

THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE KINGDOM OF LESOTHO

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The Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Lesotho to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Permanent Missions and Offices of Permanent Observers to the United Nations and has the honour to inform them that His Excellency Ambassador Monyane Paanya Phoofolo, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Lesotho to the United Nations, has returned to New Ybrk and resumed charge of the Mission.

The Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Lesotho to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Permanent Missions and Offices of Permanent Observers to the United Nations the assurances of its highest consideration.

NEW YORK

ah April, 1990.

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o AFRICA: THE NEW ORDER ' .

oMORQCCO: HASSANS MINOR TROUBLES mm 1 2 1991"; ' 1 '

"'0 zAIRE: AGOVERNMENTWITHOUTACONSTITUTION " " 1 J

OANGOLA:KINGOFTHESOUTH ' t 'A ' " "- ,

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Africa' , J

The :11er Erder .

The 26 March overthmw of President Moussa Traore' in  
Mali, eVei'y bit as bloody and dramatic as that Of Nicolae  
Ceausescu just 16 months ago, and the democratic election  
of a ne'W president, Nicephore Soglo, in Benin on 24 March,  
911585th 'landmark events which have received less attention  
from the news media of the Western World than they deserve.  
Both indicate that the wave of political Change sweeping  
AfriCa, Which appeared to be weakening, still has some way  
torgoi .9115

Most importantly; South Africa 18 mW on the verge of an  
all-party pre-negotiation conference, whose task will be to  
fix the agenda and form of the constitutionl'al conference  
scheduled to begin later this year. A Widel'y-held view is that  
the political prospects for change are quite good, while the  
economic 'prospects appear bleak. The country will have to  
navigate the perils of constitutional change with a low or  
zero growth rate, rising unemployment, and "a' harsh anti-  
inflationary economic policy. The 'continiled high level of  
killingsincreasingly suggests that political 'violence may be  
even more prevalent in the new South Africa than in the old.  
7 South Africa, despite the features Which distinguish it  
from other African countries, poses thquestions which  
haunt every 'government contemplating reform: 'how'does a  
government engage the opposition in dialogue without  
handing Over an unacceptable degree of power? If a govem-  
ment will not accept the formmon of a Constituent assembly,  
how' else 15' it to establish a constitution-making body which  
is' considered legitimate? 4 ' ' ' ' ' ;

Not a single country in Africa is 110W untouched by'the  
spirit of change Which has made itselffelt sir'tce'1989-90 and  
can afford to ignore these questions; Even Malawi, previ-  
o'uSIy hermetic, has been affected. All are grappling With  
similar problems as they seek aiway forward. \$50 Tome e  
Principe and Cape'Verde have bEth's'ucceeded' 11) trains-  
forming themselves into multilpartyndemocrac'ie's, but bOIh  
are small Portuguese- speaking island- states whose infiu-  
ence is limited.

According to our calculations, the key countries, other  
than South Africa, are as follows:

0 Mali: President Moussa Traore had distinguished himself as one  
of the mosttobdurate ofAfrica's opponents of pOIitical refoi-m. For  
months his calculation appeared to be paying off, as it seemed that  
a countryas rural and poor as Mali could resist change more easily  
than a' more urbanised'Country With a largermiddle Elass. Tlaol'els  
overthrow has demonstrated that this is not'so and has illustrated the  
danger of resisting'change. It may now have a'knock4on effect in  
other Ftench-speaking countries which have been unenthusiastiain  
the implementation of reform, especially Niger and Guinea. '1 '

0 Zambia: important because it hosts arguably .sub-Saharan  
Africa's most pEpular anfiIrobust oppositiontin one of the most  
highly urbanised countries. The Movement for Multi- party De-  
mocracy (MMD) has secured the passage to a mtilti-party consti-  
tution while staying intact. There has been a relative absence of  
political violence, to the credit of all concerned. The MMD how  
has a good chance of ousting President Kenneth Kaunda s United  
National Independence Party, m power since independence. But

the MMD could itself be weakened by in-tighting between rival barons (AC Vol 32 No 5). Some observers consider that MMD leader Frederick Chiluba may not be immune from the type of presidentialism which many Zambians condemn in Kaunda; The next few months will test the true quality of the MMD. , 111111

0 ZaireN-grfsident Mobutu Sese Seko, famous as an apostle of the one-party state, last year set a new prec'edent by agreeing to a multi-party constitution His aim was to create a system of three tame parties, which he would dominate in the role of a head of state who was above party politics. When this strategy failed, he went to the other extreme, creating as many political parties as possible in an effort to divide and rule. The result is that Mobutu, a tactician of genius, still dominates Zairean politics. But the country is further than ever from political or economic regeneration.,

0 Benin: it has succeeded better than any other mainland state in transforming a politically and financially bankrupt dictatorship into a model of multi-party democracy. President Soglo received 80% of the votes in the south of the country, but a mere 10% percent in the north, where people voted for the outgoing Mathieu Kerekou indicating the continuing importance of ethnic factors

0 Cote d'Ivoire: the former showpiece of French-speaking Africa has succeeded in transforming itself into a multi-party system in which President Felix Houphouet-Boigny still runs the show, and his party still runs the elections with a tame opposition. iGOne is the threat of massive street-protests which hovered early last year.. The scene is now set -'for Houphouet-Boigny to quit power. With his head held high, like his hero, General Charles de Gaulle

0 Kenya: at the same time one of the most successful countries in Africa, and also one, whose government has set itself resolutely

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against fundamental reform. Last July, many observers, including ourselves (AC Vol 31- No 1,4) thought that President Daniel arap Moi might have difficulty surviving 1990. He has come through intact, thanks to the Gulf War, his control of the army, the indulgence of the British government, and the existence of a large middle class; with a 'vested interest in stability which surpasses even its dislike for its government. V

The above six cases are notable only in that they illustrate certain tendencies. Almost every other country is undergoing some similar experience. In southern Africa, Angola

3. now has every prospect of a multi-party constitution, although peace could still be many months away. In Mozambique, there is no end in sight to the rural rebellion inspired by the Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo) in spite of a new, multi-party constitution. Zimbabwe is embarking on economic (but not political) restructuring.

Virtually all of the French-speaking countries south of the Sahara have now settled for the formula of managed political reform recommended by France, which has been conspicuous by its disinclination to help diehard opponents of reform such as Mali's Moussa Traore and Chad's Hisssein Habre, who have paid the price. Togo's President Gnassingbe Eyadéma saw the light and conceded serious reforms in the nick of time? Elsewhere in the French-speaking world, serving heads of state have remained in power while opening up the constitution to national debate and have successfully established multi-party systems which do not seriously threaten their grip on power. This has been the case not only in Côte d'Ivoire but also in Gabon, with reform trailing behind in Cameroon, Madagascar, Congo, and others.

Rwanda, Djibouti, Guinea, the Seychelles (a special case) and the Central African Republic drag their feet.

Other countries taking faltering steps towards political reform include Tanzania and Ghana. Nigeria is in a category of its own as it grapples with a programme of transition to civilian rule.

The most tragic category is that of states which appear to have fallen apart for the indefinite future. These include Liberia, Somalia and Sudan, the latter having incurred the wrath of powerful enemies by supporting the wrong side in the Gulf war. Mozambique, in spite of its government's flexibility, may also be placed in this category.

Mauritius is arguably Africa's only real, functioning multi-party democracy. In the case of Namibia, more time is needed for a definitive judgement. Gambia, Botswana and Senegal have all had multi-party systems for some years, but close examination of each reveals a system of de facto single-party control in which the opposition appears doomed to permanent electoral defeat.

The political reforms undertaken so far, while they may warm the hearts of democrats and liberals world-wide, have underlined the importance of the reservations expressed by Africa Confidential

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Africa Confidential last year (AC Vol 31 No 5). Ethnic politics are alive and well, as the case of Benin demonstrates with particular clarity. Opponents of multi-party systems claim, making a serious point when they argue that this system 'carries a risk of an aggravated form of ethnic voting. But the solution is surely not to preserve rigid and tyrannical one-party states in which the winner takes all. The days are gone when organised expressions of ethnic solidarity could be mistaken for a threat to national sovereignty in Africa. The task facing African governments is not to stifle such expression by banning ethnic parties, but to find constitutional systems which take full account of the multiplicity of ethnic and factional interests. 'So far' only South Africa has begun seriously exploring this avenue. Others will have to follow, starting, perhaps, with Ethiopia.

A second relevant observation concerns the inadequacy of international response. Sao Tome, Cape Verde and Benin have all taken remarkable strides to transform their constitutions. Many other governments have taken brave steps in the direction urged upon them by the World Bank and leading Western donors but are not being rewarded by any loosening of purse-strings. Cote d'Ivoire, for example continues to groan under the weight of its debt. Democracy in itself will not produce prosperity. And democracy is unlikely to flourish in impoverished circumstances. The World Bank has so far failed to answer the question of whether structural adjustment of African economies "can take place under elected governments. The experiences of Ghana and Nigeria suggest not. In these circumstances, to call for democracy and then hope for the best verges on the irresponsible. There is even a question-mark over the commitment of France, the most entrenched of external powers to continuing large-scale aid. France is, after all, no more than a medium power, and must consider its European future. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States appears to be losing even the little interest it had in Africa (AC Vol 32 No 1). . 1

In the absence of either real political legitimacy or overwhelming power, more and more governments- and even states- are now coming under threat from ambitious young men who see their way to power through violence. . . . Chad, Liberia and Somalia, to name but three, all appear to have established a pattern of unending struggle for power by armed factions. Even after the end of the Cold war, aspiring warlords like Charles Taylor do not find it hard to find external backers. Mozambique appears to be in the same situation - and Renamo's refusal to honour a ceasefire indicates that the real motive of its leaders is not to establish the possibility to fight for power through political means, but to seize power by force. The same could become true of South Africa's townships, where unending violent struggle risks becoming a normal form of political expression. 0

Morocco:

Hassan's minor troubles

There is a growing view abroad that Morocco is North Africa's next crisis country.

The opposition has been strengthened by its challenge to King Hassan II's policy over the Gulf war. The government's weaknesses were demonstrated by riots which shook Fez and other cities last December. Islamist opponents have

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at last shown themselves in public, alongside the traditional leftist/Arab nationalist opposition. With the economy under pressure from debt, and fluctuating world prices for oil and minerals, it will not be easy to meet demands for jobs higher wages and a better quality of life for the huge majority that is excluded from the wealth of an elite gathered round the Palace. ' y. z 1

The view from inside the kingdom is rather different. In recent months, a united opposition front has developed which will push for greater democracy. It expressed itself in a 3 February demonstration in Rabat, held to release tensions deriving from popular anti-war sentiment. At the tail of the huge crowd were up to 30,000 Islamists - whose largest movement, AlAdl wallhsan (Justice and Charity), has been heavily repressed. Some 250,000-300,000 others took part in what became the largest demonstrations since independence in 1956. ,

Not for a decade have opposition parties manoeuvred so assenively, They will press for a fair chance of representation in a more powerful parliament when elections are eventually held. Yet few Moroccans doubt that the Palace will continue to dominate politics, with Hassan perched atop a complex pyramid of local patronage networks. Reforms there may be, but more sweeping change is unlikely without the sort of popular explosion or military coup that would seriously undermine Hassan, 60 this year. The Rabat demonstration, significantly, was peaceful. When the King banned all subsequent marches, the order was obeyed. It is an illustration of the King's continuing authority.

In fact the collapse of Iraq's army showed that, once again, Hassan had proved himself a master tactician. This was an essential quality for handling the Gulf crisis, whose consequences were potentially explosive, even for the extreme west of the Arab world.

: There was no question who was running things during the War. Hassan is understood to have told his ministers at least twice not to speak out on Gulf issues. He ended in the winning team, having sent some 1,300 troops to Saudi Arabia and maintaining a contingent of about 5,000 Special Forces in the United Arab Emirates, there to 'protect Abu Dhabi's ruler Sheikh. Zayed bin Sultan al Nahayan, a regular visitor to Morocco, along with many of his wealthiest countrymen. :-' v .

The opposition had wanted Hassan to change sides. But the Palace had few doubts who would win the War. Unlike most Maghrebis, Hassan and his closest advisors did not believe the often undigested Iraqi communiques that littered the North African press. , . - ,

Skilful manoeuvring has consolidated Morocco's ties with the United States. Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger paid an unannounced visit in mid-February to tell Hassan that President George Bush understood his position: Rabat could count on Washington's full support - unlike its Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) neighbours, including Tunisia (AC Vol 32 No 4), whose US aid has been slashed. Washington can be expected to lobby for Moroccan interests in critical international forums, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Paris Club and the United Nations Security Council, which is now working on the future of the Western Sahara (AC Vol 32 No 6).

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RUMOURS OF RIOTS

The worst rioting since 1984 was focussed on Fez and , several towns in the traditionally rebellious north on 14-15 p December 1990. Initial reports of the violence in Fez were " deeply shocking to most Moroccans since the city is they ' 5 government's heartland. Fassis predominate in government, business and influence - broking. i i i i' -'

The 17 December events in Casablanca were thus largely overlooked outside the kingdom; Casablanca was swept by a strange wave of panic. Thousands of people and cars 'took' to the streets. According to some sources, groups of youths went through the town announcing that trouble was starting. Others say it could merely have been a car crash - a very irregular event - or even the noise made by youths leaving a King Fu movie that caused a nervous city to panic. Fear was the worst, thousands of students and workers started leaving the city, causing immense traffic jams. The security forces were overstretched, with police academy cadets being mobilised to control the crowds.

In the event, nothing happened, The panic subsided as quickly as it had risen. When the Gulf war broke out, Hassan made it clear that no demonstrations would be allowed in Casablanca. The city's battle-hardened security chiefs and the provincial governor Ahmed Motei spread the word that 'unlike in Fez in December, live ammunition would be used immediately if things got out of hand. Even small groups of youths were dispersed. Troops were moved up from the Western Sahara. Casablanca remains a quiet, though sullen city. Security forces went off red alert only in March.

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fdwelled on the subject of 1111111311 rights The Outkir family has now been released, albeit into another form of house arrest in a Rabat villa. (Their Original hollle was razed to the greleases would follow,including prisoners from the horrific Tazmamamen dangeon and leftist leader Abraham Serfaty, have not been confinne(L This indicates that Hassan does not feel under great pressure to give more ground.-

' Rabat had never admitted the Oufkirs were held, and people defending them facedtharsh criticism and even law Zsuits. Pressure not to criticise the king- a Crime in Morocco ;- continues to be excited abrbad. This can make reporting difficult as the monarchy remains at the very centre of politics. And yet with the exdeption of the King himself; men: is scope for Open dlscusslon at times. Thus, the government of Prime Milllster Azzedine Lai'aki last year faced independent Morocco 5 first parliamentary censure motion. This attacked illls that included .the gangrene of corruption, not usually a subject for public discussion. But criticism has to stop at the Prime Minister. .

' Campaigns against French authorGilles Perrault(whose 'book tNotre ami le roi ' - iO'ur friend the king- -has been 25 weeks in the: French best-seller'-"-listsil)'t-(and others 'whose reports are deemed to insult themor'rarchisho'w the Palace has little to leam about news management when lts vital interests fseemthreatened (AC V0132 No 6). The local press can be liver'\_ on some issues, such as labour disputes, but sOme fleading journalists have intimate ties with the Palace sera-glio 01 the powerful Intedorand Information Minister Driss Basri. Getting out of line on political stories can mean journalists families come under pressure flom the security services- ' t i ' Wynn ' - ' . . - ' . .

i Rabat is relatively underpopulated with foreign corre-'spondents.Reutel s and Agence F rance Pr'esse (AFP) maintain offices, while the USA-based Associated Press boasts the well- connected Abdel Jalil Fenjiro as local stringer; He is also the long-standin g director-general of the official news agency, Maghreb'Arabe ?Presse (MAP).

Neither AFP nor AP were quick to reportthe December riots. Another force Hassan has controlled successfully for two decades is the army. There have recently been unconfirmed tales of small-scale mutinies 2. at Azrew military academy for example - and a widely denied but not necessarily untrue report that 2,000 soldierstried toleave the Sahara to join Iraqi ranks via Algeria: Allthese are unconfirmed but it is known many military men had gen'uinepro-Baghdad sym-pathies. The prospect of an end to the Saharan conflict will put new emphasis on the militaryis role; This could explain an upturn in interest in military matters, with repons of unScheduled cabinet meetings to discuss military issues.

2: . 2. The opposition has not emerged from the war as strong as it might have if Saddam had won. Bu't there'haVe been real advances, putting human rights, social andkeven political reform on the agenda. The re-emergence of trades unions as a focus of opposition confirms the view that the tSaharan consensusi which held Morocco together in the 1980s, when the population tacitly conceded they must make sacrifices to secure Western Sahara for Morocco, is now ending.- One symptom is guarded public criticism of corruption and even high spending by the Palace, most visible in the massive and opulent Hassan II mosque' in' Casablanca and an ever-

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increasingnhmberof luxurious palaces across the kinngm.

1 Making the running have been the Confederation democra-itique'du travail i(CDT),-twhich is affiliated to the Union socialiste des forces 'populaires 1 (USFP) and led by a pugnacious long-time leftist, Mohamed Noubir Amaoui; the Union ge'nefrale des travailleurs maro'cains (UGTM), led by Abder Razak Afilal and aligned to the traditional



nationalist party, Istiqlal (Independence); plus the teachers, 2. union and other professional groups. Even the more loyalist Union marocaine du travail (UMT) is calling for radically (improved living conditions for its members who, as in 1981, did not take part in the December general strike. 1. 1. Students are potentially a powerful force. The Fez rioters included students from the Kairouine and Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdullah universities, where Islamist and leftists groups are increasingly vocal, as well as unemployed youths who prey on tourists in the historic medina. As in Algeria in October 1988, young rioters compared themselves to the fighters of the Palestinian Intifada. 3. Much of their rage focussed on the security services, Basll being a hate figure for many. - ' ' 1.

The ageing party leadership is being replaced, too; The oldest party, of course Istiqlal, is borrowing new clothes this time from the Islamist movement. 2. Istiqlal's influential number two Mohamed Douiri, is increasingly vocal in calling for a ban on alcohol, Friday as a day of rest and other Islamic demands. He has described the party as that of the Sharia. A recent communique that maintained the party is ultra-Arab nationalist line on Iraq also criticised a clampdown on mosque preachers who strayed beyond government-prescribed limits. ' ' - - -

Istiqlal is trying to win potential Islamist voters who, despite the Rabat march, have yet to show themselves to be a real force and cannot participate in elections; Al Adl wal Ihsan has not been given the opportunity to become a local equivalent of Algeria's Frontlisl'amique 'du salut (FIS). Radical mosques and imams are closely watched by police. Leaders expect to suffer the consequences of their implied opposition to Hassan who, as Amir al Mumihin (Commander of the Faithful) is Morocco's spiritual leader. The latest Amnesty report lists several Al Adl wal Ihsan members as prisoners of conscience, including the twice-imprisoned Mohamed Bechiri. He is one of six Politburo members gaoled last May for belonging to an illegal organisation. Many charges stem from the fact that the group is still illegal. It first applied for legal recognition as a political party in 1981. 1

Among legalised parties, the left will try to make the running, if necessary with very different policies from the past: The largest socialist party, the USFP, is going through one of its populist phases. (Its paper, Al Ittihad al Ishtiraki (Socialist Union), enjoyed hugely increased sales during the Gulf war. Militants are now trying to exploit that interest for electoral gain. 2 2

3. The most remarkable change has overtaken the small but influential Parti du progres et du socialisme (PPS), the former Communist Party, led by Ali Yata. PPS perestroika has made it an ultra-liberal party, giving a whole new vision to the internationalism espoused by members in pro-Moscow days. This move, which is opposed by the old-guard proletarians who traditionally vie in the party's leadership

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with mavericks drawn :from the professions, has been engineered by the talented Nadir Yatai son of Ali. So impressive has Yatajunior been in mobilising middle-class support with a 19903-style message,:that he is eventalked of as a future premier, should the Palace decide real change is needed, or in the event that the opposition forms a broad front. . The Istiqlal, USFP, PPS ,and other groups .may take comfort from the fact that there is an increasing electorate for opposition politicsas the numbers of the urbanised and the literate grow. Loyalist parties such as the Union constitutionnelle (UC), Rasse'mblement. national des independents (RNI) and the divided Berber-based Mouvementpopulaire, which make up the parliamentary majority, depend on rural votes. ' ' 1.1 .. 1 m.-- 11-99

'We could well see some startling changes of direction in the near future Economic liberalism remains in vogue but "social adjustment"-is under discussion as well, aimed at providing more opportunities for the unemployed, underemployed and underpaid. . This could require a government reshuffle. Hassan traditionally takes his time over these but new faces may be required as the government confronts intense opposition and a lack of public confidence while it implements the new, social agenda. Many ministers would not be missed, including the lacklustre Laraki- who left Istiqlal in 1984 to keep his government seat and was appointed Premier in 1985.1 . "

More significant would be a shuffle involving Basri,  
Foreign Affairs Minister Abdel Latif Filali - whose son  
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Fouadjs married to Hassan's daug-hterIL'alla Meriem and runs Omnium Nord Africain (ONA), the giant holding company whose main shareholders are close to the Palace - and-possibly Finance MinisterMohamed Berrada. Ob-serversiare also watchingito see if more senior military men enter the cabinet, to join Tourism Minister Abdellah Kadiri; a colonel appointed in last years limited reshuffle. Critical questiOns includehow to end the Western Sahara coititlict once and'for all. A solution is still in the balance and could prove highly-traumatic. Also toicome are elections, with the opposition looking for aige'nuine dem0cratic ad-vance. -..There must be a new :parliament by October 1992, which puts the most probable p011 dateat aroun'd J une next year Local elections, important since they also help choose indirectly elected members of parliament will probably take place shortly before. . .

Reforms are unlikely to concede such major opposition demands as de-linking the government from royal control (and giving more power to "parliament, or even ending the (indirect election of one'-third of deputies, nwhich.favours the loyalist (ruling'majorit'yi; Yet Slich questions are on the 'agenda of an increasingly'as'sertive opposition and will give the Palace plenty to cope with, even if Moroccans do nOt take to the streets againttovhighlightithealimits:to lHassanian democracy'. A And if the Iage which in December surged through the governmentis 'heanla'nd'of Fez should flare again on a larger scale, then even Hassanis skills as 'a ruthless master-tactician will be sorely tested 0 ' '

Zaire:

A government Without a constitution  
Zaire has a new government and a new prime minister who  
is pushing ahead with a programme of privatisation, includ-  
ing of a minority share in the mineral giant Gecarnines and  
of all or part of the national postoffice. But the country still  
has no constitution, although it is now a year since President  
Mobutu Sese Seko announced the inauguration of Zaire's  
Third Republic, on 24 April 1990 .(AC/Vol 31 No 10). 1  
V , Fifty-eight of the 66 political parties now in legal exis-  
tence have accepted Mobutu's 1 invitation to , attend a

constitutional conference at a date yet to be decided. There is precious little time to unblock the constitutional log-jam since Mobutu's seven-year presidential mandate expires on 4. December 1991, and before that date there must be legislative elections and a referendum on the new constitution.

The problem is that among the eight parties which have refused to cooperate with Mobutu's proposal for a conference are the three most important: the Union des forces démocratiques et des républicains indépendants (UDFRI) of Nguzi Karimbonzi, the Parti démocratique et social chrétien (PDSC) of Joseph Ilunga, and the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social (UDPS) of Etienne Tshisekedi. These three have refused to participate in a transitional government, with the UDPS, probably the strongest of the three, demanding Mobutu's resignation. 1

On 14 March, Lunda Bululu, prime minister of the first transitional government, resigned at the President's request, apologising for failing to fulfil his mandate to restore the economy and promulgate a new constitution. , Mobutu's twists and turns have now sown utter confusion, but leave him as the undisputed master of the political scene. On 15 March he appointed a new Prime Minister, Professor Mulumba Lukoji, whose job is to construct a Mark II transitional government. Lukoji learned of his promotion while he was on a private visit to the United States. Forty-eight years old, a seminary student before becoming a professor of public finances after receiving a doctorate in the USA, he was a minister before leaving the government in 1989 after a difference with the then Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo.. He is well-known in international financial circles, but there is no reason to believe he will be any more successful than his predecessor in persuading the major opposition parties to join in a new constitution.

. Mulumba Lukoji put together his new government on the night of 30-31 March, and its 51 members swore their oath of loyalty to the head of state on 1 April. Two ministers, however, refused to take part in the government, the first such case in Zaire's history. Most members of the new government are from East and West Kasai and Shaba. This indicates an obvious attempt to weaken the UDPS, strong in Kasai, and the UDFRI, whose base is Shaba province. After the announcement of the new government, students in Kinshasa went on the rampage and attacked the houses of some government members. V,

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. Mobutu has also announced a change at the top of the major public companies; Thus Umba Kyamitala becomes director general of Gecamines for the second time. He successfully asked as a condition for his nomination the privatisation of 48% of the company and the sacking of 6,000 out of 28,000 employees. Both the new prime minister and the new governor of the central bank, Nyembo Shabani, are in favour of privatisation as a way of filling state coffers. They aim to privatise. first Gecamines and the post office. Negotiations are said to be at an advanced stage, involving notably US and South African businessmen. -

. Meanwhile the economy is being strangled.- The state is bankrupt The currency, the Zaire, continues to fall in value. It was worth two US dollars when it was launched in 1968 but has now fallen to 3,000 to the dollar, compared to 1,500 only three months ago. Hyper-inflation has hit trade. - Every family in Kinshasa now has a relative or a child on the streets selling small items of food, such as peanuts, bread or manioc, to the extent that the informal sector now utterly dwarfs official employment. For the first time senior officials are now complaining about the cost of living. Ministerial salaries have passed from 1,500,000 to 5,000,000 zaires a month (\$ 1,600), but that is not enough to support a top life-style. In addition to their pay, senior officials benefit from free housing or a housing allowance, expenses for televisions, videos, cars and furniture and school fees for their children's private education. .

The latter is now a major benefit. Even parents who send their children to stateschools are finding it too expensive, as underpaid teachers are demanding money from each child before allowing them to enter class. Pupils without money are able to pay in kind with empty bottles, preferably Prirrus or Skol beer bottles, which have a monetary value v A For the first time soldiers of the elite Division spéciale présidentielle (DSP), the presidential guard, are joining in the rackets which have long been practised by other military and security forces. Previously, DSP soldiers had been sufficiently well-paid as to be able to abstain from such racketeering. It is a sign of desperation.

Banks are short of cash and will only allow withdrawals of 300,000 zaires (\$100) per week, and that only at a day's notice. The shortage is attributed to the drain of zaire notes to neighbouring countries and the withdrawal of notes which, inexplicably, had entered circulation without serial numbers. People are made nervous by widespread rumours of a forthcoming change of bank-notes. Many people would like to see a return to a currency pegged to the Belgian franc, and the official national trade union has even asked that Zaire enter the CFA zone. Much of Kinshasa's external trade is already conducted in CFA brought in from Brazzaville. -The Organ company, belonging to the Belgian Damseaux group, the main importer of fresh food, recently bought a Congolese company solely to gain better access to CFA francs.

The price of urban transport has risen so alarmingly that would-be passengers are resorting to hijacking buses, forcing drivers to take them on board on pain of being beaten and seeing the bus burned. Pedestrians force them to stop with barricades. If they fail to stop, a hail of stones smashes their windows. Taxis are simply out of the normal price-range, and the streets of Kinshasa are full of people walking. It is now commonplace to hear public criticism of Mobutu.

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The UDPS and the PDSC hold regular public meetings at which crowds are encouraged to shout anti-Mobutu slogans. On 24 February, more than 30,000 UDPS supporters came to meet Tshisekedi on his return to the airport from a trip abroad, and escorted him to UDPS headquarters. On 23 March, some opposition parties called for a mass meeting at

Tshela, in Bas- Zai're province, to honour the tomb of Zai're's first president Joseph Kasavubu, on the 22nd anniversary of his death.- Kasavubu has been written out of the official Mobutiste history of the country.

Kasavubu's old party, the Abako, has not been registered by the interior ministry on the grounds that it is a Bakongo tribalist association. This has opened up a political opportunity which has been adroitly seized by the UDPS, which was the first party to propose a pilgrimage to Kasavubu's tomb. The former President's daughter, Justine Kasavubu, is a member of the UDPS national committee, despite the fact that the UDPS has always been a mostly Baluba party. Her presence in the UDPS leadership may attract many other Bakongo and help to diminish the reputation of the UDPS as a single-tribe party. Hence the UDPS is demanding the formation of a transitional government under Tshisekedi, whose task would be to promulgate a new constitution. Tshisekedi is believed to see this as a stepping-stone to the presidency. Tshisekedi is himself related to Mobutu through his elder brother Bonaventure Kalonga, who is married to the cousin of Marie-Antoinette Mobutu, the President's late wife.. Tshisekedi was once a close aide to Mobutu, the drafter of the constitution of the Second Republic and of the charter of the ruling party, and is a former interior minister. However, the UDPS has the distinction of being considered the party which has opposed Mobutu most consistently. The new 'prime minister, Mulumba Lukoji is a former member of the UDPS.

Lukoji seems doomed to failure on both the political and economic fronts. An economic revival is impossible without an injection of new money. The European Community, the USA and Canada all cut off aid after Mobutu's refusal to allow an international inquiry into the Lubumbashi massacre of May 1990. The EC governments are said to be in possession of a confidential report affirming that at least 12 students were killed on the Lubumbashi campus. Brussels in particular continues to insist on the appointment of an international commission of inquiry into the incident before it will re-establish cooperation agreements. Belgian non-governmental organisations are bringing increasing pressure to bear on their government to re-open cooperation so as to alleviate growing hunger and shortages of medicine. Mobutu has been negotiating with opposition parties at his residence of N7sele, outside Kinshasa. His palace there is connected by an enclosed passage to the jetty where his yacht, the Kamanyola, is moored. Nobody knows in which of the two locations he sleeps. The area is guarded by elements of both the DSP and the Garde civile. The first lady, Bobi Ladawa, has also been receiving delegations, a sign of early campaigning for presidential elections.'

To be re-elected Mobutu may now have to resume the presidency of the former single party, the Mouvement populaire de la révolution, from which he resigned last year when he hoped to impose a new three-party constitution of his own design 0

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The seventh Congress of the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), held at the Kwame Nkrumah military base in southern Angola last month, caused no surprise when delegates decided that Jonas Savimbi should be the organisation's candidate for the presidency of Angola as soon as peace had been established. Other aspects of the Congress were of rather more interest, such as the commitment to sign a ceasefire with the ruling Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (MPLA) this month, on condition that national elections are held by the end of May 1992. Even if a ceasefire is not forthcoming; UNITA has resolved to suspend its attacks in Huambo province and in Luanda.

The Congress also approved in principle the creation of a single national army. UNITA soldiers who failed to find employment and were demobilised would be assured of professional retraining before their return to civilian life. Even if the MPLA and UNITA are able to agree a ceasefire, numerous problems remain. Not least is the question of the number of men UNITA has under arms. A year ago, UNITA's staff was claiming that it had about 75,000 men, a figure broadly in line with estimates in Luanda. Now, spokesmen claim to control only some 10,000 regular soldiers and 40,000 guerrillas. Some observers wonder whether UNITA is not trying to hide soldiers, whom it can exclude from the negotiating process. Moreover, Savimbi's present position includes the condition that the future national armed forces of Angola include the MPLA's current airforce and navy but that the guerrillas will be composed largely of UNITA combatants. Savimbi is also proposing that a future national army should receive training from Morocco, Britain or Portugal, his preference being for the first two.

The general thrust of the Seventh Congress, advertised as the last to be held in the bush, is the transformation of UNITA from a military organisation into a political party. To this end, eleven of its 110 staff have been transferred from the Political Bureau and the Central Committee to the Congress itself, while a commission has been established to draw up a new election manifesto before May 1992.

UNITA has declared its willingness to recognise President José Eduardo dos Santos as head of state until free elections can be held. There is little doubt that pressure from South Africa and the United States has played a part in ensuring this new flexibility, although Savimbi denies it. During the Congress, Walter Kansteiner, the American envoy, read to assembled delegates a message of support from President George Bush, expressing his support for UNITA during the transition to multi-party democracy. Savimbi is making every effort to represent the US position of general support as a more precise backing for Savimbi himself as a future president of Angola. Thus, no sooner was President Bush's message read out to the Congress than the UNITA number two, Jeremias Chitunda, announced that the Seventh Congress would propose Savimbi as its sole candidate for the presidency. To his audience in UNITA-land, it must appear not that the USA is supporting the principle of democracy in Angola, but that it is backing a single man and a single political party.

The South African delegation observing the UNITA Congress avoided falling into the same trap. Rusty Evans, the deputy director of the Department of Foreign Affairs, clearly stated his government's intention of developing a realpolitik extending to every Angolan party.

Pretoria's prudence may be explained partly by its rap-  
 id rapprochement with Luanda, and partly by the South African  
 . . . delegation's sharp reaction to a suggestion by Savimbi that  
 a future Angola could form the CFA franc zone rather than the  
 ' Rand zone. Evans countered this with the suggestion that  
 " Europeans have lost interest in Africa and that it would be  
 foolish to rely on them ' '

The South Africans present at the Seventh congress, like  
 many other observers, seem to believe it is very likely that  
 Savimbi would win future free national elections in Angola.  
 , Emerging new forces like the Associagao Civil da Angola  
 of Joaquim Pinto de Andrade or the Frente para a De-  
 moeracia of Nelson Pestana are unlikely to make any  
 headway outside the urban areas. Savimbi has no intention  
 . of giving up his radio station, the Voice of the Black  
 Cockerel, and has announced that UNITA will establish its  
 own television station in due course.

Curiously, there is far more freedom of expression in  
 ' areas controlled by the MPLA, where opponents and critics  
 have occasional access to the public airwaves, than in  
 UNITA-land, where there is no place for opposition to .  
 Savimbi. He was re-elected to the presidency of UNITA by ;  
 3,069 votes out of 3080 during a Congress which from start .  
 . to finish, was a paean of praise to the Savimbi personality '

cult. The "opening of the Congress was marked by priests and '  
 preachers paying homage to Savimbi, the saviour, the good  
 shepherd who would lead his flock to safety.

Savimbi's personality cult must now be ranked among  
 the most grotesque in the entire African continent. It extends  
 to Savimbi's own parents, his father Lutho and his mother :  
 Mbundi, lauded by huge banners at the entrance to, the  
 stadium housing the Congress as the grandparents of the .  
 . entire nation. It is not only the cult of a political leader, but  
 also of his family and ancestors .

Guests at the Seventh Congress were mostly confined for  
 over a week in the Kwame Nkrumah base and were not  
 permitted to speak to civilians, while several journalists failed to  
 secure interviews with the former UNITA representative in  
 Washington, Tito Chingunji, who was recalled to Jamba in  
 late 1988 and who has not been seen outside Jamba since that  
 date. , In reply to questions about Jorge Sangumba, the  
 . former UNITA foreign affairs chief, whom two senior  
 UNITA officials affirmed to Africa Confidential to have  
 been beaten to death by UNITA security men, UNITA  
 claimed he was still alive. It is now highly pertinent to  
 wonder what might result from the eventual clash between  
 the totalitarian culture in UNITA-land and the pluralist so-  
 ciety evolving in the rest of Angola

q .

Pointers

#### UNITED NATIONS: AFRICAN NAMES

It is Africa's time to provide a United Nations General Secretary to replace Javier Perez de Cuellar at the end of his term of office. According to French diplomatic sources, the French, British and United States governments - all members of the Security Council - have a preference for Dr Boutros Boutros Ghali, the Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. One of the architects of the Camp David accords of 1978, he has a good knowledge of Africa, especially southern Africa, through his work with the Organisation of African Unity. He also has a command of issues in the Western and Arab worlds. He recently succeeded in having the headquarters of the Arab League returned to Egypt, to the chagrin of the Tunisian government. It is a measure of French appreciation of Ghali, which is important for mustering African votes, is that he has received a French award in recognition of his distinction in the French-speaking world. He is a friend of French Academics Alain Decaux and Leopold Sedar Senghor.

Boutros is reckoned to have two serious contenders since Senegalese President Abdou Diouf and Nelson Mandela have declined interest in the post. The two are the former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, president of the Forum of African leaders, who has launched a new magazine to help his cause. He is said to have the support of former World Bank President and US Defence Secretary Robert MacNamara. The other leading candidate is Julius Nyerere, President of the South-South Commission as well as former President of Tanzania. Among his backers are said to be the Socialist International and ex-President Jimmy Carter. Other candidates include a number of serving UN officials of African origin, plus Bernard Chidzero, Zimbabwe's highly-respected Minister of Finance. But Chidzero, although he may be interested in the job, is understood to have received no approaches as yet. Moreover, his chief, President Robert Mugabe, may well be unwilling to release him from his domestic responsibilities.

#### CAR: MOURNING FOR MOUSSA

President Andre Kolingba was so depressed by the overthrow of his fellow-head of state, Mali's Moussa Traore, that he spent two days cloistered in his country retreat at Kembe in the company of his Secretary of State for Defence Colonel Alphonse Rehote, and the chief of army staff Col. Aime Kassa, in opposition sources say.

The 26 March overthrow, of Traore came at a time when Kolingba thought he might have done enough to stave off pressure for fundamental change (AC Vol 32 No 3). Early

last month he appointed to the post of prime minister Edouard Frank, a former clerk. He is from the Banda tribe, the country's largest. A notable feature of the new government is the eclipse of the hawkish Christophe Grelombe, who previously handled both the justice and defence portfolios. Kolingba has



taken the defence portfolio himself and 'retained Greiombe as an adviser. The new justice minister is Jean Kpowka, one of Grelombe's aeolytes. from the President's own Yakoma tribe. Kpowka, formerly a member of various opposition patties before going over to the government in 1981, has the job of opening a dialogue with the opposition. But opposition groups show little enthusiasm.

#### LIBERIA: REFUGEES? HOSTAGES?

The International Committee of the Red Cros's (ICRC) has confirmed that it is providing food- and medicines to some 1,800 West African nationals living in Camps in areas controlled by the NationaliPatriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor.

The real total of displaced persons of non-Liberian origin in these areas is believed to be much higher. .

The refugees are mostly from countries which have provided military contingents to the Monitoring Group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG) Those registered by the ICRC include 995 Ghanaians as well as 781 Nigerians 28 Sierra Leoneans and others -1

. Humanitarian sources say that the NPFL has not explicitly used the refugees as hostages to obtain political leverage. but that, when ECOMOG began'to bombard NPFL camps " from the air. Taylor's men pointed out that these targets contained large numbers of nationals from ECOMOG countries. There is a suspicion that some in the Taylor camp at least might be trying to use these refugees as a human shield.

#### GHANA: IN THE COURTS

There is continuing interest in the case of the seizure by the authorities of International Tobacco Ghana (ITG) Ltd.. probably the largest locally-owned private company.

According to ITG. its problems began when the company's owner, B.A. Mensah, planned to sell some two-thirds of his 100% stake in the company. half to a local bank \_ called Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT), and half to Rothmans International. He did this to refinance his I companyfwhich had been hard-hit by the government's economic recovery programme.

On the day the newly-reconstructed \_ company was due to start trading the Customs and Excise Board seized the company and ' some related assets on the grounds that ITG ; owedtsome 900 million cedis in taxes. The governmentrenamed the company Meridian Tobacco, installed some of its own directors and handed it over to SSNIT and Rothmans.

In July 1990 Mensah sued SSNIT and i , Rothmans for a massive 32,100,000,000jcedis, about \$100 million,claiming that his company had been taken over illegally. The defendants did not contest the plaint, but the day before the judge was due to rule, Mensah was yyyyyy arrested and charged with economic sabotage. The hearing of this case by a public tribunal rather than a conventional court has been constantly adjourned.- The defendants, in the , 1 civil case launched by Mensah, meanwhile, have been granted an indemnity for taking 'posseSSion of ITG property, protecting them '-

against legal action by ITG.

Sources close to ITG claim that the case has damaged foreign business confidence and has also upset international institutions, notably the World Bank. There is also an interesting legal 'precedent, as Mensah is simultaneously a defendant before a public tribunal and a plaintiff in a case before one of the traditional courts. The next hearings in both cases are fixed for next month.

BRITAIN: HURRAH FOR KENYA!

During a public meeting of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Overseas Development on 26 March, addressed by Professor George Saitoti, the Vice-President of Kenya, Michael Colvin MP, a mainstay of the ; Bophuthatswana lobby in the House of Commons, explained that he had realised for the first time in his life, on visiting Kenya, that it was possible to have democracy in a one-party system. I ' 4

This insight was offered to the assembled committee after Professor Saitoti had explained that many of those pressing for a multi-party system in Kenya were communists or professional political agitators

EC/LIBYA: POOR RELATIONS

al.

Speculation that last month's Visit to Tripoli by a European Community (EC) troika of 1 foreign ministers might herald an improvement in troubled relations with Libya seems to have been ill-founded.

Current EC President Jacques Poos of Luxembourg, Gianni de Michelis of Italy (past president) and the Netherlands' Hans van den Broek (next president) were in Libya for the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) summit. The issue of Libya-EC relations was raised during a meeting with AMU foreign ministers and Moammar el Gadaifi's closest aide, Abdel Salam Jalloud.

The encounter did not go smoothly, ' participants say; Major Jalloud who' - unlike Colonel Gadaffi - is close to Iraqi President , Saddam Hussein, accused the Europeans of being lackeys of United States imperialism. The Dutch minister timely rebuffed Jalloud's accusations. - - ,

De Michelis was absent, perhaps in return for his treatment at Gadaffi's 5 September 1989 20th anniversary celebrations, when he was ignored by Libyan officials.

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