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INTERNATIONAL

Blacks at War

As vigilantes attack radicals, South Africaâ\200\231s unrest takes a bloody new turn

hey are called  $a\200\234$ the fathers" $a\200\224$ but

there is nothing paternal about

their wrath. In the South African !

squattersâ\200\231 shantytown of Cross-roads last week, scores of blacks armed with clubs, spears, iron bars and

stones went on a rampage against radicals.

Wearing white headbands, the vigilantes thrashed the  $a\200\234$ comrades,  $a\200\235$  burned down their shacks and destroyed the homes of their kinsmen. In at least one incident, they dispensed street justice with a gory punishment the radicals themselves have made infamous: they hung a  $a\200\234$ necklace,  $a\200\235$  or an automobile tire soaked with gasoline, around the neck of a victim and set it on fire, engulfing the man in a blazing ring of death (page 34).  $a\200\234$ We are giving them a

taste of their own medicine!â\200\235 shouted one | vigilante leader as he and 70 followers ma- |

rauded through the streets.

The fires smoldered for four days, sending a mushroom cloud of smoke over the

sprawling shantytown near Cape Town. | When it was over, more than 3,000 of the |

tiny housesin Crossroads had burned to he ground and over a quarter of its population

of 200,000 was left homeless. Thousands of displaced blacks sat on the roadsides, shiv-

ering in the winter cold, surrounded by salvaged scraps of bedding, clothing and kitchen utensils. There was no clue to where they would  $goa^2200^24$  that they could soon get caught again in the cross fire between the fathers and the comrades.

The war for South Africaâ\200\231stownships has i

taken a bloody new turn. The young radicals who have gained increasing control over the segregated areas are no longer fighting just the white police. Now they are

. bodies in the streets and the front yards. $\hat{a}$ \200\235

waging violent battles with other blacks. Some of the vigilantes are moderates who oppose the radicals $\hat{a}\200\231$  strategy of armed struggle. Others are street gangs who fear the loss of their petty-crime rackets. Still others are older blacks who have become fed up with intimidation of blacks who refuse to join in antiwhite boycotts and protests. Whatever their motives, thousands have started to fight back, convulsing townships from Guguletu near Cape Town to Soweto outside Johannesburg in violence that has left more than 100 dead in the past month.  $\hat{a}$ 200\234Sowetoisin astate of civil war,  $\hat{a}$ 200\235 says one resident.  $\hat{a}$ 200\234It $\hat{a}$ 200\231s no longer 32 NEWSWEEK : JUNE 2. 1986 an increasingly tough war on the radical African National Congress (ANC) â\200\224astrategy he underlined last week by ordering air and ground strikes on ANC bases in Zim-2 P - b -| Fighting fire with fire: Black vigilantes after attacking comrades in Cape Town e A ~ ARGUS news to wake up in the morning and see For the moment, South African President P. W. Botha seems content to let the blacksgoat each other. He hasbeen waging ! babwe, Zambia and Botswana (box). At - than police in punishing ANC-inspired home, the vigilantes may have more luck radicals. The battles in the townships also i support Botha's bid to convince the world ' that much of South Africaâ\200\231s unrest is '  $\hat{a}$ 200\234black on black. $\hat{a}$ \200\235 Some blacks charge that ! government forces are helping the vigilantes, turning a blind eye to their violence. supplying them with arms and in some cases even joining in their rampages. Pre| toria has denied the charges.

The government could quickly come to

regret the violence. A new round of unrest

may erupt in three weeks, when blacks celebrate the 10th anniversary of the 1976

i Soweto riots. Last week ANC leader Oliver

Tambo called on his followers to stage a

{ nationwide strike and  $a\200\234$ spread total disobedience  $a\200\235$  on June 16. Even more worrisome

for Pretoria, the warfare has begun to seep beyond the townships, which house only 25

. percent of South Africaâ $\200\231s$  22 million blacks

but lie close to major cities and are seedbeds of radicalism. It has now spread to rural black â\200\234homelandsâ\200\235 like | KwaNdebele. If the bloodshed | keeps mounting, Botha may decide toscotch his policy of limited reform and crack down harder than ever. â\200\234Soon the Afrikaner will say, â\200\234â\200\230What is the point of going on like this when you get no credit for anything youdo?â\200\231 â\200\235 warns one senior government official.

Rising expectations: Of the township warriors, the young radicals remain by far the strongest. Over the past 20 months they have tangled repeatedly with white police and alleged black  $a\200\234$ collaborators $a\200\235$ in clashes that have left more than 1,500 people dead. Their grievances include substandard black education that has left many of them illiterate and unskilled, a white-dominated economy that keeps many young black job seekers unemployed and a political system that largely excludes them. Meanwhile, Pretoriaâ\200\231s halting moves toward reform have given them a sense of "'rising expectationsâ\200\235â\200\224a feeling that white resolve is weakening and that they may win equality faster than their parents ever dreamed. Recently Botha

stepped up the reform process by proposing

to abolish the  $a\200\234$ pass laws $a\200\235$  that force blacks to carry identity cards to travel to white areas. He also proposed to allow blacks to

participate in provincial governments and give them property rights. But the radicals insist he hasna $200\231t$  gone far enough. They

want a one man, one vote system that
' cals have begun to set up their own de facto
. governments. In some areas they control,

- would almost certainly ensure a black
- takeover of power.

Eight months ago the militant rioting was largely sporadic (NEWSWEEK, Sept. 16,

ly organized. The radicals seem to be focusing on attacking black policemen and their familiesâ\200\224firebombing their houses, leaning on black shopkeepers not toserve them. While the comrades once fought mostly

with stones, they are now better armed. In major townships like Alexandra and Guguletu. police have come under sniper fire or grenade attack dozens of times in the past six weeks. In their hunt for suspected ANC terrorists government forces have uncovered arms caches that include Soviet-made limpet mines and AK-47 rifles. The radicals have also grown increasingly effective in carrying out the ANC' $\hat{a}$ \200\231s strateg\ of  $a\200\234$  making the townships ungo ernable.â\200\235 Many administrative boards and councils no longe: meet for fear of being harassed. Some local government staffers are afraid to show up for work. The comrades have leaned on thousands of residents not to paytheir rentâ\200\224acampaign that.according to one senior civil servant, has cost the townships more than \$65 million. As official authority has broken down. the radi-

## NEWSWEER

youths order residents to clean the streets.

i In others, they try suspected collaborators 1985). Since then it has become increasing-

in  $a\200\234$ people $a\200\231$ s courts $a\200\235$  and punish them with beatingsand sometimes death. For many blacks the intimidation cam-

. paign has had its intended effect. There

have been hundreds of resignations among South Africaâ $\200\231s$  black policemen, who num-

Pretoriaâ\200\231s Surprise Show of Force

| Party rally in Pietersburg, in i the Transvaal. It was also

. questionable how effective

T'he attacks began as the 'sun rose. Two South African fighter-bombers dived '

ple of South Africa will have

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to pay the price of this, \hat{a} \200\235 de-
. clared official opposition lead- :
i er Colin Eglin.
Economic threat: White House
over the Zambian capital of
Lusaka to strike a suspected
encampment of the African
National Congress. Rather
than destroying any terror- |
ists, their bombs killed two
drinkers in an all-night bar.
Helicopter-borne South Afri-
can troops attacked a group of
houses outside the Botswana '
capital of Gaborone, killing a
government employee. And
in Harare, the capital of Zim-
babwe, South Africansoldiers
stormed the local downtown
ANC office and a suburban
safe house; a night watchman
was wounded in the attack.
All together last weekâ\200\231s ac-
tions represented the most
spectacular blow that Preto-
ria has launched against the
outlawed ANCâ\200\224and possibly
the most inept. \hat{a}\200\234All the peo-
spokesman Larry Speakes ex-
pressed the Reagan adminis-
coal, uranium and steel. If !
' fronts. Far from damaging
. the ANC'\hat{a}200\231s terrorist network,
South Africa has not made
significant reforms within
i one year, the bill would ban
U.S. computer exports to
South Africa. If Pretoria re-
mains stubborn after two
years, the bill requires the
president to consider order-
" ing U.S. firms to give up their
trationâ\200\231s â\200\234outrageâ\200\235 at the
raids; the administration also :
! calculated to stave off the
expelled the senior South Af-
rican defense attaché from
Washington and recalled the
senior U.S. attaché from Pre-
toria. But presidential aides
ruled out imposing additional
sanctions. In Congress, how-
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ever, a bipartisan coalition introduced legislation that would bar new U.S. investments or loans to South Africa and block imports of its

South African investments. At home, the raid seemed

growing right-wing political challenge to President P. W. Botha and to reassure agitated white voters that the government would not knuckle under to black extremists. But the hard-liners did not

| seem appeased: three days i after the raid, 3,000 white

right-wing militants forcibly

the raids will prove on other

they may improve the organization's standing around the world. The threat of tougher

- sanctions can also only deep-
- . en South Africaâ\200\231s economic
- depression. Still, Botha re-

mained unrepentant. Asserting that the ANC had been responsible for 193 â\200\234serious acts of terrorismâ\200\235 since April 1985, he vowed: â\200\234We will continue to strike against ANC base facilities in neighbor:ng countries in accordance with our legal right.â\200\235 Given the consequences of last week's raids, it's unlikely the ANC was much impressed.

HARRY ANDERSON with PETER

: . i YouNGcHUSBANDinCape Tounand broke up a ruling National !

Ray WiLKINSON in Harare

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ber about 18,000 out of a total force of 45,000. Police recruitment has slowed dramatically in the most turbulent areas. Recently two policemen resigned in the townships of Atteridgeville and Mamelodi. Constable Thomas Makhubela, 24, burned his uniform and emotionally recounted his change of heart. After seeing a police bullet kill a three-year-old child, he said, "I really could not take it any longer.â\200\235 Constable Actor Motadi, meanwhile, admitted that he had resigned "against his willâ\200\235 because he feared for hislife in his off-duty hours.

But increasingly, other blacks have de-

cided to fight back against the radicals. Perhaps the largest groupâ\200\224including most of the â\200\234fathersâ\200\235 of Crossroadsâ\200\224are older blacks who have grown tired of being attacked as Uncle Toms. Enforcing their boycotts, radicals have attacked older blacks who shop at white stores; they have forced some offenders to drink cooking oil, detergent and bleach. A Soweto resident told of students who picked fights with him and other older blacks in a township shebeen (speak-easy). Eventually two older blacks went to the home of one student and beat him badly. â\200\234"Now what is happening,â\200\235

## TEED

the Soweto man caid, "i- that the e:ders are getting back at the students.
For some of the vigilantes the motive for
retaliating is ideological Some moderate
blacksâ\200\224town councilers. lieuor-store ownersâ\200\224lead fairly comfor:.hic middle-class
lives. They may want t¢ see the system
change, but only gradually. in a way that
will preserve their advantages. At the other end of the spectrum. lovalists of the
militant United Democratic Fron: (UDF)
in Soweto have come under attuck from
members of the far-left Azanian Peopleâ\200\231s
Organization (AZAPO),a "black conscious-

The Comradesâ\200\231 Decree: Death by Necklace
Peopleâ\200\231s Court is in session!
in South Africa. The courtroom may be a Sowetoshanty,
with tires hanging ominously!
on the walls. Or it may be just
a vacant lot in another of the
roiling black townships. The!
judges are the "comrades,â\200\235 | Â\$

the radical young blacks who

increasingly run the town- : ships. A suspect is hauled in. The trial is short, the guilty verdict foreordained. The sentence:. death by  $a\200\234$ necklace. $a\200\235$ ! The victim $\hat{a}$ 200\231s hands are tied, : sometimes with barbed wire. One rubber tire is put around his neck and another around hislegs. They are soaked with gasoline and set ablaze.  $\hat{a}\200\234$ Yes, ' it surely is a horrible way to die,  $\hat{a}$ \200\235 says "Killer,  $\hat{a}$ \200\235 a 16-yearold comrade from Diepkloof, a ' section of Soweto. â\200\234But the people we necklace have com-

mitted horrible crimes and deserve to die horribly. $\hat{a}\200\235$ Many radical young blacks agree, justifying the necklace because it frightens less committed blacks out of cooperating with South Africaâ\200\231s apartheid system. By some estimates, necklacings have increased to the rate of one a day over the past year. South African police say they have 145 cases of necklacing on record. Occasionally even progovernment black gangs have done it. Sources in the eastern Cape Province, where this brutal form of ex-

ecution has been most often '

used, say that at least 207 people have been killed by necklacing. A grim joke is

DAVID â\202¬. TURNLEYâ\200\224DETROIT FREE PRESS-BLACK STAR

â\200\230You're going to think twiceâ\200\231: Mob law in Duncan Village

making the rounds there at the expense of South Africaâ\200\231s United Democratic Front
' (UDF), an umbrella organization of antiapartheid groups.
Question: what does UDF stand for? Answer: Uniroyal,
Dunlop and Firestone.
The purpose of the necklace
" isnot just to kill but to terrorize. Bongani, a 21-year-old comrade, admitted necklac-

ing a 20-year-old found at a rally with a hidden tape recorder. â\200\234He was screaming for mercy and crying that he would never do it again and . that he didnâ\200\231t know what he wasdoing and that he was sor-' ry. We set him on fire,â\200\235 Bongani said. "If other would-be informers see today what could happen to them tomorrow, then they won't take the

" job. $\hat{a}$ 200\235 In weeding out oppo-

' to man was necklaced for

nents the necklace also helps the comrades strengthen their hold on the townships. Victims are necklaced for a range of comrade-perceived sins. Township officials and black policemen have been executedâ\200\224but so have migrant miners, since mines are pillars of the system, and liguor-store owners, since they operate under government licenses. Anyone disregarding a boycott or a strike called by the comrades may be condemned. A 20-year-old Sowe-

holding a party; he was found guilty of defying a  $a\geq00\geq34$ people $a\geq00\geq31$ s ban $a\geq00\geq35$  on Christmas festivities.

Killer, one of Bonganiâ\200\231s friends, related how he helped to necklace a 62-year-old

woman, Mary Skhosana, who worked in a funeral parlor. Since she sold funeral insurance, he said, she was part of  $200\234$ the system.  $200\235$   $200\234$  We knew she was a police informer,  $\hat{a}$ \200\235 Killer recounted coolly. â\200\234We did not need proof. She was pleading for mercy and crying and screaming. She said sheâ\200\231d pay us 7,000 rands [\$3,080] if we let her go. We told her we didnâ\200\231t need her money; we needed her life. Then we put a tire around her legs and another around her neck and shoulders. We forced her to drink petrol. We poured the restintothe tiresand onto her and set her alight. But the fire went out. Another tin of petrol was fetched, and it took about an hour.â\200\235

The necklace is brutal but

. effective.  $\hat{a}$ 200\234When you attend

- " a funeral, $\hat{a}$ \200\235 says Diliza Ma-
- ' choba of the South African
- . Council of Churches,  $\hat{a}\200\234$ and

you hear these young com-

 $a\200\230$  rades chanting,  $a\200\230$ Long live

the necklace,  $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 35$  you're going to think twice about doing anything which will in any way offend the comrades. It

. is the ultimate deterrence.

And it $\hat{a}$ 200\231s also a symbol of the wrath of the people. What we're trying to do, we older

" leaders, is point out that

blind action is no good and that action and reflection must go together.â\200\235 The town-shipsâ\200\231 angry young radicals have little patience with such talk, and their elders will have a hard time persuading them to forgo their most potent weapon.

RicHARD MANNIXNG in Johannesbur.

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nessâ\200\235 group that opposes power sharing with the whites. In other areas conflict | stems from a combustible mix of political and tribal differences. In Natal Province, Zulus loyal to moderate chief Gatsha Buthelezi have repeatedly attacked Xhosas, who represent a major share of the ANC'â\200\231s constituency. In KwaNdebele, supporters of the homeland leader, Simon Skhosana, have been dispensing savage beatingsâ\200\224what one South African scholar describes as â\200\234'Black Shirt justiceâ\200\235â\200\224to comrades who don'â\200\231t back their chief.

Police role? Finally, there are old-fash-ioned thugs who resent the radicals for threatening their turf. In Soweto, a small gang called Kabasa has operated for 40 vears. Recently it has specialized in break-

ing into houses and in stealing cars. Now

they have turned on the radicalsâ\200\224and some township residents charge they have received guns and tear gas from the police.

Two weeks ago Kabasa members roamed = j

the township firing automatic weapons

and tear-gassing houses of suspected radi-!

cals.  $\hat{a}$ 200\234The police gave these gangsters guns and told them to use them on us,  $\hat{a} \geq 200 \geq 35$  said one militant named Bongani.  $\hat{a}$ 200\234Now we will treat the gangsters the same way we treat the police and the town councilors. $\hat{a}$ \200\235 Police spokesmen deny giving any support to the vigilantes. But township residents insist otherwise. At the very least, many say, the police turn the other way when antiradical blacks attack.  $\hat{a}\200\234$ When the police Caspirs [armored troop carriers] come. $\hat{a}\200\235$  says one Crossroads man,  $\hat{a}\200\234$ the witdoeke [white capsâ\200\224after the vigilantesâ\200\231 white headbands] hide behind them and the police do nothing to them. $\hat{a}\200\235$  Other Crossroads residents say they saw white police chatting with fathers during last weekâ\200\231s fighting. Still others claim they saw

masked white men among the antimilitant

blacks: they say the whites were also identifiable by their speech.

Itâ\200\231s unclear how long the vigilantes can sustain the struggle against the radicals. In the long run the comrades may have numbers and revolutionary zeal on their side. But if the radicals do prevailâ\200\224and if they keep up their attacks against policeâ\200\224the government may eventually crack down harder. Pretoria has yet to use a fraction of its might. It could turn the townships i) (\to

virtual concentration camps, teeming with soldiers, surrounded with roadblocks by day and searchlights by night.  $\hat{a}\200\234$ The tragedy of it is that the kids believe the system is on its last legs and about to totter over,  $\hat{a}\200\235$  says-John Kane-Berman, head of the South African Institute of Race Relations.  $\hat{a}\200\234$ But the system hasn $\hat{a}\200\231$ t flexed its muscles yet. $\hat{a}\200\235$  When it does, the black backlash against the radicals may look tame in comparison.

Mark WHiTaAKER with RICHARD MANNING i Johannesburg und PETER YO UNGHUSBAND in Crossroads

- " NATO missiles, bu
- ' governments stu

The Politics of Chernobyl

Nuclear wins and losses

all accounts the Dutch prime minisshould have been a loser. His aus-

ble. â\200\234I'm a bit surprlsed he\said. â\200\234Itâ\200\231s a very remarkable result. â\200\235 \

In the immediate aftermath of Chernobyl, many analysts had predicted that antinuclear sentiment would sweep across Europe, pushing pro-NATO governments to the left. The disaster did prove a bdon to West Germanyâ\200\231s aggressive Green Party; the coalition of Chancellor Helmut Kohl dropped below 50 percent in the polls. Elsewhere, however, Chernobyl has produced remarkably little political chapg®) The muted reaction follows a pattep has prevailed for several yeargs Britain, West Germany and the Netherlands were rocked by masgive demonstrations against the depfoyment of new their conservative with deployment and survived. Belgjah Prime Minister Wilfried Martens was handily re-elected last Octo-

] : West German Chancellor Kohl

\_â\200\224

that | n 1983 '

Gmn tide: Protest j

Wackersdorf

" ber despite his support for Euromissiles.

In Finland, th㩠center-left government brazenly thregtened to resign this week unless oppongénts withdraw a proposal to scrap nucledr power by the year 2000.

In West/Germany, the issue of nuclear power hgs triggered an especially strong politicgd response. Last week 5,000 protesters asgembled near the site of a new nuclear-yaste reprocessing plant in Wackersderf, Bavaria, fighting hit-and-run battles with police. West Germanyâ\200\231s nuclear program may be a decisive factor in key state elections scheduled for June and October, and perhaps for the national elections in â\200\230\January 1987. The countryâ\200\231s powerful farm bloc is angry over crop losses resulting from the Chernobyl accident. and ac-

. cording to a poll published by Der Spiegel.

69 percent of West German voters oppose further construction of nuclear power plants. For now, however, Kohl remains committed to promoting nuclear power. Poles apart: Far greater strains are being

nERMANN J KaippErTzâ\200\224ap | feltin Eastern Europe, where Poland, Hun-

gary and nonaligned Yugoslavia have been

' hard hit by West European restrictions on

farm imports possibly contaminated by radioactive fallout. Polish authorities have complained that the boycott might cost them as much as \$300 million in hard-

currency exportsâ\200\224money vitally needed to service Warsawâ\200\231s massive foreign debt.

The Soviet market will not give them dol-

- ' lars and Deutsche marks. The shower of . rubles that will fall instead can only add to | their resentment of what sarcastic Poles . now call the  $a\200\234$ cloud of friendship. $a\200\235$
- HARRY ANDERSON with SCOTT SULLIVAN

in Paris, FRED CoLEMAN iln The Hugue and DesBie SEWARD (n Bonn  $\,$ 

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