

SPM/004/0009/6 u.d

ADVANCE TO NATIONAL DEMOCRACY:

(GUIDELINES ON STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE ANC)

1. INTRODUCTION:

1.0. After 30 years of illegality, the ANC is once more able to operate within South Africa as a legal organisation. This also holds true for our ally, the SACP, which was banned for forty years, as well as other organisations. Political prisoners are being released and those who had been driven into exile are returning. The ANC has moved back into the country its National headquarters and leading organs.

2.0. These developments reflect the deep, all-round crisis afflicting the apartheid system. The South African economy is in shambles, and the majority of the people refused to be governed by a regime not based on their will. The apartheid regime and the ruling National Party have been forced to openly admit that the system of white minority domination and exploitation has failed and can no longer be maintained. They have accepted that it is necessary to enter into negotiations with the National Liberation Movement for the elaboration and adoption of a new constitution.

3.0. Apartheid stands condemned by the world community of nations as a crime against humanity. The International community is at one in seeking an end to system of apartheid and the creation of a society based on the will of all the people.

4.0. All these developments represent a major victory for the forces, led by the ANC, which have struggled for many decades for the destruction of the system of white minority domination and the transformation of South Africa into a united democratic and non-racial country. The immediate issue on the agenda is the question of political power, to effect the transfer of power into the hands of the people as a whole is the most crucial and immediate challenge facing the National Democratic Movement.

5.0 Despite the strategic advance made by the liberation movement, the regime still retains the capacity to implement counter measures on a whole range of fronts. The white ruling group has entered the negotiations with its own agenda. A radically reformed system of apartheid which will retain the essential of white domination of the economic, political and social institutions in a manner that would constitute surrender on the part of the ANC; delays in the implementation of agreements reached and the systematic use of violence and other repressive measures against the people - all these are part of Pretoria's arsenal to weaken the ANC and its allies and derail the struggle for National Liberation.

6.0 In the words of the (OAU Harare) declaration, many factors are at play "which, if there is demonstrable readiness on the part of the Pretoria regime to engage in negotiations genuinely and sincerely, could create the possibility to end apartheid through negotiations". Whether or not this process unfolds towards the desired end, depends primarily on the strength of the National Democratic Movement, the main function of which is the people in political motion.

11 BALANCE OF FORCES:

7.0 The mid-1970's witnessed the commencement of a process that has led the passing of the initiative in Southern Africa from the forces of colonialism and reaction, to those of National Liberation and democracy. The defeat of Portuguese colonialism, the fall of the Rhodesian colonial regime and the decolonisation of Namibia have placed the seal of permanence on these changes. The Pretoria regime's campaign of destabilisation and blackmail against neighboring states has exacted great dislocation and losses in the form of life and property. But it has failed to roll back the frontiers of African Liberation. Today, South Africa is the only country in which white domination, rooted in the past, is maintained.

8.0 The crisis of apartheid colonialism is also a result of concerted campaigns by the people of the world against this system, and in solidarity with the struggling masses of South Africa. It is these mass-based campaigns which brought pressure to bear on the governments of Western Europe and Northern America to take some practical measures to isolate the apartheid regime. The limited sanctions, the cultural, academic and sport boycott, as well as divestment and pressure on financial loans were also influenced by the struggles within South Africa and the unfavourable economic climate resulting, in part, from these struggles. The status of the ANC among the people.

1 and the governments of the world has grown, and it is recognised by friend and
2 foe alike as an alternative power within South Africa.

3
4 9.0 The collapse of a number of governments in Eastern Europe, and the crisis
5 facing the socialist system has somewhat weakened the camp of the forces
6 opposed to apartheid. The fact that these countries have been among the closest
7 allies of the ANC and the struggling people of South Africa on its own warrants
8 that the National Democratic Movement should draw relevant lessons from
9 these experiences. This applies in particular to the question of rooting the anti-
10 apartheid campaign among the mass of the people in all countries of the world.
11 Related to this is the tendency among some governments to relax pressure on
12 the apartheid regime. Such a measure can only have the effect of weakening the
13 national democratic struggle and thus slow down the process of peaceful
14 transition to a new democratic order in South Africa. At the same time, the
15 liberation Movement must creatively utilise the positive developments in the
16 international arena, such as the relaxation of tension among the developed
17 countries, and the enhanced role of the UN.

18
19 10.0 The crisis of apartheid stems, first and foremost, from the objective
20 contradictions rooted within the system. It is due to the system of capitalist
21 exploitation based on colonial racial relations that the South African economy is
22 today experiencing a deep structural crisis. While the system of super-
23 exploitation of the black majority all long fully served the interest of big
24 business and the state, this has become a brake on the development of the
25 economy as whole. Negative growth rates, low investor confidence, spiralling
26 inflation, shortage of skilled personnel—all these are the fruits of apartheid. The
27 problems of massive unemployment, shortage of housing, high prices and
28 others, resulting from this crisis, cannot be resolved within the ambit of the
29 apartheid system. The state and the big business are neither willing to, nor
30 capable of, curing these ills.

31
32 11.0 The struggles of the masses, led by the ANC, are the primary factor which
33 has precipitated the crisis of apartheid.

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35 11.1 The mass revolts of the 1980s were characterised by the following major
36 factors :

37 * protest around day-to-day issues and united mass action consistently linked
38 to the primary question of national liberation;

39 * mass uprisings in the urban and rural areas challenging apartheid power
40 relations and leading to the emergence of rudimentary organs of people's
41 power;

42 * progressive merger between mass and armed actions reflected in the street
43 battles and barricades and the emergence of popular combat groups;

1 * emergence of sectoral democratic organisations such as the youth, students,
2 women's and cultural organisations and civics, and their coalition into a front for
3 national democracy, the UDF;

4 * the emergence of broad coalition of anti-apartheid forces on a minimum
5 platform against tyranny and the effects of national oppression; and

6 * the growth of anti-apartheid forces within the white community, including
7 elements close to the ruling establishment.

8
9 11.2 A crucial role in these developments was played by the ANC from the
10 underground. This was complemented through the open contacts established
11 with various anti-apartheid forces and those elements who did not agree with
12 all our policies but shared the desire to see the normalisation of the situation
13 on the basis of the eradication of apartheid. Increasingly, the ANC gained
14 acceptance among forces opposed to apartheid as the leader in the struggle and
15 the alternative to the present government.

16
17 11.3 The armed struggle waged by Umkhonto weSizwe contributed immensely
18 to the deepening of the crisis of apartheid. By giving the much-needed cutting
19 edge to the mass uprisings, it helped to weaken the apartheid establishment
20 and to mobilise the masses into militant action. The support armed struggle
21 enjoyed among the oppressed people, and their growing involvement in various
22 forms of armed activity, helped to shape the struggle towards becoming a
23 generalised people's war against the apartheid regime.

24
25 11.4 It is a combination of all these factors which deepened the crisis of the
26 ruling class. Faced with a subject population unwilling to be governed the old
27 way, the Pretoria regime resorted to repression and petty reform, in order to
28 reassert its authority. All these attempts failed to quell popular resistance. This
29 crisis of policy helped to deepen conflict within the white ruling bloc. Confusion
30 and uncertainty within the white community, and desertion by leading
31 ideologues of apartheid further undermined the ideological platform of the
32 ruling group.

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34 12.0 It is against the backdrop of these developments that the regime has been
35 forced to introduce some changes. These changes constitute a strategic defeat
36 for the apartheid regime and an open admission on its part that all its counter-
37 revolutionary efforts, both inside and outside the country, have failed to
38 suppress and crush the National Liberation Movement of our country. The
39 strength and the invincibility of this Movement, the just cause and the
40 adherence of the overwhelming majority of our people to the democratic
41 perspectives represented by our Movement are being borne out by history.
42

1 13.0. The regime has completely failed to achieve its central objective of the
2 perpetuation of white minority domination through the use of state terrorism.
3 Its attempts to divide and weaken the oppressed through balkanisation of the
4 country and the conduct of a campaign of aggression and destabilisation in the
5 sub-continent have not resolved the problems of apartheid. Nor have its earlier
6 attempts to co-opt the oppressed people through the tri-cameral parliament,
7 town councils and as such so called negotiations fora as the National Council and
8 the Great Indaba.

9
10 14.0. The liberation Movement has set the stage and defined the agenda of the
11 current phase of struggle. Having taken the initiative to define the terrain
12 within which the genuine negotiations should take place, the democratic
13 Movement also ensured that its approach enjoys the unanimous formal support
14 of the international community, reflected in the OAU(Harare) and UN General
15 Assembly Declarations. However, it should be emphasised that the balance of
16 forces which has made the beginning of negotiations possible is not necessarily
17 one which can lead to a genuine resolution of the conflict.

18
19 15.0. While the liberation Movement set the arena for the present phase and
20 thus enjoys the strategic initiative, the balance of forces is not a static
21 phenomenon. The regime seek to minimise the impact of the general crisis of
22 apartheid on itself, and to regain the strategic initiative. In fact, in the months
23 particularly after the August 1990 Pretoria Summit between the ANC and the
24 government, the regime utilised the terrain of negotiations more effectively
25 than the liberation Movement. Combined with devastating campaign of violence
26 against African communities, this led to situations in which the liberation
27 Movement was losing the tactical initiative to the regime. This was compounded
28 by the sense among the international community that the talks and contact with
29 the regime implied a de-escalation of the struggle against apartheid. In this
30 regard, "talks-about-talks" and negotiations must be seen as a terrain of
31 intense struggle.

32
33 16.0. The victories we have scored pose many challenges to the liberation
34 Movement. Objectively, we are operating under conditions in which most
35 institutions of apartheid remain intact. The state machinery still possesses the
36 capacity to wreak havoc. Resources of all kinds, including funds and media,
37 remain in the hands of a white minority establishment. Subjectively, our
38 Movement has not been fast enough in establishing its organisational machinery
39 and adapting to the new terrain of struggle. To understand the essence of this
40 terrain, it is necessary to examine the basic issues around which negotiations
41 revolve.

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III. NATURE OF SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY:

17.0. The space won by the liberation Movement and the possibility of negotiations do not change the essence of apartheid power relations. The South African regime remains a racist, colonial state, specifically created as a result of the pact concluded between the British imperialism and the white settler minority in 1910. In spite of various modifications, its main characteristics remain.

Firstly, it is a system of minority rule in which the black majority are by law excluded from central organs of power. Except for marginal delegated powers, political power is explicitly the monopoly of the white minority. Further, this system is rooted in the policies, traditions and practices of male domination.

Secondly, it is based on the dispossession of the indigenous peoples of their land and its wealth. The formal repeal of the Land Acts and commercialisation of ownership rights only entrench this act of dispossession.

Thirdly, it is a system of labour coercion, based on the deliberate impoverishment of African people and regulations designed to compel them to avail themselves as sources of cheap labour.

Fourthly, it is a system in which access to productive capacity and property, as well as distribution of income, are racially defined, with the real property-owning class drawn exclusively from the white minority.

18.0. The principal beneficiaries of the system of race domination are the class of monopoly capitalists who control most sectors of the economy. Together, the top six companies account for almost 90% of all shares on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Because of the material benefits accruing to the white community as a whole and the ideology of white supremacy, the ruling class has over the years forged an alliance with other classes and strata within this community. The strain that has emerged within this alliance is a reflection of the economic and political crisis of apartheid: primarily, the increasing failure of the system to provide aplenty to the white community and to guarantee them all-round security. Sections of the white community, including forces within the big business, have come to accept the need for fundamental change. Others are vowed to fight against this, as shown in the growth of right-wing parties and para-military organisations.

19.0. One of the chief elements in the regime's strategy has been to seek auxiliaries from among the oppressed themselves. The bantustan system was the first comprehensive attempt to create a cast of junior partners to whom the regime would delegate some powers of social control and repression. Through the tri-cameral parliament and local government structures the regime has sought to expand the base of collaborators. It is a reflection of the depth of the

crises of the system, that more and more forces from the ranks of the bantustan and other local government functionaries have abandoned the ship of apartheid and seek to align themselves with the democratic Movement. These forces include elements within the civil service, the army and police, and therefore constitute an important loss to the regime.

20.0. The contradiction between the black majority and the white oppressor state is the most visible and dominant within South Africa. Conflict within our society derives from the system of oppression and exploitation. This contradiction cannot be resolved by the apartheid state reforming itself. Attempts by the ruling Nationalist Party to change its image and on that basis draw around itself a coalition of forces primarily from the black community are aimed at blunting this contradiction on a platform of modified white domination.

21.0. The sense of national grievance against oppression and the fight against exploitation constitute the driving force of the national democratic revolution. The liberation Movement faces the challenge of harnessing these elements into a mighty force to sweep aside the apartheid state and create a united, non-racial and democratic society. Attempts by the regime and its allies to divert the masses from this reality, and to confine the terrain of debate and contest to areas conveniently defined by the champions of oppression and exploitation must be resisted.

IV. CHARACTER AND FORCES OF TRANSFORMATION:

22.0. The victories by the democratic Movement do not change the strategic aims of the struggle. Our central objective remains the transfer of power to the people as whole, and the use of that power to create a socio-economic system that will meet the aspirations of all the people of our country. The guidelines outlining the society we wish to build are contained in the Freedom Charter, a document which has become the property of the broad movement for democratic change. The broad perspectives the Movement puts forward towards the realisation of these goals are:

22.1. The adoption, through negotiations in an elected Constituent Assembly, of a constitution based on the principle of one-person one- vote in united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South Africa.

22.2. The guarantee of the fundamental human rights of all South Africans, including their rights to life, liberty, language, culture, religion, freedom of press and freedom from racial abuse. This will be underpinned by such means as an entrenched Bill of rights, a multi-party system of government, a representative and independent judiciary and regular elections to all relevant organs of government.

1 22.3. The restructuring of the economy, as mixed economy, to ensure that
 2 while it achieves high rates of growth, it also meets the fundamental needs of
 3 all the people by abolishing poverty and racial inequalities in the distribution of
 4 wealth. The economy must enable all citizens of our country to enjoy a rising
 5 standard of living. This will demand of all sectors of the economy - state
 6 owned, private, cooperative and others - to allocate resources and implement
 7 policies in keeping with this common national requirement.

8
 9 23.0. The main content of the national democratic revolution is the liberation of
 10 the black people in general and Africans in particular. The oppressed black
 11 masses objectively stand to gain from the victory of this struggle. Among the
 12 coalition of national and social forces, the African people are the most adversely
 13 affected by the policies of apartheid. Victims of armed conquest and land
 14 dispossession, and the chief object of racial policies, they carry the burden of
 15 the edifice of white domination. The regime, in its counter-revolutionary
 16 schemes, has targeted the African people to foment divisions and weaken the
 17 liberation alliance in its entirety. To defeat these schemes demands a principled,
 18 creative and flexible approach on the part of the democratic Movement. This
 19 demands of the African people that they take the lead in combatting any
 20 notions of racial or ethnic chauvinism and create the basis for the emergence of
 21 a common South African national identity.

22
 23 24.0. The Coloured and Indian people are also victims of national oppression
 24 and share with the African people a desire for national emancipation. These
 25 oppressed communities are an integral part of the motive forces of struggle.
 26 Over the years, through differential treatment, the white minority regime has
 27 sought to attach these communities to itself. The resounding rejection of these
 28 schemes by the Coloured and Indian people in the struggle, is a fitting rebuff to
 29 the regime. Unity of the black people on the basis of unequivocal equality is
 30 vital for the success of our struggle.

31
 32 25.0. It has always been the view of the ANC that the system of apartheid is
 33 the detriment of the South African people as whole. The entrenchment of racial
 34 hatred and mistrust between black and white, economic dislocation, international
 35 isolation, subjection to warped doctrines of racial superiority, constrains on
 36 human freedoms - all these affect the white community as well. The existence
 37 of an oppressed and restive majority is also a source of great insecurity; and
 38 whites cannot claim to be free and at peace when the rest of their country -
 39 men and women are oppressed. The insecurity among the sections of white
 40 community is compounded by the fact that the Nationalist Party is increasingly
 41 aligning itself with the position of big business to the relative detriment of the
 42 lower classes and strata of the white population.

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1 The ANC has consistently worked for the unity of all the anti-apartheid forces,
 2 black and white, for the realisation of a future democracy, peace and equality.
 3 The growth of the movement for democracy within the white community is an
 4 indispensable factor in the realisation of the victories scored by the liberation
 5 Movement and for future advance. It is in the theatre of struggle that the
 6 foundation of the South African nation is being forged. As the genuine
 7 alternative to the apartheid system, the democratic Movement must marry, in
 8 splendid combination, the tasks of forging black unity and consolidating the
 9 non-racial content of the struggle.

10
 11 26.0. Various classes, strata and social groups constitute the coalition of forces
 12 struggling for national democracy. Black workers occupy a special place among
 13 these forces. As a class subject to exploitation, and responsible for creation of
 14 the greater part of social wealth, they will be among the chief beneficiaries of
 15 fundamental transformation. In the field of organisation and struggle, they have
 16 emerged as the leading force. Alongside them have been students, the rural
 17 poor, professionals, black business-people, traditional leaders and others. The
 18 ANC considers it crucial to organise and mobilise various sectors of the
 19 population - women, youth, the religious community, cultural workers and
 20 others - into active struggle against apartheid. While these forces occupy varied
 21 positions on the economic ladder, this does not subtract from the fact of their
 22 oppression as blacks. It is the task of the ANC to unite all these forces, on the
 23 basis of their specific grievances and shared desire to rid our country of
 24 apartheid and all forms of inequality into a mighty force of national liberation.

25
 26 27.0. These tasks are being carried out in a situation in which new possibilities
 27 have emerged for the widest organisation and mobilisation of the forces for
 28 fundamental change. Given the legal space conquered in the struggle, the ANC
 29 must strive to reach out to all our people, black and white. The desire of
 30 overwhelming majority for a peaceful transition, which the ANC is sincerely
 31 pursuing, affords the Movement ever wider possibilities to assert itself as the
 32 force representing genuinely national patriotic interests. The Movement must at
 33 all times exercise maximum creativity and take advantage of new possibilities
 34 to unite the people as a whole and speed up the process towards the creation of
 35 a just and peaceful dispensation which will be in the interest of all in our
 36 society.

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 38 28.0. At the same time, new dangers have emerged, with the regime
 39 desperately seeking to win over as many people as possible to its camp. By
 40 attempting to present itself as a force of change, while weakening the forces of
 41 opposition, it hopes to undermine the liberation struggle and reverse the
 42 popular gains achieved at much suffering and sacrifice on the part of the mass
 43 of the people.

by hook or
 2 crook, a constitution which entrenches apartheid in a new disguised form.
 3 Attempts to limit the powers of a new government, and entrenchment of white
 4 privilege in property and land ownership and distribution of income, are
 5 cunningly designed cloaks under which to perpetuate the system of white
 6 minority domination. Their implementation will leave the lot of the black people
 7 unchanged. The democratic Movement faces the challenge of ensuring that the
 8 struggle for fundamental change is not undermined or derailed by means of
 9 subterfuge, violence and any other actions by the forces in power.

11 **V. OUR APPROACH TO THE TRANSITION :**

12
 13 29.0. The historic period in which we have entered is one of transition from
 14 white minority rule to democratic government. As a result of change in the
 15 balance of forces brought about by the National Democratic Movement and the
 16 struggling people as a whole, the possibility has emerged to effect this transition
 17 by peaceful means.

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 19 29.1. The strategic challenge this period poses is that, as much as the National
 20 Democratic Movement led and continue to lead opposition and resistance to
 21 apartheid, it must lead the process of transition to a democratic South Africa.
 22 We must not concede such leadership to the very same forces that are
 23 responsible for the establishment and perpetuation of the system of apartheid.

24
 25 29.2. At the same time, the National Democratic Movement has a responsibility
 26 to ensure that the forces of reaction do not reverse the gains it has scored. The
 27 irreversibility of these achievements and the peaceful process as a whole, is a
 28 function of the strength of the democratic forces, primarily the masses in active
 29 struggle, and not the goodwill of those who continue to benefit from the system
 30 of apartheid.

31
 32 29.3. It is in the true interest of the ANC and the masses of our people that the
 33 transition to a democratic order should take place as soon as possible so as to
 34 end the apartheid system with out delay. Speed is therefore an essential
 35 element in all our efforts to realise this objective. On the other hand, the
 36 representatives of apartheid are interested to draw up the process of change to
 37 give themselves time to evolve schemes intended to compromise the depth of
 38 the process of democratic transformation.

39
 40 30.0. Our approach to the process of transition entails in the main:

41 30.1. The immediate and permanent normalisation of the political situation by
 42 an end to all forms of repression and protection of the people from all acts of
 43 violence.

1 All hinderances to free political activity, which includes such democratic
2 practices as the rights to demonstrate peacefully and to go on strike, must be
3 removed. The process of normalisation includes the release of all political
4 prisoners, ending all political trials, repeal of repressive legislation, the return of
5 exiles and the termination of the practice of detention without trial.

6 30.2. The establishment of an interim government, acceptable to the widest
7 spectrum of people, to supervise the process of transition from white minority
8 rule to a democratically elected government.

9 30.3. The convening of a Constituent Assembly, elected on the basis of one-
10 person one-vote on a common voters' roll, to draw up a new democratic
11 constitution for our country.

12 30.4. An end to the campaign of aggression and destabilisation directed against
13 the independent states of our region.

14 30.5. A congress of all parties with a proven constituency should be convened
15 to work out the broad and basic principles to underpin the new constitution as
16 well as to agree on the modalities for the establishment of an Interim
17 Government and a Constituent Assembly.

18
19 31.0. To achieve these objectives requires that the National Democratic
20 Movement marshals all anti-apartheid forces, both within the country and
21 abroad, and defeat the schemes of the regime to tailor the transition in a
22 direction suited to the interests of white minority domination. These schemes
23 include attempts by the government to portray itself as the establishment best
24 suited to supervise and direct the transition. At the same time, Pretoria is bent
25 on weakening the National Democratic Movement by fomenting divisions
26 within the democratic alliance, by attempting to delegitimise popular mass
27 actions, side-lining the national democratic demands of the people by narrowing
28 the terrain of political contest into confines defined by itself and by dividing the
29 most oppressed African masses along ethnic lines.

30
31 32.0. The campaign of violence against the black population, which aims at
32 fomenting fear and despondency among the people is also intended to weaken
33 the democratic Movement. Under cover of inter-communal conflict, generated
34 primarily by forces within the state machinery, these forces have introduced
35 devastating counter-revolutionary banditry characterised by selective as well
36 as indiscriminate attacks against anti-apartheid forces and African communities
37 in general. While some of the elements involved this campaign seek to
38 undermine the whole peace process, others aim at debilitating the liberation
39 Movement as a negotiating partner. It is crucial that the Movement, using a
40 multi-pronged strategy of political and military self-defense, reduces the
41 capacity of the state to act against the people.

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VI. FORMS OF STRUGGLE:

33.0. The new situation demands a sober and balance assessment of our approach to various forms of struggle as well as their inter-relationship. We have, in the past, under a different set of conditions, characterised our struggle as a protracted people's war in which partial and general uprisings would play an important role. Led by the ANC underground, mass and armed actions were to dovetail and emerge in a process leading to seizure of power, in which the armed element would occupy a crucial place. Does this still hold ?

34.0. The answer to this question cannot derive solely from a belief in the integrity or otherwise of those in power. Neither can it be seen as static phenomenon holding out for all time. The most crucial considerations in this regard are:

- * the depth of the crisis gripping the apartheid system and the extent to which it compels the regime to act in good faith;
- * our capacity to deepen this crisis to ensure that those in power are dissuaded from the temptation or intention to derail the process of peaceful transition;
- * the concrete conditions under which we operate, the basic among which is the depth and spread of atmosphere of free political activity;
- * the methods used by the regime and other right-wing forces against the democratic Movement and the people in general; and last but not least,
- * the line-up of forces within the ruling white establishment, including individuals, parties, organisations and army and police.

35.0. The ANC has entered the path of negotiations at our own initiative, and not as a tactic with some hidden agenda. We did so because a negotiated transition to a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa is not only desirable to our Movement and people; but it has become possible, at the instance of all-round struggle on a variety of fronts. Negotiations are and should be about the transfer of power to the people as a whole and the democratisation of our society in all spheres of life. They therefore do not constitute a departure from the strategic perspective held by the liberation Movement over the years. Rather, they are a result of struggle and a terrain of intense struggle for the final realisation of the strategic objectives of the national democratic revolution.

36.0. While in the past we pursued the objective of seizure of power, and pledged to enter negotiations if the situation arose, the approach today has definitely changed. We have entered negotiations as viable mechanism for the transition to a new order, under the new situation, and we pledge to pursue the perspective of seizure of power - armed/or otherwise - if the situation changes. Given the considerations outlined above, the situation is still fluid.

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2 The ANC cannot afford to sacrifice the aspirations of the millions of
3 oppressed South Africans, the people of the region and the world, on the altar of
4 wishful thinking and imagined possibilities. While we prefer a negotiated
5 transition to a new order, it behoves the state and its allies to ensure that this
6 becomes a reality.

7
8 37.0. How then does this affect the role of balance among the "internal pillars"
9 of our struggle?

10 37.1. Central to our approach to the transition and to counter the schemes of
11 defenders of white domination is our reliance on the mass of the oppressed and
12 anti-apartheid forces. In as much as the victories we have scored are a
13 consequence primarily of this approach, and to ensure that what emerges in the
14 end reflects their basic interests, the people must be the engine of transition
15 and be seen to take active part at all possible levels. This demands the continual
16 strengthening of the ANC and other democratic forces, and mobilising the people
17 to express, defend and advance their point of view through mass action.

18 Negotiations do not mean that the people should be immobilised. Rather, the
19 legitimacy of the process itself and therefore the permanence of its results, will,
20 primarily, derive from the involvement of the people at all levels.

21
22 37.2. As part of the struggle to advance the process towards a speedy political
23 settlement, the ANC decided to suspend the armed actions. However, the armed
24 struggle has not been terminated. The enemy still has the possibility to reimpose
25 the conditions which necessitated that we resort to this form of struggle. A
26 democratic constitution has not yet been agreed upon, and the regime and other
27 forces in the country continue to maintain their own armed formations. The ANC
28 therefore has a continuing responsibility to maintain its own combat formations,
29 organised in the people's army Umkhonto weSizwe. It has the responsibility to
30 ensure people's self-defense at all times.

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32 37.3. Most of the tasks that had to be carried out from underground can now be
33 conducted openly. But the atmosphere of free political activity has yet to be
34 fully realised, both in general terms and in relation to various parts of the
35 country. Further, possibilities still exist for the reversal of the process of
36 peaceful transition. In this regard, the ANC is duty bound to maintain such
37 underground structures as present-day conditions and future possibilities
38 demand. The supreme political responsibility for work conducted at all levels
39 rest with the leadership structures of the ANC as defined in its constitution.

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VII. STRATEGIC TASKS IN THE TRANSITION:

38.0. The fact that we have entered into a period of transition to a democratic South Africa does not mean that the struggle has come to an end. The forces responsible for the establishment of the apartheid system still continue to pursue their own objectives which do not originate from any mandate but their own self-seeking interests. A struggle is therefore inevitable between the perspectives represented by these forces and by the democratic Movement.

39.0. The process of negotiations, at all its levels represents a theatre of intense struggle. In this struggle, we aim to advance the demands of the mass of our people for fundamental democratic transformation of our country. This form of struggle also requires that the Movement should, at all times, keep close contact with rest of the democratic movement and the people as a whole. The principle and practice of consultation, seeking mandates and reports-back must inform our approach to negotiations, both within the ranks of the democratic Movement and in relation to the mass of the people. Those elected to serve in a Constituent Assembly would themselves have been mandated by the people to represent a set of demands that would have been canvassed during the election process.

40.0. The ANC must firmly take the lead in ensuring the earliest adoption and enforcement of a genuinely democratic, non-racial and non-sexist constitution. This is the principal theatre of struggle during the period of transition to a democratic South Africa. It revolves around the central question of the exercise of political power, the decisive element in any revolutionary struggle.

41.0. The fact of the changes brought about by the struggle does not change the reality that the apartheid structures of the government remain in place. These structures, at all levels, from the national to the local, are illegitimate. They represent a continuation of apartheid system of white minority domination and cannot be expected to act as institutions that would facilitate the transition to a democratic South Africa. The ANC should therefore take all the necessary measures to ensure speedy movement towards the establishment and proper functioning of an Interim Government. At the same time, the liberation Movement must resist as well as avoid involvement in dispensations that would in practice entail its co-option into apartheid structures.

1 42.0. The achievement and defence of the democratic gains which enabled free
 2 political activity is also of crucial importance to the struggle. This will ensure
 3 that the peace process moves forward as rapidly and as freely as possible
 4 towards the earliest adoption of a democratic constitution. The defence of these
 5 gains includes actions aimed at preventing the use of violence against the
 6 people. The ANC should therefore take all the necessary measures to contain
 7 and eliminate such violence, and develop the necessary organisational
 8 structures for the defence of the people. This should entail a multi-faceted
 9 campaign which brings to the fore our strategic political strengths as a
 10 liberation Movement which seeks to unite the mass of our people for their own
 11 liberation, irrespective of their ethnic, racial and class origins. We must
 12 maximise the cost of such acts of banditry to the perpetrators and their allies.

13
 14 43.0. The exercise of leadership in the transition also means that the ANC and
 15 the rest of the democratic movement must act more than just a movement of
 16 protest. Already, during the mass revolt of the 1980s, the people had started to
 17 introduce alternative and popular expressions of government, education,
 18 culture, sports and so on. This task becomes even more crucial in the transition,
 19 and in a situation in which the balance of forces has shifted in favour of the
 20 democratic Movement. It entails the building of the people's organs from the
 21 lowest to the highest possible levels. It also means the clarity and foresight to
 22 put forward and implement viable alternatives in all spheres of life.

23
 24 44.0. The ANC also faces the challenge of sharpening its strategy and tactics as
 25 well as strengthening structures pertaining to negotiations in the narrow sense.
 26 This means, first and foremost, ensuring consistent political leadership to our
 27 negotiating teams, mastering, on the part of the Movement as a whole, of the art
 28 and science of parley, ability to assess and utilise a given balance of forces to
 29 our fullest advantage as well as consistency and flexibility at the negotiation
 30 table. In order to ensure that we give the leadership to the whole process, and
 31 not find ourselves responding to initiatives from the other side, we need to
 32 deploy such resources as are necessary to the area of negotiations and act with
 33 deliberate speed in the formulation of our policies and approaches to various
 34 issues.

35
 36 The social forces interested in the democratic transformation of our country are
 37 composed of all the oppressed masses, including the majority of those who serve
 38 within apartheid state institutions. Also among the youth and students, the
 39 professional strata and significant sections of the business community. Our
 40 organisational work must enable us to reach all these social forces in their
 41 millions, ensure that they understand and support the political perspectives of
 42 our Movement and draw them into action as a conscious and organised force for
 43 the realisation of their aspirations.

1 More attention than before needs to be paid to the organisation and
 2 mobilisation of the masses in the rural areas and bantustans, as well as the
 3 women and the youth. We must consciously transform into concrete support the
 4 sympathy and respect the ANC enjoys among functionaries within apartheid
 5 institutions, including the army and the police. These forces must be made to
 6 feel that they have got a place and a future in the ranks of the anti-apartheid
 7 movement.

8
 9 46.0. To carry out all the tasks relevant to the entire process of transformation,
 10 including the formation of a democratic government, the ANC has to build itself
 11 into a strong and well-organised democratic, non-racial and non-sexist mass
 12 movement, able to reach all our people throughout the length and breath of our
 13 country. This task is urgent. Its successful accomplishment is decisive for the
 14 peaceful transition and victory of the national democratic struggle. The basic
 15 task facing the struggle remains the liberation of all our people. The ANC is not
 16 a political party, but a liberation movement. It must therefore remain the
 17 political home for all individuals interested in and committed to this future,
 18 without regard to ideological beliefs that are not in conflict with its basic policy
 19 positions and programme. At the same time the ANC must rapidly develop to
 20 master all methods of political contest that operation under conditions of
 21 legality demand. It must deliberately prepare itself for the different challenges
 22 of transition and the future, including work in an Interim Government, elections
 23 into a Constituent Assembly and so on. However, this must not be allowed to
 24 infringe on the main character of the Movement as an organisation of the
 25 people, pursuing their aspirations, rather than an elitist cabal. We should also
 26 ensure that the ANC and its allies do not behave in such a way that they are
 27 seen by the people as formations which they should fear, because of such wrong
 28 methods of work as political intolerance.

29
 30 47.0.0 The ANC has to encourage the formation and strengthening of
 31 independent, democratic mass formations of the people, including trade
 32 unions, civic associations, youth and women's organisations as well as other
 33 organisations representing various strata of our population, such as cultural
 34 workers, intelligentsia, the business community and others. This is to ensure
 35 that all sections of the population are organised around the democratic
 36 perspective and are able to make their own independent intervention in the
 37 process of peaceful transformation of our country. The ANC should maintain a
 38 structured relationship with all these formations to ensure joint action in the
 39 common effort to bring about a just society. It is, however, in the interest of the
 40 ANC and the entire struggle that these formation should maintain their
 41 independence and operate on the basis of democratic practices determined by
 42 their members.
 43

1
2
3 48.0. To ensure the widest possible organisation and mobilisation of our people
4 for the achievement of the goal of a united, non-racial and democratic South
5 Africa, ANC must build and strengthen relations with organisation which share
6 some or all of its policies and perspectives.

7 48.1. The closest allies of the ANC are the SACP and COSATU. This principled
8 and structured alliance, based on a shared commitment to , as well as the
9 strategy and tactics for, the achievement of a united, non-racial and democratic
10 South Africa, should be continually strengthened at national, regional and local
11 levels. Forged in the theatre of struggle, and based on the recognition of the
12 leadership role of the ANC, the tri-partite alliance recognizes and operates on
13 the basis of the independence of its component parts and is shaped in
14 accordance with the new conditions of legality in which we operate.

15 48.2. For the purpose of ensuring the fastest movement towards fundamental
16 change, the ANC should work with all forces committed to the basic perspective
17 of a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa in a structured broad
18 patriotic front. This front should act together to effect the transition from white
19 minority domination to democratic rule.

20 48.3. Furthermore, the ANC must identify and seek co-operation with other
21 political and social formations within the country who, because of their
22 opposition to apartheid, can enter into even limited agreements with the ANC,
23 aimed at facilitating the process of peaceful transition, the dismantling of the
24 apartheid system and the transformation of our country into a non-racial
25 democracy. In the overall, we should ensure that all levels of the Movement are
26 well versed in the theory and practice of alliances and conduct our work in this
27 terrain in such a way that we do not undermine our own base.

28
29 49.0. The international community remains seized with the issue of the
30 abolition of apartheid and the transformation of our country into a non-racial
31 democracy. The ANC must continue its work to ensure that this community
32 sustains its pressure for the rapid movement towards the realisation of these
33 goals. The maintenance of such economic sanctions as presently exist, and the
34 all-round isolation of apartheid South Africa, are conditional upon progress in
35 the eradication of the system of apartheid. We must work for the intensification
36 of efforts by the international community to extend political and material
37 support to the ANC, the rest of the democratic movement and the people as a
38 whole, to enable these forces to realise the political and socio-economic
39 objectives which are a necessary component part of the process of change.

VIII. CONCLUSION:

50.0. South Africa has entered a decisive stage in the struggle for national liberation. The balance of forces both within the country and internationally favours a rapid movement towards the transformation of South Africa into a united, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist country. The strategy and tactics of the ANC during this period of transition must ensure that this advance is as rapid as possible, leads to genuine democratic change and places the democratic Movement in the vanguard of this process. At this critical and historic moment, the unity of the entire democratic Movement around common perspectives and common programme of action is of critical importance.

51.0. In this regard, the main tasks during the period of transition are:

51.1. A rapid transfer of power to the people as a whole, through the adoption of a democratic constitution negotiated by an elected Constituent Assembly.

51.2. The establishment and maintenance of an Interim Government, acceptable to all the people, to supervise the transition to a democratic South Africa.

51.3. The defence of the democratic gains and the defeat of the efforts of the counter-revolutionary forces to take away the political space won through struggle.

51.4. The consolidation of the positions won by the democratic Movement in all spheres of life, and its intervention to ensure that the masses increasingly run their own lives and improve their socio-economic conditions.

52.0. The optimism of the ANC constitutes a challenge to itself and the people in general to realise, sooner rather than later, the dream of millions of South Africans for freedom and democracy. It is primarily the strength of the ANC and its allies, including its ability to lead the people in active struggle, and not the integrity or otherwise of the forces in power, which will guarantee the success of the process of peaceful transition.

THE STRGGL CONTINUES !

VICTORY IS CERTAIN !

ALL POWER TO TH PEOPLE !