

NYM/009/001/27

SA Dialogue

Committed to a changing South Africa

◆ Volume 3 Number 1 JOHANNESBURG January 1991 ◆

De Klerk at the crossroads

On eve of crucial speech, FW warns: Solutions must be found soon

PRESIDENT FW de Klerk will move fast this year to bury apartheid to prove to those still refusing to join negotiations that the old order is no more. Literally, he will be burning his bridges behind him to emphasise the need for a new creative drive in the country.

"The government is totally committed to the removal of all discrimination. In the new South Africa there can be no place for racism - all citizens must enjoy the same rights," De Klerk said on the eve of the 1991 session of parliament.

National Party insiders say there will be no residential discrimination by July 1. The Group Areas Act will be scrapped, thus ending urban apartheid, and the Land Acts drastically amended to allow all South Africans to own or occupy rural land.

Also due for the scrap heap are the country's laws relating to separate local authorities based on ethnicity. A new system of non-racial urban councils is likely to be unveiled soon. This will establish the right of all to reside, to sell their labour and to own and occupy property wherever they wish.

Already published is a new Business Bill which will enable anyone to set up business anywhere. Licensing restrictions will only apply to activities where public health is at risk - catering, the sale of fresh produce, places of public entertainment or amusement, and such suspect ventures as escort services and massage parlours.

However, it is the overall political mood of the country which is causing most concern. As South Africans



CRUCIAL DECISIONS AHEAD: President FW de Klerk addresses an NP rally

wait for De Klerk's February 1 speech that will open the 1991 session of parliament, far more is expected of him than before his opening speech last year.

Then, the mere contemplation of an end to apartheid and the birth of a new democracy was a novelty. The lesson learned since then is that there is a thin line between social renewal and bloodshed and between negotiation and wrangling.

South Africans are well aware, too, of the consequences of perestroika in the erstwhile or surviving communist states. Movement towards democracy and free market economics is no assurance of stability, prosperity or even freedom.

The East European experience has been a warning to both the De Klerk government and to Nelson Mandela's ANC. For the government it showed that there are no instant solutions and for the ANC it proved there is no falling back on the help of

old allies. Both sides have had their successes and failures in the past 12 months. The immediate aspirations raised by the release of Mandela and others last February have been tempered by subsequent events.

At first the De Klerk vision of a negotiated future, in which all would share, faced two other conflicting claims - one aimed at a future one-party state and the other at simple black majority rule. For those who propounded a communist take-over aimed at creating a sort of nirvana of the proletariat, the East European experience has been daunting. Most of Africa has moved strongly away from one-party rule.

The South African Communist Party appears to have watered down much of its public rhetoric on nationalisation and now says it favours a multi-party state. If its ultimate aims are as yet unclear and its national influence minimal, it still exercises enormous influence within the

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IN THE COLD: Conservative Party supporters at a Pretoria rally

Why the reluctant fringe won't come to the party

EXTREMISTS on the Right are unlikely to become involved in this year's negotiations, which means that about one in four whites will have no say in the quest for a new constitution.

The percentage of blacks still outside the negotiating process is more difficult to ascertain. The PAC and Azapo, at their recent congresses, said they would boycott the forthcoming all-party talks.

The two organisations give differing reasons for their decision. The PAC appears to have shifted substantially from its old war cry of "one settler, one bullet", leaving the door open to possible participation. Its preconditions, however, are unlikely to be fulfilled: it is demanding a government commitment to PAC policies in advance. Azapo, in rejecting its invitation, said pre-negotiation talks between the government and the ANC were nothing but a "charade".

"The regime has done absolutely nothing. It has tried to reform itself to keep itself in power," said Azapo deputy president Nchaupe Mokoape. Azapo has demanded the total "dismantling" of South Africa's security forces. In the present climate of violence, this precondition is unlikely to be seriously considered. Government sources say Azapo's demand is "a recipe for disaster" and will result in chaos and a power struggle among blacks which could reach civil war proportions.

Nevertheless, it is significant that neither the PAC nor Azapo have closed the door to future participation, and both have committed themselves to get there peaceably. In common with the ANC, both these organisations want a

constituent assembly elected on a common franchise. None of the other would-be participants agree, saying the country is not yet ready for an all-out election.

In any case, argues Constitution Minister Gerrit Viljoen, this would result in a "majority-winner situation". South Africa did not want to see one sort of unacceptable domination exchanged for another, he said.

The Indian political parties, Solidarity and the National Peoples Party, and the coloured parties, Labour and the Democratic Freedom Party, are also opposed to a constituent assembly, instead favouring a negotiated constitution. Inkatha, the major Zulu party, is also vehemently opposed to "setting the cart before the horses" by holding such an election ahead of negotiations.

Outside the process is the white right-wing Conservative Party. Its stand is fully backed by more radical and militant bodies such as the Boerestaats Party and the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging. The Conservative Party, which has about 26 percent of white voter support, stands for Verwoerd-style separate states for different ethnic groups.

There is a common belief among both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary parties that few, if any, of them are likely to survive the process in their present forms. Alliances, mergers and a variety of deals are expected as each shuffles its options in the hope of achieving maximum voter support.

But tough work lies ahead. Says President FW De Klerk: "It is what the leadership achieves in the next year or two that will determine the future."

ANC. What also failed to materialise was the vision of grand unity among the former liberation groups. By year's end, the ANC was still no closer to an accord with Black Consciousness groups, headed by the PAC and Azapo. Both remain highly critical of the ANC.

While reiterating their refusal to join in negotiations with the government and again speaking in terms of a "take-over of power", they have apportioned to the ANC some blame for the country's unrest.

Clearly angered at being left out of the "liberation" fold is Mangosuthu Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party, which commands massive Zulu support. Amid accusations and counter-accusations over armed conflict between their supporters, Mandela and Buthelezi have yet to meet.

One common plea from the ANC, PAC and Azapo conferences was for intensified international sanctions. The opposite is in fact happening, and this has given the De Klerk government a new confidence about pressing forward with reform.

De Klerk emerged at the end of his first year with the visible rewards of a decision by the European Community to end an investment boycott - with the Bush administration giving its approval, if not tangible support. The ANC, on the other hand, still faces nagging internal problems.

Its huge membership drive, aimed at enrolling about a million members, fell far short of target, with only 200 000 recruited. And there have been rumblings within the second echelon that the ANC leadership has gone too far in striking accords with the government, including the Pretoria agreement to end its armed struggle.

Coloured and Indian leaders have warned that their followers are not willing to delay negotiations for a new constitution simply because black leaders will not, or cannot, settle their differences.

Said Labour Party leader Allan Hendrickse: "We can't wait until everyone is ready. If, after 40 years of apartheid, we, the oppressed people, still cannot find one another and still cannot take the hand offered by those who until now have enjoyed privilege, then we will never find one another."

Dr Buthelezi said the time for negotiation was ripe. "I believe whites are ready to bow to the dictates of history." De Klerk, too, emphasised the point: "We cannot delay, cannot leave the solutions to a future generation. We have come to the crossroads."

Clash between hardliners and pragmatists splits ANC

Decision to suspend armed struggle meets a barrage of criticism

THE African National Congress entered 1991, the year of real negotiations with the SA government, deeply divided on crucial aspects of its strategy and tactics.

Its historic December congress - the first legal one in 30 years inside South Africa - did little to forge the expected unity between various factions within the movement. Instead, it accentuated existing differences and opened up new divides that may seriously encumber the leadership at the negotiating table.

Another feature of the three-day congress was the strong leadership displayed by ANC deputy president Nelson Mandela - for the first time, some critics would say. He made it clear he would not be swayed from his decision to enter into a process of political deal-making with the government.

How these two elements - strong commitment to the negotiating process by the leadership and a growing disenchantment among rank-and-file supporters - will be met will determine the strength and unity of the ANC in 1991.

A decision on whether or not to support the comprehensive set of international sanctions imposed on South Africa proved to be the most hotly debated issue on the agenda. Giving rise to it was a draft policy document drawn up by senior members of the ANC's National Executive which pleaded for a more "nuanced" approach towards sanctions.

The document pointed out that key sanctions were crumbling anyway - especially in the field of trade with Europe and Africa - and this could leave the ANC with egg on its face if it continued with an inflexible approach.

This view was roundly rejected by the vast majority of delegates to the conference. Instead, delegates opted for a bland statement - that the existing package of sanctions measures should be maintained.

But, in an ironic twist, within minutes of the ANC's statement the European Community announced the lifting of its embargo on new in-

vestments in South Africa. The differences between hardliners and pragmatists were also evident in other decisions taken by the conference.

The leadership's decision to "suspend the armed struggle" during the pre-negotiations phase came under heavy fire from ordinary delegates, particularly former members of the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe.

They argued that the movement

tion process turned sour.

However, the conference endorsed the leadership's stance on talks - largely at the behest of two perceived hardliners in the ANC - SA Communist Party general secretary Joe Slovo and Umkhonto chief of staff Chris Hani. Closing the conference, Mandela gave glimpses of the fiery nature of the discussions that had taken place behind closed doors. Angrily spurning criticism of the negotiation process, he said negotiations had led to the unbanning of the ANC and its ability to organise and mobilise support in the open. And he chastised critics who had questioned his "secret discussions" with President FW de Klerk and his failure to "consult the masses" on important issues.

It can reasonably be expected that a large percentage of the present national executive will not be elected at the coming official congress in June. However, in spite of the criticism leveled against some of his actions, Mandela's position remains unchallenged. He is highly regarded both for his ability to draw popular internal support, and his continuing high international profile.

ANC president Oliver Tambo, on his first visit to his homeland in 30 years, was greeted with warmth and tremendous respect. However, it soon became clear that he might never fully recover from the debilitating stroke that has left him partly paralysed.

In spite of Mandela's quick moves to assert his authority, there can be little doubt he will in future have to take more cognisance of the grassroots sentiments expressed at the conference.

Until the December conference there were high hopes in government circles that some form of compromise between it and the ANC might be worked out. However, this grandstanding by the ANC leadership might delay the start of the real negotiations, originally expected to begin by March.



UNCHALLENGED: ANC leader Mandela

had unilaterally abandoned its strongest weapon without gaining comparable concessions from the government. The feeling that the ANC "gave up more than it gained" was a refrain often repeated at the conference.

Once again, to appease hardliners, the conference settled for a compromise in an ambiguous resolution. While it endorsed the leadership's action, it vowed not to budge on the sensitive issues of recruitment for Umkhonto and the strategy of mass mobilisation. And it threatened to resume the armed struggle if the negotia-

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After apartheid's dark ages, turbulence was inevitable

A MINOR miracle . . . that is how the first year of political normalisation in South Africa can best be described. A mere 12 months ago few people thought it possible. The government and the major liberation movements were still locked in an unedifying war of words which, more often than not, also deteriorated into actual violence and an ensuing loss of lives.


A number of bold moves from opposite sides of the political spectrum took the country out of the dangerous impasse. A new government leader, FW de Klerk, instinctively realised that pre-emptive action was the only possible way to break the deadlock.

And, in response, the leadership of the African National Congress took similar political risks by involving themselves in a negotiating process that was not greeted with universal applause by all factions inside the movement. Generations of lost time and squandered opportunities were made up in months. Given the years of mistrust and conflict, the first few months preceded relatively smoothly. Major strides were made in resolving difficult issues such as the armed struggle and the position of ANC exiles and detainees.

However, by year's end, the momentum seemed to have been lost and the process got bogged down in an insidious climate of continuing violence and a squabble over the varying interpretations of agreements reached. And, if the first 12 months indeed produced a minor miracle, it will need wonders of larger proportions to keep the process on track - and on time - in 1991.

One issue that can no longer be kept on the backburner is the ANC's commitment to what it calls "mass action". In pre-negotiation days, mass action or mass mobilisation formed part of the broad "armed propaganda" strategy.

The aim was to keep the regime under pressure on all fronts - international isolation, organised consumer or trade union actions, armed incursions, attacks on symbolic targets, acts of sabotage in the heart of the white redoubt. Behind this



lurked the often unspoken assumption that this strategy enjoyed broad support among the masses. In the changing political landscape, mass action has taken on a new dimension. Now, it is often little more than an attempt by the ANC to establish and expand its support base among the population at large.

I have a measure of sympathy for many of the arguments advanced by the ANC in support of mass action. The leadership is only too aware of the perception among a significant proportion of its supporters that the

'Can the liberation movements persuade the masses that freedom does not occur overnight?'

ANC has thus far "given up more than it received" during the negotiating process. To abandon mass action as well would run the risk of alienating a large slice of its support base. But there is also a second dimension. In a sense, mass action is the only avenue available to a popular movement seeking to increase its support in South Africa.

The ANC is at a major disadvantage to the government. It does not enjoy the financial backing of large companies. It does not have a state-run television service or powerful newspapers to carry its message.

It cannot fall back on sophisticated advisers or a well-paid civil service to develop an infrastructure or policy positions. All it has going for it is the support of large numbers of people and its ability to mobilise them.

With the principle of mass action there can be little quarrel. It is an accepted element of democracies throughout the world. However, South Africa is at present far from an ideal democratic state. It is a society in transition - a highly combustible society. This places a massive re-

sponsibility on the shoulders of the major political movements and their leaders and on those in power not to delay the process of change and thus frustrate the will of the majority.

A line of sorts is crossed when mass action - or any other political strategy - becomes an excuse for browbeating and bullying opponents, for intimidation and overt violence.

Sadly, South Africa has already experienced some elements of these undemocratic practices. Negotiation is not the route of instant political gratification. It is the path of long, drawn-out talks. Of countless hours of meetings. It does not always yield short-term results.

I have a lot of sympathy for people who have been denied basic human rights for so many decades and who now demand their freedom yesterday. But if they demonstrate their impatience over the slowness of the process, it should be done in a legitimate and peaceful manner. I have little doubt that, given time and opportunity, the leaders of diverse groupings will find solutions for South Africa's vexed problems around the negotiating table.

There still seems to be an immense reservoir of goodwill and persistence that has pulled the process through many a crisis in the past few weeks.

The acid test is whether the agreements reached can be adequately "sold" to the various political constituencies. For the government, the question is whether it can persuade the white electorate to relinquish its total domination of the levers of power for the uncertain future of power sharing.

And for the liberation movements: can they persuade their followers that political, social and economic liberation does not necessarily occur overnight?

How the masses - white and black - respond to these unpalatable messages will determine the stability of the new South Africa.

Mauritz le Roux

'People have become numbed - human life has become cheap'
- Commissioner Johan van der Merwe

PROBABLY the most intractable of South Africa's problems awaiting a solution in 1991 is that of urban violence, which is fuelled by a campaign aimed at the total destruction of the present system of black municipal councils.

The average of 10 people killed each day during 1990 in widening urban unrest was in stark contrast to the hopes raised by President FW de Klerk last February, when he lifted all restrictions on political activity in the country. There were high hopes after the Groote Schuur and Pretoria meetings between the ANC and the government, which led to a landmark agreement that the government would lift the state of emergency and the ANC would suspend its armed struggle.

There was talk of greater peace and more personal safety. In fact, public violence not only persisted, but increased as the ANC's campaign of "mass mobilisation" took effect. ANC deputy president Nelson Mandela told the media that it was the "democratic right" of people to dismiss black municipal councillors in whom they had no trust.

Other factors appear to have wrested any hope of control over this mobilisation from the ANC. Not least among these were ethnic differences - Mandela is a Xhosa and the ANC has huge support in the Xhosa "homeland" of Transkei. Where ANC interests clashed with those of the Zulus - mainly in Natal and the Witwatersrand - running gun-battles ensued.


The hostel system which provides housing for male mineworkers was another source of friction. This De Klerk recognised as a matter requiring urgent correction. There were also accusations by the ANC that the police and Inkatha, the Zulu political organisation, were acting in collusion against the ANC. These were hotly denied by the police and Inkatha, the latter of whom accused the ANC of fomenting violence, intimidation and threats against its political opponents.

The PAC and Azapo offered to mediate in peace talks to end the black-on-black violence and, while these succeeded in some areas, the plan got nowhere nationally. Pandelani Nefolovhodwe, a former Robben Island prisoner elected president

The ANC's mass mobilisation reaps a bitter harvest

of Azapo, commented: "Our attempts to involve other organisations in peace negotiations have not been successful. Unfortunately, there are some liberation movements whose concept of democracy means non-existence of others." His pointed reference to the ANC came in the wake of a series of clashes between the ANC and Azapo. As was

The institute concluded that "the violence stems not so much from community disenchantment with the manner in which councillors' duties have been performed, but is part of a broader campaign aimed at rendering the townships ungovernable and introducing new, alternative local structures". This campaign was blamed in the report for causing



SETTLING OLD SCORES: Remains of a car in which a black 'spy' was burnt

the case with the ANC-Inkatha clashes, these had nothing to do with the system of black local authorities.

There were also damning reports by the strongly anti-apartheid SA Institute of Race Relations. "Much of the violence that South Africa has experienced during the last six years has been sparked off by campaigns to achieve the dismantling of black local authorities, which were an important aspect of mass mobilisation," the institute said in December.

Its report directly implicated the ANC: "The mindless violence that people talk about is generally directed either at community councillors, black policemen, informers, the SA Defence Force or the like."

The report continued: "Campaigns against black local authorities have unleashed situations of individual and mob violence in which increasing numbers of councillors, policemen and their families have been attacked."

the deaths of six councillors and 22 off-duty policemen during the first seven months of 1990 alone. By year's end, the number of policemen killed in the line of duty had reached 91, of whom 65 had died during incidents of unrest.

This is an astonishingly high figure, particularly when compared with the 197 civilian deaths attributed to the police in combating political crime and unrest from January 1 to November 30.

One aspect of the violence on which there appears to be wide agreement is that it has provided an open field for criminal elements. Where ordinary law has been undermined, crime has assumed brutal proportions, with criminals using smuggled AK-47 rifles, for example, in robberies and burglaries.

"People have become numbed - life has become cheap," admitted police commissioner Johan van der Merwe. In his Christmas message,

Mandela also bewailed the continuing bloodshed: "As I look around, I have fears that the culture of violence is becoming endemic."

Attempts were made by the government to persuade the ANC in terms of the Pretoria Minute to give up any arms caches, but these were shipwrecked by mutual suspicion. In this situation, there has been much public debate on the merits of the ANC's "mass mobilisation" campaign at a time when ways of eliminating race from local government are already being considered. The government, black municipal councillors and almost all political parties concede that these councillors were elected with minimal support in municipal elections.

Mismanagement has admittedly been fairly widespread, but the councillors' task has been made almost impossible by the campaign of resistance, intimidation and

threats. In May, De Klerk told the Cape Municipal Association that local government had to move away from race. In June, the all-race Council for the Co-Ordination of Local Government received an interim report from its technical committee - the Thornhill committee - on proposed models for future local gov-

'As I look around me, I have fears that the culture of violence is becoming endemic' - Nelson Mandela

ernment. Of its four models, two seem to have little chance of acceptance. One envisages the retention of separate local authorities while the other involves a co-operative effort between local bodies.

The other models involve simple non-racial local government and "community government". In the latter, a metropolitan body would

have control at the macro level, but largely autonomous "neighbourhood management committees" would rule on local issues.

In the face of the campaign by the ANC and its political affiliates to destroy existing black local authorities, the Thornhill report has not been publicly debated. De Klerk said there was no need for violence to end a system that was being scrapped in any event. Local government in future would be based on the principle of "one city, one tax base".

"We cannot move forward by a process of destruction," he said. The question is whether a new system of local government can be negotiated and introduced ahead of national negotiations aimed at a new constitution. This will remain one of the toughest issues of 1991: it is at the local level that ordinary citizens sense either their safety or their insecurity.

Senseless brutalities that sparked a national outrage

AMID South Africa's appalling urban unrest, senseless crime has reached disturbing proportions - so much so that no political party or urban grouping has failed to comment on it. Highlighting its prevalence have been incidents of mindless brutality that have sparked a sense of national outrage.

In one episode, 12 khaki-clad white men attacked and whipped a group of black Sunday school children at a park in the Conservative Party-controlled Transvaal town of Louis Trichardt. The incident was unquestionably racially-motivated and the Venda people responded by imposing a crippling boycott of white businesses in the town.

In another incident, seven white youths aged between 17 and 24 were arrested after the discovery of the charred bodies of a coloured man and a woman at Germiston railway station near Johannesburg. Police said the young men apparently assaulted and killed the couple after an argument. They then went to the home of one of the youths to fetch petrol, which was poured on the bodies and set alight.

On Christmas Day, 22 black youths burst into the Bethany Salvation Army girls' home in Soweto, abducted nine of the girls and gang-raped six of them. Public outrage

was so great that Soweto residents took it upon themselves to track down members of the gang, who were then handed over to the police.

The use of weapons by criminals has also increased markedly. A man in the Natal resort town of Amanzimtoti was shot in cold blood when he tried to stop three men from stealing his car. And a white businessman was shot dead when he stopped at an intersection in Soweto.

President FW de Klerk responded by warning that the police and defence force would this year intensify measures to end the violence and restore peace. There are now 75 000

policemen in South Africa, but an additional 10 000 have been recruited and should add a more visible presence on the beat in the next few months.

Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok said the police were determined to end the disorder. But, he noted, the solution to underlying social, economic and political problems lay in the hands of the country's political leaders - not the police.

Said Vlok: "The rising crime rate is just a manifestation of a deeper ill in society. We cannot combat it effectively if we don't find solutions for the other problems."

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BLOODSHED?

THE Human Rights Commission claimed in December that at least 1 382 people had died and 3 945 were injured between July and November as a result of "police and vigilante" actions, but this has been disputed by the Institute of Race Relations.

Institute director John Kane-Berman noted that the commission had categorised "vigilantes" as groups protecting people such as councillors and homeland leaders. He said the commission had also "exaggerated" vigilante vio-

lence by including deaths where the attackers were unknown or where vigilantes were unlikely to have been involved - in cases such as necklacing.

Identifying the perpetrators of violence was often difficult because information was scanty.

"The police, vigilantes, right-wing and left-wing hit squads, comrades, rival political organisations, striking workers and non-strikers and ordinary criminals are all among the guilty parties," said Kane-Berman.

1990 in Retrospect

Supplement to SA Dialogue

Vol 3 no1

January 1991

JANUARY

- The African National Congress (ANC) stresses the importance of negotiation in its new year message.
- Leaders of African Front Line States urge President FW De Klerk to respond to the ANC's call for the "mutual suspension of hostilities".
- After a visit to South Africa, US Assistant Secretary of State, Mr Herman Cohen, describes developments in SA as "encouraging".
- Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) president Zeph Mothopeng visits Botswana.
- SA Communist Party (SACP) leader Joe Slovo states that the party has learnt from the Eastern European experience and rejects a one party state.
- ANC stalwart Walter Sisulu says in Oslo, Sweden, that he expects the ANC to be unbanned "as speedily as possible possibly even this year."

FEBRUARY

- De Klerk opens parliament with a historic speech unbanning the

ANC, SACP and PAC. He puts a moratorium on the execution of death row prisoners, relaxes emergency media regulations and vows to scrap the Separate Amenities Act.

- The United Democratic Front (UDF) reacts to the unbanning of the ANC, SACP and PAC by committing itself to "intensify the struggle".
- ANC Secretary-general Alfred Nzo says that "the nationalisation of key elements (in the economy) is necessary to get the resources for the democratic government to carry out its programmes".
- Nelson Mandela is released from prison.
- The Washington Post describes it as "uncomfortable" to hear Nelson Mandela salute the SACP in his first public speech after his release.
- Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda says that the time has come for the ANC to lay down arms.
- The ANC requests the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to block De Klerk's attendance of a meeting of African heads of state in Zaire.
- Nelson Mandela defends the ANC's ties with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO).

MARCH

- The ANC NEC elects Nelson Mandela as deputy president.
- Nelson Mandela meets Zeph Mothopeng in Harare.
- The Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo) calls for the intensification of the armed struggle at its 9th annual congress.
- The Pan Africanist Movement (PAM) is renamed PAC internal.
- The OAU agrees to begin direct contacts with the SA Government in an effort to find a peaceful end to apartheid.
- Jacob Zuma, ANC intelligence chief and member of the NEC, as well as other senior ANC officials arrive in SA for preparatory talks with the SA Government.
- Inkatha leader Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi says the need for the redistribution of wealth is urgent, but rejects nationalisation.
- The ANC calls off talks with the SA Government scheduled for April 11 in reaction to a violent clash between police and demonstrators in Sebokeng township near Vereeniging.
- The labour wing of the ANC, the SA Congress of Trade Unions, (Sactu) disbands.

APRIL

- Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) Secretary Jay Naidoo states at the funeral of victims of the Sebokeng shootings that Neurenberg style trials can be expected to be held when the people comes to power.
- The United States calls on the ANC to reschedule cancelled talks

with the SA Government.

- The ANC welcomes De Klerk's assurances that he will urgently address the issues of state violence against peaceful demonstrations, as well as detentions.
- The Sunday Star reports that a highly confidential opinion poll indicates that the Conservative Party (CP) enjoys the support of more than half of white voters.
- De Klerk says in parliament that the ANC's continued commitment to the armed struggle is an obstacle which has to be removed before negotiations could begin.
- The PAC and Azapo calls on the ANC to pull out of negotiations following De Klerk's dismissal of majority rule as a "simplistic model".
- Nelson Mandela tells a gathering of traditional chiefs in Transkei that ANC supporters prevented him from meeting Buthelezi on his recent visit to troubled townships in Natal.
- Benny Alexander, Secretary-general of the PAC internal, describes talks between the ANC and the SA Government as a "mockery and a circus".
- The ANC appoints regional committees in Southern Natal and Western Cape.
- PAC founder member Japhta Masemola dies.

MAY

- The first official talks between the ANC and the SA Government conclude with the Groote Schuur Minute, committing them to resolving the violence rocking the country.

- Azapo accuses the ANC of betraying blacks by talking to the SA Government.
- CP leader Andries Treurnicht says the SA Government has no mandate from whites to talk with the ANC.
- Former State President and ex-National Party leader, PW Botha, announces he has "no confidence" in the new leadership of the NP and the direction it is taking.
- Minister of Health and Population Development, Dr Rina Venter, opens all 42 provincial hospitals in SA to all races.
- Minister of Justice, Mr Kobie Coetsee, end segregation in SA prisons.
- Leaders of the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) meet retired South African Defence Force (SADF) officers in Lusaka.
- 300 top SA businessmen meet 40 representatives of the ANC, the UDF and Cosatu.
- The SA Government accepts in principle a single education body.
- Benny Alexander claims that the PAC has more than doubled its registered membership to 200 000, since its unbanning in February.
- The Southern Transvaal region of the South African Youth Congress (Sayco) holds its regional congress.
- ANC spokesperson Patrick "Terror" Lekotha denies that the ANC is losing support in Soweto and on the Witwatersrand.

JUNE

- Inkatha General Secretary Dr Oscar Dhlomo resigns.

- Legislation is tabled in parliament to scrap the Separate Amenities Act, coming into effect on October 15.
- The State of Emergency (SOE) which was declared in 1984 is lifted, with the exception of Natal, where violence continues.
- 74 Political prisoners are released from Robben Island.
- De Klerk meets a delegation of Rightwingers.
- The PAC says that a constituent assembly must be created before it would enter into negotiation with the SA Government.
- The ANC approaches the business sector to assist them with the provision of jobs, housing and education facilities for an estimated number of 20 000 exiles expected to return to SA.
- Zeph Mothopeng meets Muammar Ghaddafi in Tripoli, Lybia, and Ghaddafi pledges full support to the PAC.
- British Prime Minister Mrs Margaret Thatcher says that the European Community (EC) is reconsidering its position on sanctions because of "profound and irreversible change" in SA.
- The ANC appoints three local lawyers, Dullah Omar, Bulelani Ngcuka and Essa Moosa to their constitutional committee, as well as Pius Langa, president of the National Democratic Lawyers Association (Nadel).
- The ANC and Azapo declares a ceasefire after bloody conflicts between the two groups.
- Homeland leaders meet De Klerk at Tuynhuis.
- De Klerk reaffirms that the Group Areas Act will be scrapped during the next session of parliament.
- The Constitutional Committee of the ANC meets for the first time.
- The PAC offers to mediate between the warring factions of the

ANC and Inkatha in Natal.

- Constitutional Development Minister, Dr Gerrit Viljoen says "talks about talks" will get under way early in 1991. He warns that "The train can't wait on the station forever for those passengers who can't make up their minds".

JULY

- Police detain seven armed ANC/SACP insurgents.
- At a rally held in Butterworth, Transkei, MK Chief of Staff Chris Hani warns that the ANC may find it necessary to "seize power" if negotiation fails.
- De Klerk reveals the existence of Operation Vula and presents Nelson Mandela with documentation of an SACP insurrection plot.
- Nelson Mandela meets Labour Party (LP) leader Alan Hendrickse.
- Inkatha and ANC supporters clash violently after a "peace" rally at Evaton Stadium near Vereeniging.
- The SACP is relaunched as an above-ground organisation and three trade unionists are included in its provisional leadership.
- Azapo executive committee member Muntu Myeza dies.
- Foreign Minister Pik Botha briefs foreign ambassadors on the detention of about 40 people after the uncovering of ANC/SACP cells and the seizure of arms caches.
- The ANC opens a Department of Economy and Planning office in South Africa.

- The PAC hosts a two-day Conference of the Oppressed in Johannesburg.
- The ANC and Azapo agree to establish channels to iron out their differences.
- Buthelezi announces that Inkatha will transform itself from a cultural liberation movement into a political party.

AUGUST

- Inkatha-ANC violence that erupted in the Vaal Triangle spreads to other townships on the Witwatersrand.
- The ANC suspends the armed struggle after a meeting with the SA Government. The Pretoria Minute, issued at the conclusion of this meeting, states that "The way is now open to proceed towards negotiations on a new constitution".
- The PAC rejects the ANC's suspension of the armed struggle.
- The ANC calls for referendums to be held in the Transkei and other independent and self-governing homelands to determine if they should be reincorporated into SA.
- The Black Consciousness Movement of SA (BCMA) criticises the ANC's agreement to suspend violence towards the SA Government, while it is involved in a "war" with Inkatha.
- Several Witwatersrand and Vaal Triangle townships are declared "unrest areas" after two weeks of tribal fighting claims in excess of 500 lives.
- A Labour Party (LP) delegation meets Nelson Mandela.
- Andries Treurnicht rejects Nelson Mandela's claim that the ANC negotiates with rightwing organisations as "mischievous and un-

truthful propaganda".

- The SA Government formally invites the PAC to take part in talks on a new constitution.

SEPTEMBER

- Gerrit Viljoen says the repeal of the Population Registration Act is necessary. SACP chief Joe Slovo states in a SABC-TV interview that the ultimate economic system for SA is communism.
- Mauritius sets up an office to promote trade with South Africa.
- Ronnie Bethlehem, prominent businessman, states that "money will flee the country" if a future SA government does not respect property rights.
- High ranking ANC and Inkatha delegations meet to set up a sub-committee to investigate continued violence in Natal.
- The PAC central committee states after a meeting in Harare that it is "not ready" to get involved into direct talks with the SA Government.
- Alfred Nzo calls for mass action to demand a police force accountable to the community.
- Benny Alexander urges the National Congress of Trade Unions (Nactu) to reconsider its policy of non-alignment.
- The SA Government invites Azapo to join constitutional talks.
- IDASA executive Dr van Zyl Slabbert pleads for the formation of an SA equivalent for Untag, the UN's Transitional Assistance Group, to maintain law and order during the constitutional negotiation phase.
- Pik Botha says that governments in Southern Africa should form

an association for economic co-operation as soon as possible. He reiterates proposals for a Southern African equivalent of the Marshall Plan for foreign aid.

- The Witwatersrand region of the Pan Africanist Students Organisation (PASO) holds its annual conference in Johannesburg.
- Azapo rejects the SA Government's invitation to join talks bout a new constitution.
- Buthelezi declines an invitation to join the ANC and other homeland leaders for talks on negotiation.

OCTOBER

- Winnie Mandela and others charged with murder and attempted murder relating to youths kidnapped and assaulted by the erst-while Mandela Football Club. This follows death sentence imposed on club leader, Jerry Richardson.
- De Klerk meets George Bush in Washington, and endorses the principle of "one man one vote" in a new constitution.
- De Klerk meets Margaret Thatcher for the third time to discuss South and Southern African events.
- It is reported that the ANC is investigating the viability of a national commercial bank which would compete with other banks.
- Winnie Mandela is appointed as head of the ANC's Welfare Department.
- Curfews in Witwatersrand townships are lifted.
- The State of Emergency in Natal is lifted.
- The ANC launches its 351 st branch, being one third of the way

towards its goal of one thousand branches.

- The ANC calls on big businesses to donate R15m towards vocational training of returning exiles.
- Nelson Mandela agrees to meet Buthelezi in an attempt to end the violence that claimed nearly 5 000 lives in the last four years. However, the meeting does not materialise.
- Zeph Mothopeng dies.
- BMW South Africa refuses an ANC request for a fleet of luxury cars.
- Nelson Mandela criticises Kenya's decision to resume flights to Johannesburg and allow SA Airways flights to Nairobi.
- An ANC delegation meets Cabinet Ministers and agrees that all sides must contribute to stop the increasing violence in South Africa.
- The negotiation process receives a setback after the ANC attacks the good faith of F W De Klerk.
- The ANC states its intention to redistribute wealth through "affirmative action" in an economic discussion document.
- The media reports that hundreds of youths still leave the country for military training despite reform and the prospect of constitutional negotiations.

NOVEMBER

- Pik Botha, and Minister of Trade and Industry and Tourism, Mr Kent Durr, woo former communist countries in newly-free East European bloc.
- It is speculated in the media that the SA Government is meeting

secretly with the PAC and Azapo for exploratory talks.

- De Klerk states in The Hague, Netherlands, that he would be willing to serve in a government led by Nelson Mandela.
- Eleven Witwatersrand townships are no longer unrest areas, according to Minister Vlok, but three townships in the Cape Province are declared unrest areas.
- White rightwing Conservative Party congresses affirm "total resistance" to integration in a non-racial South Africa.
- The ANC postpones its National Consultative Conference scheduled for December 1990 to June 1991.
- Parents of many schools vote to become multi-racial when given the opportunity by the Department of Education to decide on their own future. By year's end, more than 200 previously "white" schools are non-racial.
- The NP gains a convincing win over the CP in the Randburg parliamentary by-election.
- Buthelezi rejects an invitation by Cape Town Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu to attend a meeting of black political leaders to discuss reconciliation, peace and unity.
- An opinion poll conducted by Market and Opinion Surveys finds a dramatic increase in white support for a negotiated settlement between the SA Government and the ANC.
- Gerrit Viljoen says that the SA Government will not hand over power to an interim government, but will stay in power until a new constitution is accepted.
- The Japanese Government refuses to give the ANC \$25 million to rehabilitate returning ANC exiles and political prisoners.
- Cosatu holds a workers' charter conference in Johannesburg

discussing workers' demands for a new constitution.

- The ANC issues a draft Bill of Rights.
- Nelson Mandela meets Clarence Makwethu in Swaziland, raising hopes for a united front between the ANC and the PAC.
- F W De Klerk warns that mass action is destructive and creates the opportunity for violence.
- The ANC launches a mass campaign against local authorities in the Western Cape.

DECEMBER

- Harry Schwarz, Democratic Party MP and veteran anti-government campaigner, is appointed new SA Ambassador to Washington, to succeed Dr Piet Koornhof.
- Kent Durr is host to first official Soviet trade visit to South Africa as relations thaw, with hints of trade and diplomatic links to be established.
- Curfews are imposed in four Witwatersrand townships following an outbreak of violence.
- Black local authorities countrywide (40 percent) are paralysed by mass resignation of councillors.
- ANC foreign representatives meet in Johannesburg to discuss sanctions.
- Exiled PAC leaders arrive back home to attend the PAC's Consultative Conference.
- The PAC denies that it plans to join negotiations between the ANC and the SA Government.

- ANC President Oliver Tambo arrives in SA.
- The ANC holds its first conference inside the country in 30 years.
- Political observers describe the mood at the National Conference of the ANC as militant and critical of the leadership.
- The PAC Consultative Conference elicits media criticism for the continued use of the slogan "one settler one bullet".
- The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) is officially launched and calls on Pres De Klerk to start negotiations with all those organisations which have committed themselves to talks.
- The PAC warns Western countries that a relaxation of sanctions would constitute a "recipe for increased violence".
- A top official of the National Federated Chamber of Commerce (Nafcoc) says that the future of social stability is at risk if Inkatha and other interested parties are not included in the negotiation process.
- De Klerk meets Oliver Tambo at the Union Buildings in Pretoria.
- In his annual address to the nation, De Klerk challenges the ANC to choose between supporting the commitment of its leaders to peaceful negotiations and reverting to the old order of confrontation and conflict.
- ANC snubs Labour Party by not even answering invitation to Nelson Mandela to address its annual congress. De Klerk does address the congress.
- The ANC, PAC and Azapo have agreed to hold a consultative conference, but could not agree on a suitable date.
- Azapo publicity secretary, Strini Moodley, reiterates Azapo's decision not to take part in negotiation, and blames violence on Pres De Klerk.

1. AFTER APARTHEID'S DARK AGES, TURBULENCE WAS INEVITABLE

A minor miracle is how the first year of political normalisation in South Africa can best be described.

A number of bold moves from opposite sides of the political spectrum took the country out of the dangerous impasse.

Generations of lost time and squandered opportunities were made up in months.

An issue that can no longer be kept on the backburner is the ANC's commitment to what it calls "mass action". In pre-negotiation days the aim was to keep the regime under pressure on all fronts.

Now, it is often little more than an attempt by the ANC to establish and expand its support base among the population at large.

With the principle of mass action there can be little quarrel. It is an accepted element of democracies throughout the world.

However, a line of sorts is crossed when mass action - or any other political strategy - becomes an excuse for browbeating and bullying opponents, for intimidation and overt violence.

For the government, the question is whether it can persuade the white electorate to relinquish its total domination of the levers of power for the uncertain future of power sharing.

And for the liberation movements: can they persuade their followers that political, social and economic liberation does not necessarily occur overnight?

2. DE KLERK AT THE CROSSROADS

President FW de Klerk will move fast this year to bury apartheid to prove to those still refusing to join negotiations that the old order is no more. Literally, he will be burning his bridges behind him to emphasise the need for a new creative drive in the country.

"The government is totally committed to the removal of all discrimination. In the new South Africa there can be no place for racism - all citizens must enjoy the same rights", De Klerk said on the eve of the 1991 session of parliament.

National Party insiders say there will be no residential discrimination by July 1. The Group Areas Act will be scrapped, thus ending urban apartheid, and the Land Acts drastically amended to allow all South Africans to own or occupy rural land.

Also due for the scrap heap are the country's laws relating to separate local authorities based on ethnicity.

However, it is the overall political mood of the country which is causing most concern.

Last year the mere contemplation of an end to apartheid and the hope of a new democracy was a novelty. The lesson learned since then is that there is a thin line between social renewal and bloodshed and between negotiation and wrangling.

The immediate aspirations raised by the release of Mandela and others last February have been tempered by subsequent events.

What also failed to materialise was the vision of grand unity among the former liberation groups.

De Klerk emerged at the end of his first year with the visible rewards of a decision by the European Community to end an investment boycott - with the Bush administration giving its approval, if not tangible support. The ANC, on the other hand, still faces nagging internal problems.

3. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION OR PENANCE? THE ANC HAS YET TO DECIDE

Coming to terms with the realities of a harsh business environment on the one hand and the increasingly strident demands by millions of blacks for rapid socio-economic upliftment on the other, are the key challenges facing the ANC and the business community as South Africa enters its second year of transition to true democracy.

The ANC's initial threat to nationalise a wide range of important industries and other commercial undertakings has matured into a hybrid policy positioned somewhere between punitive measures and affirmative action. The immediate focus has shifted from demands for a reallocation of state spending - although this remains an ANC priority - to what amounts to an insistence on the reallocation of a significant slice of private sector profits and a say in how businesses are run.

But in other areas, the ANC clearly believes businessmen must pay up. For example, the

organisation wants all businesses to donate R35 to a fund, which the ANC will manage, to finance black business ventures and community projects. There has also been a suggestion - bordering on a demand - by Nafcoc president Sam Motsuenyane that quotas be set for black representation on the boards of listed companies (30%), black shareholding in companies (40%), purchases from black suppliers (50%) and black senior management and personnel (60%).

Businessmen also reacted angrily and defiantly to an ANC call - this time bordering on a threat - that life insurers invest 5-10% of their funds in low yield "socially desirable" projects.

Businessmen argue that it is pointless to invest in housing and other "socially desirable" projects in black areas if the investment - both in terms of yield and physical security of fixed property - cannot be ensured.

The ANC's campaigns are arguably creating an ethos in the townships in terms of which any investment or upgrading will be regarded as inimical to "the struggle" and a legitimate target for destruction - just as black education, once promoted by the ANC as the frontline of struggle, has disintegrated beyond even Nelson Mandela's ability to salvage any good from it. The desire and need to learn has been destroyed. And there is now a danger that the desire and need to live in secure and ordered residential areas is being similarly crushed.

4. BUTHELEZI MOVES HIS INKATHA PARTY ON TO THE CENTRE STAGE

The Government's still-to-be-unveiled plans for a multi-party conference to thrash out an agenda for real negotiations could provide the opportunity the Inkatha Freedom Party needs to bring it into the mainstream of the negotiation process.

The calling of a multi-party conference - the idea of which was mooted at a meeting between President FW De Klerk and political leaders operating "within the system" has generally been well received.

Relations with the Labour Party have thawed significantly in the last two years after reaching their nadir when Labour decided in 1983 to participate in the tricameral system.

There is also a distinct lack of hostility between Buthelezi and the PAC.

Inkatha's position at this juncture appears far healthier than that of the ANC. It has established a political party with a full infrastructure, a clearly identifiable political base in Natal and now, with the advent of a multi-party conference on negotiations, an equal place at the table with the ANC which that organisation has worked so hard to deny him. A further plus for Buthelezi and Inkatha is its aim to advocate the creation of some type of federation - a constitutional dispensation far more acceptable to whites and other minority groups than the ANC's plans for a unitary state.

Added to this is Inkatha's hearty opposition to nationalisation and a socialist economy. Such a moderate stance could see him quickly embraced by whites as the one credible black leader who can stand against the ANC, whose hardline stance taken at its recent conference raised considerable fears.

5. THE ANC'S MASS MOBILISATION REAPS A BITTER HARVEST

Probably the most intractable of South Africa's problems awaiting a solution in 1991 is that of urban violence, which is fuelled by a campaign aimed at the total destruction of the present system of black municipal councils.

Public violence not only persisted, but increased as the ANC's campaign of "mass mobilisation" took effect.

The PAC and Azapo offered to mediate in peace talks to end the black-on-black violence and while these succeeded in some areas, the plan got nowhere nationally.

There were also damning reports by the strongly anti-apartheid SA Institute of Race Relations.

The institute said that "the violence stems not so much from community disenchantment with the manner in which councillors' duties have been performed, but is part of a broader campaign aimed at rendering the townships ungovernable and introducing new, alternative local structures".

One aspect of the violence on which there appears to be wide agreement is that it has provided an open field for criminal elements.

In June, the all-race Council for the Co-Ordination of Local Government received an interim report from its technical committee - the Thornhill committee - on proposed models for future local government.

"We cannot move forward by a process of destruction", De Klerk said. This will remain one of the toughest issues of 1991: it is at the local level that ordinary citizens sense either their safety or their insecurity.

6. **PAC'S HARDLINE STRATEGY ON NEGOTIATIONS COULD BACKFIRE**

Newly elected PAC president Clarence Makwetu says the creation of a "patriotic front" will be "pursued rigorously" by his organisation. However, there are strong indications that this desire for closer co-operation with the ANC is not shared by rank-and-file supporters of the PAC who have been involved for many years in violent conflicts over political turf in black townships.

The strongest pressure on the PAC to soften its attitude towards the ANC comes from its traditional backers - the Organisation of African Unity.

The pressures to move closer to the ANC come at a time when the PAC is experiencing severe financial difficulties. It has also not yet been able to establish a viable internal organisation.

There is little doubt that its hardline refusal to abandon the "armed struggle" and to join the negotiating process is costing it foreign financial backing.

On the question of negotiations, the PAC remains ambiguous.

For the government, PAC participation is vital, if only to act as a brake on ANC claims that it represents the vast majority of South Africans. However, the most important feature of the PAC congress was the vehement opposition from rank-and-file supporters to participation in the talks. The result was a no-compromise statement demanding the PAC would refuse to participate unless a constituent assembly was elected on a one-person-one-vote basis and agreement reached on the "transfer of power and the return of the land to the people."

The PAC's strategy is risky: if it fails, it runs the risk of being completely marginalised and eclipsed by the ANC.

7. **WHY THE RELUCTANT FRINGE WON'T COME TO THE PARTY**

Extremists on the Right are unlikely to become involved in this year's negotiations, which means that about one in four whites will have no say in the quest for a new constitution.

The percentage of blacks still outside the negotiating process is more difficult to ascertain. The PAC and Azapo, at their recent congresses, said they would boycott the forthcoming all-party talks.

Nevertheless, it is significant that neither the PAC nor Azapo have closed the door to future participation, and both have committed themselves to get there peaceably.

8. **CLASH BETWEEN HARDLINERS AND PRAGMATISTS SPLITS ANC**

The African National Congress entered 1991, the year of real negotiations with the SA government, deeply divided on crucial aspects of its strategy and tactics.

A feature of the three-day congress was the strong leadership displayed by ANC deputy president Nelson Mandela.

A draft policy document drawn up by senior members of the ANC's National Executive which pleaded for a more "nuanced" approach towards sanctions was roundly rejected by the vast majority of delegates to the conference. Instead, delegates opted for a bland statement - that the existing package of sanctions measures should be maintained.

The leadership's decision to "suspend the armed struggle" during the pre-negotiations phase came under heavy fire from ordinary delegates, particularly former members of the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe.

Until the December conference there were high hopes in government circles that some form of compromise between it and the ANC might be worked out. However, this grandstanding by the ANC leadership might delay the start of the real negotiations, originally expected to begin by March.

9. **SANCTIONS CRUMBLE, BUT THE ROAD AHEAD REMAINS PRECARIOUS**

Even with the expected further easing of sanctions, a positive inflow of foreign capital and a drop of 2 - 3% in interest rates, South Africa's economy faces another tough year - possibly even worse than 1990.

It is clear that in the coming year sanctions will continue to be eased as the West takes approving note of President FW de Klerk's reforms.

But to what extent this easing will aid the recovery of the country's economy and provide for the sort of growth essential to ensure peace and prosperity remains unknown.

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PAC's hardline strategy on negotiations could backfire

Refusal to end armed struggle sends foreign backers scurrying

EXTERNAL pressures on the Pan Africanist Congress to moderate its stance on negotiations and to enter into a united front with the ANC are expected to increase in the coming weeks.

Newly elected PAC president Clarence Makwetu says the creation of a "patriotic front" will be "pursued rigorously" by his organisation. However, there are strong indications that this desire for closer cooperation with the ANC is not shared by rank-and-file supporters of the PAC who have been involved for many years in violent conflicts over political turf in black townships.

At the recent PAC congress near Johannesburg, delegates urged the leadership not to rush into ill-conceived alliances with the ANC. They expressed the fear that this would dilute the hardline demands of the PAC.

The strongest pressure on the PAC to soften its attitude towards the ANC comes from its traditional backers - the Organisation of African Unity. In September ANC deputy president Nelson Mandela and PAC external leader Johnson Mlambo met in Uganda with OAU president Yoweri Museveni and Zambian leader Kenneth Kaunda. The message from the OAU was blunt: form a united front, or risk the loss of financial and moral support.

The pressures come at a time when a new generation of leaders has taken over the reins of the organisation. Makwetu, elected to succeed the late Zeph Mothopeng, is one of the last executive members who were present when Robert Sobukwe led the breakaway from the ANC in 1959. The rest of its leaders are considerably younger and are predominantly intellectuals - a marked contrast with the working class leadership that characterised the PAC in its early years. The pressures to move

closer to the ANC come at a time when the PAC is experiencing severe financial difficulties. It has also not yet been able to establish a viable internal organisation.

There have been no big PAC rallies or marches to rival those of the ANC and even Mothopeng's funeral drew a modest crowd of less than 3 000 people.

Glimpses of its financial problems were provided at the conference when members were called on to donate 3% of their salaries to party

elected on a one-person-one-vote basis and agreement reached on the "transfer of power and the return of the land to the people".

According to PAC Western Cape leader Barney Desai, "no self-respecting liberation movement will come within spitting distance of a negotiating table" unless these demands are met.

As far as "pre-negotiations" are concerned, the PAC is willing to attend - but then only at a neutral venue outside South Africa and only

to discuss the "modalities of electing a constituent assembly". Says Makwetu: "The PAC is not deluded by De Klerk's smile. We do not take our decisions based on his good intentions."

This intransigent stance may, however, backfire against the PAC and put it at a major disadvantage against the ANC:

■ It may lose further vital foreign financial and logistic support if it is seen to be the only hardline movement unwilling

to take up De Klerk's offer to negotiate.

■ It may be precluded from enjoying the short-term "benefits of negotiating" in that its members in exile may be refused indemnity or its supporters in jail may not be released together with ANC prisoners.

■ It may be completely overshadowed by the ANC, whose participation in the process will increase its public profile and gain favourable publicity.

Already Gerrit Viljoen, the government's chief negotiator, has said that "the negotiations train" cannot be delayed indefinitely.

"The process will have to start soon and those who are not ready to participate will either have to join later or run the risk of being marginalised," he said. Hardline PAC supporters believe that history will vindicate their stance. They often refer to the position in Zimbabwe in the



INTRANSIGENT: PAC delegates vote against ties with the ANC

funds. There is little doubt that its hardline refusal to abandon the "armed struggle" and to join the negotiating process is costing it foreign financial backing.

On the question of negotiations, the PAC remains ambiguous. There are signs that the leadership may agree to participate in preliminary talks and senior government sources maintain that "all is not yet lost" in their attempts to persuade the PAC to join the negotiating process.

For the government, PAC participation is vital, if only to act as a brake on ANC claims that it represents the vast majority of South Africans. However, the most important feature of the PAC congress was the vehement opposition from rank-and-file supporters to participation in the talks. The result was a no-compromise statement stating the PAC would refuse to participate unless a constituent assembly was

1970s when Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU received the most international attention while Robert Mugabe's ZANU swept the boards in a popular election.

However, the big difference is that at the height of the war ZANU were already militarily active in more than half of the country and had more than 60 000 armed guerrillas in the field compared with Nkomo's "paper army".

There is little objective verification for PAC claims about military successes scored by its armed wing, the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA). Figures compiled by the SA Institute of International Relations indicate that APLA actions have been negligible compared with those of the ANC's Umkhonto we Sizwe, which averaged about 250 armed attacks a year in the late 1980s.

In 1987, for instance, 446 Umkhonto members were killed or captured compared to 85 APLA insurgents.

Whether there can be any real and

lasting united front between the PAC and the ANC is an open question. In spite of its strategy of brinkmanship, the ANC - and especially Mandela - remains committed to the negotiating process. This is a complete anathema to grassroots PAC supporters.

It now seems as if the PAC leadership will go through the motions of unity talks to appease its backers in Africa. But there is also a strong belief that the ANC will, in the long-term, lose mass support because of the softening of its position. Hardline elements will grow disenchanted with any lack of progress at the negotiating table and will accuse the ANC leadership of "selling out to the government".

ANC dissidents will start looking for a new political home - and the PAC will be the logical destination. But the PAC's strategy is risky: if it fails, it runs the risk of being completely marginalised and eclipsed by the ANC.

Exporters wing their way across the dark continent

THERE'S a new export trade wind blowing -

By JACK BLADES

fanned by the wings of South African Airways. Despite sanctions, 15% of the nation's export business last year was done on the African continent, much of it in finished goods. Further trade will be generated by new African air routes opened in the past few months.

Exports increased by 40% in 1989 and by 20% in 1990 and could currently be worth as much as R5,5-billion a year, according to estimates by the South African Foreign Trade Organisation (Safto).

Few would have predicted a year ago that SAA would be flying to Lubumbashi in partnership with Air Zaire or to Antananarivo with Air Madagascar after trade approaches by those countries. Or that there would be a regular, direct service to Kenya.

Primarily as a result of state visits by President FW de Klerk and his predecessor, PW Botha, SAA has now been granted landing rights at Abidjan in Ivory Coast, the Comores, Morocco and Rwanda.

However, there are still a number of African countries which prohibit South African visitors. By the end of this year many of them are expected to have changed their minds, unless something goes seriously awry with the talks scheduled between the government and the ANC. Clearly, Africa knows it pays to shop in South

Africa. Because of the devalued rand, prices

are cheap by European or American standards. Even more important, South African goods have been manufactured for African conditions, while spares and after-sales services are more readily available than is the case for goods imported from Europe.

After many years, Africa is finally succeeding in shrugging off the communist yoke: the Congo, Benin and Mozambique have now opted for multi-party systems.

Angola is dumping Marxism, too. It is insisting, however, that only approved foreign investors with Angolan tax clearances will be allowed in. Two companies which have been given the green light are the South African Coca-Cola franchise holder and De Beers, which is back in Angola with a marketing agreement with Endiama, the state diamond company.

Meanwhile, trade with newly-liberated East European countries is booming. International airlines are also moving quickly to claim a share of the South African passenger market - bringing with them the promise of more tourist dollars and distinctly brighter prospects for South African exporters.

First into Jan Smuts airport, in May, will be Austrian Airlines. Next will be Cathay Pacific, which will inaugurate a service to the Far East in mid-year.

NEWS IN BRIEF

Olympic hopes flicker again

South Africa's possible readmission to the Olympic Games, possibly in time for the 1992 Olympics in Barcelona, will be considered this year.

A delegation from the International Olympic Committee is to make a fact-finding visit to South Africa in April - the first such visit in 20 years.

The South African Sports Co-ordinating Committee was due to meet in Johannesburg on January 12 to finalise steps to unify South African sport along non-racial lines. Early in March the four-man African Monitoring Committee will meet in Gaborone, Botswana, to analyse further developments.

The last words from a hybrid

Mining house Gencor has announced that at its newest gold mine it will not use Fanakalo, a hybrid language widely used on South African mines.

Fanakalo (literally: "Like This"), a language of limited vocabulary, makes use of basic nouns and verbs from all the main black and white tongues of Southern Africa. Although easily understood by most South Africans, it has been condemned of late as an outdated "master-servant" language.

Gencor said it would be difficult to eliminate Fanakalo entirely in existing mines, where the majority of workers speak neither English nor Afrikaans. Anglo American is also due to sound the death knell for Fanakalo by offering its mine workers courses in other languages.

Comment: "Wena funa bulala Fanakalo maningi checha?" (Do you want to kill off Fanakalo fast?)

Newsmakers who will hit the headlines in 1991

THIS year should see the start of multi-party negotiations about a future political dispensation in South Africa.

Thus far the talks have mostly taken the form of bilateral discussions between the Pretoria government and the African National Congress, aimed at removing certain obstacles to negotiations.

However, the first few months of the year will see the government reaching out to the other main actors on the political stage in an attempt to persuade them to join the process as well. This year should also see the emergence of a new generation of leaders in most of the movements - people who will become increasingly prominent as the negotiations proceed.

Faces to watch in 1991 include:

NATIONAL PARTY:

President FW DE KLERK, 54, clearly remains the dominant figure on the establishment side. His opening of parliament speech on February 1 will set the agenda for the negotiating process. Expect him to announce a multi-party summit of all interested political movements as a precursor to negotiations.

Another expected development is a growing distinction between the government and the ruling National Party. The NP will participate in the process as an independent entity.

Its negotiating team will almost certainly be led by GERRIT VILJOEN, 64, a former academic, university rector and now Minister of Constitutional Development.

Two other key players will be: STOFFEL VAN DER MERWE, 51, the Minister of Education and Training, and Viljoen's deputy, ROELF MEYER, 43. Meyer is also expected to become a co-ordinator of security actions, attached to De Klerk's own office.

AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

In spite of strong criticism of his "secret negotiations" with the government, NELSON MANDELA's position as the de facto leader of the ANC remains secure.

The precarious health of ANC president OLIVER TAMBO, 73, may force him to retire from active politics. He is expected to be elevated to

an honorary position at the movement's June congress, with Mandela, 72, taking over the day-to-day running of the ANC.

Key figures in the ANC's National Executive are likely to remain SA Communist Party general secretary, JOE SLOVO, 64, Umkhonto we Sizwe chief of staff, CHRIS HANI, 48, and foreign affairs director, THABO MBEKI, 48. However, Mbeki's reputation took something of a knock at the ANC's December conference when delegates roundly rejected his pragmatic approach to the

ternal leader. Also on the rise is ANC youth leader, PETER MOKABA, 33. He is said to have overcome earlier problems because of his close association with Nelson Mandela's turbulent wife, Winnie, and has successfully withstood attempts to prevent him from being elected youth leader.

Another internal leader expected to become more prominent is trade unionist MOSES MAYEKISO, 42. A member of the South African Communist Party leadership, Mayekiso will be an important figure among the many ANC hardliners unhappy about the negotiating process.

PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS

Newly elected president CLARENCE MAKWETU, 63, is a veteran of the liberation struggle who served a lengthy period of detention on Robben Island. Over the past two years he was very active in rebuilding the movement's internal structures and it came as little surprise when he was elected to succeed the late Zeph Mothopeng.

However, the rising star in the PAC is Pretoria lawyer DIKGANG MOSENEKE, who was elected almost out of the blue as deputy president. Moseneke, a charismatic speaker, is part of a new generation trying to rejuvenate the PAC's ageing leadership.

INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY

Inkatha president MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI, 62, remains unchallenged in his organisation. He is expected to demand a stronger recognition for his party in the run-up to the negotiating process. The leading figure among the younger generation is MUSA ZONDI, 30, a businessman and leader of the Inkatha Youth Brigade for the past six years.

AZAPO

PANDELANI NEFOLOVHODWE, 43, took over the leadership of Azanian People's Organisation at a time when the movement was clearly in trouble. Lack of funds and an inability to project its philosophy of Black Consciousness sufficiently on a crowded political stage have resulted in a significant decline in the fortunes of the movement founded by Steve Biko.



FACES TO WATCH: Tambo, Slovo, Zuma and Hani (right to left)

selective lifting of sanctions against South Africa.

The rising star in the ANC is JACOB ZUMA, 48. The most senior Zulu in the organisation, Zuma is the ANC's chief of intelligence and chairman of its Natal region. Also highly regarded in government circles, Zuma is expected to head a number of joint committees investigating constitutional options.

Expected to return to an increasingly prominent role in the ANC is National Union of Mineworkers' general secretary, CYRIL RAMAPHOSA, 38. A trained lawyer, Ramaphosa was rumoured to be out of favour with the leadership, but at the December conference he again shot to prominence as the most visible in-

Affirmative action or penance? The ANC has yet to decide

COMING to terms with the realities of a harsh business environment on the one hand and the increasingly strident demands by millions of blacks for rapid socio-economic upliftment on the other are the key challenges facing the ANC and the business community as South Africa enters its second year of transition to true democracy.

To be charitable, one should perhaps write off 1990 as a necessary period of posturing during which the two sides tried to discover each other. Taken at face value, much of what was said and written probably created more mutual fear and suspicion than trust. But at least there was debate.

The ANC's initial threat to nationalise a wide range of important industries and other commercial undertakings has matured into a hybrid policy positioned somewhere between punitive measures and affirmative action. The immediate focus has shifted from demands for a reallocation of state spending - although this remains an ANC priority - to what amounts to an insistence on the reallocation of a significant slice of private sector profits and a say in how businesses are run.


From a practical point of view the ANC's position is quite understandable. Decades of neglect - inter alia by the business community in general and the mining houses in particular - have severely deprived most black South Africans of the same education, housing and employment opportunities to which whites have had access. The need to move quickly to redress this imbalance is obvious.

But how far and how fast the moves must be made and the determination of responsibility for financing such wide-ranging strategies is still a major point of disagreement.

Some of what is being demanded - such as equal spending on education and pensions - is definitely out of the private sector's range and beyond its immediate responsibility.

But in other areas, the ANC clearly believes businessmen must pay up. For example, the organisation wants all businesses to donate R35 to a fund, which the ANC will manage, to

**TAKING
STOCK**
by Barnato



finance black business ventures and community projects. There has also been a suggestion - bordering on a demand - by Nafcoc president Sam Motsuenyane that quotas be set for black representation on the boards of listed companies (30%), black shareholding in companies (40%), purchases from black suppliers (50%) and black senior management and personnel (60%).

Neither "suggestions" have been welcomed by the business community.

Businessmen also reacted angrily and defiantly to an ANC call - this time bordering on a threat - that life insurers invest 5-10% of their funds in low yield "socially desir-

'It is accepted by all sides that stability and economic growth stoked by investment form the framework for prosperity'

able" projects. The irony is that a considerable sum of money is available for socio-economic upliftment in the form of R2-billion held in the Independent Development Trust administered by respected public figure Jan Steyn.

But Steyn has resisted calls to "do something quickly", in spite of the obvious need to do so. He believes community involvement and co-operation in whatever projects the IDT finances is essential for their longer term success.

And in another recent development, the government is understood to be investigating the establishment of a R5-billion fund - separate from the main Budget - for social spending.

But again community involvement is important. Sadly, however, it is on this aspect that the ANC and

the business community (and the government to an extent) are talking at cross purposes.

It is accepted by all sides that social stability and economic growth stoked by foreign and local investment form the framework for prosperity. SA Communist Party general secretary Joe Slovo said as much in a recent speech.

But on the ground the situation is somewhat different. The ANC's insistence on the maintenance of international sanctions deters foreign investment and its "mass action" strategy is arguably fanning the flames of violence in the townships and undermining investor confidence.

Businessmen argue that it is pointless to invest in housing and other "socially desirable" projects in black areas if the investment - both in terms of yield and physical security of fixed property - cannot be ensured.

The ANC's campaigns are arguably creating an ethos in the townships in terms of which any investment or upgrading will be regarded as inimical to "the struggle" and a legitimate target for destruction - just as black education, once promoted by the ANC as the frontline of struggle, has disintegrated beyond even Nelson Mandela's ability to salvage any good from it. The desire and need to learn has been destroyed. And there is now a

danger that the desire and need to live in secure and ordered residential areas is being similarly crushed.

If a more positive situation is to develop, 1991 will have to see a significant change of attitudes on both sides. On the one hand, those ANC leaders who privately accept that socio-economic upgrading goes hand in hand with political stability should have the courage to say so publicly and be seen to be doing something to achieve it.

On the other hand, more businessmen will need to follow the example of those sectors that have committed themselves to significant development projects.

Both sides will also have to be more understanding of each other's limitations and try to accommodate them within mutually acceptable strategies.

'The decisions of companies to invest have to be made at least two years in advance. That is why we have to talk to them at this stage'
- the ANC's Thabo Mbeki

EVEN with the expected further easing of sanctions, a positive inflow of foreign capital and a drop of 2-3% in interest rates, South Africa's economy faces another tough year - possibly even worse than 1990.

Unemployment will remain high and is likely to grow as the recession continues well into the year and probably into 1992. The chances of inflation being reduced significantly are also slim.

Export volumes may drop and rise only marginally in rand value terms in line with a lower demand for base metals. The continuing drought will slash earnings from agricultural exports and increase imports.

Government spending across a wide spectrum is expected to be slashed in real terms in the March Budget, but social spending will rise. Finance Minister Barend du Plessis wants an average real growth in spending of no more than 1%.

Although analysts say the recession is not as severe as that of 1985, their statistics are cold comfort for businessmen at the coalface. Economic problems are compounded by political uncertainty and businessmen's view of the future - as reflected in a recently published Markinor poll - is more gloomy than it has been for nearly a decade.

Sanlam economists predict a tough year. They say consumer demand will decline further and businessmen will face cost increases they will not be able to pass on to consumers. These conditions are expected to persist for at least the whole of 1991.

But in spite of the outlook, Reserve Bank governor Chris Stals is clearly determined to keep a tight rein on fiscal and monetary policy. Financial stability and attempts to reduce inflation have taken priority over economic growth in an effort to build a firm foundation for future growth. It is felt that the period of political transition to democracy

Sanctions crumble, but the road ahead remains precarious

will be difficult enough without being further hampered by an ill-managed economy or one that is allowed to expand too soon.

The policies Stals is following are also aimed at convincing foreign investors and lenders that South Africa is serious about developing production potential and offering secure and reasonable yields.

But the success of Stals' fight against inflation and his ability to

year's end was one of them, also reflecting the further crumbling of the ANC's campaign to maintain South Africa's economic isolation.

An even stronger inflow of overseas capital is expected to be reflected in figures due for release early this year in the wake of the EEC's easing of sanctions in December. The ANC, obviously embarrassed by the failure of its efforts to keep sanctions in place in order to pressurise the government, now faces serious internal divisions on the issue.

Shortly before the EEC decision, ANC foreign affairs spokesman Thabo Mbeki appealed to businessmen in Britain and diplomats at the United Nations not to ease sanctions until further political demands had been met by the South African government. The EEC ignored the calls.

And then, in what appeared to be an effort to save face as the international campaign continued to crumble, ANC moderates - including Mbeki and ANC president Oliver Tambo -

were defeated at the organisation's consultative conference in December when they tried to win approval for a reassessment of the sanctions policy. For what it is worth, hardliners had the call for continued sanctions reaffirmed.

It is clear that in the coming year sanctions will continue to be eased as the West takes approving note of President FW de Klerk's reforms and becomes increasingly concerned by the ANC's apparent inability to transform itself from a protest movement into a political organisation.

But to what extent this easing will aid the recovery of the country's economy and provide for the sort of growth essential to ensure peace and prosperity remains unknown.



KEEPING A TIGHT REIN: Reserve Bank governor Chris Stals

create a platform for growth have been questioned by some economists.

Ockie Stuart, head of Stellenbosch University's Bureau for Economic Research, forecasts an average inflation rate for the period 1990-95 of 13,2% - only 1% or so below the current rate and way above the inflation rates of the country's main trading partners.

He also forecasts an average annual growth rate for the period in real GDP terms of only 2,2% - well below the 5-6% regarded as essential if South Africa is to cope with escalating demands for employment.

However, there is evidence of Stals' success in other areas. A significant inflow of foreign funds at

Buthelezi moves his Inkatha Party on to the centre stage

THE Government's still-to-be-unveiled plans for a multi-party conference to thrash out an agenda for real negotiations could provide the opportunity the Inkatha Freedom Party needs to bring it into the mainstream of the negotiation process.

The ANC has accorded Inkatha and its president, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, similar status to other non-independent homelands and minor political actors, such as the Labour Party and Solidarity.

This is despite Buthelezi's insistence that he is not only a homeland leader, but the president of an established political party. The ANC's stance is apparently calculated to distance the Zulu leader from other non-independent homeland leaders and to frustrate Inkatha's claim to a seat at the negotiating table as an independent political force rather than as one of six leaders of the non-independent homelands.

The calling of a multi-party conference - the idea of which was mooted at a meeting between President FW De Klerk and political leaders operating "within the system" - has generally been well received.

In line with his goal of establishing Inkatha as an "independent political force", Buthelezi has shied away from forging alliances with other groups, such as the "coloured" Labour Party, although he is carefully keeping his options open.

Relations with the Labour Party have thawed significantly in the last two years after reaching their nadir when Labour decided in 1983 to par-

ticipate in the tricameral system. Buthelezi has also established some rapport with De Klerk, a marked change from the cold war of the PW Botha era. There is also a distinct lack of hostility between Buthelezi and the PAC. Under the leadership of Zeph Mothopeng, relations be-

the "Natal Region of the PAC", which is based in Buthelezi's political stronghold.

However, it is still unclear what influence the Sobukwe faction will have on overall PAC policy - or the broader political spectrum. In essence, Buthelezi appears to be keeping his options open while, for the moment, making no move to cement alliances which could tie him down at a later stage.

Inkatha's position at this juncture appears far healthier than that of the ANC. It has established a political party with a full infrastructure, a clearly identifiable political base in Natal and now, with the advent of a multi-party conference on negotiations, an equal place at the table with the ANC which that organisation has worked so hard to deny him. A further plus for Buthelezi and Inkatha is its aim to advocate the creation of some type of federation - a constitutional dispensa-

tion far more acceptable to whites and other minority groups than the ANC's plans for a unitary state.

Added to this is Inkatha's hearty opposition to nationalisation and a socialist economy. Such a moderate stance could see him quickly embraced by whites as the one credible black leader who can stand against the ANC, whose hardline stance taken at its recent conference raised considerable fears.



VOICE OF THE 'RADICAL' CENTRE:
Zulu leader Gatsha Buthelezi

tween the PAC and Inkatha improved markedly. However, it remains to be seen if newly-elected PAC president Clarence Makwetu and Buthelezi can maintain this cordiality.

The PAC has its own idiosyncrasies. The existence of the Sobukwe faction, a dissident group of PAC members favouring negotiation, has to be taken into account. This faction has an internal dimension known as

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