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Parnell,
AUCKLAND/NEW ZEALAND

2 July 1993
The Secretary
Delimitation Commission
Muldm Party Negotiations
Wo Trade Centre
ISANDO/TRANSVAAL

Dear Sir/Madam

Enclosed is a 217 page submission to the Delimitation Commission based on the twelve state decentralized federation outlined in my book "Freedom For All" now available from retailers.

The basic proposal is contained in the 44 pages dealing with a so-called "white Homeland", the 20 pages dealing with population changes until 2020 beginning on page 238, the 27 pages dealing with Black National States beginning on

page 273, and the 33 figures in the appendix which delineate important aspects of boundaries not otherwise dealt with within those chapters.

The boundary proposals assume a true federation in which wealth sharing and redistribution occur through taxation and local body levies in almost the same way as if South Africa was a unitary state. Since completely free movement of capital, labour, and place of residence would be assured under the constitution, no attention at all need be given to the independent strength of

each region's economy. Instead boundaries can be drawn solely on the basis of community of interest using language boundaries as the main but not the only guide. Only if community of interest requirements are satisfied, will South Africa enjoy the peace and certainty required for the economy to flourish in any case. Specific proposals for wealth sharing are contained in the

32 pages dealing with Sharing of Resources beginning page 403.

Since the political system in place within each state is also an important aspect when considering a federal system, various electoral systems and their implications for South Africa, both now and in the future, are considered in the 23 pages on Electoral Systems beginning page 300.

Possible types of executive government are considered in the 34 pages on Systems of Government beginning page 338, which also considers likely political

alliances given relative support for each of South Africa's political parties. A strong case is made for a totally independent, representative executive elected by single transferable vote by both the Legislature and the Senate. This executive would be chaired by a popularly elected president. There would be no senate at state level, but a similar independent representative executive, elected by single transferable vote by each state's legislature and chaired

by a popularly elected governor, is envisaged at state level.

A third essential area of government is seen as local metropolitan regions

such as Soweto/Johannesburg, whose rating and administrative functions would overlap state boundaries and be entrenched in the South African constitution. Metropolitan regions would disregard narrower state based ethnic and language

community of interest considerations in the interests of total geographic urban areas, but while they would have fund raising and administrative powers which

could not be challenged by states, they would have no law making powers and could not disregard specific state laws.

Yours faithfully,

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A Submission to the Delimitation Commission

Based On The Book

FREEDOM FOR ALL

by

DAVID GUISE

David Guise is a New Zealand Business Consultant and lifetime student of the Politics of Minority Groups in larger societies. He has no affiliation to any of South Africa's groupings.

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DAVID GUISE

WHITE HOMELAND

POPULATION CHANGES

BLACK NATIONAL STATES

ELECTORIAL SYSTEMS

SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT

SHARING OF RESOURCES

LIST OF FIGURES DELINIATING BOUDARIES

IWHITE HOMELAND?

If one accepts a decentralized federal republic as the most practical and just solution to the conflicting demands for autonomy of South Africa's races. the next problem is where to draw the boundaries. Since the whole basis of the argument for a federal republic is to allow a major degree of self government to the different racial groups. and in particular to the White group who are the major key to a peaceful settlement. it follows that the boundaries must be drawn to achieve this.

It is also logical and reasonable to use any clear cut boundaries between the various Black groups as state boundaries wherever possible. Having established the nucleus of such Black states, the allocation of areas of mixed Black population to one state or another becomes a practical administrative matter based on proximity and community of interest.

[It is neither necessary nor possible for a White homeland to be predominantly White for it to meet the needs of Whites. Only 4% of the world's population live in states composed entirely of their own ethnic group. Whites have spent their whole lives living amongst people of other races and would have no objection to continuing to do so providing a democratically based political power. whose legitimacy could not be challenged. remained predominantly in White hands and was likely to remain there for the near future. In any case a homeland with a greater population than Whites alone could supply would increase the economic and political influence of that homeland within the federation.

A prosperous mainly White state in a South African federation would not remain that way for long in any case. Whites will not give up cheap labour and no land border will keep out the hungry and desperate. South Africa already has 1.0 million workers from neighbouring states. both legal and illegal. and every year thousands of illegal workers cross its borders, Thousands of Blacks wanted to immigrate to South Africa in the past when Black personal freedoms were grossly restricted and even more wish to immigrate now. :

South Africa is by no means a uniformly Black country with a small White minority. Historically Black settlement stopped where the sweet veld grassland merged into semidesert. In 74 magisterial districts in the western Cape covering 42% of South Africa's land area. Blacks are not a majority of the population and never have been. Historically there were no Blacks settled there and the present 17.5% of their total population are recent immigrants. The largest population group in 64 of those districts is the Afrikaans speaking Coloureds with Whites forming a strong minority.

By including Coloureds and Whites together. Whites rationalize an historical claim to this 42% of South Africa which is mostly semidesert. However although 1.12 million Whites dominate this area culturally and economically, they are only 26.9% of its population. Coloureds make up 54.9% of the population so ethnically this is a Coloured area.

Black pastoralists permanently occupied nearly all of the remainder of South Africa where their descendants still form an overwhelming majority in most districts. The Black 58% of South Africa has the richest agricultural land, the most water resources, and the richest mineral deposits. It is here that 77.5% of Whites now live, laying claim to three quarters of this "Black" area as "White" territory, a territory in which 176 of the 192 magisterial districts, or 92%, have a Black majority. Not even the most rabid White supremacists can claim such a situation is just. Expedient perhaps, even desirable from their point of view, but not just.

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Fig2 DISTRICTS 50% OR MORE BLACK

Fig 2 shows 1985 magisterial districts that are 50% or more Black. As well as the western Cape in which Blacks are very thinly represented, 16 other districts in the North and east have non Black majorities, six of them White, two of them Indian, and eight mixed White, Coloured and Indian.

Blacks themselves are split among nine major language groups, each of which numerically dominates large areas of the country, frequently including major urban areas. Fig 3 shows 1985 magisterial districts that are 50% or more Coloured, Sotho, Zulu, Shangaan and Ndebele, and Fig 4 shows districts that are 50% or more Indian, Xhosa, Tswana, Swazi, Pedi and Venda.

Fig3 DISTRICTS 50% OR MORE COLOURED SOTHO ZULU SHANGAAN
NDEBELE

Indian

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Fig4 DISTRICTS 50% OR MORE INDIAN XHOSA TSWANA SWAZI VENDA
PEDI

This Icaves 16 districts in Cape Province, 29 in Orange Free State, 4 in Natal,
and 46 in Transvaal where no single ethnic group forms 50%. although many
groups come close to doing so. Reducing the threshold level from 50% to either

30% or the largest group where two groups each exceed 30%, as in Fig 5, clarifies
the cthnic distribution considcrably.

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FigÂ\$ LARGEST GROUP GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 30%

Each of the ethnic groups thus forms either a majority or a very substantial minority of 30% or more over most of South Africa. Only 13 magisterial districts are not allocated to one or other ethnic group. Eight are in the PWV district and in seven of them, Whites are the largest single group.

While consideration of ethnic dominance by magisterial district is satisfactory " over most of South Africa, it is a very blunt instrument in the highly urbanized industrial and mining districts where the impact of apartheid planning has affected

one district and not another by the placement of a large Black township or hostels for single contract miners. Both the largest White concentration in the country of 406.000 and by far the largest Black concentration of 1.8 million are in the same magisterial district of Johannesburg yet are administratively and geographically separate areas.

Whites alone of all ethnic groups are widely scattered over all parts of South Africa. A study of the 266 magisterial districts outside the Black homelands in 1985, reveals Whites as a majority in only eight urban magisterial districts in or around Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Cape Town, and two mixed urban and rural districts, Newcastle and Phalaborwa. In Newcastle and Phalaborwa, they predominate only in the town, which underlines the fact that everywhere in South Africa Whites are a majority only in the White suburbs of towns and cities. In the rural areas of "White" South Africa Blacks outnumber Whites by 12.6 : 1 in Natal, 6.4 : 1 in Transvaal, and 16.7 : 1 in OFS. Fig 6 shows White concentrations down to 10,000.

Fig6 WHITE CONCENTRATIONS OF 10,000 PERSONS OR MORE

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A map with White concentrations shown in this form understates White dominance of large areas of South Africa since following commercial advantage. White concentrations tend to be in the most populated urban areas of the country and when they are a majority they are present in considerable numbers. These are areas of rapid urban growth with populations of very mixed ethnic origin. As shown in Fig 7. Whites are the largest single group not only in the ten magisterial districts where they are a majority, but also in 19 where they number from 30 to 48% of the population, and a further 9 where they number from 23 to 30%.

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Fig7 DISTRICTS WHERE WHITES ARE THE LARGEST SINGLE GROUP

The heart of this area is the Pretoria/Witwatersrand /Vereniging industrial region. (PWV) where a multiplicity of ethnic groups reflect the migration of South Africans of all races. Two million Whites, 40% of South Africa's total White population, and 5.0 million Blacks, 19% of all Blacks, live in this small area. If a

compact state with a White majority is to be found. it will be found within this area.

Solutions to South Africa's race conflicts will grow from those found here where the largest group of Whites live, rather than from looking to the western Cape. Whatever solution is proposed must do so without disruption of the PWV's economic functions. Both Black and White groups are essential to these functions and both depend on each other for their economic wellbeing so any political solution must encourage them to continue to workfreely and willingly together.

THE PWV REGION

Within the PWYV arca the Group Arcas Act ensurcd that Whites, Coloureds. Indians and Blacks lived predominantly in their own suburbs. This now makes it relatively easy to allocatc suburbs to states with either a White or a Black majority.

Obvious areas for inclusion in a White state arc the vast White residential suburbs of the Witwatersrand, Pretoria and the Vaal Triangle. but this does not necessarily include associated White owned industrial areas or gold mines. and cannot include many Black townships without Whites continuing to. be a minority in their own state.

An obvious area for inclusion within a Black state is the area between the White cities of the Witwatersrand and Verceniging/Vanderbijlpark which has 3.46 million people. The 3.26 million of its people belonging to Black ethnic groups are inextricably mixed with no group predominating. although Sotho are the largest group in the South and Tswanas in the West. Zulus are the largest single Black group at 26%, but predominate nowhere. As a group, Blacks within this area are the most urbanized, the best educated. have the highest level of skills and highest level of family income of all Black groups in South Africa. They are also the most politically sophisticated with large numbers eschewing individual tribal loyalties in favour of support for the ANC and Black Consciousness groups. If a non racial Black state can work anywhere, it should be able to work here.

Defining borders between this Black area and the White cities to its north and south requircs prior consideration of just what such a border would aim to achieve.

(1) Firstly the sole aim of such a border is to achieve a large measure of long term autonomy for Whites within a Black dominated federation. It makes a great deal of difference to the long term political control of a White state which side of the border a Black township is located on, so all dominantly Black areas should be excluded from the White state wherever possible.

(2) Secondly any mainly White state in the PWV will come under immense future pressure from potential Black settlers because of heavy Black migration to the PWYV area and rising Black standards of living. To ensure White political control

will continue well into the future. boundaries must be tightly drawn around existing White suburbs so there are few opportunities for the development of extensive Black suburbs within the White state which will threaten that control. It is definitely a case of less is better.

(3) Thirdly it would only be a state border between different parts of one federation and would have no bearing on the rights of all people to live and work and exercise their political rights anywhere which would be guaranteed by the constitution.

Unless provision is directly made. the wealthy cities of a mainly White state in the PWV region would escape planning and financial responsibility for the provision of housing and infrastructure for the continuous inflow of migrants. mainly Black. into their mainly Black towns across the border, imposing an impossible and unjust burden on them.

Provision could be made in the constitution for legal interstate entities such as the present Regional Service Councils. or for single cities straddling state borders. which would have both the responsibility and the power to raise funds for the provision of infrastructure. including zoned and serviced land for housing. The powers of these councils would have to be negotiated with Black leaders and membership would have to be more representative than at present. but they would not be able to override the political authority of the state in which they operated except in their ability to levy funds at the agreed level.

A housing corporation funded by taxation. privatization of government assets. and private enterprise sources. would have to provide the actual housing for poor migrants in those areas that were their main destination. Private enterprise alone would willingly supply housing for the better off.

To a considerable extent the creation of a White state in the PWV area depends on the concept of twin cities. one largely White and the other largely Black. on opposite sides of a state border. Since both would belong to the same federation and share local economic interests. nothing should prevent normal economic relationships between the two. or a common administration and tax base. yet politically each would be largely independent of the other.

The principles of political sovereignty and the sharing of a common city administration and tax base are entirely separate. There is no reason why municipal boundaries based on a common geographical area should not replace present boundaries based on race, but the sovereignty of each federal state over legislation within its own area would be paramount.

Such arrangements are perfectly functional in the United States and have little effect on the lives of their citizens. There is no reason why they should not also work well in South Africa. The only difference in South Africa is that the change in political control would largely coincide with a change in race, but then political control of their own affairs by differing groups is largely what South Africa's present conflicts are all about.

Some examples of United States twin cities divided by a state border but not necessarily sharing any degree of common administration are as follows.

Cities States

Chicago/Gary Illinois/Indiana
Cincinnati/Covington Ohio/Kentucky

Jersey City/New York New Jersey/New York
Kansas City/Kansas City Kansas/Missouri
Memphis/Memphis Arkansas/Tennessee
Philadelphia/Camden Pennsylvania/New Jersey
Phoenix/Columbus Alabama/Georgia
Portland/Vancouver Oregon/Washington

St. Louis/St. Louis Missouri/ Illinois

Sioux City/South Sioux City Iowa/Nebraska
Washington Dist. Columbia/Maryland/Virginia

The concept of twin cities freely sharing the commercial, industrial and social resources, and the taxable wealth of an area, while each group retains a large degree of political control of its own residential suburbs, is the answer to South Africa's dilemma since it allows the creation of a viable state with a White majority without reducing any of the reasonable social, economic or political rights of other groups. The majority of South Africa's people would have considerable autonomy where they lived, but would be free to work where they have always worked.

It can well be argued that city sharing between the races, as an effective means of providing each with a large degree of autonomy, rests heavily on the present geographical location of the races as they work those resources presently important to South Africa. Apart from gold and diamonds whose production is declining, most minerals, water, and good agricultural land would be in Black states and it is extremely likely that future resources to be developed will not straddle borders so neatly. People of all races will have to relocate to new areas of economic activity.

This argument is irrelevant to the fact that semiautonomous federal states for all races can be created now, where people actually live, ending the prospect of violent confrontation between irreconcilable interests. Access to employment and business opportunities in the vast majority of the industrial areas of South Africa would be readily available to all races without them leaving their preferred state of residence. Future relocations would be a voluntary choice.

Fig 8, in which all Black towns are marked, shows how the PWV area falls quite naturally into dominantly White and dominantly Black areas. For the most part the border closely follows the boundary of White residential suburbs or of closely settled White smallholdings. The central White area taking in Pretoria and the Witwatersrand can be divided from the White areas of the Vaal Triangle along the Randfontein/Westonaria/Oberholzer district boundaries which mark the western extremity of the Witwatersrand. This would create a hypothetical White

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dominated state of approximately 4070 km² containing 176 million Whites which

I subsequently call Rand.

Nonty Central
TRANSVAAL
(Perz)

Southern West Transvaal

(Tswana)

Central
TRANSVAAL
(Noemere)

Southern Central Transvaal

UanL Free State
Black Towns

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Fig8 BLACK AND WHITE AREAS OF THE PWV REGION

Accurate population statistics are very hard to gather in South Africa. The Higher Sciences Research Council (HSRC) estimated that throughout the country, excluding the independent homelands. Blacks were 25% undercounted in the 1985

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census and Whites 8%. The 1985 statistics were noticeably inaccurate in the Black townships of the PWV area.

In an October 1986 study on the Black towns of the PWV, Davies Bristow Small and Associates made their own estimates of the populations of those towns which I have accepted as being reasonably accurate. The 1985 population of Rand was as follows.

Population % of total

Afrikaners	895.000	34.7
English	861,000	33.3
Coloureds	92.000	3.6
Indians	54,000	2.1
Tswana	113.000	4.4
Pedi	111.000	4.3
Xhosa	110,000	4.3
Zulu	102,000	3.9
Shangaan	61,000	2.4
Sotho	60,000	2.3
Other Blacks	123.000	4.7
	2.582.000	100.0

Rand had a total population in 1985 of 2.58 million, being 68% White, 26% Black, and 6% Coloured and Indian. To its north and east, four major Black towns, Daveyton, Tembisa, Mamelodi and Atteridgeville with populations of between 110.000 and 225.000 have easy access to Rand's industrial, commercial and residential areas and plenty of room to expand. :

Only three Black townships fall within Rand. Alexander, (105,000) Wattsville. (31.000) and Munsieville. (14.000) They must be treated as integral parts of Rand, with their residents having the normal right to vote for its government. To treat them as outlying but integral parts of Black states, or as self governing enclaves or cantons with no voice in the affairs of Rand, is to revert to apartheid and destroy the idea of city sharing as a reasonable way to solve South Africa's political problems. It would also destroy what is probably the only way to create a viable White homeland that would include a majority of Whites.

Of the 680.000 total Blacks in Rand, 117.000 are temporary migrants drawn from all over South Africa on short term mining contracts. Temporary migrants would vote in federal elections wherever they were currently living. They would also vote for the government of their home states so it would not be unreasonable to exclude them from voting for the government of Rand until they had been resident there for three years.

The remaining 563.000 Blacks are 22.8% of the permanent population but because they have a very young age structure, they are only 19.4% of potential voters compared with 75.4% for Whites.

With Whites being the largest group. parties supported by Whites would win over 90% of the seats in Rand's parliament in a first past the post election. Since it is well documented that a higher proportion of wealthier or better educated people actually vote than those of other socio economic groups. White supported parties could gain as much as 79% of the total votes cast even in an election by proportional representation. Whites would therefore be the major influence in the region's politics.)

Figs A1 to A12 in the appendix define Rand's boundaries in more detail.

The population of the central Black state in 1985 was 3.46 million. 3.26 million of them Black Soweto is its largest city with 1.8 million people but there are 16 other major towns, 5 of them with a population of more than 100,000 and 2 exceeding 250,000 One hundred and twenty-one thousand Coloureds live mainly in Soweto and Enneldoort. 54,000 Indians live mainly in Lenasia, and 18,500 Whites live mainly in small towns and on farms, orchards and other small holdings. Despite the population being nearly 99% urban, open veld makes up 90% of the state and 1/5 consists of part of the Suikrobosrand nature reserve. The whole area forms a slight basin divided roughly in half by a small river, the Klip. For want of a better name [subsequently refer to this hypothetical Black state as Klip River.

The towns of Klip River are mostly dormitory suburbs of White industrial and commercial areas to the north and south. Many lack any defined downtown area and are deficient in shops, offices, sports grounds, theatres, or administrative buildings as a result of past government policies. Soweto however also contains the famous elite townships of Beverley Hills and Prestige Park with their marble walls and steel gates.

A primary requirement of these towns is to develop their own infrastructure around a town plan, independent of the services of White areas. At present White city centres are shopping meccas for township residents where they spend a large proportion of their disposable income. There is no sufficient reason why White owned chain stores that would be affected by loss of Black custom should not open up local branches, just as down town businesses in the rest of the world have pursued their customers into the suburbs. While 50% of the shareholdings of such branches should be made available for purchase by local residents, such developments would quickly turn these townships into real cities.

Klip River also holds much of the land in the P\WV suitable for future industrial development, so a plan for the whole state making provision for future industrial and residential areas and the site of a state administration is essential.

With an area of approximately 3670 km², a distance east to west of 107 km and north to south of 67 km, a population of 3.46 million, and an economic and geographical focus that is entirely concerned with the PWV region, the area is ideally suited to become the only truly multi racial Black state in the federation. There are over 30 totally independent states in the world with an area smaller than the federal state of Klip River.

Figs A8 to A13 in the appendix define Klip River's boundaries in more detail.

As drawn, the boundaries for both Rand and Klip River are only tentative. intended as a workable model around which discussions can take place. Detailed local knowledge of populations and their politics is necessary to be more definitive.

However based on the modified 1985 census. only 100.000. or 4.9% of the PWV region's 2.026.000 Whites, fall outside areas with White majorities, and only 730.000 Blacks. or 1.9% of the PWV region's Blacks, are not in areas with Black majorities.

While these results must be considered within the context of an overall settlement between the races. it appears extremely probable that semiautonomous states for all races. including Whites. can be created now where people actually live. ending the prospect of violent confrontation between irreconcilable interests.

The concept of twin cities freely sharing the commercial. industrial and social resources. and the taxable wealth of an area. while each group retains substantial political control of its own residential areas, could be extended southwards. In the east it would apply to Kroonstad. Welkom. Virginia. Bloemfontein. Middleburg, Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth. In the west it would apply to Carletonville, Potchefstroom. Stilfontein. Klerksdorp. Orkney and Kimberley. This would give a large measure of self rule to the 560.000 Whites along the Vaal river and in western Orange Free State. and link up the PWV area with the 1.12 million Whites in the western Cape.

However since the western Cape has a Coloured majority. the attitude of its 2.28 million Coloured people to being included in a state in which Whites would probably cast a bare majority of votes must first be considered.

THE WESTERN CAPE

For the most part the language. culture and religion of the Coloured people are those of the Afrikaner and during most of their history they were unequal partners with Whites in their pioneering settlement and development of South Africa. From 1828 until the Union of 1910 there were no statutory differences between White and Coloured in Cape Province and no amendment ever sought to place the Coloured people on a different political footing. Instead the same property. income or educational qualifications were required from all races for the right to vote.

There was a conventional colour bar which had some economic effect but was mainly in the social sphere. Coloureds thought of themselves as civilized and Blacks as tribespeople and their aspiration was to be fully accepted by Whites as equals.

Coloured attitudes changed during 40 years of apartheid. with their loss of voting rights on common rolls with Whites in 1956 and their exclusion from any representation at all in 1968. The removal of Coloureds from Cape Town's district six to new settlements on the Cape Flats in 1966 was a wound to the unity of Afrikaans speakers that will take a very long time to heal. To their credit local

Cape Town \Whites opposed central government's action with such long term solidarity that 20 years later the area was still largely empty except for government buildings.

While Coloured people in the older age groups may still prefer to be in a state dominated by Whites rather than one dominated by Blacks. many younger people are alienated from Whites by a lifetime of struggle against unjust laws. However all of the people of the western Cape would have to take part in any decision to become part of Orange River. not just Coloureds. Only a common interest in their own autonomy. and a lack of real alternatives. will create a White/Coloured partnership at this stage since Coloureds do not really believe that Whites would not attempt to dominate them and many Whites would be afraid that any coalition they did not totally control might betray their state's autonomy to Black federal domination. Only a generation of straight dealing based strictly on state autonomy and a true sharing of power will create the confidence of a true partnership.

Theoretically the Coloureds of the western Cape have four future choices.

(1) Remain in a Black dominated unitary state.

(2) Become totally independent.

(3) Become a majority Coloured state of western Cape within a decentralized federation.

(4) Participate with Whites to the north of the Orange River in a common state within a decentralized federation.

The place of Coloureds in a Black ruled unitary South Africa would be just as insecure as that of Whites since few people of mixed race hold positions of real power elsewhere in Africa. When Whites were replaced as the dominant group it would be by Blacks not by Coloureds.

In the face of heavy Black migration into the western Cape and Black central government appointees to all positions of importance. Coloureds would have little control over their own affairs. It would matter little whether a Coloured person was actually appointed to a position. What would matter would be to whom their loyalty was due and who could sack them. '

Economically the western Cape could stand alone as an independent country. Without any poor homeland areas. its income per capita is about 36% higher than that for the rest of the country as a whole. although only 40% of that of Rand.

However although the White/Coloured area of the western Cape makes up 42% of South African territory. its 4.16 million people are only 12.1% of South Africa's people because of the relative scarcity of minerals and good agricultural land. The state's potential would be quite restricted and its people would greatly prefer to remain integrated within the South African economy as a whole.

If Coloureds opted for a state of western Cape within a South African federation, in preference to a common federal state with Whites to the North, Coloureds would make up only 52% of the state's voters because of differing age structures between the state's ethnic groups. In addition. the political parties which

Coloureds support differ widely in their attitudes. from vocal minority support for the ANC to probable majority support for the NP. The NP is also likely to be the party of choice for approximately 69 of Whites in the western Cape so it seems highly probable that the NP would form a majority government in the state in a reasonably equal partnership between its White and Coloured supporters.

With Whites being an economically powerful minority with 31% of all votes, and Blacks being a poor, predominantly pro central government minority with 16%, it would make good sense for predominantly Coloured parties such as the LP to join an NP led coalition. both from the point of view of preserving local autonomy and for rapid economic development. The LP places strong emphasis on constitutionally entrenched regional authorities whose authority the central government would have no power to revoke or undermine. It also wants a formula for the equitable financing of all regions. However all of the people of the four Cape Provinces would have to take part in any decision to become part of Orange River, not just Coloureds.

No government not dominated by the NP would be possible in the western Cape for at least a decade, so little would be different if Coloureds were part of a larger common federal state with Whites to the North. The only gain to Coloureds in opting for a smaller, predominantly Coloured state would be that if the swing of Coloured voters to the NP went far enough. Coloureds would themselves dominate the NP in the western Cape and temporarily be the senior partner in the government of the state.

By 2020 following heavy Black migration to the western Cape, Coloureds will be only 44% of the state's voters. Whites 25% and Blacks will have risen to 29%. While it would still be possible for Coloureds to dominate the NP in the western Cape. the NP would by then be hard pressed to hold a majority of parliamentary seats. It would have to depend on other parties to gain a majority and Coloureds of all of the parties in any governing coalition would at most be no more than an equal partner.

Since political necessity dictates that Whites and Coloureds will always have a common interest in defending minority rights. and within the western Cape will always have to cooperate closely in the government and development of their common area. this cooperation might as well be over the larger area of a joint White/Coloured state.

It could be argued that it would be better for Coloureds to retain the possibility of becoming a majority partner in the smaller area rather than settling for the certainty of being a minority partner in a larger and richer area. However nearly the same degree of Coloured control could be retained in western Cape by organizing the White/Coloured state as a mini federation of self governing provinces in which Coloureds could have effective control of their own areas and still play a controlling role in the larger state.

Similarly Whites would retain effective control of their areas in Rand. western Free State and along the Vaal river while building a larger and more viable base from which to negotiate with other members of the federation over the concerns of

all minorities. Such underlying White or Coloured control of the various provinces of their state would not preclude the participation of Black parties in their government.

Most of the social legislation Coloureds would want actioned at state level would be readily passed by pragmatic White politicians to ensure continuing Coloured support in resisting any attempt at Black domination. They would have little choice in any case since an NP majority at state level would require it to draw at least 30% of its support from Coloured voters.

A coalition at state level between Whites and Coloureds, both within the NP and between the NP and predominantly Coloured parties, would be a pragmatic outcome of the necessary partnership between the White and Coloured peoples and would be less difficult for any of the partners than might be supposed. All of the partners would be heavily dominated by Afrikaans speakers and share a similar cultural and religious outlook.

The differences between them in the circumstances of a multi racial federation, made possible by the NP, would not be so much philosophical as one of pure horse trading for each to obtain the best deal for their own party and people. Since the parties supported by Whites and Coloureds would increasingly need each other to retain effective power, such horse trading would be likely to be pragmatic rather than acrimonious, just what would be needed to make a multi racial state government work.

Since a multi racial National Party is likely to continue indefinitely as the major party at the joint state level and predominantly Coloured parties such as the LP would have to work with it to participate effectively in the government of the state as a whole, they would be extremely likely to choose to ally themselves with the NP in the Cape.

Participation in a common state with Whites would considerably strengthen the long term autonomy of both Coloureds and Whites. On their own, Coloureds muster barely 52% of the potential voters in the western Cape. On their own, Whites muster barely 68% in areas they dominate. Together the two groups form an unassailable 77% of all potential voters in a joint state.

By 2020 each of them on their own would be becoming vulnerable because of continual Black immigration into their states. Coloured voters would be just 44% of their state's voters and White voters would be down to 58%. Together they would still be over 65% of all voters.

In the longer term a state made up only of the western Cape could face the problem of pressure from its growing Xhosa population in favour of a greater Xhosaland. Xhosas will rise from 28.4% of the Coloured population in 1985 to 63.0% by 2020. The trend will continue in the future though more slowly. The White population will only increase slightly from 48.9% of the Coloured population to 50.3% during the same period.

Whatever residual disputes Coloureds may have with Whites, any potential threats to maintaining a strong Coloured political influence in the western Cape

will come from a Black dominated federal government and from heavy Black immigration.

As part of a much larger joint White/Coloured state, the continuing regional autonomy of the western Cape would be assured since Xhosa will make up only 18.1% of a joint state's total population by 2020 compared with 30.7% of the population in the western Cape. A joint state would also have the political clout to successfully protect its autonomy by resisting changes to the constitution.

With the establishment of a joint White/Coloured state, with a Coloured province or provinces having half of its 8.24 million people. Coloureds would become full and influential partners in a self governing state of a South African federation. If Coloureds could be the dominant partner in the western Cape and a major partner in the government of the whole state, they may well welcome the greater opportunities and economic strength of a joint state, and the greater protection of minority rights within the federation that such a strong state could give.

Within the framework of the joint state, there is no reason why Coloured control at the provincial level in the western Cape should not be nearly as extensive as that of the state itself in relationship to the federal government.

Because both state and provincial governments would necessarily be coalitions of all races, neither the state nor any of the provinces would be committed to preservation of the rule of a single political party representing one racial group. Politics could be very flexible and could accommodate multi racial groupings that included Black political parties.

Coloured people realize that they too are a minority in South Africa. On their own each of the two states would have a population of a little over 4.0 million and be vulnerable to political manoeuvring to split their unity on minority or state's rights issues. Together they would have nearly 24% of the people of the federation and be strong enough to resist unwanted federal encroachment on their local affairs. They would also have a real say in the affairs of the federation and provide a powerful voice in support of South Africa's constitution.

A further incentive for Coloureds to opt for a common state with Whites is that the less wealthy regions of the Cape will form a common state with Rand and the other White areas which are more than twice as wealthy, and thereby have access to a higher level of state spending for education, health and housing above any basic federal grant. This is likely to be very readily forthcoming since long term White security in a semiautonomous state demands that partnership with Coloureds should work.

Whites also have a further incentive to enter such a partnership since Black birthrates and migration are pushing the population composition of many areas where Whites can still dominate democratic government inexorably beyond White control. It makes very good sense to cultivate a firm alliance with the Coloured people which could withstand the political effects of such population changes for at least 100 years.

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Fig9 BORDER BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN CAPE

Fig 10 shows the division of the main nrban areas of Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage. and Fips A11 to A1G in the appendix show the application of the city sharing principle to three towns along the north south railway linkage to Colesberg.

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Fig 10 PORT ELIZABETH/UITENHAGE

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Fig 11 KIMBERLEY

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Fig 11 shows the division of the main urban area at Kimberley. and Fig 12 shows the proposed boundary between northern Cape and the Tswana dominated area of southwest Transvaal. Fig 13 shows a possible split of the western Cape into 4 administrative provinces based on economic planning regions.

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Fig 12 NORTHERN CAPE BORDER

The 1988 census of the western Cape. adjusted by HSRC corrections and a 1985 estimate of the people in their area by the Cape Town Transport Board, shows the following population.

Population % of Total		
Afrikaners	650,000	15.6
English	467,000	11.3
Coloureds	2,285,000	54.0
Indians	29,000	0.7
Xhosa	619,000	15.6
Other Blacks	80,000	1.9
	4,160,000	100.0

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Fig 13 FOUR WESTERN CAPE PROVINCES

The settlement and development of the Cape was in fact a joint White Coloured affair. For 300 years, the Whites and Coloureds of the Cape had a joint history and a joint destiny. It would reflect reasonable justice if the government of the successor state should be a joint White/Coloured government. i

If a joint state is to fulfil its function of providing a geographically unified state containing a majority of Whites. and thereby provide the necessary security for them to peaceably allow dominant political power at federal level to pass to Blacks. it is essential that the main White concentration in Rand be linked with the western Cape along the two main north south transport routes and include the major White settlements along and between those routes. A further 564,000 Whites live between these routes. the only remaining large concentration of Whites outside Durban.

Application of the twin city principle. where each group retains substantial political control of its own residential areas, allows the creation of a state in which Whites would be a bare majority of voters to be fairly carried out.

The major White concentrations in central Orange Free State are along the main north south railway line and highway in the towns of Bloemfontein, Virginia. Welkom. Odendaalsrus, Kroonstad. and Sasolburg. These towns are resources which all races must continue to share, yet a natural border can be easily drawn around the edge of White residential suburbs or closely settled White smallholdings which would allow most people of all races to live in a state under the political control of their own group. Between towns the border should largely follow the north south railway way from Vereeniging. to Colesburg

Fig 14 shows the division of the main urban areas at Bloemfontein. Figs A17 to A26 in the appendix show the application of the city sharing principle to 11 other towns. both large and small. from north to south along the railway.

The other major north south route connecting the western Cape with the PWV region runs to the west of the Vaal river. through White concentrations at Warrenton, Christiana. Bloemhof. Leeudoringstad. Makiwassie, Orkney. Klerksdorp. Stilfontein. Potchefstroom. and Carletonville. Here too the border within towns should closely follow the boundary of White residential suburbs or closely settled White smallholdings. and between towns should largely follow the north south railway way from Kimberley to Carletonville. Fig 15 shows the division of the main urban areas at Klerksdorp. Orkney and Stilfontein.

Figs A27 to A33 in the appendix further show the application of the city sharing principle to seven other towns, both large and small, from north to south along the railway.

By quirk of fate or prescient planning. nearly all the Black townships along the western border are to the west of the White towns and nearly all those on the eastern border are to the east. This makes it very easy to place borders without misallocating large numbers of people.

EASTERN
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Fig 14 BLOEMFONTEIN

Fig 15 KLERKSDORP/ORKNEY/STILFONTEIN

The total population of all of the twin citics on both sides of the eastern and western borders of this arca is 939.000. Of these people 462,000, including 165.000 Whites. 20.000 Coloureds. 500 Indians and 66,000 Blacks would fall within the new joint White/Coloured state. One hundred and seventy-seven

thousand. including 81,000 Tswana, would &ll within the Tswana dominated arca of southwest Transvaal and 300,000, including 151.000 Sotho. would fall within the Sotho dominated arca of castern Orange Free State. Only 19.000 members of minority groups in all of the twin citics. including less than 1000 Whites. would fall outside the borders of the joint White/Coloured state.

The total population of western Orange Free State. the White arcas of the Vaal Triangle south of Klip River. and the strip of western Transvaal between the Vaal river and the north south railway line from Carlctonville to Warrenton is only 1.496.000 or 4.3% of South Africa's population.

The districts involved would have an arca of approximately 64.200 km² which

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is only \$.3% of South Africa's arca. yc they arc cssential to a satisfactory

resolution of South Africa's conflicts Such a province of the joint White/Coloured state, drawing its population 60% from western Orange Free State and 40% from Transvaal towns along the Vaal, could be called Vaal Free State. Fig 16 shows the borders of Vaal Free State in relationship to surrounding states and provinces.

SOUTH WEST TRANSVAAL

EASTERN
FREE
STATE

EASTERN CAPE

Fig 16 VAAL FREE STATE

The 1985 population of Vaal Frec Statc was as follows.

Population % of total	
Afrikaners	465.000 311
English	99.000 6.6
Coloureds	58.000 39
Indians	4.000 03
Sotho	325.000 21.7
Xhosa	247.000 16.5
Tswana	138.000 10.5
Other Blacks	140.000 94
	1.496.000 100.0

Of the 870.000 total Blacks in Vaal Frce State. 272.000 are temporary migrants drawn from all over South Africa on short term mining contracts. The remaining 598.000 Blacks slightly outnumber the 564.000 Whites, but because they have a much younger age structure. only 309.000 are of voting age compared with 364.000 Whites. With 46% of the permanent population Whites would therefore number nearly 52% of the state's voters compared with less than 44% for Blacks.

Temporary migrants would vote in federal elections wherever they were currently living. and would also vote for the government of their home states. so it would not be unreasonable to exclude them from voting for the government of Vaal Free State until they had been resident there for three years.

Whites would be the largest group of electors and would be concentrated in city electorates. White supported parties could therefore win two thirds of the seats in a first past the post election for Vaal Free State's parliament on the White vote alone. Since a greater proportion of White electors than Black would actually vote. White supported parties would gain 55% of the total votes cast even in an election by proportional representation. In practice they would also be heavily supported by the 4.6% of Coloured and Indian voters.

Whites would thereforc be the major influence in the province's politics but because over one third of Whites would be likely to still support the CP. any government would have to be an NP led coalition which included Black parties.

Despite the rural character conveyed by the wide horizons of its open veld. nearly 60% of the population of Vaal Free State would live in or around its 10 largest cities which range from 19.000 to 142,000 people. These cities would average about 70% White residents, and excluding short term Black workers. about 82% White voters so would be under strong White control. The sparsely populated rural areas only average about 11% Whites except in the south where Whites are about 16% and Coloureds about 2% of the population.

Because continuous outwards migration of rural Blacks from Vaal Free State will exceed inwards Black migration to the province's industrial cities, the proportion of Whites in Vaal Free State will actually increase from 37.7% in 1985

to 413 5% in 2020, However because of an ageing non White population and a halving of the number of Black residents who are only temporary, the White proportion of those eligible to vote will drop from 51.6% to 49.8% and the Black proportion will rise to 45.0%.

Even with proportional representation a dominant White role in Vaal Free State's government seems likely to continue.

THE JOINT STATE

What to call a state composed of Rand. western Free State. Transvaal towns along the Vaal river, and western Cape? A neutral name drawn from the main geographical feature of its middle section. Orange River, seems appropriate.

Such a state as outlined in Fig 17 would basically consist of the western Cape and a panhandle extending to Pretoria.

Fig 17 ORANGE RIVER

The panhandle would be 500 km long from Kimberley to Pretoria. 12 km wide at its narrowest point at Randfontein, 95 km wide at Odendaalsrus. and 150 km wide from Kimberley to Bloemfontein.

Orange River would contain 8.24 million people or 23.9% of South Africa's population. 69.4% of all Whites. 8.4.9% of all Coloureds, 10.1% of all Indians. and 8. 8% of all Blacks. Its 1983 population would be as shown in Table 3.

Whites would be 41.7% of its 8.24 million people. Coloureds 29.5%. Indians 1.1 and Blacks 27.7% Whites would be the dominant group in Rand and Vaal Free State and Coloureds in the Cape.

Table 3
1985 POPULATION OF ORANGE RIVER (000s)

	Total	White	Coloured	Indian	Black
North Cape	357	84	205	1	67
N. W. Cape	398	78	30	-	18
S. W. Cape	2.807	739	1.484	565	
Central Cape	598	219	290	8	80
Rand	2.582	1.756	92	54	680
Vaal F. S.	1.496	564	58	4	870
	8.238	3.437	2.434	87	2.280

The same social and economic forces that have caused the White proportion of the South African population to shrink also automatically increase the proportion of the White population able to vote. The proportion of the various races aged 20 years or older in the 1985 census was

White 64.3%
Coloured 52.1%
Indian 55.4%
Black 51.7% .

Since one sixth of Blacks or 391.000 people would be temporary residents on short term labour contracts. and since the age structure of the White population provides more people of voting age. Whites would provide 49.2% of the voting population. Coloureds 28.1%. Indians 1.1% and Blacks 21.6%.

Since Whites would be the largest group of electors and would be mainly concentrated in city electorates. White supported parties could win 56% of the seats in a first past the post election for Orange River's parliament on the White vote alone. Since a greater proportion of White electors than Black would actually vote, White supported parties would gain more than 52% of the total votes cast even in an election by proportional representation. In practice those parties would also be heavily supported by the 29.2% of Coloured and Indian voters.

Since more than 20% of Whites would be likely to still support the right wing CP, even an NP strongly supported by Coloured voters would be hard pressed to gain more than a bare majority in the state's parliament. It would have no choice but to form a coalition with other moderate White, Coloured and Black parties to effectively govern the state. On all likely voting outcomes, the division of Coloureds between moderates and the radical left, and the division of Whites between moderates and the radical right makes a political marriage between parties supported by Coloured and White moderates almost inevitable.

Such a coalition is essential in any case if the western Cape is to be a willing partner in the state, but it is a coalition which could be relied upon to protect the state's continuing autonomy. A multi racial state government would also gain more willing acceptance in the councils of the federation as one which had clearly broken with an apartheid past.

Despite a declining population in most rural areas and very slow growth in some whole regions, Orange River's population will actually increase slightly faster than that of South Africa as a whole to 17.42 million by 2020, or 25.1% of South Africa's population.

In my view the part of South Africa encompassed by the Orange River provinces is the maximum in which Whites could reasonably expect to be the dominant partner in a governing coalition. Even this is only possible with a close working relationship with the Coloured people and within the confines of a federation of predominantly Black states who will share the state's resources and tax base. The establishment of such a state would free Whites from fear of Black domination yet no person of any race would be required to relocate nor would they lose any existing rights. :

While Whites are an absolute majority only in the suburbs of major cities, 35% of all rural Whites would live in Orange River.

No White homeland can ever be an exclusively White homeland. Whites must go on sharing their state with Coloureds as a major partner, and an increasing number of Blacks, just as they have done in the 300 years since they first came to Africa. Orange River would be a White homeland only in the sense that it would be their own place, albeit a shared one, where their customs, language and laws would remain dominant.

Whites will never take that final step of surrendering complete power unless they can clearly see where that step leads. The unwillingness of many CP voters to take even the first few steps of reform is precisely because they see a bottomless void ahead for their race. While a home state as outlined is much less than many of them could hope for, its deficiencies are at least quantifiable and it does represent a solid degree of permanent self government.

The boundaries of Orange River suggested in this outline are open to criticism, and the author makes no claim to detailed local knowledge of every one of the areas affected. However these boundaries provide a workable solution to South Africa's present power struggle on at least a dozen counts.

- (1) The 25.2% of non Blacks in South Africa would have democratic political control of an area in which 23.9% of the population presently lives.
- (2) Non Blacks form a natural majority of 72% within this area. and Whites nearly 42%. Amongst non Blacks Whites are a natural majority of nearly 58%.
- (3) Of all Whites in South Africa. 694 presently reside within these boundaries and this is likely to rise to over 80% by 2020. Apart from those at Durban and East London. the rest are widely distributed geographically and could not be included within a minority dominated state without diluting White/Coloured political control.
- (4) Because of their much older age structure. Whites are presently 49% of all voters in the state. and with Coloureds and Indians would be 78%. White supported parties could expect to be dominant in any coalition government of their state which would ensure them a continuing strong voice in the affairs of the federation as a whole.
- (5) These boundaries contain nearly all areas to which Whites and Coloureds jointly can claim any kind of historical priority over Blacks.
- (6) The territory is continuous. with port access and natural transport links to its various parts and can be defended if necessary.
- (7) The territory is economically strong. with 55% of South Africa's GGP. yet disrupts no present economic linkages between regions.
- (8) All ethnic groups have continuing unlimited economic access to South Africa's major assets. the goldfields of the Witwatersrand and the industrial areas of all major cities.
- (9) An agreed federal tax structure can ensure a continuing redistribution of wealth from rich states to poorer ones.
- (10) No present residents. White or non White. need change their place of residence to create states with a very large degree of homogeneity.
- (11) An economically and militarily powerful White/Coloured state with 23.9% of South Africa's population can make a major contribution to maintaining stability and real democracy throughout the federation. Confidence that the agreed constitution will be observed is critical if Whites are to allow the dominant political power at federal level to pass peacefully to Blacks.
- (12) South Africa would remain an economic and political whole and Blacks would have majority control of the affairs of the federation, yet political

domination would be impossible because of the restricted areas over which the federal legislature would have power to legislate and the maximum tax it could impose.

HISTORICAL CLAIMS TO LAND

An acceptance of a division of South Africa into federal states, largely along present ethnic boundaries, necessarily implies an acceptance of where people now reside and a rejection of all claims to boundaries based on who got where first, or who was dispossessed. People with claims of unjust dispossession can individually or collectively seek redress or compensation through the courts. Any move to take these claims into account while drawing boundaries, ignoring the present distribution of ethnic groups, would only inflict fresh injustice on families who are not responsible for the old injustices.

Ncvertheless many people will be interested in the extent to which present
cthnic boundarics coincide or fail to coincide with old historical claims to certain
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Fig 22 CHANGING ETHNIC DOMINANCE 1911 - 1985

Peoples have always migrated so at what date do we decide to freeze claims and see who was where? Such a freezing must be arbitrary so the alternative is to look at historical clashes over land between the present population groups, and the patterns of migration in this century.

The area between the Gamtoos river east of Humansdorp and the Bushman's river south of Grahamstown was an area of conflict between rival Afrikaner and Xhosa pastoral groups from their first contact. Port Elizabeth in the middle of this area is still the meeting place of the historical partners to this conflict - the population is predominantly Coloured and Afrikaner to the west and Xhosa to the east.

The boundary between Orange River and Eastern Cape previously shown in Fig 9 represents a reasonable compromise between the conflicting claims of Afrikaner settler and Xhosa herdsman in the fluid frontier conditions of the late eighteenth century, as well as a fair compromise today.

Since the 1911 census Blacks have become predominant in districts where they were previously a minority because Whites and Coloureds left rural areas for employment in the cities and were replaced by migrating Black labourers. Between 1960 and 1970 over half of all magisterial districts recorded absolute decreases in White population as did more than half of all towns.

In 1946 653.000 Whites lived in rural areas but only 494.000 did so in 1970. Fig 22, showing 1911 magisterial districts in which non Blacks were a majority but in which Blacks predominate today, indicates how widespread this movement has been.

In recent history the western Cape could lay claim to 9 magisterial districts to the west of its suggested boundary which were at one time preponderantly non Black, but to claim even the seven which are contiguous with its border today would include 110,000 Blacks for 18.000 Whites and 28.000 Coloureds.

Orange River is in any case claiming 13 complete and 5 part magisterial districts in Vaal Free State in all of which Black permanent residents are an undoubted majority today, and of which only 6 were non Black in recent history. These 18 districts and part districts have a permanent population of 374.000 Blacks and only 56.000 Whites and 16.000 Coloureds so Orange River is doing rather well if considered on a historical basis.

ARE BOUNDARIES FAIR?

When any border is drawn through a mixed population many individuals will

-find themselves on the wrong side of it. One test of its fairness is whether roughly

equal numbers of each group are excluded from their national state.

In 1985, South Africa had 8.69 million people belonging to minority groups, and 25.81 million belonging to Black groups. The proposed borders of Orange

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River include 2.28 million Blacks within a predominantly White/Coloured state. or 8 8% of all Blacks. but 2.73 million members of minority groups are excluded. (1.52 million Whites. 0.43 million Coloureds. 0.78 million Indians.) As between Blacks and minorities. the border is more than fair to Blacks.

Only 87.000 Indians are included in Orange River because most of them are located in Natal. but between Blacks on the one hand and Whites and Coloureds on the other. the ratio is 2.28 million Blacks within Orange River of whom 0.39 million are temporary migrants, to 1.95 million Whites and Coloureds within predominantly Black states. so the border is still extremely fair and reasonable on a total population basis.

There are unlikely to be serious disputes about the boundaries between the various dominantly Black states. between Black states and Rand. or between eastern and western Cape, since these can be set objectively on the relative numbers of the competing groups and confirmed by a referendum in disputed districts.

The major areas of dispute are likely to be the eastern and western boundaries of Vaal Free State, since these boundaries have been drawn principally within the constraints of a just and acceptable overall settlement of conflicting demands for Black and White autonomy.

While fair and reasonable when viewed as part of the overall settlement between Blacks and minorities. they are not on the face of it equally fair and reasonable on a purely local basis. since even excluding temporary migrants, 18 of the 35 whole or part magisterial districts included in what will be a White dominated area. demonstrably have a Black majority of permanent residents. These mainly rural districts contain 31.1% of Vaal Free State's 1,496,000 people.

However when it comes to allocating these 18 districts to any of the surrounding states. the issue is far from clear cut. Only the three largest Black groups. who make up 83.9% of all Blacks in the state. the Tswana. Xhosa and Sotho. have a state adjacent to Vaal Free State. Tswana alone are an absolute majority in only two districts. Sotho in one. and Xhosa in none.

Amongst Blacks in the rural areas of Vaal Free State, Tswana are the largest single group in the southwest. Xhosa in the south, and Sotho in the north and east. Since the overall settlement between Blacks and minorities is fair, it only remains to consider whether any of these three major Black groups has received clearly unfair treatment.

A suitable test would be whether the largest group of permanent residents in any district. which also exceeded 30% of the district's population, had been unreasonably excluded from a neighbouring state in which their group was dominant. Since Vaal Free State is intended to be part of a joint White/Coloured state it is consistent to count White and Coloured groups together.

Fig 23 shows areas of Vaal Free State in which Tswana, Sotho, Whites and Whites/Coloureds. are the largest group over 30%.

White/Coloured Areas

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Whites predominate in the no
districts of Vanderbijlpark and S
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Fig 23 LARGEST GROUP OVER 30% -

W = White So = Sotho

W/C = White/Coloured Ts = Tswana

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Excluding 127.000 migrant mineworkers in three western goldfields districts, 441.000 people live in the 6 northern part districts of Vaal Free State where Whites, Coloureds and Indians make up 73.2% or 323,000 of the permanent population and have by far the strongest claim to all of this northern area. Whites alone make up 70 774 of the permanent population

It is reasonable to exclude the short term migrants of the goldfields from any weighting in deciding to which state to allocate each district since by definition their home is elsewhere and temporary residents will have no voice in political decisions affecting the state

In addition, even including migrant workers, no single Black ethnic group makes up more than 18.2% of the people of the three goldfields part districts. The Tswana, the dominant group in adjacent South West Transvaal, make up only 14.6%.

The 10 magisterial districts and part districts in the south of Vaal Free State have a total population of 228,000 of whom Whites and Coloureds make up 145,000. Coloureds alone are the largest single group in five districts. Whites in one, Xhosa in two, and Tswana and Sotho in one each. However Whites and Coloureds together either equal or greatly exceed any other single ethnic group in all but one district where no group exceeds 30% of the population.

The single part district of Bloemfontein, which is 62% White and 1% Coloured, dominates the area with nearly three times the population of the other nine districts together. Within the other nine districts and part districts Coloureds are the largest single group at 25.2%, and with Whites make up 41.2% of the population, well ahead of the Xhosa at 22.7% and the Sotho, who are the largest realistic Black contender for the area, at 17.2%.

Whites and Coloureds with 63.6% of the total population have by far the strongest claim to all of this southern area.

Tswana Area

Excluding temporary migrants, 126,000 of South Africa's 2.7 million Tswana live in Vaal Free State where they are 10.3% of the permanent population. Only 41,000 live in three rural magisterial districts and part districts of the south west which could be considered traditional Tswana territory and in which they are still the largest single group over 30%. A further 4000 live in three part districts, heavily dominated by Whites and Coloureds, which would also have to be transferred to include the first three districts in a Tswana dominated state.

To include all 55,000 Tswana within South West Transvaal as in Fig 24 would reduce the distance across Vaal Free State at Bloemfontein by two thirds, cut one of the two major road and rail links between Rand and the western Cape, and vastly reduce the acceptability of the state of Orange River as a viable solution for White autonomy. It would also transfer over 23,000 Whites and Coloureds from the state.

Fig 24 TSWANA AREA OF VAAL FREE STATE

The difference between the Tswana and White/Coloured populations of 22.000
Tswana - 0.8% of all Tswana, and 1.8% of the permanent population of Vaal Free
State - is a very small, but quite definite, Tswana contribution to an overall
settlement affecting 34.5 million people.

Tswana are nearly 43.0% of the people of the six districts under consideration compared with just over 32.0% for Whites and Coloureds. Under the normal criteria for allocating districts to one state or another, they would be allocated to South West Transvaal. However the territory is very sparsely inhabited and takes a disproportionately large bite out of what could otherwise be an acceptable settlement for all of South Africa. In terms of the very small numbers of people involved and the larger good, the boundary between Vaal Free State and South West Transvaal is not unreasonable.

It could be argued that Blacks of all ethnic groups are 81,000 or 77.5% of the permanent population of 104,000 in the area under consideration. In a referendum, enough of them in some districts might choose to join the Tswana dominated area of South West Transvaal to out vote those of all races favouring the district's inclusion in Vaal Free State.

Such a local result must be ruled unacceptable before the possibility is even tested since the area allocated to Blacks of all ethnic groups is already very fair. To allocate further areas of Vaal Free State to South West Transvaal on such a basis would destroy a realistic overall settlement between all of the races of South Africa which is both fair and reasonable.

Sotho Area

Excluding temporary migrants, 236,000 of South Africa's 2.33 million Sotho live in Vaal Free State, where they are 19.3% of the permanent population. Only 121,000 of them live in the nine whole or part magisterial districts of the north and west which are traditional Sotho territory and in which they are still the largest group of permanent residents over 30%.

Only the small part district of Koppies has an actual Sotho majority but they number from 31% to 47% in the other eight districts and average 42.3% of the 286,000 permanent residents in all nine districts. A further 33,000 live as a 20.1% minority of the 165,000 permanent residents in the four dominantly White part districts of Welkom, Virginia, Odendaalsrus and Kroonstad which contain 102,000 Whites and Coloureds. These four districts would be isolated by any transfer of territory to the Sotho dominated area of Eastern Free State, so both areas have to be considered as a whole.

To include the 154,000 Sotho in all thirteen districts within Eastern Free State, as shown in Fig 25, would nearly cut Vaal Free State in two and totally destroy the acceptability of the state of Orange River as a viable solution for White autonomy. It would also transfer over 135,000 Whites and Coloureds from the state.

The difference between the Sotho and White/Coloured populations of 19,000 - 0.8% of all Sothos and 1.6% of the permanent population of Vaal Free State - is a small but definite Sotho contribution to an overall settlement affecting 34.5 million people.

While the White/Coloured claim to this central part of Vaal Frce State is marginally weaker than that of the Sotho. the Sotho {hemselfes are only 34.1% of the permancnt popnlation of the 13 districts under consideration compared with Iso far from compelling.

30 0% for Whites and Colourcds. so their claim isa

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Fig25 SOTH0 AREA OF VAAL FREE STATE

It could be argued that Blacks of all ethnic groups are 70.0% of the 451.000 permanent population of the area under consideration. In a referendum, enough of them in some districts might choose to join the Sotho dominated area of Eastern Free State to outvote those of all races favouring the district's inclusion in Vaal Free State. Here too, such a local result must be considered unacceptable since the area allocated to Blacks of all ethnic groups is already very fair. To allocate further areas of Vaal Free State to Eastern Free State on such a basis would destroy a realistic overall settlement between all of the races of South Africa which is both fair and reasonable.

Xhosa Area

Excluding temporary migrants, [51.000 of South Africa's 6.15 million Xhosa also live in Vaal Free State, where they are 12.4% of the population but they are mostly recent migrants or their descendants, living far from traditional Xhosa territory.

Only in the district of Philippolis in the far south - the only area that is close to another Xhosa dominated state - are Xhosas the largest single ethnic group over 30% of the district's population. They are marginally ahead of Coloureds but are well outnumbered by Coloureds and Whites together at 48%. Xhosas as a group have therefore been fairly treated by Vaal Free State's boundaries.

A REASONABLE POLITICAL DECISION

Excluding migrant mineworkers, approximately 154.000 Sotho and 45.000 Tswana in the middle section of Vaal Free State have been included in the province so its 158.000 Whites and Coloureds can be linked with the 323.000 Whites, Coloureds and Indians in the north of the province and the 145.000 in the south. A majority of #1.000 more Tswana and Sotho than Whites and Coloureds in this middle section of Vaal Free State would marginally indicate that it should be allocated differently.

The decision to include all of this middle section is a small but necessary price to create an acceptable White/Coloured state of Orange River. Orange River must offer the continuing possibility of a high degree of autonomy to the 3.44 million Whites who will fall within its borders. This requires solid territorial linkages between its main population centres.

To allocate the middle 37% of Vaal Free State to Eastern Free State and South West Transvaal would be to cut Orange River in two. A dominantly White state of Rand and the remaining 6 dominantly White districts in the north, and a dominantly Coloured state of western Cape and the remaining 10 White/Coloured districts in the south, would be extremely unlikely to be an acceptable solution for

continuing White autonomy and therefore could not contribute towards a political settlement

As shown in Fig 26. this would leave Whites with predominant control of less than 1% of the territory of South Africa, as a tiny atoll shaped urban island surrounded by Black states. It would contain 2.07 million Whites. only 41.7% of those in South Africa. and be far more manifestly an unfair result than the allocation of all of Vaal Free State to Orange River

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Fig 26 RESIDUAL STATES OF ORANGE RIVER

Quite apart from the loss of central Vaal Free State with its 691.000 people and vital transport links. a White dominated city state of 3.16 million people of all races in the north. and a vast. mainly semidesert. Coloured dominated state of 4.39 million in the south, could never hope to have the same political influence or power to resist authoritarian action by the central government as a single unified state with nearly one quarter of South Africa's people.

There is a difference of only 40.000 people between the two different solutions for the middle section of Vaal Free State. an area which excluding temporary

migrants has a permanent population of 336,000 people. The number of Tswana involved is small and Sotho claims to the Qotho area as a whole are only marginally stronger than those of Whites and Coloureds. It is therefore not unreasonable to make a political decision to allocate this middle section of Vaal Free State to Orange River so that 2.22 million Whites, Coloureds and Indians in the north can be joined to 3 million in the south, and include 138,000 in between.

While 71.5% of the permanent residents of the middle section of Vaal Free State, or 398,000 people, belong to Black ethnic groups and a referendum could possibly show a majority in favour of parts of the area being included in the Sotho or Tswana state, the area allocated to Blacks of all ethnic groups throughout South Africa is already very fair. The proposed eastern and western borders of Vaal Free State have therefore to be regarded as non negotiable, except for minor local adjustments, so that an overall settlement fair to all population groups can be put in place.

Under our test of whether the largest group of permanent residents in any district, which also exceeded 30% of the district's population, had been unreasonably excluded from a neighbouring state in which their group was dominant, the conclusion has to be that small groups of both Tswana and Sotho have been excluded but the exclusion is reasonable.

With continuous mechanization of agriculture and better opportunities elsewhere, the rural areas of this middle section of Vaal Free State will suffer a continuous outwards migration of rural Blacks to Klip River, Cape Town, and the twin cities in South West Transvaal and Eastern Free State. Its major towns will also grow less quickly than other major urban areas in South Africa. By 2020 the 11,000 majority in favour of the area being included in the Tswana and Sotho states will have moved to parity or a small White and Coloured majority favouring its inclusion in Vaal Free State.

The final acceptability of such borders to Blacks rests firmly on the fairness of the overall South African settlement. While the proposed boundaries of the White/Coloured state could receive minor adjustment here and there in response

to detailed local knowledge, I believe that the boundaries as proposed substantially enclose all of South Africa over which Blacks could reasonably be expected to abandon claims to full political control.

POPULATION CHALLENGES

\While a semi autonomous state of Orange River as outlined appears to fulfil reasonable White demands for a large degree of autonomy, and offers a considerable guarantee that any negotiated federal constitution will be observed, future population changes within South Africa have the potential to undermine both the autonomy of Orange River and the very desire of a democratically elected government of Orange River to protect the constitution.

Projecting what the populations of the various states might be in the year 2020 involves many assumptions about overall population growth, differing reproductive rates in different areas, and the speed with which industrialization will divert to areas other than the PWV. All of these assumptions are subject to upset by political actions of the federal and state governments of the day.

The projections used are based on HSRC projected growth rates of the various population groups from 1985 to 2020, but using a slightly higher base rate than the 1983 adjusted statistics. Urban populations are based on projections from 1986 to 2020 by Davics, Bristow, Small and Associates.â\204ç

It is fairly apparent that if the whole population of South Africa, including the presently independent homelands, is to nearly double by natural increase between 1985 and 2020, then the highly desirable urban areas of Orange River, whose present populations will not double by natural increase, are going to be under a great deal of pressure from Black migrants. The total Black population of South Africa will increase by 29.0 million by 2020 from a base of 25.8 million in 1985, so the Black populations of these areas must inevitably increase.

Similarly the rural areas of the homelands, which are already overpopulated and simply can not absorb more people, must release a flood of migrants to those areas better able to provide jobs and homes. Since these rural areas with one third of South Africa's people cannot increase at all, it follows that industrial areas, and any adjacent homeland cities, must increase three or four times. In these circumstances, the major urban areas of Orange River cannot escape more than doubling their population. About 53% of the population of South Africa was urbanized in 1983 but as early as the year 2000 this will be 65%, and by 2010 is expected to be 69%.

Without migration, natural growth would increase the 14.13 million population of all of the homelands in 1985 to 29 million by 2020, far beyond their capacity to support reasonable living standards. At least 12.0 million of these people will have to be relocated to industrialized urban areas outside the homelands, and 5.0 million to urban homeland's areas, mostly adjacent to such industrialized areas.

By the year 2020 the populations of most of the homelands will certainly be higher than they are now but an increasing proportion of these people will only technically be homeland dwellers since they will live in modern cities adjacent to federal industrial districts. However the rural population of the homelands is

unlikely to drop much with a birth rate capable of doubling the population in 20 years

By 2020 it is likely that rural populations outside the homelands will be only a little lower than they are now. Decreases due to mechanization and amalgamation of farms will continue in the drier areas, including nearly all of Orange River, Eastern Cape, and South West Transvaal, and there will also be decreases in the dry rural homelands of Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, and Kwandebele. More intensive land use will offset this tendency in the commercial farming areas of other states, and the rural population could even increase in the wetter hill country of Natal, which is unsuitable to large machinery, due to an increase in Black tenant farming and a policy of providing land for Black small holders.

In 1985, 83% of the non independent homelands' populations were migrant labourers under contract, and a further 8375 committed daily across the border to employment in "White" South Africa. Short term contract workers from the homelands will not stop coming to industrialized areas, with the assumption of power by Blacks in most states, since many families will still choose the familiarity and security of low cost living in the homelands while their breadwinners work in urban areas. The major difference will be that many fewer migrant workers will reside in single sex compounds than at present, and more will choose the greater freedom and stimulation of residence in the Black townships.

A further development that will reduce the number of migrant workers actually living in Rand and Vaal Free State is the increasing trend to use permanent workers in all skilled mining jobs. An assumption is that only half the migrant workers presently in Orange River will be there in 2020.

Trends that become apparent upon studying where all these people will live are

(1) Most new jobs in the future South Africa, as elsewhere in the world, will be created in or near existing cities. From 1960, the government provided incentives to encourage industry to locate in or near the homelands, but only in areas where economic factors were already fundamentally attractive without incentives was decentralization at all successful. The existence of industrial areas encourages further firms to locate there because of existing pools of skilled labour, the ready availability of services which lower delivery and repair times, and the existence of a wide range of social services.

(2) There will be a very large increase in the populations of many homeland towns adjacent to major industrial areas.

(3) Population growth will transfer from some inconveniently sited Black dormitory townships to the suburbs of the industrial towns to which their workers presently commute, resulting in a seven to ten fold increase in some local areas.

(4) There will be a four fold increase in the industrial population of the Tugela Basin in Natal.

(3) If the Davies estimate's figure of 143 million for Black towns of the PAWV in 2020 is correct, it seems highly likely that an unbroken string of industrial areas and residential suburbs will stretch for 170 km from Matopane in Bophuthatswana, through Pretoria, Johannesburg and Klip River to Sasolburg and Coalbrook. Existing industrial centres within Orange River will continue to expand where possible, but many will be constrained by a shortage of land. The bulk of future industrialization must centre in Black states no matter what economic or political policies are adopted.

(6) Since most present township Blacks are relatively poor, and nearly all the new migrants will also be poor, most housing growth will occur around existing Black townships where land is available and cheap, rather than in the high priced White suburbs where most land is already fully occupied. Most Black townships are within normal suburban commuting distances of industrial and commercial areas, and most Black workers will reside in precisely the same locations no matter who has political control.

(7) Economic forces will maintain a large degree of de facto segregation, but it will by no means be absolute. An increasing number of non Whites will have both the wealth and the desire to live in "White" areas, and will increasingly do so wherever social barriers are sufficiently relaxed.

INTERNAL WHITE MIGRATION

200\234 Whites will leave Black states for Orange River for many reasons other than an unwillingness to live under a Black government. In a majority of the Black states, most of the expected natural increase in the White population of 48.2% between 1985 and 2170 will be lost by the present drift to the major White urban areas.

Up to half of the more conservative Whites will make a deliberate choice to leave during this period for political or social reasons, but for the majority of Whites, their farms, businesses, homes, lack of good alternatives of just dogged attachment to their birthplace, will force them to come to some working arrangement with the new order.

Opportunities for Whites to gain employment in administrative jobs within state and local government are likely to contract considerably as Blacks gain preferment. The search for better jobs in the private sector will also intensify as better education increases the ability of Blacks to compete. Some Whites will leave because they are unable to adapt to new ways of doing things, some because they have a bad experience of the new system.

If there is a continuing net outflow of much more than 1% per year, present White populations in the Black states will decrease. In fact they will probably decrease in all Black states except Klip River and Natal where economic growth is likely to be strong. 3

Most Whites holding foreign passports. who could easily emigrate abroad. live within the boundaries of Orange River where the incentive to leave would not be high. Orange River therefore provides Black leaders with their greatest assurance of maintaining South Africa's managerial and technical skill base after Blacks achieve majority control at federal level.

{ estimate that the total White population of Black states in 2020 will be about 3% higher than the 1985 total. but this overall figure hides a decreasing proportion in predominantly rural states and an increasing proportion in expanding industrial areas such as Natal.

Including their descendants, 688000 South African Whites will migrate to Orange River. two thirds of them Afrikaners. Over one sixth of them will go to the western Cape. nearly one fifth to Natal Free State. and nearly two thirds to Rand.

South West and North Central Transvaal are likely to suffer the greatest loss of their existing White population. both because of the right wing views of much of their White population and because of the lack of growth in job opportunities apart from those in Rustenburg. Pietersburg and the Black town cities adjacent to Rand and Natal Free State.

COLOURED MIGRATION

Job vacancies in predominantly Coloured areas of Orange River will run at 1.5 jobs per Coloured school leaver so there is little incentive for them to leave the state. The overall increase in employment opportunities in areas of Black states having significant Coloured populations is also likely to exceed the overall level in Orange River.

Nevertheless some drift of Coloureds into Orange River can be expected in search of higher wages and better facilities. and because of cultural affinity and negative experiences of Black rule. In particular. competition for jobs in lower growth areas such as Eastern Cape. Eastern Free State. and South West Transvaal will see many Coloureds migrating to Port Elizabeth. Cape Town. Natal Free State and Rand.

Most Coloured migration will originate and remain within Orange River. with 158.000 people and their descendants migrating mainly to Cape Town from the outlying parts of the western Cape. However 91.000 Coloureds from Black national states will relocate to Orange River. mostly to Rand. Capetown and Port Elizabeth. and nearly 60.000 to the cheap housing and job opportunities of Klip River. and to a very much lesser extent. of Durban.

INDIAN MIGRATION

While Natal as the mother province of South Africaâ\200\231s Indians. and having the largest sinele concentration. will continue to excrcise a strong hold on their lovaltics. about 107 can be expected to relocate to Orange River in scarch of better living conditions. The ontflow of Indians is likely to be even larger from Black states with low economic growth. While the Indian population of all Black national states is likely to increase. only Eastern Free State. in w hich Indians have only recently gained the right to scuttle. is likely to sez a noticeable increase.

Orange River will receive 127.000 Indian migrants and their descendants by 2020, and its Indian population in 2020 will he nearly double that cpected by the natural increase of the present population Nearly two thirds of them will live in Rand province as they do now, but all parts of Orange River will record increascs.

BLACK MIGRATION

Economic factors will play the main role in both Black migration from the homelands to urban arcas of their statc and in migration between states. but they will be by no means the only influence. In arcas where economic growth is inadequate for a growing population. the migration of Black minorities to job opportunities in states dominated by their own ethnic group is likely to be greater than that from majority groups. for whom it would bc a move into a foreign dominated environment. Thus Black areas with low growth are likely to become slightly more homogenons. .

Amongst areas of high employment growth. migrants will show a preference for areas dominated by their own ethnic group. or if no such arca exists. for areas in which large numbers of their own group already live.

A total of 13.64 million Blacks and their descendants will migrate away from their homeland. state or province. Migration that stays within those areas has been ignored.

The three largest sources of Black migrants will be KwaZulu with 2.60 million. Transkei with 2.23 million. and Lebowa with 2.22 million. South Africa will also attract 1.0 million Black foreign migrants mainly from Lesotho. Botswana and Swaziland who will be casily absorted into their own language group within South Africa.

The six largest destinations will be Klip River. which will attract 5.53 million migrants and their descendants. the Durban/Natal region with 3.66 million. Rand with 1.17 million. Cape Town with 973.000. the PWV area of North Central Transvaal with 902,000 and Central Transvaal with 707.000.

Zulu and Xhosa migrants will number about 3.3 millien cach. but whercas 72% of Zulu migration will be contained within Natal. nearly one million Xhosa will

migrate to each of Cape Town and Klip River. changing the ethnic character of both.

Pedi migrants will number 2.22 million and along with the other peoples of northern Transvaal. the North Ndebele. Shangaan and Venda. will contribute proportionately more of their people to future Black migration to the PWV area than other groups

The high number of Shangaan on the move. 1.13 million. is a surprise until it is realized that 60% of Shangaan presently live outside their state and homeland area in Lebowa. KwaZulu. North Central Transvaal, and in mining areas in Eastern Transvaal, Natal Free State. and South West Transvaal. More Shangaan migrants will source from other parts of South Africa than from Gazankulu itself.

Sotho are another group where 63.5% presently live outside their state. but at 900,000 they will provide the second lowest proportion of their people as immigrants because previous migration has established so many of them in growth areas already

The Tswana will contribute the lowest proportion of their people as migrants at 982,000. since so many of them will be able to relocate to industrial growth areas without leaving their state.

FOREIGN IMMIGRATION

The only way a racial group will be able to lay claim to a territory with any permanence in the new South Africa is by effectively occupying it with residential suburbs. or by economically healthy smallholdings which produce a majority in numbers on the ground. It follows that for Whites and Coloureds to retain control of their state with certainty. in a South Africa whose population will double between 1985 and 2020, their own populations would also have to double.

This will not happen without foreign immigration since projected rates of natural increase from 1985 to 2020 are 48% for Whites, 71% for Coloureds. and 60% for Indians.)

Despite Orange River receiving 688,000 Whites. 91,000 Coloureds and 127,000 Indians by 2020, mainly from rural or slow growth areas of Black states. its 5.96 million minority population will increase by only 72% to 10.29 million.

Despite a 50% reduction in single hostel residents in Orange River to 2020, and dwindling live in Black domestic help. Blacks will increase 174% from 2.28 million to 6.26 million.

The long term future of the South African federation will be decided by demography as much as by politics. The different regions of South Africa will ultimately be governed by those population groups that have the numbers on the ground. and all political manoeuvrings to prevent this are mere delaying actions. For some time into the future Black numbers will increase much more rapidly than those of other population groups and Blacks will migrate into Orange River in considerable numbers. Not only would their freedom of movement be guaranteed

by the constitution, but attempts to limit such migration by discriminatory measures would provoke widespread outrage in a population sensitized by 40 years of blatant apartheid.

One extra child for every White woman would do more to ensure continuing White supremacy than all their politicking, but if Whites fail to maintain their proportion of the population by natural increase, then they have no other acceptable choice but to attempt to provide it by migration.

Orange River must have the right under the constitution to sponsor and admit migrants that are acceptable to it as permanent residents of South Africa. It would be reasonable therefore that Orange River would also remain totally liable for all welfare payments incurred on such migrants' behalf by any state in the federation.

Since 1968 Quebec has had its own minister of immigration. In 1978 it became the only Canadian province to win control over its own immigrant admissions in the "independent" skills based category, subject only to the federal government's final approval. Quebec now maintains immigration offices around the world. A proposed 1983 Canadian constitutional amendment expanded the rights of all Canadian provinces even further and expressly acknowledged Quebec as a distinct society within the Canadian confederation.

The surest recipe for racial tolerance and cooperation is if every group feels secure, with no imminent threat to their economic livelihood, language, culture, or political autonomy. This means Blacks must make some effort to preserve the status quo, at the time of setting up the federation, by assenting to a reasonable flow of White immigrants to South Africa, most of whom will settle in the present urban industrial areas of Orange River.

The net numbers of such migrants could be negotiated, but even if no limit was set the numbers are not likely to be large. People with skills are in demand around the world, and birthrates in the countries that provide them are mostly insufficient to maintain their populations.

Unskilled Europeans would have little incentive to migrate to South Africa where they would have to compete for low paying jobs against a huge pool of unemployed migrants from South Africa's homelands. They would be unwanted in any case since Orange River will inherit a new occurrence of its own "poor White" problem, as unskilled Whites from Black states move in looking for welfare or for preference in employment.

On the other hand, given stable conditions in South Africa, a reasonable flow of skilled migrants is likely to continue well into next century, in search of space, clean air, and a less stressful way of life. Even in the unsettled conditions of the late eighties, White migration to South Africa showed a small net gain, with 38% of economically active arrivals having professional and administrative occupations compared with 41% of those who left.

Of new White migrants, 10% would probably be over 40, and 30% would probably be children. Given this kind of distribution, natural increase amongst the total immigrant group would probably not increase their numbers by more than 50% in the first 30 years. Thus a net gain of 20,000 White immigrants per year

would probably increase the White population by 870,000 after deaths in 30 years. This number is not enough to stop the White preportion of South Africa's population falling. from 14 36% in 1983 to 11.84% in 2020, but the White proportion would be only 19 12% without it. i

More important. 21 of the additional White population is likely to reside in Orange River where they will make up 137 of the state's Whites by 2020. Without them. Whites in Orange River would fall from 38 157 of its population in 2020 to 34 00 and their percentage of voters in 2020 from 41.95% to 38.58%.

While the additional numbers are not great. their absence could mean at least a 50% drop in support for parties supported by minorities in the Orange River parliament. Such a drastic erosion of power and influence could contribute to a general White lack of confidence due to a feeling that everything was steadily slipping away

At a net additional 10 000 per year, migrants and their descendants would be only 1.25% of Orange River's people in 2020 and 1.25% of those of South Africa. but they would be a comparatively skilled and optimistic element of the population. not attached to any of the conflicts of the past. Rand would be by far the most popular destination for such migrants taking around 70%. and Cape Town 20%.

Afrikaners have been of two minds about White migration in the past. since it tended to dilute Afrikaner dominance of the White population and therefore Afrikaner control of South Africa. The new issue will be to choose between growing non Afrikaner and White influence. or growing Black influence.

In any case within the proposed state of Orange River, Afrikaners will be 58.5% of the White population compared with 56.5% of the 1985 White population of all South Africa. so the inflow of any likely number of White migrants will have minimal effect on Afrikaner dominance of White politics for at least two generations -

While White migration from outside South Africa will change the composition of the White population. and modify its racial attitudes and international outlook. it is extremely unlikely to change the basic politics of preserving White autonomy.

To maintain Whites at their present proportion of the population. in the face of their low birthrate. would take 67,090 White migrants per year. Such a flow of skilled immigrants is extremely unlikely. but at least until 2020 Orange River would be likely to maximize their flow. and the whole of Southern Africa would reap the benefit in enhanced economic growth.

Continual rapid tilting of the present racial balance against Whites within Orange River. because of Black immigration to its cities and their much higher birthrates. would tend to create racial discord as Whites saw their last bastion of self rule disappearing. Discord within Orange River would have considerable potential to cause political instability in the whole of South Africa.

The White rate of natural increase at 1.125% per annum is 1.0% below the Black rate of 2.125% so a White negotiating position could be to bring in up to 1% of the White population as immigrants each year. Once a right for Orange River to

recruit immigrants was embedded in South Africa's constitution. such immigration could continue regardless of possible demonstrations against it in other states.

If South Africa is to successfully raise non White standards of living, it desperately needs the political and economic stability which a tolerant White immigration policy would encourage. This would enable it to retain its present skilled people who are mostly White. to recruit others from abroad. and to encourage massive capital investment from Europe. America and Japan. South Africa would gain access to the particular foreign skills. technological advances and investment resources which come with migration

To create adequate employment for Blacks. South Africa MUST have a considerable annual net gain in professional. managerial and technical staff from abroad. to supply the general shortage created by decades of inadequate education for non Whites. While the present accelerated education and on the job training of Blacks will improve the situation. the supply of skilled South Africans, to what all parties hope will be a rapidly expanding economy. will remain inadequate for at least two decades.

This shortage is accentuated by the present low percentage of Black graduates who have studied management. science and technical subjects. For this reason a policy of encouraging skilled White and oriental immigrants, the majority of whom would settle within Orange River, would actually assist Blacks to achieve their own economic and political goals.

In the face of massive Black unemployment, many Blacks will strongly oppose White immigration which will fill skilled jobs they see as theirs. Opposition will be particularly strong from the half trained and half educated. who might otherwise gain some of these jobs by default.

This is a false argument from the viewpoint of self interest for the majority of Blacks. It is the very shortage of truly skilled people which keeps productivity low. prevents the economy from expanding, and restricts employment opportunities for the unskilled. Truly suitable people of any race will be quickly snapped up.

South Africa's productivity rate on major construction projects is only 40% of that in developed countries. mainly because of a critical shortage of skilled and semiskilled workers, and consequent exorbitant union demands on wages and working conditions. Until South Africa can train sufficient skilled workers itself. immigrants from overseas are essential to improve efficiency and get the economy moving. to supply jobs to the great mass of unskilled workers.

In 1989 South Africa launched a campaign to attract skilled immigrants from eastern Europe to fill shortages of skilled manpower in nearly every sector. Thousands of people. particularly Hungarians. applied to emigrate. In a reaction which may well typify the future attitudes of many Blacks. the UDF angrily called it a move to buttress White rule and said the government should give priority to upgrading Black skills to fill these jobs.

While all states. with the aid of federal grants. must make maximum effort to educate and train their own people in the technical and managerial skills the

economy requires, the hard facts are that a chronic deficiency in such skills will limit economic growth and employment for at least two decades.

Nearly one million White South Africans either possess or can gain access (0 foreign passports. Whether they go or stay will depend greatly on political attitudes towards them, which will be reflected in immigration policy.

If they believe it themselves. Black politicians can convince their constituents that a flow of skilled White immigrants is essential to economic growth. It is either growth now, or growth in ten years' time when education and training begin to catch up on the shortage of skills. but which will never catch up on the economy that might have been. Privately. Black politicians might also acknowledge the benefits such migration would have on encouraging political stability and cooperation between Whites and Blacks.

Small scale entrepreneurial activity can exist in almost any environment. but for a modern state to thrive there must be a widespread culture of technology. efficient management and relative freedom from corruption and government patronage. Such a general culture exists nowhere in Black Africa and will not be widespread in South Africa for two generations. Such a culture is absorbed rather than taught.

Without a thriving. confident and expanding White community. the base from which such a culture can spread will be too small. and South Africa will drift into the patterns of states further north. With it. generations of Black South Africans will arise to whom such a culture is indigenous. and these attitudes could spread throughout Black Africa. .

Four other social and political arguments strongly support such a policy because of the effect of immigration on Orange River.

(1) The Stability Argument

Continual rapid tilting of the present racial balance against Whites within Orange River would cause political instability in the whole of South Africa as Whites demanded steps to prevent the imminent disappearance of their last bastion of white rule.

To maintain their present proportion of the population would require a flow of 67.000 skilled White migrants per year which is extremely unlikely, but the stable political situation associated with a slow decline in their proportion, predicted in the chapter on systems of government. requires a net inflow of only 20.000 which is quite probable.

(2) The Distinct Society Argument

Like Quebec in Canada. Orange River is undoubtedly a distinct society within the federation. or rather several distinct societies. but those societies are under threat from Orange River's changing demography. Blacks in Orange River will increase 175% from 2.28 million in 1985 to 6.26 million in 2020. Without foreign migration, the 5.96 million minority population of Orange River will increase by only 72% to 10.29 million.

Orange River. like Quehee. must therefore at least have the opportunity to maintain a measure of political independence for those societies, by having the right under the constitution to sponsor and admit migrants that are acceptable to it as permanent residents of South Africa. most of whom will settle in the present urban industrial areas of Orange River.

An annual net migration of 20.000 per year would change South Africa's projected overall population composition in 2020 by just 1.25% but migrants and their descendants would be 5.0% of the population of Orange River which would significantly assist minorities to retain political control of their state.

(3) The Justice Argument

A further argument in favour of encouraging skilled immigration from overseas is simple fairness. Projected rates of natural increase from 1985 to 2020 are 48% for Whites. 71% for Coloureds, 60% for Indians and 108% for Blacks.

Because average Black family size is so much larger than that of Whites, each Black family will make a much greater demand on the resources of South Africa for education, health and job training than each White family. It seems obviously unfair, as well as politically destabilizing, that by restricting their family size and consequent demand on South Africa's resources. Whites should be disadvantaged by losing the last elements of their political autonomy.

If Whites are not maintaining their proportion of the population by natural increase. it is not unreasonable for them to attempt to provide it by migration. Not only would this have no adverse effects on other population groups. but it would provide South Africa with essential skills in which it has made no investment of its limited resources at all.

(4) The Open Society Argument

Orange River will be expected to be a totally open society. to the extent that its special character one century from now will be quite different. It is therefore not unreasonable to expect that South Africa will also be an open society, to the extent that this is beneficial to all of its people.

An open society, which would be reflected in a tolerant White immigration policy. would then more easily gain access to the particular foreign skills, technological advances and investment resources which come with migration. South Africa cannot prevent its own skilled people from leaving if they wish. so it must make it attractive for others to come.

The surest recipe for racial tolerance and cooperation is if every group feels secure, with no imminent threat to their economic livelihood or political autonomy. This means Blacks must make some effort to preserve the status quo at the time of setting up the federation, by assenting to a reasonable flow of skilled

White immigrants to South Africa, most of whom will settle in the present urban industrial areas of Orange River. The numbers are not likely to be very large since people with skills are in demand around the world. Unskilled people would be unwanted by Orange River since it would already be grappling with a new occurrence of the "poor White" problem.

In 1990 only 4722 people emigrated and immigration increased to 14,499 from 11,270 in 1989 so there was a net gain of nearly 10,000 people. This could easily increase to 20,000 per year following a settlement. If political violence subsides and the economy revives, this could well increase again, particularly since removal companies estimated that 25% of immigrants in 1990 were previous emigrants returning to South Africa.

White immigration must be considered as part of the overall level of immigration into South Africa. A net level of 20,000 White immigrants each year would contribute less to South Africa's population in 2020 than the one million legal Black migrants and their descendants allowed for in the chapter on population changes. If South Africa prospers and its neighbours remain locked in poverty, the estimated 1.0 million illegal migrants in South Africa in 1986 could also at least treble.

The federal government would administer overall immigration, and authorize the granting of citizenship of the federation to persons of good character after three years' residence. However it would also delegate some of the administration of immigration to individual states, which would have the right under the settlement protocol to sponsor and admit as many immigrants as they thought they needed for their economy. This would extend to having their own representatives overseas to recruit migrants.

The sponsoring state would be liable for all welfare payments incurred on behalf of immigrants by any state in the federation.

THE AFRIKAANS LANGUAGE

Afrikaans would be solidly entrenched as an official language of Orange River

where 4.18 million people or 51% of the population would speak it as a mother tongue. This would compare with only 21% for English, and 12% for Xhosa, the most prevalent Black language. In western Cape 2.70 million people or 65.9% of the population would speak it as a mother tongue compared with 16.8% for English.)

Since millions of Blacks would enter Afrikaans speaking areas every working day, Afrikaans would also remain a relevant language to millions of Blacks.

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.English would be dominant as a home language only amongst the Whites of Cape

Town and Johannesburg. but would continue to dominate the commercial life. and increasingly the political life of South Africa as a whole. because of the preference of Blacks for English. Already English language newspapers dominate Afrikaans language newspapers by three to one and few Blacks buy Afrikaans language newspapers.

Afrikaans speakers are faced with a reduction in the importance of Afrikaans in South Africa. since experience shows that once a language loses its official functions. as Afrikaans will in Black dominated states. it loses its status and the reinforcing value of constant use. Once a language ceases to be an official medium of communication between groups. existing speakers have less incentive to use it, and non speakers cease learning it and accept another language in its place.

The widespread survival of Afrikaans depends on it remaining an official language. Within Orange River. as the mother tongue of 51% of the state's population. it will. As an entrenched state language of a state having one quarter of the federation's population. it also has a reasonable chance of maintaining its long term position as one of the de facto official languages in daily use throughout the entire South African federation.

About two thirds of Whites migrating into Orange River from other states would be Afrikaner, which would help maintain the Afrikaner character of the White population in the face of new White immigration from overseas.

With an annual net inflow of 20.000 White immigrants per year, the proportion of Orange River Whites speaking Afrikaans as a home language will fall from 58.5% in 1985 to 51.7% in 2020. This drop represents an increase in a variety of immigrant languages rather than a decrease in Afrikaans. As immigrants' children take up either English or Afrikaans as a home language. this figure will stabilise at something over 53%.

Including the whole population of Orange River. the proportion of Afrikaans speakers will drop from 51% to 41.5% by 2020, mainly due to Black migrants who will speak a variety of languages which do not really threaten the prominence of

200\234Afrikaans. Xhosa speakers will increase. mainly in the Cape. from 12.0% to 17.9% of the total.

The greatest erosion of Afrikaans will occur in Rand which will attract 612,000 foreign White immigrants and their descendants and 1.174.000 Blacks. The proportion of Whites in Rand. whose mother tongue is Afrikaans. will drop from 51% in 1985 to 44.6% in 2020. Afrikaans speakers in the population of Rand as a whole will drop from 37.4% to 28.0%. However the newcomers will speak a variety of languages that do not challenge Afrikaans. and the real erosion is occurring only slowly as the largest proportion of new immigrants adopt English instead of Afrikaans as a home language.

Afrikaner Whites are faced with the choice of a slowly diminishing proportion of Whites in Orange River who speak Afrikaans as a home language. which does not threaten the position of Afrikaans as a state language. or a diminishing proportion of Whites and Coloureds in Orange River's total population. which could. Too low a proportion of Whites and Coloureds in its population could directly threaten Orange River's continued existence as a separate state. and therefore the ability of Afrikaners to retain Afrikaans as an official state language.

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Orange River As .4 Whole

On the basis of the 1985 figures. Orange River would contain 8.24 million people or 23.94% of South Africa's population. 69.4% of all Whites. 84.9% of all Coloureds. 10.17% of all Indians. and 8.8% of all Blacks. Whites would be 41.7% of its 8.24 million people. Coloureds 29.3% Indians 1.1% and Blacks 27.7%. Whites would be the dominant group in Rand and Vaal Free State. and Coloureds in the Cape.

Excluding the 391,000 Black migrant workers who were only temporary residents. Whites would provide 49.2% of the voting population, Coloureds 28.1%. Indians 1.1% and Blacks 21.6%. Migrant workers under short term labour contracts would vote for the government of their own state. not for that of Orange River. until they had been resident in Orange River for three years.

Because a higher proportion of wealthier or better educated people actually vote. Whites would probably cast 52.3% of the total vote in an election by proportional representation. Coloureds 26.6%. and Blacks 19.1%. As the largest group. and being mainly concentrated in urban electorates which they dominate, Whites could also win 56% of the electorates in a first past the post election. Clearly Whites would be the greatest single influence in a democratic. racially mixed state, even though they were less than half the voters.

Since somewhat over half of Coloureds appear likely to support the NP, it would probably hold at least 50% of the seats in the state legislature. and with an NP governor. would dominate the state executive. Orange River as a whole would therefore be basically controlled by the NP, but it would be an NP drawing 30% of its support from Coloureds.

Many NP policies would be supported by both the DP and the CP in an open vote. and the semi autonomy of the state would be quite secure. with around 80% of the members of the state legislature likely to support state's rights in conflicts with the federal government. The ANC would hold only about 20% of seats.

However the NP would be aware firstly that the proportion of the state parliament that White supported parties can control is shrinking along with the White proportion of the state population. and secondly that a genuine consensus on most social and economic questions would provide the best hope for long term political stability. Both Coloured and Black parties could therefore be expected to gain all of their more moderate and reasonable objectives.

A genuine partnership between White and Coloured moderates within the NP is essential if the western Cape is to be a willing partner in Orange River. Such a partnership would broadly represent the reality of a state that was mainly White and mainly Coloured in its two halves.

The reality of federal politics would also indicate that the best possible future for both Whites and the NP. in a highly divided society. would come from genuinely inclusive politics on a representative executive. Such a government would be more acceptable in the councils of the federation. as one that had clearly broken with an apartheid past. Representation by province in Orange River's

legislature would be roughly proportional to the number who voted in each province.

Population projections for Orange River to 2020 are based on HSRC estimates for South Africa as a whole plus the likely pattern of foreign immigration following a political settlement. Regional distributions are based on the estimates of Black urban dwellers in South Africa, and particularly in the PWV, by Davies, Bristow, Small and Associates'Â®, and the author's own estimates, based on the likely pattern of economic growth and interstate migration by the various ethnic groups. All of these estimates are subject to impact by political actions of the federal and state governments during the intervening years.

Despite a declining population in most rural areas and very slow growth in some whole regions, Orange River's population will actually increase slightly faster than that of South Africa as a whole to 17.42 million in 2020. Most major urban areas will increase around 2.5 times. Including the descendants of migrants, the state will net approximately 3.89 million migrants between 1985 and 2020 of whom nearly 55% will be Blacks.

Although the ethnic character of much of the countryside will not change markedly, all major towns will be characterized by higher income Blacks becoming a majority in the apartment districts of their downtown areas, by the complete takeover of some suburbs by relatively low income Blacks, and by a substantial penetration of affluent White suburbs by wealthy Blacks.

White flight away from areas of Black migration will be nowhere as drastic as that which has radically changed many American cities, since at least a half of all Whites will live in Rand where suburban expansion will be tightly constrained by borders with Black states. White flight will therefore be limited by lack of space, and resistance to wholesale change in the character of a suburb is likely to be much more stubborn than in the USA. This resistance will be strengthened by government policies to support house prices in districts subject to heavy Black migration, by tight control on the supply of housing, by heavy penalties on landlords and owner occupants who permit overcrowding, and by high land and housing prices generally. .

Affluent White suburbs with up to 20% of independent Black households will not be very different from White suburbs today, since wealthy Blacks will also want law and order and peaceful well-kept suburbs. Independent Black households will also tend to concentrate in particular areas as they do in the USA, which will mean minimal effect on the other areas.

By policy, public schools will draw pupils from their immediate areas and therefore include many Blacks, but in most schools Black pupils will remain below 30 and therefore be insufficient to greatly change a school's character and ethos. The chief reason for Whites with young families to abandon a suburb is likely to be because Black pupils have risen sharply above 30%, but the problem of finding an alternative house at a reasonable price will make this increasingly difficult.

Only 50% of urban Whites would willingly accept all races in schools - 67% of Afrikaners and 24% of English speakers oppose such integration. It is not just

racism that is behind these attitudes. since feeling against small numbers of other races attending their schools. which would leave their ethos and standards unchanged. is by no means so strong. Seventy per cent of all Whites would accept integration with various degrees of reluctance providing standards were maintained. The slowness of changes in social attitudes is a world wide phenomenon. Considering this. attitudes amongst White South Africans have changed remarkably rapidly. but maintenance of acceptable standards in their children's schools is not an area most are willing to compromise. Given the projected natural increase in the state's White population. and the expected net inwards migration from Black states of 632,000 South African Whites, including their descendants. and the absorption of 870,000 foreign Whites. including their descendants. Whites will increase by 93% to 6,645,000 of the state's 17.42 million total population by 2020, or 38.2% of the whole.

With the projected natural increase in the Coloured population plus the expected inwards migration of 91,000 Coloureds from Black states. including their descendants. Coloureds in Orange River will increase by 75% to 4,252,000, or 24.4% of the total population.

The projected natural increase in the Indian population plus the expected inwards migration of 127,000 Indians from Black states. including their descendants. will see Indians in Orange River increase by 206% to 265,000. or 1.5% of the total population.

The permanent Black population of 1.89 million in Orange River in 1985 is projected to increase to 3.94 million in 2020. There will also be a net inwards migration from other states of 2.12 million. with increases of 2.32 million. mainly in Rand and Capetown. being offset by a net outflow of 200,000, mainly from the rural areas of Vaal Free State.

Since 1960. with increasing mechanisation and better job opportunities in the cities. around 1.5 million Black workers and family members have left permanent employment in White farmed areas throughout South Africa, being partly replaced with casual labour and single migrant workers with no dependents. Black labour is continuing to leave agriculture at around 0.8% per year. and with increasing Black wages. farming must continue to mechanize if food prices are not to soar. A decreasing number of Blacks on White farms means a decreasing number of Blacks resident in the rural areas of Orange River. particularly in Vaal Free State.

The 391,000 Black migrant workers within Orange River in 1985 are likely to halve to 195,000 as mining companies switch to permanent married staff who will tend to live in the low cost towns of adjacent Black states. Overall, Blacks will increase by 174% to 6.26 million or 35.9% of the total population.

Table 10 compares the numbers and composition of Orange River's population in 1985 and 2020.

Table 10
Population of Orange River in 1985 and 2020 (000's)

	Total	White	Coloured	Indian	Black	Migrant
1985	8238	437	2434	b	1839	391
% 100	417	29.5	.	229	438	
2020	17418	66435	4232	:	6061	195
2%	100	38.2	244	Â¥	348	1.1

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In 2020 Orange River will contain 25.1% of Sonth Africa's popnlation, a little more than the 23.9% in 1983 Tt will also contain a greater proportion of all population groups than before.

Table 11
Percentage of South Africa's ethnic groups in Orange River

	White	Coloured	Indian	Black
1985	694	849	10.1	88
2020	80.9	86.7	19.3	114

In 2020. Orange River would still provide a workable solution to White demands for a high degree of continuing political autonomy, since 80.9% of all Whites in South Africa will reside there. Of the 1.565.000 Whites who will live in

Black states, little more than in 1985, the only significant concentrations will be those at Durban and East London. The rest will be widely distributed and will nowhere reach even half their present proportions of those state's populations outside their homelands.

Including Coloureds and Indians. the 20.9% of non Blacks in South Africa in 2020 will have democratic political control of an area in which 25.1% of South Africa's population will live. Non Blacks will form a natural majority of 64.1% within this area, and amongst those non Blacks. Whites will be a natural majority of 59.5%. :

With birth rates declining amongst all population groups. the proportion of each population group of voting age in 1985 and 2020 is compared in Table 12.

Table 12
Proportions of populations of voting age

White	Coloured	Indian	Black
1985	645	821	554
2020	.650	.570	.600

Since the age structure of the White population in 2020 would still be older than that of other groups. providing more people of voting age, Whites would still

be 42.0%, of all voters in Orange River, Coloureds would be 23.3%. Indians 1.6% and Blacks 32.9%. Temporary residents on short term labour contracts would still be excluded from voting in Orange River state and provincial elections.

By 2020, even though a higher proportion of . wealthier or better educated people would actually vote than these of other socio economic groups. Whites would probably cast only 43.1% of the total vote in an election by proportional representation. Since Whites would still be the largest group and be mainly concentrated in urban electorates which they would dominate. those same votes in a first past the post election would win 1/4 of the electorates. Coloureds would cast 22.64 of the total vote, Indians 1.65, and Blacks 30.7%,

Assuming that half of the CP vote had transferred back to the NP but there had been no other change in voting preferences. the NP's share of the vote would have fallen from 30% to around 18%. Because of the rising numbers of Blacks. the ANC's share would have risen from 20% to around 27%. Although the passage of NP sponsored legislation through Orange River's parliament. and decisions by its representative executive. would depend much more heavily on support from minority parties. the NP would still be the dominant influence in Orange River's politics.

By 2020 the minority voting population of Orange River would have fallen considerably from its 78.3% level in 1985, Nevertheless Whites, Coloureds and Indians together would still be over 67% of registered voters. and probably 69% of those who actually exercised their vote. so they would have no internal difficulty in ensuring the continuing existence of their state. In partnership with each other they would also be strong enough to resist unwanted federal encroachment in their state's local affairs. and to have a real say in the affairs of the South African federation.

Since Coloureds would cast 22.6% of the overall state vote. and would be the strongest political influence in provinces containing half of Orange River's population. they would still be well placed to ensure their continuing strong representation in Orange River's government. and the passage of all reasonable legislation they might require. :

The White electorate could be persuaded to support a constitution which established such a state since the majority of them already live there and they can see clearly where such a step will lead. While as outlined. Orange River is much less than many of them hope for. its deficiencies are at least quantifiable and it represents a solid degree of permanent self government.

With good port access and natural transport links to its various parts. Orange River could be defended against any attempt to destroy it by the overthrow of South Africa's constitution. An economically and militarily powerful White/Coloured state with 25.1% of South Africa's population would make a continuing contribution to maintaining stability and real democracy throughout the federation.

On the other hand. all states would share a common transport system. which with the exception of the Krugersdorp - Kimberley and Vereeniging - Port Elizabeth railways. criss crosses borders in a way that entirely disregards them. All

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states would be dependent on others for the supply of certain goods. and the city and resource sharing arrangement would maintain - inextricable economic dependence on each other between Orange River and surrounding states.

Only the major ports of Capetown and Saldanha Bay would be solely under the control of Orange River. since Port Elizabeth would be heavily dependent on transport routes through Black states for its prosperity, and on Black workers from eastern cape for its labour force. While these ports would provide Orange River with some security in case of serious disputes with the rest of the federation, more than two thirds of Orange River's import/export trade would go through the ports of Durban. Richard's Bay. and East London. and by rail to the Mozambique port of Maputo

On every front - economic. transport. trade. raw materials. energy. labour. food. water and a peaceful prosperous future - Orange River would be impelled to seek close and mutually beneficial cooperation with its neighbouring states. No legislation or official practices which directly discriminated against Blacks could survive such obvious self interest. and increasingly social attitudes would follow this self interest.

Being economically strong now. Orange River will probably lead the way in the development of new growth industries. and although its relative share of GDP will fall as Black states gain in affluence. it will continue to produce wealth approaching 50% of South Africa's GDP in 2020.

A slower rate of overall Black urbanization than has been projected would have less effect on the balance of political power in Orange River than might be expected. Most new Black migrants will be the wealthy or skilled descendants of an existing older generation of town dwellers who are likely to take up residence in Orange River in any case. The exception would be in South West Cape where all Black migration to the area will fall within the province's political boundaries. not mainly the migration of better off Blacks.

The existence of Orange River as a separate federal state. to meet the needs for autonomy of Whites and Coloureds. would not artificially restrict the development of the people of other states. All ethnic groups would continue to have unlimited economic access to Orange River's industrial areas and major cities. and to the goldfields of the Witwatersrand. An agreed federal tax structure would continue to redistribute its taxable wealth to poorer states in the same manner as if South Africa was a unitary state. The only restriction on any person taking up residence in Orange River would be the availability of housing and their ability to afford it.

Although Whites. through the medium of Orange River. would be only one of many partners in a South African federation. they would nevertheless be a partner whose voice was listened to. whose influence was considerable. and who would have formidable economic and military power to hold the other partners to an observance of the agreed constitution.

Whites are a known quantity to the international community, and so long as they remain a real influence, foreign investors will be much more willing to take the risk of investing in South Africa to the benefit of all of its peoples. A federal

state of Orange River. as outlined. allows Whites to retain a degree of control within the Western Cape. the region of their origin. and majority control of most of the present cities in which they dwell in Rand and Vaal Free State. They cannot expect more in a just settlement. but neither can they be expected to accept less. Such a solution would give most Whites continuity with the soil of their origins. continuity with their present place of residence. and continuity of control over the majority of places of significance in their history

It is no use Whites railing against. or pushing against demographic trends. or the inevitable development of one man one vote democracy throughout South Africa. The only thing they can do is to shape policies which realistically take these trends into account and which can still provide a large degree of local autonomy for all minority groups.

[It is likely that Orange River would remain in minority control for at least three or four generations. by which time a whole population will have grown up knowing no other way than real power sharing. Whether the amount of power minorities control at that time is 51% or 49% is not likely to be particularly relevant to either the people or whatever all party executive of the day is the government. so long as moderate parties are in a majority.

White's future influence in Orange River and the security of their institutions and way of life will depend heavily on building bridges of cooperation and goodwill to the other communities with which they share the state and share South Africa.

Some time late in the 21st century Blacks will cast 2 majority of votes in Orange River. but moderate parties from all races who favour state's rights are still likely to command a majority in both the legislature and the executive. and moderate White supported parties will still be the largest element in such a grouping. By that time Whites will have to have merged their aims and aspirations with those of non Whites for a common future if they are to retain a large degree of control over their own destinies.

BLACK NATIONAL STATES

While the homelands are economically dependent on South Africa, and want to maintain close links with it, neither the independent Black homelands nor the self governing ones are entirely ready to give up their regional autonomy. Many Black intellectuals from the smaller tribes are hesitant about too much centralization, fearing a tribal system of domination of the government by Xhosa or Zulu.

Chief Buthelezi, the leader of South Africa's largest ethnic group, wants to preserve a large measure of Zulu self government through a federal relationship between Natal and the rest of South Africa.

Inkatha, and other Black political groups opposed to the policies of the ANC, are apprehensive that a future ANC could use its potential dominance of the central parliament, and armed forces to effectively nullify all opposition.

Considering South Africa as a whole, the creation of an ethnically based 12 state geographic federation which included Orange River would solve the following problems.

(1) The recognition of Natal/KwaZulu as a semiautonomous state of the federation would go a long way towards neutralizing violent Zulu opposition to domination from outside their region.

(2) The continuance of the homelands, as provinces with a degree of self government within their ethnic state, would go a long way towards dissipating homeland opposition to losing total autonomy, since in all cases except KwaNdebele, people of their own ethnic group would dominate the new state. Maintaining tribal areas in some form would also maintain the security of tribal land ownership for poor people in a rapidly developing country with few resources to spare for government welfare.

(3) A decentralized federal system would remove much of the fear that the central government would be dominated by Zulu or Xhosa since the greatest proportion of effective government power would be spread amongst the regions.

(4) A decentralized federal system would make it impossible for any political group to seize total power and abrogate the constitution, since at least some states would be ruled by opposition groups. The economically and militarily powerful White/Coloured state, with 23.9% of South Africa's population, would have a vested interest in ensuring that the constitution was maintained for its own protection. Such a federal system would make a major contribution to maintaining stability and real democracy in all of the states.

230 A Black dominated federation of semi autonomous states should find acceptance amongst a majority of urban Blacks. Amongst rural Blacks, who are more locally oriented, the proportion favouring a federation of national states is likely to be even higher than in the cities. The 1985 census of South Africa, which excluded only the four independent homelands, listed 316 magisterial districts. Those districts or part districts not included in Orange River can be easily allocated to a Black national state on the basis of their dominant ethnic groups as defined in Fig 27 which groups districts according to the largest single ethnic group that is also greater than or equal to 30%, of the population.

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Coloured Swaz o | Padi
Xhosa Shangaan fMdabele
Tulu VVenda Tswana

Fig 27 LARGEST GROUP GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 30%

Magisterial districts were established purely for ease of administration and are neutral about race. Each has 2 magistrats' court. tax office. school board and labour and licensing offices. The inclusion of complete magisterial districts in new states wherever reasonable would greatly simplify their administrative problems.

Only 14 of the 316 districts are subject to division between Black groups because of differing ethnic dominance in parts of a district. but a further 43 are subject to division between Black states and Orange River.

In 13 of the 14 divisions of districts between Black groups. and a further 27 involving Orange River. this would mean only a transfer of part of a magisterial district to the administration of its neighbour. In a further 10 divisions. two new districts would be created out of one: in 2 divisions. part of each of two existing districts would be formed into one new one: and 15 districts would be absorbed by their neighbours and totally disappear. From the point of view of administration at district level. none of these changes pose any real difficulties. and nearly 82% of all districts would be unaffected.

In practice. boundaries between Black national states should not be finally fixed without a judicial commission hearing evidence regarding the desires of the people on either side of the proposed border. A local referendum could be held where the issue was not clearcut.)

What are the criteria a commission should use to establish the boundaries for Black states?

(1) Boundaries should be established according to where people actually resided permanently at the 1985 census. Boundaries would not be significantly different in most places if any census was used back to 1970. but historical claims to certain areas must be secondary to where ethnic groups live now.

(2) In general, the boundary between two ethnic groups should be established at that point where numerical dominance between the two groups changes.

(3) Where a magisterial district was not contiguous with others belonging to an ethnic group. it should be excluded from that group's state unless a clear argument could be documented showing it to be more just to include it. Since including it would mean mis-allocating people of other ethnic groups in the intervening territory. an acceptable argument would have to prove that on balance fewer people would be wrongly allocated.

(4) Where all Black groups are small minorities, as in many areas adjacent to the industrial regions of the PWV. those fixing boundaries should also consider the direction of future growth. and population pressure from adjacent national states.

(5) There must be no compulsory population relocations. The rights and obligations of foreign workers with temporary residence permits, and of short term contract workers from the homelands, should remain unchanged.

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(6) Since South Africa will remain one economic unit, the functional transport linkages between regions are not a sufficient reason to mis-allocate an area's population.

Fig 28 shows a map of the states of the proposed Federation of South Africa. For the sake of greater clarity, regarding the distribution of territory between the different ethnic groups, the homelands are not shown, although this does not necessarily imply their disappearance as political entities of some kind.

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Fig 28 STATES OF THE FEDERATION OF SOUTH AFRICA

NORTH TRANSVAAL

North Transvaal is made-up of the two parts of the present independent homeland of Venda, the magisterial district of Messina, and Soutpansberg less the

mainly Pedi district of Sockmekaar in the south and part of the former district of Sibasa on the Mozambique border.

The 393.000 population of the Venda homeland far outnumbers the 67.000 of all races in the drier non homeland part. but many more Venda would undoubtedly live outside the homeland once they had gained political control there.

Venda make up 40 774 of the total non homeland population. They also make up 50.7% of its Black population with the rest closely split between Pedi and Shangaan. Given likeh outwards and inwards migration pattrns with North Transvaal under \'enda control and with Venda as the official Black language, the Venda progortion of the Black population outside the homeland would probably rise to 60% by 2020

In 1985. 12.000 Whites were 18.1% of the total population outside the Venda homeland. and all mnonties 19.7%. While Whites could continue to exercise considerable influence on the government of the non homeland part. all minorities together were only 2 9% of a united North Transvaal of 460.000 people.

Even in the non homcland part. the proportion of minorities will drop to 9.1% by 2020 as the non homeland population increases (0 around 136,000. The population of North Transvaal as a whole will reach 590.000 by 2020.

The greatest degrec of long term autonomy that local Whites can hope for is continucd majonty control of their own town councils. â\200\231

NORTH EAST TRANSVAAL

North East Transvaal is made up of the five territories of the non independent but self governing homeland of Gazankulu, the magisterial districts of Phalaborwa and Witrivier. part of the former district of Sibasa on the Mozambique border, the part of Letaba around Letsitele. Pelgrimsrus east of the Drakensberg escarpment. and the two Pedi enclaves of Namakgale.

The 624.000 population of the Shangaan homeland of Gazankulu far outnumbers the 90.000 of all races in the rest of North East Transvaal, but many more Shangaan would undoubtedly live outside the homeland once they had gained political control there.

Shangaan make up only 33.8% of the total non homeland population but 49.2% of its Black population. with Pedi at 24.6% and Swazi at 17.6%.

Given the very large number of Shangaan migrating from adjacent Gazankulu. and the likelihood that mere non Shangaan than Shangaan would migrate from a North East Transvaal under Shangaan control. it is likely that Shangaan will rise to over 60% of all Blacks in non homeland territory by 2020 from their present 49%. This proportion might be affected by foreign migration since in March 1991 there were \$2.000 Mozambican refugees in Gazankulu.

In 1985, 28.000 Whites were just 30.9% of the non homeland population and all minorities 31.5%. While the 15.000 Whites of the Phalaborwa magisterial district are nearly 54% of that district's population. this is a very artificial situation

with 47.000 Blacks in the two small Pedi enclaves of Namakgale near Phalaborwa township and 227.000 Blacks in the adjacent Gazankulu territory of Giyani.

While Whites could continue to exercise considerable influence on the government of the non homeland part, all minorities together were only 4.1% of a united North East Transvaal of 714.000 people. '

Even in the non homeland part, the proportion of minorities will drop to 14.1% by 2020 as the non homeland population increases to around 160,000. The population of North East Transvaal as a whole will reach 845.000 by 2020.

The greatest degree of long term autonomy that local Whites can hope for is continued majority control of their own town councils.

EASTERN TRANSVAAL

Eastern Transvaal is made up of the three parts of the non independent but self governing homeland of Kangwane. the seven magisterial districts of Barberton, Nelspruit. Waterval-Boven. Carolina. Ermelo. Amersfoort and Bethal, plus the northern, Swazi dominated parts of Wakkerstroom. and Piet Retief, the Machadodorp area of Belfast. and the Hendrina district of Middleburg.

The 493.000 population of the Swazi homeland of Kangwane just outnumbered the 473.000 of all races in the rest of Eastern Transvaal, but many more Swazi would undoubtedly live outside their homeland once they had gained political control there.

Swazi make up only 45.4% of the total non homeland population, but 56.1% of its Black population. The only significant Black minorities are Zulu at 15.1% of all Blacks. mainly in the southeast and in the industrial towns of Bethal and Ermelo. and Shangaan at 10.8%, mostly in the northeast around Barberton and Nelspruit.

Given that the people of overpopulated Kangwane must migrate, and the likelihood that more non Swazi than Swazi would migrate away from an Eastern Transvaal under Swazi control and with Swazi as the official Black language, it is likely that Swazi will rise to over 63% of all Blacks in non homeland territory by 2020 from their present 56%.

In 1985, 84.000 Whites were 17.7% of the non homeland population and all minorities 19.0. so they would continue to exercise considerable influence on its government. However all minorities together would be only 9.47% of a united Eastern Transvaal of 966.000 people.

Even in the non homeland part. the proportion of minorities will drop to 9.6% by 2020 as the non homeland population increases to around 870,000. The population of Eastern Transvaal as a whole will reach 1,319,000 by 2020.

In the long term. the greatest degree of autonomy local Whites can hope for is continued majority control of their own town councils.

CENTRAL TRANSVAAL

Central Transvaal is made up of the non independent but self governing homeland of Kwandcbele. all of the magisterial district of Witbank. plus most of the districts of Belfast. Bronkhorstspuit. Delmas and Middleburg.

The 296.000 people of overpopulated Kwandebele are outnumbered by the 394.000 people of all races living in the much larger balance of Central Transvaal. Many of the people of Kwandebele would undoubtedly move to the larger non homeland area once Blacks gain political control there.

Because of a large White population. which is actually the largest single ethnic group in the industrialized districts of Middlcburg and Witbank, 103,000 Ndebele make up only 26.2% of the total non homeland population.

However Ndcbele are by far the largest Black group in the non homeland area, with 36.7% of its Black population compared with Pedi at 18.6% and Swazi at 16.6%. Within the Kwandcbele homeland 178.000 Ndebele make up 60.2% of its Black population. with the only other significant group being Pcdi at 13.4%.

Including both homeland and non homeland areas of Central Transvaal, 281.000 Ndebele make up 40.8% of its 690.000 people and 48.7% of all Blacks. Whites and other minorities are 16.3% of the total. Pedi 13.3%. Swazi 10.6% and all other Black groups 19.0%.

Ndcbele are a very scattered ethnic group with only 30.1% of their 935,000 total living inside their proposed state of Central Transvaal. In addition they are split between a southern group of 567.000, who still maintain their original language and customs. and a northern group of 368,000 who have been strongly influenced by the Pedi. amongst whom they have lived for generations.

South Ndebele at 231.000 are 81.9% of all Ndebele in Central Transvaal and 33.5% of the total population. so South Ndebele should be the official Black language that is taught in schools. and along with English and Afrikaans. be required for entry into the civil service. This will secure the Ndebele heritage within the state without affecting the rights of other groups. !

South Ndebele was not included in a 1991 list of official languages recognized by the ANC. but more people speak South Ndebele than Venda so there is no reason at all why they should not also have their own state when it is so easily and fairly accomplished.

Central Transvaal is a traditional home of the Ndebele but outside Kwandebele a predominantly Ndebele rural population has been overlaid by immigrants from other Black ethnic groups working in coal mines and their associated industrial towns. Ndebele still make up 44 to 58% of the Black rural population in all five magisterial districts. but only 25 to 40% of Black town dwellers. Only the large migrant worker groups in the mines of Witbank and Middleburg are strongly non Ndebele.

The largest external groups of South Ndebele are in Lebowa and the non homeland part of North Central Transvaal, but there are considerable settlements

in Eastern Free State. Vaal Free State. Eastern Transvaal, and South West Transvaal.

By far the largest single concentration of North Ndebele are in Lebowa, but considerable numbers live in the non homeland part of North Central Transvaal. South West Transvaal and Bophuthatswana. All of those regions will lose population to areas with more rapid economic growth and are a potential source of Ndebele migrants.

Given likely strong growth in the economy and population of the non homeland area of Central Transvaal to 1.136 million by 2020, given that the people of overpopulated Kwandebele must migrate and many would prefer to settle in growing Ndebele areas. and given that more non Ndebele than Ndebele are likely to migrate away from a Central Transvaal in which Ndebele are a strong force in government and in which South Ndebele is the official Black language. the proportion of Ndebele in the population of Central Transvaal outside Kwandebele is likely to rise from 26.1% in 1985 to about 40% by 2020.

Even by 2020 with a 4.2% increase to 34.3% in the proportion of South Africa's Ndebele within Central Transvaal, the Ndebele proportion of the total population will have only increased from 40.8% in 1985 to 46.6%. However with 455,000 of Central Transvaal's 669,000 Ndebele. or 68%. living outside the homeland instead of 64% within it. the source of Ndebele demographic dominance will have shifted decisively to the industrial cities of Central Transvaal.

While Ndebele will have become a slim majority of 50.7% amongst Blacks, they will not be a majority of the total population and will themselves be divided 73/27 between South and North Ndebele. A majority of Ndebele will not support an ethnic party so Ndebele everywhere must operate from the beginning as part of a liberal coalition giving a maximum of freedom to all groups. Their own freedoms and security would be sufficiently entrenched by making South Ndebele one of the official languages and teaching it in schools.

In 1985, 104,000 Whites were 26.3% of the non homeland population and all minorities 28.5%. so they would continue to exercise considerable influence on its government. However all minorities together would only be 16.3% of a united

Central Transvaal of 690,000 people.

Even in the non homeland part. the proportion of minorities will drop to 10.1% by 2020 as the non homeland population increases to around 1,136,000. The population of Central Transvaal as a whole will reach 1,436,000 by 2020.

In the long term, the greatest degree of autonomy local Whites can hope for is continued majority control of their own town councils.

SOUTH CENTRAL TRANSVAAL

South Central Transvaal is made up of the three magisterial districts of Balfour, Hoefeldrif and Standerton, the larger part of Heidelberg and Nigel not allocated to Klip River and Rand. the southeastern rural area of Springs, and the southeastern

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rural corner of Vereeniging. It had a 1985 population of 386.000 people. and is a balanced modern community with a mixed rural and industrial economy.

No Black homeland is part of its area. so political changes in the character of its administration will come about mainly from the inevitably rapid growth of its Black population with further industrialization. The reason for its status as a separate state is that no single Black group has numerical dominance, and in fact Whites are the largest ethnic group.

Its 1985 population composition was 25.0% White with all minorities at 28.5%. Zulu 19.8%, Sotho 15.9%, Swazi 11.7%. Xhosa 9.6%. Ndebele 6.6%. and all other Blacks 7.9%.

The state could be part of Central Transvaal, but this would take the possibility of a national state away from the Ndebele by reducing them to 28.5% of the new state's population. It could be part of Eastern Transvaal but this would include four districts in which Swazi are a very small minority of 6 to 9%. and reduce Swazi to a 30.3% minority of their own non homeland population in 1985.

The only alternative to separate statehood is to dismember the area amongst the other larger adjacent states but this too poses problems of equity. The state has no compelling community of interest with Natal, Klip River or Eastern Free State, and splitting the 97,000 Whites and 13.000 Coloureds and Indians amongst these heavily Black dominated states would be to reduce their influence on their state's government to insignificance.

In the western areas of Nigel. Heidelberg. and Hoedsig, Whites are by far the largest group at 31.4% of the total, and all minorities are 35.7%. but these areas together do not make a practical state. A case could be made for including Balfour in the Sotho state of Eastern Free State. and Standerton in the Zulu area of Natal, but neither case makes as much sense as a separate state of South Central Transvaal which would give the largest group. the Whites. a state in which they would have a real voice.

South Central Transvaal will grow rapidly, particularly with industrialization and Black migration into areas near the PWV region, and rapidly establish itself as an economically important state. Whites will fall to 9.6% of a population of 939.000 in 2020, and all minorities will fall to 12.0%. Zulu will be 23.7% of the total, Sotho 22.7%, Swazi 13.6%. Xhosa 12.5%. Ndebele 4.8% and other Blacks 10.7%.

The main changes will come from Black migration and their higher birthrate. but there will be only marginal changes in the composition of the Black population. The most significant will stem from a proportionately greater flow of Sotho than Zulu migrants bringing the Sotho population to nearly equal that of the Zulu.

At 25% of the population in the beginning, Whites will have a significant input into the government of the state, and if this is handled wisely, they will continue to be influential as their proportion of the population drops.

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NORTH CENTRAL TRANSVAAL

North Central Transvaal is made up of 17 of the 19 territories of the non independent but self governing homeland of Lebowa. spread in 8 blocks across the northern half of Transvaal but excluding the two Pedi enclaves of Namakgale. It also includes all of the magisterial districts of Cullinan, Groblersdal. Lydenburg. Pictersburg. and Potgietersrus, the largest part of Lctaba, \Vaterberg and Warmbad. Pclgrimsrus west of the escarpment. and parts of Bronkhorstspruit. Kempton Park, Pretoria. Wonderboom and Soutpansberg.

The 2.430.000 people of the Pedi homeland of Lebowa far outnumber the 1.024.000 of all races in the rest of North Central Transvaal. Many more Pedi would undoubtedly live outside the homeland once they had gained political

\ control there. ;

Pedi make up only 351.000 or 34.3% of the non homeland population. They are also only 39.2% of its Black population. but far ahead of Ndebele at 13.0% of Blacks. Shangaan at 12.0% and Zulu at 9.3%. Within Lebowa, whose territories

1 are well distributed throughout North Central Transvaal, Pedi are 80.6% of the Black population. with the only other significant groups being Ndebele at 7.4% and Shangaan at 6.8%.

I) The proportion of Pedi in the population living outside the homeland in 1985 was artificially low because previous apartheid policy endeavoured to make them live within their homeland borders and commute to work. This constraint has now gone.

] Another reason for the low proportion of Pedi in non homeland territories is that 602.000 people. or 58.8% of the non homeland population, live south of Warmbad in the PWV area. including the Black cities of Mamelodi, Tembisa and

] Daveyton which have been a magnet to migrants from all parts of South Africa. Pedi are the biggest single group by a considerable margin in the first two cities but still only 37.2% of the population of Mamelodi and 26.7% of Tembisa. In

| Daveyton they are only the second largest group at 15.2%. behind the Zulu at 20.4%. In the whole of the southern area they are just 27.6%, more than double

Zulu at 13.2%.

A glance at the map in Fig 29 shows that the only other Black state which could possibly administer Tembisa and Daveyton is Central Transvaal. This would create many more anomalies since all Ndebele make up only 7.3% of Tembisa's population and 11.2% of Daveyton's. and with the expected heavy Black migration to the PWV area, the proportion of Ndebele will fall.

If they were included in Central Transvaal, the 346,000 people of the Tembisa and Daveyton areas would be 33.4% of Central Transvaal's population in 1985 and this proportion would rise to 47.0% by 2020. Both would always remain alien cities whose interests were centred on the PWV not on Central Transvaal, and they would make a strong Ndebele influence on CentralTransvaal's affairs impossible. Both Tembisa and Daveyton have the potential to expand to over one million people so ample room must be provided from the rural land to their east.

Including the 2,430,000 people of I.chowa. 2,308,000 Pedi make up 66.8% of the 3.451.000 people of North Central Transvaal. Ndcbele make up 8.6%. Shangaan 7.9%. Whites and other minoritics 3.8% and all other Black groups 12.9%.

As a people. a lower proportion of Pedi have migrated away from the suggested area of their state than from the states of all other groups except the Zulu. but with 1.cbowa struggling to support its present population. this is about to change.

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Fig 29 PWV AREA OF NORTH CENTRAL TRANSVAAL

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Pedi. along with the other peoples of northern Transvaal. the North Ndbele. Shangaan and Venda. will contribute proportionately mere of their people to future Black migration to the PWV area than other groups. Migration is defined as including moving from a homeland to the rest of a state.

The non homeland area of North Central Transvaal will expand much faster than natural population growth, but most of this growth will occur in Tembisa. Mamelodi. Daveyton. Cullinan and other towns of the PWV region. Elsewhere rapid growth will occur only around Pictersburg. The proportion of the non homeland's people living in the southern growth area adjacent to the PWV region will rise from 58.8% to 76% by 2020.

Far from weakening Pedi control of the southern cities. migration is likely to strengthen it. since around 545,000 of the 964.000 migrants to the area are likely to be Pedi, raising their proportion of the southern area's population to about 42.4%. The next largest group will be Shangaan at about 11.8% and Zulu at 8.0%.

Including Lebowa. 3.54 million Pedi will have firm control of North Central Transvaal in 2020 since they will still make up 62.9% of the state's 5.63 million people. Shangaan will be 9.1%. Ndebele 8%. Whites and other minorities 1.9% and all other Black groups 26.1%.

The proportion of Pedi will have dropped from the 66.8% in 1985 because there will be heavy migration from the dominantly Pedi homeland of Lebowa to Klip River and other states. as well as to other parts of North Central Transvaal. However, because so many Pedi migrants will choose the southern area of North Central Transvaal adjacent to the PWV, the proportion of Pedi there will rise sharply.

â\200\234This massive movement of Pedi to the PWV area in the next 30 years is a further reason to include the area shown in Fig 29 in North Central Transvaal. It includes adequate room for industrial arcas south of Mamelodi. east of Tembisa and northeast of Daveyton.

In 1985, 119.000 Whites were just 11.6% of the non homeland population, and all minorities were 12.5%. While Whites could continue to excrcise influence on the government of the non homeland part, all minorities together were only 3.83% of a united North Central Transvaal of 3.45 million people.

Even in the non homeland part. the proportion of minoritics will drop to 3.6% by 2020 as the non homcland population increascs to around 2.78 million. The population of North Central Transvaal as a whole will reach 5,630,000 by 2020.

The greatest degree of autonomy that local Whites can hope for long term is continued majority control of their own town councils.

SOUTH WEST TRANSVAAL

South West Transvaal includes seven of the eight parts of the independent homeland of Bophuthatswana, excluding only ThabaNchu east of Bloemfontein. It

includes the magisterial district of Thahazimbi. the western parts of Waterberg and Warmbad north of Bophuthatswana. 11 districts and 10 part districts of western Transvaal to the south of Warmbad and Thabazimbi which lie between Rand. Vaal Free State and Botswana. the 4 northern Cape districts of Vryberg. Hartswater. Barkly West. and Kuruman. and the part districts of Postmasburg, Warrenton and Kimberley.

Southwest Transvaal alone of the 11 Black states would finish up with a homeland territory lying just outside the body of the proposed state, near Kwandebele north of Pretoria.

The 1,495,000 population of Bophuthatswana just outnumbers the 1,381,000 of all races in the rest of South West Transvaal. and an increasing number of its people will live there once Tswana gain political control of the area.

Tswana make up only 640,000 or 16.3% of the non homeland population. but they are 56.3% of its Black population. far ahead of Xhosas. the next largest group at 10.7%. Pedi at 9.8%, and Sotho at 7.3%. [ncluding the 1,495,000 people of Bophuthatswana. 1.68 million Tswana make up 58.6% of the 2.88 million people of South West Transvaal and 64. 1% of all Blacks.

The proportion of Tswana in the population of the seven scattered territories of Bophuthatswana is higher than in the Black population outside. because previous apartheid policy endeavoured to make Tswana live within their homeland borders and commute to work. This policy particularly affected areas near Pretoria such as Attridgeville. Soshanguve and northwest Wonderboom which are shown in Fig 29.

In Auridgeville 40,000 Pedi with no adjacent homcland. at 36.6% of the population. considerably outnumber 16,000 Tswana at 14.9%. In Soshanguve 34,000 Pedi. at 34.4% of the population, far outnumber 5,000 Tswana at 4.7%. who have a homeland a few kilometres away.

The whole of this area lies between the White suburbs of Pretoria and a much greater Tswana population confined to the homeland cities of Ga-Rankuwa. Hebron. Erasmus. Mabopane, Diloppe. and KwaRatsiepane, which outnumbers many times the 75,000 Pedi of the area. With the abolition of apartheid. the Tswana population of these cities will inevitably expand into it. Under Tswana political control, Tswana in both Soshanguve and Attridgeville will considerably outnumber any other single group by 2020. The eastern boundary of the Tswana area of Wondcrboom has been set at the N1 freeway.

Some depopulation can be expected in the rural arcas of South West Transvaal but this will be more than compensated for by the rapid growth of Brits and Rustenburg. and of the Black twin citics strung along the western edge of Vaal Free State and Rand. such as Galeshewe. Kanana. Jouberton. Khuma, Tkageng, Khutsong. Attridgeville and Soshanguve.

Quite probably new Black towns will also spring up on the Krokodil. Jukskei and Hennops rivers to gain proximity to Randburg and the growing industrial areas of mid Rand. The population of the non homeland area is likely to more than double to 2,776,000 by 2020.

With large numbers of Tswana migrants from Bophuthatswana and Botswana choosing to live in a Tswana controlled state. the proportion of Tswana in the non homeland areas of South West Transvaal is likely to increase from 56.3% of all Blacks to around 68%.

In 1985, 176.000 Whites were 12.7% of the non homeland population. Coloureds 4.6% and Indians 0.5%. -Whites and minorities could continue to exercise a considerable influence on the government of the non homeland area. but including Bophuthatswana. all minorities together would be only 8.6% of a united South West Transvaal of 2.88 million people.

Even in the non homeland part. the proportion of minorities will drop to 7.7% by 2020 as the non homeland population increases to around 2.776,000. The population of South West Transvaal as a whole will reach 5.630.000 by 2020.

In the long term, the greatest degree of autonomy local Whites can hope for is continued majority control of their own town councils.

EASTERN FREE STATE

Eastern Free State is made up of the Sotho homeland of Qua Qua. the previous Bophuthatswanan enclave of ThabaNchu. and 22 magisterial districts and 14 part districts of Orange Free State to the east of Vaal Free State.

The magisterial district of Rouxville and the part district of Bethulie contain 40% Xhosa and only 34% Sotho but a difference between them of only 1200 in a total population of nearly 20.000 is hardly enough to change the existing boundary between the Cape and Orange Free State on the Orange river. On the other hand, the Zulu dominated eastern parts of Vrede and Harrismith, with over 10,000 Zulu, have been allocated to Natal.

The 228.000 population of the non independent but self governing homeland of Qua Qua is heavily outnumbered by the 1.200,000 people of all races in the rest of Eastern Free State and is likely to be quickly absorbed into the state. Both Qua Qua and ThabaNchu could retain a degree of self government as provinces of Eastern Free State.

Sotho make up only 679.000 or 56.6% of the non homeland population, but they are 61.9% of its Black population. far ahead of Zulus. the next largest group at 13.9%. Xhosa at 11.8%. and Tswana at 7.3%. Including Qua Qua, 850,000 Sotho are 59.6% of a total population of 1.43 million and 64.2% of all Blacks.

There will be a net outflow of people from Eastern Free State until 2020. Apart from Bethlehem, Harrismith, the northern coalfields. and the twin cities of Mangaung, Maseru. Thabong. Kuthwanong, Seeisoville and Zamdela bordering Western Free State towns, economic growth will be insufficient to cope with a doubling of population by natural increase. Since non Sotho are more likely to migrate away. and there will be strong competition for jobs from poor migrant workers from Lesotho, the Sotho speaking population of Eastern Free State,

including Qua Qua. is likely to increase from 59.6% to over 68% of a population of 2.31 million.

In 1985. 86.000 Whites were 7.1% of the non homeland population and Coloureds 1.4%. Whites would continue to have some influence on the government of the entire state. since even including Qua Qua and ThabaNchu. they would be 6.0% of the total population. and economically a very important element.

The population of Eastern Free State as a whole will reach 2,310,000 by 2020. Most of the existing White population will remain and the ethnic character of much of the state's area will not have changed greatly. Because of the growth of the Black towns. the White proportion of the state's population will have dropped from 6.0% to 3.4% and all minorities to 4.3%.

In the long term. the greatest degree of autonomy local Whites can hope for is continued majority control of their own town councils.

EASTERN CAPE

Eastern Cape is made up of the 3 regions of the independent homeland of Transkei. the independent homeland of Ciskei, and 29 magisterial districts and 6 part districts of Cape Province to the east of Orange River, including the Xhosa dominated district of Mount Currie reclaimed from Natal.

The 2.633.000 population of Transkei. and the 718.000 population of Ciskei, far outnumber the 1.252.000 people of all races in the rest of Eastern Cape. It would be best if all three areas remained partly self administering as provinces of Eastern Cape. because of differences between Transkei and Ciskei and between the homelands and modern commercial areas.

Xhosa make up 945,000 or 75.5% of the non homeland population but they are 96.5% of its Black population. Including Transkei and Ciskei, 4.19 million Xhosa are 91.0% of a total Eastern Cape population of 4.60 million, and 97.1% of all Blacks. This apparent massive Xhosa dominance is deceptive, since Xhosa are strongly splintered into many competing sub tribes. and between supporters of the Xhosa dominated ANC and tribally minded conservatives.

There will be a huge net outflow of people from the homelands until 2020, mostly to Cape Town and Klip River. Apart from East London. King Williamstown. Queenstown. Albany. the coalfields of Molteno and the industrial towns bordering Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage. economic growth will be insufficient to cope with a doubling of population through natural increase.

On the other hand the industrial centres of East London and Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage will get a new lease of life as the presently unexploited coalfields of Eastern Cape are opened up to provide electricity, replacing eastern Transvaal fields expected to be largely used up within 30 to 40 years.

The non homeland area will more than double its population to 2,723,000 people. with the industrial area adjacent to Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage increasing 3.5

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times to nearly 1.0 million people. Xhosa will have increased to 87.4% of the non homeland population.

Transkei and Ciskei will increase by less than 25% each to 3.252,000 and 880.000 respectively. but all of this increase will be urban; 6.38 million Xhosa will continue to make up nearly all of the 6.56 Blacks in Eastern Cape.

In 1985, 166.000 Whites were 13.3% of the non homeland population, 103.000 Coloureds 8.2% and 4.000 Indians 03%. Whites would continue to have considerable influence on a provincial government outside the homelands. and could be expected to strongly support a continuation of the area's provincial status. Full amalgamation with the homelands would reduce Whites to 3.7% of a united population. and all minorities to 6.2%. This could take a considerable time in any case because of the differences between Ciskei and Transkei.

The population of Eastern Cape as a whole will reach 6.855.000 by 2020. Most of the existing White population will remain and the ethnic character of much of the non homeland area will not have changed greatly. However because of the huge population growth in the Black towns, the overall White proportion of the non homeland's population will drop to 5.8% by 2020. and all minorities to 10.4%.

While Whites will remain influential in the non homeland province, the greatest degree of autonomy they can hope for in the long term is continued majority control of their own town councils

NATAL

Natal is made up of the 10 regions of the non independent but self governing homeland of KwaZulu, the 37 magisterial districts of present day non homeland Natal less the Xhosa dominated district of Mount Currie. the eastern part of the districts of Vrede and Harrisburg in Orange Free State. and in Transvaal all of the district of Volksrust, 55% of Wakkerstroom and 70% of Piet Retief.

The 4.816.000 population of KwaZulu is more than double the 2.408.000 population of all races in the rest of Natal.

Zulu make up only 860.000 or 35.7% of the non homeland population but they are 85.0% of its 1.012.000 Black population with Xhosa at 7.5% of Blacks. Swazi at 3.7% and Sotho at 2.3%.

Within KwaZulu. whose territories are well distributed throughout Natal, Zulu are 96.3% of the Black population with the only other significant groups being Xhosa at 1.7%. Sotho at 0.9% and Swazi at 0.7%. The proportion of Zulu in the population outside the homeland would be higher but for previous apartheid policy which endeavoured to make them live within their homeland borders and commute to work. This constraint has now gone.

Including KwaZulu 5.48 million Zulu are 75.9% of a total Natal population of 7.22 million and 94.3% of all Blacks.

There will be a huge net outflow of people from KwaZulu until 2020, but most of them will remain in Natal once the industrial development of the Tugela basin

really begins. The Durban Pietermaritzburg region and the balance of non homeland Natal will each receive 1.2 million Zulu migrants and their descendants, and Klip River over half a million.

The Tugela basin has the water resources to support industrial cities containing fifty million people. and has favourable conditions for hydro electricity generation along the whole length of the Tugela and its main tributaries. About 12.5% of the Tugela's water is presently being pumped to the Transvaal. since the cost of shifting water is a minor element compared with the cost of providing industrial infrastructure.

However with massive Black urbanization, additional infrastructure will have to be provided somewhere. Increasingly it will be provided in the Tugela basin which has so many advantages for the export based manufacturing industries essential to South Africa's future prosperity. Its advantages are unemployed labour, high grade coal. already existing road and rail links to the nearby export ports of Durban and Richard's Bay and major inland markets, the existence of decentralized industry at Newcastle. Ladysmith and at Isithcbe near the coast. and the presence of good housing and schooling at Newcastle, Ladysmith, Colenso and Estcourt.

Billions of rand have already been invested in paper mills, coal handling, aluminium and fertilizer production at Richards Bay making it a major growth point in South Africa. and the population growth in Durban is said to be 9% per year, at least as high as anywhere in the world.

The non homeland area will more than treble its population to 7,469,000 people by 2020. and the population of some areas such as Newcastle and Richard's Bay will quadruple. KwaZulu itself will increase by 54% to 7,436,000 but all of the increase will be urban and most of it will live in towns adjacent to industrialized areas.

The Black population of Durban/Pietermaritzburg will cease to be so homogenous. with the present 82% Zulu majority dropping to 67%. Nearly all Black minorities will increase. but the greatest increases will be amongst Swazi rising from 0.7% to 6% and Shangaan from 0.3% to nearly 5%.

Similarly Zulu will fall from 85% of the rest of non homeland Natal's Blacks to 76%. All minority Black groups will increase sharply in the latter part of the period when the industrialization of the Tugela basin gains momentum.

Including KwaZulu. 11.18 million Zulu will be 86.2% of Natal's 12.97 million Blacks by 2020 which will still mean a very solid political base for Inkatha for the future. However they will only be 4.02 million or 72% of the 5.55 million Blacks outside the boundaries of the old KwaZulu. in Durban, Pietermaritzburg and the industrialized towns of the Tugela basin and Richard's Bay.

Many Zulu in these towns. and in the large towns of KwaZulu itself. will themselves become more radical and turn away from their old values and allegiances. Politics in Natal will become even more a balancing act between the Zulu tribal values of the countryside and the demands of the economically powerful and restless towns.

The proportion of all of Natal's people living outside Kwazulu compared with those within will be 1 : 1 instead of 1 : 2 in 1985. The influence of traditional Zulu loyalties in Natal's common legislature is likely to decline.

In 1985, 615.000 Whites were 25.5% of the non homeland population, 92.000 Coloureds 3.8% and 689.000 Indians 28.6%. Whites and Indians would be the major influence in the government of non homeland Natal. but including KwaZulu. all minorities together would only be 19.5% of a united Natal of 7.22 million people. Whites would be 8.6%. Indians 9.6% and Coloureds 1.3%.

Even then. because minorities would number a substantial 1.41 million, or 19.5% of 2 united population of 7.22 million in 1985, because they would be economically and commercially very powerful. and because minority backed parties would control 20% of the legislature. they could realistically expect to have a strong input into the government of the new Natal

However the flood of homeland Blacks to urban and industrial areas, and the development of the Tugela basin, will reduce all minorities to 25.7% of a non homeland population of 7.469,000 by 2020. and only 13% of a population of 14.905.000 million in the whole of Natal. Growing Black economic strength would also have undermined their dominant position in business.

The proportion of the legislature controlled by minority backed parties would fall to 15%. but unless there was a change of sentiment amongst Zulus, Inkatha would still control around 50% of the state legislature. A stable all party executive would continue little changed in either general policies or party loyalties.

The maximum degree of practical long term autonomy to which the minorities of Natal can reasonably aspire is administration at the level of city and town councils of those residential areas in which they are a majority. This has already potentially been provided for in the [ndaba constitution.

KLIP RIVER

The boundaries of Klip River are shown in Fig 30 and further defined in Figs A8 10 A13 of the Appendix.

No Black group comes anywhere near a majority of Klip River's 1985 population of 3.6 million. Instead all of South Africa's Black groups are solidly represented and together make up 94.4% of the population.

The largest single group is the Zulu at 851,000 who make up 24.6% of the total, but Sotho are 19.0%, Tswana 14.1%, and Xhosa 11.4%. Compared with South Africa's total Black population. Sotho. Swazi and Tswana are over represented in Klip River and Xhosa. Pedi and Ndebele are under represented.

These proportions will change as Klip River absorbs 5.5 million migrants and their descendants by 2020 to bring the state's population to 12.0 million. One quarter of all new immigrants into Klip River will be Pedi, which will more than double their proportion of the population from 7.0% to 15.6%.

Nearly as many Venda will live in Klip River as in Venda, one third more Shangaan than in Gazankulu. and one third more Sotho than in Eastern Free State. Migration out of Klip River will be comparatively small. with the biggest destination being Rand.

Zulu will remain the largest single ethnic group in Klip River, but with the industrial development of the Tugela basin, the supply of Zulu migrants will dwindle and their proportion will fall to 17.8%. Sotho will fall to 15.9%. and Tswana to 12.7%. :

On the other hand with nearly one million Xhosa migrants and their descendants. the Xhosa proportion will increase to 14.7%. Shangaan with over 600,000 migrants will increase to 76%. and Venda with 300,000 migrants to 3.6%.

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THE PWV AREA

No single ethnic group can hope to dominate Klip River politics and it will become a microcosm of Black South Africa with Zulu, Sotho, Pedi, Xhosa, and Tswana all ranging from 13% to 18% of the population. With an economic and geographical focus that is entirely concerned with the PWV region, the area is ideally suited to become the only truly multi racial Black state in the federation.

The influence of Klip River will grow dramatically as its population swells from 10% of South Africa's total to 17.3% and industry floods into its industrial parks in search of a dwindling supply of centrally located sites. Since 1985 the government has been actively promoting development of industries in eastern and western Rand, and eastern, western and southern Klip River. Despite its population being nearly 99% urban, open veld makes up 90% of Klip River and it has a large proportion of the land in the PWV region suitable for future industrial development.

The future expansion of its largest city, Soweto, into the rural land to its northwest, is limited because of the risk of sinkholes in the dolomite subsoil, but it can expand along the railway towards Westonaria, Ennerdale, in mid Klip River, on the railway from Soweto to Vereeniging and home to 25,000 Coloured people in 1986, is expected to have 250,000 people by 2010.

The northwestern industrial town of Kagiso has enough land to house a further one million people, and development will spread southwards through Mohlakeng and Bekkersdal. The Black urban areas of Katlehong, Tokoza, and Vosloorus, southwest of Alberton, will also expand to meet the KwaThema, Tsakane and Duduza urban areas near Springs and Nigel. Industry will also expand along the railway and N3 highway north of Heidelberg, and in the east from Dunottar to Nigel.

In the south, the area between Sharpville and Boipatong has been zoned as Black residential for some years, and Evaton and Sebokeng have plenty of room to expand. Industry is likely to completely fill the area between Boipatong and Sebokeng and expand along the railway towards Fochville. It will also expand from Evaton towards Meyerton and Rothdene. Residential and industrial development could also be expected around Fochville railway station itself, as other areas become developed. i

While just over half of Klip River's people lived in Soweto/Diepsmeadow/Dobsonville in 1985, this will probably drop to one third as expansion takes place in the other areas.

In 1985, 18,500 Whites were just 0.3% of the population of Klip River, 121,000 Coloureds 3.5%, and 54,000- Indians 1.6%. Because of the demand for skilled people created by the massive economic development of Klip River, White residents are likely to double by 2020, even though many White farmers will be displaced, since not all Whites employed in Klip River will be able or willing to commute from Rand or Vaal Free State.

Some of Klip River's Coloured population will migrate away, mostly to Rand, but even more poor Coloured migrants will replace them. The Indian population

on the other hand is likely to be a little lower than natural growth would suggest. as more Indians leave than come in.

In 2020, Whites will be only 0.3% of Klip River's greatly expanded population of 11.999.000. Coloureds will be 1.9% and Indians 0.7%. Minorities will have negligible political influence on the governing bodies of Klip River. except perhaps by proxy through Rand and Vaal Free State representatives on regional councils.

While predominantly rural Eastern Free State would be the poorest area outside the homelands when the federation was established. Klip River with over three times the population. and the focus of Black migration in South Africa, would be the main problem area

This would not have to remain so given an enlightened administration in Klip River, since the state would be far and away the major remaining source of well-sited flat industrial land in the PWV area. and both its total production and production per head could be expected to increase rapidly.

THE HOMELANDS

In many ways traditional institutions such as the tribal system of land

ownership hamper the development of homeland areas. They do provide a form of -

social security as a fallback position to those who are unsuccessful in the urban struggle, and thereby will contribute greatly to stability during South Africa's efforts to integrate most Blacks into a modern industrial society.

Unquestionably a very great number of Blacks wish to preserve tribal society and institutions in the meantime, but others see the homelands as products of apartheid and demand their total abolition. The integration of the homelands within the federation as semi autonomous provinces of national states goes a considerable distance towards satisfying both points of view and should be one of the planks of a new constitution.

The degree of autonomy allowed the homelands could be limited to their right to preserve or change traditional tribal law within the homeland with regard to property and inheritance. and to judge crimes by that law which merited less than one month's imprisonment outside the homeland. On most other matters such as criminal law. police. the administration of justice and particularly with regard to taxation and the administration of education, health. etc. the state would function as one unit.

Such a policy would also allow non homeland commercial areas to administer present property and commercial law, free from the influence of homeland populations which would be a dominant majority in five of the twelve federal states.

From a democratic point of view, the degree of integration, and the closeness of the relationship between the homeland and non homeland provinces of each state should be left to their peoples to negotiate. starting from general principles laid down in the constitution which would protect the basic rights of all.

The semi autonomy of both homeland and non homeland provinces, over the making and administration of laws reserved for them. would be maintained until a federally supervised referendum of any area giving up such rights decided otherwise. Federally supervised referendums would also be a recognized means by which a homeland urban area. adjacent to non homeland industrial areas, could be reclassified as non homeland.

The long term relationship between homeland and non homeland provinces of the different states will differ considerably depending on the numerical balance between their populations and the aspirations of their people. Nowhere is the non Black population large enough to decisively influence any long term trends.

Where the non homeland province with its private land ownership. commercial attitudes. and democratic. non traditional ways of organization, is numerically dominated at state level by a conservative homeland with traditional attitudes, the political relationship between the two may well be fairly formal and confined to matters of common interest.

This is likely to be particularly true in states such as North Central Transvaal. where a non homeland province would be dominated by its southern PWV area with its 72% majority of non Pedi inhabitants. Although by 2020 non Pedi would be only 58% of the southern area's people, the area will always remain focused on the PWV with little in common with the Lebowa homeland.

On the other hand, in states such as Eastern Free State where both homeland and non homeland would be dominated by the same ethnic group, and where most people would share similar interests. the relationship could be very close. This could also be true in Central Transvaal, where Ndebele in both areas would need each other to maintain their influence in the state's government.

As shown in Table 13. the proportion of each Black state's people living in its homelands will decline sharply by 2020. The influence of homeland traditions on

Table 13
Percentage of Homeland Population in Each Black State
1985 | 2002

Eastern Cape	73	60
Eastern Free State	16	9
South West Transvaal	52	46
North Central Transvaal	70	51
North Transvaal	85	77
North East Transvaal	87	81
Eastern Transvaal	51	34
Central Transvaal	43	21
South Central Transvaal	-	-
Klip River	-	-
Natal	67	50

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each state's common affairs will decline to an even greater extent, since very large numbers of people still within the homeland will be living modern lives in the suburbs of industrial cities.

Although in the beginning, traditional attitudes are likely to predominate in North, North East and North Central Transvaal. and in Eastern Cape, only in North and North East Transvaal will homeland influences remain dominant by 2020. These influences will be a reality no matter what internal organization is adopted for each state. but the acceptance of provinces with a degree of autonomy allows the maximum freedom for each society to adapt and grow with a minimum of stress.

Population control for example is politically sensitive. and birth control is completely foreign to Black traditions and cultural beliefs. Given time. socio economic uplift will lower the birth rate. but with its population doubling every 30 years. South Africa does not have time. An efficient family planning service. available to all, is urgently needed. but only local Black politicians can gain its acceptance.

In 1985 the people of the homelands made up 41% of South Africa's people and 54.7% of all Blacks. So long as a real democracy existed, their traditional views would continue to strongly influence a new South Africa even within a unitary state.

If the leaders of non traditional parties believe in democracy. they have no choice but to wait for those views to change. At least in a federation the dominance of those traditional views would be restricted to perhaps five states where they were the views of the majority.

Table 14
Ethnic Dominance in Non Homeland Areas %

State Dominant Group Minorities

1985	2020	1985	2020
Eastern Cape	Xhosa	76	87 22 10
Eastern Free State	Sotho	57	65 9 4
South West Transvaal	Tswana	46	63 18 8
North Central Transvaal	Pedi	34	45 13 4
North Transvaal	Venda	41	54 20 9
North East Transvaal	Shangaan	34	52 32 14

Eastern Transvaal Swazi 45 57 19 10
Central Transvaal Ndebele 26 40 29 10
South Central Transvaal | Zulu 20 24 29 12
Klip River Zulu 25 18 6 3
Natal Zulu 36 54 58 26

ETHNIC DOMINANCE OUTSIDE THE HOMELANDS

In all of the nine Black states designed as national states. the proportion of the dominant group in the population outside the homelands will increase substantially between 1985 and 2020 as shown in Table 14,

The reasons for their increase rest mainly with the massive migration of people from the homelands and the consequent drastic reduction in the proportions of White. Coloured and Indian minorities present. Providing jobs and housing are available. homelands migrants will tend to go to a nearby state where their own ethnic group is dominant.

The actual populations of minority groups will be almost static or decline slightly in all Black states except Klip River and Natal where there will be strong economic growth. Not only is the rate of natural increase considerably lower amongst minorities than amongst Blacks. but large numbers, particularly of Whites, will migrate to Orange River in search of greater security and better job opportunities.

The figures for all minorities in 2020 underline how hopeless are White right wing aspirations to remain dominant over a greater proportion of South Africa than they will share with Coloureds in the state of Orange River.

In 2020 the Black national states will provide an even more secure place for each of South Africa's nine Black ethnic groups. in terms of preservation of their language and customs, than they did before. However in all but the Xhosa state of Eastern Cape. the other groups will provide a strong force to maintain equal rights for all individuals. The advocacy of other states in federal councils, and the enforcement of the South African constitution by the federal justice system. will ensure that the struggle to maintain the reasonable rights of all groups everywhere is successful. ' :

OVERALL VIEW OF BLACK STATES .

A 12 state South African federation as outlined would remove direct White political control over 76% of the population. or 88% if the people of the four Coloured provinces of the Cape are included. With the exception of Central Transvaal. Whites would make up only 3% to 9% of the population of the nine Black states with homelands. 15% of Central Transvaal's, 25% of South Central Transvaal's and just 0.5% of Klip River's population.

In most Black states the White population will either fall somewhat by 2020 or remain near the numbers in 1985. Only in Klip River and Natal will White populations actually increase by 2020. Everywhere Whites will be only a half to two thirds of the proportion of their state's population that they were in 1985.

These trends should suit Black politicians and upwardly mobile educated Blacks. since with a minimum of disruption to the economy or to administrative

services at settlement. nearly all new opportunities in the service of the state government, town councils or in private enterprise will naturally fail to Blacks.

Although South Africa would continue to be an economic whole. a new Black political and professional class would develop in the public service of all of the Black states which would ensure the growth of a Black professional, managerial and administrative class in the private sector.

Although White residential suburbs were included in Orange River wherever possible. many border White owned factories were not. Already nearly half of South Africa's manufacturing capacity is located in what will be Black states, and with this proportion rapidly increasing for reasons of space. the pressure on these private businesses to advance Blacks would be considerable. It could not be unreasonable to the point where it affected profits or many of these industries would simply relocate. but no industry within a Black national state would be likely to resist advancing capable people on the grounds of race.

The development of a Black elite in the nation states. which would have much more in common with its own working classes than previous White administrations. would be paralleled by a greatly reduced influence outside Orange River for the present White elite. whose place even in federal government

* administration would gradually dwindle to a level more in keeping with their proportion of the population. In business on the other hand, which they presently dominate. White influence would fall more slowly.

Table 15
Ethnic Dominance Within A South African Federation

Ethnic Group	% of Total Population	% Nominally in 1985 Controlled By Each Group
Xhosa	17.82	13.34
Sotho	6.76	14.14
Tswana	7.81	8.34
Pedi	9.38	10.01
Venda	1.59	1.33
Shangaan	433	2.07
Swazi	342	2.80
Ndcbale	2	2.00
Zulu	20.71	20.94
\White	14.26	11.82
Coloured	831	12.06
Indian	2.51	-
Other	0.28	-
	100.00	88.85

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Even PAC supporters should be reasonably satisfied with a geographic federation. since 90% of Blacks would live in states with an overwhelming Black parliamentary majority which would have direct power over most matters that concerned them.

Consensus and stability are more likely to be arrived at in federation of 12 states. & of which are relatively homogenous. and all of which would have one or more languages common to their area. Stability would be further enhanced by granting limited autonomy to provincial administrations within distinct regions of 10 of the 12 states.

No ethnic group would have established a disproportionate control over the people of South Africa. Table 15 shows the percentage of each ethnic group within South Africa in 1985, and the percentage of the people of a South African federation that would be nominally under its control.

Klip River. and South Central Transvaal with 11.15% of the total population would very definitely be multinational states. Groups such as the Shangaan. Sotho. Ndebele. Xhosa. and Whites themselves. which are very scattered. consequently appear to have lower nominal control at state or provincial level than they could hope for. In fact the major share of political control in all states and provinces, except Natal, will be held by multi ethnic national parties such as the ANC and the NP, not by predominantly ethnic parties.

INTERSTATE POLITICS

Although Orange River would be the largest state in terms of area and population, and would initially produce 55% of South Africa's GNP, politically it

Table 16

Population of South Africa's Federal States (000's)

1985 % 2020 %

Orange River	8238		239		17418		25.1
Eastern Cape	4603	13.4		6855	9.9		
Eastern Free State	1428	4.1	2310	33			
South West Transvaal	2876	83	5110	74			
North Central Transvaal	3454	10.0	5630	8.1			
North Transvaal	1460	1.3	590	0.8			
North East Transvaal	714	2.1	845	1.2			
Eastern Transvaal	966	2.8	1319	19			
Central Transvaal	690	2.0	1436	2.1			
South Central Transvaal	386	1.1	939	1.4			
Klip River	3457	100		11999		17.3	
Natal	7223		209		14905		21.5
South Africa	34495		100.0		69356		100.0

would be outvoted more than 3 : 1 in the federal parliament and be treated with some suspicion by the other states until it proves its credentials by a history of acting in the best interests of all of South Africa.

Its attempts to limit the inflow of poor Black migrants by building restrictions and high house prices would be likely to cause some friction with its neighbours, particularly Klip River. but a more important source of friction would be wrangles over the funding and development of the huge Black housing developments around its borders. for which it would share responsibility through Regional Services Councils.

Both Orange River and Natal would be prickly about any federal laws they construed as an attempt to reduce the degree of their state's autonomy. and would probably be supported in their opposition by some of the states mainly populated by smaller ethnic groups. Moves to consolidate or increase the federal government's areas of authority would be likely to be led by Klip River, with strong backing from Eastern Cape and elements of the population in the southern PWV area of North Central Transvaal.

Table 16 shows the relative proportions of the total South African population each of the twelve federal states would have in 1985 and 2020.

* The table indicates a continuing strong population movement from the peripheries of South Africa to the PWV region and to Natal. Six of the 12 states shared just 13.4% of South Africa's total population between them in 1985. By 2020 this proportion would have fallen to 10.7%.

Initially the main Black players in central politics would be Klip River. and states dominated by Zulu. Xhosa. Pedi and Tswana groups. By 2020 there would be only two important Black players, Natal with 14.9 million people. and Klip River with 12.0 million. plus the White/Coloured state of Orange River with 17.4 million. Together these three states would have 63.9% of the total population compared with 54.8% now.

Klip River will go from 10.0% of South Africa's population to 17.3%, and will make dramatic increases in its wealth, and economic and political power. Natal will increase from 20.9% of the population to 21.5%. with just a little over half of Natalians living outside KwaZulu compared with one third now. Orange River will increase from 23.9% to 25.1%. and its population will show a shift from being 27.7% Black to 35.9% Black.

Klip River's position as a leader of Black opinion will be contested by a Natal with more people. but with 30% still following subsistence tribal lifestyles in the rural areas of KwaZulu.

The influence of the conservative homelands throughout South Africa will dwindle as their population falls from 41% to 27% of the total by 2020. However this will not mean that South African politics will become more radical, since rising generations in the Black townships will almost certainly become more conservative as their standard of living increases.

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LELECTORAL SYSTEMS

Democratic clelections have five main characteristics.

- (1) Everyone has ths vote
- (2) All votes are cqual
- (3) Voting is secret
- (4) Voting for representatives is direct
- (5) There is freedom to vote for any party without coercion.

However these characteristics of themselves are not enough to ensure a liberal democracy that will give due weight to the rights and beliefs of minority races, cultural and religious groups and political partics.

The British Westminster system of parliament has thesc five characteristics but is entircly unsuitable for South Africa since it assumes there will be a moderation and a balance of interests in society in which, given South Africa's history and demography. there can be little confidence.

The Western liberal democratic tradition does not work very well even in the West when community antagonisms are the mainspring of politics, as they are in Northern Ireland. Thesc kinds of pressures undermine democratic governments and must be counteracted in South Africa by the creation of institutions specifically designed to neutralise and channel those pressures.

The Westminster system also presupposes an clectorate which votes mainly for panty policies and not for individual leaders. South Africa's Blacks already show a marked tendency to support individuals as much as parties. and many parties centre on personalities. regions and tribal and cthnic groupings. Even in the ANC, leaders of Xhosa origin are over represented. The main divide in South Africa is between those who support centralised power and those who support regional government, i

Western constitutional systems also assume flexible voting patterns and changes in voter allegiance. The pattern in Africa is for voter preferences to consistently coincide with ethnic or tribal allegiances. producing permanent majorities and permanent minoritics. There is a monopoly of power by dominant groups which precludes other groups {rom participation in decision making.

South Africaâ\200\231s expericnce of politics- to date has been the present highly centralised. winner takes all system, which has much more appeal to militant activists, who want to sweep the enemy away. than a compromise system where they must daily acknowldge that their enemy still retains rights. Because more democratic concepts are unfamiliar, both Blacks and Whites are suspicious of them. fearing the prospect of cunningly concealed electoral disasters.

Though it may be little comfort to South African Whites, success in finding a just scttlement which avoids their becoming a powerless minority will be a

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precedent establishing the rights of many other minorities throughout the world. Though they are in the unique bargaining position for a minority of holding the dominant power now, the principles they establish will have to be seen as reasonable to be accepted by leaders of the Black majority.

PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa can reasonably hope to escape the worst of the problems which have afflicted much of Black Africa, since the social and economic structures which can support democracy are already present, at the very least in embryo form.

South Africa is not mainly a country of peasant farmers living traditional life styles. Already 55% of Blacks are urban and this will rise to 63% by the year 2000. Nearly 90% of the nine million minority population are already urban. This urban population is highly politicised, has a high level of literacy and a tradition of strong criticism of, and reaction to, government excesses. Although split into many ethnic groups, decades of strong central administration have conditioned all groups to think of themselves, at least partly, as South Africans.

Most South Africans do concede relevance and authority to the central government, and whoever becomes the government in the future will be able to mobilise considerable organized support for its policies from pressure groups. Opposition groups outside the government will also have strong organized support

There is a strong pressure group of independent White farmers, an even stronger White business class and a growing Black one. Nationally organized unions, particularly Black ones, are strong and growing stronger. South Africa is a food exporter and has a strong industrial base capable of exporting to the rest of the world. Measures which increase those exports will for the most part benefit the mainly urban electorate and be supported.

With most of the problems and pressures South Africa will experience, the presence of large, politically independent and stable minority groups can help the government resist the worst pressures to govern unwisely for short term expediency. Within a united and non racial South Africa, Whites would still be economically powerful, and therefore a substantial and potentially stabilizing political force for decades, whether in government or opposition.

Conditions suitable for democracy are greatly helped by South Africa's strong middle class which is able to impose discipline and responsiveness on government departments, but this is partly nullified because most of the middle class are White. However from long exposure to a distorted and discriminatory democratic system, all South Africans share a tradition of pushing for real democracy, far more than the people of any other African country.

However South Africa also contains more highly divisive and autocratic forces than most countries, and it is quite uncertain whether real democracy will result from a change to Black dominance at the centre. Being powerless and exploited for decades does not create any special virtue in a population.

PURTEEEEN

Although there are many highly educated Blacks, and many Black leaders show awareness of the need to retain the best of what they already have, the major political tradition at national level is not democracy. but an authoritarian government making laws in the interest of a minority. The commitment of the mass of Black people is to see the government making laws in the interest of the majority. not to democracy as such. although the strongly influential White group will struggle to maintain democratic forms of government.

Decades of struggle against a strong central government have conditioned people to look to the centre for authority. The model of state organization they are used to is one of an all powerful central government, though there is also a strong tradition of local self government in the homelands using a mixture of traditional chiefs and popularly elected legislators.

Most of the popular political organizations have evolved to fight for power at the centre. and are capable of mobilizing hundreds of thousands of active supporters in street demonstrations. If violence and intimidation continue. domination of the streets by the largest group outside Natal. the ANC. will mean a lack of effective opposition at the grassroots level to any ANC dominated central government.

The fragilely democratic Black unions are one of the competing array of decentralized forces essential to the maintenance of a future multi-racial democratic government. but each major union strongly supports a different party. Black workers have not yet gained the confidence to become a strongly cohesive class. and they would be as unlikely to be able to successfully push their views on a Black dominated government as on the present White one.

Although 14.0 million Blacks are involved in the urban industrial economy and a further 2.0 million live on White commercial farms. most Black workers are still poorly educated and unskilled. In any case massive training in particular jobs does not immediately change a traditional. authoritarian, tribally based society into a democratic. innovative, dynamic. industrial one.

Most Blacks form an underprivileged working class whose interests are opposed to those of the mainly White capitalist class. South Africa thus assumes the worst aspects of a country riven by a diversity of strong ethnic loyalties, and a class structure in which ethnicity is a strong complicating factor. Such a society will prove very difficult to govern whether rulers are Black or White, and could normally be expected to set the stage for a strongman to play the central integrating role.

In Western Europe a dominant middle class controlled the development of the modern state, but it belonged to the same ethnic group as the rest of the people. In South Africa the middle class is predominantly White and will not be permitted to exercise undue influence.

Black political parties will gain control of central government well before the majority of Blacks have gained sufficient education or job skills to have a real stake in the existing society, so there must still be an element of doubt about the development of South Africa as a democratic, free enterprise economy. Given rapid economic growth, the threshold to the secure development of such a society could be passed about the year 2000.

Who exercises political power, and to what degree, will be at least partly decided in advance by the electoral laws of the new constitution. The problem is that this constitution is likely to heavily reflect the present real balance of power in South Africa, and therefore mainly represent the perceived interests of the big three – the NP, the ANC and Inkatha.

None of these groups want a proliferation of small parties, and are almost certain to frame electoral laws which eliminate them at federal level and correspondingly increase their own strength. Even a historic, truly liberal, anti apartheid grouping such as the DP could fail to gain representation at federal level.

VOTING POPULATIONS

Because of their different age structures minority groups will contribute a greater proportion of South Africa's potential voters than their proportion of the population, as shown in Table 17. This advantage will decline somewhat by 2020.

Table 17

Voters by Ethnic Group in 1985 and 2020 (000s)

1985 2020

Voter Voter

Population | Voters % | Population | Voters | %

White 4953 3195 173 8211 5337 | 135

Coloured 2868 1491 8.1 4902 2794 7.0

Indian 865 479 2.6 1379 827 2.1

Black 25809 | 13336 72.0 54864 | 30720 77.4

South Africa 34495 | 18501 100.0 69356 | 39678 | 100.0

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In 1985 White voters at 17.3% of the voting population exceeded their 14.4% proportion of the total population. and all minority voters at 28.0% exceeded their 25.2%. Blacks will increase faster than other groups. and with some ageing of the Black population by 2020. the proportion of Black voters will increase from 72.0% to 77.4%.

Because more of their members belong to the higher socio economic groups, a higher proportion of minority voters is likely to vote whether voting is by proportional representation or first past the post. [initially the proportion of the vote cast by minority groups in a typical South African election is likely to range from 28 to 31%. but by 2020 this range will have fallen to 22.5% to 25.5%.

Because all of the federal states will have a population of mixed racial origin, the older age structure of the White population will have only a marginal effect on representation in the federal legislature by state. The age advantage of the heavily White populations of Rand and Vaal Free State is offset by the fact that the temporary migrant element of their population votes in other states.

Table 18 compares each region's percentage of South Africa's population with its percentage of total voters.

Table 18
Voting Population of the States and Provinces in 1985
Provinces Population % Voting %
Population

North Cape	357	1.1	195	1.1
N. W. Cape	398	1.2	217	1.2
S. W. Cape	2807	8.1	1551	8.4
Central Cape	598	1.7	338	1.8
Rand	2582	1.5	1501	8.1
Vaal F. S.	1496	4.3	705	3.8
States				
Orange River	8238	23.9	4508	24.4
Eastern Cape	4603	13.4	2470	13.3
Eastern Free State	1428	4.2	794	4.3
South West Transvaal	2876	8.3	1550	8.4
North Central Transvaal	3454	10.0	1822	9.8
North Transvaal	460	1.3	242	1.3
North East Transvaal	714	2.1	383	2.1
Eastern Transvaal	966	2.8	520	2.8
Central Transvaal	690	2.0	367	2.0
South Central Transvaal	386	1.1	197	1.1
Klip River	3457	10.0	1785	9.6
Natal	7223	20.9	3863	20.9
South Africa	34495	100.0	18501	100.0

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Voters in all provinces of Orange River either equal or exceed their proportion of South Africa's population. Black states with a low proportion of Whites and a youthful age structure. such as Eastern Cape. North Central Transvaal and Klip River, have slightly less. .

Although Xhosa and Sotho speaking migrants make up around half of all temporary migrants living in other states. language group is not a reliable indicator of the home state in which the migrants will vote, since many Sotho do not come from South Africa but from Lesotho, and states like North Central Transvaal are the state of origin for temporary migrants from many language groups.

By 2020 Orange River's share of voters will actually rise from 24.4% to 25.9% due to a small rise in Orange River's share of the population and the replacement of many migrant workers by permanent residents.

PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

With proportional representation the total national vote is distributed proportionally to each party according to the vote it receives.

Where no minimum percentage of the vote is required for a party to gain representation, proportional representation (P.R.) delivers four things.

(1) Fair elections, since the percentage of seats a party gains equals its percentage of the total votes cast.

(2) Accountable government, since parties must weigh the effect of all votes, not just those cast in marginal electorates.

(3) A truly representative parliament, which reflects all significant views in the community.

(3) If P.R. is carried into executive government, there is truly representative government which is less likely to become hostage to special interest groups.

In deeply divided societies such as South Africa. some form of P.R. at all levels

is the only sensible system, since the first task of government is to build consensus and this is best begun by ensuring true representation of all groups. It can provide

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ethnic representation. if that is what voters want, without institutionalizing ethnicity.

With P.R.. governments cannot usually be formed by one party alone and ministers have to learn to work with talented and capable colleagues from other parties. P.R. can thus help to unify the low degree of consensus amongst groups in South Africa by forcing all parties to look outside their own ethnic group. or beyond their own supporters. for cooperation from every major group and region in the country.

Coalitions based on cooperation between the races would have to proceed with moderation and would provide little to fear for any race. particularly since federal control over the individual states would be limited.

The drawback of P.R.. which results in a parliament of many parties, is that in some circumstances it has given rise to weak coalition governments which are unable to take necessary action because one of the coalition partners will withdraw its support. On occasions in some countries. a series of weak coalition governments have followed each other in rapid succession leading to periods of uncertainty and instability.

This weakness, inherent in P.R., can be easily overcome by separating the powers of the executive from those of the legislature so that the executive no longer has to rely on the support of a specific coalition of parties. Withdrawal of support by one small party would then have no effect on the executive, although parliament as a whole could still bring down the government by a two thirds majority on a vote of no confidence.

The purpose of a legislature is NOT to provide a government with a stable majority where the outcome of every vote is predetermined. although this has been the practice wherever the powers of the executive are not separate from those of the legislature. '

A house of representatives should be just that. a representative legislature of the people passing laws and approving budgets which a majority of the people support. An independent executive must then be answerable to the representatives for the execution of those laws, and for public policies in keeping with them.

Many traditionalists oppose multi-party coalition government on the grounds that the resultant policy is a compromise that no group of the population has voted for. This view ignores the fact that if a party has more than 50% of the popular vote it will BE the effective government. If it does not. then there IS no popular majority in favour of its policies and policy SHOULD be a compromise between opposing view points.

The wheeling and dealing amongst caucus factions behind closed doors in single party governments is almost identical to such a process, the difference being that coalition deals are much more open, accountable and democratic.

The other factor about P.R. which angers traditionalists is the possibility of a small party holding a balance of power out of all proportion to its strength. This too would be largely eliminated by the complete separation of the powers of the executive from those of the legislature.

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The fact that no single party may gain a majority does not of itself cause bad government. since coalitions have governed the wealthy democracies of West Germany, Sweden and Switzerland for decades. Policies followed by coalitions represent the consensus of a genuine majority and therefore represent reality.

In practice. even with complete separation of the powers of the legislature and the executive, some informal kind of majority coalition would still form in both. but this majority would be more fluid since the discipline of maintaining a governing coalition in power would be absent. Parties participating in informal coalitions would sometimes find themselves in opposition on particular issues.

It would be essential for stability that any habitual governing coalition which formed on most issues drew its support from a reasonable range of political groupings. since it would have to inspire at least some confidence among supporters of other parties that it would use its power to solve problems from a national viewpoint.

With P.R.. opposition parties are usually willing to view a broad majority coalition of other parties as an acceptable government, since with only a small shift in public support they may themselves take an active part. Most opposition parties in South Africa would therefore see their future in trying to change voter allegiance at the fringes of any governing coalition rather than in disruption of South Africa's stability and economic growth.

Under these conditions a P.R. system in South Africa could take on the characteristics of stability enjoyed by two party systems in countries with a more homogenous population. Party differences would be expressed in the legislature by attitudes to budgetary policy or to individual pieces of legislation.

Democracy must involve some form of majority rule. but the majority does not have to all belong to a single party, the same majority does not have to pass all significant legislation, nor does the same majority have to rule everywhere at all levels of government.

Democracy is not a sentimental luxury of highly developed nations but the most practical way of organizing economic, social and political forces so that all of its competing groups can survive and prosper according to their public support.

Democracies are stable only if all major parties accept public support as their only claim to power, and are therefore willing to accept continual change in their relative strengths. P.R. allows for the possibility of any party taking part in government. but normally produces much smaller swings in parliamentary representation than first past the post electoral systems. It therefore makes for more stable public policy.

In South Africa there is one large and potentially dominant political party, the ANC, and many smaller parties representing a great variety of ethnic and political interests. A P.R. system, where a grouping of parties on an issue by issue basis could achieve policies between the extremes. would be more conducive to genuine democracy and lasting political stability than a first past the post system. This is particularly so since many of the parties will essentially represent different ethnic

or tribal groups. and conversion from one political allegiance to another would be emotionally difficult.

Clearly proportional representation would provide a vastly fairer representation for minorities everywhere as well as providing federal representation for all substantial political viewpoints within each ethnic group.

P.R. also overcomes the problem with first past the post elections that in reality MPs represent electorates which differ considerably in size. Although such electorates are theoretically supposed to have an equal number of registered voters, the proportion who actually vote differs greatly from electorate to electorate. This results in non voters having an influence on the outcome of elections since the allocation of electorates is based on their presence.

In South Africa this effect could result in an increase in Black representation of at least 3%. With P.R. only those who actually voted would determine the outcome which is entirely reasonable.

It is part of Black tradition to patiently argue and negotiate at an Indaba to reach consensus decisions. A federal parliament which no single party could dominate would prompt such real discussion of the issues, resulting in compromise, and would be much closer to Black tradition than the guillotine method of majority decision presently used by the South African parliament. The last thing needed in South Africa's divided society is total domination of government by one particular faction.

LIST SYSTEM OF P.R.

This is the system most people think of when P.R. is discussed. Electors vote for their favoured party's list of candidates and the total national vote is distributed proportionally to each party.

List systems can provide parliamentary representation by party on a very fair basis. but they lose the clement of the responsibility of a representative to the people of a particular district which is the strength of the first past the post system. They also give too much power to the party bosses who choose the list, since an MP is no longer responsible to the people of a region but to the party bosses.

A pure list system is unsuitable for South Africa since it is highly desirable for the development of grass roots democracy that the majority of MPs remain directly responsible to the people of a particular district. A large degree of control over the selection of party candidates must also remain with the party rank and file of each region, since regions frequently have strong views about the type of men and women they want to represent them.

A cut-off point, set at 2 minimum percentage of the total vote before a party is awarded any seats, is often used with a list system to avoid multiplicities of very small parties. This only has validity, as a practical measure to ensure stable government, where legislative and executive powers are not entirely separate.

All of the Codesa parties have accepted some kind of proportional voting in principle. but there are proposals circulating that to gain representation in the central parliament a party would have to pass a minimum threshold of 5.0% of the total vote. :

In the South African situation of many minor political, regional, and tribal parties. this would eliminate at least 17 parties representing up to 25% of voters' first preferences and would be flagrantly undemocratic. Unless some of the parties representing homeland interests amalgamated. only three parties would be left, the ANC, Inkatha. and the NP.

A major beneficiary would be the NP which could potentially hold up to 28% of the federal legislature. Inkatha would also more than double its vote. This tendency to favour the major parties would occur automatically with any cut-off, since voters would have to number party lists in order of preference in case their first choice was eliminated, and these preferences would finally gravitate to the few large parties left.

In the context of a clear separation of the powers of the executive and the legislature, which eliminates inherent problems where there is a multiplicity of small parties, a cut-off point, set at a minimum percentage of the total vote before a party is awarded any seats. is a clear manipulation of the electoral system and must

be hotly opposed.

SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE

This P.R. system uses large multi member electorates, usually returning between 4 to 6 representatives each. Theoretically a successful candidate in a five member electorate would have to win one fifth of the total votes cast, though in practice it is a little less.

Electors have only one effective vote but number the candidates in their electorate in the order of their preference. This can leave electors in control of which MPs are selected, and would permit any minority of reasonable size within an electorate to gain at least one representative at federal level.

The most popular candidate inevitably has a surplus of first preference votes above those needed to win a seat. This surplus is allocated to those voters' second choices. A second candidate may in turn gain a surplus of votes and this surplus is again allocated to his supporters' next choice. A point is usually reached where even with the redistribution of surplus votes. none of the remaining candidates has enough votes to gain a seat. At this point the lowest polling candidate's votes are redistributed, and then the next, until all of the electorate's seats have a preferred candidate.

This system would allow the election of candidates representing several different parties from one geographical electorate, and so avoid the suppression of minority viewpoints at the local level which occurs with first past the post voting. Nationally only very small parties would still fail to gain representation

somewhere. For all others. the proportion of parliamentary seats they won would correspond approximately to their proportion of the total vote.

For all but very small parties this system combines the fairness of elections by P.R. with the responsibility of a representative to the people of a particular district, which is the strength of the first past the post system.

Since all voters could feel that their vote counted for something, more of the people are likely to actively participate in elections to the benefit of real democracy.

Because votes which do not succeed in electing their preferred candidate are automatically allocated to each voter's next preference, single transferable voting would greatly hasten the development of cross racial voting. It would also be invaluable in the selection of committees to represent multi-racial organizations.

MIXED MEMBER SYSTEMS

This system elects 50 to 80% of MPs by either first past the post election from single member electorates. or by single transferable vote from multi member electorates. The remainder are chosen from party lists to ensure that each party's final representation is proportional to the number of votes it has received. Final representation is almost the same as that with a list system.

Voters may vote just for an individual or for a list for their own electorate, or the system may allow one effective vote for a local representative and a second for a party at national level.

This system is fairer to very small parties. and to ethnic minorities thinly spread amongst a dominant racial group, than a single transferable vote system on its own, and largely retains the responsibility of a representative to the people of a particular district. However it does give party bosses the power to select the additional list MPs so this proportion should be kept as small as possible.

It would be possible of course to require that all candidates on the party list had been selected somewhere by local party members for their electorate and would therefore have to actively campaign for election, but in that case the party bosses would still decide the ranking of unsuccessful candidates for list seats. It would also be possible to require that list members be the highest polling unsuccessful candidates for each party. which would remove the choice entirely from party bosses and ensure the responsiveness of all MPs to local issues if they wished to be successful next time.

Besides the main parties, at least the CP, DP, LP, Solidarity and some homeland groupings would win regional seats in their own right before list entitlements were distributed.

This would seem to be by far the most desirable P.R. system by which to elect federal and state legislatures.

VOTER TURNOUT

It is impossible to state with complete accuracy how many of the eligible voters of each ethnic group will actually vote. but it is not impossible to make reasonable estimates.)

On the basis of widespread evidence from other countries, it is reasonably certain that a greater proportion of voters from higher socio economic groups will actually vote. and on this basis the voter turnout by ethnic group can be ranked with a fair degree of certainty, from highest to lowest, as White, Indian, Coloured, and Black.

On overseas evidence an 80% turnout at elections is regarded as very high. Even with the passionately felt divisions amongst South African Whites, their turnout in the May 1987 election was only 67.97% and in the September 1989 election 69.66%. The highest White voting turnout ever recorded in South Africa was 85.5% in the referendum on 17 March 1992 on negotiations with Blacks for a new constitution.

To indicate the likely results of one man one vote elections based on proportional representation, the following arbitrary voter turnout figures have been used.

Black 65%
Coloured 67%
Indian 70%
White 5%

The White figure is higher than that in previous White only elections since Whites who were previously confused about the issues, or indifferent about the outcome. will be faced with the very clear issue of maximising their representation in the common parliament, and are likely to be under heavy social pressure to exercise their vote.

In the evphoria associated with a new constitution, and the intense rivalry between political parties. there could well be a 10 to 15% higher turnout of all races. as indicated by the 85.5% White turnout in the March 1992 referendum. This enthusiasm is likely to fade with ensuing elections as people find that changes in government only bring about slow changes in the economy and in social conditions.

People of any race who find that their vote is ineffective in gaining their chosen representation. or bringing about desired change, will certainly vote in lower numbers than those taking part in critical contests where every vote counts. From the results in other underdeveloped countries the Black vote in some areas could well fall as low as 50% of eligible Black voters. In any likely situation a margin of a 10% higher White turnout than Black is probably a conservative estimate.

The estimates above, with an average voter turnout of 67%, form a reasonable basis for predicting the outcome of elections and the consequent future political

development of South Africa. Based on 1985 populations. White voters would cast 19.3% of the total vote. Coloured voters 8.1%. Indian voters 2.7% and Black voters 69.9%.

THE FEDERAL LEGISLATURE

If 2 mixed member system of proportional representation was adopted. then with 18.5 million voters in South Africa in 1985, of whom only about 67% would probably vote, viewpoints shared by political or ethnic groups as small as 46,250 voters. or one quarter of one per cent of all voters. would be adequately represented in a federal legislature of just 400 members. No significant group could say they had been unjustly treated.

With a population nearing 40.0 million, approximately one member per 100,000 South Africans would also be an appropriate size for South Africa. Four hundred members would be big enough to allow backbenchers of any 200 plus governing coalition to solidly outvote members of the executive, under secretaries and party whips, who are usually constrained to follow executive decisions. Control of policy would therefore remain with ordinary MPs.

Even with total separation of the executive from the legislature, there would still be pressure on MPs from party leaders. and the whips of parties with a major say in executive decisions, to conform with executive policy. If final control of South Africa is to remain with parliament, backbenchers must have the effective freedom to prevent executive decisions, with which they disagree, from becoming binding caucus decisions for their party. This would greatly improve the quality of decision making. the nature of political debate, and confidence in the government across all sections of the public.

To provide for representation by local region. at least 66% or 264 members could be directly elected from 52 multi member constituencies with 3 to 7 members each - a little over 70,000 voters per directly elected member. Thirty-four per cent or 136 seats could be allocated to parties indirectly to ensure their final representation in the federal legislature was proportional to the number of first preference votes they had received in the direct elections.

This would ensure that most local constituencies had at least one directly elected member who was reasonably acceptable to most of its minority ethnic or minority political groups, while also ensuring that total representation in the federal legislature fairly represented all ethnic and political viewpoints.

Table 19 shows the direct and indirect representation states and provinces would gain in a 400 member federal legislature, based on their voting population in 1985 and the proportion of it that would actually vote.

For directly elected members each state would be approximately represented in the legislature in proportion to its voting population. Only people who actually voted would influence the final total of seats allocated to each party. Parties would gain seats in direct proportion to their total number of first preference votes, which

would provide minoritics with the full benefit of their older age structure and probable greater turnout at clelections.

The indirectly elected members shown actually represent the contribution made by each state or province to the 136 list members, since it is not strictly accurate to allocate indirectly elected members to a state. Even if all candidates on the party list were selected by local party members and actively campaigned for local election. and those appointed as list MPs were the highest polling unsuccessful candidates for each party. this would not necessarily ensure an equitable geographical spread of list MPs.

An estimated 70.5% of Orange River voters are likely to actually vote. and as many as 72.7% from Rand. compared with 65.9% of all voters in Black states. This higher turnout would have the effect of increasing Orange River's representation in the 400 member legislature by 6 seats.

Table 19
Representation By State With P.R. Voting 1985

Voting Actual	264 By	136 By	
Provinces Population	Voters	Direct	Indirect
* (000's)	(000's)	Election	Election
North Cape	196 135 3 1		
N. W. Cape	217 149 3 2		
S. W. Cape	1551 1072 22 13		
Central Cape	338 237 5 3		
Rand	1501 1091 21 14		
Vaal F. S.	705 495 6		
States			
Orange River	4508 3179 39		
Eastern Cape	2470 1618 17		
Eastern Free State	794 522 6		
South West Transvaal	1550 1020 01		
North Central Transvaal	1822 1193 12		
North Transvaal	242 158 1		
North East Transvaal	383 251 2		
Eastern Transvaal	520 343 4		
Central Transvaal	367 245 3		
South Central Transvaal	197 135 1		
Klip River	1785 1164 26 12		
Natal	3863 2571 55 28		
South Africa	18501 12399 264 136		

If this voter turnout actually occurred. White voters would be likely to gain 19.3% of the total representation in the federal legislature, Coloured voters 8.1%,

Indian voters 2.7% and Black voters 69.9. Total minority representation would be 30.1%.

The wide range of political viewpoints amongst all ethnic and tribal groups would also be fairly represented. which would be helpful for the development of cross racial politics at federal level. Black political views are much more diverse than the news making actions of the majority players would indicate, and the diversity of views in a legislature elected by proportional representation would be added to by the fact that legislators would come from 12 different states and ten different homelands.

A diverse array of political opinion from each of the population groups would allow moderates from all parties and all races to form a pragmatic middle of the way government. It would be very difficult for any single party to dictate to all the rest which would protect all minorities. Black and non Black. A majority coalition however could still implement its policies as long as they were legitimate under the constitution.

Table 20
Representation By State With P.R. Voting 2020

Voting Actual 264 By 136 By

Provinces Population ~(000s)	Population (000's)	Voters Direct Election	Indirect Election
North Cape	295	202	2
N. W. Cape	381	259	3
S. W. Cape	3678	2513	24
Central Cape	705	491	5
Rand	3920	2793	26
Vaal F. S.	1317	923	9
States			
Orange River	10296	7181	69
Eastern Cape	3892	2542	26
Eastern Free State	1324	866	9
South West Transvaal	2896	1892	19
North Central Transvaal	3173	2068	21
North Transvaal	333	217	2
North East Transvaal	181	314	3
Eastern Transvaal	751	493	5
Central Transvaal	811	534	>
South Central Transvaal	527	349	4
Klip River	6724	4378	45
Natal	8470	5588	56
South Africa	39678	26422	264
		136	

South Africa's politics have until now been hugely dominated by questions of race, and party policies on other issues have frequently not been widely known.

With questions of race largely disposed of by the new constitution, and with a common multi-racial parliament. the new cleavages which will dominate debate are the traditional ones throughout the world of rich versus poor, and the best ways to stimulate economic growth and increase everyone's standards of living. These are issues on which all races will be split. and multi-racial coalitions sharing a common economic and social viewpoint are certain to arise.

By 2020 the balance of population between the states and between the races will have altered considerably. States and provinces would gain direct and indirect representation in a 400 member legislature as shown in Table 20.

The new distribution of seats in the legislature in 2020 reflects the movement of South Africa's population to the central PWV area and to Natal. Seven states, whose territory lies mostly or entirely outside these growth areas, have lost an average of 22.5% of their original representation, with individual states losing from 12% in South West Transvaal to 40% for North Transvaal. Klip River would make a 74% gain in representation and begin to rival Natal as the most important Black state. Changes in representation by state are compared in Table 21.

Table 21
Changes in Representation By State With P.R. Voting
264 By Direct | 136 By Indirect Total
Election Election Seats

Provinces	1985	2020	1985	2020	1985	2020
North Cape	3	2	1	1	4	3
N. W. Cape	3	3	2	1	5	4
S. W. Cape	22	24	13	14	35	38
Central Cape	5	5	3	3	8	8
Rand	21	26	14	16	35	42
Vaal F. S.	10	9	6	5	16	14
Orange River	64	69	39	40	103	109
Eastern Cape	35	26	17	13	52	39
Eastern Free State	11	9	6	4	17	13
South West Transvaal	22	19	11	10	33	29
North Central Transvaal	26	21	12	10	38	31
North Transvaal	4	2	1	1	5	3
North East Transvaal	6	3	2	2	8	5
Eastern Transvaal	7	5	4	2	11	7
Central Transvaal	5	5	3	3	8	8
South Central Transvaal	3	4	1	1	4	5
Klip River	26	45	12	21	38	66
Natal	55	56	28	29	83	85
South Africa	264	264	136	136	400	400

An estimated 69.7% of Orange River voters are likely to actually vote in 2020, and as many as 71.3% from Rand, compared with 65.5% of all voters in Black states. Despite a 0.8% reduction in turnout due to its changing population composition, the slightly higher proportion of the population in Orange River would maintain a 6 seat increased representation in the 400 member legislature due to its higher voter turnout. '

If this voter turnout actually occurred in 2020, White voters would be likely to gain 15.1% of the total representation in the legislature, Coloured voters 7.1%. Indian voters 2.2% and Black voters 75.6%. Total minority representation would be 24.4% which would still be enough to exercise considerable influence in the federal government.

Electing the legislature by P.R., with no minimum percentage of the vote required for a party to gain representation, provides the fairest possible result and also provides the best protection for minorities everywhere, whether Black or White, which is consistent with the necessary aims of a settlement constitution.

Since a mixed member system of P.R. can retain the responsibility of a representative to the people of a particular district, and can minimize the power of party bosses to select list representatives, a mixed member system, using multi member electorates for at least two thirds of the members plus a list system for the remainder, should be the preferred South African system.

The size of the legislature should be dictated by the number of members needed to ensure that final control of the legislative process remains with parliament and not the executive. A legislature of 400 members ensures this. It is also consistent with ensuring that views within the smallest units of the federation are reasonably represented, which requires such areas to directly elect at least 3 representatives by single transferable vote.

THE FEDERAL SENATE

Since representation of ethnic groups in the Federal House of Representatives is open ended, depending finally on the proportion of each ethnic group in the federation, the representation of minorities in the legislature could become very low and cease to adequately protect their interests.

To provide for this eventuality a senate is required to put a check on the legislature, and this senate should provide for permanent over representation of minorities. Since separate electoral rolls for minorities have been discarded as an electoral tool, this can only be done by over representing Orange River unless resort is had to list senators.

The aim of over representing states in most federations is to protect the interests of the smaller states, but in South Africa the most obvious interests needing protection are those of the minorities, the Whites, Coloureds and Indians, whose power base is actually the largest state.

The minimum representation in the Senate for Orange River should therefore be fixed at 30%. instead of at its share of South Africa's population in 1985 of 23.9%. and in 2020 of 25.1%.

Orange River's share of those who would actually vote is likely to be 25.6% based on the 1985 population and 27.2% in 2020 so the advantage conferred is much less than it appears.

Orange River's share of the national vote will increase by 2020 due to a slightly increased share of the total population. an increased proportion of permanent residents who vote there. and a decreased proportion of the White group with its older age structure in the population of other states.

Although Blacks would cast 20.0% of Orange River's votes for the senate. on the basis of 1985 populations. and 30.7% in 2020. a 30% share of senate seats would still ensure that minorities had a solid representation in the early formative years of the federation.

The eleven mainly Black states would each receive their proportion of the other 70% of seats on a population basis, rounded to the nearest whole number, but to give extra representation to the smaller states, one seat would first be allocated to each of the eleven states.

It is essential that elections to the senate be by P.R. to ensure fair representation in the senate of all ethnic and political groups, both Black and White, from all states. However the major intent of senate elections is to provide representation on a state or local district basis, so list and mixed member systems of P.R. are unsuitable.

ALL senators should be directly elected from multi member electorates within each state's boundaries, by electors casting a single vote, transferable according to the voter's preference. Senators should have to reside in the district from which they are elected. On a nationwide basis this would provide fair representation for all but the smallest ethnic or political groups, but these would already be represented in the legislature. The boundaries of the multi member electorates for the senate would coincide with those for the 264 directly elected members of the legislature. '

The idea put forward that each state should decide how to select its own senators, and their term of office. is totally insupportable and would lead to all kinds of injustice for all but the dominant groups in each state.

Because small states or provinces will have few seats to contest. their elections will tend to return only senators representing the strongest parties, because the minimum quota required for a small party to win a seat would be quite high even if the whole state were to be regarded as one constituency The senate must therefore be sufficiently large to provide at least 4 or 5 senators from most states.

If the senate were to consist of 250 seats Orange River would receive a permanent allocation of 75, or 30%. The formula for population per senate seat for the 175 seats allocated to the 11 Black states would be :

Population of South Africa - Population of Orange River
175 - 11 seats

In 1985 this would have produced the following result.

14 1/2 million - 8.24 million
million - 8.24 million 160 000 people per senate seat
164 seats

An example of the outcome would be North Transvaal including Venda which had only 460 000 people in 1985. It would have been allocated 2.875 seats, which rounded up and adding one would have given it 4 seats in a 250 seat senate. Table 22 details the senators each state would have received in 1985 compared with its proportion of South Africa's population.

" Table 22

State Senators on 1985 Populations

Population

(000s) % Senators %

Orange River	8238		23.9	75		300
Eastern Cape	4603		13.4	30		12.0
Eastern Free State	1428		4.2	10		40
South West Transvaal	2876		8.3	19		16
North Central Transvaal	3454		100	23		9.2
North Transvaal	460		1.3	4		1.6
North East Transvaal	714		2.1	5		20
Eastern Transvaal	966		2.8	7		28
Central Transvaal	690		2.0	5		20
South Central Transvaal	386		1.1	3		1.2
Klip River	3457		10.0	23		9.2
Natal	7223		20.9	46		18.4
South Africa	34495		100.0	250		100.0

Only the five largest Black states have a proportion of senators appreciably less than their proportion of the population.

The 75 seats allocated to Orange River could be distributed amongst its six

provinces on a similar basis to that for the 11 Black states, with one seat first being allocated to each of the six provinces. then the population per senator being calculated by dividing Orange River's population by 69.

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v Table 23 shows the allocation of senators for both states and provinces in 2020,

-j compared with their proportion of South Africa's population. It also compares

ï-\201 : senators based on 1985 populations with those in 2020.

E Table 23

â\200\230 State Senators in 1985 and 2020

%..

Population

Provinces (000's) Scnators Senators

2020 % 2020 % 1985

North Cape 505 0.7 3 1.2 4

N. W. Cape 656 0.9 4 1.6 4

S. W. Cape 6296 9.1 26 10.4 24

Central Cape 1185 1.7 6 2.4 6

Rand 6455 93 26 10.4 23

Vaal F. S. 2321 34 10 4.0 14

States

Orange River 17418 25.1 75 300 75

Eastern Cape 6855 9.9 23 9.2 30

Eastern Free State 2310 3.3 8 3.2 10

South West Transvaal 5110 74 17 6.8 19

North Central Transvaal 5630 8.1 19 7.6 23

North Transvaal 590 08 3 12 4

North East Transvaal 845 1.2 4 1.6 5

Eastern Transvaal 1319 1.9 5 20 7

Central Transvaal 1436 2.1 5 2.0 5

South Central Transvaal 939 1.4 4 1.6 3

Klip River 11999 17.3 39 15.6 23

Natal 14905 21.5 48 19.2 46

South Africa 69356 100.0 250 100.0 250

In 2020 all provinces of Orange River would be slightly over represented and the smaller ones considerably over represented. The four smallest Black states

would also be over represented and three of them would have a greater per capita representation in the senate than Rand. Only the five largest Black states would be a little under represented.

The new distribution of senators in 2020 reflects the movement of South Africa's population to the central PWV area and to Natal. Seven states whose territory lies mostly or entirely outside these growth areas have typically lost about . 20% of their original representation in the senate.

In 1985 and 2020 the system of senate elections described above would provide senators representing minority groups approximately as shown in Table 24.

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Table 24
Minority Senators on 1985 and 2020 Populations

1985	2020
Provinces	Scats White Coloured Scats White Coloured
North Cape	4 3 3 1 2
N. W. Cape	4 3 4 1 3
S. W. Cape	24 12 26 7 11
Central Cape	6 3 6 3 2
Rand	23 26 17 1
Vaal F. S.	14 10 6
States	
Orange River	75 75 35 19
Eastern Cape	30 23
Eastern Free State	10 8
Sth West Transvaal	19 17
Nth Central Transvaal	
Nth Transvaal	
Nth East Transvaal	
Eastern Transvaal	
Central Transvaal	
Sth Central Transvaal	
Klip River	1 1
Natal	*4 2 3
South Africa	250 53 26 250 37 23
* Indian Senators	

On 1985 population figures, 79 of the 250 senators or 31.6% of the total would represent minorities, with 18 coming from outside Orange River. White voters would elect 13 senators. 40 of them from Orange River. there would be 22 Coloured senators. 21 of them from Orange River, and 4 Indian senators all of whom would be from Durban. There would also be 14 Black senators from Orange River.

Minority representation in the senate of 31.6% would compare favourably with a total minority population in South Africa of 25.2% in 1985, but would not be over generous considering minorities would be likely to cast 30.1% of the total vote.

Whites. with only 14.4% of the population, would have 21.2% of the representation but would be likely to cast 19.3% of the vote. Coloureds, with only 8.3% of the population, would have 8.8% of the representation and would be likely to cast 8.1% of the vote. Only Indians, with 2.5% of the population, who would be likely to cast 2.7% of the vote would be under represented with just 1.6% of the representation.

Which political parties senators mainly elected by minorities would represent is of course another matter. since many of them would be politically opposed to each other. However with 75 senators from Orange River. 34 from small states that each have less than 5% of South Africa's population. and 15 or 16 minority senators from larger Black states. the senate offers at least the possibility of effective opposition on some issues to the desires of larger Black groups.

On 2020 population figures approximately 60 of the 250 senators would represent minorities. or 24.0% of the total, with only 6 of the 60 coming from outside Orange River. White voters would elect 37 senators, 35 of them from Orange River. there would be 20 Coloured senators. 19 of them from Orange River, and 3 Indian senators all of whom would be from Durban. There would also be 21 Black senators from Orange River.

Minority representation in the senate of 24.0% in 2020 again compares favourably with a total minority population in South Africa of 20.9%, but is not over generous considering minorities are likely to cast 24.4% of the total vote. Unless Orange River elects 30% of all senators. minorities would be considerably under represented by 2020. since the proportion of minority voters, even in multi member electorates, would be too low for them to gain fair representation.

In 2020 Whites. with 11.8% of the population, would have 14.8% of representation but would be likely to cast 15.1% of the vote. Coloureds, with 7.1% of the population. would have 8.0% of representation and would be likely to cast 7.1% of the vote. Indians. with 2.1% of the population and likely to cast 2.2% of the vote. would be still under represented with just 1.2% of the senators.

Table 25 compares the election of senators by proportional representation from multi member electorates (P.R.) and by first past the post from single member electorates. (FPP)

The increase with a P.R. system on 1985 populations, from 8 to 18 minority senators from Black states. dramatically underlines the automatic suppression of minority viewpoints with a first past the post system. P.R. makes it possible for thinly distributed minorities to elect at least one representative from a multi member electorate. However by 2020 the proportion of minority voters in most multi member electorates outside Orange River would be too low for them to gain representation from any states but Natal and Klip River.

First past the post also suppresses Black representation from Orange River by at least three seats. although with either system Black senators from Orange River will increase by six or seven by 2020 as the proportion of Blacks in its population increases.

P.R. gives minorities 79 seats on 1985 populations, a gain over FPP elections of 7, but gives them 3 less in 2020.

On 1985 populations using P.R., minorities would be about 1.5% over represented based on their proportion of all adults likely to vote, (30.1%) and about 0.4% under represented in 2020 as their proportion falls. With FPP elections, senators representing minority groups would be about 1.3% under represented in 1985 and about 0.8% over represented in 2020.

Table 25

Senators Representing Minorities With FPP and PR

Total Seats Minority Seats

FPP PR

Provinces 1985 2020 1985 | 2020 | 1985 | 2020

North Cape 4 2] 4 3 4 3

N. W. Cape 4 4 4 4 4 4

S. W. Cape 24 26 21 19 20 18

Central Cape 6 6 6 6 6 5

Rand 23 26 20 20 19 18

Vaal F. S. 14 10 9 6 8 6

States

Orange River ' 75 75 64 58 61 54

Eastern Cape 30 23 2

Eastern Free State 10 8

South West Transvaal 19 17

North Central Transvaal 23 19 1

North Transvaal 4 3

North East Transvaal 5 4

Eastern Transvaal 7] 5

Central Transvaal 5 5 1

South Central Transvaal 3 4 1

Klip River 23 39 1 1

Natal 46 48 8 5 10 5

South Africa 250 250 72 63 79 60

Since the election of senators by P.R. provides a fairer result, and also provides better protection of both Black and White minorities everywhere, which is consistent with the necessary aims of a settlement constitution, P.R. should be the preferred system for elcctions to the South African senate.

Preference voting in electorates with three to seven members, using a single transferable vote. should be the preferred method and senators should have to reside in the district from which they are elected.

SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT

If the system of proportional representation proposed in the previous chapter was adopted. South Africa would have a legislature and a senate in which all viewpoints. regions. and ethnic groups of any consequence would be fairly represented. which would encourage the acceptance of those institutions by all South Africans. However the public face of government, which would determine the overall success of the system, would come from the nature of the executive government and the personalities of its members.

To make reasonable judgments about the type of executive government best suited to South Africa, it is necessary to first determine the probable range of support for the various political parties who could be members of it, and the probable restrictions this would place on the realistic expression of public will by the legislature and the senate.

SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL PARTIES

In South Africa's present fluid political climate. where there has never been a nationwide test of political loyalties. it is impossible to accurately predict the outcome of national elections by party, or the parties that will be favoured by each ethnic or tribal group.

Nevertheless some general statements about the character of the new federal parliament are made possible by a study of the likely voting patterns of the four main ethnic groups. and the attitudes of the parties they are likely to elect.

On the basis of 1985 populations. if there was a 67% turnout of registered voters. White voters would cast 19.3% of the total vote for the legislature, Coloured voters 8.1%, Indian voters 2.7%. and Black voters 69.9%.

With a mixed member system of proportional representation, the effect of both Blacks and Whites mainly bloc voting for their own ethnic parties would be modified by the wide support given to both the NP and the ANC by Coloured and Indian voters. Some modification will also occur through the system of numbering party preferences on ballot papers. but before either effect can be taken into account. the basic political preferences of each group must be approximated.

A broad South African patriotism committed to non racial democracy can not. in the time available, overcome the basic tendency of both Black and White population groups to vote solidly for their own political parties. Namibia's people voted heavily along ethnic lines in early 1990, with the majority Ovambos of the North voting overwhelmingly for Swapo. but few members of other groups.

THE WHITE VOTE

By early 1992 the DP was estimated to have lost one quarter of its 20% support in the 1989 elections to the newly liberal NP. By-elections also indicated an approximate 20% swing of former NP supporters to the CP, but this was not followed through in the March 1992 referendum on the Codesa negotiations where the division between right wingers and moderates closely followed that of the 1989 elections. A DP vote of 15.0%, a right wing vote at the 1989 level of 31.8%, and a small majority supporting the NP therefore roughly indicated White viewpoints at that time.

By the time Whites begin voting for representatives in a common federal legislature, the issue of South Africa's future will have been settled. White voters are likely to settle into voting patterns which reflect their basic political orientation - cooperation in the new multi-racial society, or stonewalling wherever possible which does not seem to have much of a future.

Although the ANC appears agreeable to not banning right wing parties as such, the CP would be a dead end in its present form, forever excluded from any real influence in government. It would have great difficulty adapting its philosophy to operate successfully in a multi racial federal South Africa, since its policy of state enforced apartheid would be illegal under the new constitution.

The CP could take the position of a vociferous champion of state's rights, and an opponent of all laws whose aim was to reduce the voluntary segregation which would still be widespread within South African society. However this would not be enough to distinguish it from the NP which would also strongly support state and individual rights, and would be the main White influence at federal government level because of its generally cooperative attitudes towards other groups and parties.

It seems highly likely that the one third of CP support which is based mainly on anxiety about the future will revert to the NP, since the NP will once again be seen as the only party with a realistic ability to protect remaining White rights. A pragmatic NP would have no option but to genuinely support the rights of all minorities, so it could easily accommodate the viewpoint of more moderate CP voters. Since the NP would be the only White supported party to retain a prominent place in national affairs, other CP supporters would also slowly drift back to the NP and attempt to direct its policies in directions they considered desirable.

CP support will still be about 22% at the first national election, but thereafter the CP vote will increasingly be recaptured by the NP. It is nevertheless possible that a modified CP with 15 to 20% of the White vote could continue for many years as a vehicle for Afrikaner nationalism.

With the ending of apartheid, DP support is likely to revert to its basic core of mainly English speaking, liberal oriented, affluent urban Whites in Rand, Capetown, Port Elizabeth, East London and Durban at around 13% of the White vote. The DP may also attract a small Coloured and Indian constituency. White

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society would be in defensive mode for at least a generation following a settlement and the NP would be seen as offering more effective protection than the DP. The direct White vote for the ANC will be very small.

While the NP and DP seem fated to cooperate as they struggle for a new constitution. it is very unlikely that they will merge. Once the new constitution is in place. there will be room for only two long term political parties amongst Whites if they are to maximize their influence in the federal parliament. In time they will revert to a natural division of liberal and conservative which will be filled by the DP and NP.

It seems highly likely the NP will once again dominate White politics with around 64 to 65% of the White vote both at the federal level and within Orange River.

Once non Whites had an equal vote with Whites. both the liberal instincts of many NP and DP voters. and their own self interest as Whites. would lead them to strongly support Orange River's semi autonomy and the rights of non Black minorities in other states. In other words they will themselves become the object of their own liberal sympathies against a new potential domination.

The interests of liberal anti apartheid Whites are NOT precisely the same as those of Blacks and. once White domination of South Africa has been eliminated, are likely to become even less similar. At times their interests will be in direct conflict. This will not reduce basic NP cooperation with other parties and other races since real cooperation will be a necessity for peace and prosperity in the new South Africa.

With the majority of Coloured MPs deserting to the NP during 1991, and solid evidence that a majority of the Coloured people also now support the NP, it is no longer correct to see the NP as JUST representing White interests. However it most definitely still does represent White interests. It has simply added the interests of other minorities. since being in the same boat they are a natural constituency that will help keep the NP in government.

Attempts by the major parties to manipulate the electoral process to their advantage during the framing of the constitution could totally eliminate DP and CP representation at federal level, but it seems unlikely that the smaller parties at Codesa. supported by public opinion, would allow a high cut-off point in the votes a party received before it could succeed in gaining representation in the legislature.

On the above projections, of the 77 seats nominally representing the White vote in the 400 seat federal legislature, the ANC would take no seats, the NP 49 to 50, the DP 10 or 11. and the CP 17.

THE COLOURED VOTE

A strong boycott of the polls by Coloured voters in the 1989 elections could be construed not just as a protest against apartheid, but as indicating strong support for the ANC. This construction does not fit presently known facts.

Including registered voters in 17 electorates where LP members were returned unopposed. there were 12.6% more Coloured voters registered in 1989 than was possible given the proportion of the Coloured population of voting age. The proportion of possible voters who actually voted was consequently more like 22.7% than the 20.1% shown in the government gazette.

Only 69.66% of Whites voted in 1989 in an election arousing strong passions, so there is no reason to think that a greater proportion of Coloureds than Whites would have voted if there had been no boycotts. If only 65% of Coloureds would have actually voted. then 34.9% of the Coloured voters likely to vote did vote despite intimidation and strong moral pressure not to do so.

Over 75% of the remainder would have to support pro ANC parties for those parties to gain just 50% of the Coloured vote. This is totally unlikely. Coloured political opinion is in a state of flux as to whom it supports, with over half of LP representatives, and all of the representatives of two smaller Coloured parties, deserting to the NP during 1991. This gained control of the Coloured parliament for the NP.

During 1991 there was increasing evidence of a surge in Coloured support for de Klerk. but this support did not always extend to support for the NP. However Coloureds generally were uneasy about a future dominated by Blacks, and ANC activists in the western Cape learned that they were not synonymous with "the people".

Polls showed that of those who would vote, 49.2% would support the NP, 10.2% the LP and 9.3% the ANC. These three parties. and perhaps the DP, are likely to take nearly all Coloured votes for the federal legislature.

Extrapolating these polls to allow for other parties. don't knows and the effects of STV voting, the NP is likely to take 55.5% of the Coloured vote, the ANC 14.0%. the LP 14.5%. and the DP up to 16.0%. A majority of both Coloureds and Indians are likely to support the NP, since all minorities will share a common fate as a minority voice in the government of the new South Africa,

The LP gained 226,400 votes in the 1989 elections if a similar LP vote is allowed for electorates for which an LP member was returned unopposed as for those where votes were cast. A 14.5% share of the Coloured vote for the LP would be underwritten if two thirds of those LP voters remained loyal.

On these projections. of the 32 seats nominally representing the Coloured vote in the 400 seat federal legislature, pro ANC parties would be likely to take only 4 or 5. the LP 4 or 5, the DP 5. and the NP 17 or 18.

Distinctly Coloured parties other than the LP would be very unlikely to gain federal representation, and because of the small numbers of Coloured voters in Black states. the LP itself could not gain representation at state level outside Orange River. It would only maintain a party organization at all in areas where it could garner a reasonable number of votes towards federal representation. Coloured votes in most Black states, other than those for the ANC, would be likely to fall to the NP by default on a first or subsequent preference.

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All of the Coloured vote cast for national parties such as the ANC, NP and DP will be unidentifiable as Coloured votes, although many of those parties' candidates contesting directly elected seats in Coloured areas will be Coloured. Those candidates will doubtless put pressure on their party's leadership to ensure an equitable proportion of Coloured list members. This loss of identity with a distinctly Coloured party will not appeal to some Coloureds which will help maintain the LP in the Cape.

THE INDIAN VOTE

The Natal Indian Congress (NIC) has a long history of supporting the ANC, and a strong boycott of the polls by Indian voters in the 1989 elections could be construed as indicating general Indian support for both organizations. This construction does not fit presently known facts.

There were 32.9% more Indian voters registered in 1989 than was possible given the proportion of the Indian population of voting age. The proportion of possible voters who actually voted was consequently more like 30.9% than the 23.7% shown in the government gazette. If only 65% of Indians would have actually voted then 47.6% of the Indian voters likely to vote did vote, despite intimidation and strong moral pressure not to do so.

Nearly all of the remainder would have to support pro ANC parties for those parties to gain just 50% of the Indian vote. This is totally unlikely. Indian political opinion, like Coloured, is in a state of flux as to whom it supports but the pattern is even less predictable. Perhaps 30% who favour the ANC and its ally the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) are unlikely to change but up to one third could switch to the NP from other parties and from the uncommitted. Perhaps 10% could support the DP.

Solidarity is likely to remain the largest distinctly Indian party in national elections with a similar vote to the 1989 elections. A second Indian party, the NPP, will have its vote reduced on that gained in 1989. .

On these projections, of the 11 seats nominally representing the Indian vote in the 400 seat federal legislature, pro ANC parties would be likely to take 3, the NP 4, Solidarity 2, the NPP 1, and the DP 1.

All of the Indian vote cast for national parties such as the ANC, NP and DP will be unidentifiable as Indian votes, although many of those parties' candidates contesting directly elected seats in Indian areas will be Indian. Those candidates will doubtless put pressure on their party's leadership to ensure an equitable proportion of Indian list members. This loss of identity with a distinctly Indian party will not appeal to some Indians which will help maintain parties such as Solidarity and NIC.

Because of the very low number of Indian voters in most states and provinces, distinctly Indian parties would not even contest seats outside Natal except possibly

in Rand. Indian votes in most Black states. other than those for the ANC, would be likely to fall to the NP by default on a first or subsequent preference.

THE BLACK VOTE

Blacks will cast nearly 70% of South African votes compared with just over 30% by minorities so their preferences will be critical in deciding the nature of the new government. Since there has never been a nation wide election to test Black political loyalties it is difficult to gauge the degree of support given to the various political groups.

The ANC is very much the popular symbol of liberation and Nelson Mandela is a folk hero to many who is clearly seen to be negotiating with the White government for a new democratic constitution. ANC inspired marches, protests and riots have dominated the news for most of the past decade. so it is easy to think that apart from Inkatha in Natal. Black politics IS the ANC.

However as the inhabitants of Western democracies know, street politics seldom reflect the balance of power in a democratically elected legislature because moderates and conservatives seldom take to the streets. In addition the conservative tribes people of the rural homelands have had little opportunity to make their opinions known in ways that get in the news.

The ANC is a broad liberation movement rather than a political party, with members ranging from communists to social democrats. The moment it defines precisely where it stands politically it will lose support to other parties.

Polls show it commands the support of 70% of urban Blacks who make up 55% of Black voters. If it also had the support of 70% of rural Blacks outside Natal, it would still be lucky to gain an average of 60% of the total Black rural vote since this level would imply that over 40% of rural Zulus in Natal supported the ANC. or that its level of support was much more than 70% in a substantial proportion of rural areas outside Natal. Seventy per cent of the urban vote plus 60% of the Black rural vote would give the ANC just 65.5% Black support.

The ANC is likely to be most successful in areas where there is a direct contest between Blacks and Whites. or between Blacks and Coloureds, for political power. Where Black control is assured. political and tribal rivalries amongst Blacks are likely to see many successful challenges to ANC dominance.

Support for Inkatha could range as high as 22% of the Black vote, but even conservatively, Inkatha would get at least 15 to 16%. one tenth of it from outside Natal. Even with the passing of Buthelezi, Inkatha will still play an important role as the most prominent alternative to the ANC. Within Natal Inkatha would take over 60% of the Black vote.

An opinion poll by Drum magazine in mid 1991 showed that while 24% of Blacks on the Rand would be afraid to vote, only 4% would vote for Inkatha and 39% for the ANC. Since Zulus make up 20 to 25% of all Blacks on the Rand,

depending on how the Rand is defined. quite clearly most of them disassociate themselves from Inkatha which they link with the violent activities of migrant impis. Only a determined effort by Inkatha to stop the violence on the Rand will change these attitudes. Â¢

Inkatha will undoubtedly endeavour to adapt to an urban industrialized situation, because if it is powerful only in the rural arcas of KwaZulu. its influence in both Natal and South Africa will shrink. As a mainly Zulu party it can never have a very wide appeal to other Blacks. but if it was to form a moderate conscrvative alliance with Sofasonke type urban parties throughout South Africa. it would find a political niche amongst the dominantly urban population of the future and become a nationwide party of some importance.

At the moment no broad based urban conservative party exists amongst Blacks, but this niche will grow quite quickly in the new South Africa and cannot be filled by Inkatha and the conservative tribal partics as they are presently perceived.

Outside Natal. homeland parties are likely to average at least one quarter of the vote from within their collective territories and draw over 10% support from tribal members living cisewhere. This wonid give them around 12% of the total Black vote but their support would be split amongst at lcast nine parties none of which would have more than 3% of the total.

Many Blacks have a strong allegiance to their tribal group. however much this factor has been minimised by anti apartheid leaders in the interests of unity, and most homeland parties favour some kind of continuing autonomy within a South African federation. Unless parties such as the ANC can co-opt highly respected leaders of the various tribal groups to represent them, the vote for homeland parties could be even higher.

The struggle against apartheid presently unites the Black tribes against White domination, but with that gone the old tribal struggles for and against domination will certainly reassert themselves as they have done in every other ethnically mixed state in Black Africa. This does not mean that tribal rivalry will be the major force in future South African politics, but it will certainly be a strong contributing factor in the political alliances formed amongst Black parties.

For the majority of urban Blacks. tribal differences are masked by their common circumstances but the differences and loalties are still there. Only a minority. who have spent their lives in the city, feel themselves to be South African Blacks or to belong to the city they live in rather than to a tribal group. Azanian nationalism or Black consciousness. which stress clements that all Blacks have in common, are only deminant amongst highly politicized Blacks. For the great majority of rural Blacks the tribe is of far greater importance.

Support for PAC and Azapo may run as high as \$ or 6% for each in the PWV region but nationally they are not likely to gain much over 3% of the vote between them. PAC has little future in a multi racial South Africa, since its policies are as racially exclusive as those of the White CP. On the other hand if moderate Black parties such as Sofasonke organized throughout South Africa, they could collectively gain up to 5% of the total vote.

The philosophy of Black consciousness will probably continue to play a significant role in Eastern Cape, Klip River, Rand, Durban and Cape Town, wherever direct competition between Blacks and Whites for political and economic power is most active. However it is unlikely to be a separate political force, since with the political predominance of Blacks in most areas of national life, Black consciousness will already be the mainstream.

A wild card in the Black vote is the degree of abstention from voting at all. The 1991 opinion poll by Drum magazine showed that 24% of Blacks in the PWV area would be afraid to vote, and that the ANC would get only 39% of the vote in a highly urbanized area where its support is supposedly 70%. In addition, at least 20% of all Blacks are members of the Zion Christian church which has no place for people who undermine the security of the land or break the country's laws. Zionists live their faith to a far greater degree than most other groups in South Africa and are extremely unlikely to vote for radicals.

On these projections, of the 280 seats nominally representing the Black vote in the 400 seat federal legislature, the ANC would take 180 or 181, Inkatha 45 or 46, the nine homeland parties 29. Sifiso type parties 16. PAC and Azapo 4 each, and the NP 1. Inkatha, Sifiso and the NP are likely to benefit from second and subsequent preference votes from voters for the homeland parties.

While there is likely to be increasingly close cooperation between all races for the common good, first preference cross racial voting of Blacks for minority parties, and minorities for Black parties, will not play a major role for at least a generation. Well educated or wealthy Blacks will vote en bloc for Black political parties just as much as the uneducated, because of their alienation from White interests. When the NP opened its membership to all races in August 1990, the ANC's information chief said he could not conceive why Blacks would want to join.

If the ANC gains 65.5% of the Black vote as projected, 95.7% of its support would come from Black groups. Inkatha, the second largest group, would be fairly solidly Black.

Only in Orange River will the ANC be truly multi-racial, initially drawing around 23% of its support from minorities. Continued minority support will depend mainly on the actions of the ANC nationally. If it is perceived as being mainly a party for Blacks, minority support will drop.

The proportion of federal legislators representing Black or mainly Black parties is likely to grow from 72.0% to 76.0% by 2020 as the proportion of Blacks in South Africa's population increases.

While the vote for strictly tribal parties will diminish with increasing urbanization, the ANC is also likely to undergo a schism into two different parties at some time in the future. There is a strong communist representation amongst the ANC leadership, a militant faction amongst its rank and file, and party members generally are considerably more radical than most ANC supporters. Equally possible is that the sobering reality of sharing responsibility for the development of

South Africa will lead to pragmatism amongst the ANC's radical members, as it has for many other idealologues upon reaching power.

CHARACTER OF THE FEDERAL LEGISLATURE

What will be the character of a South African federal legislature elected by a mixed member system of proportional representation? From the general indications above a reasonable estimate would give the lineup of parties shown in Table 26. if the ANC took 65.5% of the Black vote. The line ups if the ANC took 45%. 60% and 70% of the Black vote are given for comparison.

Table 26
Possible Representation in the First Federal Legislature

ANC Proportion of Black Vote 45% | 60% | 65.5% | 70%
Seats

African National Congress (ANC)	134	192	205
Inkatha Freedom Party (TFP)	68	43	39
National Party (NP)	75	73	3
Conservative Party (CP)	17	17	17
Democratic Party (DP)	16	16	16
Labour Party (LP)	4	4	4
National Peoples Party (NPP)	1	1	1
Solidarity (S)	2	2	2
Pan African Congress (PAC)	6	4	3
Azanian Peoples Organization (Azapo)	6	4	3
Sofasonke type parties	23	16	15
Homeland parties	48	34	29
Total Seats	400	400	400

The most significant fact about the new legislature is that the ANC will be by far the largest party. with around half the seats. The balance will be split amongst at least 19 other parties. including 9 representing the various homelands. Despite the fact that there is a rough balance in the legislature between radicals on the one hand and moderate and conservative groups on the other, there is a severe risk from the outscet that as the only largs homogenous bloc the ANC will dominate all other viewpoints.

From the analysis of minority voting patterns in previous sections, the ANC is unlikely to gain more than 250,000 votes or 2.0% of the national vote from minorities who would cast 30% of all votes. This means that to gain just 50% of the national vote it must gain 68.6% of all votes cast by Blacks. This appears to be just outside the most probable 65.5% result shown above, so it could just fail to become the government in its own right.

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On the other hand if the ANC were to gain 5% of the national vote from minorities. it would only need 65% of the total Black vote to dominate government. Minorities and Zulus will cast 49.5% of the national vote so this would imply that if one third of Zulus and one sixth of minorities had voted for the ANC. it had gained 76.7% of all other Black votes. This also does not seem very likely.

Whatever the final outcome. the ANC will assuredly be the largest single party in the legislature and clearly be a dominating influence on the future of South Africa.

Despite the liberal. democratic views of Nelson Mandela and a few others, the spirit of much of the ANC leadership remains authoritarian and intolerant. Its ability to use its strength to divide and rule in perpetuity. or to ignore other major viewpoints by forming very limited coalitions. must be carefully guarded against. The system of executive government South Africa adopts must be designed to truly reflect the views of roughly a half of South Africans represented by the ANC and the other half split amongst a dozen viewpoints.

The NP with around 18% of the seats will be the second largest party, and the natural leader of any potential opposition grouping. It will no longer be a "White"â\200\235

â\200\230party but will draw over 30% of its support from Coloured and other non White voters.

The apparent swing of majority Coloured opinion to active support for the NP, the switch of many DP voters to the NP, and a probable switch back to the NP of many CP voters once a final settlement has been achieved, will dramatically alter potential NP influence in the future South Africa.

Without these changes the NP would potentially have controlled only around 8.5% of the federal legislature. although all minority parties together would have still controlled nearly 25%. With these changes. the NP will itself control over 18% of the federal legislature. This coherence in the minority viewpoint will place all minorities in a much stronger negotiating position in federal affairs.

At most the NP could only gain 28% of federal seats if it absorbed the support of all those not supporting dominantly Black parties. It would take an unrealistic one third of Black votes to actually elect the NP as a majority government on its own.

Inkatha with at least 11% of all seats. will be the third largest party in the federal legislature.

CHARACTER OF THE FEDERAL SENATE

If the ANC took 65.5% of the Black vote, then given the same probable distribution of voting preferences as in the legislature, representation by party in a 250 member senate elected by the single transferable vote system of proportional representation would be approximately as shown in Table 27.

The ANC. with nearly half the seats. would come as close to dominating the senate as it would to dominating the legislature. The balance of the seats would be split amongst at least 15 other parties. including 8 parties representing the homelands.

Because senators would represent regional multi member constituencies. four of the smallest parties represented in the Legislature would be eliminated and the senate would show the effect of the dominance of the major parties in various regions.

The NP with nearly 24% of the seats would be the second largest party, and the natural leader of any potential opposition grouping. Inkatha with nearly 10% of the seats would be the third largest party.

Table 27
Senators by Party

IFP	NP	CP	DP
Provinces			
North Cape 3			
"N. W. Cape 3			
S. W. Cape 13			
Central Cape 4			

12

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Rand

Vaal F. S.
States

Orange River
Eastern Cape
E Free State

S W Transvaal
N C Transvaal
N Transvaal

N E Transvaal
E Transvaal

C Transvaal

S C Transvaal]

Klip River 18 5
Natal 12 24 11 2
South Africa 121 24 39 6 9 2 2 7 20

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The homeland grouping would win proportionately more seats in the senate than in the legislature because its support would be mainly concentrated in seats that it could win. Most other parties, and especially the CP, would win less because part of their support would be scattered thinly amongst the supporters of other parties. The NP would benefit by as many as a dozen seats as the ultimate recipient of votes whose first preference was for other parties. :

On 1985 population figures 78 of the 250 senators would represent parties mainly supported by minorities. There could also be 2 Coloured and 2 Indian ANC senators elected to represent the ANC but these would have lost their independence of action. At 31.2%, minority party representation in the senate would be slightly more than expected because they would also have been the ultimate recipients of some anti ANC preferences from Black voters.

While the senate would provide a strong watching brief for state and regional interests, its overall political character would be very similar to that of the legislature and it would be unlikely to seriously challenge any laws that were passed there.

ALLIANCES

Although the ANC would almost certainly be able to form a coalition government with a bare majority which could legally exclude most other viewpoints, its present leadership appears to be aware of the need for government to have much broader support if South Africa is to achieve stability and rapid economic growth.

In any case, even following the normal P.R. tradition where a majority coalition forms the entire executive government, clearly the ANC could not form a strong government without including parties mainly representing minorities, or else including either Inkatha or most of the homeland parties which are anathema to it.

Since the active cooperation of minority groups is essential to the economic development of South Africa, and most of the minority parties are essentially moderate in their policies, the ANC would undoubtedly choose them as its main partners to gain a substantial working majority. This would also reflect ANC claims to stand for a multi racial South Africa.

This would appear to clear the way for the much mooted alliance between the ANC and the NP, which by itself would control two thirds of the legislature and 72% of the senate. De Klerk has said he is willing to serve in a government led by anyone who has been democratically elected under a new constitution, including Nelson Mandela. Such an alliance would effectively control policy making whether it formed a simple coalition government or was part of an all party executive.

However to totally exclude the large Inkatha and homeland party bloc from government would be unwise in the extreme in a situation of potential bloody conflict, and when stability and unity are essential to gain foreign backing for South Africa's economic development. While the ANC would be extremely reluctant to include Inkatha in a traditional formal governing coalition, the strongly business oriented NP would be extremely reluctant to leave it out.

Even if Buthelezi was no more than a tribal leader of the Zulus, he has the demonstrable support of at least 4.0 million of his people and is the only Black leader who can provide stability in Natal which has 21% of the people of South Africa. Inkatha's policies have been approved time and again by delegates to

Inkatha meetings and by overwhelming Inkatha victories in the legislative assembly of the 4.8 million KwaZulu homeland. Both Buthelezi and Inkatha must have a place in the new South Africa.

If the ANC only received 55% or less of the Black vote, it could itself be excluded from a majority coalition if the NP and DP chose to form a conservative alliance with Inkatha, the homeland parties and Sifiso. However this would be a very difficult and potentially unstable alliance of at least a dozen separate parties, with only a slim majority. No single partner would have more than 35% of the total voting strength. Such an alliance would tend to be an alliance of those who were against the ANC rather than one which truly shared a common forward looking policy.

It would be an extremely unwise choice for parties representing minorities. They would be siding mainly with regional parties who will be of declining importance as the percentage of Blacks living in the homelands falls from 54.6% in 1985 to 34.3% in 2020. Nearly half of those remaining in the homelands will also move to urban areas, little different from those outside the homelands. Black urbanization and industrialization is the direction South Africa must take, yet such an alliance would exclude most Black representatives from urban areas, and on some points oppose the policies they require.

While minority parties, Inkatha and the homeland parties would all have a strong common interest in opposing attempts by the ANC to increase the power of central government at the expense of the states, to form a governing alliance of those parties would be essentially to confront all the new forces emerging from Black urbanization, and would result in recurring unrest.

Minority parties themselves draw their strength from an urban, industrial, capitalist world, and would favour a working arrangement with the ANC which is the preferred party of mushrooming Black urban society. Whatever its past excesses and present internal divisions, the ANC is forward looking. A minority alliance with it would harness the main strands of the immediate future and move South Africa forward in a controlled way.

Minority parties would have much more underlying influence in a de facto partnership with the ANC than their 113 seats in a 400 seat legislature would indicate, since at all levels of Black support for the ANC below 60%, it could not pursue its policies against minority opposition without the support of Inkatha or some of the homeland parties.

The major alliance in the future South Africa is therefore certain to be between the ANC and the NP, but the potential stability such a strong partnership could bring must be cemented by somehow including Inkatha and the homeland parties which together would have as much voting strength as the NP.

There will be little difference on substantive social issues between most of the parties, whether they favour the centralizing of power in central government like the ANC, are regionally based like Inkatha and the homeland parties, or ethnically based like the NP, LP and Solidarity. Although their motives may differ greatly, from real identification with the disadvantaged, to simple pragmatism and the

need to ensure stability. they all accept the need to generate wealth as fast as possible to raise the living standards of the mainly Black poor. Only fringe groups like the White CP and the Black PAC and Azapo are likely to differ on the implications of this basic policy.

Differences in economic policy will center on the degree of state interference and control. and the extent of taxation. Minorities will generally opt for a minimum of state interference and maximum economic growth, and the ANC will probably err on the side of heavy taxation and spreading ownership and control of large companies even at the cost of slower growth.

Even when the politics of race have been disposed of by a new constitution, the great divide for the next 30 years will indirectly remain the politics of race. The divide will ostensibly be between the haves and have nots. but since minorities will be the most obvious haves. they will be in the forefront of parties trying to preserve the present economic system. Parties dependent mainly on minority support will therefore remain strong.

While given the makeup of the federal legislature and senate, the ANC is likely to find sufficient support to introduce modified forms of most of its policies, initially at least it would be in no position to strongly dictate the future shape of South Africa on its own.

The ANC could not quickly reshape South Africa socially and economically without compulsion and authoritarian rule, and even then it could not succeed without destroying the economy. It makes much more sense to build on the existing structures by a process of continual democratic modification by consensus.

As yet. the ANC is structurally too weak to govern South Africa alone. but any future government will need its charismatic appeal to confront problems in administering the schools and townships.

TYPES OF EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT

The adoption of one form of executive government over another cannot be considered without also considering the character of the future South African federal legislature and senate as previously outlined, the huge potential for bloodshed and instability if the ANC achieves political domination on its own. the need for rapid economic development if South Africa is to avoid disastrous unemployment. and the way in which different forms of executive government would impact on South Africa.

The executive could take eight main forms.

(1) The British system where the leader of the majority party in the legislature selects the executive from amongst his own MPs.

(2) The American system where an elected President selects an executive from the best people available. mostly from outside the legislature or senate.

(3) The present South African system where an executive President. selected by an electoral college drawn from the legislature. chooses his cabinet from the different parties in the legislature.

(4) A Council of Ministers nominated by the states could decide federal policy and a South African Commission which would be entirely a civil service organization could provide the administration.

(5) The Swiss system where the legislature and the senate jointly elect an executive from amongst their own members. and each year also elect one of them as federal president for a one year term.

(6) The KwaZulu Natal Indaba concept where the leader of a majority party appoints half the ministers and the other half is elected by a PR/STV system of voting by all of the other parties in both the legislature and the senate.

(7) A collective presidency consisting of the leaders of three to five of the largest parties in the legislature which would have to make its decisions by consensus.

(8) A president elected by popular vote could select his ministers from an all party executive elected by single transferable vote by a joint sitting of the legislature and the senate.

(1) The British System

The most common form of executive in democracies is where the leader of the largest party becomes Prime Minister and selects an executive cabinet entirely from amongst the members of his own party. When a coalition government is necessary, as seems likely to be the case in South Africa, this system is modified by deals which allocate some cabinet ministries to other parties.

Under this system South Africa would be governed. possibly for decades. by an ANC/NP alliance which would control two thirds of the legislature and 72% of the senate.

To totally exclude the large 72 seat Inkatha and homeland party bloc from government would be unwise in the extreme. One of the major sources of conflict in the history of independent Africa has been where significant political groupings have felt permanently excluded from a share of power.

Inkatha will be dominant in Natal, one of South Africa's major economic regions with 21% of the population. If Natal's main political grouping was

permanently denied a say in federal government. many of its people could feel that Natal was little better than a colony of South Africa.

Inkatha and the homeland partics both represent at least in part the values and customs of tribal Africa. Realistically these values and customs are under very real threat as Black South Africans become increasingly integrated into an urban industrial civilization. To permanently exclude the rcpresentatives of these tribal interests from executive government would be an invitation to conflict.

The situation in Natal since 1986 illustrates the way in which a government, totally dominated by onc party. can indirctly bring about violence even if it is democratically elected. The ANC has absolutely no voice in the government or parliament of KwaZulu. and the KwaZulu police force is not impartial in clashes between Inkatha and ANC supporters. Local KwaZulu ofTicials have been known to deny use of public facilities to people with the wrong political affiliation.

The hate generated by poverty and total impotence in affecting government policy expresses itself in violent attacks on people seen as agents of the government, and leads to equally violent attacks in return. People on both sides, who have seen their relatives die gruesome deaths and their houses burnt, will not easily lay down their arms.

Another- recurring problem with government by majority parliamentary parties or coalitions is that a group of ministers that is dominant in the executive can, through the discipline of cabinet rules. dominate their party caucuses and then through party discipline dominate the parliamentary process. This can lead to a situation where a group of dominant ministers can ram legislation through parliament which is not truly supported by a majority of their own party.

Drawing the governing executive from within the legislature has always had serious drawbacks in most democracics. When members of a majority party form the entire executive, the legislature runs the risk of just becoming a rubber stamp for it. In proportional represntation systems the legislature is a potential source of instability or weak government if a member party of a coalition withdraws or threatens to withdraw its support. _

In either case. since members of the executive are still also members of the legislature, the idea of the legislature as a forum to pass laws and keep a constructive check on the executive has been lost - to a dominant party leadership in the first example. and to parties sccking their own advantage in the second.

Unlike similar situations overseas where very divergent representation sometimes makes it very difficult to form an effective government, it appears as if an ANC/NP alliance could initially ensure strong government in South Africa. However the ANC and the NP represent naturally opposing constituencies and their marriage would only be one of convenience because they need each other. Future circumstances could easily arise where the NP would withdraw its support.

South Africa desperately needs the stability which an effective government can bring and cannot afford a system where loss of one partner's support in the legislature can bring down the executive. Neither can it afford an executive that can continue to govern when it no longer represents the majority of the country.

Because there is no consistent majority view on all issues in South Africa, and because of the real potential for bloody violence to destroy attempts at rapid economic development, it is essential that no one party or group of individuals in a coalition should be able to dominate or manipulate executive government. What is needed is a consensus, issue by issue, which will not always favour the same political party and will allow all groups to feel they have a real impact on at least some issues. The British system of government by parliamentary majority does not allow this to happen.

(2) The American System

In the American system a directly elected president selects an executive from the best people available, mostly from outside the legislature and senate. Although the president can dismiss members of his executive, the president himself is elected for a fixed term of four years.

In addition the executive and the legislature are entirely separate in their powers and functions. A legislature dominated by the president's own party will at times refuse to pass legislation put forward by the president.

Since the ANC will have by far the largest support of any single party, it is quite probable that South Africa would elect an ANC presidential candidate for several consecutive terms, because of the failure of a candidate from any other single party to gain wide enough support.

South Africa would also have a legislature in which the ANC would be by far the largest cohesive group and possibly be a majority. The only thing an opposition splintered into five main parties and over a dozen smaller ones would have would be a possible slight majority in numbers.

The only way opposition parties can avoid being manipulated by a coalition system, and use their numbers to maintain an effective check on an executive in which the ANC will play the largest single role, is to strictly follow the American idea of keeping the executive and the legislature entirely separate. Parties not in accord with policies advocated by the ANC would not then be constrained by their membership in a coalition government to vote for those policies. Legislation on any issue would be passed solely by the weight of numbers genuinely in favour.

On the other hand the American system of "to the victor the spoils", which allows elected presidents or state governors to appoint their own executive from outside the legislature, would be in the South African situation an invitation to corruption and the repayment of obligations.

It would also allow an ANC President, with very substantial guaranteed support in the legislature, too much power to appoint ANC sympathizers to every position of importance and to remake South Africa solely according to the ANC's own concepts.

For South Africa to develop a reasonable consensus on future policy, the executive, like the legislature and the senate, must reflect the main facets of South

African political opinion. The political opinions of a President. even from such a powerful group as the ANC, cannot be allowed to dominate executive government.

Any system that allows enormous authority to be given to a single person encourages them to become heavy handed and overbearing, and many ANC leaders already betray the authoritarian's drive for dominant power. Should an opposition leader become president the roles are simply reversed. In South Africa the greatest threat to democracy will come not from indecisive government. but from unbridled power, so a directly elected president cannot be allowed to choose the executive.

(3) The Present South African System

In the present South African system an executive President is selected for a five year term by an electoral college of 50 Whites, 25 Coloureds, and 13 Indians elected by a majority vote from each of the three separate communal legislatures. The President chairs a multi racial cabinet of his own choice, drawn proportionally from the three legislatures, to deal with "general" matters.

"General" legislation has to be decided by a concurrent majority in each of the three parliaments. or in the event of a deadlock. referred to a President's Council with a built in government majority which can give the State President power to pass legislation by decree. The President also chooses an executive council from each of the three legislatures which administers their "own" community concerns.

Elements of the present constitution which might possibly continue with a single, multi racial legislature are the election of an executive President by the legislature and his personal selection of a cabinet from within parliament. This would result in an executive which could not be deposed until the end of the president's term, which would ensure stability of administration.

However since the president would choose only members of parties that could be expected to support his administration. and the executive would still retain their seats in the legislature, the direct link between the executive and the legislature would remain. with the risk that the legislature would be just a rubber stamp for presidential policies.

In addition the president would be much more free from control by parliament than would a cabinet headed by a Prime Minister who could be voted out at any time.

The legislature must be kept entirely separate from the executive if it is to carry out its major role of keeping a constructive check on it. and the executive must be representative of all major groups.

(4) A Council of State Ministers

A Council of Ministers nominated by the states could certainly decide federal policy and a South African Commission, which would be entirely a civil service organization, could provide an even handed administration. The result would be more of a confederation than a federation.

Such a council would not be a democratic reflection of the opinions of all South Africans since ministers would only be nominated by the ruling party in each state. There could also be recurring disagreement on the weighting to be given to each state's vote.

Given that most South Africans of all races want a united country, not a confederation of independent states, such a council will not be considered.

(5) The Swiss System

The Swiss solution to the problem of a multi-party legislature is to include representatives of all of the main parties in cabinet so that issues of implementation as well as legislation may be decided after discussion by all parties.

The legislature and the senate together elect a federal executive of seven equally ranked ministers for a four year term with each minister being responsible for a department of state. Each year they also elect one of the ministers as federal president for a one year term, a position that involves little more than chairing the federal executive and a few ceremonial duties. The executive must have no more than one member from any of Switzerland's 26 cantons and two of its seven members must represent linguistic minorities. The ministers' functions are purely administrative and many Swiss do not even know the name of their current federal president.

Given the propensity for violence between opposing political factions in South Africa, and considering that the future South African parliament will be split between one large party with up to half of the seats - the ANC - and an opposition splintered into five main parties with at least 15 seats each and more than a dozen minor parties with perhaps 50 seats between them, the inclusion of all main groups in the cabinet is by far the best solution.

No major group need then feel itself excluded from or threatened by administrative power. Information available to the executive would be freely available to all parties, and while policy decisions would still be made by majorities, all groups would be aware of the reasons for those decisions and policy would tend much more often towards consensus. Clearly there would have to be room for ministers without portfolios in such an executive since ministers could not be expected to faithfully implement policies with which they strongly disagreed.

Electing an executive for a set four year term would ensure stability of administration, and providing it was carried out by the PR/STV system of voting. the concept of the legislature and the senate together electing the federal executive would provide a sound means of ensuring that all major viewpoints were represented in cabinet. The rules could also specify the maximum number of the executive that could be elected from one state.

However the Swiss system is not entirely suitable to South Africa since Switzerland has a very long tradition of democracy and its present rate of social. economic and political change is very slow. South Africa is undergoing very rapid change on all fronts and needs an executive which can respond rapidly to events. provide leadership. and guide policy making, not one which is purely administrative. While policies requiring legislation would have to gain the approval of both the legislature and the senate, the executive must be able to clearly indicate the need for such legislation and rapidly frame the laws it wants passed. .

The Swiss system also strongly retains the link between the legislature and the executive. This may be suitable for a body which is purely an administrative arm of parliament but is quite wrong for an executive which is actively framing policy and offering national leadership. The legislature must be entirely separate from such an executive if it is to properly perform its function of keeping a constructive check on it and passing sound laws.

(6) The KwaZulu Natal Indaba Concept

The Indaba concept, whereby the leader of a party which secures 50% or more of the legislative seats will appoint half the executive, and the other half will be elected by all of the other parties in both the legislature and the senate using the PR/STV system of voting. has much to commend it.

While a majority party would retain its domination in the legislature, it would only have a majority of one on the executive. which would encourage decision making by consensus amongst all major points of view.

The Indaba concept does retain the close link between the executive and the legislature which could make the latter a rubber stamp for a dominant party in the executive. What is worth adopting. to encourage power sharing and consensus. is the idea that even if a single party gains an absolute majority in both the South African legislature and senate, they will be limited to electing only 50% of the executive.

(7) A Collective Presidency

In September 1991 a proposal was put to the NP congress for an executive - which would be a collective body known as the Presidency and consist of the

leaders of three to five of the largest parties in the legislature. This multiple presidency would have to make its decisions by consensus.

The proposal drew on the Swiss model of a seven man executive, and Swiss advice was that to achieve consensus the executive must be kept small. No detail was provided to the congress as to how a choice would be made between a three, four or five person presidency.

The only merit in such a proposal is that it would include representatives of the main parties in the executive so that issues of implementation as well as legislation could be jointly decided.

However a three to five man executive is clearly too small to assume detailed responsibility for all of the departments of a modern state. Responsibility for those departments would have to devolve on other appointed politicians or on the professional civil service. The role of the collective presidency could only be to allow the major parties to monitor the activities of those departments and make final decisions on policy. There are better ways for this to be done.

The main thrust of the proposal, particularly in the context of its associated proposals aimed at limiting Black political domination, was obviously to introduce an NP veto at executive level under the guise of requiring consensus decisions. While the NP will clearly be a major partner in future government, and its views will receive careful consideration, its absolute right to a veto will never be accepted by Codesa.

Without a veto and in the absence of real consensus, a three to five person presidential executive would be extremely difficult to make work, even though it would only administer the law not make it. Majority decision making on the executive would not be accepted for long, particularly if many decisions went against the ANC, since its real level of public support would be greater than that of all the other executive members together.

It would prove much easier to gain a sufficient consensus of national opinion by majority decision in a much larger all party executive, which could come closer to truly representing all national viewpoints on any subject. Cabinets of 15 to 30 members are the norm amongst the world's democracies and they are quite able to function effectively since absolute consensus is not required.

A collective presidency by its very nature would also strongly retain the link between the legislature and the executive since executive members would be the leaders of the largest parties. This would prevent the legislature from performing its proper function of keeping a constructive check on the executive and passing sound laws.

(8) An Elected President and Executive

A president, elected by popular vote, could select his ministers from amongst an all party executive elected for a four year term by single transferable vote, by a joint sitting of the legislature and the senate. The legislature would be entirely

separate from such an executive which would enable it to properly perform its function of keeping a constructive check on it and passing sound laws.

Electing an executive for a set four year term would ensure stability of administration. and providing it was carried out by the PR/STV system of voting, the concept of the legislature and the senate together electing the federal executive would provide a sound means of ensuring that all major viewpoints were represented in cabinet in proportion to their national support. The rules could also specify the maximum number of the executive that could be elected from one state, although this appears unnecessary with STV voting.

Small parties in the legislature would cause no problems in elections by STV since their preferences would be expressed in those who were elected to the executive but their close control over them would disappear.

Such a system would provide an executive which could respond rapidly to events, provide national leadership. and actively frame policy. It would also encourage national unity since policies accepted by such an executive would have a very good chance of gaining approval in the legislature and the senate, and would be carefully formulated to meet real needs. Since the executive would broadly reflect the opinions of the legislature, its public policies would also be more likely to be in keeping with the laws passed by the legislature.

Being elected as a member of a majority party, or allied group of parties in parliament. would no longer necessarily mean that an MP would be part of the government. Parliament would be independent of the executive and could take it to task without endangering either the existence of the executive or risking a new election. .

Clearly political loyalties in any new South African legislature will be highly fragmented. with a probable distribution of seats approximating a 48% share for the ANC. 18 or 19% for the Inkatha/homeland grouping, and excluding the CP, 24% for moderate parties representing minority groups.

The new South Africa will not be able to function satisfactorily without the support of the urban based ANC. but neither will the ANC be able to effectively govern South Africa without the support of minority groups.

An alliance of Inkatha. the homeland parties and minority groups which tried to exclude the ANC would be highly fragmented, potentially unstable, and in almost certain regular violent confrontation with ANC backed unions and street mobs who would see such a government as little better than the White government it had displaced. Yet the alternative, of excluding Inkatha from government. and raising the fear that federal power might be used to suppress it. has the potential for even greater disruption and bloodshed.

Precedent in other Black countries indicates the danger of the public service, including the permanent police and the military forces, being increased in numbers to reward supporters of a new governing party for past loyalty. Together with Africanization. which allows the placing of government supporters at high levels, this tends to entrench the ruling party. To avoid this possibility, South Africa must

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have a system of government which does not allow one party to ever gain complete control of the executive.

The ANC., Inkatha and the minority groups are all essential to the peace and rapid development of South Africa and somehow must all be included in any governing executive. The personal and procedural difficulties of such an arrangement are not to be compared with the damage to South Africa's future of excluding any of them.

The system described above is as close to an all party governing executive as is attainable. Its adoption would be by far the best solution for South Africa since it would avoid a formal coalition which both the ANC and Inkatha would find difficult to accept. Instead the executive would be simply a reflection of the political views of the legislature. No major group need feel itself excluded from or threatened by administrative power, nor would it have to justify an alliance with its political opponents.

Reconciliation between Mandela and Buthelezi will be very difficult, particularly for Mandela who risks losing considerable anti Inkatha support to PAC, Azapo or other radical groups. Yet for South Africa's future this must happen. A representative executive would provide a reasonable forum where this could occur. i

The procedural difficulties. and the difficulties in reaching decisions experienced by such an executive, would actually be far less than those of many coalition governments which are frequently forced to compromise policy to keep their coalition together. Instead decisions could be made by simple majority on most issues and by "sufficient consensus" on important issues. The contests of policy which occur within any governing executive would simply cross party lines.

Such an executive appears to be a far more workable solution to a parliament composed of representatives from 12 semiautonomous states, and perhaps twenty political parties. than a prime ministerial or presidential solution resting on the continual need to command a majority coalition within parliament. It would also provide a widely accepted and very stable focus around which a real South African unity could develop. i

Parliament would remain the forum where legislation within federal jurisdiction was passed by simple majority vote in both houses, but a president and an executive elected for a four year term would run the effective government.

THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE

Under the last option discussed, a joint session of the legislature and the senate, chaired by the Chief Justice. would elect a federal executive very representative of the parties in the legislature, using the single transferable vote system. This executive would be ensured of serving out a four year term unless a two thirds majority of both the legislature and the senate passed a vote of no confidence in the president's administration. This power would be responsibly exercised since the

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constitution would also provide that if the legislature and senate voted to remove the executive. new elections would be held for all three institutions.

Successful candidates for the executive would have to cease all partisan party activity while serving in the government and swear to uphold the constitution. They would also have to accept the doctrine of collective responsibility. the principle which requires all ministers to accept cabinet decisions whether or not they agree with them No executive can function effectively if ministers constantly buck at decisions supposed to have been already settled.

It appears reasonably probable that no single party will have an absolute majority in both houses in the near future, but if they did. the Chief Justice would chair two sessions. one for the majority party to elect 50% of the executive. and one for all the other parties to elect the other 50%. The PR/STV system of voting would be used in both cases to prevent the dominant party's representatives from just representing a dominant faction within their party.

In circumstances where there was a majority party. the separately elected president would almost certainly be a member of it which would still give it a deciding vote on the executive.

It would be unnecessary to place a constitutional limit on the number of executive members elected from any one state, since electing 30 members by the STV system would ensure a good spread of representation. It would also allow each party to put forward its best candidates without the use of strategic voting procedures to gain a state's quota for. or deny it to. a particular party. Normally Orange River would supply 8 of the 30 member executive, and no other state would supply more than six.

The President would be bound to select 15 ministers from amongst his 30 member executive to head government departments. This would be done according to two rigidly applied rules.

(1) No single party could head more than 7 of the 15 ministries.

(2) No party could head a greater proportion of ministries than its proportion of representatives on the executive. To give the president a degree of choice. where strict proportionality resulted in half members, party quotas could be rounded up or down to the nearest whole number.

Given the probable composition of the legislature and the senate, a PR/STV election system would provide a 30 member executive with the following party loyalties. This could result in several different allocations of ministerial portfolios, the most likely of which are shown.

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Table 28
The Executive and Ministerial Portfolios

Party Executive | Possible Ministerial Portfolios
Members
ANC 13
[nkatha

NP

CP

DP

Sofasonke
Homeland Partics

30 15 15

Many of the small parties' candidates for the executive would have been eliminated during the voting but it would prebably still contain representatives of 8 sparate parties. These could be grouped into the ANC with 15 members, Black groups oposed to the ANC with 6 members and minority parties with 9 members. No group would hold an absolute majority and common policies would have to be reasonabl to be adopted.

At lcast 23 members of the 30 member executive. and 11 of the 15 ministers holding portfolios. would be favourably disposed towards the general policies which 2 de facto ANC/NP alliance might adopt. so the executive would face no problems of effectiveness. and minimal diffiulties in the allocation of crucial portfolios.

On most reasonable projections of its support. Inkatha would consistently be eligible for either one or two portfolios and it would make good sense for it to be two. It would also make good sense, so long as CP support was sufficient to gain them a seat on the executive. for the CP to head a ministry such as agriculture. the sector from which the CP draws the bulk of its hard core support. Responsibility for activitics such as closer rural scttlement need not be part of the agricultural portfolio.

Executive members not heading ministries could be allocated to departments as deputy ministers, or simply be ministers without portfolio. However all members of the exccutive would have an equal vote when it came to deciding matters of policy.

.'l'he President would obviously be free to allocate a small number of key

ministries to members of his own party. and have some freedom to choose as ministers, from amongst his political opponents. those members who were most compatible with his own philosophies. This would be reasonable since he would have to head a cabinet to which he could relate and for whose actions he would ultimately be held accountable at four yearly elections.

To prevent the president from always reallocating politically important matters to life portfolios of "trusted" ministers while other ministers were given only nominal duties. the responsibilities attached to the various ministries should be

defined in a codicil to the Codesa constitution. Modification of ministerial responsibilities not approved by 80% of the executive should require the approval of a two thirds majority in both houses.

Members of the legislature and senate who were elected to the executive would have to resign their seat to preserve the complete independence of the executive from the legislative arm of government. Since as few as 20% of those elected might have originally been appointed to the legislature from party lists, probably 24 of the country's 52 multi member electorates would lose one or more of their elected legislators or senators.

It would be entirely impractical to hold a by-election for just one member in a multi member electorate, and in any case the affected electorates would have just finished expressing their preferences. For vacancies in the senate therefore, the party an executive member had previously belonged to would appoint its highest polling unsuccessful candidate for the senate in the affected state. For vacancies in the legislature they would nominate the next highest polling candidate from their legislative list. A suitable list member in the legislature could also be appointed to directly represent the party in an executive member's former electorate.

Similar procedures are already followed in France where French ministers must give up their seats to substitutes. The removal of perhaps 12 senators in a house of 250, and perhaps 20 legislators in a house of 400, and their replacement by substitutes, would not affect the strength of individual parties or alter the expressed will of the voters.

If an executive member was to die, or to resign for reasons of ill health, it would be reasonable for the party to which he or she had belonged to elect a replacement, but if an executive member resigned in protest at government action, their place would be once again subject to election by the full legislature and senate. With only one member being elected, this would inevitably result in the strengthening of the dominant group on the executive, the opposite of what the resigning member would be trying to achieve.

Executive members belonging to parties opposing the general thrust of government policy would thus be unable to manipulate the government, and instead be forced to use reason and logic to achieve their aims.

Although at least 23 of the 30 executive members and 11 of the 15 ministers holding portfolios might support the general policies of a de facto ANC/NP alliance, other executive members would be far from powerless. Their views would not always be opposed to those of the majority and at times they would be decisive in formulating policy. They would also head 3 or 4 of the country's ministries. At worst they would have far more influence than in any other form of executive government that might be devised.

It is vitally important for the sake of stability and unity in South Africa that all important segments of political opinion take a real part, and be seen to take a real part, in the administration of the country at federal level. If South Africa's best interests are to be served, the first government at least needs to be a government of national reconciliation.

[It might be noted that such a representative executive fulfils the unity function which is the rationale behind a one party state, yet it leaves the parties making it up free to gain or lose support according to their public stance. The executive would therefore be highly responsive to changes in public opinion.

The problem that the word for democracy in many Black languages is the same as the word used for majority rule would be overcome with a representative executive in which decisions were made by either consensus or by majority decision.

At a practical level the same close cooperation of the ANC with minorities would continue within an all party executive government as would occur within a majority coalition government. but the relationship would be more flexible allowing for solid opposition to each other on some issues. Awareness by the ANC of the joint opposition of Inkatha, minority groups and the homeland parties, would prevent many issues from ever being tested, but neither side of the partnership would be obliged to support the other merely to prevent the fall of the government.

Practically the South African president would be first amongst equals on the executive. since although he would not choose its members. and except in special circumstances could not make them resign. he would chair the executive and could allocate and remove ministerial portfolios. His position would be akin to that of a chairman of a board of directors who is held responsible for a board's policy. even if some of the board are hostile to that policy.

The government could only administer existing laws, not make new ones, without the full cooperation of the legislature and the senate. Since there would be no governing party or formal governing coalition. parties could vote for or against legislation depending on the issue, although in practice legislation would be likely to be a compromise between major groups who together would have a majority. Executive proposals would face the power brokers of a parliament and senate largely unfettered by executive control.

Rejection of legislation proposed by the federal executive would not be seen as disastrous. but rather as a call to think again. Margaret Thatcher lost 100 votes on various measures while she was British Prime Minister.

The influence of the ANC. as by far the largest party. would be likely to be both more pervasive and less decisive with a representative executive government, which it seems likely to head for many years. On the plus side. its need to capture the assured support of at least some minority or homeland parties to remain the government would be greatly reduced, since the government it headed would not rise or fall on that support. On the negative side it would have to line up support in both the cabinet and the legislature for every new policy or piece of legislation with which it wished to proceed.

If the ANC wishes to permanently hold a major place in South African politics. it has to occupy a moderate middle of the way position. This would not compromise its determination to alleviate the poverty of the majority of Blacks since such an aim would be common to all moderate parties. It would however

compromise its socialist leanings by an accommodation with business interests. which is essential if the wealth required for its social policies is to be generated. Since 1990 some ANC leaders have shown by their pronouncements that they are acutely aware of this. but not all accept it.

Such policies will not suit many of their own radical rank and file, nor many in the trade union movement. At some time in the future there is likely to be a breakaway of its left wing. together with members of the South African Communist Party, and the growth of a socialist party which could absorb much of the present minor support for the policies of Azapo and PAC. Such a breakaway could in some circumstances reduce support for a formal ANC/NP coalition in a typical majority type government to less than 50% of the seats in the legislature and senate.

Since even in these circumstances. the general policies followed by an informal ANC/NP partnership in a representative executive would have over 60% assured support in the legislature, a schism in the ANC would be much less disruptive within a representative executive elected for a set term. Such an executive could largely continue business as usual. A head of government and a representative, basically moderate executive, elected for a fixed term of office. would give South Africa the stability it will need if it is to achieve rapid economic growth.

The restricted powers of the federal legislature and senate. the checks imposed on both by the interests of 12 semi autonomous states. and the representative structure of the executive, would prevent single parties or personalities from becoming dominant in federal government and build prestige for the institutions themselves.

THE PRESIDENT

What will be the nature of South Africa's highest political office - the presidency? Nelson Mandela is often spoken of as a future president who would be fair minded and moderate, but the post cannot be designed around the attributes of a particular man. }

The president must be acceptable to all groups in a highly plural society so he must be seen to be chosen on an impeccably fair basis. He cannot be too powerful or opposition groups will fear for their safety, yet if he is to be the focus of a new all inclusive South African nationalism he must be both prominent and effective.

To a very large extent the powers of the presidential office have already been severely constrained by the decisions about the nature of the executive. This only leaves two views as to the nature of the office and three real choices as to how the president should be selected.

(1) A variation of the Swiss system where the president would be simply the chairman chosen by the 30 member executive for a one year term, and in effect be only a ceremonial head of state.

(2) A variation of the present South African system whereby the president would be elected by a joint assembly of the legislature and senate for a four year term, and operate as a real leader of the executive and a real head of state.

(3) The traditional practice whereby the president would be elected by popular vote for a four year term, and once again operate as a real leader of the executive and as a real head of state.

(1) A One Year Ceremonial President

A president who was simply the chairman chosen by the executive for a one year term would fit the concept of a decentralized federation, but would not provide enough continuity to foster a sense of common South African nationality between the people of the various states.

South Africa is very far from being a single nation and a largely ceremonial president would be incapable of contributing to the unity and stability South Africa needs. The president must be the focus of a new all inclusive South African nationalism, so he must be prominently involved in federal administration and be seen to be effective. A position that involved little more than chairing the executive for a one year term and a few ceremonial duties would be totally inadequate for South Africa's needs.

(2) Election by the Joint Assembly

A joint session of the legislature and the senate, chaired by the Chief Justice, could elect the federal president by simple majority vote. If no candidate received a majority the two highest polling candidates would contest a second election.

The president would hold office during the lifetime of the parliament which had elected him and would be ensured of serving out a four year term unless a two thirds majority of the legislature passed a vote to impeach him for some act unbecoming to a president.

Although parliament would remain the forum where legislation within federal jurisdiction would be passed by simple majority, the president would be the most powerful man in the country and head an independent executive charged with implementing legislation and initiating policy.

However his powers would be considerably restricted compared to those of a U.S. president. He would have to select his departmental ministers from amongst a 30 member executive also elected by the joint assembly, and the president and the executive together would decide policy by majority vote. The president could not sack members of the executive with whom he disagreed unless they breached cabinet confidentiality or took actions within their departments that were at variance with cabinet policy.

A major drawback to allowing the legislature and the senate to elect the president is that, given their party loyalties, an election would resolve itself into a contest among three unequal factions, none of which are likely to have an authoritative majority - the ANC, Black parties opposed to the ANC, and the minority parties.

The minority parties would be put in the position of king makers and forced to take sides in a matter which could badly affect their relationships with the losing side and possibly alter the future course of politics in South Africa. The losing side would feel no more loyalty to such a president than an opposition does to a ruling prime minister.

The matter of who should be head of state should be left to the people of South Africa to settle by direct popular vote.

(3) Elected by Popular Vote

Directly electing the president for a four year term would ensure that the people of South Africa would decide who was to be head of state, not deals by the heads of a 200\230coalition parties. This should ensure support for the office, reluctant or otherwise, from the majority of the population, and maintain reasonable working relationships in both parliament and the executive between representatives of most political parties. '

The ideal of keeping the executive and the legislature entirely separate would be even more closely followed with a president who had been independently elected, since he would jealously safeguard his authority. The legislature would be even more just a forum to pass laws and keep a constructive check on the executive.

The president would still be responsible, along with his executive, for implementing legislation and initiating policy, and he would still have to select his departmental ministers even handedly from amongst a 30 member executive elected by a joint session of the legislature and the senate.

The President could have been obliged to appoint the executive proportionally from all political groupings in the federal legislature who had a minimum representation, but this would have given him unnecessary power and almost certainly a lesser spread of opinion and sympathies on the executive. His role is essentially that of chairman of a board of directors who have been elected by a wide range of shareholders, many of whom are opposed to his policies.

The procedures set out earlier governing ministerial appointments would be written into the constitution rather than just developed by informal custom, since in an atmosphere of factional suspicion, it is important that all parties know in advance exactly what the rules are.

The policies followed by the executive would reflect the main facets of political opinion in South Africa, and the opinions of a President, even from a substantial

group like the ANC. would not be able to dominate executive government unless the ANC also held a substantial majority in both the legislature and the senate.

Because of the need for a strong broad based government, an ANC president would almost certainly have to gain the willing cooperation of a majority of other groups and therefore be constrained to pursue moderate policies. Even if, as is most likely, the ANC held the presidency for several terms in succession, the president would be unable to appoint ANC sympathizers to every position of importance and remake South Africa solely according to ANC concepts.

The legislature would have its own independent teams of analysts with access to all material held by government departments. since in the absence of adequate independent information the executive would be able to dominate the legislature and senate. Facts are the key to knowledge and power and the law makers must have the knowledge to dispute executive arguments.

The president would be ensured of serving out a four year term unless he became incapable of holding office. or a two thirds majority of the legislature and the senate voted to impeach him for some action unbefitting to a president. The executive would be an integral part of the presidential administration, independent of parliament. and could not be separately dismissed by any parliamentary motion of no confidence.

The president could not increase his power, even by sacking a member of the executive where this was justified, since the party to which the dismissed member belonged would simply elect a replacement.

A moderate. stable. representative administration in power for a fixed term of office. led by a popularly elected president. would give South Africa the stability it will need if it is to achieve rapid economic growth.

VICE PRESIDENT

The American concept of running a team for the offices of president and vice president has little to commend it. Too often the vice president rides into office on the coat tails of the president. without whom he would never have been elected. While some American vice presidents have performed creditably upon reaching presidential office. the reality is that the public has had little say in choosing them.

It would also make no sense for the runner up in a South African presidential race to become vice president. since in the event of the president's demise, this would involve a complete reversal of the public's political choice to head the executive. .

Instead the members of the incoming executive should elect three executive vice chairmen from amongst themselves. by single transferable vote, and the president would nominate one of them to be vice president. to serve out the president's term if he should die or be unable to carry out his office. The public would thus have had just as much say in his selection as they would have in the selection of Prime Minister for a typical coalition government, and considerably more than the

American public has in the selection of their vice president.

Since the incoming executive would reflect the mood of a country which had just elected the president by popular vote, it would be very unlikely that the president's first choice as vice president would not be elected a vice chairman. This would ensure a competent person as vice president and the certainty of the continuation of the same political colouration in the presidential office for a full four year term.

PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEES

Potential new legislation could be submitted for consideration by the executive, by any political party, or by individual MPs or senators. However all new legislation would have to undergo detailed scrutiny before a vote was taken, by standing committees from both the legislature and the senate.

Most standing committees around the world are dominated by members of the governing party or coalition, and it is not common for a bill that survives their scrutiny to be totally rejected by a legislature which they also dominate. In effect this means that a considerable amount of legislation is finalized by members of the committee before parliamentary debate commences.

If South Africans are to have confidence in the law, it is essential that all points of view are seen to be thoroughly considered in the formulation of new laws. Permanent standing committees of 15 members for each federal ministry should therefore be elected from both the legislature and the senate using the PR/STV system of voting.

Each house would first elect a chairperson for each committee, then seven of the remaining members would be elected by the majority party if there was one, and seven by all the other parties. Because the chairperson would be certain to represent the dominant opinion in the house there would be no danger of a bill being permanently stalled in committee by members opposing it.

The essence of the legislative process would be that bills would require the agreement of the relevant standing committee, both chambers of parliament, and the executive, before they could be signed by the president and become law.

While it would be possible for a single dominant party to have a secure majority in the legislature and senate, there would be a substantial but not complete check on its unilateral action in matters under federal jurisdiction, since it would have a majority of only one on the standing committee considering each new law and on the executive. Given the will to cooperate, such a system should strongly encourage consensus government.

STATE POWERS

Each state would have legislative jurisdiction over affairs which concerned only its own people. and would have its own policies regarding state taxation. education. health. social welfare. law and order. transport. commerce and industry. labour regulations. public service, roading and traffic regulation, state property. liquor. business and professional licensing. local and regional government. land use and housing. forestry and conservation. tourism. police. the raising of loans. agricultural policy and closer agricultural settlement.

All present South African government laws would be deemed to be state laws until they were changed. Most states would remain heavily dependent on funding transfers from wealthy states through the federal government taxation system.

Most of the different states and provinces would be heavily influenced by one ethnic or cultural group. Each would be free to put its own favoured economic and social policies into practice. so far as they could finance them, providing those policies did not conflict with the Bill of Rights. areas of administration where only the federal government had jurisdiction such as customs and excise duties, and areas subject to agreements such as the size of state national guards.

Over time. such a system would tend towards moderation and towards what was successful. because people could monitor the effects of competing systems.

In the meantime there could be considerable differences between states in such things as labour and transport laws. regulations governing apprenticeships and entry to professions, price control and subsidies. state ownership of businesses, and regulations governing standards in goods. accommodation. and health. What might be considered appropriate by Whites living in the urban industrial areas of Orange River might be a serious impediment to real progress in Black rural areas.

Through out the world goods and services are provided much more effectively by free market economics than by state controlled ones. but the actual rules and regulations can differ markedly between different free market countries, or between states within the same country.

The federal government's role would be largely administrative, and most hotly felt emotional issues would be fought out at state level. Acceptance of the Bill of Rights would be entrenched in the constitution of every individual state and would be enforced by the federal judiciary backed up by the federal army as a last resort.

State and provincial governments would not merely be vested with the powers that central government was prepared to devolve. On the contrary they would have full power in all areas except those reserved to central government, and would be legitimized by their own democratic structures.

They would be financially independent of central government because 70% of all federal taxes would be obligatorily redistributed to the states under a per capita grant that was non discretionary between states. The role of the federal government would be to perform those functions that only a central government could carry out. to ensure peace. the observance of human rights, and the freedom of each society to develop in its own way.

The constitutions of all states would not be precisely the same, since some states would contain homelands as provinces with some powers of self government. and Orange River would be divided into 6 provinces with considerable powers of self government. tHowever all states would adhere to the same basic principles.

Proposals to change their constitutions would have to be approved by the constitutional court as consistent with the settlement constitution, and gain the approval of two thirds of their people in a referendum.

The major impact of the federal government on ordinary citizens would come from its tax collection functions through joint federal/state tax departments, regulations governing interstate and international commerce, and legislation defining crimes.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The constitution could guarantee a degree of regional and local autonomy to local ethnic concentrations. in a way that would remain acceptable to a majority based state government. This could be simply done by providing that city and local government boundaries would be drawn to provide local ethnic concentrations with the full degree of self control that pertained to each institution. Such arrangements could accommodate a high degree of local diversity without excessively restraining the political powers of majority groups.

In February 1991 the government proposed non-racial local administrations based on one city. one tax base. These are essential if the poorer and rapidly growing Black areas are to have a decent level of public services, and if they are to be integrated into the city of which they are a part. and to whose economic growth they are contributing. However there is a clear distinction between an attempt by a suburb to escape the tax net of the greater urban area and the right of its people to decide standards and regulations for their own suburban area.

Any presently established urban council, representing 1000 people or more, which votes to establish its own town council with full authority over local bylaws should be entitled to do so. but it would still be required to elect representatives to its metropolitan council and to pay a levy towards basic services for the greater urban area.

A system of local councils could accommodate the various ethnic communities. not as an apartheid system discriminating against individuals, but by allowing communities to develop their own identities. each with their own style, operated by local people for local people. This could well mean that local bylaws affecting such things as shopping hours. noise levels. minimum size of subdivisions. and the development of apartment style housing could differ between councils in the same urban area. Such bylaws would be limited in scope since they could not override state laws.

The constitution should also provide for any district of a council's area, with 10% of its people. to successfully petition their council for a referendum within the district on becoming a distinct ward electing its own representative to the council.

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SIIARING OF RESOURCES

South Africa is not a rich country. Its GDP in 1986, of US\$1850 per head. can not be compared with that of the USA at \$17180 or Australia at \$11920, but more fairly with Mexico at \$1860 per head or Brazil at \$1810.

Forty-four per cent of the population has extremely low incomes, and GDP per head of population has been falling at about 1.5% per year since 1981 as rapid population growth outstrips cconomic growth. The economically active population is growing at 3.0% per year. yet from 1985 to 1989 only 12.5% of new entrants to the labour market found a job in the formal sector.

One of the problems in South Africa is that there are two economies not onc. One is a first world econemy involving 21 million people. although half of them only marginally. and the othzr a third world scctor of 15 million people. To extend first world services to the 15 million people of the third world, and to the 10 million only marginally invelved in the first world, will cost an immense amount of moncy.

However to create its wealth the first world sector preempted most of the land and resources of South Africa that the people of the third world sector would otherwisc have been frce to occupy and wse. Natural justice would therefore demand the extension of the first world cconomy to include these people.

Racial conflict in South Africa is at leist in part about the allocation of resources. Roth Blacks and Whites tend to regard wealth as being finite in quantity, and that one group's gain must be the other group's loss. A workable solution to South Africa's problems must induce them to think in terms of joint efforts to attain common goals. whose realisation will make all groups better off.

The acceptance of a federation as the basis of a scttlement presupposes that all parties would accept that they were citizens of a common country, and would work to close the edncational. economic and social gaps between them. The best political svstem will fail if the economy collapscs.

AREA AND "LIVING ROOM"

Although Orange River would contain approximatcly 47.5% of South Africaâ\200\231s territory and only 24.9% of its people. this would not represent an unfair allocation since it would reflect the present distribution of population between regions within South Africa. The western Cape alone makes up 42% of South African territory, but its 4.16 million people are only 12.1% of South Africa's people because of the relative scarcity of mincrals and good agricultural land.

Simple comparisons between population and arca are invalid since they take no account of the ability of the land to support peoplcs. Where people live now more

accurately demonstrates "living room" 235, and the proposed federal boundaries have been placed accordingly. ,
South Africa is a dry country with an average rainfall of 497 mm or 20 inches per year, 80% of which falls in the five summer months, so few of the rivers are perennial. Rainfall is less than 50 mm in the West to more than 3000 mm in the East. Generally the 500 mm rainfall line, as shown in Fig 31, divides the pure stock areas from those where cropping is possible if soil, topography and the season of rainfall are suitable. 230

Fig 31 500 mm RAINFALL LINE

Orange River is nearly 0% semidesert, much of which receives less than 400 mm of rain per year and has never had a dense population. The semi desert Karoo, which is more than one third of South Africa's area and contributes less than 1% of its GDP. makes up 64% of the state. In the Karoo it takes 5000 ha. to support 2000 sheep or goats.

Because of its large area of semidesert. Orange River has 35 to 40% of South Africa's sheep. but for the same reason has only around 10% of South Africa's

cattle. It produces perhaps half of South Africa's wheat in the winter rainfall area as of the Cape and in northern Vaal Free State. In the western Cape. it also produces most of South Africa's wine, fresh and dried fruit. and fish.

On the other hand. South Africa's major crop is maize and Orange River includes only 16 to 17% of South Africa's main maize growing area, the maize triangle of the highveld region, most of which is in South West. Central and South Central Transvaal. and in Eastern Free State. Considerable maize is also grown in Natal and Transkei. North East Transvaal is the main banana producing area and most of the citrus fruit is grown in Eastern Cape. South West. North and Eastern Transvaal.

Altogether Orange River, with 23.9% of South Africa's people, produces around 40% of South Africa's GGP from agriculture, fishing and forestry. It could be independent of the Black states for most of its food. but in the PWV region would be heavily dependent on them for water from the Vaal river.

MINERALS AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

Outside the homelands, the main factor controlling population distribution is not good agricultural land but the location of mineral resources and of industrial production.

There were 107 active gold mines in South Africa in 1986, only 50 of them in Orange River. but the goldfields of Rand and Vaal Free State produced much more than half the volume of South Africa's gold with 30% being produced around Welkom alone. These goldmines also produce silver and uranium. In addition Orange River has diamonds at Kimberley and on its west coast beaches, and major iron ore. manganese. and asbestos deposits in North Cape.

All of the other states also have mineral deposits, though mostly not of such high value. Besides diamonds, South West Transvaal mines 30% of the world's platinum and has major deposits of chrome, manganese, asbestos and iron ore. Natal has extensive reserves of coking coal. titanium, aluminium, and the only plentiful supplies of industrial water in South Africa.

North Central Transvaal has huge chrome deposits, plus diamonds and platinum, North East Transvaal has highly valuable deposits of phosphate and antimony. North Transvaal has copper and diamond mines, and Eastern Free State has coal and a growing gold mining industry.

Eastern. Central and South Central Transvaal have huge deposits of coal used as the base material for electricity generation, liquid fuel, and smelting industries, and both Central and South Central Transvaal and Klip River have major producing goldfields. Only Eastern Cape has little but an as yet largely unexploited coalfield.

Orange River generates considerably more than its fair share of the value of South Africa's mineral production through gold, but although gold is extremely

important to foreign exchange earnings. all gold production makes up less than 10% of South Africa's GNP. :

Most wealth is generated not from mining but from manufacturing and other urban activities. These activities tend to ignore the more recent mining developments in Black states. and for good economic reasons, continue to concentrate around the earliest White settlements.

Around 75% of all manufacturing capacity is concentrated in the PWV region, Cape Town. Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage and Durban/ Pinetown. Only Durban/Pinetown and about 30% of the manufacturing capacity of Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage would be within a Black state.

More than half of the rest comes from East London, Pietermaritzburg, Newcastle, Witbank, Klerksdorp and Wellington. the first four of which would be entirely in Black states. Service jobs tend to follow the industrial concentrations, leading to a concentration of wealth in a comparatively few locations.

Around 55% of South Africa's total manufacturing capacity lies in Orange River, 20% in Natal, 6% in Central Transvaal, 5% in Eastern Cape, and about 9% in Klip River and other Black states abutting the PWV area.

Excluding all of Orange River south of a line from Kimberley to Bloemfontein, which few Black leaders would dispute is traditionally non Black territory, leaves a balance which is only 4% of South Africa's territory. It is this balance which is likely to be the crux of any serious dispute about resources since it produces 38% of South Africa's total GDP, yet even including 390.000 temporary migrant workers, 62% of its 3.85 million people are non Black and 57.4% are White.

Although it has a disproportionate share of South Africa's gold mines, arguably its greatest resource is its skilled people who have created a flow of wealth from the greatest industrial and commercial concentration in Africa, which many times exceeds that from the gold mines. Most of those skilled people vehemently desire a very large degree of autonomy.

Reflecting the pattern of White settlement, 56.5% of South Africa's total GDP is produced within an area lying within 50 km of both sides of the proposed Orange River borders. Three quarters of this border GDP presently comes from Orange River and one quarter from other states, but these proportions are moving in favour of the Black states.

All of the major industrial and urban areas of Orange River are within easy suburban commuter access of Black states so present employment and business opportunities will continue to be available to all, no matter in which state they live.

There is limited land left in Rand and northern Vaal Free State for either industrial expansion or urban development. Both will inevitably spill over into the open spaces of Klip River, the Rosslyn area of South West Transvaal, the Mamelodi. Tembisa and Daveyton areas of North Central Transvaal, the Nigel area of South Central Transvaal and the Coalbrook area of Eastern Free State. Industrial production at Port Elizabeth has already jumped eastwards across the Swartkops river, and its future growth will be mainly in Eastern Cape.

In general. future economic growth will be slow south of the PWYV area which will mainly affect Orange River. However Durban. the Tugela basin and Richard's Bay in Natal. the Bethal/Ermelo and Neelspruit areas of Eastern Transvaal. the Witbank/Middleburg area of Central Transvaal. the Hoedsig area of South Central Transvaal. the Rustenburg area of South West Transvaal. and Pictersburg in North Central Transvaal. will experience rapid future growth and are wholly within Black states.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH

The main factors controlling population distribution outside the homelands are the location of mineral resources and of industrial production, with the last being by far the most important. These two factors are also the main determinants of the distribution of wealth as determined by gross geographic product.(GGP)

In Table 33, regional GGPs have been calculated from 1978 government GGPs for magisterial districts, and approximations made where a magisterial district is shared by two or more regions. Regional GGPs have been adjusted to reflect changes in relative production between the regions to 1985, then divided on a per capita basis by the region's 1985 population and compared in index form with the per capita GGP for Rand. the wealthiest region. For the homelands, their gross domestic products (GDPs) which reflect similar underlying production have been used. '

Table 33

Index of Regional GGPs Per Capita (Rand = 1000)

Provinces

North Cape 441 Central Transvaal

N. W. Cape 389 South Central Transvaal

S. W. Cape 384 Klip River

Central Cape 452 Natal

Rand 1000 KwaZulu

Vaal F. S. 924 Lebowa

States Kwandebele

Orange River 683 Qua Qua

Eastern Cape 231 Kangwane

Eastern Free State 174 Gazankulu

South West Transvaal 258 Transket

North Central Transvaal 282 Venda

North Transvaal 231 Bophuthatswana

North East Transvaal 748 Ciskei

Eastern Transvaal 500 South Africa

The real wealth of the homelands. is considerably higher than their GGPs per capita indicate. since GGPs do not reflect inwards transfers of income by their workers within "White" South Africa which are most frequently used to purchase non homeland goods. nor do they reflect non monetary transactions such as the building of houses and subsistence farming. However their GGPs per capita do reflect an extreme lack of monetary incomes above subsistence level for development work to improve their economies.

The ten homelands with 14.13 million people produced only 6.6% of South Africa's GGP in 1985 compared with Orange River's 8.24 million people who produced 3.4%. The other 12.13 million people, who were 35% of the population. produced 38.0% of South Africa's GGP.

The homelands are disadvantaged by their lack of urban industrial production, by their artificially high populations. and by the continual leakage of their purchasing power. and therefore of potential job opportunities. to the industrial cities of non homeland areas.

Rand alone produces 25.4% of South Africa's annual wealth as measured by monetary transactions. and Rand and Vaal Free State together 39.0%. However the actual beneficiaries, in terms of wages spent consuming some of the goods recorded as GGP for Rand or Vaal Free State, may well be the residents of one of the surrounding Black states.

Orange River is not uniformly wealthy since the four Cape provinces, with half of Orange River's population, produce less than 30% of its GGP, and their average per capita production is less than double that of Klip river. Eastern Free State, which is mainly agricultural. is revealed as considerably the poorest region outside the homelands.

If the homelands are included within their appropriate national state. the poorest regions of South Africa are more clearly identified, and the ranking's change.

Table 34
Index of State and Provincial GGPs Per Capita (Rand = 1000)

Provinces South West Transvaal 172	
North Cape 441	North Central Transvaal 96
N. W. Cape 389	North Transvaal 73
S. W. Cape 384	North East Transvaal 134
Central Cape 452	Eastern Transvaal 258
Rand 1000	Central Transvaal 443
Vaal F. S. 924	South Central Transvaal 393
at Klip River 214	
Orange River 683	Natal 187
Eastern Cape 119	Average of Black States 173
Eastern Free State 155	South Africa 294

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The poorest states are those of North and North Central Transvaal and Eastern Cape. Basically these are the states with the smallest proportion of Whites and. White inspired economic activity, and the greatest proportion of poor homeland residents amongst their populations. By combining with their homelands. regions that were already relatively poor have absorbed two or more times their own number of ever poorer populations.

By South African standards. Klip River is far from poor. producing more annual wealth per capita than Natal including KwaZulu. Klip River's GGP would be above the average of the remaining regions if the massive contributions of Rand and Vaal Free State to South African GGP were excluded. and is well above the average of Black states only.

Reflecting the development of capital based industry there, the Black state of Central Transvaal has higher per capita production than three of the four Cape provinces. Per capita production in South Central Transvaal is nearly as high.

In view of the present differences in per capita income between the races. it is hardly surprising that Orange River. with the highest proportion of Whites in its population. has the highest GGP per capita.

Table 35

SOURCES OF GGP IN 1978

Black States	Orange River	Difference
%	%	%
Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing	10.0	5.6 <44
Mining and Quarrying	12.3	15.7 +34
Manufacturing	22.2	22.8 +0.6
Utilities	74	2.5 <49
Construction	35	32 0.3
Commerce	12.3	13.7 +1.4
Transport and Communications	10.4	9.9 0.5
Business Services	11.6	14.0 +2.4
Social Services	1.6	1.8 +0.2
Government	8.1	10.4 +2.3
Other	0.6	0.4 0.2
100.0	100.0	

Comparing Orange Riv~r with the rest of South Africa. the proportions of its GGP that came from manufacturing. construction, commerce, transport, and social services in 1978 were remarkably similar. It produced a somewhat larger proportion from mining. business scrvices and government, but the major differences were in the much smaller proportions coming from agricuiture and the provision of utilities such as clectricity. gas and water.

Such differences as there were in the source of GGP reflected the difference between a sophisticated. industrial, urban economy and a much less developed one.

The major difference was in the size and value of the various activities. Orange River produced 60% or more of all GGP from mining, commerce, business, personal services and government, and 55% or more from manufacturing, construction and transport activities.

Adjusting 1978 regional GGPs to reflect changes in relative production to 1985, Orange River still produces 55.49% of South Africa's GGP. This reflects the heavy involvement of its population in major economic activities, and the involvement of the majority of the people in the other states in low productivity or subsistence activities.

The disparity in income earning skills, and the considerable differences in mineral resources and economic development between regions, would continue to exist even in a Black dominated unitary state. The wide disparity between industrialized Black states such as Central and South Central Transvaal and predominantly agricultural states such as Eastern Free State would also remain.

Wherever possible, all substantial groups of Whites have been included within Orange River to create a secure and viable state for them as the price of an overall political settlement. However a large degree of autonomy for Whites does not necessarily imply that the factories and mines they own in border areas should actually lie within Orange River. Normally they have been included only if they are embedded in an area populated by Whites. All other border mining and industrial sites have been included in Black controlled areas.

A share of mineral and industrial resources much greater than its 23.9% of South Africa's population remains within Orange River, because Whites have been instrumental in developing such resources and tend to remain grouped around them.

The physical location of these mines and industries makes no difference to "living room" arguments by any side, since all groups would continue to make use of them as they do now. Nor does it make any difference to the incomes of individuals presently involved with them, whose job security and income earning capacity would be unchanged.

However their physical location does make a very great difference to the relative distribution of wealth creating resources- between the states, and therefore the gross taxable income of each state. Orange River would produce 55.4% of South Africa's GDP and a much larger proportion of its potential government revenue.

To gain Black acceptance of Orange River, the effects of differing tax revenues on the ability of state governments to supply a reasonable level of government services to their people would have to be corrected by redistribution of those revenues, exactly as would be done if South Africa was a unitary state, or indeed if it was a federation with the whole PWV area totally under Black control. This could be effectively done only by the federal government.

On the other hand such a redistribution must be strictly controlled, and the principles determining the raising and spending of taxes tightly defined, or the rich state of Orange River could be exposed to confiscatory levels of taxation

imposed by the Black majority. This would severely slow South Africa's overall economic growth.

The transfer to the states of most of the revenue raised by the federal government must in turn be obligatory. or financial and political power would quickly concentrate at the centre. nullifying state autonomy.

As in any country with such wide differences in regional wealth, the federal government will have to fund a minimum level of education. health, postal. police and transport services to all regions. but the administration of most of those services will be tightly under the control of each state.

TAXATION

It has been suggested that the problem of differing mineral resources in each region could be overcome by the federal government nationalizing all mineral resources and charging royalties on their extraction. Such nationalization might be necessary to a Black dominated government as a political gesture, but royalties would have to be set at a very low level if they were not to discourage future investment in mining, and the employment and taxes that would flow from further processing. Realistically the redistributive effects of nationalization of the mineral deposits themselves would be extremely low.

It is not so much the deposits as the mining and processing companies associated with them that are the source of wealth from minerals, and therefore all taxes levied on mining and processing companies should be solely a federal revenue.

The uneven distribution of industrial areas could also be overcome by making tax on every kind of company solely a federal revenue. This would make company taxation a federal political issue, and mean that taxation on most wealth producing assets throughout South Africa would be under the control of a Black dominated federal government.

However company taxation would be unlikely to prove the goldmine that some prospective federal politicians might envisage. since effective average corporate tax rates throughout the world are frequently below 10% of company profits, and taxes from companies are normally only 10 to 20% of government revenues.

One beneficial effect of a uniform company tax would be that international investors would face only one uniform tax regime for the whole of South Africa, which would greatly simplify investment decisions.

The realistic autonomy of states could be preserved by limiting the federal government's right to levy taxes. including personal. company and excise taxes, and customs duty, to 25% of South Africa's total GGP, and to 33% of any one state's GGP exclusive of royalties on minerals. Taxation potential above the rate of the federal levy would belong exclusively to each state.

A 33% limit on federal appropriation of any one state's GGP, and a uniform federal tax scale for all states, are essential if Orange River is not to be exposed to

confiscatory levels of taxation imposed by the Black majority in the federal parliament.

There is no reason why federal taxes in South Africa should be more than 25% of GDP, since the Australian federal government spent only 23.5% of GDP in 1990/91. and was aiming at 21.6% in 1993/4. The US federal government spent just 21.0% of GDP in 1990/91. Sufficient scope must be left for each state to raise and spend its own taxes on matters that are its own concern.

The federal government would be free to introduce any kind of tax it thought desirable. but it could not increase its total take. including profits from federally owned enterprises such as post offices. above 25.0% of South Africa's GDP.

Even within this limitation, federal rather than state taxes could still increase the redistributive effect. Whereas a state charge such as a domestic air travel tax could be partially avoided by departing from an adjacent state. a federal tax could not. All additional revenue the federal government gained in such ways would increase the potential revenue remaining to the states from other kinds of taxes.

To determine a fair contribution from each state to the 25% of GDP represented by the federal budget. a progressive federal income tax for states could be devised. just like that used for individual incomes but based on the GDP per capita for each state including their homeland areas. This would allow for future changes in their relative wealth, and could not be directed at any one race.

On the basis of their GDPs per capita. none of the homelands would pay any tax on income. The true ability of states to pay would rest with their first world sector which varies widely from state to state. However the only fair basis for a federal levy on incomes is one based on per capita GDP for the whole population of a state.

An example in Table 37 uses the index of state GDPs per capita shown in Table 34 with the five tier tax structure shown in Table 36.

Table 38
A POSSIBLE FIVE TIER TAX STRUCTURE

[Index Per Capita of State GDP on Tier (%)		Income Tax as Federal Tax (%)	Maximum GDP Levied
0-100	0	0	
100 - 200	10	5	
200 - 300	20	10	
300 - 400	30	15	
400 - 1000	35	27	

In addition each state would pay value added tax (VAT) at 12% of its GDP which would be also solely a federal levy. These tax rates would result in the following percentages of each state or province's GDP being collected as federal tax, most of which would be paid to the federal government.

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Table 37 a
PERCENTAGE OF STATE GGP PAID TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Provinces Index of GGP | "% of GGP | % Paid to Fed
per Capita Collected

North Cape	441	289	26.4
N. W. Care	389	26.6	243
S. W. Cape	384	26.4	241
Central Cape	452	29.3	26.7
Rand 1000	39.0	356	
Vaal F. S.	924	383	35.0
States			
Orange River	683	353.	323
Eastern Cape	119	13.6	12.4
Eastern Free State	155	15.5	14.2
South West Transvaal	172	16.2	14.8
North Central Transvaal	96	12.0	11.0
North Transvaal	73	12.0	10.9
North East Transvaal	134	14.5	13.2
Eastern Transvaal	258	20.4	18.6
Central Transvaal	443	28.9	26.4
South Central Transvaal	393	26.7	244
Klip River	214	18.0	16.4
Natal	187	16.7	15.2
South Africa	294	27.4	25.0

In this example. 91.2% of the tax collected would need to be paid to the federal government for it to collect 25% of South Africa's GGP.

It is essential that federal personal taxes be uniform throughout South Africa. yet with all company taxes going to the federal tax pool. and with varyving company activitics in each state, it would be impossible to devise a single

" progressive federal tax scale on perscnal incomes that would exactly collect the balance of the contribution due from each state.

The casiest and fairest system is to simply sct a federal tax scale on personal incomes which would resuit in a small over collection. which each state would retain. Each state could then accurately assess its own likely tax take and set its own additional state taxes to derive its desired income.

Customs duty at about 2.4% of South Africa's GDP is not a direct state payment. but since states ultimately bear it. the amount of each state's federal levy would take its assessed customs payments into account.

Fig 32 shows graphically the percentage of each state or province's GGP levied by the federal government. compared with its index of GGP per capita. Such a system seems both practical and fair.

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INDEX OF GGP PER CAPITA '

Fig 32 TAXES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GGP PER CAPITA

This tax scale taxes low and middle income states more heavily than would a scale for a developed country because a very high proportion of South Africa's population is in a low income category. Without such taxes, the revenue the federal government could raise would be inadequate to meet the basic requirements of all of South Africa's people.

VAT would make up around 47% of all net federal collections. For all Black states except Central and South Central Transvaal, the value added tax collected would far exceed collections from personal and company tax. VAT represents the only effective method of raising reasonable government revenue from populations of whom the bulk are relatively poor but who are making immense demands on their government for services.

Orange River would pay 71.4% of all federal taxes, amounting to 55.4% of all value added tax and 86.2% of all other taxes. Contributions to the federal levy from the Black states would vary from 10.9% of GGP for North Transvaal, which would not even reach its total collections from VAT, to 26.4% of GGP for Central Transvaal. Federal levies on Klip River and Natal would be very moderate at 16.4% and 15.2% respectively. On average all of the Black states would pay only 16.0% of their GGP to the federal government compared with 32.3% by Orange

River.

of this total defence spending would be borne by the federal budget and the other half by state funding of their own national guards.

Government services to agriculture, mining, industry, transport, and various incentives and subsidies took R10.1 billion in 1991/92 or 3.4% of GDP. Most of these services will be either privatized or taken over by the states and severely slashed. However the elimination of many of the subsidies and services not directly helping Blacks will be partly negated by the introduction of many more which do.

State debt took R12.9 billion or 4.3% of GDP. The only satisfactory way to handle South Africa's existing public debt is for the federal government to continue to be responsible for it. Since Orange River, as the main past beneficiary of this debt, would effectively be paying for nearly all spending on federal functions, this seems fair and reasonable. A Black dominated federal government would be unlikely not to honour past debt costs, since this would choke off future investment and economic growth.

At the beginning of 1991 government debt dominated South African capital markets, being R79.3 billion out of a total of R118.6 billion of stock owed by public sector institutions. It had an average maturity of 10 years.

Year after year governments have seemed quite content to spend 10% more than they raise as taxes, or 3.0% of South Africa's GDP, yet the surest way to raise the availability of savings for productive investment would be to cut government deficit spending.

The federal parliament must be required to balance its budget so that it cannot increase its spending and its powers by borrowing, nor can it be permitted to guarantee any quasi state body such as the South African Housing Trust which would indirectly increase its influence. Following a settlement, it would be barred from borrowing all but bridging finance. Public borrowing capacity would lie entirely with state governments which would be restricted to borrowing only 1.0% of their GDP per year.

With only three instead of nine billion rand of new state backed stock coming on the market each year, and only about 5.5 to 8.0 billion of old debt being rolled over, total annual borrowing to fund government debt would fall by 35 to 40%.

Providing firm monetary control was maintained by the Reserve Bank, interest rates would fall within a year from 15.5% to 11%, and but for the inflexibility of stock maturities, the bill for federal debt would fall from R12.9 billion to R9.1 billion, or just 3.0% of GDP.

The government could be expected to move to exchange long dated 11% stock for short dated high interest rate stock. This endeavour would be likely to be reinforced by stiff windfall taxes on all income from previously issued bonds attributable to an interest rate greater than 2% above the average base rate for the current year.

With these measures, the annual federal interest bill could be reduced to R11.0 billion, or 3.7% of GDP, within 3 years, and would continue to fall. With borrowing severely restricted, all governments would have to fund any increased

expenditure by the politically less popular but economically sounder method of raising taxes.

Both a zero budgeting approach and a study of US federal spending in 1990 as a percentage of GNP show that with a R11.0 billion debt payment and a R3.3 billion federal share of defence costs, a South African federal government could carry out the proposed federal functions quite adequately on 7.5% of South Africa's GDP.

Table 39 compares US federal spending with proposed South African federal spending. -

Table 39
PROPOSED SOUTH AFRICAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET

USA	South Africa
Budget 1990	% GNP % GDP
Defence	5.5 1.1 (plus 1.1% state)
Foreign Affairs	0.3 0.2
Environment	0.3 0.1
Transportation	0.5 0.4
Education	0.7 0.7
Health	0.3 0.3
Veterans	0.5 0.3
Justice	0.2 0.2
General	0.2 0.2
Interest	3.1 3.7
1 Research	0.3 0.3
Welfare	8.7 - (solely state control)
Other	0.6 - (solely state control)
	21.2 1.5

The US federal government is involved in some activities which will be under state control in South Africa. plus some activities which do not exist in South Africa. With increasingly lower interest costs as debt matures and strict control of federal activities. 7.5% of South Africa's GDP is a reasonable figure for federal spending.

This would leave 17.5% of South Africa's GDP to be compulsorily transferred

to the states on a per capita basis, based on each state's population. The federal government would decide the total amount of the transfer funds to be compulsorily spent on education and health throughout South Africa up to a negotiated limit. but the balance of the money would have no strings attached.

There would be no federal ability to discriminate on the allocation of funds between states. but states would remain accountable to the federal government to ensure that all federal grants were spent for the benefit of their people.

More than 42% of the South African central government 91/92 budget went to other levels of government by way of direct transfers, plus transfers to the homelands. so directing 70% to the states would cause no administrative problems.

At present, homeland governments are dependent on central government financing and take spending decisions with minimum responsibility for the tax implications. With a known limit on federal transfers, and the necessity for finding a large proportion of their own funds, the new state governments would be squarely faced with the taxation implications of any increased spending.

REDISTRIBUTION

The difference between a state's payments to the federal government and its receipts from it would represent the direct redistribution of wealth through the taxation system, but as Table 40 shows, the indirect benefit would be much greater. Nine of the eleven Black states would make no contribution at all to the functions of the federal government, because their federal grant will be much greater than the taxes they contribute.

Table 40

Redistribution of Wealth Through the Taxation System.

Provinces	% GGP Paid to Fed	% GGP Received from Fed	% GGP Gained or Lost
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North Cape	26.4	11.7	-147
N. W. Cape	24.3	13.3	-11.0
S. W. Cape	24.1	13.4	-10.7
Central Cape	26.7	11.4	-15.3
Rand	356	5.2	-304
Vaal F. S.	35.0	5.6	-29.4
States !			
Orange River	323	7.5	-248
Eastern Cape	12.4	46.1	+33.7
Eastern Frce State	14.2	332	+19.0
South West Transvaal	14.8	29.9	+15.1
North Central Transvaal	1.0	53.4	+42.4
North Transvaal	10.9	69.8	+58.9
North East Transvaal	13.2	38.6	+25.4
Eastern Transvaal	18.6	19.9	+13
Central Transvaal	26.4	11.6	-1438
South Central Transvaal	244	13.1	-11.3
Klip River	16.4	24.1	+7.7
Natal	15.2	27.6	+12.4
South Africa	25.0		

Orange River would contribute a net 24.8% of its GGP to the federal budget to meet federal spending and for redistribution to the poorer states. but it should be noted that Central and Sonth Central Transvaal would also make a reasonable contribution. The 7.5% of Orange River's GGP covered by the per capita federal grant for cdneation. health etc, would in practice never leave the state.

Orange River could sustrin this kind of transfer of its wealth to poorer states since all states are still members of one fcderation and one economy. Most of its lost purchasing power would return to pay for goods and services that the people of the poorer states would want to buy.

Table 41 shows the index of GGP per capita both before and after redistribution.

Table 41
REDISTRIBUTION EFFECT ON INDEX OF GGP PER CAPITA

Before	After	Before	After
North Cape 441	376	North Central Tvl. 96	137
N. W. Cape 389	346	North Tvi. 73	117
S. W. Cape 384	343	North East Tvl. 134	167
Central Cape 152	382	Eastern Tvi. 258	262
Rand 1000	695	Central Tvl. 443	378
Vaal F. S. 924	652	South Central Tvl. 393	349
States Klip River 214	230		
Orange River GR3 514		Natal 187	210
Eastern Cape 119	149		
Eastern F. S. 155	185	Av. of Black States 1731	197
South West Tvl. 172	198	South Africa 294	294

The more revenue the federal government spent on its own mainly centralized functions. the less would be available for real redistribution which is supposed to be one of the ANC's aims. Since this would hurt the poorest states most, they would have a vested interest in keeping federal spending at a minimum.

By calculating the percentage of Orange River's GGP the present NP government is already spending in other areas. it should not be too difficult for statisticians and cconomists to determine by how much such a redistribution departs from what is happening now. It would not represent the total financial transfers between states in any case since private investment, both in and out of Orange River. would scck out the best opportunities. This would maximize economic growth for the benefit of all of South Africa.

Fig 33 shows the index of GGP per capita in the form of a bar chart both before and after redistribution. Fig 34 visually compares real per capita income among

the twelve states of the federation.

Fig 33 INDEX OF GGP PER CAPITA

The quite large amounts of their GGP contributed by the three states whose per capita income is above the South African average does not lift the per capita

incomes of most Black states by very much because there are 2.7 times as many people in the 9 poorer states.

This just underlines the fact that South Africa is not a rich country, and its real economic future lies in growth, rather than in redistribution. Levying a percentage of GGP on states according to their wealth is very flexible. since it allows for changes in their relative wealth.

The non White share of disposable national income has risen from 26% in 1970, to 40% in 1980, and 53% in 1990, and there is no reason to think that this growth, which will favour the Black states. will not continue within a Black dominated federation.

[f the relative wealth of the poorer states increased relative to Orange River, their federal levies under a progressive tax system would increase even more rapidly. The rate at which the maximum rate of tax occurs could then be moved upwards. giving tax relief to poorer taxpayers who would live mainly in Black states.

A gross federal levy of 33.0% of Orange River's GGP is likely to continue for decades. Even if the GGP per capita of the Black states were to double relative to that of Orange River, elimination of tax on the lowest taxable tier would still leave Orange River paying 33.0% of its GGP as federal tax. although its proportion of the total federal levy would fall from 71.4% to around 50%.

Wealthy taxpayers in Orange River would no more escape contributing heavily to Black education, welfare, and development. than if South Africa was a unitary state. so the distribution of South Africa's natural and industrial wealth amongst the various states should no longer be an issue.

The federal tax scale on personal incomes could not be directed at any one race or state. although clearly since it is progressive it aims to take more from the wealthy who are mainly White. In its application to the individual it would be purely a progressive tax on income. with an upper limit on marginal income of 40%, plus a pragmatic 12% value added tax on everyone's consumption.

It would have an element of inflexibility since some states might not reach their projected GGP for a given year due to drought or low prices for the commodities they produced: The income tax and VAT they collected would then be insufficient to meet the state's budgeted contribution to federal revenue. However the worst effects of such changes in a state's income could be overcome by three monthly revisions of the federal budget based on actual and projected GGPs.

SUSTAINABILITY OF TRANSFERS

Total federal expenditure. including the 70% redistributed as state grants, would be 25.0% of GDP compared with 29.5% spent by government in 1991/92. However total government spending. including the spending of state governments, would increase steeply from 29.5% to around 35% of GDP, because in many states, and particularly in Orange River, the per capita federal redistribution grant would be quite inadequate in relation to the demand for existing state services. The 9 poorer states could be expected to extract the maximum sustainable taxation in any case to fund rapid development of inadequate public facilities.

Since it could be expected that a Black dominated federal government would go for maximum redistribution, the tax scale on states shown in Table 37 would most certainly be modified so that Orange River paid 33.0% of its GGP as federal

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taxation instead of 32.3%. This would mean that a wealthy province such as Rand would pay as much as 36.4% of its GDP as a federal levy. and Vaal Free State 35.8%.

A levy of 33.0% of Orange River's GDP as federal tax represents a reasonable compromise between the need to avoid excessive taxation of the engine of South Africa's growth and the overwhelming pressure for government spending to help the disadvantaged.

However to meet reasonable requirements for Orange River's own spending above the 7.5% of its GDP returned to it in the federal grant, it would have to raise a further 10.5% of its GDP as taxes. bringing total taxation within Orange River to 43.5% of its GDP. This is certainly near the maximum since a total levy of more than 45% is simply unsustainable in the experience of most countries that have tried it. The average level of total government spending in all the OECD countries in 1990 was 41%. down from 45.2% in 1982.

However Orange River would not be a self contained country earning all of its wealth by selling goods and services to its own population. but rather a part of the larger South African economy whose total spending at all levels of government would still be only about 35.0% of GDP. It is also true everywhere that the rich parts of any economy contribute a greater proportion of their wealth to taxation than the poorer parts.

Although 29.5% of South Africa's total GDP was spent by government in 1991/92. only 26.1% of it was raised by taxes. 3.0% was borrowed and 0.4% financed by selling strategic reserves. However borrowing for government spending remains a tax on total GDP and is a main contributor to inflation.

While excise taxes in South Africa could possibly be doubled over time, customs duties increased by 50% on items such as luxury cars, a minimum tax introduced for companies. a turnover tax levied on financial institutions, and the incidence of taxation on middle incomes increased. no matter how additional revenue was raised, no more than 5.5% of GDP as extra government revenue, or a maximum of 35% of South Africa's GDP, could be squeezed out of the economy without greatly slowing its growth.

Proposed revenue for both state and federal governments in South Africa of 35.0% of GDP can be compared with the 1990 figures for USA of 30.1%. Britain

" 36.8% and New Zealand 37.9% Total government outlays in Australia including borrowing were 33.0% of GDP in 1990.%%

Orange River could therefore probably function adequately under a total federal and state tax levy of 43.5% of GDP which included 18.0% spent directly within the state by the state government.

The heaviest tax burden of all would fall on the Orange River province of Rand since it would pay 36.4% of its GDP to the federal government and only receive a federal grant of 5.2% of its GDP. Total state and federal taxes of 50.0% of Rand's GDP would be required if the provincial government was to have just 18.8% of GDP left to meet its own needs. Vaal Free State would have to find 49.0% of its GDP to have 18.8% left. Such rates of taxation represent the absolute limit these

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two provinces could pay without significantly slowing the main engine of economic growth in South Africa.

It must be remembered however that a considerable amount of the VAT collected within Rand and Vaal Free State would come from purchases by residents of surrounding states, and would not diminish local spending power. The real internally generated federal tax paid by both of them would be probably at least 3 0% lower. Much of the customs and excise duties they paid would also be passed on in the price of goods and services purchased by residents of other states. Both would also indirectly recover some federal taxes above the level of their grant, since much of the spending on strictly federal government functions would take place within Orange River.

With 36.4% of Rand's GGP being collected as federal taxation, less perhaps 3.0% generated by out of state purchases, perhaps 3.0% recovery of customs and excise duties, a 5.2% federal redistribution grant returned for state government spending, and at least 7.5% returned as federal spending, Rand would appear to have lost 17.7% of its spending power to maintain GGP. However the tax is still present as spending power in the surrounding states, and although initially it might be spent for different purposes, it must mostly come back to existing industrial and service areas for essential purchases, since new areas take time to develop or expand.

Most of the money paid out by the present government to the independent homelands comes back into the South African economy through the purchase of goods. In the same way Rand's lost spending power would come back to buy Rand's goods and services, although there could be more emphasis on consumer goods rather than sophisticated services. This would be unlikely to slow up Rand's movement into high technology which would be inevitable with a rapidly expanding wealth base in South Africa.

As the area bearing the heaviest tax burden at 50% of GDP, Rand would have to find 38% of its GDP from taxes other than VAT. With approximately 4.5% coming from customs and excise duties, 1.0% from estate, gift duties and land tax, 4.3% from gold mining and gold leases, 6.5% from other company taxes, and 1.0% from other sources, the individual taxpayers of Rand would have to find up to 21.0% of Rand's GGP as personal tax. This is at the high end of GGP collected as personal taxes in OECD countries, and could be compared with 19.5% in New Zealand in 1991 and 9.6% for the whole of South Africa.

In 1991 personal taxes supplied 37.2% of all central government revenue in South Africa. This is quite a low figure compared with 44.1% of US federal taxes, 53.8% of Australian federal taxes, and 51.5% of those of a unitary state such as New Zealand. This is mainly because the proportion of the population in South Africa with taxable incomes is low, but also because the proportion of taxable incomes collected is actually quite low by international standards, despite a marginal rate of 43% on incomes above R80,000 in 1991.

New Zealand's maximum personal tax rate of 33% on incomes over \$30,875 is low by international standards, but since South Africans only pay more total tax

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than New Zealanders at incomes over R83.000, taxes on low and middle income earners are clearly considerably lower. Purchasing power parity of the two currencies favours the rand for low income earners and is only worse for imported goods. New Zealand welfare on the other hand makes extensive monetary grants to low income families.

Married New Zealanders with no children pay around 22% of their incomes at all levels between \$1000 and R20.000 as tax. whereas South African payments range from 1 to 8% only between R12.000 and R20.000,

There is little doubt that the incidence of personal income tax on lower and middle income Whites. who are not poor by Black standards. can be expected to increase considerably, since neither the very poor nor the very rich can be taxed at an appreciably higher rate.

Effective increases would come not just from increases in the lower and middle rates of the tax scale. but from removal of present tax exemptions on medical and dental expenses. the removal of personal tax rebates, the introduction of withholding tax on interest. more stringent fringe benefits tax, and more effective elimination of tax avoidance. The resultant tax scale would be steeply progressive, taxing middle income groups at higher rates than in most countries of the world.

Throughout South Africa. the total tax burden would be rather higher on low and middle income Whites than they would pay in most western countries. but these Whites are not internationally mobile and could probably duplicate neither the incomes they earn nor the standard of living they enjoy in South Africa if they emigrated to other countries.

For the very mobile high income groups that South Africa risks losing, tax rates would be only marginally higher than they would pay in most western countries. but because of rapid economic growth and the general shortage of skills. their income opportunities and standards of living would be much greater in South Africa.

STATE BUDGETS

State governments would have full control over their revenue raising from sources other than the federal grant such as secondary taxation of personal incomes, borrowing up to 1.0% of their GDPs and such things as road tax, licensing and revenue from state lotteries.

Table 42 shows the distribution of government spending in the 1991/92 budget by percentage of GDP. and the proposed future split between federal and state spending when direct federal spending is limited to 7.5% of GDP and total state budgets. including federal transfers, are increased to a maximum of 27.5% of GDP. The increases indicated in total spending on government services, education, health and welfare, are speculative based on Black priorities and additional layers of government.

Table 42
FEDERAL & STATE EXPENDITURES BASED ON 1991/92 BUDGET

1991/92 Future Future State

Rudgct Federal Spending

% S.A. | Spending % S.A. GDP

GDP %% S.A. GDP

Government scrvices 43 1.7 5.0

Defence 33 11 1.1

Police 1.7 - 1.7

Education 6.2 0.7 7.1

Health 2.7 0.3 5.0

Welfare and housing 30 - 13

Economic services/subsidics 3.4 - 3.2

State debt 132 3.7 -

Other 0.1 - 0.1

29.5 7.5 27.5

The elimination of costly duplication of "own" afTairs departments would not save more than 1% of GDP per year, and would be partially offset by larger regional bureaucracies. These would however deliver more local control over decision making.

At the levels shown. total public spending on education of 7.8% of GDP. and on health of 5.3%. would be amongst the highest in the world in percentage terms. although not in real value. This would reflect the imperatives of a politically demanding electorate. Private spending on these items would also be substantial. These percentages of GDP may be compared with New Zealand, a welfare state, with comparable figures of 5.9% and 5.2%. but without such a huge demand for capital to fund new services.

Increased spending would be financed by decreased spending on defence and debt servicing and by an increase of 5.5% of GDP raised as taxes. At 35% of GDP, total federal and statc spending represents the absolute maximum the South African economy could sustain at its present stage of development. but the table shows that fairly optimistic Black expectations could be met. Whether the three states which fund all of the federal transfers of income could meet their own needs on the resources remaining to them is another matter.

Federal grants would be allocated to the states on a straight per capita basis. with only the amount to be earmarked for education and heaith being specified. The balance would be for gencral use. Per capita funding would benefit poorer states for spending on such things as housing, schools and hospitals, since their

land and labour costs are only a fraction of the cost of those in major urban centres.

Although the federal parliament could not alter the per capita basis of the distribution of federal funds to the states, which would be laid down in the constitution. federal legislators from the Black states acting together would

determine how much would be allocated to education and health by deciding the per capita grant for those functions.

The differences among the 11 Black states in the proportion of their population of student age are insignificant, but Orange River would have only around 23.32% of the student population compared with its share of the total population of 23.88%. On the other hand, reflecting the size and sophistication of its contribution to national defence, the Orange River state government would be directly paying a 40% share of South Africa's reduced defence costs.

Table 43 shows the estimated percentages of its GDP that would be spent on various items in an Orange River state budget limited to 18.0% of the state's GDP. It also compares this with the percentages of South Africa's GDP spent on the same items in the 1991/92 budget, and the previously calculated amounts for the new federal government and all 12 states together shown in Table 42.

Table 43

ORANGE RIVER STATE BUDGET AT 18.0% GDP				
S.A.	% S.A.	GDP % 0. R	1991/92 . GDP	% GDP
FEDERAL STATES				
General government services	48	1.7	5.0	36
Defence	33	1.1	1.1	1.6
Police	1.7	-	1.7	0.8
Education	6.2	0.7	7.1	5.5
Health	2.7	0.3	5.0	1.9
Welfare and housing	3.0	-	43	2.5
Economic services and subsidies	34	-	3.2	2.0
State debt	43	3.7	-	-
Other	0.1	-	0.1	0.1
29.5	1.5	27.5	18.0	

Orange river would receive 7.5% of its GDP as a federal grant and would raise 10.5% of its GDP as additional taxes. At 55.4% of the 1991/92 South African GDP of R298.8 billion. Orange River's GDP would be R165.5 billion. Its government's

total revenue at 18.0% of GDP would be R29.8 billion.

Since it took R88.35 billion to run all of South Africa in 1991/92 including all central government services., R29.8 billion or 34% of this amount should be enough to run a state with 24% of the total population, even allowing for a more sophisticated and more expensive level of scrvices and a large national guard.

To provide a picture of what such a level of spending would mean to Orange River, Table 44 shows estimated Orange River spending in 1991 monetary terms and compares it with the central government budget for 1991/92.

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Table 44
ORANGE RIVER STATE BUDGET POST SETTLEMENT

Government Spending	Est. OR.	O.R. % of Spending Total
1901/92=2		
(R'm.) (R m.)		
General government services	14473 59359	41
Defence	9757 . 2649	27
Police	5122 1324	26
Education (incl TVBC)	18526 9104	49
Health	8212 3145	38
Welfare and housing	9051 4138	46
Economic services and subsidies	10137 3311	33
State debt	12903 -	
Other	172 165	96
Government expenditure	88353 29795	

At only 18% of its state GDP, Orange River would be spending at a level equal to 41% of all previous South African spending on government services, 46% of spending on welfare and housing including a grant for out of state Black housing, 26% of spending on police. 27% of spending on defence. 38% of spending on health and 49% of spending on education.

There seems no good reason why such levels of spending would not maintain services in Orange River at least at their previous level. since although following redistribution Orange River would have only 18% of its GDP available for spending on state services compared with an average of 39.3% available to the Black states. it would have a very much larger GDP per capita.

Compared with the R29.83 billion spent by Orange River. the other 11 states with 76% of the population would spend only RS2.4 billion. A further R22.4 billion would be spent by the federal government if total government spending in South Africa was 35% of GDP. Orange River would be the most highly taxed state in the federation, but its government spending per capita would still be 1.8 times

the average of the other 11 states.

The ability of the other states to raise substantial taxation in addition to their federal grant would differ considerably depending on the size of their first world sector. but this would already have been compensated for by the relative size of their contribution to federal taxes.

The mere existence of Orange River would place a limit on secondary taxation in the other states. Oppressive taxation by any state or states would result in people and businesses moving to lower tax states, so unduly high tax rates would not be an effective way for a state to raise revenue. The emphasis would be where it should be on sound management.

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Klip River would be likely to continue to be the focus of Black discontent, because although it would not be poor relative to other states. and would not receive such large per capita federal grants. it would compare itself with Rand. the richest area in South Africa. In addition it will be the main focus of urban migration and rapid change in South Africa. and will be forever trying to cope with demands for housing. services. and new industrial developments to provide work.

Some provision to assist such growth areas must be made in the total resource sharing arrangements. because while their federal grants would grow with their relative populations. they could not possibly cope with the capital demands for new housing. serviced building sites. water supplies and sewerage services.

Starting with nil debt following settlement, state governments are likely to borrow aggressively up to their limit of 1% of their respective GDPs per year, to fund roads, sewerage, water treatment plants, schools and hospitals. This is not an answer since their annual interest bills would rise rapidly and their ability to service further debt would decline.

REGIONAL SERVICES COUNCILS

Regional Service Councils (RSCs) were begun in August 1987 to provide a greater funding base and the administrative skills to solve local developmental problems in Black townships. They aimed to upgrade backward residential areas with streets, electricity, and sewerage. but they also had the political aim of supporting unpopular Black town councils by giving them a real say in decision making.

All local town councils. of all races, are included in one RSC. In an attempt to promote decision making by consensus. no single council, no matter how big, may have more than 50% of the total vote. Funds for RSCs come from

- (1) Profits from the sale of electricity and water to local authorities.
- (2) Levies of 0.1% on all business turnover in the region.
- (3) Levies of 0.25% on all wages and salaries paid by employers.

The Regional Services Council Act states that priority must be given to provision of infrastructure and services where they are needed most. which means most funds are raised in well off communities and spent in poor ones.

Regional Services Councils fit very neatly into the concept of two tier metropolitan and local government and should be incorporated into the constitution as one of the planks of the new South Africa.

RSCs would provide a uniquely South African way of providing a single metropolitan administration which could draw on the resources of a common

urban base spread over two or more federal states. They would provide commonality to the twin cities concept which is basic to the existence of Orange River. However in a major change to their method of incorporation, they should be democratically elected by all of the people in their region.

RSCs. or metropolitan councils. would have no power to legislate for their areas. since this would override the legitimate right of the people of each state to make their own laws. They would carry out such administrative functions as all local councils were prepared to delegate. and they would have constitutional power to levy and spend all of the above regional charges. In addition they could levy and spend a rating charge of up to 0.1% on the capital value of all property in their areas. since property will benefit from urban growth.

In 1991 terms these financial provisions for Regional Services Councils would provide at least R1.5 billion per year to provide new water supplies. sewerage, storm water drains. street lighting. and scaling. to developing communities. Wealthy. mainly White border communities of Orange River would thus share the burden of urban growth with their twin Black townships in surrounding states that were the target of poor migrants.

HOUSING

The Black population of the cities is expected to more than treble between 1985 and 2020, from natural growth and from migration. which means 30.0 million more Blacks will have to be housed in urban areas in the next 30 years. [t is the clear responsibility of government to make housing possible for these millions. and for those who are presently inadequately housed or homeless.

Since 1986 the government has accepted the need for large scale investment in housing. from the most elementary self build schemes to higher level projects. but it has always seen these projects as being largely privately initiated and financed. This was never ever remotely possible for the 40% of Blacks who are totally dependent on government housing or on squatting.

By 1991 private enterprise had clearly failed to meet Black housing needs despite some innovative attempts to guarantee security on many loans. The housing backlog had increased from 1.8 million units in 1987 to 2.0 million in 1990, well beyond the ability of any government to finance from current budgets.

Since at least 320.000 units per year need to be built every year for the next ten years to cut this backlog and cope with urban growth, definite and drastic steps must be taken to deal with the problem.

In view of the poverty of most home seekers, rent and loan boycotts that eliminate the normal commercial provision of housing, and a drastic shortage of government finance. the only possible way to house the poorest 50% is for governments to survey and service areas with roads, sewerage, stormwater drains, water supply. electricity. and street lighting, then allocate permanent rights to a block to home seekers.

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The R6.000 cost of developing the site would be written off over a 30 year period as a once only government subsidy. but the buyer would have to bear the basic R1500 cost of the land and erect his own basic shelter. Building their own homes is part of Black culture.

Governments would also provide do it yourself building instruction, plus the option of a R1.000 loan for basic raw materials. Loans per site would have to be small to make long term payments possible for the poor. At an average cost of R8.300 including loans for materials. the cost of 160.000 serviced sites per year would be R1.4 billion.

The house land and service cost of a further 160,000 low cost homes per year at R17.000 each. would bring the total cost to R4.1 billion per year.

There are only five sources from which this money can come.

- (1) A housing levy raised as a normal part of taxes in all states.
- (2) Regional services council levies to provide infrastructure and basic services.
- (3) Corporate donations which presently help to fund the South African Housing Trust. :
- (4) Legislation could prescribe that a proportion of new investment from pension funds. insurance companies and lending institutions would have to go into housing mortgages for R12,500 to R25,000 properties.
- (5) The privatization of present central government assets.

A housing levy of 0.7% of each states GDP would provide R2.1 billion for low cost housing, but because the need for such housing varies from state to state, neither its levying nor its spending can be at the discretion of state governments. Nor can its spending be at the discretion of the federal government which could use such discretionary power to favour certain states.

To prevent the politicization of the distribution of housing funds, such money should go to the South African Housing Trust, a joint government. private sector organisation established precisely to help provide affordable shelter for lower income communities.

The trust would be charged with providing housing where the need was greatest, and it would be responsible to all of its contributing governments. While most of the money would be spent in centralized locations, most of the migrants provided with housing or serviced sites would come from poor outlying areas so it is fair that all states should contribute.

It is entirely reasonable that Orange River should be required to provide much of the finance to house the millions of workers who will settle near its borders in surrounding Black states. greatly benefiting its economy. The housing and welfare allocation in the Orange River state budget in Table 44 makes provision for this.

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R1.1 of the R2.1 billion housing levy would in fact come from Orange River, but more than R1.1 billion per year would probably be spent providing housing in the twin cities along its borders:

As previously outlined. Regional Services Councils would provide at least R1.5 billion per year to provide new water supplies. sewerage. storm water drains, street lighting and sealing to developing communities. so no further help can be expected from them.

Similarly corporations already make substantial donations each year to the South African Housing Trust. and to the Urban Foundation, and little additional help can be expected.

Legislation could prescribe that a percentage of new investment from pension funds, insurance companies and building societies would have to go into housing mortgages for R12.500 to R25.000 properties at normal commercial interest rates. In 1990 those institutions had total assets of R203 billion. Much less than 10% of the net growth in deposits and tax paid profits available for reinvestment each year would provide R1.0 billion for mortgages on low cost housing. All institution's would be equally affected so they would remain in the same competitive position.

Their security need not be affected since state governments could afford to guarantee repayment of 30% of the value of each loan, in the event of a mortgagee sale, in return for such valuable assistance in finding funds for low income housing.

Since the South African Housing Trust would administer the funds, and state governments would be heavily dependent on it to meet their housing programs, there would be little danger they would not promptly honour their guarantees. Administration by the South African Housing Trust would also solve the problem to the institutions of the cost of administering so many low value loans.

The privatization of selected government assets to private investors represents the best hope of raising the R1.0 billion balance of the funds for low income housing. although some of the funds released by such privatization must also go as capital grants for new schools and hospitals. In November 1989 the government successfully privatized Iscor for R3.7 billion and it already owns much of the land required for subdivision. .

Iscor was listed on the stock exchange and its share price increased by 35% within two months. More than 50.000 [scor employees became shareholders, many funding their purchase by an interest free loan repayable over 36 months. Only 150 million or 8.1% of the 1.85 billion shares were offered to the general public who oversubscribed the issue 4.16 times. Institutional investors indicated they were prepared to invest twice the R3.7 billion on offer. Providing the assets being privatized were properly priced and of similar quality to Iscor, it is likely that up to R5.0 billion could be raised each year to fund basic reforms.

All money released by sale of government assets whether for housing, schools or hospitals should also be administered by the South African Housing Trust. As money flowed back to the Trust from interest and capital repayments, the standard

of housing the Trust financed could be improved. and capital investment in schools and hospitals increased.

Besides state corporations the government owns vast expanses of land and innumerable buildings. The income from their sale would represent a considerable redistribution of resources in favour of poor Blacks. Such sales would not necessarily rule out ANC plans for greater Black participation in commerce since the conditions attached to any sale could actually advance these plans.

In effect all of the R1.0 billion per year released for housing by privatization of government assets would be going as a once only grant towards the cost of providing serviced sites to the poorest 50% of Blacks - a case of redistribution to those who need it most. Profiteering by those receiving serviced sites would be prevented by only writing the R6.000 grant off progressively over 30 years. In addition, unless the balance owing was repaid, the site could only be transferred to another qualifying squatter.

The ultimate responsibility for low cost housing would lie squarely with state governments as the only organisations with the necessary power and resources to requisition appropriately sited land and to organize subdivisions. Their responsibility to provide housing would not be limited to the funding provided by the Housing Trust, but they could apply to the Trust for funding for any current project according to the Trust's assessment of priorities on a South Africa wide basis.

A R4.1 billion per year housing program in South Africa would trigger off an internally fuelled boom in low cost residential construction, building materials, furniture and household appliances and substantially cut Black unemployment. The rapid creation of jobs, housing, and hope for a decent life would also go a long way towards creating the kind of cooperative social atmosphere that would ensure the success of a political settlement.

Orange River would face the same proportional demand for new housing to 2020 as South Africa as a whole, since its proportion of a doubled South African population will be little changed. However most of its housing would be provided by private sector finance. To preserve the limited autonomy of its minority groups, it would almost certainly discourage do it yourself housing by millions of Black migrants however financed.

POLITICAL ASPECTS

The proposed federal redistribution would transfer income from Orange River to the Black states at a greater rate than is presently the case, which will meet resistance from those whose taxes must necessarily rise to meet it. However a net rate of 25.5% of Orange River's GDP transferred to Black states, or used to meet most of the cost of federal government, is probably not as great a transfer as Black politicians envisaged or want. It is however as much as is sustainable, since

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Orange River would be paying over 70% of all federal taxes. and total federal and state taxes would be taking 43.3% of its GDP.

Total government spending including that of state governments would increase steeply from 29.5% to around 35% of GDP. 5.5% above the present level of spending. which is quite comparable with typical levels in other countries. This represents the maximum that could be squeezed out of the economy at its present stage of development without greatly slowing its growth, but as Table 42 shows. it would be sufficient to meet fairly optimistic Black expectations. Total public spending on education of 7.8% of GDP. and on health of 5.3%. would be amongst the highest in the world in percentage terms.

A steeply progressive tax scale would tax middle income groups at somewhat higher rates than most countries. but this group could not duplicate the incomes they were earning. and most certainly not their standard of living, by emigrating. Tax rates would be only marginally higher for the very mobile high income groups that South Africa risks losing. but their income opportunities and standards of living would be much greater in South Africa.

Realistically. considerably higher taxation on middle income earners will be imposed under any future South African regime o meet the immense demands of Black development. The genuine sharing of resources for the welfare of all South Africa would be the ecssential price for obtaining Black acceptance of limited autonomy for Orange River. A limit on federal taxation of 33% of Orange River's GDP simply puts a cap on how far tax demands might go.

There would be little more that even a centrally planned socialist state could do to effectively redistribute the wealth of the more productive arcas of South Africa. The disparity in personal income earning skills. and the considerable differences in mineral resources and economic development between regions. would continue to exist even in a Black dominated unitary statc. Apart from investment in human wealth which is mobile. artificial investment without good economic reasons could only reduce the wealth of South Africa as a whole.

The realistic autonomy of states would be preserved by limiting the federal government's right to levy taxes to 25% of South Africa's total GGP. and to 33% of any one statc's GGP exclusive of royalties on minerals. Sufficient scope would be left for each state to raise and spend taxes on matters that were its own concern.

Personal tax would be both a state and federal revenue resource with the actual income level on which any marginal rate became effective being adjusted upwards annually for inflation. There would be an upper limit of 40% on federal taxation of marginal personal income.

Taxes should be collectcted by a joint federal/state tax office, which would mean only one tax bill was paid by the residents of each state, and that tax collection and enforcement measures were uniform between states. If a federal tax office collected all taxes. state governments would be reduced to clients of the federal government. If state governments collectcted all taxes there would be a distinct possibility of deliberate under collection by some states.

The federal tax structure in South Africa would function mainly as a clearing house to redistribute wealth to poorer states. so it follows that restrictions on direct federal spending would be a necessity. Any addition to the spending activities the constitution permitted the federal government to engage in would have to be agreed to by all states. All state spending should be subject to federal audit and federal spending subject to audit by the states.

A federation as the basis of a settlement could in fact make a more assured redistribution to the poorest areas of South Africa than a unitary state, of an amount at least equal in size. and do it with greater justice to the rights of all of the peoples of South Africa.

Setting the rate of transfer at a known level. which could be sustained without slowing South Africa's overall economic growth, is essential if living standards are to be raised in the Black states. Investors. and financial markets generally, hate uncertainty. and while the overall level of taxes in a Black dominated South Africa would certainly be higher than at present. markets would offset that against the immense potential for expansion and the stable investment climate that such a fixed system would create.

With a political agreement incorporating a large degree of autonomy for Orange River. rates of federal taxation that were reasonable, and in particular rates of company tax that were internationally comparable. it is likely there would be a rush by the international community to invest in South Africa's huge economic potential in a way that a centrally planned socialist state could never hope to emulate. Such a settlement would offer a certainty to international investors, and a certainty of rapid economic growth to South Africans, that no other political arrangement could provide.

Orange River. producing 55.4% of South Africa's GDP, would most certainly create conditions that would encourage international investment. Other states would have little option but to follow suit if they did not want to be left behind. With totally free trade between the states, wealth in any area would provide a market for the goods of other parts.

A federation of states. sharing the resources of South Africa in this way. would represent a reasonable compromise between the need to avoid excessive taxation of the engine of South Africa's growth and the overwhelming pressure for government spending to help the disadvantaged.

A federal levy that could not rise above a maximum of 33.0% of Orange River's GDP. or 25% of South Africa's GDP. and certainly would not be less for at least two decades. would also free all South Africans from quarrelling about the distribution of the national cake so they could concentrate their energies on increasing it. Having a definite upper limit to possible transfers, and a borrowing capacity for each state limited to 1% of its GDP per year, would also impose the financial discipline necessary for each state to make the maximum use of its own resources.

If Blacks wanted more government spending, they would have to raise it from within their own states. They would therefore balance real needs against the

additional taxes they would mainly have to find themselves. Any tendency for a state government to claim an exorbitant share of higher personal incomes as tax would drastically slow development of that state, as businesses that were mobile and people with skills moved elsewhere.

Although Orange River would contain 47.5% of South Africa's territory and only 24.9% of its people. RO of its area would be semi-desert with few resources. [its real wealth would lie in its skilled people and its manufacturing and other urban activities, which would generate more than half of South Africa's wealth at the time of settlement. However most of the districts that would experience rapid future urban and manufacturing growth would lie wholly within Black states.

While predominantly rural Eastern Free State would be the poorest area outside the homelands. Klip River would be the main problem area. Despite substantial help with housing and urban services, it would struggle with limited resources as millions of immigrants flocked in. This would not have to remain so given an enlightened administration. since Klip River would be by far the major remaining source of well suited. flat. industrial land in the PWV area. and both its total production and production per head could be expected to rapidly increase.

In reality it matters little for the control of resources, or for redistribution, where such wealth producing areas lie. since by making tax on every kind of company solely a federal revenue. taxation on most wealth producing assets throughout South Africa would be under the control of a Black dominated federal government.

The potentially explosive issue of providing low cost housing for millions of poor urban migrants. and those who are presently inadequately housed or homeless. would be met by a levy which would be paid as part of normal taxation on each state's GDP. by RSC levies. by requirements on lending institutions to fund a proportion of low value mortgages. and by the sale of selected government assets. Since the bulk of these funds would be provided by the wealthy, or have been so provided in the past, this would provide politicians with a clear cut example of redistribution in favour of those most in need.

For the Orange River government to maintain services to its people at their previous level, while contributing heavily to 'redistribution, total taxation in Orange River would have to rise to 43.5% of GDP, but the rich parts of any economy always contribute a greater proportion of their wealth to taxation than the poorer parts.

Wealthy taxpayers in Orange River would no more escape contributing heavily to Black education. welfare and development than if South Africa was a unitary state, so the distribution of South Africa's natural and industrial wealth amongst the various states should no longer be an issue.

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POPULATION OF SOUTH AFRICA

Accurate statistics are very hard to obtain, with the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) estimating that Blacks were 25% under counted in the 1985 statistics and Whites 8% under counted. The 1985 census gave the population of greater Soweto including Dobsonville as only 752,796 yet an official government estimate as early as 1983 had been 1,152,000. In 1986, a business study of Black towns of the PWV estimated it at 1.8 million.

The figures used below are the official 1985 government statistics adjusted by the HSRC estimates of undercount for the various ethnic groups. The figures for Black townships in the Pretoria - Witwatersrand - Verduynsburg area, (PWV area) were further increased to reconcile them with a 1986 study by Davies et al. The figure for the Black population of Cape Town was increased using estimates of the Cape Town Transport Board. The figures for the four independent states of Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei are from the 1986 Europa Yearbook, adjusted to allow for population growth.

The estimated population for South Africa in 1985, including all independent and self governing homelands was 34.5 million made up as follows.

Total	White	Coloured	Indian	Black
34,495,424	4,933,160	2,868,360	864,755	25,809,149
% 11.26	8.31	2.51	74.82	

Only one person in seven was White and all minorities together only made up one quarter of the population.

The Black population was further subdivided into nine major groups. each making up the following percentage of the total population.

Zulu	7,145,769	20.72
Xhosa	6,118,988	17.83
Pedi	3,235,524	9.38
Tswana	2,693,793	7.81
Sotho	2,333,189	6.76
Shangaan	1,492,022	4.33

Swazi 1,178,466 | 3.42
Ndebele 935,082 | 2.71
Venda 548,709 | 1.59
Other 97,608 | 0.28

25,809,150 | 74.82

In general, the different tribes occupy distinct geographical areas. The exception is the rapidly developing PWV area where the Black townships most frequently are a polyglot of all the Black peoples of South Africa. This is also true of the West Rand and Orange Free State goldfields and the industrial towns of central Transvaal.

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WARRENTON

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Fig A9 RANDFONTEIN

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Fig A10 SOWETO

Fig A11 ALBERTON

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Fig A12 SPRINGS/NIGEL

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Fig A13 VEREENIGING/VANDERBIJLPARK

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Fig A14 MIDDELBURG

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Fig A15 NOUPOORT

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Fig A18 COLESBURG

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Fig A17 SASOLBURG

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Fig A18 KOPPIES

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Fig A19 KROONSTAD

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Fig A20 WELKOM/ODENDAALSRUS

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Fig A21 VIRGINIA

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Fig A22 THEUNISSEN

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Fig A23 BRANDFORT
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Fig A24 EDENBURG

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Fig A25 SPRINGFONTEIN

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Fig A28 ORANJEKRAAG

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Fig A27 CARLETONVILLE

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Fig A29 MAKWASSIE

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