


Tim O'Connell

# **SWAPO'S VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS**



*An argument*

---



*This is the translated version of a brochure on the issue of the Swapo Ex-detainees which had been produced by different West German solidarity groups and individuals for the German solidarity movement. The brochure was the result of a difficult discussion on the issue. The German version contains additionally the different public statements made by various (mainly) German organisations about the matter.*

*May 1990*

### ***Editors:***

**AKAFRIK (Arbeitskreis Afrika), Münster**

**ASW (Aktionsgemeinschaft Solidarische Welt), Berlin**

**BUKO (Bundeskongress entwicklungspolitischer Aktionsgruppen)**

**Dritte- Welt-Haus Bielefeld**

**medico international, Frankfurt**

**WFD (Weltfriedensdienst), Berlin**

**Zimbabwe Netzwerk, Frankfurt**

**Uschi Eid, MP, The Greens**

**Klaus Linsenmeier, member of management, Buntstift**

**BUNTSTIFT, Göttingen**



# ***THE BURDEN OF THE PAST IN THE SHAPING OF A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE***

---

Since case histories on the cynical treatment by SWAPO in exile of those of their members they suspected of spying became known in June 1989, discussion of the matter has not let up. The news caused consternation both nationally and internationally, especially among those who had for many years been involved in solidarity with SWAPO's struggle for liberation.

It is true that since 1986 there had occasionally been hints of human rights violations by SWAPO, but since the organisation replied to enquiries from various sources with categorical denials, and since the origin of the reports appeared doubtful, many comforted themselves with the explanation that all this was merely anti-SWAPO propaganda.

After the definitive confirmation of torture and inhuman conditions in SWAPO prison camps the press took the matter up as a scandal to be publicised in the media, and right-wing groups attempted to use the subject for their own political interests.

Namibia solidarity groups in West Germany reacted with shock and in various ways - some bewildered and some on the defensive. Soon the public debate on the subject had itself become the subject of debate, and sometimes the discussion did not rise above the level of mutual accusations concerning public statements. Disquietingly, many even repeated the old false accusations of spying and thus attempted to justify themselves after the event.

But alternatives such as "forget it and keep going" or "avoid all contact with SWAPO" are hardly conducive to a genuine and serious ventilation of the matter in an attempt to understand the significance and background of the events.

This however is what the publishers intend in issuing this brochure: to maintain the substance of the discussion through an attempt at an analysis of what has happened submitted by Helga and Ludwig Helbig following extensive research. In addition, statements from various sources are documented in order to record the current state of the discussion.

Neither in Namibia nor in the Federal Republic is the subject closed. This is shown not only by the absence up till now of a public ventilation of the matter by SWAPO, the silence on the at least 315 missing persons and the ex-detainees' complete uncertainty about their political and personal futures, but also by the strong emotions aroused by the subject in both Namibia and in West Germany.

The history of oppression in Namibia is very closely connected with Germany, which is historically responsible for the current wretched and poverty-stricken conditions in the country. It is precisely because the question here is of the demand for freedom, human rights and social justice, which have been denied for over hundred years, that the discussion of SWAPO's violations of human rights is so important. We cannot accept that the question of the SWAPO detainees has long been settled and that now it is a matter of reconciliation, without clarification, responsibility and rehabilitation having been mentioned.

Taking the struggle for freedom by the people of Namibia seriously means being confronted with the whole dimension of "disclosures".

Only when the matter has been raised and a thorough investigation and democratisation of the structures and attitudes which made the atrocities possible has been undertaken, can the spell be broken and a democratic future shaped.

The publishers have a long history of solidarity with the Namibian struggle for liberation and with SWAPO, ranging from ideological to practical support.

The authors, Helga and Ludwig Helbig, are among those who have longest been concerned with Namibia solidarity, namely some 30 years, a major part of their lives. In numerous campaigns and publications they have been active against the brutal oppression, exploitation and incapacitation of the Namibians, and sharply criticised serious violations by their rulers, from German colonial rulers to the South African occupiers.

The passion with which they were engaged in support of Namibia's liberation was equalled by the dismay caused by the investigations into SWAPO's violations of human rights.

In this publication we wish to communicate the chilling truth of their report and to call for a productive discussion, so that there can be no repetition of what should never have occurred.

**The Publishers,  
March 1990.**



Helga Helbig  
Ludwig Helbig

# SWAPO'S VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. AN ATTEMPT AT AN ANALYSIS

November/December 1989

1989 was a decisive year in Namibia's history. After years of delaying tactics South Africa found itself compelled to implement Resolution 435 of the United Nations Security Council (UNSCR 435). The political independence of Namibia is imminent.

We have absolutely no doubt that without the liberation movement SWAPO, without its more than 22-year-long armed struggle against South Africa, the independence of Namibia would not be on the agenda for 1990. The struggle of SWAPO against the cynical South African apartheid system had a high moral legitimation. Even the relatively sceptical Franz Ansprenger established that SWAPO was waging a just war, in the sense of the "justum bellum" theory of western Christian tradition, against South Africa (Ansprenger, 1984, p.7). By far the greater part of the Namibian population supported SWAPO, as we were repeatedly able to establish during our journeys through Namibia in the 1970s and 1980s. It was no problem for us in our book "Mythos Deutsch-Südwest" in 1984 to quote approvingly the Director of the Christian Centre in Windhoek: "SWAPO is the nation and the nation is SWAPO".

In July and August 1989 horror reports of serious violations of human rights by SWAPO reached the German press. In the course of the independence process South Africa and SWAPO were obliged to release their prisoners. The 153 former SWAPO prisoners who arrived in Windhoek at the beginning of July told of torture and years of imprisonment in underground caves in southern Angola. The South African magazine "Work in Progress", close to UDF and COSATU and beyond suspicion, wrote in the issue of September/October 1989: "SWAPO had not only detained members and held them for years without trial but ... it had treated them with a brutality matching anything the South Africans had managed."

The returning SWAPO prisoners also reported that many of them had died under torture in the prisons, and gave their names. In particular they claimed that SWAPO was still hiding at least 500 prisoners in Angola and elsewhere.

SWAPO's leadership denied the accusations of torture and the assertion that they were still holding prisoners. Those released should be regarded as proven South African spies. If there had been isolated cases of maltreatment of these spies, then they had taken place against the orders of the SWAPO leadership. Up to this day the SWAPO leadership has stuck to this line, in spite of a few variations which will be reported later.

The credibility of the returned SWAPO prisoners, amongst whom were also former high and extremely highly placed SWAPO officials, was underlined by material published by Pastor Siegfried Groth, who as the human rights commissioner of the Vereinigte Evangelische Mission (VEM) had looked after Namibian refugees abroad for years and now, urged by his conscience, published his knowledge and thus confirmed the violations of human rights by the SWAPO leadership (cf. Frankfurter Rundschau, 26.8.89; Tageszeitung, 28.8.89; epd Dokumentation 1989).

For the West German solidarity groups too the news of the violation of human rights within SWAPO came as a shock. In many different appeals to the SWAPO leadership they called for clarification and the punishment of the guilty. Brigitte Kols has reported exhaustively on the reactions of the West German Namibia solidarity groups under the title: "Die Folter der SWAPO und das linke Gewissen" (Torture by SWAPO and the conscience of the left) (Frankfurter Rundschau, 18.8.89). Up to now (January 1990) the SWAPO leadership has not replied to the appeals of the solidarity groups.

The members of the church and non-church solidarity groups - and we do not exclude ourselves here - are confronted with a dilemma. We should have already known all about it. Since 1985 the International Society for Human Rights (ISHM) has been reporting violations by SWAPO of human rights. We didn't believe it and were able to give reasons for this disbelief. The ISHM is a strongly rightist organisation which transmitted the anti-SWAPO propaganda of South Africa and promoted a cold-war atmosphere. And do we not all know many honest, upright and sincere SWAPO leaders whose morality cannot be doubted? Especially since accusations from various quarters were always energetically denied.

The South African journalist Susan Brown, one of the best-informed people on the human rights violations by SWAPO, who writes for The Namibian and The Independent in England, has a message for the solidarity groups which we should at least think about:

*"Because the South African system is bad, those fighting the system must be good; this is a logic to which the massed rank of concerned, socially privileged, 'liberal' people everywhere devoutly cling, driven no doubt by an all too human urge to seek out order and normal clarity in a manifestly disordered universe. ... For many years there has been a sort of international conspiracy to project SWAPO ... as the incar-*



*nation of all that is fine and noble and heroic."* (The Independent, Sept. 18, 1989)

We have to reconsider our solidarity work. We must at last find our way to a critical solidarity. This does not mean that up till now we have done everything wrong. But we cannot accept the human rights violations for which part of the SWAPO leadership is obviously responsible. Human rights are indivisible. We will therefore have to continue to bring our influence to bear on SWAPO. SWAPO is more than that part of it which became guilty. "There is no abstract entity SWAPO!" Bience Gawamas, one of the SWAPO detainees who has returned to her organisation, said quite correctly (TAZ, 30.11.89).

Most Namibians still connect the idea of SWAPO with the hope of a life in freedom and self-determination. The country's independence is imminent. SWAPO will rule the country. But do not let us deceive ourselves: the process of liberation will be endangered as long as SWAPO has not succeeded in clearing up its own history and cleaning itself

up. The failure to come to terms with the past means to repeat it.

At the start of a reorientation of our solidarity work there must be an analysis. In order to produce this, we spent six weeks travelling in Namibia, from 30.9. to 10.11.1989, on behalf of medico international. We had numerous talks with former SWAPO detainees, academics and journalists, SWAPO officials from the Politburo and Central Committee, medium and lower SWAPO cadres, teachers, doctors, lawyers and others. Some of the talks were formal, i.e. interviews. Some of them were informal conversations. Only in a few cases have we named our partners in the talks. In order to structure our analysis better we have had recourse to some printed sources which are given in the literature list at the end. We have in addition followed the Namibian and the international press not only during our visit but also as far as possible beforehand and afterwards and taken account of it.

## 1. THE STRUCTURE AND HISTORY OF SWAPO

SWAPO was founded in exile in 1960. It issued from the "Ovamboland People's Congress (OPC) founded in 1958 by Toivo ya Toivo, Kozunguizi (now DTA), Shipanga (now SWAPO-D) and others, which shortly afterwards changed its name to "Ovamboland People's Organisation" (OPO). In 1959 Sam Nujoma became President of the OPO.

The OPO was mainly a trade union grouping which was principally concerned with protecting the interests of contract workers from Ovamboland. At the beginning of 1960 Nujoma and part of the OPO leadership left the country in order to escape South African repression following the Windhoek massacre at the end of 1959. The OPO renamed itself SWAPO, mainly because the OAU and the UN insisted on supporting only national and not ethnic liberation movements.

Now there was an exile wing of SWAPO and an internal one. For all that, SWAPO remained at first essentially an Ovambo grouping. In 1966 SWAPO in exile took up the armed struggle against the South African occupying power.

The decision to go into exile and from there to take up the armed struggle was, in view of the South African attitude towards any attempt at emancipation by the oppressed blacks, certainly the right one; and now it was subsequently confirmed by success. However, "the exiled politicians were not spared the dilemma pertaining to any politics in exile. Rivalries solidify and become consolidated, since there was no possibility of exposing them to the test of the opinion of their own people. All the parties were dependent upon friends abroad, not least financially. It was therefore practically impossible to maintain a democratic organisation or even merely free discussion of political decisions while in exile, or to extend them" (Ansprenger, 1984, p.76). It was under such auspices that 29 years of SWAPO's policies in exile stood.

Thus within a short time there formed within the SWAPO leadership authoritarian ruling structures, whose development will not be described here, though their results will. The

older leaders like Nujoma brought their entitlements from the OPO and have retained them up till today without democratic legitimisation, insofar as they have not lost them through death or power struggles. New leaders were in practice coopted. SWAPO's statutes provide for the following central organs of the organisation: the Party Congress, the Central Committee, the Politburo, the President, in addition PLAN, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, with its own organisation and structure. The connection between SWAPO and PLAN is provided by the President, who is also the Supreme Commander of PLAN.

Formally, the Party Congress is the highest organ of SWAPO. It is supposed to meet every five years. The Congress however, by no means consists mainly of elected party members: its members are nominated by a majority of already existing party bodies, among them the Central Committee. Ansprenger comments: "No, these SWAPO statutes are not affected by any basic democratic ideas" (Ansprenger, p.108). The last Party Congress in exile was held in 1969/70, the last Congress of the internal wing in Walvis Bay in 1973.

The Congress is supposed to elect the Central Committee. This consists of 45 members. Since, however, there has been no Party Congress for 20 or 17 years respectively, from time to time "extended Central Committees" are called, which are not provided for in the SWAPO statutes. Delegates to them are such qua office and not because of being elected by the basis. These extended Central Committees select new CC members or remove others.

The Central Committee is usually supposed to meet once a year. One of its functions is the election of the Politburo (up till 1983 it was called the National Executive Committee). At present the Politburo has 16 members, all of them members of the CC. The actual political decisions are taken in the Politburo. Formally the Politburo is accountable to the CC, but since the latter meets only once a year this has no significance, in the same way as the accountability of the CC to the Party Congress which in theory meets only every five years. At the head of the Politburo as of the CC is the



President. He possesses an impressive amount of power; he is at one and the same time the Supreme Commander of PLAN, the guerrilla army; he appoints and dismisses the "Military Council"; he appoints and dismisses the SWAPO representatives abroad; he is the leader and the Chief Executive Officer of the Organisation". He is supposed to be elected every five years by the Party Congress and can only be voted out of office by a two-thirds majority of the Congress. In view of the structure of the Congress, Ansprenger is of the opinion that "no President of SWAPO need fear being relieved of his office. He can only be overthrown by a party-internal coup d'état" (Ansprenger, p.111).

Power struggles are part of politics. However, how they take place depends on the rules adopted by political organisations.

The first victims of still purely personal power struggles, and thus the first SWAPO dissidents, were Dr. Mburumba Kerina in 1963 and Dr. Kenneth and Otilie Abrahams in 1964. That was in Daressalaam, where SWAPO had its first headquarters. Kerina was a co-founder of the OPO and SWAPO and from 1960 to 1963 was the petitioner of the organisation at the UN in New York. He conceived the terms OPO, SWAPO and Namibia. The Abrahams, husband and wife, SWAPO members from the start, had undertaken the dangerous escape route to follow Sam Nujoma to Daressalaam. Both became members of the Central Committee and were finally excluded for "disrespect of the leadership".

The first really serious crisis was the Kongwa crisis at the end of the 1960s in Tanzania. It is little known; we came across it through a report prepared by former SWAPO prisoners with the coordination of Riundja Ali (Othniel) Kaakunga (who was after all a member of the SWAPO Politburo!) (printed in Basson/Motinga, p.22). SWAPO had in the meantime (1966) taken up the armed struggle. In Kongwa, a military training camp of the "People's Liberation Army of Namibia" (PLAN) in Tanzania, that is, of the military arm of SWAPO, there was a rebellion which had the following causes: lack of coordination between the political and the military leadership, lack of food and lack of uniforms, arms and ammunition. These complaints were not even discussed, let alone dealt with. Instead the SWAPO leadership asked the aid of the Tanzanian army in putting down the rebellion.

There followed the so-called Shipanga-crisis in 1975/76. This occurred in Zambia, where the SWAPO headquarters had in the meantime been established and a number of SWAPO refugee camps and PLAN training camps set up. At that time PLAN was fighting mainly in the Caprivi Strip.

During the 1970s thousands of Namibians had left the country and joined SWAPO in exile. In the second half of 1974 and 1975 alone there were 5000. Among them were many members of the SWAPO Youth League (SYL), which had expressed itself programmatically for the first time in 1971. It regarded itself not only as nationalist like the SWAPO leadership in exile but as socialistically-revolutionarily bound to a new militancy which helped to increase SWAPO's basis in the country during the following years. The SYL also played its part in the successful major strike of the Ovambo contract workers in 1971.

SWAPO in exile was obviously not able to cope with the influx of new masses of refugees in two ways: logistically-militarily, and ideologically. All the deficiencies which had already triggered off the Kongwa crisis again appeared, this

time to a greater extent, also among the fighting troops. Appeals and complaints were accordingly made, both against the PLAN leadership and the political leadership. The SYL members took particular exception to the authoritarian structures of PLAN.

Now clearly every army in the world is a "total institution", which gives its members little margin for creating their own identity. Every army functions on the principle of command and obedience. But there are differences. PLAN was a guerrilla army led by people who at first possessed no military experience at all. They made up for this by taking short concentrated training courses in "friendly countries" which were probably not terribly good. Many of PLAN's officers were therefore not militarily competent. But they had unconditional powers over their subordinates, not tempered by any ideas of a rule of law.

Members of the SYL, having undergone these experiences, called for a Party Congress to be convened, that is, for a democratisation of SWAPO and a new election of the leadership. Clearly they either trusted only Shipanga in the leadership, or else Shipanga made use of their wishes for his purposes.

In an organisation structured in the way SWAPO is structured, one aspect must introduce additional tensions among the leadership elite: the dependency upon money from outside. Corruption was obviously commonplace. Thus the President - i.e. Nujoma - and Shipanga "mutually accused one another of exclusive access to certain financial resources" (Ansprenger, p. 97), whereby Shipanga certainly had received also monies from West German party political foundations.

Nujoma took action, using the same method with which he had solved the Kongwa crisis. He asked help from the host country. Shipanga, together with his closest colleagues, was taken first to a Zambian and later to a Tanzanian prison. In 1978 he was freed, plainly after intervention by Genscher. At the same time as Shipanga's arrest, about 1000 - some say 2000 - people were imprisoned in SWAPO camps. Some were executed by shooting. Many of these prisoners are still missing.

The next crisis soon made its appearance: the Muyongo crisis. Mishaka Muyongo was one of the leaders of the Caprivi African National Union (CANU) and played a decisive part in the merging of CANU with SWAPO in 1964. He moved swiftly up in the SWAPO hierarchy and in 1969/70 became SWAPO Vice-President. In this capacity he, together with the then SWAPO observer at the UN, Theo Ben Gurirab, participated in drafting the UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). In 1980 the SWAPO-CANU alliance broke up. Muyongo left SWAPO and returned to Namibia under the South African amnesty (1985). Today he is vice-president of the DTA and was the DTA's leading candidate in the elections for the Constitutional Assembly.

The Muyonga crisis, which led to the arrest of many CANU members, developed uninterruptedly into the espionage crisis which began in 1980 and to which hundreds of SWAPO members have fallen victim.

We have presented these "preliminary crises" in fair detail because they demonstrate elements to explain the espionage crisis, and also because we believe that SWAPO's history of crises should be reevaluated in view of the meanwhile proven



serious violations of human rights by the SWAPO leadership against their own people.

## 2. THE EXTERNAL COURSE OF THE "SPY DRAMA" FROM 1980 TO 1989

In Namibia we met a number of former SWAPO prisoners. With six of them, among them a woman, we conducted very long conversations in several meetings. We held shorter meetings with another four, among whom was also a woman. Most of them were between the late 20s and the end of the 30s. All speak excellent English, are highly educated and, as we noticed especially, were very concerned to give us exact information, and only about what they had themselves experienced and could bear witness to. All of them made an extremely trustworthy impression. They are clearly free of hatred and a desire for revenge, and want only one thing - to get rid of the stigma of being alleged South African spies. They are fighting for their rehabilitation, and that implies an official admission of guilt by the SWAPO leadership and a withdrawal of their accusations. Almost daily they meet their former tormentors, who have also returned, in the streets of Windhoek. They reject the attempts of SWAPO to get them to return to their ranks, as long as the accusations against them are maintained.

One of those we spoke to pointed out a major psychological problem which troubles all former SWAPO prisoners. Before he went into exile he himself had been in South African prisons and had been tortured there too. Torture is torture, it is true, but there is an enormous difference to one's self-respect whether one is tortured as a freedom fighter by the enemy, or by one's own people.

In order to fight for their rehabilitation many of over 200 returned ex-detainees have joined together in a kind of pressure group, the Political Consultative Council (PCC), whose chairman is Kaakunga. In addition, another group of them has founded a political party called the Patriotic Unity Movement (PUM). The President of PUM is Eric Biwa. The Namibia Handbook says of PUM:

*"Founded on 20th July 1989 in Windhoek by ex-SWAPO detainees and exiles who wished to create a viable alternative to SWAPO to accommodate the politically homeless who have been alienated from the party. Having revealed the inner nature of the stomach of the dragon (SWAPO in exile) on their return to Namibia PUM members believe that although no patriotic Namibian can afford to ignore SWAPO's irreproachable Constitution, SWAPO is damned with an autocratic and tyrannical leadership which has made SWAPO intrinsically undemocratic and objectively incapable of fulfilling the historic task it set for itself." (p.215)*

PUM has joined the alliance of the United Democratic Front (UDF), a grouping of left-wing parties. The President of the UDF is Justus Garoeb of the Damara Council. In the elections for the Constitutional Assembly the UDF was the third strongest party and gained four seats, although none of these went to a PUM member. But when one of the original 4 representatives withdrew in November 1989, Eric Biwa took his place in the Constitutional Assembly. The UDF has obviously profited greatly from the matter of the detainees,

and also especially from the active engagement by PUM members in the election campaign, which we ourselves can confirm.

All those we spoke to continually change their overnight accommodation. The first thing they did was to obtain passports, so that they can leave the country at short notice, for they expect persecution from a future SWAPO government. As was reported by the Frankfurter Rundschau on 21.11.89 following the election, six former SWAPO detainees asked the German Embassy in Pretoria for visas for the Federal Republic. In the meantime the number has risen to eleven. Their applications for asylum have been refused.

We are not concerned in the following to put forward further evidence of the violations of human rights committed by SWAPO or in the name of SWAPO. This evidence has been submitted long ago and cannot be refuted. In addition, it has already been admitted by SWAPO, at least in general terms.

Those suspected of being spies were sent to Lubango in the south of Angola, where both the headquarters of PLAN and the headquarters of the "Security" were located. Those suspected of spying who were outside Angola were ordered to Luanda under some pretext and there placed under arrest. Some were arrested by the police in their guest country and arrived in Angola as prisoners. The arrests of alleged spies were known about both in the SWAPO camps and by SWAPO scholarship-holders overseas. There are many reports of the general fear which spread among members of SWAPO, for they knew anybody could be involved.

In the "Karl-Marx Interrogation Centre" near Lubango Security personnel took from the prisoners their valuables, watches, documents, even their glasses. The prisoners never saw any of these again, so that now some are having difficulties in documenting their education.

Then the interrogations began. It was always the same questions that were put to everyone: "Who recruited you? What is your mission?" Only for those from Caprivi was there a variation: they were asked who had ordered them to reestablish CANU. When they protested their innocence, 24 different kinds of torture were first explained. Then they were tortured. According to statements by former SWAPO prisoners the most frequently applied kinds of torture were these: both men and women had to undress completely or their clothes were removed by the torturers (who were all men) and when they were naked their hands and feet were tied and they were beaten with sticks, wire, aerials, until the torturers were tired or the detainees became unconscious. Then the "helicopter method" was used: hand and feet were tied together behind the back and the victim was hoisted over a beam so that he hung in the air face downwards. A stick was pushed into the loop formed by the bound hands and this was then used to beat the back of the victim. Petrol, or hot pepper and



salt were dripped into the wounds from the beating or into the victim's anus. Many were forced to sit naked on burning wood. Many were buried alive for several minutes and repeatedly. Many died from this, because the torturers dug them up again too late. Others were tied behind cars and dragged for several hundred yards, while they were at the same time being beaten by guards with sticks. There were also the familiar psychological tortures such as mock executions and especially solitary confinement for months on end in underground cells.

Some endured torture for a couple of days, some for a couple of weeks, a few for a couple of months. Many died under the torture. The survivors came to realise that only a fictitious confession would save their lives.

Some of the confessions were simply dictated by Security personnel. Others were just invented. Thus one of the detainees "confessed" that at a particular time he was trained by the South African police in Windhoek for the mission of going into exile and assassinating the President of SWAPO. This man can prove that at the time he was supposed to be being trained by the South African police he cannot have been in Windhoek at all. This also applies in general; the "confessions" do not fit into the biographies of those involved and would therefore be easily disproved if there were an

independent investigation. Many of the "confessions" were subsequently filmed on video.

Possibly the most perverse of the "confessions" were exacted from two young women. It is generally known because the video was publicly shown in Europe by the SWAPO. The South Africans, "confessed" the women, had placed razor blades inside their vaginas, and these were even poisoned in order to poison SWAPO leaders during sexual intercourse. Obviously this was believed, and not a single SWAPO doctor stood up to witness to the sheer medical impossibility of such a use of razor blades.

Following their "confessions" the detainees disappeared into their prisons. These were mostly underground holes, "dungeons", in which they vegetated in the indescribably atrocious conditions. There were men's camps and women's camps. In the women's camps there were also children. Many of the women report that they were raped by the guards. Some of the detainees spent up to nine years in the SWAPO prisons. Many died in the "dungeons". Their names have become known through the released detainees.

It must be emphasised here that in not a single case of the ex-detainees has there been even the glimmer of something like a legal trial.

### 3. WHO IS MAINLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE "SPY DRAMA"?

The fact that up till present SWAPO is obviously unable to clear up the "spy drama" - we shall return to this later - is explained in the already quoted article in "Work in Progress" as follows:

*"Among African diplomats, and within SWAPO, there is concern that the leadership has neither the will nor the intention to act. 'The responsibility leads too high,' says a former SWAPO member who left the organisation after discovering that relatives had died in its detention camps." (p. 20).*

This is also what was said by those we talked to, among them the journalist Susan Brown. The ex-detainees name the person mainly for the "spy drama" as being Solomon Hauwala (or Hawala), who bears the combat-name "Jesus". Hauwala was head of the Security department of SWAPO and at the same time deputy PLAN Commander. To the former prisoners he is the "butcher of Lubango". Not only did he carry out numerous interrogations himself but also personally undertook torture and filmed many of the "confessions" on video. This also applies to his deputy, Uuna Shaanika, with the combat-name "Kanana".

Closely involved in the "spy-drama" too is Hidipo Hamutenya, member of the SWAPO Politburo and Secretary for Information, who is regarded as the most competent man in SWAPO after, or besides, Nujoma. Hamutenya not only enticed or ordered SWAPO members to Angola or Lubango, such as e.g. Kavee Hambira (cf. Basson/Motinga, p. 176), who were arrested there on the spot; he is said also personally to have videoed confessions (as for instance in November 1984 in Etale detention camp).

According to statements by those we spoke to Moses Garoeb, member of the Politburo and Secretary for Administration,

is also involved in the "spy drama". He repeatedly visited the detainees in their prisons. He showed video tapes with the "confessions" at SWAPO events abroad. Our informants also stated that Lucas Pohamba, as Treasurer a member of the Politburo, and Peter Mueshihange, also a member of the Politburo and Secretary for Defence, were often present at interrogations and in addition visited the prisons.

Sam Nujoma visited the "dungeons" at least three times, in April 1986 those in Mungakwiyu, on April 21, 1986 those in Minya, and on March 9, 1988 those in Kikuya. Our informants bear witness to his saying that they were traitors and would remain in these dungeons until the day of independence. Then he would bring them before the Namibian people in "Freedom Square" and have them judged by them. They took this to be a threat that they would then be liquidated. Attempts by prisoners to talk with Nujoma and their requests to be allowed to prove their innocence fell on deaf ears.

The former SWAPO detainees made it clear to us that they were not intending to accuse the whole leadership of SWAPO. This was plainly expressed by Riundja Ali Kaakunga at the famous press conference held by the ex-detainees on July 7, 1989, in Khomasdal, where he stated:

*"... there are some elements in the SWAPO leadership whom we can identify. There have been some members who tried to fight against this, but they were powerless. The organisation's power is in the hands of just a small clique surrounding Nujoma. And this clique is led by the so-called SWAPO Security Organisation." (holographed report on the press conference on 7.7.1989, in our possession).*



## 4. SOME BACKGROUND CONDITIONS

The fact that the leaders of a liberation movement which represented the human rights and human dignity of one of the most oppressed peoples of the world should have been able to commit such crimes, not against the enemy, but against their own people, poses many puzzles. The "war situation" does not explain their paranoia either, but merely disguises it. All the same, a couple of background conditions could be established which made the crimes easier even though they did not excuse them.

SWAPO had and still has many international friends: the UN, all of the African states, the Nordic countries, the Eastern Bloc countries, the Lutheran World Federation, the World Council of Churches and many church and non-church solidarity groups all over the world.

Since SWAPO's cause was just, SWAPO had also to be just. Thus the SWAPO leadership enjoyed the confidence of the world to a greater extent than any other leadership of a liberation movement. It was not least the abuse of this confidence by the SWAPO leadership, or part of it, which made possible or easier the conduct of the "spy drama".

Among the African countries Angola played a prominent role as an ally of SWAPO. The country suffered for this more than any other. After the victory of the MPLA in the Angolan civil war (1975) which followed the fight for liberation from Portugal, SWAPO was able to move its headquarters to Luanda and to open a second front on the middle and western part of Namibia's northern border. Angola granted far more latitude to SWAPO than Zambia had previously. It could be said that SWAPO's camps in Angola represented a state within a state, where the Angolan authorities had no jurisdiction. The Angolan police and military also undertook "supply services" for SWAPO, for instance making arrests for SWAPO on the Luanda airport. That SWAPO was able to maintain its own prisons on Angolan territory, with which the authorities of the host country did not concern themselves, demonstrates the great latitude enjoyed in Angola by SWAPO.

At the press conference of the ex-detainees in Khomasdal which has already been mentioned, their spokesman Kaakunga said that officials of the Angolan MPLA were also present at their release:

*"... they were shocked to realise for the first time that SWAPO did all these things on Angolan soil, contrary to the Angolan laws."*

Other countries too contributed to the process of SWAPO's "spy drama". For instance, Willem Meyer of Berseba told us that he was arrested in Sofia on December 16, 1986 by the Bulgarian security forces and put into prison. No charge was made against him. A security official told him that they were purging Bulgaria of criminals such as him. On December 29, 1986 he was escorted together with other prisoners to the airport of Sofia by heavily armed police, who even had police dogs with them, and put on a plane to Luanda. There they were met by Angolan police and handed over to the SWAPO Security Organisation.

Similar events occurred in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Tanzania and above all Cuba, we were told by our informants. In Cuba SWAPO members who were arrested on the request of the SWAPO representative were held in prison for weeks. The UN too is reproached with having helped create the possibilities for the carrying out of the "spy drama" by its bias towards SWAPO. The UN had recognised SWAPO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Namibian people. Formally the UN Council for Namibia was the de jure government of Namibia and in this capacity for instance issued passports to Namibian refugees. Heinz (1989, p. 19) states that for infringements of the Geneva Convention by SWAPO "the UN Council for Namibia and the governments of Angola and Zambia must be held responsible." It is obvious that the UN at least did not thoroughly investigate the suspicious circumstances concerning SWAPO. For instance a UN delegation visited the SWAPO camps in Angola and Zambia in the spring of 1985. In their report they stated that they had found no indications that SWAPO was holding prisoners (cf. Heinz 1989, p. 47).

In Zambia too it was for instance extremely difficult for SWAPO dissidents to obtain recognition as general refugees from the UN High Commission for Refugees. Heinz quotes a conversation with the UNHCR representative Kleist Sykes in 1987 (Heinz 1989, p.50):

*"When someone wishes to leave SWAPO and to obtain the status of an individual refugee, our system is to inform the Zambian Liberation Center and SWAPO to meet together in my office with the person concerned. Reasons have to be given openly before the representatives of these organisations and us, and we have to try to establish the truth of their story."*

## 5. THE RATIONAL CORE OF THE "SPY DRAMA"

In the second half of the 1970s SWAPO's guerrilla war was relatively successful, after the Angolan front had been opened. This was the time when Ovamboland belonged to the SADF by day and to PLAN by night. In these years, during the rains, there were regular incursions to the south by small PLAN units into the white farming areas. The military reverses followed in the 1980s, after the SADF had been enormously strengthened and in addition had established the

South West African Territorial Force. In a series of military operations, among which "Operation Protea" was the best known, PLAN was driven from Namibian territory and the war took place only deep within Angola.

The military defeats placed pressure on the PLAN leadership. From about 1980 and peaking in 1985/86, ever more "spies" and "traitors" were discerned within their own ranks, and



were snowballing because everybody who had been tortured had to name further "spies" and "traitors".

Nobody will deny, and those we spoke to did not either, that South Africa has infiltrated SWAPO in the same way as it has infiltrated other liberation movements. The ex-detainees with whom we spoke also did not wish to exclude the possibility that among the hundreds who were imprisoned and tortured with them there could have been a few South African spies. But they point out quite rightly that there are no proofs of this. To place the responsibility for PLAN's defeats on the activities of secret agents is just eyewash, since this omits to take account of the military superiority of the South Africans in those years. It is constantly stated by the SWAPO leadership that for instance the Kassinga massacre by the South Africans in 1978 could have been made possible only through the activities of spies within SWAPO. This has been accepted uncritically by many apologists in the solidarity movement even though SWAPO could only put forward

for this claim the extorted confessions of their own prisoners. Those we spoke to were of the opinion that the South Africans could have discovered Kassinga and other camps which were attacked simply from air reconnaissance.

The Political Consultative Council (PCC) of the ex-SWAPO detainees expressed itself on the Kassinga affair in their press release in Katutura on August 3, 1989, as follows:

"Well before the date of the attack (on Kassinga) the local population, PLAN fighters and even Russian advisors warned of a South African army buildup poised to strike. This was a big operation and could not easily be concealed. Why were precautions such as evacuation etc. not taken? In fact it will only take a man ignorant of military science to contemplate that South Africa with its highly sophisticated war machinery was unable to detect a camp with over a thousand people on its own." (holographed press release, in our possession).

## 6. ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN SWAPO AND THE "SPY DRAMA"

The names and origin of the c. 200 former SWAPO prisoners who were repatriated to Namibia in July 1989, as well as of those murdered or missing, show clearly that most of them do not come from Ovamboland but from southern and central parts of Namibia. This is insofar relevant because, as also "Work in Progress" (Sept./Oct. 89, p. 20) noted, only some 10% of the members of SWAPO in exile were non-Ovambo.

The Internationale Gesellschaft für Menschenrechte (IGfM) concludes from this that ethnic conflicts were at the root of the "spy drama", that the purpose was to eliminate the non-Ovambo. Such a conclusion corresponds, it is true, to the prejudices of conservative circles, but it is false. The ex-SWAPO detainees to whom we spoke reject the ethnic explanation for these events; it was at most a secondary element, a corollary. One of them said, "it was a matter of literacy and illiteracy", that is, a question of whether someone could read and write or not. Another ex-SWAPO detainee specified that the "spy drama" was an attempt to eliminate the intellectuals from the middle and lower ranks, since they represented a danger to the power of the "old guard".

It was pointed out to us that among those SWAPO members declared to be spies there were definitely quite a number of Ovambo-speakers. But they mostly came not from Ovamboland but from the townships of Windhoek, Swakopmund, Lüderitz, etc. These urbanised Ovambo were given a derogatory name by those from Ovamboland: "Mbutidis" - "tares among the wheat". The term expresses what is felt to be a cultural difference between the urbanised Ovambo-speakers, usually at least able to read and write, and the rural, mostly illiterate ones from Ovamboland.

In Namibia there is a cultural north-south differential, the result of the German colonial period, which has been further consolidated during the South African occupation. The Germans had already established the so-called Police Zone, which excluded the northern part of the country, that is principally the densely populated Ovamboland. The northern parts outside the Police Zone were largely left to their own devices during the German colonial period, which meant

amongst other things that they had no part in any "development", however that is interpreted. Within the Police Zone, that is in the central and southern regions, urbanisation took place, first isolated schools were organised, there was a seminary for black priests. So at first patchily, later more widely, "education" was communicated, however colonialistically warped it may have been. Also the attempt, by South Africa since the mid-1970s to create something like a black middle class was a component in the creation of more schools for the "non-white" population, while the north, now a war zone under emergency laws, was never included in the same way.

One example shows that this educational differentiation still exists today. In Ovamboland (where more than half the Namibian population lives), in 1988, 5 (five!) pupils obtained matric exemption, i.e. university entrance. We were unable to obtain total figures for the "non-white" pupils in the centre and south of the country, but just at the five schools which we know there were about 20.

It is clear that this difference of education between the north and south affected SWAPO in exile when more and more refugees from the centre and the south went into exile and there met with the "old guard" which came almost exclusively from Ovamboland. The majority of the "old guard" had little or no schooling and were at the controls. When the first "intellectuals" joined SWAPO in exile in larger numbers - in 1974/75 these were above all members of the SWAPO Youth League - they were shocked at the amount of power, the abuse of power and the incompetence of the "old guard", especially in the command posts of PLAN. Those who could read and write, especially those who had been teachers or pastors, businessmen or white-collar workers, had a difficult time in the training camps. All reports from that period indicate that already the leadership or parts of the leadership raised their anti-intellectualism to a ruling principle. Illiterates were promoted to be over those who could read and write, intellectuals were humiliated, teachers in particular were despised. Spies were recruited among the illiterates to spy upon the educated. Already the educated were being arrested as spies, long before the "spy drama" began.



There was only one intermission in this anti-intellectualism, when Peter Nanyemba, as Secretary of Defence, attempted to professionalise PLAN (see the next section), and it then returned in greater force when especially the young elite from the central and southern parts of the country went into exile.

In the mid-1970s many Nama groups under Hendrik Witbooi, Willem Konjore and other leaders had joined SWAPO. Now an increased number of young refugees came into exile from the Nama/Damara area, among them pupils and teachers from the private church schools such as the Martin Luther School of the ELC at the AME school in Gibeon. These schools were (and are) after all SWAPO schools. But the "old guard" in exile was unable to understand the changes happening in Namibia from the mid-1970s onwards. The wilder the spy drama became, the more perverse the forms it assumed. In the 1980s many young pupils, students, members of NANSO, and conscientious objectors were sent by the churches and the Council of Churches to SWAPO in exile because they were in danger or had just been released from South African prisons. But these young activists brought with them the political culture of the struggle within Namibia, and that was obviously sufficient for many of them to wind up

immediately in the "dungeons" of "Jesus" Haula. SWAPO members in Windhoek told us of one particularly tragic case.

It concerns Joseph (Agab) Hendrickse from Windhoek, born 1968. He was one of the leaders of NANSO, the militant pupil and student association which stands close to SWAPO. As an activist he had taken part in the student boycott in 1988 and was arrested in Windhoek together with more than 20 others in August 1988. At the time these arrests were by the way widely publicised in our press. Whereas the others were released after a few days, Hendrickse remained in solitary confinement because he had during his public appearance in court declared the court to be illegal.

He was not released until December 7, 1988, when the implementation of UNSCR 435 was signed and after the Council of Churches had provided bail for him. But his friends urged him to leave the country, since they feared for his safety.

He left the country, and SWAPO prisoners who have returned have seen and spoken to him in a SWAPO prison in Angola. Up to the present he is still missing (cf. also Basson/Motinga, p. 182 f).

## 7. THE UTILISATION OF THE SPY DRAMA FOR THE POWER STRUGGLE IN SWAPO'S TOP LEADERSHIP

It is not easy to speak of power struggles in the SWAPO leadership so long as the leading actors keep silent. In the following the basis is "A report to the Namibian People" in which the former SWAPO detainees who have come together in the Political Consultative Council (PCC) attempt to clarify the background of the "spy drama" (reprinted in Basson/Motinga, p. 20 ff). After all, Riundja Kaakunga and Eric Biwa, who as former high SWAPO functionaries know the power structures and the main actors well, cooperated in this report. In addition we had an exhaustive conversation about it with Susan Brown who, as mentioned, is one of those best informed about the "spy drama". We also rely on talks with a few higher-ranking members of the SWAPO who have since resigned, as well as on our contacts with ex-detainees. Finally we have made use of two issues of "Africa Confidential" (of 16.12.88 and 8.9.89). According to our information the British Secret Service is behind "Africa Confidential".

In this way an at least plausible picture emerges of the political background. At present no more is possible.

At the end of the 1970s Peter Nanyemba, SWAPO Secretary for Defence, attempted to improve the efficiency of PLAN. On this we have a statement by Johannes Gaomab, a young PLAN commander (combat-name "Mistake") who led one of the most daring guerrilla attacks in Namibia, which did not prevent his being suspected in 1984 of espionage and finishing up in the Security prisons. At the end of the 1980s, Gaomab writes,

*"the Secretary of Defence Peter Nanyemba was busy replacing the members of the old guard in the military hierarchy. Nanyemba had something that was uncommon in the SWAPO leadership: he could think about strategy in military terms ... Whatever military success SWAPO had is attributable to him. Nanyemba was trying to introduce new tactics and new men,*

*committed and professional fighters. He was trying to replace illiterates with literates, the old guard with people who could think in new terms."* (Basson/Motinga, p. 14).

With this he triggered off a power struggle in SWAPO.

In 1980 the Security chief of SWAPO "Jesus" Haula had started the spy drama by having six people arrested and tortured. Under torture they named 60 to 70 further alleged spies, who were also arrested. Peter Nanyemba, who as Secretary for Defence ranked higher, intervened together with his two colleagues, Tauno Hatuikulipi (member of the Politburo, previous Director of the Christian Centre in Windhoek) and Bennie Petrus. Haula had to release his prisoners, and Nanyemba took many of them without further ado into PLAN as officers.

Measures such as these met not only with the delaying resistance of "Jesus" Haula but also resistance from a number of members of the Politburo who had taken up the interests of those dismissed by Nanyemba. But plainly Nanyemba enjoyed Nujoma's confidence.

In April 1983 Nanyemba was killed in a car accident. Rumours that SWAPO Security had had a hand in this have not died away. No evidence exists. The consequence of his death was that in the Politburo those who had taken up the cause of the "old guard" dismissed by Nanyemba got the upper hand. Hamutenya was at the head of this group.

Haula now had a free hand in continuing his spyhunt. Nanyemba's closest colleagues became his victims. At the beginning of 1984 Hatuikulipi was abducted and died in mysterious circumstances. Only six months later did Nujoma tell the CC that Hatuikulipi had committed suicide by swallowing a poison capsule which he had carried under a tooth



for five years (!). Bennie Petrus disappeared into the "dungeons" and was killed.

"Jesus" Hauuala was presumably able to convince Nujoma of the "danger" which also threatened him by showing him the videoed "confessions". In any case he now had a free hand.

The spy drama, all ex-detainees confirm, was carried out with the closest cooperation of Hamutenya, whom many call the Robespierre of SWAPO. His party has since then been the most important in the Politburo. It occupies the following important positions: Hamutenya himself is the Secretary for Information, Peter Mueshihange is Secretary for Defence (he therefore succeeded Nanyemba) and Lucas Pohamba is Treasurer. In addition, Dimo Hamaambo has an important function as PLAN Commander. Further regarded as belonging to Hamutenya's party: Moses Garoeb, Naha Angula and of course the deputy PLAN Commander "Jesus" Hauuala, who was at the same time Security Chief, as well as his deputy in this position Uuno Shaanika. Seen from this angle the spy drama had also the function of promoting Hamutenya into the role of "Crown Prince" of SWAPO.

Obviously the craziness of the spy drama was not readily accepted by other leading SWAPO members. Susan Brown told us that during a session of the Central Committee in 1984 Hage Geingob, member of the Politburo in his capacity as Director of the UN Institute for Namibia in Lusaka, demanded an end to this witch hunt. Upon this "Jesus" Hauuala expressed the supposition that Geingob too was an enemy agent. This is supposed to have silenced Geingob.

In the time following the spy drama was able to become even more paranoid. It did not even spare the close relatives of SWAPO leaders. Thus Nujoma's brother-in-law Aaron Mus-

himba disappeared into the "dungeons" and even Nujoma's wife was detained for a time because she had expressed criticism. David Meroro, National Chairman of SWAPO and the third highest man in the hierarchy, lost a son who died in the "dungeons". Hendrik Witbooi, as Vice President number two in SWAPO, was especially affected. Four of his close relations were held in prison for years as South African agents. One nephew, Markus Pietersen, died in a "dungeon" in 1987, another nephew, Ferdinand Witbooi, is still missing. A niece, Anna Pietersen, and his brother-in-law Samuel Thomas have returned home. Others who died in the "dungeons" include a son of Dr. Mose Tjitendero, member of the CC and an outstanding educationalist, and a son of Joshua Hoebe, internal leader of SWAPO and also an educationalist. Willem Konjore, a prominent SWAPO leader in Vaalgras in the south, lost his brother, Lukas Stephanus. We have mentioned here only relatives of those SWAPO leaders who today represent SWAPO in the Constitutional Assembly.

The top groups of SWAPO were massively affected. Eight members of the Central Committee fell into the clutches of "Jesus" Hauuala: Iauno Hatuikulipi, Riundja Kaakunga, Lukas Stephanus, Pejavi Munyaro, Viktor Nkandi, Ben Boys, Eric Biwa and Aaron Mushimba. Two of them, Hatuikulipi and Lukas Stephanus are dead, probably also Munyaro and Nkandi. The remainder have returned. Apart from Hatuikulipi, who however lived his adult life in Windhoek, all are non-Ovambo. Ben Boys and Aaron Mushimba, Nujoma's brother-in-law, have returned to SWAPO.

One central question remains open: Did Sam Nujoma merely tolerate the spy drama or play an active part in it, or was he from one particular point in time himself almost a victim? The arrests of his brother-in-law and his wife pose puzzles.

## **8. THE RELEASE OF c. 200 PRISONERS IN ANGOLA**

As implementation of UNSCR 435 approached it was clear to the SWAPO leadership that they would have to release their prisoners in the course of an independence process. What our informants among the ex-SWAPO-detainees told us about their release procedure bears all the characteristics of an attempt by the SWAPO leadership to limit the damage, of crisis management, for obviously those responsible were worried about consequences if the released detainees were to talk.

Already in January 1989 Moses Garoeb, Administrative Secretary in the SWAPO Politburo, appeared in some of the prisons and informed the detainees that they were to be released. He urged them to return to SWAPO. If they did not, he threatened, they would be further persecuted, in the same way as SWAPO had fought against the South Africans. The prisoners assured him of their return to SWAPO, for they feared they would otherwise not be released.

After this (April/May 89) 103 men were brought together in a camp (a "production unit") and similarly 98 women and a number of children were taken to another camp. They were unclothed, and given a pair of rubber sandals, 1 pair of underpants, 1 pair of trousers, 1 shirt, 1 blanket, 1 sheet and 1 mattress. The food suddenly improved too. On April 17, 1989 Nujoma appeared personally in the women's camp and asked the women to rejoin SWAPO. They did so.

Then "Jesus" Hauuala appeared in the men's camp (on April 19) and the women's camp (on May 12). He demanded that the men should sign a statement swearing loyalty to SWAPO and promising to vote for SWAPO in the election in Namibia. In the women's camp similar commitments were even recorded on video. Obviously however Security was not quite sure that the crisis management had been successful. Now the General Secretary Toivo ya Toivo was sent into both prison camps. Toivo, who was not involved at all in the spy drama, would, it was probably hoped, definitely be able because of his popularity to bring the prisoners back to SWAPO. He confronted both the men and the women with an alternative: either a declaration in favour of SWAPO, in which case the files would be closed and they would be repatriated to Namibia, or they would be turned over to the South Africans. When the women asked him to enable them to prove their innocence, ya Toivo, visibly irritated, replied that the truth was locked up in their hearts, and he did not know whether they were guilty or innocent.

About a week later men and women were moved together into one camp and, again under the supervision of Toivo, presented before representatives of the international press. Among them was the photo reporter of The Namibian, John Liebenberg, and the ZDF reporter Gunter Peus.



Toivo told the journalists, "We have pardoned them", upholding the accusations "that these prisoners have been active as spies and agents for South Africa". (Peus in: Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt of July 21, 1989). Then the detainees were permitted to talk freely to the journalists. Some of them undressed and showed the scars of torture they had undergone. Peus: *"The SWAPO officials in the background did not interfere; how could they anyway at this time? A kind of forward strategy appeared to be being followed. It would be much worse for SWAPO if the shocking truth came to light only back in Namibia during the election campaign."*

That Toivo was quite obviously being used here is clear from an interview which he gave to the Namibia Nachrichten (December 10/11, 1989). He said:

*"I must however say that I was disappointed when I saw the scars of torture on the body of some of the detainees. Some*

*of them told the group of journalists that they had been abducted and placed under detention. Only then did I hear of these things. I saw the scars myself."*

What the international press did not hear at that time in southern Angola was what happened afterwards. The 103 men (what happened to the women we do not know) had to line up and were asked once more who would return to SWAPO and who would not. Only 8 declared themselves for SWAPO. Hauuala immediately took away from the others their mattresses, blankets and sheets. Since they feared they would be liquidated many of them fled into the bush and hid. They made their way to Lubango, where they went to the Red Cross and UNTAG, who repatriated them like the others to Namibia.

## 9. THE PROBLEM OF THE MISSING

The returned ex-SWAPO detainees published a list over more than 500 people who were, they said, still being kept imprisoned by SWAPO. The Parents' Committee spoke of over 1000 people. Since the implementation of UNSCR 435 was tied to the condition that the parties which had been waging war should release all prisoners, the UN Special Representative for Namibia, Ahtissari, was ordered to investigate the matter.

Under the leadership of Ambassador B.A. Clarke, the UNTAG representative in Angola, a ten-man UN mission went to Angola and Zambia in September 1989. It was to visit all the places where SWAPO had previously held detainees in order to find out whether Namibians were still being kept imprisoned there. The mission found no prisoners, but stated that indeed for 315 of the alleged 1100 missing persons listed by various human rights organisations no evidence could be found of their whereabouts. In other cases there was duplications of names, some had returned home, etc. Ahtissari

summarised this at a press conference (11.10.89; cf. The Namibian, 12.10.89):

*"The mission found that there were no detainees in any of the alleged detention centres and other places which we visited in Angola and Zambia ... I assure you that for my part the search is not over. I will not disband the mission on detainees."*

These results were criticised by various groups. The former SWAPO detainees reproached Ahtissari that they had not taken part in the mission, although they best knew where detainees were held. Furthermore the two detention camps Kilimanjaro southeast of Lubango and Caputa camp had not been visited by the mission.

The Times of Namibia reported on December 8, 1989 on a SWAPO detainee who had recently escaped from a prison in Angola and made his way to Namibia. He had said that there were still many SWAPO prisoners in Angola. The report has not been confirmed up till now.

## 10. THE HANDLING OF THE SPY DRAMA BY THE SWAPO LEADERS AFTER THE RETURN OF FORMER PRISONERS

According to the lists of the Parents' Committee 153 former SWAPO prisoners were repatriated to Namibia on July 5, 1989. A further 16 who had escaped from SWAPO captivity returned on August 8. 49 smuggled themselves in among the "normal" returnees. In addition there were a number of children. In the meantime further ex-detainees have returned. Already on July 6 the Parents' Committee organised a sensational press conference in Khomasdal, at which a number of former prisoners again undressed to their underclothes and showed the scars of their torture.

The strategy of the SWAPO leaders becomes clear from the first statement by Hidipo Hamutenya (cf. Weekly Mail, July 7, 1989): the maintaining of the claim that all former prisoners were convicted spies for South Africa; denial of the claims by ex-detainees that SWAPO killed prisoners or is still

holding hundreds; denial of the accusations of torture with the qualification that if something like that should have occurred, it was due to the excesses of individuals who were contravening SWAPO orders.

This line continued to be followed in the election campaign. In Khomasdal and Katutura video recordings of alleged confessions were even shown at public meetings. We spoke to three SWAPO members who had seen the "confession" of Riundja Ali Kaakunga on video. They expressed to us their stupefaction at this, for it was obvious that here a broken man had appeared and that in addition members of Security constantly whispered to him what he was to say. Evidently the campaign leadership had then realised that these showings were counter-productive, and they ceased. One SWAPO member told us of an especially macabre election appearance



by Moses Garoeb, who said that SWAPO had no reason to apologise for having arrested spies. As "evidence" of this, he had with him people who had lost their arms or legs and moved about with difficulty on artificial limbs. All of these, said Garoeb, were victims of South African air attacks which could only have occurred because spies in their own ranks had betrayed the location of the camp.

One member of the Politburo followed a different line from the first: Theo Ben Gurirab, SWAPO spokesman on foreign policy. According to Susan Brown he is the only top leader of SWAPO who reads the international press and who because of his long service as UN observer and SWAPO representative in the USA can assess how much damage is being done internationally by the whole affair. He was the first to admit that torturing had taken place, and apologized for it in SWAPO's name. He also indicated that "steps would be taken", i.e. an investigation would be held (cf. TAZ, 12.7.89; FR, 25.8.89). In an interview with Rolf-Henning Hintze (FR, 18.10.89) he then backed down. There would be neither an international nor an internal SWAPO investigation. Besides, the whole subject was "kept alive only by a few well-meaning friends abroad and the media". To Rolf-Henning Hintze and Susan Brown it is pretty sure that Gurirab was called off by the Politburo. We twice met Gurirab at an unofficial level. Our attempt to bring the matter up failed because he refused to be drawn.

Another who did not behave according to the prescribed SWAPO phraseology was Hendrik Witbooi, Pastor, traditional leader of the Witbooi Nama and as Vice President of SWAPO a member of the Politburo. He has been, as already mentioned, personally affected by the spy drama, since four close relatives were involved, of whom a nephew died. Also, there are about 10 people from Gibeon among those still missing.

We attended Witbooi Day in Gibeon, which is celebrated at the end of October every year in memory of the death of Hendrik Witbooi's legendary great-grandfather of the same name, who was once the thorn in the flesh of the German colonial rulers. Already at one of the events in the framework of Witbooi Day Hendrik Witbooi said that the talk about the spies must finally cease. Then on 30.10.89 we had the opportunity of a long talk with him.

He told us that he and the Witbooi community had warmly welcomed returning ex-SWAPO-detainees back to Gibeon. This was confirmed; Witbooi had had organised a regular "heroes' reception" for them. He told them he knew very well that they were not traitors and spies. Even if they told him they were, he could only say that they were still suffering from the shock of their experiences. After all, he knew very well that it was they who had built up SWAPO in the south.

He accepted them back officially into the Witbooi community. They had sat together until 2 in the morning and celebrated their return.

Witbooi however emphasised too that he had requested the returnees to return also to SWAPO. Only in this way could they demonstrate to everybody that they were no traitors. The struggle for freedom and self-determination was not yet over. He regretted that except for his friend Ben Boys none of the returnees had felt prepared to do this.

We told Witbooi at the close that we were impressed by his attitude, that he as the second man in SWAPO was saying that the former prisoners were not spies. Should not now a similar statement come from the first man, the President? Witbooi is convinced that it should. Only recently he was in Windhoek together with Nujoma on the occasion of a reception for the Secretary General of the OAU, Dr. Salim. Salim expressed the expectation that a definitive word should be said on the ex-SWAPO-detainees. Nujoma had agreed to this.

This word has not yet been spoken. At an election campaign meeting in Rundu the SWAPO President said according to Namibia Today of October 25, 1989 (SWAPO's party newspaper):

*"SWAPO does not detain anybody anywhere. Those elements whom we detected serving the interest of the enemy were responsible for the deaths of our people."*

And at a press conference on November 6, 1989, he said that he felt no regret for the ex-detainees:

*"When asked by a Norwegian journalist about SWAPO's violation of human rights in Angola and Zambia, Nujoma emotionally replied that the Norwegians had as well killed their Prime Minister (Quisling) in public after the second World War. 'You whites are now very concerned about human rights, but think about your own past,' he said" (The Times of Namibia, 7.11.89).*

We take the so far most recent pronouncement by a SWAPO leader from an article by Henning Melber in WoZ, 24.11.89. According to this Hamutenya announced after the election that following a policy of reconciliation there would be a general amnesty for all who had taken part in the colonial war:

*"He was explicitly addressing the Namibian agents of the South African government of occupation, but wished at the same time to have the problem of how the ex-SWAPO-detainees should be treated solved."*

But this does not seem to be the last word on the subject (see the final remark).

## 11. THE NAMIBIAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES (CCN) AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY SWAPO

The CCN and those progressive Namibian churches belonging to it (amongst which are the Catholic Church but not the "white" ones) have been placed in a serious dilemma by SWAPO's violation of human rights. It emerges from the documentation by Siegfried Groth (1989) that human rights

violations by SWAPO in Zambia and Angola had already been pointed out to the CCN and Namibia's churches at an early date. They were regarded as not credible, and this is perfectly comprehensible from the enormously polarised situation in which the accusations were made. The accusa-



tions were made since the mid-1980s by a parents' committee in Namibia which later devided. One party, which calls itself "Parents' Committee" (the other chose the name "Committee of Parents") cooperated with the interim government put in power by South Africa and also with the IGfM. The CCN had made no secret of the fact that it supported the SWAPO liberation movement and regarded it as the only hope of ending South Africa's foreign rule. The accusations were therefore regarded as being a part of South African propaganda.

The general line of the churches and the CCN are expressed on a paper by Dr. Shejavali, the Secretary General of the CCN, on December 23, 1985, where he takes issue with the activities of the Parents' Committee.

*"There is a lot of information saying that South Africa has been trying in many ways to destroy SWAPO and that they have their agents who are doing this job for them. SWAPO has the right to protect her people from those who are collaborating with the enemy."*

*The spirit of the letters (of the Parents' Committee) sent to various people including the President of SWAPO is not a reconciling one at all. Its mood is bordering near hate. In this time in Namibia we need to struggle for unity, which is very important on the eve of independence."*

Above all, Dr. Shejavali pointed out that the church leaders "feel that allegations are not facts, and thus they decided it's better to have a meeting with the SWAPO leadership first before coming to any conclusions."

When the SWAPO prisoners arrived in Windhoek in July 1989 it was proved that this were indeed facts and not only allegations. How did the church react, especially since among the SWAPO ex-detainees there were several pastors (at least five)? It was the Catholic Church who first stood up publicly for justice and peace in a press release on July 12, 1989 (cf. Hinz, p.22). It reads:

*"With great pain and deep disappointment we have to listen to reports of former detainees about their sufferings in camps in Angola. Sadly enough, torture has a long history in Namibia. Is it for that reason that we have to endure the reports of some returnee's hardship? ..."*

*Torture is the most striking denial of the humanity of man, the extreme form of human decay. And yet, this human decay began early in this country ... We look forward to see those responsible for any kind of torture to be called to account and the victims to be duly compensated."*

Bishop Frederick of the ELCSWA, the Evangelical Lutheran Church (Rhenish Mission), published a statement, part of which reads:

*"The Council (of the ELCSWA) does not view these tragic events in isolation from the nightmare of colonialism and apartheid which the Namibians have been subjected to for more than a hundred years ... Considering this situation which we are subjected to by enemies of peace, the Church Council strongly condemns torture and other forms of ill-treatment of Namibians by fellow-Namibians during the liberation struggle, whether they are guilty or not."* (CCN/RRR Weekly Newsletter of September 29, 1989)

Bishop Dumeni of the ELCIN, The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia (previously the ELOC, the Evangelical

Lutheran Church in Ovambo and Cavango) expressed himself in similar fashion, first on the reproach that he had not taken a position earlier on the human rights violations by SWAPO: this question had been discussed with the SWAPO leadership during all the years of struggle up to the present day:

*"We believe that these contacts were effective in some cases because certain detainees were released."*

He continued that his church rejected the violation of human rights from whatever quarter. *"We call upon anyone who may still have prisoners or detainees to release them without any further delay or conditions. We reiterate quite unequivocally that our church does not condone torture."* (The Namibian, October 16, 1989)

Dr. Shejavali expressed himself similarly in the name of the CCN.

These statements were strongly criticised by Nora Chase, former senior employee of the CCN and in the World Council of Churches, Secretary General of SWANU:

*"My own church, like the CCN, says we condemn torture wherever it is, but we do not condemn SWAPO. Whom is being helped? The churches are not even helping SWAPO by doing that ..."*

She continued: *"I'm perhaps the strongest supporter of the CCN because unless the CCN changes it is going to lose the role it has played in this country in the post-independence period. It will lose the credibility it has had."* (CCN/RRR Weekly Newsletter, October 6, 1989)

Those of the former prisoners with whom we spoke saw things in the same way, and complained above all that they had found no help from the churches. One of them (whom we did not speak to) is Pastor Hellao of the ELCSWA. He has in the meantime let it be known that he received no help from his church (cf. idea spectrum 45, November 8, 1989, p. 16f).

Are Namibia's churches in danger of forfeiting their high moral authority? In 1988 Gerhard Töttemeyer, Professor of Political Science at the Academy in Windhoek, said to us that no government of a free Namibia could govern in opposition to the churches, so that even in a one-party state human rights would be guaranteed. When we asked him about this in October 1989 he replied tersely: "The churches have forfeited their guardianship." We heard this frequently, even from convinced Christians who support SWAPO.

As things are in present, the following sentence, which the ELCSWA formulated in their statement, is no longer valid:

*"The Church Council welcomes the standpoint of SWAPO, that the torture of detainees is not the policy of the organisation, and that those who were responsible for such deeds will be held accountable for them."* (CCN/RRR Weekly Newsletter, September 29, 1989)

We made especial efforts to obtain an interview with Dr. Kameeta, probably the most important minister of the church in Namibia, deputy bishop of the ELCSWA, a respected liberation theologian, member of SWAPO and in the meantime SWAPO representative in the Constitutional Assembly. The talk took place on November 8, 1989, and was very brief, since Dr. Kameeta had practically no time to spare. The



subject matter was concentrated on a few points: his attitude to the reactions in the German Evangelical Church to human rights violations by SWAPO, his own assessment of matters, and on the question of reconciliation in Namibia, including reconciliation with former SWAPO detainees.

Dr. Kameeta complained bitterly about the attitude of the Evangelical Church in Germany. In particular he criticised the publications by Pastor Siegfried Groth. He could not understand what Pastor Groth intended by them. He criticised further the resolution of the Synod of the EKD of October 29, 1989, in which there was no word of encouragement for the Namibian churches and which had also not been discussed beforehand with them. It was only with the German church that they had this problem, not for instance with the Dutch one, a delegation from which had just visited him.

In judging the human rights violations by SWAPO the context should not be forgotten, the context of colonialism and apartheid, the context of a terrible war. He could only point to an interview he had given recently. There he had said:

*"A moral revolution should take place within ourselves. That we be honest with the people, that we must not claim to have clean hands as some people would claim their hands to be clean. We have been working and if you are working your hands become dirty, that is the truth and a sign that you are working very hard ..."* (The Namibian, November 3, 1989).

As to the churches' task of reconciliation, Dr. Kameeta said, they were all having talks with the ex-detainees and had in the meantime succeeded in getting the SWAPO leadership

and ex-SWAPO prisoners together at one table. It was hoped to continue these reconciliation talks under the auspices of the CCN.

The meeting between the ex-detainees and SWAPO under the auspices of the CCN took place on October 11. SWAPO was represented by Moses Garoeb, Shoombe (formerly SWAPO representative in Bonn) and another SWAPO representative; the group of ex-detainees was led by Kaakunga. In the press release issued by Dr. Shejavali, the Secretary General of the CCN, it said that the meeting "had been constructive and made a contribution towards reconciliation." At the moment nothing further could be made public, since the subject was highly sensitive. A further meeting had been agreed upon at the beginning of November (CCN/RRR Weekly Newsletter, October 6, 1989).

We made enquiries of our informants from among the former SWAPO detainees following this meeting of October 11. They told a different story. Moses Garoeb had appeared with a bodyguard, whose first action was to search the ex-detainees for weapons. During it they noticed that the guard himself had a pistol in his jacket pocket. The meeting had lasted for barely 20-30 minutes. Garoeb had raised the old demand that they should return to SWAPO and then they would be rehabilitated. When this was refused by Kaakunga, Garoeb had left the meeting.

According to our information no further meeting has taken place. The dialogue for reconciliation between the SWAPO leadership and their former prisoners under the auspices of the CCN has obviously been broken off.

## 12 "WHY VOTE SWAPO?"

The events surrounding the SWAPO spy drama have caused great unrest in the middle and lower ranks of the organisation. We cannot speak for the north, especially not for Ovambo-land, where it is presumably for good reason somewhat different, since this time we did not visit the north. Our observations are limited to Windhoek and the south. Some of the returnees whom we knew from West Germany told us openly how happy they were not to be there any longer, for they did not know what they could say in justification. There were of course also other reactions: vindication, disparagement, statements such as "It's terrible, of course, but now we have to look to the future". Others however spoke frankly with us about their problems of identity into which the human rights violations of their organisation had plunged them. Some are genuinely desperate.

Whatever the individual reactions may have been, there is one central subject on the minds of many SWAPO members and supporters. But we also established that for them there is no alternative to SWAPO.

If we attempt to understand, and that means also those who today are sitting as SWAPO representatives in the Constitutional Assembly even though they have lost sons or brothers through their own organisation - if therefore we attempt to understand, then we have to take this seriously: *there is no genuine alternative to SWAPO*. Many to whom we spoke knew the South African prisons from inside, have been tortured by South Africans, and all suffer from the trauma of a terrible foreign rule which we can barely comprehend. But without SWAPO there would have been no liberation. One of those we spoke to even went so far as to say more or less: and even if SWAPO sets up a dictatorship here, it's our dictatorship and not that of the Boers!

Richard Pakleppa has best expressed what innumerable SWAPO members are feeling in a poem, which was published on the first election day in The Namibian (see next page).



## WHY VOTE SWAPO?

as so many of us  
I also  
have had to soul search over the  
question  
about  
the character and promise of our  
liberation movement.

as so many of us  
I also  
have had to answer to loud chal-  
lenges and whispered fears  
that have been expressed in recent  
months.

as so many of us  
I also  
have lain sleepless over the injus-  
tices committed  
in the name of our people's organ-  
isation

I also  
have expressed in smallest circles  
what no one dares utter publicly  
I also  
have felt the fear of the threatened  
with political and moral homeless-  
ness  
I also  
have shared in the public silence  
around what we all know to be  
wrong

I also  
have listened to all our defensive  
posturing and rhetoric  
I also  
have recoiled to those hypocritical  
cries  
which exhibit the raw wounds of  
the down-trodden  
in order to tarnish the vehicle of  
liberation

I also  
lash out at the rushed flight of  
bonepickers feasting on their past  
kills;

I also  
have had to balance rumour and  
slander of past years with reports  
of returned comrades

I also  
have had to assess my own judge-  
ments  
against voices quick to convince  
me that I am a victim of propa-  
ganda

I also  
sense enemy agents among the vic-  
tims

I also  
have come to realise the secret shame  
and secret fear  
expressed in our silence

our silence  
that continues to exile  
and ostracise and make into non-  
persons the very comrades who  
fought heroically and who became  
victims of the contradictions that

grew out of our long and difficult  
struggle for liberation  
our contradictions...  
leave us with no means to hide,  
even behind our own words: these  
contradictions arise from our heri-  
tage of colonial backwardness,  
our insecurity  
our fear  
our tribal and selfish values  
our greed and  
our own brutality that springs  
up in answer to the brutality of the  
aggressor  
our lack of deep, basic and  
living political values  
which guide action in struggle;  
these contradictions are the reality  
of life where we are all too human.

These contradictions express them-  
selves in the disturbed lives of many  
individuals in our society  
in PLAN  
in Koevoet  
in the ranks of the ex-detainees.

In Liberation lies the promise of  
shedding the shapes, the traces and  
scars of colonialism that moulded  
everyone of us...

these terrible contradictions  
can be overcome only by facing our  
pain and our shame  
by participating in democratic proc-  
esses  
by trusting the power of many in  
decision making, planning an exe-  
cuting the changes required to build  
our nation

As so many others  
I also  
have come to see that our silence  
and our blindness  
has given the defenders of division  
and colonial rule  
weapons that are used against us  
our silence  
has given the killers of the first  
order and the perpetrators of the  
root cause of our nightmare  
our own blood to smear our name  
with.

I also  
reject the desolation of cynicism  
and resignation.  
Too much has been sacrificed.

vot swapo  
because swapo is the struggle  
because history is made by you and  
me  
because the people that are repre-  
sented by swapo  
are the people who have to build  
and direct swapo  
because everyone of us may rejoice

with the coming of a new era  
where everyone of us must trans-  
form our silence and shame into  
courage of thought and action  
vote swapo  
because everyone of us may rejoice  
with the coming of a new era  
where everyone of us will receive  
back those who were unjustly ex-  
pelled  
vote swapo  
because everyone of us may rejoice  
with the coming of a new era  
where everyone of us transforms  
silence and blindness  
into the fierce loyalty that directs  
our leaders who are the servants of  
the people

As so many others  
I also  
vote swapo  
because swapo is the people's or-  
ganisation  
I also  
vote swapo  
because it is only through our unity  
that we can face the challenges of  
the process of liberation  
because it is only through the mutual  
strengthening of the people in swapo  
that we can actively engage in heal-  
ing our wounds, in correcting what  
is wrong and in embracing true  
reconciliation  
vote swapo  
if this also is your struggle  
vote swapo  
knowing clearly that you are swapo  
and that only you can take up the  
difficult challenges of national lib-  
eration  
no one can do this for us: we all  
have to do this together  
vote swapo  
because there is no easy myth to  
believe in  
vote swapo  
because that is a reality that you  
must help shape  
vote swapo  
with the knowledge of those chal-  
lenges  
vote swapo  
knowing that leaders are given  
power through you  
vote swapo  
knowing that your participation in  
guiding power is crucial  
vote swapo  
as a commitment to participate in  
your history.

viva people of namibia  
viva swapo  
viva people of namibia.

RICHARD PAKLEPPA



### 13. QUO VADIS, NAMIBIA?

Anybody who makes forecasts is going to be made a fool of in a couple of years' time, for there are all too many variables, connected and unconnected, for a dependable picture of the future to be drawn up from them.

One thing is certain, though: the future government of Namibia will be a SWAPO one.

We do not intend here to describe the enormous tasks facing the future Namibian government; they can be taken as read. What interests us here is simply: will there be a democratic future or not?

Gerhard Töttemeyer (cf. Töttemeyer, 1989) assumes that in the medium term a one-party state will develop in Namibia. That has been the course of development in most African countries, and a one-party state is more suitable than a multi-party state to bind together the disparate language and cultural groups into one nation. Where there are several parties there is a danger that these will be organised following ethnic principles, which conjures up the danger of civil wars. Then he goes further, though, and claims that a one-party state can definitely be a democratic state, as long as the independence of the courts is guaranteed, a Bill of Rights is included in the constitution, and further checks and balances are present. In the case of Namibia he is thinking principally of "horizontal social forces" such as the churches and the trade unions, against which a future one-party rule of SWAPO could not govern.

At the latest at this point some energetically express their contrary opinion, as for instance Nora Chase or a former high-ranking SWAPO member, and also some ex-detainees. In summary their argument runs like this:

They agree with Töttemeyer that SWAPO will go over to one-party rule when the opportunity offers. Then however there would be neither independent courts nor would human rights be respected, no matter whether these are included in the constitution or not. Nor could the churches exert sufficient controls; they have already fallen into the "Constantinian trap", i.e. they have already subordinated themselves to SWAPO. The unions too are already almost in SWAPO's grip. The inclusion as SWAPO representatives in the Constitutional Assembly of Dr. Kameeta as church leader and Ben Ulenga as trade union leader is evaluated by these ex-detainees as an indication that church and trade unions are to be immobilised.

The unions are however an uncertain factor; their militancy could speedily reemerge if a future government proved unable to realise their election promises of fast economic improvements.

Strong police forces would be needed for this. SWAPO's rhetoric about reconciliation should be regarded from this aspect. It is directed not only at the whites so that they remain, but above all at the former myrmidons of South Africa. SWAPO would not only take over the SWA police just as it

is, it would also complement it with Koevoet members. All the old SWAPO security people were also again in the country. "Jesus" Hauuala is, it is true, staying out of sight for the time being but could easily be reactivated at any time. The Security will secure the SWAPO dictatorship in the same way as previously in exile.

The international community will be glad when it can get out of Namibia following its involvement and leave the country to its own devices. The world has tolerated quite different terror regimes from the expected "typically African" dictatorship, as long as the country can still be exploited. And the new SWAPO oligarchy will take care of that, since it is interested only in power.

Against such horror prognoses critical SWAPO members place a picture of a developing democracy. The people from these circles to whom we spoke were united by one thing: they are happy that SWAPO did not attain the two-thirds majority in the elections to the Constitutional Assembly. That makes everything a lot simpler. SWAPO has already agreed to the constitutional principles of 1982 (independence of the courts, Bill of Rights). The development into a one-party state has also been blocked by this, for the opposition is too large for such an alteration in the constitution to be carried.

After the return of SWAPO in exile there were certain irritations, mutual problems of adaptation between the returnees and those who had remained in the country, but these had mainly been overcome. People knew each other now and could get by with one another. Now they would above all press for a Party Congress to be called soon to draw up a new democratic set of statutes. For the rest, it was one thing to run an exile organisation and something quite different to rule a country. For the latter competent colleagues were required. Many were available. Above all among those who had returned from exile there were a large number of well-educated people, many of whom had studied also in countries with a democratic constitution. These had the appropriate conception of values. Participatory values had also been developed in the pupils' and student organisation NANSO and in the many small community projects. All these organisations would play an essential part in the phase of reconstruction, which would then however only be optimised if participation and co-determination were present. An eventual new SWAPO leadership would have to acknowledge this.

As to human rights violations, these critical SWAPO members believe there will be a cleaning-up of the organisation. They see an indication of this in the fact that Hauuala no longer figures amongst the leaders and that the Security has in the meantime been entrusted with very peaceful tasks and thus neutralised (it guards the SWAPO building and the houses of the SWAPO leaders). Of course a future state will need a police force and an army and also security services, but they would oppose the inclusion of the Koevoet people just as much as the inclusion of former Security people in the civil service.



## CONCLUDING REMARK

Following the conclusion of the above text, two further developments should be noted. In the meantime (December 1989), Sam Nujoma has presented his shadow cabinet. There will also be a Security, but neither Hauuala nor his deputy figure in it. The second development seems even more important. If "African Confidential" is correctly informed, the grand old man of SWAPO, Toivo ya Toivo, after Nujoma the most popular SWAPO leader, got it accepted in the session of the Central Committee of SWAPO on November 18, 1989, that the whole Central Committee should concern itself with the question of the ex-detainees and also question Hauuala and his colleagues from the Security on the matter, above all about whether prisoners were still being held. "Africa Confidential" sees this as a direct attack on Hamutenya and his

faction. A party congress, which would then finally have to make a pronouncement on this problem, would take place in 1992 at the latest.

This would mean that the processing by SWAPO of the matter moves into the realm of the possible. It can only result in a full rehabilitation of the detainees. In the period up till then, we as solidarity groups have two tasks. We must continue to exert pressure on SWAPO to clear the matter up adequately. And we must care for those freedom fighters who became victims and today live in constant fear of still being overtaken by an avenging hand of the SWAPO leadership: the ex-detainees, who urgently need medical, psychiatric and also material help

### LIST OF QUOTED SOURCES:

FRANZ ANSPRENGER: Die SWAPO. Profil einer afrikanischen Befreiungsbewegung. Mainz/München 1984

NICO BASSON/BEN MOTINGA: Call them spies. The Namibian spy drama. Windhoek/Johannesburg, October 1989

SIEGFRIED GROTH: Menschenrechtsverletzungen in der Exil-SWAPO, epd-dokumentation 40/89 vom 18.9.1989

WOLFGANG S.HEINZ: Report on Alleged Human Rights Violations by SWAPO in Angola and Zambia. Berlin, March 1989 (ai-report, not printed)

MANFRED HINZ: Report on a Visit to Namibia 1-25 July 1989. Bremen, August 1989 (Ms. not printed)

PÜTZ, VON EGIDY, CAPLAN: Namibia Handbook and Political Who's Who. Windhoek, October 1989

GERHARD TÖTEMEYER: The Prospects for Democracy in an Independent Namibia. Namibia Institute for Social and Economic Research. University of Windhoek 1989