduction for working people. The opposition parties drafted their bills reflecting the unified demands of the union centers. The joint action produced some positive results, but the agreement among the four bodies is not yet solid enough. On this account, joint action has experienced setbacks as well as progress.

(iii) Struggle to Develop and Defend Peace and Democracy

World War II started by Japanese militarism brought about untold sufferings to the Asian people and other peoples of the world, and at once gave bitter lessons to the Japanese people. Japanese workers through this experience realized that they were responsible for the defense of peace. Japanese workers also realized, reflecting on their experience with the despotic rule since the Meiji era, that they should defend democracy at all costs - not only because democracy is precious in itself but also because democracy is a necessary prerequisite for the defense of peace and protection of the living of workers. They also knew well that unless organized labor took upon them this task of defending democracy, democracy would not be maintained. Defending and developing peace and democracy thus became a basic task and responsibility of Sohyo to the whole nation. The following chronology illustrates the main struggles and campaigns Sohyo has carried out in the past 25 years for the defense of peace and democracy.

Struggle for the establishment of the four principles of peace

(1950-51): Sohyo, jointly with the Socialist Party and religious associations organized the National Congress for the Promotion of Peace.

Through this organization Sohyo opposed the proposed peace treaty excluding some Asian countries and Socialist countries, and demanded an all-round peace treaty with all countries involved. This was a struggle for the removal of foreign military bases from Japan and for Japan's neutrality, and against Japan's remilitarization.

Struggle against the adverse revision of labor laws (1952)

(1952): After the peace treaty took effect, the Japanese government at-

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tempted to ill-revise the labor laws and to make a new repressive law (the Anti-Subversive Activities Law) in order to suppress mass movements. Sohyo and allied unions jointly staged five waves of large scale strikes, the first united political strikes to be held in Japan. Under this pressure, the repressive bill was partially revised. The bill however was forced through the Diet.

Struggle against the US. forces firing range at Uchinada (1953):

Sohyo fought jointly with local fishermen opposing the US. armed forces plan to turn a fishing village at Uchinada in Ishikawa Prefecture into their firing range. In this period, similar anti-military base struggles were conducted in many places overlapping.

Movement for the defense of the Constitution (1954 to today):

Sohyo organized the National Federation for the Defense of the Constitution, jointly with the Socialist Party, other democratic organizations and progressive individuals. This movement, continued to today, is dedicated to the defense of the Constitution, particularly its peace clause and provisions establishing democracy and guaranteeing the basic human rights. In 1955-56, the ruling Liberal Party strongly pushed moves to revise the Constitution, but in the 1956 general election, Sohyo made full efforts to back pro-Constitution candidates. The pro-Constitution forces thus succeeded in securing one third of the Diet seats, frustrating the Liberal Party's attempt to revise the Constitution.

Movement against nuclear weapons (1954 to today): The atom-

bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed more than 100,000 citizens in 1945. Later, a US. nuclear test in the Pacific claimed the life of a Japanese child. Prohibition of nuclear weapons thus became the cherished

desire of all Japanese people excepting a handful of die-hard ruling people.

Sohyo actively participated in annual World Conferences Against A&H

Bombs from the standpoint of opposing all nuclear weapons of all countries. In 1960, the Japan Communist Party tried to forcibly subject the anti-bomb movement to its particular political line, causing a temporary split in the movement. Sohyo, however, endeavored to reunify the movements, and achieved an initial success in this effort in 1977.

Sunakawa struggle (1955-57): The US. military forces attempted

to enlarge the Tachikawa air base near Sunakawa in Tokyo's suburb to use it as a major logistic base for US. forces all over Asia. Supporting local

peasants who opposed the expansion, Sohyo mobilized its members on a large scale. Repeated clashes occurred with the police. Later, the US. forces revised their strategy, and after all the base expansion was not carried out.

Struggle against the Police Duties Bill (1958): The government attempted to pass the Police Duties Bill through the Diet in order to create a new system to strengthen the powers of policemen in their contact with citizens so that it can arbitrarily suppress the basic human rights under the pretext of criminal investigation. This attempt was opposed by all trade unions in Japan, which organized joint action and strike. The government attempt ended in failure.

Struggle against the conclusion of a new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (1959-60) TheJapmwseand1L3.govennnmhsagmedtorevmethel1951

Security Treaty into a new treaty with an increased bilateral character. This represented the two governments effort to expand the scope of the Japan-U.S. military alliance to cover the entire Far East region. Since the new treaty increased the danger of Japan being dragged into American war and also reflected the Japanese ruling groups ambition to re-invade Asia, many people opposed it. Sohyo, the Socialist Party and other organizations set up the National Council Against the Revised Security Treaty to conduct anti-treaty campaigns. The council organized nationwide united action on 20 occasions from June, 1959 through June, 1960. On May 18, 1960, the government and the Liberal Democratic Party forcibly wound up Diet deliberations. introduced police into the Diet hall and ratified the treaty. This outrageous conduct turned this struggle to a broader struggle for the dclbnse of parhanientary dentocracy subscnbed to by'the overwhelming majority of the Japanese people including those who supported the meaty.ln June, 19(KL Sohyo carded out broad unMed proteststnkes three times. Though the treaty was ratified by force, the struggle compelled US. President Dwight Eisenhower to cancel his trip to Japan. He was schddidcd to conictr)Japan to exchangeinstnunents ofrathicahon. The Kishi Cabinet. amidst peoplels denunciation, had to resign en mass. As this struggle was conducted simultaneously with the Miike coal miners struggle, it was called "Treaty-Miike struggle? The year 1959#60 saw the largest mass upsurge in Sohyois history.

Struggle against the Anti-Political Violence Law (1961-62): Star-  
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led by the vast energies of workers and citizens shown in the anti-treaty struggle, the government prepared a new legislation intended to suppress mass movement. Sohyo organized mass action to prevent the Anti-Political Violence Bill from being passed through the Diet and successfully blocked the government's attempt.

Struggle against the Vietnam War (1964-75): Active struggle was carried out in Japan against the dirty war conducted by the United States against the Vietnamese people. Especially from 1966, Sohyo conducted mass action including short-time strikes on October 21 every year. The October 21 struggle day was observed internationally. The National Railway Workers' Union and the National Railway Motive Power Workers' Union boycotted U.S. military cargoes.

Struggle against the Japan-Republic of Korea Normalization Treaty (1965): Sohyo organized mass action including strikes opposing the Japan-Republic of Korea normalization Treaty. The treaty recognized the Republic of Korea as the sole legitimate state in the Korean peninsula where there are obviously two parallel states, thus obstructing future peaceful unification of Korea.

Struggle for the reversion of Okinawa to Japan (1968-71):

Okinawa remained under U.S. occupation even after the peace treaty was concluded. The Okinawa people conducted struggle for the return of their islands to Japan over a long period. In 1968-71, this struggle reached culmination. Under the pressure of Japanese public opinion, the U.S. agreed to return the islands to Japan in exchange for the Japanese government's acceptance of U.S. military bases there for an indefinite term. The Japanese government accepted this condition. Sohyo, cooperating with Okinawa people, struggled for the islands' base-free return to Japan.

Struggle against a small constituency scheme (1975): Although the Liberal Democratic Party commands a Diet majority, the voting ratio for the party fell below the 50 per cent level in 1973 and came down to the 40 per cent level at certain times in the 1970s. The Liberal Democrats under these circumstances attempted to introduce a new election system based on smaller constituencies shaped in their unilateral favor so as to maintain their parliamentary force. Sohyo, with the cooperation of the Socialist Party and other organizations, organized mass movement and frustrated this attempt.

Pacific Trade Union Conferences (1981-82): The first conference of trade unions of Pacific countries was held in May, 1981 in Venuatu to create a nuclear-free Pacific. The second conference was held in 1982 in New Caledonia. Sohyo made active contribution toward holding these conferences and making them a success.

A new upsurge of antinuclear peace movement (1982): In 1982, the United Nations convened a general assembly on disarmament. Connected with this and stimulated by European movements for disarmament, 200,000 people gathered in Hiroshima on March 21 and 400,000 on May 23 in Tokyo to demonstrate the Japanese people's wish for disarmament and determination to oppose nuclear weapons. This represented an unprecedented upsurge of the Japanese anti-nuke movement. Startled by this upswing of movement, the Liberal Democratic Party charged it with anti-Americanism, and instructed its party units to obstruct the passage of anti-nuke resolutions through local assemblies. But this attempt failed. On the contrary, the LDP was forced to support anti-nuke resolutions proposed to the Upper and Lower Houses. The National Liaison Council for the Promotion of Anti-Nuke Movement, of which Sohyo is a participant, collected 28 million signatures for an anti-nuclear petition. The movement involved trade unions, citizens' groups, women's associations, political parties, and intellectuals. While maintaining their respective independence, voluntarily collaborated with one another. The movement proved that this type of collaboration, new in Japan, can release vast energies of the people. Many trade union members participated in the peace rally and demonstration held in New York simultaneously with the U.N. General Assembly.

These are some of all political actions conducted by Sohyo. In the 1967 Tokyo gubernatorial election, Sohyo acted as the main organized force to ensure the victory of Prof. Ryokichi Minobet the joint candidate of the Socialist and Communist parties and citizens' groups. Tokyo thus came to have a progressive governor for the first time. Sohyo and its affiliated unions are thus playing important roles in local politics.

(iv) International Struggle

As was explained earlier, Sohyo supports the Socialist Party on the

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basis of its convention resolutions. Implementing these resolutions; Sohyo has been fighting for the victory of the Socialist Party in national and local elections. Before general elections, Sohyo sets up its campaign headquarters and concentrates its activities on election issues during the campaigns.

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## CHAPTER 3 THE PRESENT STATE OF JAPANESE

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### 1. Sohyo and the Present State of Japanese Trade Union Movement

#### (1) A General Picture of Trade Union Organizations

As of 1980, Japan had a total of 40,120,000 employed persons. As the unionized population in the same year numbered 12,370,000, according to a survey by the Labor Ministry, the rate of organization is estimated at 30.8 per cent, rather a low figure for an advanced industrial country. Table 9 shows industrial distribution of the unionized workers. The rate of organization dropped toward the end of the 70s. As the table illustrates, rates of organization are relatively high (more than 50 per cent) in the public sector, electric, gas, water service and thermal energy supply, transportation, finance and insurance and real estate industries. In the meantime, the rate is less than 10 per cent in the wholesale and retail businesses. Rates are also low for the construction and service industries though the rate is increasing in the service industry in recent years. The manufacturing industry is located in between. Unlike other advanced industrial countries, the rate of organization is rather high in Japan for white-collar employees and low for productive workers in the manufacturing industry. Table 11 suggests that the rate of organization is extremely low in the medium and small industries.

The organized workers in Japan do not belong to a single national center. There are four national organizations generally called national centers. They are Sohyo, Domei, Churitsu Roren and Shinsambetsu. They are also called the 'Four Labor Organizations'. While Churitsu Roren at one time intended to grow into a real national center, it still remains a liaison organization of industrial unions and now regards itself as a "preliminary" in the on-going process of unification of labor fronts. Shinsambetsu is the union federation of historical importance, but it is too small to be called a national center. Recently, Shinsambetsu jointly with Churitsu

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Roren formed Sorengo, an organization deeming itself a catalyst (or the unification of labor fronts).

The distribution of Japanese workers among the four organizations is shown by Table 12. As the table indicates, Sohyo accounts for 36.8 per cent of the total number of the organized workers, exceeding all the others by large margins. (The second largest union Domei has less than half the membership of Sohyo).

Besides the parallel presence of the four labor organizations, the Japanese labor scene is characterized by the presence of a high percentage of unionized workers not belonging to any of the national centers. These workers in fact constitute the single largest national group of organized labor. Why this is so is explained in several ways.

(1) The leadership of non-affiliate unions often find it difficult to unify the views of their members as to which national center they should join;

(2) Many of the non-affiliate unions are company unions or almost company unions. They hesitate to be affiliated even with industrial unions;

(3) Many non-affiliates are afraid that they will have to shoulder heavy financial burdens if they should join one of the national centers;

(4) Many unionists are averse to the idea of their having to give automatic political support for a specific political party if they should join a national center (for the Socialist Party if they choose Sohyo and Democratic Socialist Party if they join Domei).

(2) Sohyo is Organizational Picture

(21) Members of Sohyo

As was earlier explained, Sohyo has as its members private sector industrial unions organized by sub-industrial grouping and the national unions at public corporations. The form and criteria of organization for industrial unions differ greatly from one to another. Part II carries the full list of Sohyo member unions as of 1983.

The largest of the Sohyo member unions are the All-Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers Union (Jichiro) and the Japan Teachers Union (Nikkyoso), each with a membership of more than 500,000. It is noted that both are unions of white-collar workers employed in the public

sector. Following the two majors are several unions each with more than 200,000 members. They are the National Federation of Iron and Steel Workers' Unions (Tekko Roren), the Joint Council of Telecommunication Industry Workers' Unions (Dentsu-Roren), and the National Railway Workers Union (Kokuro). These major unions, together with several other unions with more than 100,000 members, such as the General Federation of Private Railway Workers' Unions (Shitetsu Soren), the National Trade Union of Metal & Engineering Workers (Zenkoku Kinzoku), the General Federation of Synthetic Chemical Industry Workers' Unions (Goka Roren), and the National Council of General Amalgamated Workers' Unions (Zenkoku Ippan), constitute the main force of Sohyo. As this composition indicates, Sohyo is strong in the public sector but not strong enough in the private manufacturing sector.

It is true that outside of Sohyo, mammoth private sector unions with more than half a million members exist such as the Federation of Electrical Workers' Unions (affiliated with Churitsu Roren), the General Confederation of Automobile Workers Unions (independent), and Zensen (Domei). But this does not mean that Churitsu Roren and Domei are dominant forces in the private sector. Non-affiliates are the majority force. Those private sector unions which are affiliated with national centers are prevented from bringing their potential force to full play because the national labor front is divided into three segments.

(b) Local Organizations

Sohyo has no local organizations directly under its control. Instead, Sohyo has trade union councils in all prefectures composed of the prefectural branches of Sohyo-affiliated industrial unions and other unions. (These councils are called differently according to prefectures). The composition of the prefectural councils also differs according to localities. Some of the Sohyo affiliates are not members of the councils in certain prefectures while Sohyo non-affiliates play active roles in prefectural councils elsewhere. Some medium and small enterprise workers' unions do not belong to any national organizations but are affiliated with prefectural councils. Prefectural councils thus are formally independent organizations, but they have the right to send to the Sohyo convention special delegates who have the right to speak but don't have the right to vote. The prefect-

W60\_

tural councils are engaged in day-to-day activities to expand the Sohyo movement in their areas. They are thus an integral part of the Sohyo-led labor movement.

The prefectural council performs broad functions on all important local issues such as local minimum wages, employment, policy making for local governments and support for striking workers. It also conducts election campaigns. The prefectural council exerts widespread influence upon the political life of local community in which it operates.

Each prefecture has municipalities and subprefectures as lower echelon administrative units. There, too (in some cases even at the levels of township and village), district trade union councils (Chikuro) operate. In some areas, the district trade union councils are subject to the prefectural trade union council, but generally speaking, the relationship between the prefectural and district councils is similar to that existing between Sohyo and the prefectural council. The district council facilitates mutual co-operation amongst local union units, mainly among the units of Sohyo-affiliated unions, and also plays an important role in organizing unorganized.

#### (0) Joint Struggle and Cooperative Organizations

Sohyo has partnerships of various kinds with many unions not affiliated with it. There are two major forms of such partnership. Sohyo and Sohyo member organizations have permanent joint struggle and/or consultative organizations with other unions operating on specific issues.

The most typical organization of this kind is the Peoples Spring Struggle Committee. Until 1977, this committee was called simply the Spring Struggle Committee. The committee in 1977 had as its members 102 industrial unions including all Sohyo and Churitsu Roren member unions and independent unions, with a total membership of 8,850,000. The Peoples Spring Struggle Committee is an ad hoc organization established each autumn for the spring struggle of the following year. It is dissolved when the years spring struggle is wound up. But some of the committees special commissions operate round the year.

Another typical joint struggle organization is the National Council of Transportation Workers' Unions (Zenkoun). This council rallies under it

the greater transportation industry workers. Zenkoun's core unions are the General Federation of Private Railway Workers, Unions (Shitetsu Soren), National Railway Workers, Union (Kokuro) and other Sohyo unions. Also, the Federation of Transportation Workers' Unions (Unyu Roren) and the Federation of Tourist Service Workers, Unions (Kanko Roren), which are independent unions, play active role in it. Zenkoun performs its effective role by making tactical coordination during the spring struggle presenting transportation workers' unified demands to the government and holding seminars - the Asian seminar of transportation workers, for instance. There are many other greater industrial joint struggle organizations, which, though not affiliated with Sohyo, are active factors in the Sohyo movement.

One other type of joint struggle organizations are those organized by product grouping. Unit unions whose members are making the same kinds of products are grouped together beyond differences in their organizational affiliation in order to exchange information. This represents a classification by smaller industrial grouping or trade grouping. Thus, an organization of this kind operates to bind together unions at steel frame and bridge building firms, and another offers a forum for workers at paint manufacturing firms. These organizations form the broad outskirts of the Sohyo movement.

Another kind of joint organizations are associations composed of unions affiliated with different centers plus others to which the unions provide financial and personnel support. For instance, the Labor Banks are supported by all trade unions including Sohyo and Domei members. The banks collect deposits from unionists, extend housing loans, provide funds for insolvent firms for the payment of workers' wages and furnish striking unions with struggle funds. The government is trying to muzzle Labor Bank's activities by taking discriminatory steps against them and by obstructing national consolidation.

Other organizations operating on the basis of Sohyo unions' support include the National Federation of Workers' Mutual Assistance Cooperatives (Rosairen) which assists workers in cases of industrial accidents and fire, the Japan Workers' Housing Association (Kinjukyo) and the Housing Cooperative Association (Jutaku Seikyo), both helping workers to build their own houses. Sohyo also has close cooperative relationships with con-

sumersl cooperatives.

((1) Organizations for Peoples Movements

Sohyo also is a member, or maintains close relationships with, various organizations promoting mass movements, for it is concerned not only with the living of industrial workers but also with the cause of defending the living of all working people and of developing peace and democracy. Some of these peoples organizations have Sohyo-affiliated industrial unions as their core.

The people's organizations in which Sohyo or its member unions are actively working are as follows:

Organizations for the protection of peoples living

Liaison Conference for Opposition to Pollution

Council for the Promotion of Socialization of Medical Services

Conference for the Rectification Of Unfair Taxation

Conference for the Defense of Democratic Education

Council for the Promotion of Social Security

National Conference for Proper Means of Transportation for the People

National Council to Protect the Right to Privacy

Joint Struggle Conference for Democratization of Postal Services

The National Liaison Council of Aged, Retireesl Associations

Liaison Council for Livelihood Guarantee for Handicapped Persons

National Liaison Council for the Protection of Food Control System

Organizations to defend and develop peace and democracy

Federation for the Defense ofthe Constitution

Japan Congress Against A & H Bombs

Working Committee to Oppose the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

Conference of Citizens Concerned with Mass Communication Media

Sohyo also maintains collaboratory relations with the National Conference of Progressive Mayors (consisting of mayors supported by the Socialist Party and other progressive parties) and the Japan Peasantsl Union.

(e) Sohyols Relationships with International Labor Organizations

Sohyo follows its international policy of llorganizational neutrality."

This means that Sohyo strives to cultivate mutual understanding with all trade unions in all countries and to strengthen friendly relations with them actively seeking joint action on issues of common concern. Sohyo will not join any international trade union organization as long as the international trade union front remains divided. This reflects Sohyo's positive posture that it should contribute to the eventual unification of divided international labor fronts by not choosing one against the others. Though Sohyo as a national center is neutral, five Sohyo member industrial unions, namely, the Japan Postal Workers Union (Zentei), All-Japan Federation of Non-Ferrous Metal Workers Unions (Hitetsu Kinzoku Roren), the Japan Broadcasting Workers Union (Nipporo), All-Japan Telecommunication Workers Union (Dentsu), All-Japan Federation of Municipal Traffic Workers Unions (Toshiko) and the Japan Coal Miners Union (Tanro) are directly affiliated with the ICFTU. The ICFTU's ITSes have some Sohyo unions as their members. The National Railway Workers Union (Kokurō National Railway Workers Union (Dōrō) All-Japan Federation of Municipal Traffic Workers Union (Toshiko) and the All-Japan Express Workers Union (Zeimitsu) are affiliated with ITF, the Japan Postal Workers Union (Zentei), the All-Japan Telecommunication Industry Workers Union (Dentsu Roren), and KDD Workers' Union with PTTI, the National Synthetic Chemical Industry Workers Union (Gokai Roren) with ICFI. The National Federation of Iron and Steel Workers Union (Tekko Roren) with IMF, the All-Japan Federation of Non-Ferrous Metal Workers Unions (Hitetsu Kinzoku Roren) and Kawachi COM Miners Union (Tanro) with MIF. The All-Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers Union (Ichihiro) is affiliated with PSI, the Japan Teachers Union (Nemkyōan with FTU, and the All-Japan Monopoly Commission Workers' Union (Zensenhui) and the All-Japan Federation of Hotel Workers Unions (Hotel Roren) with IUF. Nikkyōso is also a member of WCOTP. In the meantime, the National Federation of Automobile Transport Workers Unions (Chūjiko). Japan Federation of National Public Service Employees Unions (Kokko Roren). Japan Council of Medical Workers Unions (Nihon Imkyō), All Construction Ministry Workers Unions (Zenkenro), All-Japan Day Workers Union (Zennichi Jim), and All-Japan Transport and General Workers' Unions (Unyū Rengo) are affiliated with TUI of the WFTU.

#### (D Decision-Making and Management Process of Sohyo

Sohyo's basic policy is decided at its general Convention held once a year. (Besides, an extraordinary convention is held every year usually in February before the years spring struggle is started). The Convention, composed of delegates from member unions and special delegates from prefectural trade union councils, is Sohyo's supreme decision-making organ.

Between Conventions, the Board of Councillors meets several times a year. The Board of Councillors decides short-term policies.

In order to unify the views of member unions on important issues, Sohyo convenes conferences of the Chairpersons of the member industrial unions (usually once a month).

The Board of Executives, consisting of Sohyo Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary General and Standing Executives - they are elected by the Convention - is responsible for the implementation of the Convention decisions. Each Standing Executive takes charge of one of the departments organized in the Sohyo head office, and the Standing Executives with the help of organizers and secretariat members execute all decisions.

The Sohyo member industrial unions are grouped into the Private Enterprise Union Conference, the Council of Public Corporation and National Enterprise Workers' Unions (Korokyo) and the Joint Struggle Council of Government Workers Unions (Kokuin Kyoto) so that they can work out proper policies and tactics in accordance with their different employment situations.

Sohyo has its local officers in major places all over Japan, where Sohyo organizers are posted. The officers make liaison and coordination with the local trade union councils. The prefectural councils have a total of about 250 organizers specializing in organizing the unorganized.

#### (g) Sohyo's Finance

Sohyo's activities are supported by contributions by its member industrial unions. The contributions consist of membership dues (about 80 yen per month from each of the registered members), donations for specific purposes (such as construction of office buildings and election campaigns), and temporary donations sought to support major struggles.

## 2. Direction of Activities of Sohyo and Other Japanese Trade Unions

### ( 1) For the Protection of the Living of Workers

#### (a) Basic Standpoint

The basic task of trade unions is to protect that livelihood of their members and workers in general. As we have seen, Sohyo in its long history has been fully committed to this task. But with the political and economic situation changing, new difficulties emerged and new issues unions must take up increased. Accordingly, the goals and style of movement also have had to be modified. Especially in the '80s when the key-tone of the Japanese economy is undergoing a major change, we cannot expect to fully protect the living of workers merely by resorting to traditional tactics.

In the following, we shall explain how Sohyo is reacting to this new situation, with a focus on the wage issue.

#### (b) Struggle for Higher Wages

in the 80s, Japanese employers are stepping up their wage suppressing policies, with the backing of the government. For instance, the government in 1982 decided not to implement the yearly wage increase recommendations by the Personnel Agency in spite of the fact that the Personnel Agency system had been created precisely to compensate for negation of the public workers' right to strike. Faced by the 1983 spring struggle, the employers' Association of Japan (Nikkeiren) declared that there be no wage increase in the year. In fact, the real wage increase rate in Japan has been less than 2 per cent per annum since 1974, the real disposable income increase rate in the meantime failing to reach even 1 per cent. The living standards of workers have practically ceased to rise. Under these circumstances, breaking this system of wage freeze has emerged as the focal task of the Japanese trade unions. Considering the Japanese economy's growth potential, the employers' wage suppression program obviously has the effect of artificially reducing economic growth rates. This adversely affects the national economy and ultimately negatively influences the world economy. Opposed to this policy orientation, we take the position that expansion of domestic demand by wage increase



and income tax cuts should be the way to activate the national economy. Sohyo, together with other trade unions, organizes the Peoples Spring Struggle Committee, and also engages in joint action with Domei and other labor federations in order to strengthen efforts to obtain higher real wages for labor. It is recalled, however, that during the rapid economic growth period, the success of some powerful unions in obtaining higher wages was able to be relatively easily generalized across society in due time. In that period, this process had its own objective ground. Now the conditions allowing this to happen has been lost. Consequently, socially unfair wage gaps have again started to expand. To counter this tendency, Sohyo is endeavoring to set minimum standard demands and levels of settlement to be observed by all unions at all enterprises, large or small, so as to gradually equalize, and hopefully to raise in real terms, the living standards of all workers irrespective of the business conditions of the enterprises where they are working. Since wages are basically determined in Japan by management of individual Firms, workers in the same category of job and with the same capacity are often treated differently in accordance with the enterprises they are employed by. This again generates unfair gaps among these workers. In order to prevent this. Sohyo unions are demanding the so-called individual wage defined for each age group and job group, so that workers in the same age or job group are paid the same minimum and standard wage. This formula of wage demand is counterposed to the traditional one of concentrating on average wage increase.

In the spring struggle of 1983, the Peoples Spring Struggle Committee presented as its standard wage demand a minimum of 7 per cent wage increase and at once decided to demand 230,000 yen per month for all 35-year old standard workers (workers who graduated from high school and in service for the same company for 17 years).

#### (c) Struggle for Minimum Wages

As has been explained, we are required not only to Fight for a real wage increase but also to work a change in the wage scale so that the socially unjustified wage differentials be overcome. Control of minimum wages is the key to this task.

Concerning minimum wages, Sohyo considers the following to be its

necessary tasks: (1) the establishment of a nationally uniform minimum wage system as the core of the national social security guarantee; raising the level of such a unified minimum wage to that of the United States, France and other advanced industrial countries; (2) improvement of the regional comprehensive minimum wages; and (3) establishment in the future of an effective industrial minimum wage mechanism, which will set wage levels higher than the nationally uniform minimum wages as llfair wage standards?

Sohyo has been forcefully promoting, in collaboration with regional trade unions concerned, improvements in regional minimum wages under the existing system under which the regional minimum wages are grouped into four ranks. The Peoples Spring Struggle Committee in 1983 demands that monthly 90,000 yen (515 yen per hour) be the rank A wage and 78,500 yen (449 yen per hour) the rank D wage. Sohyo hopes to get this differential squeezed in the future so that the minimum wages will be ultimately unilied on a national scale.

Increasing efforts are being made at this stage to establish industrial minimum wages. The Peoples Spring Struggle Committee in 1983 demands that the contractual minimum wage applicable to all the workers including part-time workers be set at 95,000 yen per month across the industry. Sohyo considers that such contractual minimum wages should be applied not only to the unionists but also to indirectly employed workers. In long- and medium-range perspective. this extension of contractual minimum wages to indirectly or irregularly employed workers should be considered the main means by which minimum wages are made applicable to all workers.

Independent from this effort, fresh endeavor has been started to establish minimum wages not specifically for low-paid workers but for the main body of workers in the same industry (or business category). In this case, workers are to be divided into categories smaller than the traditional industries.

Sohyo encourages these various types of minimum wages to be negotiated between labor and management. rather than prescribed by the administration. Sohyo demands that laws be amended to facilitate this transition from administrative to contractual minimum wage decision. Subject to yet lower working conditions than those of minimum

h68\_

wage recipients are an estimated 1,300,000 cottage industry workers strewn all over the country. Sohyo through its prefectural organizations is making active efforts to get the minimum wage rates for them raised. During the rapid growth period, an average wage increase would mean corresponding wage increases for all groups of workers on all kinds of jobs. But today, we should strive not only to raise the average wage but also specify a minimum wage level for each workers' groups, and formulate a standard wage demand for each age and trade group disregarding difference in enterprise, sex, trade, and form of employment. This is Sohyo's strategic task.

#### ((1) Income Tax Cuts

The real disposable income increase rate for working families, failing to catch up with the real wage increase rate, has levelled off (or even dipped at times). This is because tax rate adjustments corresponding to consumer price increase totally have been neglected. Sohyo and all the trade unions therefore strongly demand income tax cuts. The Peoples Spring Struggle Committee takes the position that the existing unfair taxation formula giving preferential benefits to big corporations should be thoroughly rectified for fair distribution of tax burdens amongst the various segments of population. The committee demands in this context that the minimum taxable income be drastically raised in fiscal 1983, that the price-related tax cuts be institutionalized and that income and local tax cuts totaling 1,400,000 million yen be made in the year.

#### (c) Shorter Working Time

Working time in Japan by far lags behind other advanced industrial countries. Japan's backwardness involves weekly off-days, total annual real work time, the length of annual vacation, and restriction on overtime. Criticisms from overseas of this aspect of Japanese working conditions is mounting as the employment situations in other countries get serious and trade friction with them develops.

The government recently worked out a program promoting measures concerning two off-days a week and work time, whose goal is to reduce the annual real work time to 2,000 hours or less. To approach this goal, the government program proposes setting an upper limit to

overtime (50 hours a month), mandatory record keeping about workers' annual vacation, and control on shift work and night duties. But this program has not been effectively implemented as business associations put up strong resistance to it and as the program can be implemented only through administrative guidance and lacks penalties against violation. Sohyo on its part is conducting its activities for the following goals:

(1) Closing banks and the offices of other financial institutions as well as government offices on Saturdays so as to give their employees full two off-days a week; using this as the leverage, establishment of two off-days a week system in all industries;

(2) 40 hour work week and 2,000 hours or less annual work time;

the elimination of work time gaps among industries and enterprises;

(3) Extension of paid annual leave and the full exercise by workers of their right to paid annual leave on a well planned basis; increase in national holidays;

(4) Improvement of the night duty and shift work systems;

(5) Legal restrictions on overtime; increase in overtime premiums; and progressive scaling of such premiums;

(6) A longer summer vacation; making summer vacation an established social practice; making the May 1 Labor Day a national holiday by law.

(7) Promotion of international exchange to facilitate efforts to reach the European and U.S. level of working time; early and unconditional ratification of ILO Conventions related to working time.

(2) Changes in Social Structure and the Role of Trade Unions

(a) Basic Viewpoints

The Japanese society will certainly be exposed to a series of structural transformations from the 1980s through the early 21st century. The Japanese trade union movement should positively respond to the challenges of transformation. For instance, the following new factors will emerge affecting employment: (1) problems of middle-aged and old-aged workers in a society with a growing average age and a particular employment practice in favor of young labor force; (2) increasing instability and stratification of employment with growing numbers of temporary workers,

t70h

part-time workers, and subcontract workers as well as frequent transfers of parent firm workers to subsidiary firms; (3) more and more lopsided employment and unemployment patterns according to regions; (4) serious unemployment issues arising in the specific branches of the processing industry which suffer from stagnation, or the branches which suffer from relative disadvantages stemming from the second oil crisis and consequent business internationalization; (5) and effects upon employment of technological innovation including the spreading use of microelectronics. These problems are closely intertwined, and involve extra-firm factors. This is a salient feature of the current situation. In the following, we shall explain what Sohyo is going to do vis-u-vis the new situation.

(b) Sohyo's Response to Introduction of Microelectronics Technology  
Introduction of microelectronics systems, centering upon robotization and office automation represents the main thrust of technological innovation in the 80s. Japan pioneers this innovation in this area as is indicated by its rapidest pace of robotization of all advanced industrial countries. This means that in responding to this issue, we cannot follow examples of other countries. On the contrary, we, the Japanese trade union movement, have the moral responsibility to the labor movement of other advanced countries; we must meet this responsibility by finding new ways of countering this type of technological innovation. But Sohyo has just started to react to it, and efforts so far made are still on a trial-and-error stage.

Several unions conducted surveys in 1981 and 1982 on the effects of microelectronics technology on labor. One of the important surveys was conducted jointly by the Sohyo headquarters and the National Metal Workers Union, a member of Sohyo.

These surveys indicate that serious disputes involving the application of microelectronics technology have not yet occurred, but that in the future microelectronics will have a serious impact on workers.

According to the surveys, there are several reasons why no major disputes have occurred involving microelectronics: (1) workers on the shop floor rather welcomed robotization because robots have been introduced so far to replace manual labor in painting, welding and other dirty

e71A

works not favored by workers or else into workshops where workers had too much work to do and had to do overtime frequently; (2) the electrical and automobile industries, and industries related to them, were increasing their production until the early 1805, and so introduction of robots did not lead to reduction in the number of workers; and (3) in these industries, workers working in the robotized shops were transferred to other categories of jobs or to other posts, without losing wages or jobs in the same companies. But the same survey showed that in some specific cases, employment adjustment (reduction in employment) has already been made in connection with introduction of robots. Transfer to other jobs, it has been learned, involves great difficulties especially for workers above the age of 40.

As to the future, negative effects of robotization will come to the fore: (1) under the prevailing slump, further introduction of microelectronics technology is likely to lead to cuts in employment, causing many workers to lose jobs; (2) introduction of industrial robots, for instance, will cause processing work now done by skilled workers to be done by robots; through increasing labor may be required in the area of making software. skilled workers will become redundant when they cannot easily be transferred to new jobs; (3) already. works requiring little skill have been outsourced or else given to part-time workers. but with the massive introduction of microelectronics technology, ultimately the works related to software too may be outsourced; this will lead to further reduction in regular employees and strengthen dual structurization of economy.

To meet this new situation. Sohyo has established a committee to survey the effects of micro-computerization. Sohyo proposes as its policy line the following: on the level of enterprise and factory, prior consultation systems should be strengthened so that all matters involving labor and microelectronics such as employment quantity and quality of labor (involving inhuman working conditions), posting. education, industrial accidents. and professional diseases, should be subject to prior consultation and practically placed under the unions control when production plans are modified or induction of new technology is planned. But restricting introduction of new technology at the company or factory level often involves difficulties as such technology is usually adopted in the midst of severe inter-firm competition; therefore, unified standards concerning in-

-72\_

duction of new technology are definitely required as applicable to each business category, industry, or commodity market; reduction in working time is indispensable for the maintenance of employment when technological progress is under way. Sohyo considers that implementation of this policy line would require joint action at different levels, which will not be confined to joint action among the national labor federations but will include business category level joint action. Sohyo encourages such manifold joint action to develop.

(C) Responding to the Requirements of Aging Society

At a time when the average age of the Japanese population is rapidly rising, two acute issues arise for workers - job opportunities of aged workers and income guarantee for retired workers.

The major issue involving employment of aged workers is the compulsory retirement age. A number of enterprises still force workers to retire before 60 at which they become entitled to old age pensions. Under these circumstances, Sohyo and all other trade unions are called upon to act to get the retirement age raised to 60 years at all enterprises. Sohyo is striving to achieve this goal at two levels - industrial and enterprise level and the level of legislation. But even if the compulsory retirement age is raised to 60 years, that alone would not ensure decent living for aged workers. As the pension is not large enough, we still have to pay attention to the fact that workers in their early 60s still need jobs. How to secure jobs for them is a newly emerging issue. In actual cases, many of the workers in this age group who are working full-time are paid 50 per cent or less wages than their pre-retirement wages. The excuse for this is that they are receiving pensions as well as wages are supplementary. Nikkeiren even insists that such workers be made exempt from the minimum wage system. Sohyo demands that proper job opportunities be created for aged workers not only to ensure them means of living but also to make their life worth living. Sohyo also demands measures to keep their wages at a proper level so as to prevent the wages of young workers from going down under the pressure of low wages of old workers.

Concerning old age pensions, attempts are made as part of the administrative reform to revise the pension systems. It is however clear that the pension funds are running out in the long-run, and there-

tore the existing pension systems anyway requires a drastic reform.  
Sohyo's long range goal is to establish a unified basic pension scheme.

((1) Prevention of Unemployment and Guarantee of Employment

Structural problems aside, job security is the single major issue facing Sohyo and other Japanese trade unions. Each unit union should struggle against dismissals, when such occurs at its enterprise, with the backing of the industrial union it is affiliated with. At the same time, struggle for the establishment of industrial policies conducive to the stability of employment should be stepped up.

On the national center level, Sohyo follows the following basic policy line:

(i) Sohyo opposes such economic policies (industrial and regional policies) as would not contribute to the defense and improvement of the employment and livelihood situation of the people and demands economic policies having the livelihood of the people as the priority consideration. In concrete, Sohyo demands that social security including pension and medical service be improved and that economic policies be instrumental to the laying of the premises of employment guarantee in the areas of working time and minimum wages. Sohyo also demands that public investments be increased for the expansion of infrastructure related to peoples living, that steps to absorb surplus labor be taken accompanied by positive measures to create new jobs.

(ii) Sohyo demands that an employment guarantee system be established as the basis of the government's economic and industrial policies. The new system will provide for regulation on mass dismissals, establishment of an employment guarantee council, measures to improve the employment conditions of workers in precarious employment status, provision of livelihood assistance for them, increase in unemployment benefits for the unemployed and extension of the benefit-covered period, and provision of allowances for the unemployed after the lapse of the benefit-covered term until such times as they get reemployed and the same for those not yet qualified to receive regular benefits. Sohyo also demands that the life-time professional training systems be expanded and a fund therefor be established.

(iii) Worker solidarity should be strengthened among organized



labor on the issues of a higher retirement age and shorter work time. On this basis, Sohyo strives to get job opportunities increased and discriminatory employment practice wiped out by means of contractual and social regulation and control.

Of these items, certain progress has been made with regard to (ii) through joint action taken by the four labor federations. Sohyo is prepared to conduct joint action and present common demands with all other willing trade unions concerning demands related to employment. Sohyo is thus determined to achieve its goals in this area of struggle.

(e) Changing Industrial Structure and Fresh Efforts to Organize

As was already examined, the Japanese industrial structure is changing in favor of a growing tertiary sector. With regard to the form of employment, Japanese business remarkably increased employment of part-time workers and subcontract workers after it went through the body slimming process? Being enterprise-based unions, the Japanese unions basically consider only the regular employees of the main firms as their object of organization. Industry-wise, rates of unionization are relatively high in the manufacturing, transportation, communication, and public service sectors. This means that the industrial areas where the number of workers is now rapidly increasing are where the Japanese trade union movement has had failed to organize successfully. However, now that the industrial structure, and accordingly the employment structure, is changing rapidly, the trade unions would suffer from falling rates of organization and declining social influence unless they start fresh efforts to organize these new areas. Zenkoku Konzoku, Jichiro and some other Sohyo unions have thus begun to urge their member unions to engage in organizing beyond their traditional boundaries. Considering that it is women, and aged workers who are now joining work force in large numbers, a new type of organizing is definitely required. The new type of organizing will certainly involve union control of labor supply in each region. Sohyo has already raised this as its new policy.

(3) For the Establishment Of Basic Labor Rights, Especially  
the Right to Strike

Sohyo now lays Special emphasis on the establishment of the public Workers's right to strike. For the furtherance of this goal, Sohyo is making effort to further strengthen the unity of public service workers and to gain the support of public opinion domestically and internationally for this struggle.

The Korokyo workers in 1975 carried out a large scale strike to get their right to strike back, and Sohyo follows it up with activities for legislation establishing their right to strike. Sohyo has obtained the agreement on this matter from most of the opposition parties, including the Socialist, Democratic Socialist, and Komei Parties.

The National Railway Corporation under the pressure of the Liberal Democratic Party, has taken an outrageous step against Kokuro and Doro. The corporation tiled a lawsuit against the unions asking for compensations amounting to 2,200 million yen for the damage allegedly done by the 1975 strike.

Private enterpn'ses nowadays increasingly consider that they have the right to demand compensations of unions for iistrike damage? Sohyo is struggling to get the National Railway Corporation and the government to retract the lawsuit.

(4) Unification of Labor Fronts

Needless to say, the labor front should be unified if labor hopes to exert strong influence upon the politics and economics of a country. Sohyo itself was founded as the body expected to grow into a unified national labor front. Later, parallel national union centers came to exist side by side, but Sohyo has never relinquished its endeavor to establish a united labor front.

The National Council of Private Enterprise Workers' unions (Zenmin Rokyo), founded in December 1982. is still an organization for joint action set up on an agreement among private sector unions. But with the inauguration of this council, moves will certainly be invigorated to establish practically the single, powerful national labor center representing the

#76.\_

overwhelming majority of the union members in Japan. Sohyo is determined to take the initiative in promoting such moves.

Out of this determination, Soliyos national convention in 1982 decided to put a draft program for unification of labor fronts to discussion by all Sohyo members. This program makes the following points:

(1) Sohyo since its founding has been endeavoring to unify all workers under a single front. Today, in a deepening economic crisis, workers' living standards are substantially pressed down and reactionary tendencies are being strengthened in the political arena. One new social problem after another is emerging in the wake of the rising average age of the population and technological innovation. To cope with this situation, Sohyo must on the one hand qualitatively strengthen itself and on the other hand develop broad joint action of all workers and trade unions. organize mass action, and thereby achieve unification of labor fronts on a broad basis.

(2) What does all-inclusive unification of labor fronts mean? That means in short the ultimate creation of a single, powerful national labor center which rallies all the trade unions existing in this country. Such a national center should unify under it all private as well as public sector workers, all workers at big enterprises as well as small enterprises, insofar as they are union members. The center should establish policies and programs that will reflect demands and views of not only union members but also those of unorganized workers as well. The center should unfold its movement on the basis of these policies and programs. We must step up our activities toward this strategic goal of establishing such a national labor center.

(3) Adopting a specific ideology and trying to impose it on others would be an attitude obstructing the task of unification of labor fronts. But the following points are the minimum standards commonly accepted by all workers and therefore must be observed in connection with this task.

First, the national center should strive to promote economic, social, cultural and political interests of workers on the basis of the demands of workers. The center, as a representative of workers, should always act on behalf of the demands and views of all workers including the unorganized, well aware of its social

responsibility.

Second, the unions affiliated with the center should maintain independence from the government, political parties and capital and fight against their attempt to intervene in, and dominate, the trade unions. The center will have collaborative relationship, on the basis of mutual respect of independence and on an equal footing, with those political parties which support demands of unions and share the same policies with the center. Similarly, the unions will cooperate in the same manner with mass movement organizations working for the cause of peace, democracy and protection of livelihood.

Third, the unions affiliated with the national center naturally will encourage collective action and engage in disputes for the attainment of their goals. Such action is the source of power of trade unions. The national center itself will display its strength by organizing mass action in proper and effective forms.

Fourth, the unions affiliated with the national center strive to protect the national sovereignty based on parliamentary democracy, civil liberties, and basic human rights including basic labor rights; endeavor to establish lasting peace, and uphold the Japanese Constitution that provides for these rights. The unions also strive to firmly establish the good principles included in ILO Conventions and recommendations. It is the primary duty of trade unions to establish the basic labor rights including the right to strike, exercise these rights and to get established and observed the basic minimum standards of working and living conditions.

Fifth, the unions will contribute toward raising the international level of working conditions and labor rights and strengthen international solidarity mainly with workers in advanced industrial countries whose situations are similar to the Japanese situation, so that international economic friction be overcome and the North-South problems solved from the workers' standpoint.

Sixth, the unions, faced by critical situation where peace, democracy and human rights are jeopardized, will strengthen their struggle to light emergence of militarism and political reaction domestically, and will express solidarity, and organize joint action with all trade unions and other groups abroad on an international level to safeguard peace.

(4) For the achievement of unification of labor fronts, joint action

\_78,

should be strengthened to heighten mutual trust amongst the potential participants in unification at the following levels: (i) joint action at the level of workshop through overcoming splits in the ranks of workers; (ii) joint action at the level of industry and business category; (iii) joint action at the level of private enterprise workers as well as of public sector workers; (iv) joint action in each region; and (v) joint action by the four national labor federations.

(5) The national center, when it has been fully organized in this manner, will play the roles enumerated below, and Sohyo will play these roles, until the center is fully established, at its own responsibility.

( i ) The center will establish minimum social standards of working and living conditions for Japanese workers, and through its own and its affiliates activities, will fight for the implementation of these standards. The standards will cover wages, work time, employment, pensions, and other areas involving life-time income guarantee, social means of living, and all other aspects of workers' life.

( ii ) The center will organize joint action among different industries. coordinate action schedules, and facilitate exchange of information; this is an important function of the national center;

( \_ iii ) Activities for proper policies and institutional reforms are indispensable in protecting the life of workers in society today. To work for proper economic policies for Full employment, stabilization of prices. and other measures of social equity and to present new demands appropriate to the rising average age of population and ensuring a new quality of life in conformity to the transformation of social structure are an important task of the new national center.

( iv ) For the achievement of demands presented to the government. the center will actively intervene in the decision making process by (1) collaborating with political parties which understand the union's position, (2) negotiating directly with the government, and (3) participating in administrative committees and advisory councils.

( v ) The new national center will have its organizing function. Though organizing the unorganized is the direct responsibility of industrial unions and regional centers, the national center will play its role by backing organizing activities of its members. The national center will handle and settle organizational disputes that may arise amongst affiliated unions.

The national center will actively support activities of medium and small unions.

( vi ) The national center will back movements conducted by various groups for the achievement of social fairness. Solidarity should especially be expressed with the movement of the socially weak. It will actively promote movement against nuclear weapons, arms buildup and for peace and disarmament, and in areas of activities where the national center share the same ideal and policy goals with other bodies, the center will participate actively in campaigns organized by the latter. Concerning relationships with political parties, Sohyo at this stage supports and cooperates with the Socialist Party, but in the course of the development of activities for unification, Sohyo is prepared to leave the choice of political parties to the discretion of its member unions.

#### (5) Peace and International Solidarity

Since its inception, Sohyo has been maintaining close ties with international labor movements, and as the struggle for basic labor rights has shown, Sohyo has been supported effectively by international labor movements. Sohyo realizes that its international responsibility has become heavier at this stage, and is determined to strengthen its activities of international solidarity on the principle of enhancement of workers, living standards and rights, by overcoming ideological and political conflicts. The basic attitude of Sohyo is described as follows: ltSohyo adheres to the position of organizational neutrality and promote vigorous solidarity activities on common issues?

In the past ten years, Sohyo has stepped up international exchange with trade unions in advanced industrial countries on such common issues as internationalization, employment and trade. Sohyo opened its Europe office, got affiliated with TUAC. and organized exchange visits with international trade secretariats and ICFTU. Sohyo also fully supported the Polish trade union Solidarnosc which is fighting for independence of unions and worker solidarity. While maintaining its independent stance, Sohyo has been promoting exchange with China and other socialist countries.

Sohyo's line of positive neutrality is thus yielding fruit. With these activities as the background, the 1982 annual national convention of Sohyo

agreed on the following points:

( i ) The campaigns against nuclear armament and for disarmament and peace is spreading all over the world, and the role Japan is to play in this campaign is becoming increasingly important. Sohyo will endeavor to see to it that an international meeting of trade union leaders be held on the issue of nuclear armament and disarmament. Sohyo will make effort to extend the basis of solidarity on this issue on all available occasions.

( ii ) Sohyo, aware that the worldwide crisis of today has its concentrated expressions in the countries of the south, will engage itself on a full scale in solidarity actions promoting development. Sohyo will continue to strengthen exchange of visits with other Asian countries, and extend its activities into Africa.

Under an agreement with the OATUU, the united organization of African trade unions following a policy of neutrality, Sohyo will establish its Africa office at Accra where the OATUU headquarters is located. The Africa office will conduct surveys on labor affairs in Africa and convene seminars in Japan and Africa in turn. The 1983 seminar will be on the subject of anti-nuclear struggle, disarmament, and development.

( iii ) In connection with ILO, the importance of activities to promote ratification of ILO conventions, treaties, and recommendations, to establish the basic labor rights, and to deal properly with employment, rationalization and development issues is increasing. In order to formulate policies on these new issues, Sohyo will establish an ILO project team.

( iv ) Sohyo encourages affiliation of its member unions with international trade secretariats and strengthens its relationship with ICFTU.

Of these issues, opposition to nuclear armament is of paramount importance as it involves the fate of mankind. Japan as country victimized by nuclear bombs has its special reason to be concerned with this issue. Sohyo considers that the Japanese anti-nuclear movement should march at the top of the worldwide anti-nuclear campaign. Sohyo is determined to carry out maximum mobilization of the people (1) to inform the reality of nuclear bombing to the world, (2) to get an international treaty on a ban on the use of nuclear weapons concluded, (3) to get the three non-nuclear principles fully implemented and establish more nuclear-free zones, and (4) to get a disarmament treaty concluded for implementation within a prescribed period of time and to get nuclear weapons completely

\_81a

prohibited.

(6) Toward the 21st Century

The existing situation in Japan poses difficulties, both political and economical, to the trade union movement. But Sohyo is determined to overcome these difficulties, and march toward the 21st century to establish a society of peace, justice, and solidarity.

-82



# TABLES & FIGURE

Fig. 1 State Bonds Issued & Budgets Dependency  
upon State Bonds

State bonds

issued (value) State bonds Rate of  
(in 31,000 M!) Issued (value) dependency

152,700 ('22)

Rate of X 39.6 142,700 133 450

15 dependency 33.5 122,700 26.5 126,800

26.2 2 , 116.800 40

104,400 5 0 22.2

21.1

10 30

20

(in moo mil.) 10

FY1975 FY76 FY77 FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY182 FY183 FY'84 FY85

Note: New data available as of September 1985 are adopted  
in the Tables and Figure of this edition.

-83-

Table 1 Breakdown of Gross Domestic Product (values & percentages  
at constant prices Base year : Calendar year of 1975)

1970

(in #51 bil.) 5'

1. Industries	107,463.1	91.2
(1) Agriculture-forestry-flshery	7,187.8	6.1
(2) Mining	820.0	0.7
(3) Manufacturing	35,141.5	29.8
(4) Construction	10,9568	9.3
(5) Electric,gas,water services	2,360.0	2.0
(6) Wholesale,retail	15,9018	13.5
(7) Financial,insurance	5,034.8	4.3
(8) Realestates	8,614.6	7.3
(9) Transportation,communication	7,380.7	6.3
(10) Service	14,0652	11.9
2. Govlt Service Suppliers	10,3369	8.9
(1) Electric,gas,water service	246.4	0.2
(2) Service	4,550.1	3.9
(3) Public service	5,740.5	4.9
3. Private, Non-Proflt Service Suppliers	1,609.0	1.4
(1) Service	1,609.0	1.4
4. Total	116,803.7	100.0

\_34\_

1975 1980 1983  
(in #51 bil.) (in 331 bil.) (in W bil.)  
138,726.5 93.9 184,0708 97.5 209,686.1 95.6  
8,129.5 5.5 7,368.2 3.9 7,502.3 3.4  
776.2 0.5 1,048.8 0.6 1,049.0 0.5  
44,2500 29.9 69,4619 36.8 86,1648 39.3  
14,3239 9.7 15,2590 8.1 14,0968 6.4  
3,001.8 2.0 3,659.4 1.9 4,081.0 1.9  
21,9043 14.8 27,3662 14.5 30,271.7 13.8  
8,264.6 5 .6 11,001.7 5.8 14,039 .5 6.4  
12,2842 8.3 17,1169 9.1 19,1293 8.7  
9,540.8 6.5 11,9457 6.3 11,9780 5.5  
16,2512 11.0 19,8430 10.5 21,373.7 9.7  
12,9545 8.8 15,6049 8.3 17,0159 7.8  
387.2 0.3 510.8 0.3 599.0 0.3  
5,473.4 3.7 6,423.1 3.4 7,011.5 3.2  
7 ,0939 4.8 8 ,671.0 4.6 9,405 .3 4.3  
2,213.2 1.5 3,019.6 1.6 3,399.8 1.5  
2,213.2 1.5 3,019.6 1.6 3,399.8 1.5  
147,190.4 100.0 194,071.8 100.0 219,399.4 100.0  
-854

Table 2 Industrial Breakdown of the Persons on Jobs

1 Agriculture Non-agriculture/ . . - .

Year Total & forestry forestry Fl5lung Mmmg

1-1955 4,090 1,478 2,612 88 45

(in 10,000

persons)

(100.0%) (36.1) (63.9) (2.2) (1.1)

1960 4,466 1,273 3,164 67 43

(100.0) (28.5) (70.8) (1.5) 1(10)

1965 4,730 1,046 3,684 67 1 29

(100.0) (22.1) (77.9) (1.4) (0.6)

1970 5,094 842 4,251 44 20

(100.0) (16.5) (83.5) (0.9) (0.4)

1971 5,121 769 4,354 46 1 19

(100.0) (15.0) (85.0) (0.9) (0.4)

1972 5,126 706 4,420 49 16

(100.0) (13.8) (86.2) (1.0) I(0.3)

1973 5,259 658 4,601 47 13

(100.0) (12.5) (87.5) (0.9) (0.2)

1974 5,237 630 4,606 45 1 14

(100.0) (12.0) (88.0) (0.8) (0.2)

1

1975 5,223 618 4,605 43 16

(100.0) (11.8) (88.1) (0.8) , (0.3)

19761 5,271 601 4,670 42 18

(100.0) (11.4) (88.5) (0.7) (0.3)

1977 5,342 589 4,752 45 19

(100.0) (11.0) (88.9) (0.8) (0.3)

1978 5,408 589 4,819 44 15

(100.0) (10.8) (89.1) (0.8) (0.2)

1

1979 5.479 568 4,912 45 12

(100.0) (10.3) (89.6) (0.8) (0.2)

1980 5,536 532 5,004 45 11

(100.0) (10.0) (89.7) (0.8) (0.2)

1981 5,581 510 5,071 47 10

(100.0) (9.1) (90.9) (0.8) (0.2)

19821 5,638 502 5,136 46 10

(100.0) (8.9) (91.1) (0.8) (0.2)

1983 5,733 485 5,247 46 10

(100.0) (8.5) (91.5) (0.8) (0.2)

1984 5 ,7 66 468 5 ,299 44 8

1 (100.0) (8.1) (91.9) (0.8) (0.1)

\_86\_

.7  
Wholesale, .  
retail, Transponattxpn,  
' 5 - - communlca 1011, , ,  
Construcuon Manufacturmg 1511:3222: electric, gas, Sen'lces Pubhc  
J real estate; water services  
195 757 761 193 472 131  
(4.8) (18.5) (18.6) (4.7) (11.5) (3.2)  
253 1,946 899 239 574 142  
(5.7) (43.6) (20.1) (5.4) (12.9) (3.2)  
328 1,150 1,008 294 649 158  
(6.9) (24.3) (21.3) (6.2) (13.7) (3.3)  
394 1,377 1,144 353 751 161  
(7.7) (27.0) (22.5) (6.9) (14.7) (3.2)  
414 1,383 1,180 362 775 167  
(8.1) (27.0) (23.0) (7.1) (15.1) (3.3)  
433 1,383 1,201 356 799 176  
(8.4) (27.0) (23.4) (6.9) (15.6) (3.4)  
467 1,443 1,242 372 826 180  
(8.9) (27.4) (23.6) (7.1) (15.7) (3.4)  
464 1,427 1,260 364 830 192  
(8.8) (27.2) (24.0) (6.9) (15.8) (3.6)  
479 1,346 1,296 363 855 196  
(9.1) (25.7) (24.8) (6.9) (16.3) (3.7)  
492 1,345 1 1,323 374 876 190  
(9.3) (25.5) 1 (25.0) (7.0) (16.6) (3.6)  
499 1,340 1 1,372 371 903 192  
(9.3) (25.0) (25.6) (6.9) (16.9) (3.5)  
520 1,326 1 1.390 1 374 943 197  
(9.6) (24.5) 1 (25.7) (6.9) (17.4) (3 .6)  
536 1,333 1 1.413 382 980 201  
(9.7) (24.3) (25 .7) (6.9) (17.8) (3.6)  
548 1,367 1 1,439 380 1,001 199  
(9.6) (23.6) (25.5) (7.0) (18.5) (3.6)  
544 1,385 1 1,474 375 1,030 194  
(9.7) (24.8) (26.4) (6.7) (18.5) (3.5)  
541 1,380 1,501 383 1,065 195  
(9.6) (24.5) (26.6) (6.8) (18.9) (3.5)  
541 1,406 1,526 386 1,122 195  
(9,4) (24.5) (26.6) (6.7) (19.6) (3.4)  
527 1,436 1,536 376 1,154 195  
(9.1) (24.9) (26.6) (6.5) (20.0) (3.4)  
-872

Table 3 Japan's Economic Growth Rates in Recent Years

Nominal % Real

FY : 19\_\_

1974 18.4 -0.2

1975 10.0 3.6

1976 12.2 5.1

1977 10.9 5.3

1978 9.5 5.1

1979 7.4 5.3

1980 8.5 4.6

1981 5.8 3.6

1982 5.0 3.4

1983 4.2 3.9

1984 6.7 5.7

\_1

Table 4 No. of Seats at Upper & Lower Houses by Party

(January 14, 1984)

House Of Representatives Political Parties House Of

Councillors

255 Lib.-Dem. I 137

1 1 1 Socialists 42

59 Komei 27

38 Dem.-Soc. 13

27 Communists 14

8 Shinjiyu Club 0

0 Sangiin-no-kai 3

0 Shinsei Club 3

3 Niin Club, Kakushin-Kyoto 3

6 Non-affiliates 4

4 Vacancies 6

5 I 1 Total 252

Table 5 Population, Persons on Jobs, Employees, Unemployed in Japan

T' T

Po ulation Persons on

Year (in 10,0160 persons) Jobs Employees Unemployed

\_1-\_\_T\_\_"-'\_-\_\_-

1951	8,433	3,622	1,370	39
1952	8,559	3,728	1,421	47
1953	8,678	3,925	1,480	45
1954	8,803	3,958	1,518	58
1955	8,906	4,090	1,778	105
1956	9,006	4,172	1,741	98
1957	9,091	4,284	1,877	82
1958	9,181	4,312	1,973	90
1959	9,246	4,368	2,158	98
1960	9,326	4,461	2,273	1 76
1961	9,409	4,518	i 2,379	: 66
1962	9,498	4,574	2,496	59
1963	9,594	4,613	2,578	59
1964	9,695	4,655	2,763	54
1965	9,803	4,730	2,876	57
1966	9,891	4,827	2,994	' 65
1967	9,996	4,920	3,071	63
1968	10,114	5,002	3,148	59
1969	10,237	5,040	3,199	57
1970	, 10,357	5,094	3,306	59
1971	10,469	5,114	3,406	64
1972	10,604	5,109	3,452	73
1973	10,872	5,259	3,615	68
1974	11,018	5,237	3,637	73
1975	11,158	5,223	3,646	100
1976	11,282	5,271	3,712	1 108
1977	11,390	5,342	3,769	110
1978	11,495	5,408	3,799	124
1979	11,592	5,479	3,876	117
1980	11,683	5,536	3,971	i 114
1981	11,788	5,581	4,037	126
1982	11,869	5,638	4,098	136
1983	11,948	5,733	4,208	156
1984	12,023	5,766	4,265	161

#89-

Table 6 Changes of Industrial Composition of Employed Persons  
(estimates from national census)

T0131

Increase in Increase in

1960-70 1970-80

(No.) 2.276

EmP'OYeeSm 100.0 100.0 100.0 40.1 18.3

Agriculture, 26 28 27

forestry 1.1 0.9 0.7 7.7 A36

Fishery, 27 21 16

"Wine "1th 1.2 0.7 04 A222 A218

Mining 50 '9

2.2 0.6 0.2 A720 A516

209 292 379

9.2 9.2 10.1 39.7 29.8

Construction

Manufacturing 790 11080 11058

34.7 33.9 28.1 36.7 A20

Wholesale 336 56' 755

101011 14.8 17.6 20.0 67.0 34.6

Financial. 71 118 173

1115111211106.

real estates 3.1 3.7 4.6 66.2 46.6

Transportation, 206 304 3'9

connnunicutium 9.1 9.5 8.5 47.6 4.9

Electric. gas, 23 27 34

WW 5011/1903 1.0 0.8 0.9 17.4 25.9

Sclvices 373 559 789

16.4 17.5 20.9 49.9 41.4

Public service 133 174 202

L 5.8 5.5 1 5.5 30.8 16.1

L

-900



Male  
Increase in  
Increase in  
1980 1960-70 1970-80 1960 1970  
2,456 1 705 1,063  
100.0 35.3 15.6 100.0 100.0  
19 14 8  
0.8 66.7 A50 2.0 0.8  
14 2 1  
0.6 20.8 A263 0.3 0.1  
8 4 2  
0.3 63.0 A529 0.6 0.2  
331 27 35  
13.5 40.7 29.3 3.8 3.3  
701 254 362  
28.5 34.2 A24 360 34.1  
421 138 250  
17.1 57.1 35.4 19.6 23.5  
90 26 54  
3.7 42.2 40.6 3.7 5.1  
282 29 39  
11.5 47.2 6.4 4.1 3.7  
29 2 3  
1 2 9.5 26.1 0.3 0.3  
394 182 273  
16.0 50.5 38.2 25.8 25.7  
159 19 32  
2.7 3.0  
6.5 24.7 J 12.8  
\_91\_  
1980  
1,315  
100.0  
7  
0.5  
47  
3.6  
357  
27.1  
334  
25.4  
75  
5.7  
44  
3.3  
395  
30.0  
43  
3.3  
(in 10,000 persons)  
Increase in  
1 960-79  
50.8  
A429  
A500  
A500  
29.6  
81.2  
107.7  
34.5  
50.0  
50.0  
68.4  
Increase in  
1970-80  
A500  
34.3  
A14  
33.6  
38.9  
12.8

33.3

34.4

Table 7 International Comparison of Wages (wage per real work hour)  
(manufacturing; productive workers; men & women; estimates)1)

Year	Japan	U.S.A.	FRG	U.K.	France
hourly wage	Yen	Dollar	DM	Pound	1 Franc
1975	790.0	5.26	12.33	1.31	13.76
1976	849.2	5.71	13.17	1.48	13.76
1977	927.0	6.20	14.18	1.60	17.91
1978	981.2	6.73	14.93	1.83	20.07
1979	1025.0	7.31	15.73	2.14	22.45
1980	1090.3	7.93	16.67	2.59	26.08
1981	1162.0	8.72	13.59	2.57	25.69
1982	1209.8	9.28	14.29	-	29.24
exchange rate	yen/\$	yen/DM	yen/pound	yen/franc	
1975	296.79	120.63	659.41	69.240	
1976	296.55	117.77	535.63	62.045	
1977	268.51	115 .63	468.68	54.649	
1978	210.44	104.77	403.94	46.632	
1979	219.14	119.56	464.93	51.508	
1980	226.75	124.75	527.49	33.656	
1981	220.54	97.58	447.23	40.581	
1982	249.05	102.63	435 .96	37.893	
indices as against					
100 for Japan					
1975	100	197.6	188.3	109.3	120.6
1976	100	199.4	182.6	93.4	116.3
1977	100	179.6	176.9	80.9	105.6
1978	100	144.3	159.4	75.3	95.4
1979	100	156.3	183.5	97.1	112.8
1980	100	164.9	190.7	125.3	128.3
1981	100	165.5	114.1	98.9	89.7
1982	100	191.0	121.2	-	91.6

Sources: ttMonthly Labor Statistical Survey? Labor Ministry for Japan;  
8Labor Costs in Industry 1978,11 EC Statistics Bureau and other  
statistics for other countries.

Notes: 1) To make comparison possible, the following method is used to  
calculate the real work hourly wage rates:

(1) For Japan, the wage rate is an estimate for enterprises with 5  
or more employees.

(2) For West Gennany, UK. and France,the hourly real wages in  
1978 as given by a labor cost survey conducted that year by  
the EC Statistics Bureau are used as the basis; for other years,  
the real wage increase rates announced by the respective  
governments are used as multipliers of the said 1978 wages.

All enterprises with 10 or more employees are covered;

(3) For the United States, the officially announced wages are  
translated into hourly wages using figures given in labor cost  
surveys held every other year. The figures cover enterprises  
of all sizes.

2) The exchange rates used are the annual average rates given by  
ttInternational F inancial Statistics? IMF .

Table 8 Rates of Wage Increase Obtained in Spring Struggles

Year 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961

Rate 6.1 8.4 5.7 7.0 8.7 13.8

Year 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969

Rate 12.4 10.3 10.4 12.1 13.5 15.8

Year 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977

Rate 15.0 20.1 32.9 13.1 8.8 8.8

Year r 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

Rate 6.7 7 .6 7 .0 4.4 4.5 5 .1

-93\_

Table 9 No. of Union Members & Estimated Rate of Organization  
 Year No. of employees No. of unionists Estunatgd r.ate Of  
 l orgamzatlon

(in 1,000 persons) (in 1,000 persons)

1970	32,770	11,605
1971	33,880	11,798
1972	34,690	11,889
1973	36,590	12,098
1974	36,760	12,462
1975	36,620	12,590
1976	37,100	12,509
1977	37,460	12,437
1978	37,960	12,383
1979	38,990	12,309
1980	40,120	12,369
1981	40,550	12,471
1982	41,020	12,526
1983	42,090	12,520
1984	42,820	12,464

Table 11 Size of Trade Union and Number of Members (1980, 1984)

1980

. Size of Trade Union No. of unions No. of members? Composition

5 W V 7 7 persons %

Totgl	34,232	12,369,262	100.00
5,000 or more	3347	m7 5,535,102	44.75
1,000 - 4,999	1,351	2,846,049	23.00
500 4 999	1,545	1,071,339	8.66
300 - 499	1,951	748,747	6.05
100 - 299	7,823	1,320,158	10.67
30 2 99	12,216	705,730	5.71
2 29	9,012	142,137	1.15

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Table 10 Nos. of Industrial Union Members & Estimated Rates of Organization  
1980

1 r r 7 7Estimated 7

No.01 unionists

1984

No. of unionists

1 1

L 1(1111,000 persons) orgrazgiezgtfion (1111,000 perSOns) 1

All industries 1 12,369 (100% ) 30.8% 12,464 (100%)

Agriculture,forestry.1 92 ( 0.74) 20.9 77 ( 0.6) 1

, marine industry 1

1 Mining 52 ( 0.42) 47.2 40( 0.3)

3Construction 717 ( 5.80) 16.5 779( 6.2) 1

Manufacturing 4,071 (32.91) 35.3 4,121 (33.1) 1

Wholesale,retail 1 786 ( 6.35) 9.4 854( 6.9) i

Financial,insurance,1 1,016 ( 8.21) 56.1 1,019( 8.2) 1

realestates .

Transportation, 2,044 ( 16.53) 62.3 1,934 (15.5) 1

communication ( :

Electric,gas,water 232 ( 1.88) 80.1 1 235( 1.9) 1

, service 1 1

1 Service 1 1,663 ( 13.44) 21.0 1 1,701 (13.6) ,

1 Public service 1 1,499 ( 12.12) 74.6 1,490 (12.0) 1

Others 1 196 ( 1.58) 215( 1.7) 1

? 77.,i

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1984

No. of unions No. of members Composition

persons %

'- 34,579 12,463,755 100.00

-/

344 5,611,712 45.02

1,340 2,805,572 22.51

1,585 1,104,564 8.86

2,007 770,399 6.18

7,870 1,325,691 10.64

12,091 700,804 5.62

9,342 145,013 I 1.16

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(1980,1984)

Estimated

rate of

organization

, ' '-'

29.1

16.1

44.3

19.6

34.4

9.3

48.5

59.9

67.3

18.0

78.4

Table 12 Membership of Major National Trade Unions by Year

Year
1991
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Other
. Shhv Churhsu
1 T0131 Sohyo Domel sanbetsu Roren unions
111,797,570 4,244,8201 2,172,085 76,302 1,349,951 14,109,550
(100.0) 1 (36.0) (18.4) (0.6) 1 (11.4) 1 (34.8)
1 1 1 1
11,888,592 4,266,835 2,225,928 72,891 11,392,703 14,081,099
(100.0) (35.9) (18.7) (0.6) (11.4) (34.3)
1
12,097,848 4,341,265 2,277,883 70,041 11,374,344 4,419,557
(100.0) (35.9) (18.8) 1 (0.6) (11.4) (37.2)
12,461,799: 4,457,387 2,312,513 71,375 1,401,148 4,614,229
(100.0) 1 (35.8) (18.6) 1 (0.6) 1 (11.2) (38.8)
12,590,400, 4,573,313 2,266,087? 69,678 1,369,294 4,704,913
(100.0) , (36.3) (18.0) 1 (0.6) , (10.9) (39.6)
1 1
12,508,731, 4,578,911 2,208,863 66,163 11,354,183 14,690,237
(100.0) (36.6) (17.7) (0.5) (10.8) (39.5)
1
12,437,012 4,556,567 2,210,240 64,519 11,330,089 4,659,644
(100.0) (36.6) (17.8) (0.5) (10.7) (39.2)
12,382,829' 4,525,237 2,181,810 61,270 1,320,798 4,679,367
(100.0) (36.5) (17.6) (0.5) 1 (10.7) (39.4)
12,308,756 4,552,907 2,146,567 63,248 11,337,180 14,593,362
(100.0) (37.0) (17.4) (0.5) (10.9) (38.6)
12,369,262 4,550,5221 2,161,786 62,286 1,357,979 4,626,551 1
(100.0) (36.8) (17.5) (0.5) (11.0) (38.9) 1
1 12,471,270 1 4,568,826 3 2,181,903 63,997 1,391,346 4,663,367
(100.0) 1 (36.6) 1 (17.5) (0.5) (11.2) (37.4)
112,525,5291 4,550,279 1 2,196,641 ' 64,367 1,438,876 4,683,278
(100.0) 1 (36,3) 1 (17.5) (0.5) (11.5) (37.4)
1
125195301 4,508,376 2,193,232 64,016 1,480,325 4,839,295
(100.0) (36.0) (17.5) (0.5) (11.8) (38.7)
12,463,755 4,431,112 2,176,964 60,337 1,512,352 4,836,264
(100.0) (35.6) (17.5) (0.5) (12.1) (38.8)





# CONSTITUTION

## PREAMBLE

The General Council of Trade Unions of Japan was organized and inaugurated on the twelfth day of July in the year nineteen hundred and Flfty (1950) by trade unions that have united for a common cause to establish on a solid foundation 3 free and democratic trade union movement in Japan.

The purpose of this organization is to initiate and carry on vigorous activities to carry out the intents and realize the ideals of the Fundamental Principles adopted at its inaugural meeting.

The activities of this Council and the maintenance and operation of its organization to be conducted with the above objectives in view shall be subject to the stipulations as set forth in this Constitution.

## CHAPTER 1 NAME AND UNDERTAKING

### Article 1

The name of this organization shall be Nihon Rodo Kumiai Sohyogikai and its abbreviated name shall be Sohyo and its name in English shall be as follows:

General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo).

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Kanda Surugadai 3-chome, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo.

7 The office of the headquarters of Sohyo shall be located at 2 #11

### Article 2

In order to attain its objectives. Sohyo shall conduct undertakings and activities including the following matters:

1. Decision on and advancement of general policies to deal with problems common to all the affiliated trade unions.

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Rendering effective assistance to affiliated trade unions for leading the disputes engaged in by them to a successful settlement.

Promotion of sympathy and affiliation with Sohyo of non-affiliated trade unions.

Strengthening of liaison among affiliated unions and the furtherance of rearrangement by industries of workers' organizations in industries.

Maintenance of cooperation and liaison with overseas labour organizations and participation of workers in international organizations.

Launching of political activities both within and without the Diet.

Collection of information both about domestic and foreign affairs, publicity, publication, and survey as well as compilation of various data.

Other matters necessary for the attainment of the above objectives.

#### C HAPTER 1I ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF AFFILIATED UNIONS

##### Article 3

Sohyo shall be organized by trade unions organized by lines of industry in Japan.

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Any trade union shall be permitted to join Sohyo under the following terms and conditions;

1. That it supports the Fundamental Principles and the Constitution of Sohyo in effect.

2. That the matter of affiliation with Sohyo is decided by a duly authorized regular organ of the applying organization.

3. That it discharges responsibilities arising from its affiliation.

-100-

#### Article 4

The rights and status of all the trade unions affiliated with Sohyo shall be equal under the Constitution.

2. The affiliated trade unions shall bear the following responsibilities:

1. Not to take any action which runs counter to the Fundamental Principles and the Constitution, as well as to the general activities of Sohyo.

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To have respect for matters decided by pertinent organs, and with regard to decisions that call for their implementation, to so carry out such decision. However, in case the decisions are or have been found impossible of execution, the reasons therefore shall be made clear.

3. To pay membership dues and special levies on the prescribed due dates.

4. To make a monthly report on the number of their union members. Those unions whose organizations lap over each other shall consult together with a view to agreeing on the adjustment of the membership to be reported by respective unions.

5. To report every time that a change is made in organizations, re-election of officers, removal of the office, commencement and termination of a dispute or any other important events of changes with which the union is concerned take place.

#### Article 5

The number of delegates to be elected. the amount of membership dues to be borne. and the degree to which other rights and obligations will be enjoyed and assumed by affiliated unions shall be based on the number of members to be reported by respective unions according to the provisions of item 4, paragraph 2 of the preceding article.

#### Article 6

A union that supports the Fundamental Principles and the Constitution of Sohyo, undertakings and activities that Sohyo conducts, but does

-101#

not yet come to affiliate with Sohyo, shall be permitted to affiliate as an observer union.

2. The affiliation procedure and obligations arising from affiliation shall be decided by the Board of Executives and confirmed by the Board of Councillors.

#### Detailed Regulations

An observer union shall respect for matters decided by pertinent organs of Sohyo and make efforts to carry them out.

2. The union shall pay one-third of membership dues of affiliated unions as allotted charges and its special levies shall be decided through consultation with the Board of Executives.

3. An observer union shall make the utmost efforts to affiliate with a Sohyo-affiliated union on the principle of rearrangement by industries within two years after its affiliation.

#### Article 7

The lower local area organizations of the affiliated unions shall make special efforts for the formation and strengthening of regional labour councils (Chiho Hyogikai) and district labour councils (Chiku Hyogikai). A regional labour council or a district labour council may allow even non-affiliated workers' unions with localized organizations to participate in the council.

2. The operation and activity of a regional labour council or a district labour council shall be conducted autonomously on the line laid down by the Fundamental Principles and the Campaign Principles of Sohyo. However, close contact with Sohyo shall be maintained with respect to the state of its organization and activity.

#### CHAPTER III AFFILIATION, WITHDRAWAL AND EXPULSION

#### Article 8

A union desirous of joining Sohyo shall send in a written application accompanied by a certificate to the effect that the applying union fulfills  
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the terms and conditions set forth in Article 3.

2. Membership shall commence to exist with the approval of affiliation by the Board of Councillors and with the making of the First payment of membership dues decided on.

3. The Board of Councillors may reject a union applying for affiliation with Sohyo when in their judgement it is not sufficiently qualified to be a member.

4. A union desirous of withdrawing from Sohyo shall notify the President of Sohyo in writing of its desire to withdraw. The withdrawal shall become effective with a lapse of one month from the date of serving notice, the rights and obligations that the union holds as a member of Sohyo terminating therewith.

#### Article 9

In the event that an affiliated union obstructed the activities of Sohyo or failed to fulfill its responsibilities, or defaulted membership dues for more than three months, or left unpaid special levies longer than three months from the date of their assessment and would not correct such acts notwithstanding the warnings given thereagainst, the union may suffer suspension of rights or even dismissal from membership.

2. The expulsion and the suspension of rights shall be decided by the Board of Councillors on the proposal of the Board of Executives. A union subjected to expulsion or suspension of rights may, if dissatisfied with the decisions have been made.

#### CHAPTER IV ORGANS

##### Article 10

There shall be the following organs in Sohyo:

Convention

Board of Councillors

Board of Executives

2. Matters decided on by any of the above organs in conformity with the

proceedures provided for in this Constitution shall, even when there are dissenting unions, be interpreted as representing the convictions of Sohyo as a whole and be carried out as such.

3. None of the organs shall make decisions to the prejudice of the right of autonomy enjoyable by affiliated unions. However, this rule shall not apply to the giving of warnings to and the decision of expulsion of unions that do not fulfill responsibilities provided for in this Constitution.

4. Matters concerning the expression of non-confidence in any of the above organs (other than Convention), and the recall of officers shall be decided by the organ immediately above the one in question, and with regard to the manifestation of dissatisfaction with a decision, the filing of a complaint with the Convention shall be the final opportunity.

#### Article 11

The Convention shall be the highest organ of Sohyo and shall be in session regularly in July every year and specially at any time when necessary. The Convention shall be convened by the President in accordance with the decision of the Board of Executives and notice thereof shall be sent to each affiliated union stating the business to be placed on the agenda at least one month in advance of the date appointed for the Convention.

3. In case a demand is made by affiliated unions for the holding of a Convention, satisfying the conditions described in each of the following items, the President shall refer the matter without delay to the Board of Executives for decision and call the Convention in session within forty days of the day on which the demand was submitted.

I. That the subjects for debate and the reasons for holding the Convention are clearly stated.

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That the number of unions making the demand represents one-third or more of all the affiliated unions. and the number of all the members of the demanding unions represents a quarter or more of the total membership of Sohyo.

#### Article 12

Delegates to the Convention shall be elected on the basis of membership used for computing membership dues payable monthly. The number of

delegates apportioned according to the memberships is shown in the attached Table No. 1. However, no union except those which have paid up the dues up to and including the month which is two months earlier than the month in which the Convention is to be held (hereafter referred to as perfectly qualified unions) shall have the right to elect delegates to be present at the Convention.

2. The number of members of a union to be used as the basis of electing delegates shall be the average of the number of members used for computing membership dues during the six-month period ending with the month specified in the proviso of the preceding paragraph.

3. Those unions which have joined Sohyo within two months prior to the holding of the Convention shall be considered as perfectly qualified unions, provided that they have fully paid the monthly dues covering the month of their affiliation.

4. Each delegate shall have one vote. A delegate who is unable to attend the Convention may, by submitting to the Convention a document establishing power of representation, use one of the attending delegates elected by the same union that he belongs to to exercise his vote by proxy. A delegate who exercises his vote by proxy shall be considered present at the Convention.

5. No delegate present shall be entitled to more than two votes including those which he represents. Transfer of proxy shall be null and void.

6. A regional labour council and an observer union may elect and send to the Convention respectively five and two or less special delegates. The special delegates may have a voice in but no vote about the business of the Convention.

#### Article 13

The Convention shall consist of delegates and officers, and it shall be validly constituted when two-thirds or more of all the delegates, and delegates from two-thirds or more of perfectly qualified unions are present.

2. The chairman of the Convention shall be elected from among the delegates at the Convention. The method of election shall be determined by the Convention.

3. While the general business of a Convention shall be transacted with the concurrence by a majority of the delegates present, the changes in the Fundamental Principles and the Constitution, the entry into and the withdrawal from international organizations, the reform of organization or the resolving on the yearly budget shall be made and decided by a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of the delegates present. However, no business shall be transacted when the delegates of a majority of perfectly qualified unions are against.

4. In the case where a decision is made at the Convention that a specific matter be put to an open vote by union representatives, the vote shall be taken. The voting shall be done by a representative delegate of each of the affiliated unions, with votes corresponding to the membership of this union. In this case, a fraction of less than one hundred members shall be cut off and not be included in the number of votes. Decision in the case of signed voting shall be made by 21 majority of the votes cast.

5. The officers shall have the right to voice but no right to vote at the (convention).

#### Article 14

Matters mentioned in each of the following items shall be placed on the agenda of each regular Convention:

1. Report on activities;
2. Report on finance;
3. Budget for the next year;
4. Election of officers and Councillors;
- 5.

Bills deemed necessary for introduction by the Board of Council-hits.

3. Matters mentioned in each of the following items shall be submitted to the (convention) for decision or approval:

1. Change of name, removal of the office of Headquarters, reform of organization, and the revision or abolition of regulations.

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(change in the amount of membership dues, disposition of reserve funds, formulation of programs of important undertakings, the budgets therefor and the maximum limit of loan.

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3. Participation of workers., unions in, and the sending of their delegates to, international organizations.

4. Dissolution of organization.

#### Article 15

The Board of Councillors shall have the power during the period between Convention and Convention to decide, in so far as the decision does not deviate from the lines laid down by the Convention, on the attitude of Sohyo, and also the powers, with respect to urgent matters and the making of supplementary appropriations in the annual budget, to make decisions on behalf of the Convention when the holding of a Convention therefor cannot be done in time.

2. As a rule, the Board of Councillors shall meet every three months. It may meet, however, at any extra times when necessary. A meeting of the Board of Councillors shall be called by the President in accordance with the decision of the Board of Executives. Also the President, when a demand is made for holding a Board of Councillors meeting stating the reason therefor by one-fourth or more of all the Councillors or one-third or more of all the member unions, shall, subject to decision of the Board of Executives, call a meeting of the Board of Councillors in session without delay.

#### Article 16

The number of persons who will be members of the Board of Councillors representing an affiliate shall be one for those with a membership of fewer than fifty thousand, two for those with a membership of more than fifty thousand and fewer than one hundred thousand, three for those with a membership of more than one hundred thousand and fewer than one hundred and fifty thousand, four for those with a membership of more than one hundred and fifty thousand and fewer than two hundred thousand, and five for those with a membership of more than two hundred thousand.

2. Each affiliated union shall elect Councillors according to the number appointed under the provisions of the preceding paragraph. A union may appoint deputy Councillors beforehand, who, in the event that the regular Councillors are unable to present themselves, will exercise the powers of the said Councillors on their behalf. A Councillor who is unable to attend may depute his vote to one of the attending Councillors of the same union that he comes from. The deputy, however, can represent no more than one vote.

The term of office of regular Councillors shall start with their election and terminate with the subsequent election.

3. The decision on the number of Councillors to be assigned to a newly affiliated union or the revision of the number of them for the already affiliated union or the revision of the number of them for the already affiliated union that has undergone a great change in its organization shall be made by the Board of Councillors. When a Councillor vacates his post, the union that has elected the Councillor shall elect the successor.

4. An observer union may send one special councillor. However, the councillor may have a voice but no vote.

#### Article 17

A Board of Councillors meeting shall be composed of Councillors and officers and the meeting shall be deemed to have a quorum when two-thirds or more of all the Councillors are present. The chairman of the Board of Councillors shall be elected at its meeting by Councillors from among them and the method of election shall be determined by the Board of Councillors.

2. The business of a Board of Councillors meeting shall be transacted by a concurring vote of three-quarters or more of the Councillors present.

3. The officers may have a voice in but no vote about the business of the Board of councillors.

#### Article 18

The Board of Executives shall be responsible to the Board of Councillors and to the Convention and shall, in addition to examining matters pertaining to the execution of general business, the receipts and expenditures and the care of properties of Sohyo, manage the secretariat as well as carry on daily activities. In case the meeting of the Board of Councillors cannot be held in time for urgent matters, the Board of Executives may execute such matters on behalf of the Board of Councillors, in which case the Board of Executives shall report the results of the matter to a subsequent meeting of the Board of Councillors for approval.

2. A Board of Executives meeting shall be presided over by the President and shall be composed of Vice-Presidents, General Secretary, Director of

Finance Bureau, Deputy General Secretaries, and Executives. It shall be convened by the President whenever necessary.

3. A Board Of Executives meeting shall be deemed to make a quorum when two-thirds or more of the component members are present, and the business thereof shall be transacted by a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of the Executives present.

4. The Auditors may attend the meetings of the Board of Executives any time they so desire and offer advice on matters pertaining to Huanee. Further, when the Auditors want to examine the accounts. the Board of Executives must produce all the vouchers and papers supporting the accounts for verification.

#### CHAPTER V SECRETARIAT AND FINANCE BUREAU

##### Article 19

In order to conduct the affairs of Sohyo, the offices of Secretariat and Finance Bureau shall be set up at the Headquarters of Sohyo.

7 The Secretariat shall be in the charge of General Secretary and the  
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Finance Bureau in the charge of Director of Finance Bureau.

3. The business of the Secretariat and the Finance Bureau shall be conducted by Deputy General Secretaries, and Executives and each shall be responsible for his part of the business.

4. In order that the Secretariat and the Finance Bureau may function smoothly, a Finance Steering Committee shall be instituted at the Headquarters of Sohyo.

5. Specialized bureaus, offices, and departments may be instituted according as the necessity therefor arises in the Secretariat and the Finance Bureau, subject to the decision of the Board of Councillors.

6. Each specialized bureau, office, and department shall be supplied with requisite chief of each office and department, and staff-members. Their employment and dismissal and the fixing of their salaries shall be made by General Secretary, subject to the decision of the Board of Executives.

7. In order to develop the activities of Sohyo and to strengthen its organization policy, a system of national and regional organizers shall be established.

8. The employment and dismissal of national and regional organizers shall be decided by the Board of Executives and its affirmation shall be called for to the Board of Councillors. The term of office of national and regional organizers shall be two years.

9. The disposition and leading of organizers shall be based on the action policy of Sohyo; those of national organizers shall be conducted by the Board of Executives and those of regional organizers shall be conducted by the board of executives of respective regional labour council in organic liaison with Sohyo.

10. Detailed regulations to govern the conduct of the Secretariat and the Finance Bureau shall be established by the Board of Councillors.

#### CHAPTER VI AUXILIARY ORGANS

##### Article 20

In order that the work at the offices of Sohyo may be done smoothly and effectively, conferences of the delegates of regional labour councils and district labour councils, meeting of chiefs of each specialized department, meetings of departments as well as expert committees for special purposes as recognized by the Convention or the Board of Councillors may be held or appointed as occasion demands.

2. Matters pertaining to the establishment composition duties and the operation of conferences of the delegates of regional labour councils, committees by industries and expert committees shall be executed with the prior approval of the Board of Councillors, and their day-to-day activities shall be conducted on the advice of the Board of Executives.

3. The chairmen of the committees by industries and expert committees may attend meetings of the Board of Executives and express opinions on matters falling within their province.

4. Individuals and unions not affiliated with Sohyo may be permitted as occasion demands to participate in the expert committees, provided that

they are not unfavourably disposed toward Sohyo in the conducting of its activities.

#### CHAPTER VII OFFICERS AND ADVISORS

##### Article 21

There shall be the following officers in Sohyo:

President ..... one  
Vice-President ..... a number  
General Secretary ..... one  
Director of Finance Bureau ..... one  
Deputy General Secretary ..... two  
Executive ..... a number  
Auditor ..... five

2. The President shall represent Sohyo.

3. The Vice-President shall assist the president and, in case the President is not available for some reason, shall act on his behalf.

4. The General Secretary shall exercise general control over the affairs of Sohyo and take charge of the business of Secretariat.

5. The Director of Finance Bureau shall exercise general control over the affairs of Finance Bureau. In case the Director of Finance Bureau is not available for some reason, an other officer shall act on his behalf.

6. The Deputy General Secretary shall assist the General Secretary and, in case the General Secretary is not available for some reason, shall act on his behalf.

7. NO officer can hold concurrently the post of delegate Or Councillor. Consequently, when an officer is elected from among the delegates or the Councillors, the post of such delegate Or Councillor becomes vacant and the vacated post must be filled by following the procedure prescribed in this Constitution.

8. The term of office of the officers shall be two years and the term of office of an officer elected to fill a vacancy shall be the remaining period of

the term of office of his predecessor. The officers, even when their term of office has expired, shall continue to perform their duties until the time when their successors are elected. The officers are not prevented from being re-elected.

#### Article 22

The officers shall be elected at the Convention by secret ballot by the delegates present. However, any other method of election than by ballot may be adopted by the resolution of the Convention.

2. When a vacancy occurs in the post of officers, the filling of the vacated post may be made by the Board of Councillors.

#### Article 23

To give aid to the Board of Executives, a number of advisers may be taken into its service. The advisers will provide advice in answer to questions put by the Board of Executives.

### CHAPTER VIII FINANCE

#### Article 24

The expenses of operation of Sohyo shall be defrayed from membership dues, contributions and other revenues.

2. The membership dues shall be paid every month by affiliated unions by the table of rates, which shall be fixed separately.

3. When an affiliated union is in Financial difficulties as the result of a big dispute or is in a like predicament because of unavoidable causes, a retulueion in the prescribed rate of membership dues or a deferment of its payment or total exemption from assessment may be granted. Decision on any of these steps shall be made by the Board of Executives.

4. In case where additional expenditures must be made for the activity or operation of Soltytx special levies may be made in accordance with the deelsmn ol the Board olCounceillorst

5. There will be no refunds on the membership dues, special levies and

-112#

other assessments already paid in.

6. Besides a general account, a special account may be established on the basis of the decision of the Convention or the Board of Councillors in case of necessity.

#### Article 25

The fiscal year of Sohyo shall commence on the first day of June and end on the thirty-first day of May of each and every year.

2. At the end of each quarter, a financial report shall be prepared to clarify the state of finances, exhibiting by items of account the amount of revenue and expenditure and the names of major contributors, which report shall be submitted to the Board of Councillors for approval. At the end of each fiscal year, an annual report shall be prepared. Each financial report shall be made public, together with a statement of audit.

#### Article 26

The making of an outlay from reserve fund shall in principle be subject to the decision of the Board of Councillors. In an emergency, however, the defrayal may be made when the purpose for which the money to be defrayed is intended is stated in exact terms, subject to the decision of the Board of Executives, in which case the defrayal shall be submitted to the first meeting of the Board of Councillors to be subsequently held for approval.

#### Article 27

The responsibility for the safe-keeping of account books, bank-deposit records, cash and other properties belonging to Sohyo shall rest with the Director of Finance Bureau.

2. All the matters pertaining to the care of properties, cash receipt and disbursement of operating expenses shall be conducted with the approval of the Board of Executives. The General Secretary, the Director of Finance Bureau and the Executives shall, with respect to financial dispositions made without following due procedure, be held jointly responsible and shall not be absolved therefrom unless they show reasons valid enough to prove the unavoidability of their doing so.

#### Article 28

The Auditors shall conduct periodic auditing of the accounts of Sohyo four times a year and the auditing at the end of a fiscal year once before a regular Convention.

2. The Auditors shall report in writing to the Board of Executives on the result of auditing conducted under the provisions of the preceding paragraph and the state of finances. Besides, they shall report to the Board of Councillors or the regular Convention on the periodic auditing and to the regular Convention on the auditing at the end of a fiscal year.

3. In case the Convention or the Board of Councillors makes a request for the auditing, an extraordinary auditing shall be conducted on the requested.

4. The Auditors, when they are reasonably certain that there exist dishonesties or other doubtful deals regarding the accounts, shall make close investigations thereof, and, if necessary, shall demand a meeting of the Board of Councillors, recommending that an inquiry be made at the hand of the Board.

#### Article 29

The accounts of Sohyo shall be subjected once a year to the auditing by public auditors with professional qualification.

2. The audit in the foregoing paragraph shall be carried out within one month from the closing date of a fiscal year. The President shall report to the regular Convention on the result of the auditing and present there the statement of audit by the said auditor, with certification to the correctness of the accounts. together with an annual financial report covering the fiscal year.

3. The public auditor shall be commissioned by the President on the recommendation of an audit committee and through the favourable decision of the Board of Executives.

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#### SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS

1. In case more detailed regulations are deemed necessary for the enforcement of this Constitution, they shall be established by the Board of Councillors.
2. The power to formulate a standing rule to govern the' conduct of activities shall be vested in the Board of Executives.
3. This Constitution shall come into force as from the 12th day of July, 1950.
4. An amendment was made to this Constitution, which shall come into force as from the 24th day of July, 1952.
5. An amendment was made to this Constitution, which shall come into force as from the 10th day of July, 1953.
6. An amendment was made to this Constitution, which shall come into force as from the 15th day of July, 1954.
7. An amendment was made to this Constitution, which shall come into force as from the 29th day of July, 1955.
8. An amendment was made to this Constitution, which shall come into force as from the 29th day of August, 1957.
9. An amendment was made to this Constitution, which shall come into force as from the 4th day of August, 1957.
10. An amendment was made to this Constitution, which shall come into force as from the 26th day of August, 1959.
11. An amendment was made to this Constitution, which shall come into force as from the 3rd day of August, 1960.
12. An amendment was made to this Constitution, which shall come into force as from the 28th day of August, 1962.
13. An amendment was made to this Constitution, which shall come into

force us from the 29th day of July, 1963.

14. An amendment was made to this Constitution, which shall come into force as from the 25th day 0Huly, 1964.

15. An amendment was made to this Constitution, which shall come into force as from the 5th day of August, 1965,

16. An amendment was made to this Constitution, which shall come into force as from the 19th day of July, 1976.

-116-

Membership

1 - 5,000  
5,001 - 7,500  
7,501 9 10,000  
10,0019 12,500  
12,5019 15,000  
15,0019 17,500  
17,5019 20,000  
20,0019 22,500  
22,5019 25,000  
25,0019 27,500  
27,5019 30,000  
30,0019 33,300  
33,3019 36,600  
36,6019 40,000  
40,0019 43,300  
43,3019 46,600  
46,6019 50,000  
50,0019 53,300  
53,3019 56,600  
56,6019 60,000  
60,0019 65,000  
65,0019 70,000  
70,0019 75,000  
75,0019 80,000  
80,0019 85,000  
85,0019 90,000  
90,0019 95,000  
95,001 9 100,000  
100,001 9 105,000  
105,0019110,000  
110,000 9115,000  
115,001-120,000  
120,001 9 127,500  
1275019135000  
1350019142500  
1425019150000

ALLOTMENT OF DELEGATES

Delegates

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Membership

150,001-157,500  
157,5019165,000  
165,001 9172,500  
172,501 9180,000  
180,001 9187,500  
187,501-195,000  
195,001 9 202,500  
202,501 9 210,000  
210,0019 218,000  
218,001 9 226,000  
226,001 9 234,000  
234,001 9 242,000  
242,001 9 250,000  
250,001 9 258,000  
258,001 9 266,600  
266,601 9 274,000  
274,001 9 282,000  
282,001 9 290,000  
290,001 9 298,000  
298,001 9 306,000  
306,001 9 314,000  
314,0019 322,000  
322,001 9 330,000  
330,001 9 338,300  
338,301 9 346,600  
346,601 9 354,900  
354,901 9 363,300  
363,3019 371,600

371,601 9 380,000  
380,001 9 388,300  
388,301 9 396,500  
396,601 9 404,900  
404,9019 413,300  
4133019421600  
421,601 9 430,000

-117-

Delegates

38  
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72

LIST OF SOHYO-AFFILIATED LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (SOHYO)

President: Takeshi Kurokawa

General Secretary: Eikichji Magara

Membership: 4,523,007

Address: Sohyo Kaikan, 2-1-1, Kanda Surugadai 3-chome,  
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo

Phone: (03) 251-0311

Cable: SOHYO TOKYO

Telex: J32214 SOHYO

Note:

(1) The following list is based on a survey made in a form of a ttFunda-  
(3)

mental Survey on Japanese Trade Unions by the Labor Statistics &  
Information Bureau of the Ministry of Labor at the end of April,  
1982.

In the list, trade unions, Japanese appellations, names of presidents,  
addresses, telephone numbers and memberships are arranged in that  
order.

Those trade unions marked 11 are the affiliates to the International  
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and those marked 0 are  
to the International Trade Secretariats (ITS). Those organizations  
marked A are the affiliates to the Trade Departments of the World  
Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).

PUBLIC SECTOR

0

1. All-Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers' Union  
(J ICHIRO)

Yasuo Maruyama

c/o Jichijiro-Kaikan, 6 Bancho-1, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo

Tel. 263-0261

1,219,192

2. Japan Teachers' Union

(NIKKYOSO)

Ichiro Tanaka

\_1189

01k 4.  
c/o Nihon Kyoiku Kajkan, 2-6-2 Hitotsubashi, Chiyoda-ku,  
Tokyo  
Tel. 265-2171  
670,000  
National Railway Workers1 Union  
(KOKURO) M  
Shunichj Yamazaki  
c/o Kokutetsu Rodo Kaikan, 1-11-4 Marunouchi,  
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo  
Tel. 212-0580  
240,169  
J apan Postal Workers, Union  
(ZENTEI)  
Mitoshi Morihara  
c/o Zentei Kaikan, 1-2-7 Kohraku, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo  
Tel. 812-4261  
18,500  
Japan Federation of National Public Service Employees1 Unions  
(KOKKO-ROREN)  
Takashi Uchjyama  
C/o Tsukasa Bldg., 3-6-2, Nishi-Shimbashi, Minato-ku, Tokyo  
Tel. 436-1261  
175,919  
All-Japan Federation of Municipal Traffic Workers1 Unions  
(TOSHIKO)  
Tadashi Kubo  
c/o Toko-Kaikan, 3-1-35 Shibaura, Minato-ku,Tokyo  
Tel. 451-5221  
44,000  
All Forestry Workers1 Union  
(ZEN-RIN-YA)  
Isamu Kawai  
c/o Zenrinya Kaikan, 3-28-7 Ohtsuka, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo  
Tel. 945-6385  
44,912  
.419-

O  
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10.  
11.  
Nihon National Railway Moti v er Union  
(DORO)  
Akira Matsuzaki  
3-2-13 Nishi-  
Tel. 49  
43,  
anda, Shinagawa-ku, Tokyo  
All Agriculture & Forestry Ministryk Workersl Union  
(ZENNORIN)  
Toraomi Eda  
c/o Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Ministry,  
1-2-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo  
Tel. 508-1395  
41,040  
All-J apan Water Supply Workersl Union  
(ZENSUIDO)  
Yutaka Kato  
c/o Tekken Kudan Bldg. 3-12-2 Ginbo-cho,  
Kanda, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo  
Tel. 263-1192  
37.280  
All Garrison Forces Labor Union  
(ZENCHURO)  
Yoh Oikawa  
3-41-8 Shiba, Minato-ku, Tokyo  
Tel. 455-5971  
14000  
Hokkaido Development Agency Employeesl Union  
(ZENKAIHATSU)  
Masuhiro Kashiwagi  
c/o Daiichi Godo-chosha, Nishi 4-ch0me, Kita-sanjo,  
Chuo-ku. Sapporo-shi  
Tel. 011-231-1151  
1 1 ,900  
All Printing Agency Workers' Union  
(ZENINSATSU)  
Fumio Hoshimiya  
w1204

14.  
15.  
16.  
17.  
18.  
3-59-12 Nishigahara, Kita-ku, Tokyo  
Tel. 910-7131  
6,200  
All-Japan Finance Bureau Labor Union  
(ZENZAIMU)  
Takashi Kato  
c/o Ministry of Finance, 3-1-1 Kasumigaseki,  
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo  
Tel. 581-4111  
3,950  
Finance Ministry Employees Union  
(OKURASHOKUSO)  
Yukihito Kikuchj  
c/o Ministry of Finance, 3-1-1 Kasumigaseki,  
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo  
Tel. 581-3725  
1,650  
Okinawa Federation of Government Employees Unions  
(OKINAWA-KOKKORO)  
Hideyuki Kiyan  
c/o Kankoro Kyosai Kaikan, 34 Asahi-cho, Naha-shi,  
Okinawa-ken  
Tel. 0988-67-2414  
1,900  
All Mint Agency Workers Union  
(ZENZOHEI)  
Kenichi Okada  
4-42-1, Higashi-Ikebukuro, Toshima-ku, Tokyo  
Tel. 987-3131  
1,300  
Audit Board Employees Union  
(KAIKENRO)  
Tsuneji Fukuda  
c/o Board of Audit, 3-2-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku,  
Tokyo  
Tel. 581-3251  
1,000  
\_121-



PRIVATE SECTOR

Oak

0

1.

UI

Federation of Telecommunications, Electronic Information  
and Allied Workers

(DENTSU-ROREN)

Kazuo Oikawa

c/o Zen Dentsu Rodo Kaikan, 3-6 Surugadai, Kanda,  
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo

Tel. 253-3214

330,000

(Three Dentsu-roren affiliates - Japan Telecommunications  
Workers' Union (Zendentsu), KDD Workers' Union and  
Private Sector Unions' Group of Dentsu-roren - are respectively  
affiliated with PTTI. Zendentsu also is affiliated with ICFTU.)

National Federation of Iron and Steel Workers, Unions

(TEKKOROREN)

Takuhiko Nakamura

1-23-4 Shikawa, Chuo-ku, Tokyo

Tel. 555-0401

200,000

General Federation of Private Railway Workers' Unions

(SHITETSUSOREN)

Takeshi Kurokawa

4-3-5 Takanawa, Minato-ku, Tokyo

Tel. 473-0166

174,380

National Trade Union of Metal & Engineering Workers

(ZENKOKUKINZOKU)

Yoshio Hashimura

c/o Kinzoku Rodo Kaikan, 15-11 Sakuragaoka-cho,  
Shibuya-ku, Tokyo

Tel. 463-4231

161,694

Japanese Federation of Synthetic Chemistry Workers' Unions

(GOKAROREN)

Tomeyoshi Miyauchi

c/o Sembai Bldg. 5-26-30 Shiba, Minato-ku, Tokyo

Tel. 452-5 591

125,000

-122--

10.

11.

National Council of General Amalgamated Workers<sup>1</sup> Unions

(ZENKOKU-IPPAN)

Sadao Morishita

c/o Zenzosen Kaikan, 3-5-6 Misaki-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo

Tel. 230-4071

122,000

Japan Council of Medical Workers<sup>1</sup> Unions

(NIHON-IROKYO)

Michihiro Matsumoto

c/o Nihon Iryo Rodo Kaikan, 1-9-5 Iriya, Taito-ku, Tokyo

Tel. 875-5871

143,000

All-Japan Day Workers, Building & Building Materials Workers<sup>1</sup>  
Union

(KENSETSUIPPAN-ZENNICHIIJIRO)

Goshu Nakanishi

Zennichijiro-Kaikan, 4-7-2, Hyakunincho, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo

Tel. 360-8021

84,975

All-Japan Express Workers<sup>1</sup> Union

(ZENNITTTSU)

Kunji Tabuchj

Zennittsu Kasumigaseki Bldg., 3-3-3 Kasumigaseki,

Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo

Tel. 581-2261

45 ,100

National Federation of Automobile Transport Workers<sup>1</sup> Unions

(ZENJIKO-ROREN)

Chozo Suzuki

3-7-9 Sendagaya, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo

Tel. 408-0875

58,500

J apan Federation of Press WOrkers<sup>5</sup> Unions

(SHIMBUN-ROREN)

Noriaki Tamura

c/o Zosen Kaikan, 3-5-6, Misaki-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo

Tel. 265-8641

44,000

21232

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14.  
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17.

National Federation of Paper Pulp Industry Workers, Unions  
(KAMIPA-ROREN)

Koichi Kubota

2-12-4 Kita-Aoyama, Minato-ku, Tokyo

Tel. 402-7656

30,217

National Race Workers Union

(ZENKYORO)

Kiyoko Tabata

c/o Sohyo Kaikan, 3-2-11, Kanda Surugadai, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo

Tel. 253-9309

45,000

Japan Tobacco Workers Union

(ZENSEMBAI)

Kenji Makiuchi

Sembai Bldg. 5-26-30 Shiba, Minato-ku, Tokyo

Tel. 453-2191

31,500

All-Japan Dock Workers Union

(ZENKOWAN)

Tokuji Yoshioka

2-31-4 Sanno, Ohta-ku, Tokyo

Tel. 774-4141

22,200

Railway Mutual Association Workers Union

(TETSUKORO)

Nobuyuki Takano

c/o Kyoei Bldg., 6-1-18 Kojimachj, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo

Tel. 262-9709

17,020

Labor Council of Governmental Special Corporations

(SEIROKYO)

Koichi Takizawa

c/o Sohyo Kaikzm, 3-2-11 Kanda Surugadai, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo

Tel. 251-6621

15,441

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23.  
J apan Coal Miners1 Union  
(TANRO)  
Akira Hashimoto  
3-9-2, Chuo, Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164  
Tel. 371-9151  
14,000  
All-J apan Transport and General Workers1 Union  
(UNYU-IPPAN)  
Hiroyoshi Hikima  
3-3-1 Takinogawa, Kita-ku, Tokyo  
Tel. 910-1536  
20,000  
National F ederation of Printing and Publication Industry  
Workers1 Unions  
(ZENINSOREN)  
Takaji Kamogawa  
c/o Dai-2 AraiBldg., 2-1-5 Kasuga, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo  
Tel. 812-4007  
15,000  
Japanese Metal Mine Workers1 Union  
(HITETSU KINZOKU ROREN)  
Shozo Himeno  
5-21-15 Higashi-Gotanda, Shinagawa-ku, Tokyo  
Tel. 441-7191  
7,100  
Japan Broadcasting Workers, Union  
(NIPPORO)  
Yasuzo Sudo  
c/o NHK Bldg., 2-2-1 Jinnan, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo  
Tel. 465-1647  
13,400  
Japan Federation of Textile Industry Trade Unions  
(SENI-ROREN)  
Tomotsugu Ikeda  
c/o Katakura Bldg. 3-1-2 Kyobashi, Chuo-ku, Tokyo  
Tel. 2814806  
8,900  
-125\_

24.

25.

26.

All Japan Shipbuilding and Engineering Union (SEU)  
(ZENZOSEN-KIKAI)

Kenzo Kubo

c/o Zosen Kaikan, 3-5-6 Misaki-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo

Tel. 265-1921

8,000

All-Japan Federation of Hotel Workers<sup>1</sup> Unions

(HOTEL-ROREN)

Mitsuyoshi Shimura

c/o Zosen Kaikan, 3-5-6 Misaki-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo

Tel. 230-1381

11,783

All-Japan Shipping Labor Union

(ZENKAIREN)

Hiroshi Asano

c/o 818 Ichigokan, Shimbashi-Ekimae Bldg., 2-20 Shimbashi,

Minato-ku, Tokyo

Tel. 573-2401

8000

Sohyo All Japan Construction Industry Workers<sup>4</sup> Union

(ZENNIKEN)

Takehisa Hasegawa

c/o Tsukamoto Bldg., 1-1-9 Shjba Daimon, Minato-ku,

Tokyo

Tel. 4314680

Sakae Fujishima

c/o Suzuki Bldg., 1-11-2 Higashi. Taito-ku, Tokyo

Tel. 835-7066

15,000

All-Japan Council of Electric Power Workers<sup>1</sup> Unions

(ZENDENRYOKU)

Yasuaki Ueno

c/o Zenkyuden Tokyokaikan, 4-4-15 Sekimachikita,

Nerima-ku, Tokyo

Tel. 929-4197

3,163

-126#

29. Japan Automobile Drivers1 Union  
(J IUNRO)  
Shichiro Oguro  
2-3-12 Naka-Meguro, Meguro-ku, Tokyo  
Tel. 711-9387  
1,800

30. Alcohol Monopoly Workers1 Union  
(ALCOHOL-SEMBAI)  
Shinobu Ohmori  
c/o 37 Mori Bldg., 3-5-1 Toranomom, Minato-ku,  
Tokyo  
Tel. 433-7126  
450

31. Radiation Effect Research Foundation Labor Union  
(HOEIKEN-ROSO)  
Katsumi Okumoto  
5-2 Hijiyama-Koen, Hiroshima-shi, Hiroshima-ken  
Tel. 0822-61-1873  
310

32. All J apan F orestry Workers4 Union  
(ZENSANRO)  
c/o Zenrinya Kaikan, 3-28-7 Otsuka, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo  
Tel. 945-6385  
5,900

(Observer Affiliation)  
1. Liaison Council of Housing Industry WOrkers1 Unions  
(JUTAKUROKYO)  
Tetsuji Kawasaki  
c/o Nihon Denken Roso, 1-34-8 Honcho, Ikebukuro,  
Toshima-ku, Tokyo  
Tel. 988-5420  
1,831  
-127-

LIST OF REGIONAL LABOR COUNCILS

In the following list, labor councils, Japanese appellations, addresses, telephone number and memberships are arranged in that order.

Total Number of Councils: 47

Total Membership: 4,841,186

1. All Hokkaido Trade Union Council

(ZENDO-ROKYO)

c/o Hokuro Bldg, 12-chome, Nishj, Kita Shijo,

Chuo-ku, Sapporo-shi, Hokkaido

Tel. 011-231-4157

324,697

k)

Aomori Prefectural Trade Union Congress

(AOMORI-KENRO)

3-3-1 1 Honmachi, Aomori-shi. Aomori-ken

Tel. 0177-75-2401

55,002

3. Akita Prefectural Trade Union Congress

(AKITA-KENRO)

c/o Rodo-Kaikan, 6-7-36 Naka-dori, Akita-shj,

Akita-ken

Tel. 0188-33-8354

721002

4. Iwate Prefectural Trade Union Confederation

(IWATE-KENROREN)

c/o Iwate Rodo Fukushi Kaikan, 2-2-32 Ohsawa Kawahara,

Morioka-shi Iwate-ken

Tel. 0196-23-9201

46,960

-128-

10.

Yamagata Prefectural Trade Union Council  
(YAMAGATA-KENROHYO)  
c/o Kinrosha Fukushj Center, 2-9-40, Kasumi-cho,  
Yamagata-shi, Yamagata-ken  
Tel. 0236-41-5515  
60,887

Miyagi Prefectural Trade Union Council  
(MIYAGI-ROHYO)  
c/o Miyagi-ken Rodofukushi-Kaikan,  
1-5-13 Uesugi, Sendai-shi, Miyagi-ken  
Tel. 0222-22-9181  
83,154

Fukushjma Prefectural Trade Union Council  
(FUKUSHIMA-KENROKYO)  
c/o Rodo Fukushi Kaikan, 3-14, Miya-machi,  
Fukushima-shi, Fukushjma-ken  
Tel. 0245-22-6101  
91,050

Ibaragi Prefectural Trade Union Federation  
(IBARAGI-KENROREN)  
2-1-39 Umeka-cho, Mito-shi, Ibaragi-ken  
Tel. 0292-21-7178  
149,467

Tochigi Prefectural Trade Union Congress  
(TOCHIGI-KENRO)  
c/o Fukushj Center, 821 Naka-Tomatsurimachj,  
Utsunomiya-shj, Tochjgi-ken  
Tel. 0286-220567  
64,5 62

Gunma Regional Trade Union Council  
(GUNMA-CHIHYO)  
c/o Kinro-fukushi Center, 361-2 Nonaka-machj,  
Maebashi-shi, Gunma-ken  
Tel. 0272 (61) 3333  
89,135  
\_129\_



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- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
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- 16.
- 17.

Saitama Prefectural Trade Union Council  
(SAITAMA-KENROHYO)  
4-3-5 Takasago-cho, Urawa-shi, Saitama-ken  
Tel. 0488-63-1561  
127,876

Chiba Prefectural Trade Union Federation  
(CHIBA-KENROREN)  
c/o Rodosha Fukushima Center, 4-4 Chiba-Koh,  
Chiba-shi, Chiba-ken  
Tel. 0472-41-7141  
129,331

Tokyo Regional Trade Union Council  
(TOKYO-CHIHYO)  
3-18-15 Shibaura, Minato-ku, Tokyo  
Tel. 03-452-4611  
650,000

Kanagawa Prefectural Trade Union Council  
(KANAGAWA-KENPYO)  
c/o Rodo Sogo Center, 1-1-28 Nakahara, Isogo-ku,  
Yokohama-shi, Kanagawa-ken  
Tel. 045-773-2250  
214,025

Yamanashi Prefectural Trade Union Confederation  
(YAMANASHI-KENROREN)  
c/o Yamanashiken Ronofukushi Center, 2-7-17 Aioi,  
Kofu-shi, Yamanashi-ken  
Tel. 0552-35-3161  
34,790

Niigata Prefectural Trade Union Council  
(NIIGATA-KENPYO)  
c/o Rodosha Daini Fukushima Center, 2-1-7, Hanazono,  
Niigata-shi, Niigata-ken  
Tel. 025244-5454  
1 18,299

Toyama Prefectural Trade Union Council  
(TOYAMA-KENROKYO)  
4130-

18.  
19.  
20.  
21.  
22.  
23.

c/o Toyamaken Kinrosha Sogo Fukushi Center  
81 Okudashin-machj, Toyama-shj, Toyama-ken  
Tel. 0764-31-8756

73,374

Ishikawa Prefectural Trade Union Council  
(ISHIKAWA-KENPYO)

5-23, Showa-cho, Kanazawa-shi, Ishikawa-ken  
Tel. 0762-33-2170

54,5 34

Fukui Prefectural Trade Union Council  
(FUKUI-KENPYO)

c/o Rodo Fukushj Kaikan, 2-1-24, Hoei-cho,  
Fukui-shj, Fukui-ken  
Tel. 0776-21-5 321

31,342

Nagano Prefectural Trade Union Council  
(NAGANO-KENPYO)

c/o Rodo Kaikan, 532-3, Agata-machi,  
Nagano-shj, Nagano-ken  
Tel. 0262-34-2116

123,249

Gifu Prefectural Trade Union Council  
(GIFU-KENPYO)

c/o Kenpyo-kaikan, 14 Nishi Komazume-cho,  
Gifu-shj, Gifu-ken  
Tel. 0582-65 4678

56,680

Shizuoka Prefectural Trade Union Council  
(SHIZUOKA-KENPYO)

1 1-22 Minami-cho, Shizuoka-shj, Shizuoka-ken  
Tel. 0542-82-4121

120,071

Aichi Prefectural Trade Union Council  
(AICHI-ROHYO)

c/o Aichi Rodo Bunka Center, 3-8-10, Tsuruma, Showa-ku,  
Nagoya-shi, Aichi-ken  
1131-

26.  
Tel. 052-741-2266  
249,379  
Mie Prefectural Trade Union Council  
(MIE-KENROKYO)  
c/o Mie-ken Kinro Fukushi Kaikan, 1-147-5, Sakae-cho,  
Tsu-shi, Mie-ken  
Tel. 0592-27-0154  
73,977  
Shiga Regional Council of Sohyo  
(SHIGA-CHIHYO)  
c/o Kyoiku Kaikan, 1-4-15, Umebayashi,  
Ohtsu-shi, Shiga-ken  
Tel. 0775-2224644  
36,924  
Kyoto Regional Council of Sohyo  
(KYOTO-SOHO)  
c/o Kyoto Rodosha Sogo Kaikan, 30-2 Mibu Sennen-cho,  
Nakagyo-ku, Kyoto-shi, Kyoto  
Tel. 075-801-2308  
140,156  
Osaka Regional Council of Sohyo  
(OSAKA-SOHO)  
c/o PLP Kaikan, 3-9-27 Tenjinbashi, Kita-ku,  
Osaka-shi, Osaka  
Tel. 06-3580281  
359,235  
Nara Regional Trade Union Confederation  
(NARA-SOHO)  
c/o Rodo Kaikan, 93-6 Nishiki Tsuji-cho,  
Nara-shi, Nara-ken  
Tel. 0742-26-3983  
38,656  
Wakayama Regional Trade Union Council  
(WAKAYAMA-KENCHIHYO)  
c/o Kyoiku Kaikan, 3-1 Komatsubara-dori  
Wakayama-shi, Wakayama-ken  
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Tel. 0734-23-1952  
29,396  
Hyogo Regional Council of Sohyo  
(HYOGO-KENSOHYO)  
c/o Kinzoku Rodo Kaikan, 4-1-19 Nakamachi-dori,  
Chuo-ku, Kobe-shi, Hyogo-ken  
Tel. 078-341-1016  
181,620  
Tottori Prefectural Trade Union Council  
(TOTTORI-KENSOHYO)  
1 10 Ebisumachi, Tottori-shi, Tottori-ken  
Tel. 0857-23-2391  
31,807  
Okayama Prefectural Trade Union Council  
(OKAYAMA-KENSOHYO)  
c/o Okayamashi Kinro Fukushi Center, 5-5 Kasuga-cho,  
Okayama-shj, Okayama-ken  
Tel. 0862-25-1441  
75,140  
Shimane Prefectural Trade Union Council  
(SHIMANE-KENPYO)  
c/o Chuo Rodo Fukushj Center, 549-4, Mitefunaba-cho,  
Matsue-shi, Shimane-ken  
Tel. 0852-23-3300  
41,899  
Hiroshima Prefectural Trade Union Congress  
(HIROSHIMA-KENRO)  
c/o Rodo Kaikan, 1-17 Minami Kanaya-cho,  
Hiroshima-shi, Hiroshima-ken  
Tel. 0822-61-9255  
115,688  
Yamaguchj Prefectural Trade Union Council  
(YAMAGUCHI-KENRO)  
2-5-1 1 Eki-dori, Yamaguchi-shi, Yamaguchi-ken  
Tel. 0839-22-1841  
63,161  
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Kagawa Prefectural Council of Sohyo  
(KAGAWA-KENSOHYO)

7-18 Marunouchj, Takamatsu-shj,  
Kagawa-ken

Tel. 0878-51-2362  
43,128

Tokushima Prefectural Trade Union Council  
(TOKUSHIMA-KENROHYO)

c/o Tokushimaken Rodo Fukushj Kaikan,  
3-35-1 Showa-cho, Tokushima-shi, Tokushima-ken  
Tel. 0886-23-2108

32,035

Ehime Prefectural Trade Union Council of Sohyo  
(EHIME-CHIHYO)

c/o Ehimeken Kinro Kaikan, 132 Miyatamachj,  
Matsuyama-shi, Ehime-ken

Tel. 0899-414500  
40,449

Kochi Prefectural Trade Union Confederation  
(KOCHI-KENSOHYO)

c/o Rodo Kaikan, 4-1-32 Honmachi,  
Kochi-shj, Kochi-ken

Tel. 0888-75-7274  
42,919

Fukuoka Prefectural Trade Union Confederation  
(FUKUOKA-KENPYO)

c/o Ohtemon Kaikan, 3-3-3 Ohtemon,  
Chuo-ku, Fukuoka-shi, Fukuoka-ken

Tel. 092-712-0525  
158,390

Saga Prefectural Trade Union Confederation  
(SAGA-KENSOHYO)

c/o Rodo Kaikan, 2-9 Yanagi-cho, Sagashi,  
Saga-ken

Tel. 0952-24-6221  
31,062

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Nagasaki Prefectural Trade Union Council  
(NAGASAKI-KENROHYO)  
c/o Chikuro Kaikan, 9-6 Sakura-cho, Nagasaki-shj, Nagasaki-ken  
Tel. 0958-23-7281  
56,939

Kumamoto Prefectural Trade Union Confederation  
(KUMAMOTO-KENSOHYO)  
c/o Rodo Kaikan, 1-17-9 Kuhonji,  
Kumamoto-shi, Kumamoto-ken  
Tel. 0963-71-6226  
61,236

Oita Prefectural Trade Union Confederation  
(OITA-KENROHYO)  
c/o Rodo Fukushi Kaikan, 1-3 Kotobuki-cho,  
Oita-shi, Oita-ken  
Tel. 0975-34-3300  
53,870

Miyazaki Prefectural Trade Union Council  
(MIYAZAKI-KENROHYO)  
c/o Miyazakiken Rodo Jukushi Kaikan, 3-9,  
Beppu-cho, Miyazaki-shi, Miyazaki-ken  
Tel. 0985-29-1212  
38 ,5 81

Kagoshima Prefectural Trade Union Council  
(KAGOSHIMA-KENSOHYO)  
c/o Kinrosha Kyosai Kaikan, 5-7-601  
Kamoikeshin-machj, Kagoshima-shj, Kagoshima-ken  
Tel. 0992-52-8585  
38,004

Okinawa Prefectural Council of Trade Unions  
(OKINAWA-KENROKYO)  
c/o Rodo Fukushi Kaikan, 1-1 Higashi-cho,  
Naha-shi, Okinawa-ken  
Tel. 0988-62-3888  
37,048  
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