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FIFTH SESSION OF THE FIFTH KWAZULU LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

CONTINUATION OF THE POLICY SPEECH

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Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, I could not let Mr Mandela get away with saying the things he said to the Security council. I had to protest in every possible legitimate way. One avenue open to us was, of course, to seek redress through the structures set up for complaints by the National Peace Committee. We did just

this. The wording of our complaint was:

A COMPLAINT TO THE NATIONAL PEACE COMMITTEE

Violations of the National Peace Accord in Dr Mandela's address
to the Security Council

It is our contention that the ANC has on many occasions violated the National Peace Accord by the way it has unfairly, and we would argue maliciously, maligned the

Inkatha Freedom Party and the President of the IFP.

There have been many ANC violations of Chapter 2, but we specifically cite the attack that Mr Mandela made against the IFP in his address to the United Nations Security Council on Wednesday last week as the most recent and most

serious violation of this chapter.

We quote from his address to the Security Council:

- an independent socio-political and development agency known as Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) has prepared five reports in regard to the pattern of violence.

One of these reports comes to the conclusion that:

'the violence appears to be switched off at strategic moments'

It continues :

'behind the scale of brutality... is the clear evidence that the violence erupts at points when it most weakens the ANC and its Allies and dies down dramatically when it would most harm the Government of FW de Klerk!'

It goes on to say:

'two political parties have clearly benefited from the Reef violence. The Tiraet is the National Party Government....The second major beneficiary has been Inkatha.'

Mr Mandela also said:

Another report deals with 13 attacks on funerals and funeral vigils which took place on the Reef between July, 1990 and July, 1991. This study concludes that there is an overwhelming predominance of acts of aggression carried out by the supporters of the Inkatha Freedom Party. Those attacks moreover, are carried out with the active or passive support of the South African Police.'

Mr Mandela in his address to the Security Council said that 200 Inkatha members were trained by the South African Defence Force in Namibia, and cited sworn affidavits which claimed that they had been trained in offensive warfare.

Mr Mandela said "The fact of the matter however is that the IFP has permitted itself to become an extension of the Pretoria regime, its instrument and surrogate."

Against all the evidence to the contrary Mr Mandela maintains that "its activities have been financed by the South African Government. There is an abundance of evidence that it continues to benefit from covert

co-operation with the South African Government".

In speaking about the IFP he said "However, it is not an independent force with whom the ANC must enter into an

agreement to end the violence in the country as the

Pretoria regime asserts."

These assertions were made before the whole world which was focused on what was being said in the Security Council debate on violence on South Africa. The damage to the IFP

is enormous and is indeed incalculable.

This was not the first occasion on which Mr Mandela has made these kind of accusations against the IFP. Appearing in an ITV Granada television programme "World in Action - South Africa" on 27th January 1992, viewers were told that the Government is aiming to kill, while talking reform. After Mr Mandela stated that the Government could stop the violence if they so wished the commentator added that the SAG gave funds to the IFP because they wanted to build it

up at the expense of the ANC.

The commentator added that Inkatha supporters caused most of the violence and that IFP rallies are often funded by Government. He said that IFP rallies often led to killing. After showing scenes of commuters in trains, the commentary added that the police not only stood by and watched the IFP

kill people - they also asked them to do so.

Our complaint is, inter alia, that Mr Mandela participated in this type of programme. He actually participated in a programme in which he said that the Security Forces had taken over the violence and were using certain Black organisations to carry out the violence that they themselves wanted. Quite clearly Mr Mandela was referring to the IFP.

We cite the Granada Television programme as evidence of the seriousness with which Mr Mandela's malicious attack against the IFP in his Security Council address, must be regarded. These attacks are not isolated attacks but are part of an ongoing violation of Chapter 2 of the National Peace Accord.

There are numerous instances of similar attacks. We cite only one additional instance of many instances. Mr andela, in a wreath-laying ceremony, said that those responsible for 13 000 deaths, were members of Inkatha, the KwaZulu Police and certain elements in the SADF's Military Intelligence and SAP.

We reserve the right to make detailed submissions indicating the extent and duration of the ANC's attacks against the integrity of the IFP. We have very substantial evidence of what has been a continuing attempt to

marginalise the IFP for over a decade. ANC propaganda has had disastrous consequences for peace and negotiations in this country. Our submission is not exhaustive and we will

make more detailed submissions at the appropriate time.

Mr Mandela's address to the Security Council must be seen as part of an ongoing vendetta against the IFP which

incites ordinary people to violence against it.

The mock trials held in Pietermaritzburg and Cape Town recently, are further evidence of a systematic attempt by the ANC to develop grassroot anger against the IFP which has the effect of increasing tensions and precipitating more violence. We have already lodged complaints with the

NPC about these mock trials.

It is against the total background of these attacks against the IFP which form a continuing ANC violation of Chapter 2 of the Accord, that Mr Mandela's address to the Security

Council must be seen as a culminating event.

The gravity of the situation can not be over-stressed. Until this matter has been resolved and Mr Mandela

withdraws from the position he adopted in his address to

the United Nations Security Council, bi-lateral relations between the IFP and the ANC can not be sustained and the requirements of clause 2.5 of the Accord can not be met.

20th July 1992

The international view of Mr Nelson Mandela, the President of the African National Congress (ANC) is disconcerting. Mr Mandela has fostered a belief within the international community that unless the demands of the ANC are satisfied, the transition to democracy will not occur. This was particularly notable at the UN Security

Council Meeting in New York on 15 July 1992.

The UN's stance towards the ANC was clearly supportive. Mr Mandela was scheduled as the second speaker, but I was only forty fourth. This can be attributed to the ANC's intense lobbying abroad in its determination to exclude all other political

players in South Africa.

However, Mr Mandela's international agenda, as well as his agenda within South Africa, is clearly antagonistic and divisive politics. This is explicitly reflected in a statement made by Mr Mandela at the UN Security Council refusing to enter into an

agreement with the IFP to end the violence in the country. This

statement constitutes a blatant violation of the jointly agreed principles of the National Peace Accord, as outlined in Clause 2.5 of the said agreement.

If the ANC refuses to enter into an agreement with the IFP to end the violence in the country, there is no hope that the civil war in our Black communities will end, and the present crisis of violence will remain unresolved. Hence, the ANC is solely guilty of destroying the process of negotiations and the national peace initiative.

In addition, Mr Mandela made certain outrageous and unsupported allegations against the IFP, blaming the IFP for much of the violence evident in our country. This statement received international coverage, causing irreparable damage to the integrity of the IFP, as well as posing a serious violation to

Clause 2.4 of the National Peace Accord.

These allegations were made by Mr Mandela without him presenting concrete evidence of any kind to justify the content of his comments. The ANC's continual use of widespread, defamatory and destructive propaganda in no way contributes to the creation of a climate of political tolerance, or to the public's understanding of South Africa's current political scenario. Rather these scandalous accusations and unsupported lies pose a direct danger to human life, by increasing the political tension and conflict between the IFP and the ANC.

Mr Mandela's statement to the Security Council is part of the ANC's vicious onslaught against the IFP. The ANC and its allies are continuously violating or ignoring the jointly determined principles and legal solutions of the National Peace Accord, and are relentless in their malicious attack against the integrity

of the IFP.

The IFP vehemently condemns the propaganda warfare waged by the ANC but legal redress through the South African courts for the abhorrent desecration of the personal integrity, and rights of the IFP leadership, and its members is proving quite inadequate. The ANC has created a culture in which people are not proved guilty as accused, but found guilty if accused. A barrage of allegations made by the ANC/SACP Alliance are seen as prima facie

evidence in itself by the media and the international community.

The ANC has been allowed to get away with threats to march to Ulundi to oust the KwaZulu Government and the IFP. The aim of the ANC is also to provoke and to isolate other legitimate political groups in South Africa. The consequences of this for

the future stability of this country will be appalling.

The ANC has a history of violent provocation and intimidatory tactics in order to achieve its goals. However, if one takes cognizance of the background to the situation of violence, it is clearly apparent that the anarchy reigning in some parts of South

Africa today, is a direct result of the ANC's previous campaign

to make the country ungovernable - a campaign which has left a very nasty aftermath however futile it proved to be in the end. There has now of course developed as we can see in similar situations in the world, violence and counter-violence. There is revenge violence and pre-emptive violence which in total has resulted in the endemic violence that we have seen in the last 7 years.

A characteristic feature of many black areas is extreme poverty and deprivation - problems emanating from years of suppression and exploitation under racist apartheid rule. Many communities in our country lack even the most basic amenities such as ablutions, water supply, electricity and roads.

There is a desperate scarcity of resources, land and health facilities - issues exacerbating the squalor and hardship many of our people are forced to endure. These socio-economic inadequacies germinate discontent and rebellious behaviour, particularly since no avenues exist in which to vent these frustrations.

It is not difficult to understand how these regions became prime targets for the ANC's revolutionary activities and policy of destabilisation.

The ANC has never been interested in peaceful reform. They have actively sought to overthrow the South African Government, regardless of how it would be achieved, or how long it would take

the country to recover from the resultant chaos and misery. Not to mention the alarming tally of innocent civilian lives.

The ANC's strategy of ungovernability set off a vicious circle of attack and counter-attack, mindlessly provoking violent backlashes from some of their more proactive targets. The ferocity of this backlash took the ANC by surprise. Their popular, and claimed nationwide support is now in question. As a result the ANC's 'people's war', which was initiated to overthrow the state, transformed into a declaration of war against many sections of the black community. We can recall here that even Mr Alfred Nzo, as the then Secretary-General of the ANC, explained the brutal necklacing method, as a method which

the people at home had devised to deal with traitors.

What also needs to be exposed is that although representative

political parties can negotiate up to a point, and pledge to put

the 'past behind' in a bid to move forward to an acceptable future political compromise, this same degree of accommodation

can not be expected from the people on the ground.

Many of our marginalised youth are those who sacrificed their education and their careers fighting for liberation. The ANC's heroes of yesterday are the rejects of today. These children were used as the ANC's shock troops. They were politically indoctrinated to heed slogans such as 'liberation now and education later'. They now form the ranks of the workless, many

turning to crime and prostitution to survive. They are not only

unemployed, but unemployable, with no skills of any kind, and with no hope for the future. They don't foresee the possibility of the political players coming up with something that can change the route of their lives.

Community dwellers are exposed to a climate of revolution every day of their lives - at home, at school, and in their communities. Many have become the victims of the bloody political violence and are forced to make sense of their lives as they act to reconstruct a normal life within the ravages of the struggle. Nobody can realistically expect these victims of violence to put their anger, bitterness and grief aside in the aftermath of civil war and destruction where family members have died. Poverty is rife, and the violence continues.

The manner in which political violence in South Africa is being reported is assuming critical importance because such reports play a crucial role in either defusing tensions or exacerbating confrontation. Evidence of this was given in the South African Institute of 'Race Relations' latest report, 'Spotlight on Disinformation about Violence in South Africa', conducted by Dr Anthea Jeffrey.

Dr Jeffrey's report clearly reveals how various international monitoring bodies have used methodology which involves the suppression of information which does not fit their theses, the elevation of untested allegations to fact, and a consistent

disregard for the principle of giving a fair hearing to the other side. 1In omitting the realities of any given situation, these organisations not only distort the causes of violence, but also set the stage for increased confrontation. Reports which are

seen as one-sided can easily fan the flames of violence.

The enquiry into the violence in South Africa conducted by the International Commission of Jurists was totally rejected by the IFP as a shocking distortion of the reality of the situation, leaving the real perpetrators of the violence unscathed. Their report, condemning the IFP's complicity in the violence, is based on unfair inferences drawn from ANC political propaganda, which

they took as firm evidence against the IFP.

This commission totally ignored the hard fact that the IFP is the most targeted political organisation in the country in terms of attacks, deaths and assassinations. They condemn the action of the KwaZulu Police, but blatantly disregard the ANC's promotion

of its private army, Umkhonto we Sizwe.

Any enquiry into the violence in South Africa should aim to reduce the levels of violence, promote the saving of lives, and reconcile opposing political organisations. The focus of the national monitoring programme must be broadened significantly, with more attention given to the root causes of the violence,

rather than attributing violence solely to political factors.

If the situation continues where the ANC is permitted to slander, intimidate and manipulate the political processes in South Africa, civil war remains an ever present threat. This is something we should try to avoid at all costs.

UN observers have been brought into South Africa to monitor the tense situation on the ground. However, any form of monitoring and mediation done by an international body, or by the National Peace Accord itself, is mnot nearly sufficient to control the forces at play. The time has come to move towards arbitration and adjudication.

The content and consequences of the actions and statements made by political organisations in South Africa must be made to stand up to intense cross examination by an all-powerful legal body. The agitators of political violence must be held accountable for their actions. This is the only hope of resolving the current political crisis.

For the IFP it is important that the major political players in South Africa work very closely with each other to further the peace process, and get final phase negotiations under way.

The IFP complaint to the National Peace Committee about Mr Mandela's address to the Security Council was motivated by the need to normalise political relations with the ANC. Without normalising relations, the IFP and the ANC will not be able to

undertake joint action for peace, nor will they be able to act together to put South Africa first in the negotiation process.

While the ANC regards the IFP as a 'surrogate' of the Government, and says that it is not an independent force with whom the ANC must enter into an agreement to end the violence in the country, the co-operation needed for peace and negotiations is just not possible.

The IFP has more reason than any other organisation to seek peace. It suffers the most casualties in the violence. No other organisation has its leaders targeted for death as does the IFP.

IFP leaders are actually targeted for assassination.

The differences between the ANC and the IFP are dominantly strategic differences. The IFP adopted the strategy of opposing apartheid within the country with non-violent democratic opposition. The ANC chose to rely on the armed struggle and the punitive international isolation of South Africa.

The two strategies clashed in that the IFP could not support the ANC options, and the ANC demanded such support.

The ANC raised the question of participation, or non-participation, to the level of principle, where the IFP continued to regard the question as a strategy question.

Down through the years, and even the decades, the ANC has regarded the IFP's strategic decisions as evidence of its betrayal to the cause of the Black struggle for liberation. Persistence in this view will lead to unbridgeable cleavages and ultimately to civil war.

Mr Mandela's address to the Security Council containing the charges against the IFP that are in it, deepens this cleavage, incites hatred, and has the net effect of increasing levels of tension leading to violence.

The Peace Accord itself, and the whole peace process are threatened by escalating violence. The National Peace Committee was the only national forum in the land where the IFP's complaint about Mr Mandela's speech to the Security Council could be tabled. The IFP's action is a last resort action to clear the way ahead to put the negotiation process back on track.

The IFP is an independent political party which has its roots in the democratic support it enjoys. It is membership based. It has a democratic constitution. It elects its leaders democratically, and its policy and its strategic decisions are arrived at democratically.

The IFP feels particularly aggrieved because nobody fought more consistently for the release of Mr Nelson Mandela than I did. I steadfastly refused to be drawn into any constitutional negotiations until Mr Mandela and other political prisoners were

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released from jail and Black organisations were unbanned. Mr Mandela in fact expressed his gratitude for the fight I put up for him. Mr de Klerk acknowledged my constructive role in his

now famous address to Parliament on February 2 1990.

The charge of surrogacy is absurd, inter alia, on the following grounds:

- The IFP is a membership based political party with ordinary members serving as delegates to the Annual General Conferences of the party, electing leaders and deciding on

policy and strategy issues.

- The IFP is democratically structured with individual members forming branches which have elected leaders, and with Constituency and Regional structures which are elected democratically by delegates from branches. There are also

Provincial and National structures elected democratically.

- The Annual General Conference is the party's supreme authority, and an Annual General Conference has been held for every year of the IFP's existence. Each and every year the leadership of the IFP is held accountable to Conference, and it is Conference which formulates, and

accepts or rejects policy and strategy proposals.

- I am the elected President of the IFP and I am also elected as Chief Minister of KwaZulu.

The specific complaint against Mr Nelson Mandela for his address to the Security Council must be put in the context of a decade and a half long attempt to destroy the credibility, and even the existence, of the IFP.

The present complaint can not be separated from past actions of the ANC against the IFP. Mr Nelson Mandela's address to the Security Council rests on past attacks against the IFP, having no legitimacy in the Black struggle for liberation, and having no legitimacy as a regional authority in the South African state. The IFP and the KwaZulu Government, it has been argued by the ANC/SACP Alliance, have been traitors to the cause of freedom, and this argument is being reiterated again and again by them.

The Durban IFP/ANC Accord and its aftermath

The IFP and the ANC did come together in January 1991 and reached an Accord in the consultation at the Royal Hotel in Durban but

the Accord was destroyed by:

- Mr Nelson Mandela's Open Letter to the State President in April 1991
- the ANC's Midland Region opposition to the growing co-operation between the ANC and the IFP

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- Mr Nelson Mandela's withdrawal from his own proposal that he and I share a platform for peace in the violence-torn

Pietermaritzburg area

= Mr Nelson Mandela's subsequent refusal to respond positively to my repeated proposals that we act together

for peace and share public platforms

- the growth of vitriolic attacks against my integrity and person

Â» the culminating address by Mr Nelson Mandela to the Security Council.

The Record of Understanding signed by Mr de Klerk and Mr Nelson Mandela is strong evidence to support the IFP's contention that the denigration of me and the IFP is intended to prepare the way for the ANC's seizure of power politics if that organisation continues to be defeated democratically as it was defeated in CODESA working Group II, and in the Plenary Session of CODESA II in May.

The adjudication

Given the total background of political attacks against the IFP and this House, Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, we could not but make Mr Mandela's address to the Security Council a make or break issue.

The IFP formally complained to the National Peace Committee about Mr Mandela's address to the Security Council. The ANC did not respond at all to the complaint, except to take the position that the IFP was indeed a surrogate organisation.

In terms of the provisions of Chapter 9 of the Peace Accord the IFP called for adjudication, and because the complaint was in an international venue, the IFP insisted on international adjudicators. We nominated Dr Kenneth Kaunda and Dr Julius

Nyerere.

Finally Dr Kaunda accepted, and Dr Nyerere declined, and he was replaced, by agreement, by Mr Justice Kotze.

The adjudication hearing took place on Monday 19th October with both the IFP and the ANC having legal representation.

The limitations of the Peace Accord

Chapter 9 of the Peace Accord only makes provision for complaints arising out of infringements of the provisions of Chapter 2,

dealing with the Code of Conduct of political parties.

The fact that Mr Mandela's address struck at the heart of the Accord, which drew signatories together to act in concert, was not actionable in terms of Chapter 9 provisions.

Also the fact that the purpose of the Accord and the spirit of the Accord were flagrantly trampled beneath the feet of vicious political propaganda, was also not actionable.

Senior Counsel represented thus, and presented our complaint to Dr Kaunda and Mr Justice Kotze arguing that Mr Mandela's statements were an infringement of the first sentence of the National Peace Accord's clause 2.4, whether the charge of surrogacy was justified or not justified.

The ANC, in its presentation, insisted that the IFP was a surrogate organisation and was responsible for many killings and a great deal of violence.

Dr Kaunda and Mr Justice Kotze reserved judgement and made no findings, and Dr Kaunda subsequently sought to play a

facilitating and intermediary role between myself and Mr Mandela.

The real political issue at stake

The real political issue is the ANC's commitment to the total destruction of the IFP as its main opposition in its seizure of power politics.

We note:

= that it was only the combined effort of the IFP, the ANC and the South African Government which succeeded in getting

the peace process going, and it was these three parties

which made the National Peace Convention possible, and which made it possible to draw up the National Peace

Accord.

it was only this joint action, and further joint action, which made it possible to set up the November 1991

Preparatory Committee.

it was only the continued co-operation of the IFP, the ANC, and Government which finally made the setting up of CODESA

I, possible.

It is this political dependence on co-operation with the IFP and the Government which the ANC now wants to eradicate. Mr Mandela once suggested in 1991, that he, President de Klerk and I should go to the violence ravaged areas to address joint Peace Rallies. He actually phoned to ask me if I was for the idea, and I told him that I was willing to go with him and President de Klerk to address the meetings which he suggested. President de Klerk suggested to Mr Mandela that we should meet first, before going

out to address the rallies.

Mr Mandela agreed to this but it could not be done immediately

as he had to go to North Africa. On his return from this African

trip, Mr Mandela addressed a meeting in the Johannesburg City

Hall. He stated that he would not give credibility to a 'Troika' (as he put it) going with me and President de Klerk. He has

repeated this on several other occasions.

In the preliminary meetings to set up CODESA I, ANC representatives tried to break this dependence and refused even to sit in the same room with the IFP in initial discussions in December 1991. Quite clearly, CODESA I would never have got off the ground:if the ANC had persisted, and the interdependence was again established.

It was IFP opposition to the ANC which led to their democratic defeat in CODESA Working Group II and in CODESA II.

Everything the ANC is now doing is being done to finally break the ANC dependence on the IFP.

This is why Mr Mandela, in his address to the Security Council, classified the IFP as a surrogate organisation with which he does not have to enter into any agreements to act against violence.

Mr Mandela wants now only to deal with President de Klerk on constitutional and negotiation issues, and then use multi-party forums to flesh out the bones of agreements between himself and

Mr de Klerk.

IFP options

The IFP has two options:

to withdraw from the National Peace Accord as the only existing forum in which the ANC and Government has perforce to co-operate with the IFP.

to move to amend the National Peace Accord to give it mechanisms which would hold the ANC accountable for death, violence and destruction, and the negotiation of the basis for true multi-party negotiations.

= TO BE CONTINUED -