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CONFIDENTIAL REPORT ON RECENT ORGANISATIONAL RESPONSE% TO
THE NATAL VIOLENCE _, i

The following document attempts to provide an account of the processes of discussion which have recently taken place in the ranks of the mass democratic movement on the question of the violence in Natal. An account is given of various meetings held to discuss the issue since December 1988, when leading representatives of affiliates of the UDF and CDSATU, as well as the ANC, met in Harare to discuss the violence.

The discussions, which have involved local, regional and to some extent, national participation of UDF and CDSATU affiliates, have established the urgent need for a major campaign for peace among the people of Natal in order to proceed with the main task of Struggling against apartheid. In this context, the idea of the 3 Movement for Peace among the People, has arisen.

HARARE MEETING - DECEMBER 1988.

At the Harare meeting, the following 8 points were agreed upon as a basis for ending the violence.

1. There must be peace in Natal, and an end to the violence.
2. There must be a strengthening of the alliance between the affiliates of the Front and CDSATU. .,-
3. The democratic movement must win support from the broadest range of forces, and attempt to win over ordinary Inkatha members.
4. The democratic movement must intensify its offensive against apartheid forces and strengthen its mass organisations. ''
5. The democratic movement must involve all people in the struggle by organising through mass campaigns.
6. The democratic movement must develop its capacity for self-defence, with special attention being given to youth structures.
7. The democratic movement must harness other forces, e.g. churches, businesses and others, in this effort to end the violence.
8. The democratic movement must work out appropriate methods for achieving the above goals.

During the discussions, it was further agreed that:

- The most pressing issue was the ending of violence, and not the normalisation of relations with Inkatha.
- The democratic movement is not opposed in principle, to

holding talks with Inkatha, on the question of violence. i working groups should be established, both in COSATU and among the affiliates of the front, to CDdordinate and jointly implement all efforts.

- The British government should use its influence to get lthe restrictions on the UDF l&iied.
- The Pietermaritzburg legal agreement between Inkatha and ' CDSATU should be seen as an instrument of b_oth the affiliates of the front and COSATU. Steps should be taken to ensure this was practised.

INDLU IZINGNEVU/HDUSE OF THE ELDERS/COMMITTEE OF CONCERN.

Since the Harare meeting there has in fact been an escalation of violence in the Natal region. It must be admitted at the outset that the state of disorganisation in the mass democratic movement did result in a lack of urgency in attending to this problem. This is reflected in the fact that internally, no immediate follow-up to Harare, to discuss more concretely the development of a programme of action, occurred.

A self critical examination of the state of the front reveals that:

- there has been a breakdown of co-ordination between affiliates in Natal, where meetings of the regional struture have repeatedly collapsed.
- the lack of co-ordination is a particularly serious problem in the African areas, where the co-ordinating structures for youth (Nayco), students (Nasco) and civics (Jorac), have all collapsed in the past few months.
- '- since the restrictions imposed on the UDF in February 1988, affiliates have failed to develop a new and bold strategic initiative around the iSSUE of the violence in Natal.

It is in the context of this political vacuum , that the emergence of Izingwevu, as a group who claim to be concerned about the violence, and willing to take action, to end it,.must be seen.

In the early stages of our interaction with the Committee of Concern, the Folowing information was available to the mass democratic movement about this Committee: It had been started in about July 1989. Its members were cde Archie Gumede, UDF president; Messrs S.Maponya.(Umlazi); B.B.Cele (Clermont); Mrs Mteko (Chesterville)Kwenza Mlaba; Mr Dlamini (Umlazi); Mr Mthembu (KwaMashu).The coordinator is

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Fezile Vanto, also an employee of the Durban Network. The Yhithial plans 04 the Izingwevu were reportedly to set up-Crisis committees in each township; these crisis committees were to form part of civic associationsih'those areas. _g50me time before December 1988, cde Archie Gumede .Vwrote a letter to Gatsha Buthelezi in his personal u'capacity, and received a reply. Cde Gumede' 5 letter was a request to Butelezi to use his influence with Vlok , to expgke the peace pracess.

when the Natal violence began to escalate in December 1988 and January 1989, the Izingwevu met very regularly to consider the crisis. These matings were attended by a fairly large number of unorganised ordinary reidents from affected areas, who were desperate to see an end to the, violence.

However, when it became apparEnt that the intentions of the Izingwevu threatened to cut across the views and strategy of the mass democratic movement, affiliates of the front and COSATU were in fact prapelled.into acting in response to the crisis. 9

Particularly disturbing were the beliefs which some individuals repertedly expressed at same meetings of Izingwevu:

1.The committee believed that the Only solution to the violence was to talk to Inkatha and to that end,advocated urgent talks with Inkatha. There have recently been overtures by Dr. Oscar Dhlomo to hold talks with the UDF, and the committee seemed keen to enter into such talks.

2. The Committee argued very strongly that the youth were the only sector in the townships opposed to talks in the townships. At a meeting held between the UDF and CDSATU secretariats and an Izingwevu delegation to discuss this issue, it was agreed that the Izingwevu would wait until UDF and COSATU had debated the issue of talks, before they themselves proceeded with their plans.

3. It was the belief of the committee that in many instances, the UDF youth were responsible for the violence, and that individuals in the NIC were funding the violent activities of the youth.

4. This last viewpoint reflects the anti-Indian sentiments expressed at some committee meetings, where it was repostedly said that certain sections of the UDF - vi: the youth and the Indians - have an interest in continuing the vi 01 ence.

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In January 1989 Cde Archie Gude and a delegation from Izingwevu approached the NIC to discuss with them the following: that they believed the NIC has contact with the NAVCO youth and that it was therefore the responsibility of the NIC to bring the youth before Izingwevu, and to help end the violence in the townships. The NIC replied that they agreed the violence should be ended, but that the responsibility lay with the UDF and all its affiliates 'to strategise on how best to achieve this.

Some of the affiliates of the front discussed the existence of Izingwevu, and felt that the front as a whole needed to work out a response to them; in addition it was realised that the front and CDSATU needed to work out an overall strategy for dealing with Inkatha. These views were discussed at a meeting of the regional structure, and it was decided that a workshop of affiliates of the front be convened.

REPORT ON WORKSHOP OF AFFILIATES OF THE FRONT HELD ON 21.1.89. - .

The workshop was held on 21 January 1989. It was attended by about 70 representatives of affiliates of the front throughout the Natal region. Representatives came from all the UDF demarcated sub-regions, viz Greater Durban, South Coast, North Coast, Northern Natal and the Natal Midlands. A special attempt was made to get African comrades from the affected townships to the workshop, and representatives from the youth; women, civics, from African areas, formed the majority of representatives at the meeting. Representatives from NIC, UCC, DDA, NUSAS, SANSCO, and DHAC also attended, as it was strongly felt that the matter was one of concern to the entire democratic movement.

-The primary objective of the workshop was to discuss and develop a strategy for dealing with the problem of the violence in Natal, and to develop a common analysis of the situation. A secondary, but important objective of the workshop was to look at how the affiliates of the front should respond and relate to Izingwevu.

The agenda of the meeting included the following:

1. Analysis of violence

2. Reports :

Organisational responses to the violence, to date.

COSATU/Inkatha agreement

Harare meeting

Indlu Izingwevu.

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 3. Group discussions and reports back.
 4. Finalise programme of action.
 Discussion questions addressed by 4 groups in the meeting were: ' K
 1. what organisational initiatives should be taken at local and regional levels to respond to the violence?
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 .- h._ o
 2. How do we take advantage of divisions in Inkatha e. 9.
 .how d_o we organise the chiefs ? _ '1 -!
 3. How do we proceed with the peace process ?
 Discuss in terms of 1- ,ft3
 -.- a) Application to Vloki
 b) COSATU'S legal settlement with Inkatha
 c) Dhlomo wanting to talk to UDF
 d) Inkatha wanting to talk to ANC ,
 e) Initiating a broadly based Peace Campaign/Peace Movement. J
 6) Any other initiatives necessary.
 4. How does the Izingwevu initiative relate to the strategy of the affiliates of the UDF and COSATU ?
 Responses to the discussion questions were as follows:-
 Question 1.
 - Affected areas may be involved in local initiatives to resolve disputes, but the regional co-ordinating structure is to be involved in all such initiatives. 5
 - Affected areas should form defence committees.
 - At street level, house to house campaigning should take place to obtain any mandate to negotiate/discuss handling violence.' 1
 - Political education at street level must take place;
 Question 2.
 Progressive-organisations must attempt to solve community problems, and thereby gain credibility for themselves. This will win over Inkatha members too.
 - Conscientiously identify Inkatha members who can be won over. Divide ordinary members from the warlords, e.g. in Pietermaritzburg where warlords have killed Inkatha members, propaganda around such incidents will disillusion Inkatha members.
 - Maintain contact with chiefs, and attempt to organise as many as possible. This may be a sensitive area, so it should be done carefully.
 - Organise people working for KwaZulu to stop them from

supporting Gatscha.

- Organise in Trade Unions, since Inkatha and non-Inkatha members come together at workplace. Political education of workers is important.
- Greater discipline among the youth can be instilled through political education.
- Greater information/intelligence is needed for us to know exactly how Inkatha benefits, or undermines each sector, e.g. chiefs, small businesspeople, government employees, etc. Organise each of the sectors accordingly:

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Question 3. ._'

. The was fundamental agreement that violence should be ended. However, there were differences on how to end violence ;

e talks could prove to be fruitless, therefore talks should not feature.

e there was danger in being seen to be indifferent to talks.

- But it was agreed that :

e No agreement should take place above heads of people.

t Disagreements between youth and elders must be resolved.

A major recommendation from Group 3 was the establishment of a Peace Movement.

Aims of such a Peace Movement would be :

t to monitor situations in Townships, and intervene in situations of violence. '

- % to campaign for an end to violence.

% The Peace movement should be initiated by the

. affiliates of the -Front, CDSATU, and the Churches.

However all who want to end the violence must be encouraged to join

Question 4.

40 In principle we must strive towards joint unified objectives and strategies. -

- win over groups e.g. churches etc to our side through joint strategy.

CONCLUSION

Because of a time constraint, it was impossible to complete the discussion, and only very general conclusions were made. These were extracted from the above group discussion responses.

The most concrete recommendation was that of the Peace Movement which could embrace a wide range of strategies.

- Gatsha Buthelezi is also acknowledging that he has to come to terms with the UDF if he wishes to achieve any credibility. '

- Even supporters of GB e.g. Thatcher, are showing signs of pressure, and are less willing to support him if he does not make peace with the democratic movement.

It was agreed that these factors be taken into account by the Natal comrades when they discuss the question of talks.

IZINGWEVU - It was felt that Izingwevu be persuaded to act in the context of the mass democratic movement's strategy. Because of the presence of comrade Archie Gumede it would be inappropriate to adopt a hostile attitude towards them. '

RECOMMENDATIONS. . .-

There was further discussion on the recommendations to be put to the joint UDF-CDSATU meeting, later that morning :

1. A joint working committee between affiliates of the front, COSATU and the CHURCHES should be established.
2. A Peace Movement should be launched involving the widest possible range of forces committed to ending the violence. A special effort should be made to involve the "mass membership" of Inkatha in this process. The Peace Movement should strive toward concrete actions aimed at reducing the violence, and isolating and neutralising those who are perpetuating it. As this was all a massive undertaking, full time functionaries and an office should be set up. All actions of the democratic movement should take place in the context of the Peace Movement. Existing initiatives, e.g. reviving the application to Vlok, using the Pietermaritzburg agreement as a joint instrument, should be seen in this light.

3. A Peace Manifesto should be drawn up to express the aspirations and demand of all those committed to ending the violence.

4. Izingwevu - we needed to persuade them to act in terms of strategy of affiliates of the front and CDSATU.

MEETING BETWEEN UDF AFFILIATES AND COSATU ON 25.01.89

The agenda was as indicated (Note that the earlier meeting of UDF affiliate representatives had been modelled along a similar agenda).

-1. Review of Backgrounds of Harare meeting
 2. Assessment of current situation
 3. Joint - position for meeting with Churches.
 i, Practice? solutions 1. Jo
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 V1. REVIEW,OEi,SfPQIN183;_H' , . H .m g, .1
 Clarification of Backgrounds : Agreement was reached between
 UDF affiliates and COSATU delegation on the 8 points
 agreed upon in Harare. The points were as indicated in
 the earlier report, Dn_ the iHarare meeting.
 ,2.' ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SITUATION IN NATAL
 COSATU offered the following report, based on reports
 obtained in areas where their structures have a presence.
 Isithebe : UNUSA organisers approaching COSATU
 organisers, are antagonistic sometimes and 'consciliatory
 at others. - VH "
 Inenda : Ngcobo is causing division between shackdwellers
 and house dwellers.
 Kwamakutha : No Report.
 F.Shepstune : Situation not clear to COSATU.
 Pinetown : Quiet.
 Kwanengezi : Clashes between organisations of the mass
 democratic movement.
 Molweni : Some clashes between organisations.
 Mpumalanga : Attack on Nkhehli, the warlord recently n
 situation still very tense. - nu. ih
 PMB iCaluza Imbali : Escalation of attacks in city centre.
 PMB refugees also becoming a serious problem.
 Edendale valley : Crisis in schools. Possibility of
 massive confrontation.

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 Mooiriver / Escourt/ Ladysmith etc : quiet.
 COSATU REPORT ON IZINGWEVU
 A report was given on COSATU'S contact with Izingwevu. In
 a meeting with COSATU the day before, Izingwevu had
 outlined their role. They had said they had no specific
 mandate from organisations, but were acting as concerned
 individuals. They wanted to know :-

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- Zondi) which was protracted and not going smoothly - had
- what was-.CDSATU'S (perspective on the-violence. COSATU
outlined this and the steps taken to end the violence
including Harare 5e art.

Ingwevu had accept the explanation of COSATU. . .wa
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- CDSATU'S ?'perspective on the formation of Ingweyu Was
that there had been a breakdown of communication between
organisations and masses, and even between individuals
involved in the mass democratic movement.

At this point UDF affiliates responded to COSATU and .
presented their perspective, outlining the steps taken
towards working out an approach to Izingwevu.

CDSATU'S REPORT ON THE PIETERMARITZBURG ACCORD.

The complaints Board, CDSATU admitted, had fun into
serious problems. Only 1 case (against Shayabantu
gone before the Board. The workings of the Complaints
Board were being obstructed by Inkatha lawyers and
Inkatha.

COSATU reported that they had 3 to'4 complaints to put
before the Board. .Justice Lean was trying to convene a
meeting of the Board Chairpersons to review their
participation. PMB comrades reported that noticeably, no
reduction in violence in the area where Zondi has control,
could be discerned, even though he was the subject of the
Complaints Adjudication Board's investigations.

CDSATU'S PROPOSALS ON COMPLAINTS BOARD.

1. Even if Inkatha is not :o-operative, the Board should
be allowed to operate in PMB, if Leon is willing to
continue to preside. i

2. In cases of smaller incidents, we should set up V 4
commissions to investigate and report immediately. One
Inkatha and one COSATU person could possibly make up such
commissions.

3. We could set up high level tribunal of e.g. Church i
leaders and businesspeople, to put pressure on police.

4. Smaller commissions can report to tribunal, who could
make representations on the basis of concrete information.
At this point, the front delegation, put forward their
proposals as indicated earlier.

OTHER PROPOSALS MADE BY CDSATU WERE AS FOLLOWS.

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1. A peace conference - the public launch of the Peace Movement should be held.

2. An agreement or Manifesto signed by all parties, including Inkatha, will spell out these principles :

- an end to violence
- no forced recruitment
- freedom to organise etc.

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In Summary_, CDSATU offered the following assessment of the .violence is Natal :

There exists no area in Natal where the mass democratic ' mDVement is stronger today than one year ago. If the violence is not ended, we will not be able to build organisation. There is a need to bring Inkatha into initiative for peace. There is no point in an agreement which brings in traditional allies and does not force Inkatha into a committment to abandon violence.

Moreover, there are many people in the community, who because they are so tired of the violence, want to enter into talks with Inkatha.. Thus we will have to talk to them sooner or later.

The UDF affiliates delegation felt that there might be problems on the ground around a "Peace Agreement", particularly among the youth. However there was no objection to inviting Inkatha members to the conference, and the front delegation indicated it believed it would be possible to win over large numbers of Inkatha members who are disillusioned with Ulundi, in the course of the Peace process.

SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENT OF CONDITIONS AS AGREED UPON BY V: :55
COSATU AND UDF AFFILIATES DELEGATES.

It must be noted that there were differences in conceptualisation between COSATU and the front delegation on the question of a Peace Movement. CDSATU suggested it was essential to have Inkatha as an integral part of the Peace Movement. This view was not shared at that stage by UDF af4iliates, who felt that all opposed the violence (which could include Inkatha members, if they agreed) should be brought together.

Observations agreed upon by affiliates of the front and COSHTU-

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A) There is increasing collusion between Inkatha Warlords and the police.

b) Double 'standards' among Inkatha operatives, for example in Empangeni and Isithebe often occur.

c) warlords trying to gain more control, e.g. Mpumalanga and Imbali.

d) Insufficient communication/reporting may give rise to splinter/parallel initiatives and other forms of conflict within our ranks. "

e) 'Insufficient support to internal refugees and response to internal refugee problem may split our ranks.

f) Inkatha increasingly is failing to perform in terms of the PMB agreement, more so in light of recent findings against it.

Q) Modifications to Complaints Adjudication Board are necessary.

Need to brief Izingwevu on outcome of meeting with Churches.

SUMMARY OF SUGGESTIONS.

1. A Peace Movement must be established embracing among other features a Peace Conference, A Peace Tribunal and a Peace Manifesto signed by various groupings.
2. Take all steps to open space for the MDM and take advantage of conditions in our favour.
3. We must retain the Complaints Adjudication Board and make modifications to cater for the rest of the region.
4. Give publicity to the findings of both the Complaints ' Adjudication Board and the Peace Tribunal.
5. Establish a working group of the MDM for Natal and encourage churches to do the same.
6. Work out a coherent response to internal refugee problem with churches and others.

MEETING BETWEEN UDF AFFILIATES AND CDSATU AND CHURCH LEADERS HELD ON 25.01.89

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1) The UDF affiliates and COSATU delegations who had met earlier that day, met the following church delegation:

'hishop Alfred Mkhize

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Ms Vuyi . Nxasana

Rev Doug Muller

Rev Nsimbi -' -:- .

Rev Athol JeHhings;i.a t . - _ .'

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Theygare according to Jennings on the church sub group on Natal violente. Howevef UDF af\$iliates and CDSATU representatives were somewhat disappointed, as we had hoped_to meet the heads of churches in Natal.

The church delegation were quite impressed with the proposal about the Peace Movement. However, Jehnings . pointed out that they did not wish to be seen as siding with UDF and CDSATU, thus they did not see their way clear to enterihg into a structured relationship. They would however, give their support to and participate in initiatives like the Peace Tribunal.

They also pointed out that in searching for the truth they could very well reach out to Inkatha. This should not alarm the mass democratic movement, and there need be no fear that they would be betraying any confidences.

There was also some discussion on how they could avail their resources to the mass democratic movement, and it was agreed they would have further distussion with the MDMmdm on alleviating the plight of internal refugees. This brief meeting ended after 45 minutes on the note that we would keep the churches informed of our initiative.

NOTES ON DISCUSSION BETWEEN UDF AFFILIATES WORKING GROUP MEMBERS AND KEY MEMBERS OF AFFILIATES ON THE FRONT ON 1.02.89.

The meeting was held to prepare UDF affiliate representatives 4or discussion at the joint meeting which was to be held that day. Note that UDF affiliates had not as yet appointed a permanent working group. However, because ot the urgency of the issue an interim committee was appointed to attend the joint meeting.

The preparatory meeting discussed the following:

1. Concept of the ' Peace Movement ' : it was proposed that because the Peace movements are associated with the worldwide campaign for nuclear disarmament, we should refer to the peace initiative as the Movement for Peace. Need For further clarification on the concept itself. It

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was proposed that the Movement For Peace should have the following elements:

- an independent identity of either the UDF or COSATU:

From the outset it should be designed to attract the widest possible support;

- for this reason, The Movement for Peace need not arise out of talks between UDF/COSATU AND Inkatha. At the meeting on 25.01.89 some COSATU officials had argued that talks should be held with Inkatha about the terms of the Peace Movement; when these had been agreed upon, the COSATU/UDF and Inkatha should launch/lead the peace movement.

- The Peace Manifesto should be a moral, humanitarian document which sets out ideals, goals, objectives broad enough to have the support of all who support peace. - - The aim of the Movement for Peace should be to isolate the warmongers and to end the violence.

It must be noted that even amongst some key comrades present at this discussion there were different responses to the idea of a Movement for Peace. Some felt that the Movement for Peace could be interpreted as a sellout against the people who had valiantly been defending their people; others felt that it suggested a "laying down of arms". These incorrect notions were corrected. It was pointed out that the movement was for peace amongst the oppressed people and war against the enemy. However, this highlighted the need for urgent discussion amongst our activists. These should take place at local level before the workshop for affiliates scheduled to place on 12.02.89. '

A further matter was placed before this forum for discussion : Letter from comrade 2121 to cde H6 and AG. Whilst comrade Ziai's recommendations were not rejected in principle it was felt that his recommendations on the Natal situation had been made partly on the basis of limited information and that this needed to be corrected. One cde. at the discussion suggested that AG and HG should indeed enter into exploratory talks with Inkatha to sound out their views on the Movement for Peace. Other cdes felt that this could evoke strong reaction from the ground and that there needed to be urgent political education to ensure that this tactic was not misinterpreted. The following decisions were taken about how to ensure uniform discussion and clear strategising by all UDF activist:

- distribute all available information to affiliates

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 (letters to V1Dk and respDnDDD, summary of Harare '
 Q1.dec151 Dns, Gatshg s 'DtatDmerLtsr Dz???)
 Compl11D_ a dossier D\$ thDsD'and .DDnd to all areas.
 -'summarise chtDntLDf Z-iai E letters and send out to all
 affiliates in-thD #Drm Df a briefing document, for urgDnt
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 ' .4 9:) '1 1:1 1 t .,
 '4: _ Sehda delegate frqm the front to brief 2121 urgently;

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 .- Send a delDgat16h tD brief NM. _-ha;.:3. :5D1
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 V 11': .4
 ,_ Meet Izinngvu. and coMmunicatD iDea Di Movement for -
 1 Peace tD themtw
 The fDl1Dwing recommendations were to be put to the joint
 UDF/COSATU working group meeting..
 1. 1COSATU locals and branches should attenD the meeting
 on .02.89 i. D. it should DD converted intD a joint.
 meeting of both affiliates. -
 2. Whilst the process of discussion Dnd dDba D continues
 in local structures, the UDF/COSATU joint working groups
 should formulate a joint strategy to put before the
 meeting on 12.02.89.
 3. In particular they should discuss and make proposals
 on the FD11Dwing : the Peace conference - should it be set
 for approximately 2 months; working group should perDse
 who should be involved; what the terms of involvement
 should be, etc.
 4. Inkatha may be one of the invitees to the conference,
 subject to discussion in UDF affiliates and-COSATU.
 5. Legal strategy : PMB adjudication Board should be
 maintained for PME but alernative legal strategies be'
 sought, which promote the aims of the Peace Movement for
 thD regibqus a whole.

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 MEETING OF COSATU WDRIING GROUP AND UDF INTERN WORKING
 GROUP HELD ON 01. 02. 89.

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 Agenda : -
 A. Reports ngarding the 4D11Dw up to the meeting with the
 Churches.
 8. Matters arising out of reports, including proposals for
 a programme of action.
 A. Reports.
 1. Comrades from the front reported on discussions held
 earlier in the day and their recumendations.
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2. CDSATU report:

At a seminar of their branches and locals held the previous weekend the Natal situation had been the subject of discussion.

The report of the joint meeting and UDF/COSATU /CHURCHES _v, meeting had been withheld until after group discussions at the seminar. e

The following questions were addressed in the CDSATU seminar group discussions:

- what were the problems resulting from the violence ?
- what was the current strength of the mass democratic movement ?
- what strategy was needed to end the violence ?
- can we carry through the peace initiative ?

After the group discussion a report back was given of the Wednesday meeting (25.01.89). Conclusions were quite similar. Seminar felt that 3 pronged strategy should be followed.

1. Organisation and mobilisation of the masses-against the violence.

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2. Engaging Inkatha in talks with the objective of exposing them.

a. Defence.

Talks :

It was also reported that there had been 3 different views expressed as to how to relate to Inkatha at the seminar:

1.1 Peace initiative must involve Inkatha, it will not work if they are not made to commit themselves to the process. Si

2. To enter into talks with Inkatha e.g to invite them to participate in the conference will give them a platform; whilst proclaiming peace they will only step up their campaign of violence.

3. There was a need for joint working groups to canvass opinions of members and other organisations on the question, this should determine if and when Inkatha should be involved in the initiative.

The third point was the key proposal which the COSATU working group was putting forward. They said they saw it

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was no longer appropriate to talk of talks taking place with Inkatha because the Commission: in order to establish the terms of the Movement for Peace. Instead, if the wider range of organisations and individuals present at the conference called for talks between COSATU- UDF and Inkatha, this would place greater pressure on Inkatha.

Peace Tribunal: what? .'

This would be: . ''

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build public pressure around specific incidents: '

- ensure disciplining of offenders.

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- Special commissions to investigate incidents immediately would report their findings to the Peace Tribunal.

Peace Conference.:

- should be part of the Movement for Peace: organising it would give us the opportunity to rebuild our structures.

- COSATU seminar also entertained some discussion on the groups who should be invited to the Peace Conference.

B. MATTERS ARISING FROM THE REPORTS.

It was proposed that the following needed to be looked at in more detail:

- Our conceptualisation of the Movement For Peace.

- Tasks of the Joint working group.

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1. Conceptualisation of the Movement for Peace:

Agreed that:

- Harare 8 points should be used as a basis for this.

- Movement for Peace should be seen as a weapon, not as a sign of defeat. It 'h

- it was an expression of desire for peace amongst the people - and struggle against the enemy.

- both within the front and COSATU there was a need to further education and clarification about this initiative amongst the activists.

2. Tasks of the Working Group:

- Working group should plan the effort to establish the

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Movement for Peace ensuring that it was attended by
CDSATU and UDF-affiliates at all levels. '

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- Working group should meanwhile draft the Peace
Manifesto, which could be used as a basic guide for
' consultation amongst officials and allies.

- Working group should make recommendations ahead of the
Peace Conference - in particular the invitees, logistics
and mobilisation towards the conference.

3. The following sub-committees were appointed at the
meeting. '

- a planning sub-committee for the meeting on the
12.02.89.

- a conference sub-committee to make recommendations to
the 12.02.89 meeting on invitees, logistics and
mobilisation to the conference.

This last sub-committee was also to prepare a draft
manifesto to submit for discussion to the 12.2. meeting.
CDSATU CEC which was to meet on 11.02.89 would also
discuss the recommendations of the sub-committees.

4.' Legal sub-committee : Agreed that the CDSATU legal
sub-committee, which has the task of devising legal
strategies, should be extended to become a joint
CDSATU/UDF legal sub-committee. Their brief is now to
devise legal strategies which promote the realisation of
the 8 points of Harare, and also the aims and objectives
of the Movement for Peace.

It was agreed that the next meeting of the joint working
group would be held on 15.02.89.

MEETING BETWEEN A FRONT DELEGATION AND IZINGWEVU HELD ON
THE 02.02.89.

Present at the meeting were two representatives from the
front regional structure and the following in the
Izingwevu delegation; Cdre A. Gumede, Selborne Maponya,
David Gaza, Mr Ngcobo (a Hammersdale resident), Fezile
Vanto, Ma Bhala, Mrs Mthimkulu (KwaMashu). ' 2

1. Cde Gumede outlined that the meeting had been called
because people concerned about the violence wanted to know
what the response of the front had been.

2. we outlined developments regarding UDF efforts since the
restrictions imposed on the front - viz applications to
Vlok, PME agreement, joint UDF/COSATU meetings, Harare
meeting. Also gave a fairly detailed account of the

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discussions around the Movement for Peace. Appealed to them to come into this initiative of which they would be kept daily informed. .e

3. David Gaza was highly critical of-UDF for not ' _ consulting the President before-the'Harare meeting and wanted to know who had given persons who attended it a mandate to speak on- Behalf of the; .at&iliates. y

4 Fezile .Vanto traced the background to the formation of Izingwevu. Said it had been formed out of the need to act to stop the violence. To some extent he said, cde Gumede seemed to be the only person in the front who showed . visible concern about the violence: Therefore they had b' Vcailled upon other elderly leaders to come to his side and ' form the Committee of Cbncern (Izingwevu).

He said that they were interested in talks with Inkatha in order to expose Inkatha and to end the flow of blood.

They did not believe that theoriEs'would stop the violence. To some of them the violence was a very real

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issue - daily they were encountering people whose dear '. 'ones were being killed, therefore they saw the need to act promptly.

4. Cde Gumede informed the meeting that he had been contacted by P. Gastrow once again. Gastrow had been approached by Oscar Dhlomo to arrange confidential talks with the UDF. Dhlomo wants to know who would be in the UDF delegation. He also wants NIC to participate in the talks. He says the talks would be informal and no decisions would be reached. This private meeting should be arranged for 2 weeks hence (about 14 February).

. 5. The following issues are of concern to the committee of Concern.

- A Peace agreement should include UDF, CDSATU and Inkatha.

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- Proposed joint monitoring committee with Inkatha and UDF participation should be set up.

- They would like the response of the UDF to'this proposal.

- The talks would simply place on record that they are in favour of peace.

- They are aware that the violence comes from Pretoria.

- They said they were pleased to get information about the Harare meeting as well as the new peace initiative, and said that they would like to be kept informed of developments.

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6. The front delegation pointed out that the question of talks was one which was currently under intense discussion in the ranks of both UDF and COSATU affiliates. They informed them of the workshop which has been called for 2.02.89, and said that it was only going to be possible to respond after that date.

i'Other comments made by Izingwevu at this meeting:

- David Gaza said Izingwevu has a mandate from 15 .brganisations to proceed with talks, they disagree that on the basis of one organisation not co-operating (Nayco) that they should not move forward.

- Some felt that the 2 weeks suggested by Dhlomo were too long - the meeting should be held sooner, since people were dying daily.

- They criticised the front regional structure for excluding cde Gumede from front meetings. Mr Ngcobb suggested that the regional structure should allow 2 members of the Committee of Concern to attend meetings to represent cde Gumede. We corrected them by informing them that after his banning, cde Gumede had decided not to participate in activities of the front.

- Mr. Maponya said that it seemed as though there had been a breakdown in communication between REC and cde Gumede and appealed for greater communication with cde Gumede.

- Mr. Ngcobo expressed a different view from the other members of the Izingwevu - he said that Dhlomo is a sellout and that cde Gumede should be allowed to speak to Inkatha's President - Gatsha.

- David Gaza said that he had spoken to " Tambo Himself " not just ordinary members of the ANC. Cde Tambo had given him the mandate to do anything he could to bring an end to the violence in Natal, he said.

ASSESSMENT/OBSERVATIONS: t

Whilst acknowledging that the UDF affiliates and COSATU were in the process of undertaking a major initiative, and whilst accepting the Harare guidelines, the Izingwevu members present, still agreed that talks with Inkatha were an urgent priority.

- Apart from the talks, they have no programme or plans as to how to end the violence.

- whilst bent on talks, they seem reluctant to proceed on their own, and want the blessing of the front.

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- Mr. Gaza , however, feels that the cde Gumede, as leader of the front, has the right and authority to proceed with talks and is promoting this view. Given this factor, whether they will go ahead on their own, remains uncertain.

MEETING OF SUB COMMITTEE TO PLAN JOINT REGIONAL UDF COSATU WORKSHOP TO BE HELD ON 12. FEBRUARY 1989.

Date 7.2.89.

A. LOGISTICS;

- about 100 to 150 delegates from COSATU are expected - all will be their regional branch and local office bearers.

- about 70 delegates from affiliates of the front are expected : the majority will be from townships in the African sector.

- to ensure success every attempt will be made to protect detailed arrangements, i.e. meeting will be held under strict security conditions.

B. AGENDA.

It was agreed that the meeting should be jointly chaired by UDF affiliates and COSATU representatives.

The following inputs will be given :

1. Background on Natal violence and attempts to resolve it-

- Jay Naidoo (H/D) or Sydney Mafumadi 45 min.

2. Report on Harare meeting - someone from the front 30 min.

3. CuFrent developments and strategies, particularly an elaboration of the Movement for Peace proposal - Jay (CCAWUSA) in collaboration with someone from the front - 45 min.

thereafter :

GROUP DISCUSSION:

1. Is it necessary to end the violence and why?

2. Is it possible to achieve complete peace. Give reasons

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 Q. what practical steps can't be taken to end the violence?
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 4. How can we involve the widest range of people in the
 , process of bringing about peace?
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 a. How do we strengthen the core of the mass democratic
 movement, i.e. COSATU and UDF.
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THEREAFTER ' ? ; 5r1 7-
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 REPORTS- BACK' - -PLENARY

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 A
 REPORT AND DISCUSSION ON IZINGNEVU - purpose would be to
 arrive at a uniform position on how we relate to them
 SUMMARY OF DAY'S PROCEEDINGS ; A skilled secretariat
 should handle this : suggested names were H/D Jay and Syd
 as well as two people from the Front.
 RESOLUTIONS : These should be phrased so as to give the
 joint working committee sufficient guidance in the process
 of establishing the Movement for Peace.
 CLOSURE.
 SOME OBSERVATIONS;
 Some comrades from the front who were informed about the
 decisions of the meeting felt that the agenda should also
 make allowance for the following:
 1. establishing a common analysis of the violence
 4. establishing a common understanding of the state of
 organisation.
 4. 50 as to put the question of talks in perspective, an
 account of the different past initiatives to hold
 talks, i.e. PMB, cde Archie Gumede efforts, other
 local initiatives, i.e. KwaMakutha, Ntuzuma, Mpuma-
 langa and the trends that emerge. This could most
 ably be presented by the front,, whose membership
 had been involved in these different initiatives.
 4. the agenda should be discussed further by the front
 regional structure and suggested changes made, if
 necessary.
 MEETING OF SUB-COMMITTEE TO LOOK INTO THE PROPOSED PEACE
 CONFERENCE AND PEACE MANIFESTO HELD ON 7 FEBRUARY 1989.
 Present at this meeting were representatives of COSATU AND

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a:hw'f ?EACE CONFERENCE. , 'a
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-w- ' -inrtlation : it was agreed that there was a need to ensure
' ' the character 64 the Movement for Peace was one which is
seen to be independent of UDF and CDSATU. Therefore we
should not be seen to be initiating the process.
- A list was drawn up of a set of possible convenors : Cdr ,
Harry Gwala, Archbishop Hurley, Bishop Nuttall, Rev Mgojo,
Prof. Schreiner.
,:1IhCDSATU suggested that Chris Saunders of Tongaat Hulett's
. el so be approached. Reservations were expressedl not
about getting a businessperson to be part o# the
convening team, but about getting Saunders, who is seen by
many of our people as an Inkatha man. The counter _
-argument was that his inclusion may make the Peace-
Movement and the conference attractive to Buthelezi, who
would find it difficult to refuse to support the
initiative.
Another suggested businessperson was Mr Makan, outgoing
president of the PMB Chamber of Commerce.
It was agreed that controversial names be discussed at the
meeting on 12.02.89r
2. Organisations to be approached to attend the
conference :
Churches : nationally, heads in Natal, Diakonia/Pacsa,
. Jennings' sub committee
Natal Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
SABTA
NAFCOC. 1NCL. INYANDA
BLACK MANAG&MENT FORUM
CGNTRALESA
Maphumulo and other chiefs
Roger Sishi
NAMDA, NADEL, NACOS, BLACK BASH, TASA, NATO, SONAT,
NELFARE SECTOR RGS, SABSWA, KWAZULU FOOTBALL ASSOC., AFRA
YCN, NACTU, BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS MOVEMENT, BANU COSATU UDF
AND INKATHA should each be given 50 delegates.

It was felt that Inkatha should be invited as an organisation., However, the convenors should also be 'asked to approach individual Inkatha members.

International observers should include : ICRC, foreign embassies, Commonwealth. , ' t

3, Main objective of conference. _ . - t -nuiV\$'

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There was some debate about this between the two _

-delegations..1 , -' .

COSATU said that the most important proposal that should emerge from the conference was that of the need for direct talks between ourselves and Inkatha. -

This was because the principle of direct talks had been accepted by the Harare meeting. The process, he - elaborated should be as follows: M

- the conference must make the proposal that UDF and CDSATU enter into talks with Inkatha.

- thereafter delegates must provide pressure to ensure that there is an acceptance of the need for talks.

We replied that the approach to the conference currently being discussed within the front was to see talks just as one of a set of possible proposals. Given the strength of feelings among some of our ranks against talks, and given that the purpose of the meeting on 12.02.89 was to develop a clearer conception of our strategic initiatives, it was premature for the sub committee to determine what the main outcome of the conference should be.

It was felt that if talks are to be held, they should be about implementing the concrete recommendations of the conference on how to end the violence or reduce it.

Talks could possibly be chaired by the convenors.

PEACE MANIFESTO.-

Because time was running out the discussion was limited.

CDSATU felt that the manifesto should be kept very simple and should embody the principles of earlier agreements, viz ;

- freedom to organise and meet
- no forced recruitment
- free access to public facilities for all
- freedom from threats of violence

We pointed out that some comrades in the front are also

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having discussions and may want to make proposals to the meeting on Sunday. Also that it would be important to consult the conference participants, as well as the movement, about the contents.

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It was felt that the last item before group discussion at the 12. 02. 89 meeting should make provision for a report from the sub committee.

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OBSERVATIONS. ,
-Clearly there is a need for sharper strategic thinking on the Movement for Peace and the question of talks, in particular.

It was agreed that a grouping of key and disciplined comrades from the front would meet to brainstorm these issues in preparation for the meeting on 12. 02.89.

REPORT OF JOINT REGIONAL WORKSHOP OF COSATU AND UDF AFFILIATES HELD ON 12.2.89

A. OBJECTIVES OF WORKSHOP.

The workshop was called to look at joint responses to the violence in Natal. In particular, the idea of a Movement for Peace among the people was to be discussed, and concrete plans to advance it, worked out.

B. PRESENT AT WORKSHOP

The meeting was attended by 180 members of COSATU and UDF structures from throughout Natal. This included the UDF ' demarcated sub-regions, viz. Greater Durban, South Coast, North Coast, Natal Midlands, and Northern Natal. A special effort was made to get activists from the African townships to the workshop, and the majority of participants did come from these areas. However, in keeping with the non-racial character of the front activists from the NIC, UCC, DHAC, NUSAS and also attended. significantly, for Natal this was the first ever regional workshop held which brought together COSATU and UDF members from the local structures.

The meeting was also attended by COSATU and UDF head office officials, A number of activists from the UDF who are presently underground attended the meeting, which was accordingly held under strict conditions of security and discipline.

Cde Archie Gumede was accompanied to the meeting by 12 to 15 members and sympathisers D4 Indlu Izingwevu. These

included : _ ;

Kwenza Mlaba, Fezile Uhmto, 'David Base, 8383 Cele .
(Cleremoni), Mr. Dlamini (Umlazi - cinema ownefi, 'Mr.
Ngcobo (Hammersdele)r Ma- Bale (KwaMashu)

C. AGENDA.

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1. WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION - CD chairpersohs (UDF)
(COSATU)

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2. INPUTS ; ATTEMPTS AT RESOLVINB THE SITUATION; t
BACKGROUND TO THE PMB PEACE PROCESS -
(COSATU) v n

. REPORT ON HARARE MEETING - front
representative

INDLU IZINGWEVU - Hr. Dlamini

3. INPUT ; ANALYSIS AND MOVEMENT FUR PEACE ;
(CCAWUSA)

LUNCH

4. GROUP DISCUSSIONS

5. PLENARY ; REPORTS BACK

-- DISCUSSIONS AND CLARIFICATIDN

6. RESOLUTIONS

7. CLOSURE.

. 1. WELCOME AND INTRODUCTIONS.

Translations into Zulu and English were provided
throughout the meeting to ensure that all delegates
participated fully.

Chairs pointed out that meeting had been called because of
concern at situation in Natal, i.e. escalation of
violence. There wae a need to arrive at solutions. It
was highly significant and an indication of great
commitment that delegates from COSATU and UDF af&iliates
had been brought together under such difficult conditions.

2. ATTEMPTS AT RESDLVING THE SITUATION

SUMMARIES OF INPUTS.

BACKGROUND TO PMB PEACE PROCESS - (CDSATU)

Analysis which underpinned our strategy : mass
organisations had been challenging decisively, Inkatha's

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pdlttfaal ebntrol-over Natal. Inkatha was not comfortable
with this situation. Inkatha began programme of forced
"recruitment. The aim of violence was to smash
organisation on the ground - this role is equivalent to
that of the apartheid state. In responding to the
..violence in PMB, we had isolated the following objectives
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1._End the violence among Bur people

2. Build'and strengthen mass organisation

o. Isolate theiwarlords

_9. Undermine the political support given to Inkatha by
different (liberal) sectors

5. Force police'to act against the warlords

To achieve these objectives the following steps should
be taken.

1. Joint-meeting between UDF affiliates and COSATU should
be held regularly.

2. Building organisations and defences in the townships.

This involved"winning the support of ordinary Inkatha
members, and isolating the warlords.

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4. Legal interdicts - to expose the warlords. Exposure
through media did occur as a result.

4. Talks - these arose in the context of our overall
strategy. Aim of talks : end the violence.

Context : a number of other organisations, e.g. churches,
PFP, were also taking initiatives to set up talks. UDF
and COSATU had to assert their leadership role. But we
realised that violence could not be resolved by
negotiating a peace treaty. Inkatha had to agree to
certain conditions that would allow the peace to be
implemented.

These were :

- the right to organise
- the right of organisations to hold meetings
- end forced recruitment
- disciplining of offenders and the removal of warlords

From the scene i.e.the attorney general should charge
offenders and refuse bail to them.

Two meetings with Inkatha deadlocked on this last issue.

Role of national leadership had also been made an issue in
the PMB peace talks.

Following the banning of organisations in 1988, UDF had
applied to have certain restrictions lifted but with no
positive response from the state.

Because of conditions prevailing in the country in the first half of 1988, and because the violence in Natal subsided in that period, Inkatha was not the main item on the agenda of the mass democratic movement at the time. However, around June 1988, there was an escalation of violence. Context of PMB Accord outlined the weaknesses, lack of consultation, Inkatha not participating fully.

CONCLUSIONS :

Talks should be seen as only part of a broader strategy. Our primary aim is to build organisations. Strategy of the mass democratic movement must include, and have the support of all the people.

REPORT ON HARARE MEETING - UDF representative.

At the Harare meeting, the ANC had informed the MDM delegation about the following -

- they (the British) wanted to intervene in the conflict between the ANC and Inkatha.

- they also wanted the ANC to meet Inkatha.

The ANC's response was that the British government must pressurise the SA government to release detained people, lift restrictions on restricted individuals, allow the peace process to continue. Moreover, the violence in Natal was a matter for the people there to settle, thus Inkatha, UDF affiliates and COSATU should find ways of resolving it, even if this included talks.

The issue of resolving political differences between the democratic movement and Inkatha was not as important as ending the violence.

Information was also given of a proposal which Dhlomo made as the basis for achieving peace:

- all organisations must dissociate themselves from the violence

- no forced recruitment "

- a monitoring group should supervise the agreements between UDF/COSATU and Inkatha

- any party must inform and get approval from the other about its plans to hold meetings, etc;

The ANC's response was : Inkatha must not compel membership of the community, e.g. demand that people hold membership cards to get houses, licences, etc. Inkatha cannot seek power of veto over other organisations' plans. The ANC and MDM agreed at that meeting, that COSATU, UDF, and the churches should initiate the peace process.

The 8 Points agreed upon in Harare were then outlined.

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CONCLUSION : It was noted that there was no disagreement in principle, on holding talks with Inkatha, however, the differences on the point at which talks should be held, - should be addressed by that meeting of 12.02.89.

INDLU IZINGWEVE - Mr. DLAMINI

Mr. Dlamini had once hosted a memorial service For Victoria Mxenge. This was opposed by the magistrate and some Inkatha members, who claimed that UDF radicals would go on the rampage. Instead, it was Inkatha - connected members, who had disrupted the proceedings. This was his own experience of the violence.

In July 1988, in light of the deteriorating situation many people had complained that something needed to be done about the violence. The elders in the community felt that they needed to pull together a structure. They then tried to bring together all people who wanted to bring about a solution. They had held meetings with CDSATU and the UDF. '

The chairperson commented that it was still not clear to the house how Izingwevu related to the mass democratic movement. This would have to be clarified later.

ANAYLIS AND MOVEMENT FOR PEACE - representative From (CCAWUSA)

He pointed out that the situation in Natal cannot be characterised as black on black violence, Parallels can be drawn with

- Witdoeke in Crossroads
- Mbokotho in N.TVL
- Vigilantes in Eastern Cape.

But Inkatha had special features as well :

- It was linked to the Kwazulu legislative Assembly, thus, was direct arm of the state machinery
- It was linked to chieftancy and royalty.
- It had the ability to mobilise across a wide area, i.e. the whole of Natal, not just one area, like the Witdoeke in Crossroads.

Because its interests were directly threatened, Inkatha had attached MDM. But it is also affected by its own internal contradictions, i.e. it is not a democratic organisation. Rather it is controlled in a certain way. Nevertheless, it does have important support bases : imperialist forces, Warlords, businessmen, chiefs, all of whom have their own interests in protecting Inkatha. Some liberal sectors are now cautious about giving support to Inkatha. Many chiefs have also indicated that they are prepared to align themselves with the MDM.

The following assessment can be made of our state of organisation :

Through state intervention, activists are being driven out of areas. '

Inkatha is re-establishing control over several areas.

Mass structures are also greatly weakened

CDSATU structures are experiencing problems

Community based organisations, for the most part, are in tatters. a ,

A cycle of revenge killings has also become the order of the day, and a serious problem of internal refugees has resulted from the violence. Violence has caused serious problems for the MDM, the above indications show. Against this background and that outlined in the front's . representative input earlier, the PMB Accord, while flawed, should be seen as a step in the right direction. Mass campaign was needed to end the violence, and the proposal being put to the meeting was the need GDr a Movement for Peace, which would rally people around the slogan : Peace among the people. Activities in this campaign, which should involve the widest possible spectrum of people and organisations committed to peace, including, businesses, the media, the churches, even Inkatha, if they were so prepared, could include the holding of Peace rallies, a Peace week, etc. A Peace Conference, at which a Peace Manifesto could be adopted, was also envisaged. The aim of the conference would be to isolate and take action against those responsible for the violence. It would be tactically correct to invite Inkatha to the conference, as they would be forced by others there to commit themselves to the peace process. If the delegates so demanded, talks with them could take place in a climate where they would be under massive pressure. This could take place in a climate where they would be under massive pressure. This will make it difficult for them to break agreements, without exposing themselves.

4. GROUP DISCUSSIONS.

The meeting broke up into 5 groups. The groups met for an hour during which they each addressed one question.

1. WHAT DO WE UNDERSTAND EYTTHE MOVEMENT FOR PEACE, AND HOW CAN WE INVOLVE THE WIDEST RANGE QF FORCEStrN IT ?
2. DISCUSS THE PROCESS TOWARDS THE PEACE CONFERENCE, AND WHO SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN IT 7
3. DISCUSS THE BROAD PRINCIPLES TO BE CONTAINED IN THE PEACE MQNIFESTD.

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4. WE HAVE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO DIRECT TALKS WITH .
INKATHA. WHAT DO WE UNDERSTAND BY THIS ?

NB : There was some debate over the formulation of
this question, but it was presented to the workshop in
this manner, eventually.

5. HOW DO WE STRENGTHEN THE CURE OF THE MASS DEMOCRATIC '
MOVEMENT IN RESPONDING TO THE VIOLENCE / WHAT STRUCTURES
ARE NEEDED FOR THIS PROCESS /

5. REPORTS BACK - THESE WERE PRESENTED AND NOTED BY A
SECRETARIAT. '

A. 'SDME QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSIONS FOLLOWED, BUT ONLY FOR A
VERY SHORT TIME. A QUESTION AROSE AS TO THE NATURE AND
MANDATE OF THE MEETING. A HORJDRITY OF THE DELEGATES FELT
THAT THE MEETING HAD A MANDATE TO TAKE DECISIONS WHICH
WOULD LAY THE BASIS FOR A PROGRAMME OF ACTION. A SMALLER
NUMBER FELT THAT DELEGATES SHOULD REPORT BACK THE CONTENTS
OF THE MEETING AS RECOMMENDATIONS. THE LATTER VIEW WAS
NOT CARRIED. IT WAS PDINTED OUT THAT THE MEETING WAS AS
REPRESENTATIVE AS COULD BE CONDUCTED UNDER CURRENT
CONDITIONS, AND THAT THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN
UDF AND COSATU HAD BEEN UNDERWAY FOR SOME TIME. THE PME
DELEGATION INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD TAKE BACK THE
DECISIONS AS FEEDBACK WHEN IT MEETS ON 15.02.89.

RESOLUTION :

The following resolution was put to the meeting and
. accepted. It captured all the main points agreed to in
the meeting : -

There was a need for a process which must result in the
establishment of 3 Movement for Peace.

CUSATU and UDF must lead this initiative.

The process must involve the broadest range of people and
arganisatione, who wish to restore peace among the people
of Natal.

The process must be used to stimulate discussion on the
grnund among our own members.

We must work towards creating the conditions for the
restoration of Peace.

The meeting worked out the broad principles to guide the
peace process.

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The Peace Manifesto will contain these broad principles.

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The Peace Manifesto. 5 proposed principles will be referred back to our own organisations for further discussions. 1 same identified were:

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l?cfijiajfreedbm to organise and 925i, etc
1 _ , The process must be used to find ways of pressurizing the state to release persons who were detained or restricted for their earlier involvement in seeking peace.
. The process must be used to create a space for our organisations and advance the broader struggle.
There was agreement on the following on the process leading to the Peace Conference :
- We must call joint meetings in all areas to discuss what issues should be discussed at the Peace Conference.
Those organisations associated with Inkatha must be invited to the Peace Conference.
It was recommended that the process of consulting with organisations outside UDF and CDSATU should be initiated. Should the Peace Conference decide that there should be talks between UDF/CDSATU and Inkatha, we are not opposed to this in principle. However, the condition on which we will enter talks, is that they will not destroy our struggle.
It is important to improve consultation between the core of the Movement for Peace, i.e. UDF and CDSATU.
The task of rebuilding structures in the community is the joint responsibility of COSATU and the UDF.
We need to develop joint political education programmes to inculcate discipline in our ranks.

INDLU IZINGWEVU

Earlier, delegates had expressed dissatisfaction at the explanations around this matter. They asked for a fuller explanation which was given by Fezile Vanto. His explanations have been noted in another report. There was not much time for discussion, and after some delegates had addressed themselves to the questionable way in which this group had gone about organising, the chairs directed the meetings attention to the central issue facing the meeting: was the Committee of Concern prepared to accept

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 the leadeEShip and dlwectled d? the'MDvemeht for Peace, in
 2responding totthe vfnl_ence 7 13 '
 The delegates agaigh on the following 1
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 __--The joint UDF/CDSATU working group should lead all efforts
 . w-otowards geace. lhe Cummittee of Concern should subject
 itself to Its direction.
 IhEre should be one initiative - to launch the Movement
 .for Peace.
 David Basa replied that there was a big job to be done,
 and not enough people to do it. The Committee of Concern
 had been set up to reln4orce the mass democratic movement,
 by involving the elders. He denied that their objective
 was to go into talks with Inkatha; instead it was the
 mobilisation of older people into the struggle.
 It was agreed that the UDF and CDSATU would jointly meet
 with Indlu Izingwevu ta discuss its organisational role.
 7. CLOSURE.
 The National Anthem was sung and the delegates legt for '
 their respective areas.
 RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED AT THE JOINT MEETING HELD IN DURBAN ON
 12 FEBRUARY 1989 - OF CDSATU AND COMMUNITY BASED
 ORGANISATIONS.
 1. MOVEMENT FOR PEACE.
 1.1 That CDSATU and UDF aftiliates must lead the
 initiative for the Movement #or Peace.
 1.2. That the mass democratic movement (MDM) should
 involve the widest possible range of groups.
 1.3. That we cnnsolidate our organisations on the ground
 and that we use this process to build discipline in our
 ranks and stimulate discussion about making peace.
 2. PEACE MANIFESTO
 .Slhce Peace amongst the people is a fundamental principle
 of our struggle , the principles in the peace manifesto
 should be seen as conditions which most effectively allow
 us to implement peace. We must therefore work for and
 secure :
 2.1 The freedom to belong to-eny organisation
 2.2. The freedom to organise.
 .._____. ____w--nm

nJ' _ 2.3. The freedod tbehpld general meetings.
:- '_: .A314 Thetfreedom to wear T/Shirts, distribute pamphlets
1-,. _3_ e ; anq carry_out activitieshgggar organisations.
1 ,.. 2.5-4-The end t9 kprcedtfeEFhitment: ' f !'
f f'_:' IZTE. Feghs'of;hressure to be applied on the aiartheid
istate'to release detainees, lift the State of
Emergency, and bannings-and restrictions on
organisations and individuals sc_that they may
participate in the peace process.
a, 2.7. The creation of space for us to advance and ta
address the real issues facing our people from whiEh
our attention has been diverted by theriolence.
2.8. This broad framework to be referred for full
discussion in all our structures and is to be
used as a basis to consult with and win over other
groups outside the MDM to the peace process.
3. PEACE TALKS.
w
o.1. Our main aims are to :
3.1.1. Reduce and end the violence amongst our
people in Natal.
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&.&.2. To expose and isolate the warlords as the
principle orchestrators of the violence.
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m
TD expose t0 the international community
the violence of the warlords and the state's
collusion in this.
3.2. Talks with Inkatha must be on a clear basis. That
we seek to end the violence and to bring peace among the 1
people.
3.3. Talks do not replace the rebuilding and
strengthening of our structures against vigilante
attachs. i
1 v.
3.4. We should commit all forces including Inkatha's
international allies to a peace programme aimed at ending
the violence.
4. STRENGTHENING ORGANISATION
4.1. we must build a closer structured and disciplined
relationship between COSATU and its mass based allies at
all levels.
K1.)

4.2. we must develop a-joint educatinn programme aimed'at unidying and heightenihg the political awareness and understanding of Du: members.

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.o .- . _

a" - 4.3. e must launch jnint campaigns aimed at cementing 'this rekatipnship.

v,_. 4.4. We must strengthen involvement of workers in community based structures. _

4.5. we have a joint resposiblity towards rebuilding community based and COSATU Structurs..

. 4.6. The forums of both COSATU and UDF affiliates must be open for mutual participation from representatives 94 both organisations.

5. PROCESS TOWARDS THE CONFERENCE FDR PEACE.

5.1. We need to call meetings at local and regional level to discuss what issues we must focus on in a peace conference.

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5.7. We must begin to consult and meet_with other organisatione.

5.3. Every organisation in Natal must be invited to the peace con4erence, including Inkatha, Uwusa,NYANDA, the Womens Brigade of Inkatha, etc in order to bind every constituency to the peace process.

. 5.4. The jaint working groups must attend to the details of the conference, ensuring full report backs at all times to all the structures.

MEETING OF UDF CDSATU JOINT WORKING GROUP HELD ON 15.02.89

AGENDA . ' , -

1. Impiementation of resolutions 04 12.02.89 workshop, esp, setting up convening committee

2. Reports back of 12.02.89 workshop

4. Follow up consult with movement

4. Indlu Izingwevu.

1. Setting up convening committee for Peace Conference

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It was reported that_ the sub committee which had looked at the peace conference in preparatrbn \$or the workshop had suggested the following names as convenors 1 Harry Gwalaf Rev Mgojo: Archbishop quxey : Bishop Nuttall: Chris. Saunders 5 Maken (EMBfChamber of Commerce) :_Profi Schreiner. " i - "Va " ' ' - v

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There was some debate about h6uw broad this convenihg

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committee should be. Even the UDF cde were divided on two2 key issuesj" -j 2. . --

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- should Inkatha leadership elements be invblved, so as to make the Movement for Peace palatable to Inkatha ? .

- what should the size of the committee be, and what should the extent of participation of mdm and influential people \$rom the African sector be.

Eventually, the following formulation for the constitution of a convening committee was agreed upon:

- H. 5., Nuttall and Hurley be approached to initiate the process.

They sould immediately approach others who should also be part 04 the convening committee. Names suggested, were Mgojo, Prof Nyembezi, Pro4 Clarence (ex UND), Chris Saunders. However, we should leave it to their discretion 2 to add to the list or to make alternative suggestions..

- The conveyors should extend invitations to.a wide range of organisations and individuals to attend a Peace conference : Broadly, the conference agenda should involve:

1. Report on the violence

2. The Peace Manifesto

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4. Implementation of the demands:in the Manifesto.

The convenors should appoint a secretariat to assist them in convening the conference.

-Invitations will be issued to the mdm also. This space created must be used to build organisation, by e.g setting up Peace Committee that will involve the widest possible range of forces committed to the idea.

Once the conference preparations were underway, a number of organisations e.g. SAETA, NAFCOC, our affiliate Democratic Party i.e. anti apartheid coalition forces should publicly endorse the initiative.

It was agreed that Hurley, Nuttall and Gwal be immediately approached to discuss the issue with them.

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2. Report back of 12.02.89 workshop

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J2 The resolutions should be circulated to all our structureth and discussed furthen. As far as possible, jdint reparte back should be held. Aleq.5jaint structures ghould be set up to eimplement the Peace -Pro:ess. .v.' 3 w(,

. . J \$. , _ _ , - : . ,
".3; Ponsqltation:with the movement._:g?"hg M 7'1-
'The 25 Fehruary 1989 was sUggested by COSATU. UDF was consulted about_whether this was suitable. J
4. .Indlu Izingwevu.r'

The Committee's interpretation of the decision of the meeting on 12. 2.89 is that this :ammittee-should be dissolved.' Its members should be encouraged to work within the structures 0% existing organisations. A meeting will be arranged with them at which this iinterpretations will be conveyed.

MEETING OF UDF/ CDSATU JOINT WORKING GROUP HELD ON 6.03.89

AGENDA

- 1.Lusaka meeting Report
- 2.Report on convenors
- 3.Norkshop - regions and locals
- 4.working Group
- E.Steps to be taken.

1. LUSAHA MEETING REPORT

5 COSATU , 1 UDF and 14 NEC delegates had attended this meeting which took place over 2 days.

The purpose of the meeting was to brief the movement on developments in the establishment of 3 Movement #09 Peace among the People. 8 key issues were identified in the course of discussion. These were:

- aims of Peace of Conference.
- agenda of Conference
- our capacity to convene the Conference
- participants and strategies
- Peace Manifesto
- mass work
- public endorsement of the Movement for Peace
- post conference monitoring agreement.

Izingwevu

The meeting started eff with a fairly lengthy discussion' on Indlu Izingwevu.

- The UDF-CDSATU delegation had pointed out that they were
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netihbstile to the idea of a Committee of Elders, but that they believed that there were problems in the process by which the Committee of Concern had been formed. They also pointed out their concern about the racist and divisive views of some members in this structure, and the Fact that the Committee's doings tended to undermine the joint UDF-CDSATU strategy.

Eventually, after much debate and discussibn, the position - agreed upon was that the Committee of Concern should be dissolved, and its members integrated into community and trade union structures.i

Peace Conference

It should be a Natal based conference, but leading members of 311 the regions should be involved, since the issue is 'of a national concern.

- The_youth must become involved in strategic planning.

To this end it was agreed that a delegation of PME and other youth would meet with the movement.

Aims of Cbn4erence.

- to approve Peace Manifesto

- to reach agreement on peace, and make arrangements for mechanisms to be used to put such agreements into practice.

Talks.

The movement felt that talks have a signifidant role to play-in the Peace process. '

Their aim is to end the violence. MDM must not adopt an inflexible stance on this issue.

Programme of Action

e) Convenors should get together.

b) They must have their meeting and notify Inkatha of their intention to call the Peace Conference.

c) They must make a public call/anouncement about the Peace Con4erence. A -w

2) All other organisations must give support to the idea, including the movement, even the British government and others should publicly endorse it. (tactically we need to tie Inkatha to this process through this mass publicity)

3) Peace Conference

3.1. Participation

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- Should be broad and open, all local structures must participate. _
- National personalities including Tommy Bedford, chiefs, disenchanted with Kwazulu, Indian community of Natal, should be invited - that is a wide range of anti-apartheid forces.

This should be tight - Liasan should take place beforehand so that unnecessary hitches are avoided at the conference. The Agenda should include the following :

3.2.1. Peace Manifesto

This should include the following demands:

- an end to killings
- no forced recruitment
- the right of access to facilities
- the right of freedom to organise
- the right of freedom of association
- commitment to action against wrong doers and violators of the code

possibly incorporate the issue of the return of refugees to their areas

3.2.2. Enforcement and Monitoring mechanism.

At the conference, we should agree to have further talks to discuss enforcement and monitoring mechanisms. The talks should take place outside the country and include ANC, UDF, COSATU, Inkatha and churches. This forum will offer more political clout as it will have the backing of imperialist forces. The ANC will indicate to forces inside the country (including Inkatha) that it is willing to become involved in this way. -

Mass Action

The conference needs to decide on action that will involve the masses of people, so that it results not only in talks at the level of the leadership, but engages the masses in action - e.g. rallies, mini-conferences, etc.

Timing of conference

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The call by the convenors should be made in the next two weeks. The conference should take place in the following five weeks, i.e. shortly after 7.05.89.

Preparations to be made by the mass democratic movement

1. Meeting between youth of affected areas (particularly

PMS) and the movement - 20.03.87

2. Joint workshops should be held at local level to discuss mdm input at the conference.

Communication between UDF and CDSATU

Two problems were raised by the COSATU delegation:

1. the working group is not strong enough from the UDF's side - the UDF team is less cohesive than COSATU's, and does not seem to have a clear mandate. This tends to stall and prolong the process in a situation which calls for more rapid movement.

2. The decisions of the working group are not always accepted, and are sometimes changed by the UDF. An example of this was when the UDF changed the agenda for the joint meeting of 12.02.89, after the sub-committee appointed by the working group had met to discuss the agenda. . ' .

COSATU believed that the working group should have clear mandates, powers and functions. Other actors should have clearly defined rules in relation to the working group. It was agreed that CDSATU should raise these problems with UDF structures back home in the working group.

2. REPORT ON THE CDNVENDRS

A high-level UDF-CDSATU delegation met Archbishop Hurley, Rev. Magbba and Rev. Athbl Jennings on 27.02.89. They were supportive of the idea of the Peace Conference, but not confident of their own capacity to convene the Peace Conference on their own. Jennings felt that mediation skills would be required, and wanted to bring in suitable persons. 'h

Archbishop HURley was asked to approach a number of other persons to be part of the convenors' team. These were Chris Saunders (04 Tangaat- Huletts), Prof. Nyembezi, Prof. Thembela, Prof. Bonysens and Bishop Nuttall. Rev. Jennings was to contact Inkatha, to ask them whether they might want to nominate two persons of their choice to be part of the convenors' team. "

At a meeting held to discuss the convenors on 6.03.89, it was established that the following persons have now agreed to serve as convenors of the Peace Conference:

Hurley; Nuttall; Magoba (or alternatively, Mgojo); Gwala; Nyembezi; Thembela. Chris Saunders has not been available, and can only be contacted after 14.03.89. It was agreed that Prof. Nkabinde will also be approached.

Rev. Jennings had contacted Muse Zondi, and through him arranged to meet Oscar Dhlomo on Friday 10.03.89, to discuss the matter of the convenors.

Jennings proposed that the convenors be assisted by facilitators, who would have some skills in mediation. His motivation was that if the conference was to proceed without hitches, there would be a need for prior discussions, and possibly even some mediation around the agenda.

He suggested the following names as facilitators:

John Redford and Phil Glaser (Human Resource Consultants); Bishop Mkhize and Rev Ben Nsimbi (Natal Church Leaders' Conflict Group); Rev Doug Muller and Daniel Ngubane (Christian Leadership Trust); Vuyi Nxasane and Athol Jennings (Vuleka Trust), Paul Graham (IDASA).

The UDF and COSATU members present were asked to discuss whether the idea of facilitators was acceptable to them.

The following issues were also discussed in this meeting:

- suggested conference dates - 14.05.89 or alternatively 28.05.89

- the convenors are to investigate suitable venues

- they are to investigate the possibility of a translation service

- costs: UDF and COSATU affiliates will pay for transporting their members to and from the conference
- the convenors have requested a report from us on our proposals for the conference.

Following all these reports, the following issues were agreed upon by the working group:

1. a permanent contact group should be set up between the working group and the convenors. It should consist of two UDF and two COSATU persons. At least one of these persons from the side of the UDF must actually be serving on the working group.

2. The convenors should be informed of the working group's view that mediation has no role to play at this stage, thus there is presently no need for a group of facilitators, as proposed. The convenors could use whatever machinery they liked to implement their tasks, but they should not expect UDF-COSATU to accord their facilitators any status in the peace process. The UDF-COSATU contact group will relate to the convenors, only. Lastly, the list of names of possible facilitators should not be put to Inkatha.

4. To guide the convenors in their work, a report on the working group's proposals for the conference will be drawn up.

5. It should be proposed to the convenors that one of them should accompany Jennings to the meeting with Dhlomo on 10.03.89

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6. Pre aratiQns shouLdLbe made for the yauth delegation to

V :leavayoRepresentatiDn would be on an area basis, as

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Ingaddition, a person from the PMB legal ptoject, who also
serves on the working group, would attend.