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Lessons for South Africa

Lunch

Item Four

Chair: Ms. S. Sigcau

Speakers: Dr Robert Dodoo

Mr David Baker

Cabinet: The Driver of National Strategy

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Linking Visions to budget

Linking budget to performance

Making budget policy stick

Support for National Strategising

Plenary: Lessons for South Africa

Afternoon tea

Summing up

Closure

Dr Z S T Skweyiya

27 November 1998

Workshop for the Office of the Deputy President as well as selected Directors-General

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the finance ministry has excessive authority in relation to the rest of government;  
the competence, skills and values of the civil service, and the systems and structures of government, are inadequate or inappropriate for the tasks to be performed; civil service career patterns reinforce sectionalism;  
there is inadequate differentiation between the roles of Ministers and civil servants;  
there are no agreed standards or systems for measuring the performance of government, nor institutional resources available to Cabinet for improving performance;  
there are no systems for managing external communications;

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there are no internal mechanisms for correcting these defects;

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external mechanisms for accountability and scrutiny are inadequate and/or are ignored;  
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' Cabinet is unaware of the facts; it receives no reliable information on expenditure out  
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turns or on policy outcomes.

#### Remedies

To a large extent the remedies to these and other failings must rest on clarifying responsibilities and relationships. What are or should be the responsibilities of the principal actors and institutions which comprise and support Cabinet? Is anybody charged with responsibility for specific tasks that are recognised as important? What should be the relationships between the principal actors and their responsibilities?

Four sets of relationships, between groups of activities and objectives, are especially important. Establishing the right balance between these is Cabinet's major task. The four relationships are those between politics and administration; policy and finance; whole-of-government and sectional interests; long- and short-term objectives and policies. The right balance must be made at all levels of decision-making; but Cabinet, at the apex of the process, can and must determine the nature of the overall balance and the trade-offs to be made in each case.

The following section lists some of the ideas, institutions and processes which have been employed in different Commonwealth countries to correct some of the deficiencies described above. Some have been widely tried and tested, and have proved their value over time. Others have been tried with less success, but remain worth considering. Others must be regarded as still in the experimental stage. Many have both strengths and weaknesses; the balance between these must be assessed and may vary in different contexts.

#### Thinking and acting strategically

(a) The key is that ministers should develop relationships and understandings around the collective interest and dedicate time to considering national strategic issues. This can be done through:

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dedicated cabinet committees, concerned exclusively with strategic issues;

0 Out of cabinet meetings or retreats, by all Ministers or key groups.

0 The adoption of a strategic management cycle which is built into the cabinet calendar and

agendas



(b) Having agreed on strategy, to reflect it in Budget decisions.

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a long one. It will be familiar to anyone who has worked at the highest levels of government. The most important items on it include the following:

decisions made by Cabinet are inconsistent with Cabinet's own strategic framework and agreed priorities, whether because of pressure of events, crises, sectional (including donor) interests, inadequate information, defective policy analysis or any combination of these; decisions or actions taken by individual Ministers are inconsistent with agreed Cabinet strategy; departmental Ministers and officials pursue sectional interests to the detriment of the whole-of-government objectives; there is inadequate co-ordination between departments either in introducing new policies or in implementing existing policies; different parts of the government speak to the outside world with different voices; Cabinet decisions are ignored by operating units or are implemented in ways not intended; decisions taken by the political leadership are ignored by the civil service; the achievement of objectives which, in political or administrative terms, should be given high priority, is frustrated by the inflexible application of financial policies; conversely, the achievement of agreed financial objectives is frustrated by inappropriate activities on the part of individual Ministers and departments; total expenditure frequently exceeds agreed budget limits; Cabinet decisions take inadequate account of other party (the legislature, public, international - including donor) opinion; the government speaks with different voices in public; the government does not command the confidence of the public.

Some contributory causes

The essential first step in correcting these failings is to identify the contributory causes on the input side. The causes will often be multiple. The most common include the following:

Cabinet has no agreed strategy or clear order of priorities to provide a framework for individual decisions (including decisions on donor proposals); Cabinet is over-burdened with business; the supporting structure of sub-committees is absent, inadequate, under-used or lacks authority; the Cabinet agenda is not systematically managed; too many minor issues come to Cabinet while major decisions of concern to government as a whole are taken in other forums or at lower levels; Cabinet pays insufficient attention to long-term issues; consensus in Cabinet discussions tends to develop prematurely; Cabinet members have no incentives to express dissent; the Chief Executive [Head of Government] tends to bypass Cabinet; Cabinet decisions are not effectively communicated to or understood by operating units; Cabinet size and composition are inappropriate; Cabinet members are chosen for the wrong reasons; too few of them are occupationally - in terms of their portfolios or temperamentally capable of perceiving and pursuing whole-of-government objectives; Cabinet members have too few incentives to collaborate; there are neither adequate rules for the conduct of Cabinet business nor any authority capable of enforcing such rules; the finance ministry has inadequate authority in relation to the rest of government;

# Strengthening Cabinet decision-making in Commonwealth countries

## A discussion paper

### Introduction

This note summarises some of the main issues that arise in considering the performance of Cabinets in Commonwealth countries. Then, to assist systematic thinking about improving Cabinet performance, it outlines the basic functions of Cabinet, some typical deficiencies in the outputs of Cabinet activity and some of the institutional and process devices that have been employed in different countries to remedy those deficiencies.

### Issues

The questions which arise about Cabinets and their supporting systems are typically of very different kinds. For example:

- 0 how does Cabinet stay in charge?
- what kinds of decisions should go to Cabinet?
- 0 how can national vision be linked with the budget and with the direction of the Public

### Sector?

- 0 where does Cabinet get advice and support on cross-sectoral and whole-of-government

### issues?

- ' what is the appropriate division of labour between Ministers and Permanent Secretaries?
- 0 what information should Cabinet require from the Public Sector on a regular basis?
- how can Cabinet Ministers and central agencies keep spending within agreed budget

### policy limits?

- how does Cabinet control its own strategy when development resources are from foreign sources?

### Functions

There are three main functions which Cabinet and only Cabinet can perform effectively. These are:

Giving strategic direction to the government as a whole;

Ensuring effective decision-making arrangements for the government as a whole; and

Maintaining the effectiveness and integrity of government systems.

Beyond its specific functions, the Cabinet, as the top decision making body for the Executive, sets the standard for policy making at subordinate levels. A cabinet system which does not reject policy proposals which are inadequately costed or consulted; lack sound analysis or factual basis; or which do not promote the primacy of the public over partisan interests, has little credibility in expecting good decision-making further down in the hierarchy.

### Common Cabinet Failings

The successful performance of these functions is inhibited by a variety of failings. The list is



0 Whether portfolios are defined in a way which is integrative or divisive

- A number of Cabinet members without portfolio;

(0) Rules and conventions governing the conduct of Cabinet

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a structure of Ministerial subcommittees of Cabinet;

a sub-structure of supporting committees of officials

effective and predictable rules and procedures for convening Cabinet meetings, bringing issues to Cabinet, and managing the Cabinet agenda;

(d) Processes for ensuring that the collective interest of Government is the over-riding one.

0 Commitment by ministers to adhere to the rules themselves and to be intolerant of their

colleagues doing otherwise;

Effective monitoring and following-up Cabinet decisions;

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0 A professional Cabinet secretariat, whose head is recognised as having authority, subject

to the Head of Government [Chief Executive], in relation to Cabinet rules and procedures;

0 A specialised unit to provide Cabinet or Chief Executive with counter-vailing advice;

0 Means of maintaining the public integrity and solidarity of Cabinet and of regulating public dissent with cabinet decisions on the part of individual Ministers.

- The use of a centrally located communications system;

- Rules and conventions governing the activities of Ministers private Offices

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Central agencies with the authority and co-ordination to ensure policy advice takes account of the collective interest

(e) Ensuring effective fiscal discipline.

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Effective and predictable rules, and related procedures, to ensure fiscal discipline - for example all policy and project proposals, including those financed by donors, to be subjected to Ministry of Finance scrutiny for any expenditure implications;

° A publicly stated Medium Term Expenditure Framework to which the cabinet is committed

- Finance ministry with authority in disputes over programme costing

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Reliable, timely and credible financial reporting at both departmental and whole-of government levels

Processes for maximising commitment to portfolio Vote levels in the lead-up to the

budget

0 Consequences for officials and Ministers for overâ\200\224expenditure

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## Effectiveness and Integrity of Government Systems

. Oversight and control of the structure and governance arrangements for the state sector

0 An advisory capacity to monitor the structure and governance of the state sector

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a professional career civil service under a Head of Public service with authority to promote

the collective interest with respect to the organisation and control of the public service

effective means of ensuring political intent is translated into administrative action

0 Use of written performance agreements for senior officers

0 Use of corporate plans for government departments

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Clear understandings about the respective roles of Ministers and officials

Incentives and consequences related to the quality of administrative performance.

Protections against patronage and inappropriate political or other special interest influence

Civil Service Commission\200\235, and agreed rules for selection

Senior Civil Service mobile between departments

Contracts between Ministers and permanent secretaries

0 Sound processes for reporting ,monitoring, auditing, ethics promotion, investigation, evaluation, and transparency

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Clear individual responsibility for politicians and senior public servants, reinforced by appropriate decision-making rights and specified accountabilities

### Context

There are general principles of governance which apply to any complex organisation, but the relevance and value of specific processes and techniques only in the specific context of each country, taking account of the nature of that country's political and governmental institutions, the background against which these operate, their policy priorities, and the different operational risks which they face.

William Plowden and Alex Matheson

27 October 1998

The most strategically influential decisions a Cabinet makes on a regular basis are those around the budget process. National visions only begin to come real at the point that they are seen to drive the manner in which revenue is raised and funds appropriated. It is important therefore that the process of formulating the budget should be integrated with the process for defining national strategy-ideally a deliberate and inclusive cabinet process that puts a strategic â\200\234front endâ\200\235 on the annual budget process.

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Articulation of medium term national priorities by means of medium term expenditure framework

' Cabinet level agreement on major priorities in the early stages of the budget process  
0 The establishment of envelopes or â\200\234potsâ\200\235 defining the quantity of resources for major

national policy areas-with groupings of Ministers and departments

0 Allowing some internal expenditure flexibility in return for greater assurance on staying

within aggregates

- Taking more control of volume driven (eg benefits) or process driven (eg public service pay rates) expenditure to allow funds to move to areas of national priority.

' A more collaborative working style for Finance officials

- More co-ordination on budget and fiscal matters amongst central agencies - especially over

expenditure implications of policy proposals.

(C)Advice from the public service that is supportive of strategic decision-making. Ways in which this can be achieved are;

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strengthening co-ordination of central agencies - especially around the budget process; dedicated units, reporting to Cabinet, concerned with the strategic and longer-term implications of actual or potential policies and actions;

â\200\234lookoutâ\200\235 units, focusing exclusively on the long term reliance on external think tanks with a similar mission;

all policy and project proposals coming to Cabinet, including those financed by donors, to be assessed in terms of their contribution to policy priorities;

- cross-departmental teams working on major strategic issues.

Effective decision-making arrangements

The quality of Cabinet decision-making is very significantly influenced by the governance arrangements which define the cabinet composition and process. Matters of importance are:

(a) The integrity of Cabinetâ\200\235s mandate.

- Processes and remedies that ensure that all decisions that constitutionally should go to

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Cabinet, do so, including ensuring all expenditure is â\200\234on-budgetâ\200\235 and that at informal

influences and relationships are not pre-empting the Cabinet prerogative.

(b) Number and nature of portfolios

- Formal or informal limits on the maximum number of Cabinet members;

- . Consideration of degree to which port-folios reflect current priorities;

# Seminar on Improving Cabinet Decision-Making:

## A Commonwealth Perspective

Mount Grace Hotel,

Magaliesburg.

26 November 1998

8:00 - 8:10

8:10 - 8:30

8:30 - 9:00

9:00 - 9:45

9:45 - 10:30

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Welcome

Chair: Minister A M Omar

Opening Address

Minister: Dr Zola Skweyiya

Item One

Speaker: Dr Mohan Kaul

Cabinet Government in the Commonwealth

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Item Two

Demands on modern Cabinets

Responses and initiatives

Common failings

Chair: Baroness Chalker

Speakers: Tan Sri Dato Seri Sarji

Mr W. Rickett

Putting Cabinet in Charge

Steering not rowing

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Performance and conformance

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Collective vs Sectoral

Cabinet Committees

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The rules of Cabinet

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Accountability

Discussions/Lessons for South Africa

Morning tea

Item Three

Chair: Baroness Chalker

Speaker: Mr Max Moore-Wilton

Mr. N N Vohra

The Po/it/Ca/ Adm/n/Lsâ\200\230trat/ve Interface

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Rationale for Division of Labour

Whitehall vs White House Tradition

Cabinet/Public Service Relationship

Minister/Director-General Relationship

Head of Public Service Role

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CIVIL SERVICE REFORMS  
Commonwealth Experiences

Key Strategies i

- I. Policy Development & Coordination
- II. Organization Restructuring
- III. Reorientating Organisational Culture
- IV. Managing Human Resources
- V. Commercialisation & Building Partnerships
- VI. Financial Planning & Control Systems
- VII. Using Information Technology

AGENCIES

PM's Off "

a long one. It will be familiar to anyone who has worked at the highest levels of government. The most important items on it include the following:

decisions made by Cabinet are inconsistent with Cabinet's own strategic framework and agreed priorities, whether because of pressure of events, crises, sectional (including donor) interests, inadequate information, defective policy analysis or any combination of these; decisions or actions taken by individual Ministers are inconsistent with agreed Cabinet strategy; departmental Ministers and officials pursue sectional interests to the detriment of the whole-of-government objectives; there is inadequate co-ordination between departments either in introducing new policies or in implementing existing policies; different parts of the government speak to the outside world with different voices; Cabinet decisions are ignored by operating units or are implemented in ways not intended; decisions taken by the political leadership are ignored by the Civil service; the achievement of objectives which, in political or administrative terms, should be given high priority, is frustrated by the inflexible application of financial policies; conversely, the achievement of agreed financial objectives is frustrated by inappropriate activities on the part of individual Ministers and departments; total expenditure frequently exceeds agreed budget limits; Cabinet decisions take inadequate account of other party (the legislature, public, international - including donor) opinion; the government speaks with different voices in public; the government does not command the confidence of the public.

Some contributory causes

The essential first step in correcting these failings is to identify the contributory causes on the input side. The causes will often be multiple. The most common include the following:

Cabinet has no agreed strategy or clear order of priorities to provide a framework for individual decisions (including decisions on donor proposals); Cabinet is over-burdened with business; the supporting structure of sub-committees is absent, inadequate, under-used or lacks authority; the Cabinet agenda is not systematically managed; too many minor issues come to Cabinet while major decisions of concern to government as a whole are taken in other forums or at lower levels; Cabinet pays insufficient attention to long-term issues; consensus in Cabinet discussions tends to develop prematurely; Cabinet members have no incentives to express dissent; the Chief Executive [Head of Government] tends to by-pass Cabinet; Cabinet decisions are not effectively communicated to or understood by operating units; Cabinet size and composition are inappropriate; Cabinet members are chosen for the wrong reasons; too few of them are occupationally - in terms of their portfolios - or temperamentally capable of perceiving and pursuing whole-of-government objectives; Cabinet members have too few incentives to collaborate; there are neither adequate rules for the conduct of Cabinet business nor any authority capable of enforcing such rules; the finance ministry has inadequate authority in relation to the rest of government;

# Strengthening Cabinet decision-making in Commonwealth countries

## A discussion paper

### Introduction

This note summarises some of the main issues that arise in considering the performance of Cabinets in Commonwealth countries. Then, to assist systematic thinking about improving Cabinet performance, it outlines the basic functions of Cabinet, some typical deficiencies in the outputs of Cabinet activity and some of the institutional and process devices that have been employed in different countries to remedy those deficiencies.

### Issues

The questions which arise about Cabinets and their supporting systems are typically of very different kinds. For example:

- 0 how does Cabinet stay in charge?
- what kinds of decisions should go to Cabinet?
- 0 how can national vision be linked with the budget and with the direction of the Public

### Sector?

- 0 where does Cabinet get advice and support on cross-sectoral and whole-of-government

### issues?

- ' what is the appropriate division of labour between Ministers and Permanent Secretaries?
- 0 what information should Cabinet require from the Public Sector on a regular basis?
- how can Cabinet Ministers and central agencies keep spending within agreed budget

### policy limits?

- how does Cabinet control its own strategy when development resources are from foreign sources?

### Functions

There are three main functions which Cabinet and only Cabinet can perform effectively. These are:

Giving strategic direction to the government as a whole;

Ensuring effective decision-making arrangements for the government as a whole; and

Maintaining the effectiveness and integrity of government systems.

Beyond its specific functions, the Cabinet, as the top decision making body for the Executive, sets the standard for policy making at subordinate levels. A cabinet system which does not reject policy proposals which are inadequately costed or consulted; lack sound analysis or factual basis; or which do not promote the primacy of the public over partisan interests, has little credibility in expecting good decision-making further down in the hierarchy.

### Common Cabinet Failings

The successful performance of these functions is inhibited by a variety of failings. The list is

## MANAGEMENT IMTOVATIONS IN GOVERNMENT

### Commonwealth Experiences

1, Policy DeVGIOpment & C0â\200\2240rdinati0n

â\200\231 Strengthening PM/Pres. Offices (UK, Zambia)

Â° Inter-Ministerial Committees

â\200\231 National Missions & Forums (Canada, Malaysia)

â\200\231 Cabinet Committees of Secretaries

Â° Independent Policy Institutions



## PUBLIC SERVICE REFORMS

### Commonwealth Experiences

, Policy Development & COOrdination

1. Enhancing Policy Analysis
2. Strengthening Cabinet Offices
3. Improving Policy Presentation
4. Utilizing External Policy Advice

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Alex Matheson MTSD

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Lessons for South Africa

Lunch

Item Four

Chair: Ms. S. Sigcau

Speakers: Dr Robert Dodoo

Mr David Baker

Cabinet: The Driver of National Strategy

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Linking Visions to budget

Linking budget to performance

Making budget policy stick

Support for National Strategising

Plenary: Lessons for South Africa

Afternoon tea

Summing up

Closure

Dr Z S T Skweyiya

27 November 1998

Workshop for the Office of the Deputy President as well as selected Directors-General

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the finance ministry has excessive authority in relation to the rest of government;  
the competence, skills and values of the civil service, and the systems and structures of government, are inadequate or inappropriate for the tasks to be performed; civil service career patterns reinforce sectionalism;  
there is inadequate differentiation between the roles of Ministers and civil servants;  
there are no agreed standards or systems for measuring the performance of government, nor institutional resources available to Cabinet for improving performance;  
there are no systems for managing external communications;

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there are no internal mechanisms for correcting these defects;

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external mechanisms for accountability and scrutiny are inadequate and/or are ignored;  
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0 Cabinet is unaware of the facts; it receives no reliable information on expenditure out -

turns or on policy outcomes.

#### Remedies

To a large extent the remedies to these and other failings must rest on clarifying responsibilities and relationships. What are or should be the responsibilities of the principal actors and institutions which comprise and support Cabinet? Is anybody charged with responsibility for specific tasks that are recognised as important? What should be the relationships between the principal actors and their responsibilities?

Four sets of relationships, between groups of activities and objectives, are especially important. Establishing the right balance between these is Cabinet's major task. The four relationships are those between politics and administration; policy and finance; whole-of-government and sectional interests; long-term and short-term objectives and policies.

The right balance must be made at all levels of decision-making; but Cabinet, at the apex of the process, can and must determine the nature of the overall balance and the trade-offs to be made in each case.

The following section lists some of the ideas, institutions and processes which have been employed in different Commonwealth countries to correct some of the deficiencies described above. Some have been widely tried and tested, and have proved their value over time. Others have been tried with less success, but remain worth considering. Others must be regarded as still in the experimental stage. Many have both strengths and weaknesses; the balance between these must be assessed and may vary in different contexts.

#### Thinking and acting strategically

(a) The key is that ministers should develop relationships and understandings around the collective interest and dedicate time to considering national strategic issues. This can be done through:

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dedicated cabinet committees, concerned exclusively with strategic issues;

0 Out of cabinet meetings or retreats, by all Ministers or key groups.

° The adoption of a strategic management cycle which is built into the cabinet calendar and

agendas

(b) Having agreed on strategy, to reflect it in Budget decisions.

## Effectiveness and Integrity of Government Systems

. Oversight and control of the structure and governance arrangements for the state sector

0 An advisory capacity to monitor the structure and governance of the state sector

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a professional career civil service under a Head of Public service with authority to promote

the collective interest with respect to the organisation and control of the public service

effective means of ensuring political intent is translated into administrative action

0 Use of written performance agreements for senior officers

0 Use of corporate plans for government departments

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Clear understandings about the respective roles of Ministers and officials

Incentives and consequences related to the quality of administrative performance.

Protections against patronage and inappropriate political or other special interest influence

Civil Service Commission's 2003, and agreed rules for selection

Senior Civil Service mobile between departments

Contracts between Ministers and permanent secretaries

0 Sound processes for reporting ,monitoring, auditing, ethics promotion, investigation, evaluation, and transparency

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Clear individual responsibility for politicians and senior public servants, reinforced by appropriate decision-making rights and specified accountabilities

Context

There are general principles of governance which apply to any complex organisation, but the relevance and value of specific processes and techniques only in the specific context of each country, taking account of the nature of that country's political and governmental institutions, the background against which these operate, their policy priorities, and the different operational risks which they face.

William Plowden and Alex Matheson

27 October 1998

The most strategically influential decisions a Cabinet makes on a regular basis are those around the budget process. National visions only begin to come real at the point that they are seen to drive the manner in which revenue is raised and funds appropriated. It is important therefore that the process of formulating the budget should be integrated with the process for defining national strategy-ideally a deliberate and inclusive cabinet process that puts a strategic â\200\234front endâ\200\235 on the annual budget process.

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Articulation of medium term national priorities by means of medium term expenditure framework

' Cabinet level agreement on major priorities in the early stages of the budget process  
0 The establishment of envelopes or â\200\234potsâ\200\235 defining the quantity of resources for major

national policy areas-with groupings of Ministers and departments

0 Allowing some internal expenditure flexibility in return for greater assurance on staying

within aggregates

- Taking more control of volume driven (eg benefits) or process driven (eg public service pay rates) expenditure to allow funds to move to areas of national priority.

' A more collaborative working style for Finance officials

- More co-ordination on budget and fiscal matters amongst central agencies - especially over

expenditure implications of policy proposals.

(C)Advice from the public service that is supportive of strategic decision-making. Ways in which this can be achieved are;

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strengthening co-ordination of central agencies - especially around the budget process; dedicated units, reporting to Cabinet, concerned with the strategic and longer-term implications of actual or potential policies and actions;

â\200\234lookoutâ\200\235 units, focusing exclusively on the long term reliance on external think tanks with a similar mission;

all policy and project proposals coming to Cabinet, including those financed by donors, to be assessed in terms of their contribution to policy priorities;

- cross-departmental teams working on major strategic issues.

Effective decision-making arrangements

The quality of Cabinet decision-making is very significantly influenced by the governance arrangements which define the cabinet composition and process. Matters of importance are:

(a) The integrity of Cabinetâ\200\235s mandate.

- Processes and remedies that ensure that all decisions that constitutionally should go to

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Cabinet, do so, including ensuring all expenditure is â\200\234on-budgetâ\200\235 and that at informal



influences and relationships are not pre-empting the Cabinet prerogative.

(b) Number and nature of portfolios

- Formal or informal limits on the maximum number of Cabinet members;

- . Consideration of degree to which port-folios reflect current priorities;

Seminar on Improving Cabinet Decision-Making:

A Commonwealth Perspective

Mount Grace Hotel,

Magaliesburg.

26 November 1998

8:00 - 8:10

8:10 - 8:30

8:30 - 9:00

9:00 - 9:45

9:45 - 10:30

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11:00 - 12:00

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Welcome

Chair: Minister A M Omar

Opening Address

Minister: Dr Zola Skweyiya

Item One

Speaker: Dr Mohan Kaul

Cabinet Government in the Commonwealth

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Item Two

Demands on modern Cabinets

Responses and initiatives

Common failings

Chair: Baroness Chalker

Speakers: Tan Sri Dato Seri Sarji

Mr W. Rickett

Putting the Cabinet in Charge

Steering not rowing

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Performance and conformance

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Collective vs Sectoral

Cabinet Committees

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The rules of Cabinet

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Accountability

Discussions/Lessons for South Africa

Morning tea

Item Three

Chair: Baroness Chalker

Speaker: Mr Max Moore-Wilton

Mr. N N Vohra

The Po/it/Ca/ Adm/n/Ls'trat/ve Interface

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Rationale for Division of Labour

Whitehall v5 White House Tradition

Cabinet/Public Service Relationship

Minister/Director-General Relationship

Head of Public Service Role

' ~- CIVIL SERVICE REFOFMS  
Commonwealth Experiences

GWS.â\200\230 Response - REFORM !!

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Broadening

- policy formulation
- planning
- leadership

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- devolve responsibility
- contract out

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Alex Matheson MTSD

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SECRETARIAT

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CABINET  
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DEPARTMENTAL PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

Alex Matheson MTSD

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Whether port-folios are defined in a way which is integrative Or divisive

A number of Cabinet members â\200\234without portfolioâ\200\235;

(0) Rules and conventions governing the conduct of Cabinet

3 structure of Ministerial subâ\200\224committees of Cabinet;

a sub-structure of supporting committees of officials

effective and predictable rules and procedures for convening Cabinet meetings, bringing issues to Cabinet, and managing the Cabinet agenda;

(d) Processes for ensuring that the collective interest of Government is the over-riding one.

Committment by ministers to adhere to the rules themselves and to be intolerant of their colleagues doing otherwise;

Effective monitoring and following-up Cabinet decisions;

A professional Cabinet secretariat, whose head is recognised as having authority, subject to the Head of Government [Chief Executive], in relation to Cabinet rules and procedures;

A specialised unit to provide Cabinet or Chief Executive with â\200\234counter-vailing adviceâ\200\235;

Means of maintaining the public integrity and solidarity of Cabinet and of regulating public dissent with cabinet decisions on the part of individual Ministers.

The use of a centrally located â\200\234communications supremaâ\200\235

Rules and conventions governing the activities of Ministers private Offices

Central agencies with the authority and coâ\200\224ordination to ensure policy advice takes account of the collective interest

(e) Ensuring effective fiscal discipline.

Effective and predictable rules, and related procedures, to ensure fiscal discipline - for example all policy and project proposals, including those financed by donors, to be subjected to Ministry of Finance scrutiny for any expenditure implications;

A publicly stated Medium Term Expenditure Framework to which the cabinet is committed

Finance ministry with authority in disputes over programme costing

Reliable, timely and credible financial reporting at both departmental and whole-of government levels

Processes for maximising committment to portfolio Vote levels in the lead-up to the budget

Consequences for officials and Ministers for overâ\200\224expenditure

LVLANAUEMENT INNOVATIONS IN GOVERNMENT

Commonwealth Experiences

Shift in Government Objectives

DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

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Market Mechanism

Leaving Economy

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Managing Government Performance

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Three Year

Budget

Strategy

COMMONWEALTHSECRETARIAT

Annual,  
Budget

Alex Matheson MTSIS

"SRA: Strategic Resu tArea

KRA' Key RBSUItV Area

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## Ministerial Responsibility

- > Policy

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- > Ensuring proper disciplinary procedures

- > Ensuring managerial arrangements

- > Operations?

Role of Central Agencies  
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PERFORMANCE AGREEMENT

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> SHIFT from a Unitary

Managing Diversity

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Towards

> SHIFT from Developing Central Plans to

Developing Key Strategic Areas

> SHIFT from Developing Enwardâ\200\224Looking

Systems to Developing Partnerships

> SHIFT from Inputs, Procedures â\200\230

Processes Towards Outputs &lutc0mes

M Kaul