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South Africa:
Democracy deferred

The African National Congress (ANC)'s fear is coming true: that the transitional period of government, for which it set an 18 monthsâ\200\231 time limit, could stretch until the turn of the century. The establishment of a multi-party transitional authority in South Africa by 1992 is no longer a realisable goal. Nor are elections for an interim legislature by early 1993. The earliest a transitional authority is likely to be formed now is April next year, and the elections may be delayed until the end of 1993 or early 1994.

Both the government and the ANC, however, remain locked ultimately into anegotiation process. The government cannot return to wholesale repression and isolation; the ANC, although effectively having lost the levers of armed struggle and sanctions, can play its last two cards of mass mobilisation and withdrawal from the negotiating process only with extreme caution. The ANC leadershipis determined not to let the talks initiative slip out of its hands and into the grasp of township radicals who see negotiations merely as a device to effect a transfer of power.

The constitutional deadlock at Codesa II (Convention for a Democratic South Africa) is not the only factor that will delay the elections. Both President F.W. de Klerk s National Party (NP) government and Chief Mangosuthu Butheleziâ\200\231s Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) are insisting that elections cannot be held until the scale of the persistent violence in the country has been reduced and rival parties can campaign safely in each otherâ\200\231s territories (although IFP territory is more hazardous for the ANC than vice-versa). This cannot be achieved until a multi-party interim executive is formed, with control over the security forces.

Codesa, as it has existed since its formation on 20 December last year (19 delegations), is dead. Its 40-member management committee has been given the task of keeping the negotiation process on the rails. Simultaneously, bilateral talks are being held between the government and the ANC and other delegations. By the time the negotiations have been revamped, new participants may have joined the process - the Koos van der Merwe group which were expelled from the right-wing Conservative Party (CP), the CP itself, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and possibly even the black consciousness Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo).

A reconstituted Codesa would not be able to get off the ground before October-November, and then it might only be

to prepare for a full plenary meeting next year. By then, the table might have become two-sided rather than multi-sided, with the government and its allies on one side and the ANC and its allies on the other.

When Codesa II broke up, this line-up was taking shape: of the 19 delegations, nine were on one side - the government and NP delegations, supported by the two Indian parties in the tricameral parliament (Solidarity and National People's Party) and by five homeland governments (Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Gazankulu, Qwa-Qwa and KwaZulu). The ANC side consisted of 10 delegations - ANC, SACP, Transvaal/Natal Indian Congresses, two tricameral parliament parties - the (Coloured) Labour Party and the (white) Democratic Party - and five homeland governments (Transkei, Venda, Lebowa, KwaNdebele and KaNgwane).

This line-up is not set in stone: allegiances fluctuate depending on the issue. Views on federalism cut across broad support for NP or ANC positions. Both the NP and the ANC are beginning to consolidate their core support, in preparation for the elections. A two-sided negotiation structure would reduce the role of several of the smaller tricameral and homeland delegations. On the other hand, the presence of new participants, such as the CP and PAC, would mean that the monopolistic bilateral relationship between the government and the ANC would cease.

The ANC came close to being out-manoeuvred at Codesa

De Klerk has made no secret of his refusal to accept black majority rule

It with its agreement to the idea of an interim constitution that would have amounted to acceptance of an open-ended power-sharing arrangement in which the NP and its allies would have exercised an effective veto. In their eagerness to move forward, the ANC negotiators went beyond their mandate and would have been in serious trouble with their rank-and-file support if the offer of a 70 per cent clause-by-clause majority in the constitution-making body had been accepted by the government.

The government may have pushed its luck by turning down the offer. Under pressure from its regions, the ANC has now fallen back on its original offer of a 66 per cent

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DE KLERK'S NEW CLOTHES

President F.W. deKlerk is displaying new-found confidence, which has been building up since the overwhelming 'Yes' vote by whites in the 17 March referendum. He is in no mood to relinquish political power now, or to commit himself to a date on which he will relinquish it. De Klerk is playing for time, which he believes is on his side. Despite continuing reports of high level corruption in the National Party (NP) government (AC Vol 33 No 1 1) and investigations by Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists into security force sponsorship of township violence, the African National Congress (ANC) has been unable to burst the NP bubble. De Klerk has not made the psychological leap to accepting that the NP will be a minority party, let alone an opposition party, in the near future. Some critics are saying that this reveals his 'double agenda', but De Klerk has never made a secret of his refusal to accept black majority rule.

Government strategy has been based on the calculation that for 18-24 months after De Klerk's historic 2 February, 1990, speech, its domestic popularity would wane, and then begin to ascend. This is what is happening now, and NP officials again are forecasting with confidence the emergence of the NP and its allies, possibly in a broader, non-racial grouping, as the biggest political bloc in an election.

De Klerk's economic advisers have been telling him to expect a cyclical upturn in the economy in mid-1993, just when the ANC will want the principle of majority rule to be up and working in an elected interim government. De Klerk is confident he can stretch out the period of administrative power-sharing much longer, without conceding the principle of majority rule in advance.

De Klerk has virtually succeeded in convincing the international community that apartheid is dead and that fundamental reform is irreversible. The ANC, on the other hand, has established just as successfully that the NP, with its legacy of corruption and dirty tricks, is not fit to rule the country alone. The result is an impasse.

With sanctions closer to collapse now in Canada and the Scandinavian countries, and with Nigeria and Senegal ready to deal with Pretoria - and Russia, Japan and Singapore similarly poised to do business - De Klerk is in buoyant mood. He appeared to be addressing the ANC through his Japanese hosts in June when he told them of the ANC's plans for 'mass action' and urged them not to be concerned, and that he would not compromise on his political bottom line.

This is a shrewd attempt to win the support and investment of trading partners - to lock them in as allies of his government in its efforts to maintain stability in South Africa. On his visits to Japan, Russia and Singapore, De Klerk was clearly testing the international response to a tougher law and order response to township violence, particularly in the areas where the ANC is seen to have lost control.

majority.

Another critical division is over the powers of the proposed nine or ten regional authorities. The government argues the regional authorities will provide protection for minority

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rights. The ANC view is that the government wants the regional authorities to become a veto mechanism for whites to block black majority decisions. It insists, therefore, that the regional authorities must be subordinate to a (black majority) central government.

The 'mass action' programme that emerged from the ANC's policy conference on 28-31 May reflects the backlash against negotiations which have not yet delivered benefits to the rank-and-file, and also the leadership's acceptance that in future it must involve the rank-and-file more directly in the negotiation process. A programme of demonstrations, strikes, and boycotts is due to start at the end of this month, regardless of what happens in Codesa, and is likely to become a long-term feature of ANC politics.

The question is whether the ANC will be able to guide the 'mass action', or whether the action will run out of control and raise violence to a level where it causes further disruption of negotiations. Most analysts doubt whether 'mass action' could attain the heights of the 'people's wars' experienced in Eastern Europe, but it could prove highly divisive in the ANC. :

The ANC's policy conference last month was an important step in the organisation's transformation from liberation movement to political party. The mood was quite different from the July 1991 national conference. The ANC adopted a more militant manifesto but the proceedings were more sober, and the policy guidelines, while retaining some of the liberation rhetoric, were broad and ambiguous enough to allow ANC leaders room in which to compromise in an administrative interim government, particularly on key economic policies.

However, in some areas, the ANC already virtually has lost control - Phola Park, Vaal Triangle, Alexandra, parts of Soweto (Dobsonville, Meadowlands) and many parts of Natal. It is on a slippery slope to losing control in other areas, too. The ANC's dilemma is that the longer negotiations with the government take, the more the leadership's ability to organise in the townships will be weakened by growing violence and the more its monopoly of negotiations will be challenged; yet the quicker it concedes to the government's demands, the more its decisions will be challenged @

South Africa/Nigeria:
No longer poles apart

Economic prospects for Africa depend increasingly on the fortunes of two dominant states in the region - South Africa and Nigeria. Their leaders share the analysis that Africa's economic development revolves around four growth poles - South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Egypt (see Box). Of the four poles, Nigeria and South Africa are the most significant for Africa in terms of economic muscle and population. Although Egypt is a major recipient of Western aid, as its trade figures indicate, its predominant orientation to the Middle East has reduced its importance as an actor in Africa.

For foreign commercial interests it is Nigeria and South Africa, within and beyond their respective sub-regions, that have most potential to develop as platforms from which to

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export to other countries in the region. While South Africa's potential as a harbinger of economic development under current conditions is seriously overstated in Africa, it is a market which constitutes about one per cent of global business and one that few multinational companies can afford to ignore (AC Vol 32 No 23). Some of the most extreme illusions about South Africa's economic role in Africa are likely to be shattered in the next few years. Investment decisions in Africa over the next decade will be increasingly regionalised. The importance of economies of scale rules out the proliferation of manufacturing and agro-processing plant investment undertaken in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s.

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Instead, existing industrial structures are likely to be further rationalised with much African business moving to South Africa as the logical regional industrial hub. For example, two major Japanese motor manufacturers are considering major investments in South Africa to supply private and commercial vehicles to the entire continent. While South Africa does not have a competitive advantage internationally in manufacturing, it does have a marked comparative advantage in Africa where manufactures make up more than 30 per cent of its exports. The problem is that the regional market is small: on its own, South Africa accounts for more than a third of the sub-Saharan African market. With South African exports to Africa of some R6,000 million (US\$ 2,000 mn.) and imports from Africa of just R1,500mn. in 1990, the trade relationship is very one-sided. Commodities are South Africa's main buying interest in Africa: Nigerian and Angolan oil, Ivorian and Ghanaian cocoa, Kenyan and Ugandan coffee, Zambian copper and Zimbabwean tobacco.

Coping with South Africa's giantism in the African economic context will be a key problem for policy makers in post-apartheid Africa; the only possible counterbalance is Nigeria. Success or dislocation in one of the pole economies will quickly affect the surrounding countries. Ironically, these two former deadly foes face a range of similar political

and economic problems:

① A difficult transition to democratic rule. Moving from apartheid in South Africa's case, and military rule in Nigeria's case, to democracy is a critical process for both countries. A central issue in both countries is how far federalism can contain ethnic rivalries. Failure will lead to new uncertainties and further economic haemorrhage. Current developments suggest both countries will face a protracted period of authoritarian rule in this decade.

② Dependence on commodity production. Despite its relative sophistication in the African context, South Africa is still predominantly a primary commodity producer. Mineral exports alone made up 46 per cent of South Africa's merchandise exports in 1991 and in non-drought years it grows the equivalent of a third of Africa's maize requirements; crude oil makes up 95 per cent of Nigeria's exports. South Africa's moves to diversification are well advanced with several projects for the beneficiation and metallurgical processing of mineral products. Despite gold's decline in international importance, its price is still seen as a key indicator for the South African economy. Nigeria's non-oil exports remain derisory, having actually fallen in the past two years, but with gas reserves rated amongst the ten biggest in the world. Nigeria's oil marketers are determined to carve a niche in South Africa's domestic market estimated at between 350,000 and 400,000 barrels a day (b/d) in the currently recession-hit economy. Local refiners have plans to increase local capacity to 600,000 b/d over the next three years. Nigeria may offer African discounts to lure South Africa into a long-term supply agreement; an alternative, preferred by the South Africans, is that a quasi-barter deal is set up under which Nigeria agrees to buy South African manufactures or capital goods to the same value as its oil exports.

③ Gross inequalities of wealth. While disparities in South Africa are more easily measurable given the panoply of apartheid controls, inequalities in Nigeria have been exacerbated by recession, particularly in urban centres, over the past decade. While the overall GNP per capita in South Africa was \$2,460 in 1990, for whites it was \$6,530 and for blacks \$670, according to the World Bank. South Africa's middle class is in a period of painful growth,

while Nigeriaâ\200\231s is in a period of painful decline.

Â® Growing unemployment. Estimates of unemployment in South Africa vary from the governmentâ\200\231s 18 per cent to unofficial estimates as high as 40 per cent: all are agreed it will rise further. In Nigeria, few accept the governmentâ\200\231s unemployment figure of 11 per cent, while some economists claim it is higher than 25 per cent. The possible cataclysmic effects of unemployment are cushioned partly by a large and growing informal economic sector. In South Africa formal sector job vacancies absorb only seven per cent of school leavers of all races; in Nigeria the figure is unlikely

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AFRICA'S FOUR POLES OF GROWTH
GDP Imports Exports Population

US\$ 000 Millions Millions

| | | | | |
|-----------|------|------|------|------|
| Egypt | 332 | 10.3 | 2.9 | 52 |
| Kenya | 75 | 2.1 | 1.1 | 24.2 |
| Nigeria | 34.8 | 5. | 1817 | 88.5 |
| S. Africa | 90.7 | 18.2 | 23.6 | 35.9 |

Source: World Bank

to be much higher. The growth of the informal sector, and with it the spread of interlinked criminal activities such as smuggling and fraud, is not a viable alternative to support for Jjob-creating small and medium scale entrepreneurs.

@ Hectic rate of urbanisation. Both countries are amongst the fastest urbanising societies in the world. An International Labour Organisation study estimated that every hour, 20 people go to live in Nigeriaâ\200\231s former capital Lagos; another estimate reckons urbanisation in South Africa is four times as fast as the rural-urban move northwards in the United States after the Second World War. Always precarious, services in Nigeriaâ\200\231s urban centres are now on the point of breakdown. South Africaâ\200\231s much more sophisticated infrastructure is holding up, but its crime rate is soaring as Johannesburg replaces Detroit and Rio de Janeiro as murder capital of the world.

@Â® Overblown and unproductive public sectors. The army of Afrikaner clerks who people South Africaâ\200\231s 15 racially-based departments of finance, 15 education departments and 14 health departments will be weeded out, but any restructuring of the civil service is unlikely to cut total numbers as social spending on blacks rises. Privatisation, however, has cut down some traditional government fiefdoms, but remains politically controversial and will slow after a transitional government is elected. Since 1986, the Nigerian government has cut the civil service payroll and started an ambitious privatisation programme; both strategies have stalled and are unlikely to be resuscitated before a change in government. The efficiency of both civil services has been hampered by growing corruption (AC Vol 33 No 11). The Nigerian politician-'publisherâ\200\231 who took R1.5 mn. from South Africaâ\200\231s information slush-fund in

the mid-1980s without producing the promised pro-South Africa magazine showed the South Africans that they still have much to learn from Nigerians in this respect.

Â® Oversized military and security establishment. The end of apartheid and the cold war so far has made little difference to the power of the military and security apparatus over budgetary allocations. This year, half South Africa's total defence budget of R4,380 mn. was allocated to special projects or 'dirty tricks'. Until January next year at least, Nigeria's military will directly control the national budget; last year it spent \$300 mn. on tanks. South Africa's attempts to commercialise its arms production operations have already been threatened by US pressure over its arms sales to Middle East countries. Both countries see their military prowess (questionable in both cases) as integral to their standing in Africa and an important component of a possible peace-keeping force launched by the Organisation of African Unity, which they would hope to dominate between them. ;

@ Capital flight. Both countries have suffered inordinately from capital flight and disinvestment. In 1991, net sales of foreign-held equity totalled R4,100 mn. in South Africa, against net purchases of gilts totalling R2,000 mn., while some estimates reckon capital has left Nigeria at the rate of some \$500mn. a year for the past five years, which partly has been counterbalanced by energy sector investments running at \$1,000mn. for the last three years. Over-valued currencies in both countries have encouraged this trend by creating opportunities for arbitrage between the parallel and official exchange rates in Nigeria, and between the financial and commercial rand in South Africa.

@ Chronic lack of investment in education and training. Apartheid's worst legacy to the economy is the lack of skilled

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South African workers, let alone those trained in high technology industries. In Nigeria's education system, where spending per pupil was cut by more than half in the 1980s, the effects have been similar. Lack of flexibility and technical capacity in the labour market will be a major economic constraint in both countries for the next decade at least, and is a major comparative disadvantage with the industrialising countries of south-east Asia.

@ Consumerist ethos. In South Africa spending on consumption represents about 80 per cent of the gross domestic product, while savings and investment are around 20 per cent. In Nigeria, this ratio is worse. It will be difficult for either government to shift resources into investment and savings, particularly in South Africa.

@ Poor export performance. With rich natural resources and long-established markets for its primary commodities, neither economy has developed the necessary marketing skills to export its processed and manufactured goods.

However, South Africa, with its GDP more than double Nigeria's, will remain and probably reinforce its position as the dominant economy in the region. It will do so because of the obvious dissimilarities between it and Nigeria, such as its developed and efficient communications and transport system, together with Africa's deepest and most sophisticated

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money and capital markets. Indeed South Africa is likely to become the regional capital market, exporting capital to the rest of Africa whose companies and governments will be able to raise money on an internationalised Johannesburg Stock Exchange. '

Neither South Africa nor Nigeria will abandon their competitive advantage in minerals, oil exports or agriculture, but their strategists understand the long term decline in the share of primary commodities in world trade. Africa as a bloc was virtually invisible in the negotiations for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; a constructive Lagos-Pretoria axis could help change this. South Africa is going into high-technology manufacturing and services while importing primary commodities and basic manufactures from other African states. It will develop its marketing and distribution services which offer higher rewards than the initial production, and sell them to other African states. Then South Africa's 'first world' enclave economy's relationship with the rest of Africa could start to displace some industrialised country exporters @

France:

Spooks, a bomb and a DC 10

French investigations into the 1989 bombing of a DC-10 airliner, in which 171 people died (AC Vol 33 No 2), have taken a new turn with the reappearance of a key witness who had disappeared, Bernard Yanga. On 9 June, French investigating magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguière went to

Kinshasa, via Brazzaville, for the latest of many interviews with Yanga and for his first with another key witness, Yanga's colleague Jean-Bosco Bana, known as Ngalina, who is under arrest in Zaïre. The two Zaïreans are suspected of involvement in the attack on a plane belonging to the Union des Transports Internationaux (UTA) which was flying the Ndjamena-Brazzaville-Paris route and exploded over Niger's Ténéré Desert. Both are friends of a Zaïrean presumed to have carried the bomb aboard the aeroplane, Apollinaire Mangatany. The French government says he died in the crash. African sources say he is still alive.

Yanga suddenly reappeared - officially in May but apparently in April - in France's Kinshasa embassy, four months after he had fled Moungali police-station in Brazzaville, where he was being held in preventive detention. Our sources say that, suffering from a severe infection, he had quietly left his gaol to seek treatment from a traditional healer in his northern Zaïrean hometown of Guémena. However, he kept in touch with the French secret services, which whisked him off to Kinshasa in April a few days after the mysterious death of Colonel Bonaventure Mekoul, the Congolese officer and presidential relative in charge of Yanga who served as intermediary between him and Judge Bruguière.

Notwithstanding a number of contradictory statements during interrogations in Brazzaville, Yanga is crucial: he still seems to be the only witness who has directly accused Libya of the attack. This is a complicated matter, where intelligence agents of at least three continents all have different agendas. Two months after the attack, Yanga was

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secretly detained by Congo's military security on the orders of another close relative of President Denis Sassou Nguesso's, Commandant Patrice Ondele, who took charge of the affair.. Yanga was held in secret for over six months before the then government acknowledged his detention. A number of Congolese associated with the government had been advised not to board the DC-10 during its Brazzaville stopover. Mangatany, Yanga and Ngalina are Lumumbistes who have undergone military training in Libya. They have long held passports provided by the then Congolese presidential security, which was receiving Libyan assistance.

Meanwhile, in the guise of supporting Lebanese Catholics who were being ill-treated by the Syrian occupying force, French right-wing interests helped drag Paris into the Lebanese imbroglio. France did not improve relations with Damascus by jamming its radar. In June 1989, the Elysée Palace received a letter from pro-Syrian elements threatening to attack French interests abroad. UTA says it was not told of these threats. This has led to a compensation conflict between the government and its airline.

At the same time, relations between France and Libya had been more or less normalised in line with the cordial relations that had sprung up between Libya's Foreign Minister and intelligence chief, Col. Ibrahim Mohamed al Bishari, and French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas. The powerful French intelligence services, the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (AC Vol 33 No 10) and the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, were working closely with leading Libyan security men, notably Colonels Sayed Mohamed Gaddafidam (Col. Moammar al Gaddafi's cousin) and Abdallah Senoussi, married to Gaddafi's younger sister. The point of common interest was French hostages in

the Lebanon. Even Moussa Koussa, deputy Foreign Minister and head of the Mathaba International (the organisation which trains soldiers for 'special projects'), became a regular

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visitor to the Quai d'Orsay. The Libyan army became a privileged customer of the French military-industrial lobby.

Meanwhile, further intrigues were being woven among active pro-Syrian members of Brazzaville's Lebanese community, who have close connections in Congolese security and the presidency. Certain Lebanese make frequent visits to the Libyan and Palestinian embassies opposite Brazzaville's main hospital. - Bruguiere therefore has to contend with the activities of security agents from at least

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four countries: France, Congo, Libya and Syria. A number of signs point to an attack ordered by Damascus and subcontracted to Libyan terrorism specialists close to both Gadaffi and Syria, who in turn employed agents in Congo, where they enjoyed high-level protection, thanks to the facilitating role of Libyan petrodollars. This at any rate is the theory to be found among sources in the corridors of power in Paris. But they do not say so openly. Bruguiere will continue to have a hard time uncovering the truth @

Mozambique:

A hunger that Kills

Famine is top of the agenda in the eleventh round of peace negotiations which began inauspiciously in Rome on 10 June. The worst drought in Southern Africa for 30 years has meant that some three million people, one fifth of the country's population, will need emergency food aid according to the United Nations (UN). This puts added pressure on both sides but it is not clear whether it will quicken or delay the peace process.

The number of international observers at the talks has grown: it now includes Britain, France, Portugal, the United States and the UN. The eleven-person negotiating team of the Resist ncia Nacional Mo cambicana (Renamo) has also expanded but though it now includes military officials, it is still led by Renamo's Head of Organisation, Raul Domingos. The government's Transport and Communications Minister, Armando Guebuza, still leads for Maputo.

This round was to have followed a set agenda. Discussion on the composition of a future joint army and the technicalities of a ceasefire was expected by the mediators: Italy's Sant'Egidio Community and the government representative, Mario Raffaelli, now also mediating between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, Renamo once again appears determined to follow its own agenda. On 11 June, it stipulated that talks should include constitutional issues, the composition of the Joint Verification Commission (JVC, which monitors the 1990 partial ceasefire) and famine relief.

What some mediators and diplomats had hoped would be a short round of talks now looks like dragging on. There is logico Renamo's stance. The drought has caused a disastrous situation south of the Zambezi River. On 22 May, the government released its first official figures of drought deaths: 48 in Sofala Province. With no way of measuring the

situation in remote areas, the real figure must be far higher.

For Renamo in particular, the drought is a serious political disadvantage. Following the reduction of external support from South Africa, Malawi and Kenya, the rebels have had to rely far more on raiding and taxing the residents of the zones they dominate. Reports from Tete and other provinces south of the Zambezi confirm that life under Renamo is getting harder. One peasant farmer from Sofala told Africa Confidential in May that "We used to only look for food for the Matsangas (Renamo) once every seven sun-rises. They now say 'Feed us all the time!' Otherwise, they threaten to beat or kill us, because it is a hunger that kills".

Thousands of hungry refugees from Tete have again begun to cross into Zambia, many complaining that Renamo

has increased taxation demands. The story is the same in the south. Renamo faces a dilemma. Further taxation diminishes support and encourages migration to government-held zones. Renamo's policy has been to stockpile food from past taxation. These reserves will be exhausted by August, when the full brunt of the drought will be felt.

Renamo's attacks on food convoys have increased. On 5 April, for example, it attacked a relief convoy at Alto Changane, Gaza Province, destroying five lorries. On 22 May, food-raiding also started again in Zimbabwe's Eastern Highlands, the first there since December 1990, as well as in southern Malawi, for the first time since December 1991. Since January, there have been more brutal raids, too, on Mozambique's towns. Renamo increasingly attacks suburbs, especially the "zonas verdes", the food-producing areas. In one such raid near Chokwe on 22 April, government troops killed Renamo's independent-minded Southern Zone commander, General Francisco Paulo Gomes (AC Vol 33 No 2). There are also reports of pillaging by government units and free-lance robbers.

Although Renamo called for neutral food corridors on 9 April, its leadership, the National Council, is divided over negotiating policy. Several attempts by mediators and Washington to discuss the situation across the table therefore failed in April. On 25 April, Renamo boss Afonso Dhlakama at last met Herman Hank Cohen, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, in Lilongwe. Cohen obtained an undertaking from Dhlakama to return for the Rome talks and to drop Renamo's 10 April demands that the preset Rome agenda be ignored and that there be discussions on the constitution in order, as Renamo put it, "to suspend all the articles which jeopardise the democratisation process".

Renamo's dislike of the government's constitution is a recurrent problem. It has publicly set as a precondition for any agreement the suspension of twelve articles of the 1990 constitution which it claims could block implementation of the Rome Protocols. But it will not reveal which these articles are, even though the Italian Ambassador to Maputo and JVC Chairperson, Manfredo di Camerana, requested this information in April. The delay may be connected to a dispute between Renamo's two legal advisors, Andre Thomashausen and Bruce Fein. Fein has been receiving up to US\$40,000 a month for his advice. But a more fundamental issue is at stake. Although Renamo recognised the legitimacy of Mozambique's laws under Protocol One, it remains unhappy at having done so. Given its sense of

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insecurity and its overwhelming desire { achieve equality with the government, it feels it would be significantly disadvantaged if it conceded the government's legitimacy.

Cohen failed to get Dhlakama to agree to a temporary nationwide truce to facilitate food distribution. In spite of discussions with the UN Children's Fund and the World Food Programme in late May, Renamo continues to drag its feet on opening relief corridors.

Renamo has meanwhile been busy seeking international support. Dhlakama met the Organisation of African Unity Chairperson, President Ibrahim Babangida, in Nigeria on 13 June. Di Camerana was also in Nigeria to drum up support for the peace process. Dhlakama, his wife and Vincente Ululu visited Britain on Kenyan passport on 14-19 May. The visit was organised by Lonrho's Roland â\200\230Tinyâ\200\231 Rowland in an attempt to bring Dhlakama together once again with President Robert Mugabe, who was in London on a private visit. In the light of the success of the two women's 10 January meeting in Malawi, Rowland thought a further encounter might accelerate the peace process. Dhlakama appears to agree with this. â\200\230Zimbabwe is the key - without them, Chissano would fallâ\200\231, he told us in May.

Although the main objective of his London trip failed, Dhlakama's presence prompted the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to invite him for talks with Anthony Goodenough, the new Assistant Under-Secretary for Africa. Talks focussed on military issues in which Britain has a significant interest: as an official observer, as a trainer to Mozambique's army and also as holder of the European Community presidency from July. Policy is still for ministerial contact with Dhlakama only if Renamo signs a ceasefire.

During his London stay, Dhlakama also held talks with â\200\230Rustyâ\200\231 Evans, a Deputy Director General of South Africa's Foreign Ministry, who invited him to Pretoria to meet President F.W. de Klerk to discuss the peace process. Dhlakama also continued his efforts to secure a visa for the USA: he had an HIV test. But State Department policy is still to deny him entrance until he signs a ceasefire.

Dhlakama continues to look for funds. Privately, Renamo has been making financial demands as a condition of further progress. In December, it asked for \$3 million. The figure has now risen to \$10-12 mn. On 16 June, Domingos said there was 'no democracy without money'. Renamo says it needs funds to transform itself into a political organisation. Some funds for non-lethal activities have in fact already been given to Renamo, with Maputo's reluctant acquiescence.

Maputo is not without its problems, either. The drought has focussed attention on the problems of corruption. On 9 June, Niassa Provincial Assembly reported that its investigations had shown that much aid to the province was being diverted and used illegally. In Nampula Province, the army is the main culprit. Some officers have setup protection

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rackets, and violence in the province is linked more to this than to Renamo. This has contributed to some former Naparama units, such as the Mukuepas (AC Vol 32 No 023), joining Renamo, and to some others, such as those under

Commander Cinco in Namapa District, setting up autonomous warlord fiefdoms. The Attorney General's office is working hard to challenge what appears to be growing military corruption. Since he declared war on corruption on 24 April, Attorney General Eduardo Mulembwe has received death threats. These probably originate in the army.

The army leadership is closely watching developments in Rome: the eleventh round of talks deals with its future. Renamo proposes a small army, 20,000 strong and split 50:50 with the government. This is unacceptable to the army, which does not want a straight divide and insists the new army should be at least 35,000 strong, thereby maintaining jobs for its own. If women are not to be included in the new force and if the age of service is set at over 16 years, then Renamo may well have trouble providing even 10,000 eligible combatants. Renamo's difficulties seem to include recruitment: for instance, child soldiers are being extensively used in operations in northern Nampula for the first time.

Corruption is not limited to the army. At least three senior government ministers are involved. One reason for its growth is the current political uncertainty. Several business people admitted to Africa Confidential that they carried out corrupt dealings on a daily basis. They attributed this to lack of confidence in the future. A particular fear of many officials in Maputo is the future of land and houses. Except for their property, Mozambicans have little that is tangible to show for independence. There is widespread concern that Renamo intends to return the modern sector's property (e.g. the buildings of the Portuguese in Maputo's Cement City) to its former colonial owners. Although the majority of Mozambicans desire peace and reconciliation at almost any cost, any attempt by Renamo to overturn property rights of occupation would prompt urban disorder.

Because corruption is already a serious problem within the ruling party, President Joaquim Chissano has been reluctant to launch a high-profile anti-corruption campaign. During the sensitive peace talks, party unity comes first. But how much longer this unity will last is an open question. As past ideology collapses, ethnic and other allegiances come to the fore. Even in the Political Commission (ex-Politburo), debate and discussion are becoming affected by ethnic and economic alliances.

But it is the drought that is of most immediate concern to Mozambicans. One Gaza peasant echoed a widespread view that, even if an agreement is signed in Rome, people are hungry, the killing will not stop.

Congo:

Testing the waters of democracy

Voters are to cast their ballots in general elections on 21 June. They will not face easy choices. Family and tribal interests could prevail in a situation where new political parties have yet to put down roots in most areas. Tensions are high

following yet another crisis (AC Vol 33 No 5) - this one produced by fraud in the 3 May municipal elections.

The fraud, publicly acknowledged by the government, led to the sacking of six mayors and nine regional prefects

19 June 1992

on 12 June. President Denis Sassou Nguesso, Monsignor Ernest Kombo, the head of the transitional legislature, the Conseil Supérieur de la République (CSR), and Prime Minister André Milongo, had difficulty containing the crisis when it erupted last month. The problem was unanimously blamed - including by Milongo - on the then Interior Minister, Alexis Gabou. Despite his support for the government coalition - known as the Forces du Changement et du Progrès since adding 'Progrès' to its title - Gabou remains a member of the formerly ruling Parti Congolais du Travail (PCT).

The disputed results, which were allowed to stand, gave 449 seats to the Union Panafricaine pour la Démocratie Sociale (Upads) led by the pipe-smoking Professor Pascal Lissouba (known as 'Professeur la Pipe'), the main opposition to the Forces du Changement. A total of 297 seats (including seven of Brazzaville's eight) went to the main pillar of Milongo's team, the Mouvement Congolais pour le Développement et la Démocratie Intégrale (MCDDI, having added the epithet 'Congolais'), which is led by Bernard Kolélas (known as 'Ya Bkol' - 'Elder Brother Bkol' and now mayor of Brazzaville; 193 seats went to the PCT led by Sassou Nguesso (known as 'Ya Mokolo' - 'Elder Brother Owner', i.e. of Congo); and just 86 seats went to the Rassemblement Démocratique pour le Progrès Social, led by the PCT's ex-number two, Jean-Pierre Thystere Tchikaya, mainly in Koulou and his hometown, Pointe-Noire.

On 16 May, a few days after the results were announced, the CSR Vice-President, trades unionist Jean-Michel Bokamba Yangouma, led a host of angry CSR deputies in demands for Milongo's third government to resign within 48 hours. More successfully, they also demanded Gabou's departure. Attorney General Patrice Nzoalla prepared to declare the CSR's decision null and void. On 17 May, Sassou Nguesso, Kombo and Milongo - nicknamed the 'Trio Sakomi' (AC Vol 32 No 24) - embarked on talks to resolve the crisis. On 18 May, a communiqué from what the government itself was terming the 'rebel' ministers - Gabou, Jacques Okoko (Labour), Jean-Martin Mbemba (Justice), Célestin Nkoua Gongarad (Agriculture), Demba Tello (Public Works) and Jean-Blaise Kololo (Communications Minister and government spokesperson), called on the public to support the government, demonstrate 'resistance' and, if necessary, 'take up arms'. The CSR asked by name for these ministers to be sacked and for Milongo to publicly dissociate himself from the statement, which he attributed to Kololo, a protégé and nephew of Kolélas. On 19 May, Milongo told the CSR that he agreed to reshuffle the government and the rebels suddenly found themselves unable to reach him by telephone. The CSR decided to setup a Comité National des Elections, a National Election Committee to supervise the coming polls.

On 21 May, Milongo announced the new government, pruned from 18 to 10 members. Only two ministers have survived: at Foreign Affairs, and now also Posts and Telecommunications, not to mention Information, is Dieudonné Ganga, while General Raymond Damase Ngollo stays at Defence. Interior and Decentralisation has gone to PCT Central Committee member Alphonse N'Zoungou. This government is even more transitional

than its predecessor: it should last three months, until a new

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head of state is enthroned in August - unless there is another Crisis.

Several candidates (besides Kolélas) have put themselves forward for the presidency. Prominent are General Sassou, his predecessor, Gen. Joachim Yhombi Opango, and Milongo, whose announcement clearly took Kolélas by surprise and went against the MCDDI's strategy, which had propelled him to the premiership during last year's National Conference on the understanding he would then support Kolélas for president. Plateau Region in Bateke land, with ten per cent of the population, is putting forward two candidates, of whom the most serious is ex-Foreign Minister Charles-David Ganao.

The election is due in late July, with the second round (if no one gets over 51 per cent), in early August. It will take place around three main blocs. The PCT, with Sassou Nguesso as candidate, could have 80 per cent of the northern electorate - some 12 percent of the national total. He can also count on stalwarts of the old regime nationwide who still receive fees from the presidency to fight for the cause. If he reaches the second round, he can count on Ganao's and Yhombi Opango's supporters, plus some voters in Pointe-Noire, fief of his wife Antoinette. But if he is re-elected, southerners may rebel, particularly among the Lari and Bakongo. Militia training camps have already sprung up at Poto-Poto Djoué, Trou de Dieu and Kombe, with Israeli trainers who have also supplied weapons.

If negotiations lead to a Kolélas-Milongo coalition and Milongo goes to the second round with the MCDDI's blessing, he can count on the supporters of Paul Kaya, one of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny's Congolese advisors, who lives in Abidjan and comes from the Nibolek - the Niari-Bouenza-Lekoumou area where nearly 40 per cent of the population live. He should also get backing from supporters of Clément Mierassa from Plateau, of northern elements in the Forces du Changement and of supporters of Thystere Tchikaya in Kouilou, which has circa 20 per cent of the population. He should get some 90 per cent of support in Pool, which means about 15 per cent of the electorate. But if he won, PCT barons, the former Presidential Guard and over half the army could be expected to make trouble.

Lissouba is the other candidate who could make the second round. Armed with his municipal election success and strong support in Nibolek, he will first have to confront Kaya, who has been rushed to Congo by Houphouët-Boigny and Milongoto divide the Upads voters, weakening Lissouba and the Alliance Nationale pour la Démocratie, the broad front of parties opposed to the Forces du Changement. Lissouba carries a heavy burden. He is widely blamed for the execution of three southern leaders in 1963 when he was Alphonse Massemba Débat's Premier. If the second round brings him up against Milongo, he will enjoy the support of Sassou Nguesso and the PCT. In return, he would guarantee them immunity, halt judicial investigations - and perhaps save Congo from conflict. If he comes up against Sassou Nguesso, the Forces du Changement will boycott the second round because they consider Sassou Nguesso and Lissouba - both backed by Gabon's President Omar Bongo - as one and the same. Congo might then be spared bloodshed but could well be ungovernable: the Lari and Bakongo would not look kindly on rulers from outside Pool @

Pointers

ALGERIA: SETTLING ACCOUNTS

A long series of corruption trials looms following the charging of one of the most powerful army officers of the 1980s, ex-Major-General Mustapha Benloucif. Other officers and senior aides of ex-President Chadli Bendjedid will follow as Haut Conseil d'Etat (HCE) Chairman Mohamed Boudiaf and his allies (including Defence Minister Maj.-Gen. Khaled Nazzar) set out to mark a clear break with the past (AC Vol 33 No 9). Benloucif is charged with illegally obtaining some 60 million French francs, mainly in hard currency, which allegedly went into Swiss bank accounts and real estate in Algeria and France. Some other senior officers are said to enjoy similar facilities.

Officials of the ancien régime fear more traditional score-settling: not for nothing was the old Public Accounts Court popularly known as 'the court for settling accounts'. In an uncertain political climate, politicians are leaving the country. Among those who have gone is Abdelhamid Brahimi, the ex-Premier whose public revelation that Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) officials had taken US\$26 billion from state coffers unleashed a debate on corruption which saw Chadli and the old FLN fall. ;

Articles in such respected papers as the independent Algiers daily 'Watan and Le Monde' - whose Algiers correspondent Georges Marion was expelled in May - have pointed to future problems for the ex-President. Chadli has said he will collaborate with the authorities to clarify any questions about his personal fortune, which he says does not exist.

The Algiers rumour mill will now run overtime remembering that in the mid-1980s, the family of Chadli's wife, the then politically powerful Halima Bourekba, was widely criticised for its wealth. A presidential brother, Slimane Bendjedid, moved to Canada after the national carrier Air Algérie, of which he was head, earned criticism. Last year saw two employees of the Banque Extérieure d'Algérie, associates of another family member, sentenced to death for embezzlement.

Rumours about that affair led Chadli to explode into public rage in September 1988, an incident which contributed to the tensions which became the October riots.

KENYA: REGISTRATION ROW

A major row over the voter registration exercise which was supposed to have started on 8 June threatens to further delay progress towards elections. Opposition parties, including the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), are calling for a boycott of the voter registration organised by the electoral commission chaired by Justice Z. Chesoni. Since the last election in 1988, as many as 3.5 million Kenyans have reached 18

but have not registered as voters. The opposition says the government is refusing to issue young new voters (many of whom are expected to favour the opposition) with identity cards, a prerequisite to registration. An unpublished opinion poll carried out by the Daily Nation found that only 11 per cent of Kenyans interviewed would want President Daniel arap Moi re-elected as president. The power of the electoral commission to re-define electoral boundaries and to gerrymander is wide open; FORD claims it is packed with presidential appointees who favour Moi's Kenya African National Union (KANU). A less well-known governmental resource is the unpublished data from the last census, giving it information on the ethnic composition of the entire country down to enumeration level, which it can use to its advantage when drawing up electoral boundaries. This data is not available to the opposition. The creation of six new districts last month will mean redrawing boundaries.

CHAD: EMPTY THREATS?

Former President Goukouni Weddeye's 9 June threat to take up arms against the government has provoked more scorn than fear in Chad. The self-styled chief of the Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad (Frolinat) threatened military action if President Idriss Déby did not in the coming days establish a government of national consensus to replace the one headed by southerner Joseph Yodoyman. This threat, launched from his home in Algiers, came on the heels of the violent clashes between survivors of the Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Développement (MDD), the coalition of Hissene Habré's supporters and the remnants of the Forces Armées Occidentales, and government troops under Comchef (commando leader) and presidential nephew Mahamat Ali Abdallah. With nearly 200 people killed around Lake Tchad in Kanembou, Chadians

have nicknamed the rebels 'Khmers Rouges'.

In the capital, the democratic opposition is pushing Colonel Dãby to proceed with the democratisation process which, under pressure from Paris via advisor Col. Paul Faubonne, he initiated in 1990. Dãby remains the darling of the French army for chasing Goukouni from power in 1982 and defeating Libyan forces in 1987. Paris still sees Dãby as the strongest bulwark against Sudanese Islamism and eventual incursions by Tripoli and its agents. *

Goukouni is discredited by his refusal to return to take part in the democratic process. Frolinat, of which he still claims to be leader, has split into three: its brightest stars have rallied to the government. Early in 1991, Goukouni's deputy, Mahamat Djarma, defected (along with his followers) to become Vice-President of Abdoulaye Lamana's Union Nationale. Goukouni's real supporters are now restricted to his Toubou kinsmen in Tibesti, who are prey to being used by the Toubou of Colonel Moammar al Gadaffi's Presidential Guard.

ETHIOPIA: ETHNIC ELECTIONS

No fewer than 43,221 candidates from the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) are standing in the 21 June elections, which are set to entrench ethnicity as the central element in the new political process. The polls are for local administrative committees (7 out of 14 regions voted successfully last month) as well as for district and regional committees.

The size of OLF participation is surprising. Just two weeks before the elections, the OLF and 17 of the other 32 parties in the legislative body, the Council of Representatives, petitioned the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) for an investigation into electoral abuse. The complaints cover arrests, detentions of candidates and signatories, loopholes in the printing and distribution of registration and voting cards, and the disbanding of electoral committees. Most ominous is the failure of EPRDF forces to withdraw to agreed camps (the same point has been made against the OLF) and the failure to disarm illegal militias or deploy police.

Another concern was a statement by the International Observer Group (of 265 members, with over 60 from the United States) that they will not adjudicate disputes or certify results. Some opposition groups now believe that the USA is determined to make the elections justify its role in bringing the EPRDF to power last year. One party, the Islamic

Front for the Liberation of Oromia, which has been involved in numerous clashes with the EPRDF in the east, has already withdrawn from the elections.

CAR: POLITICAL PARALYSIS

President André Kolingba is digging in his heels. He is still refusing the national conference which the public, foreign donors and even his own party, the Rassemblement Démocratique Centrafricain, are demanding, while the economy staggers.

Kolingba's mid-May trip to Taiwan in search of cash was not fruitful: his request for CFA 10,000 million (US\$36.9 mn.) turned up a mere CFA 2,500 mn. So he made a surprise (and private) visit to Paris, where President Francois Mitterrand offered him a 30-minute audience and told him to end the paralysis gripping his country.

But the Central African Republic is still paralysed. A week-long general strike starting on 9 June received widespread support. The cause - five months' delay in paying civil servants' salaries in Bangui and up to fifteen months in the countryside. Two days before the strike, Kolingba set off for the Earth Summit in Brazil. Education Minister Etienne Goyemide resigned in May claiming that Kolingba refused to pay teachers from ethnic groups other than the Yakoma and its sub-group, the Gbougbou, to which the President belongs.

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