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(a) VIOLENCE (INPUT BY THE TRANSKEI GOVERNMENT):

1. The resolution adopted by the Negotiating Forum on the 1st of April 1993 outlines the mandate of the Negotiating Council and the Technical Sub-committee on Violence. The most important aspect of that Resolution is the one which refers to "issues that cause violence". What the resolution does not do is to define "violence".
2. It is our view that violence falls into two broad classes, viz. violence motivated or influenced by ordinary criminal intent and violence which is politically motivated. The sub-committee, in our view, should draw this distinction first and thereafter make recommendations with regard to how one tackles violence falling within each of these categories. Our additional input will deal in detail with our proposed solutions.
3. Politically-motivated violence falls into three broad classes:
 - (a) revolutionary violence;
 - (b) counter-revolutionary violence committed by the State or its agents;
 - (c) violence which, although committed with a political motive, is otherwise committed by individuals who are either not linked to a revolutionary movement or the State or whose actions are not

directed by a revolutionary movement or the State.

The sub-committee will have to identify solutions to the acts of violence falling within this broad classification. It must also address the threat posed by the right-wing bodies such as the AWB, Volksfront, Orde Boerevolk, etc. These right-wing bodies pose a threat to the negotiations and the problems arising therefrom must be dealt with fully as soon as possible.

4. Violence which is politically-motivated cannot be stamped out without there being a solution to the constitutional crisis facing the country. Recommended solutions, therefore, in order to be effective, have to be linked to developments and breakthroughs on the constitutional front. This sub-committee, therefore, cannot handle its work in isolation from the other issues handled by the other technical sub-committees.
5. One of the tasks of the sub-committee will be to consider the strengthening of the National Peace Accord. Transkel's input in this regard is attached (see letter dated 9 September 1991). This letter addresses at length the overall approach to be adopted if we are to have lasting peace in South Africa.
6. With regard to counter-revolutionary violence, we attach hereto -

- (a) a document read at a press conference held in Port Elizabeth on the 11th of March 1993;
- (b) a document compiled by Brigadier C.P. Van der Westhuizen on 13 June 1986;
- (c) a document compiled by Brigadier C.P. Van der Westhuizen on 9 July 1986.

7. The four documents attached hereto will provide the technical sub-committee with all the information regarding the formulation of a strategy on how to tackle the violence issue. What the technical sub-committee should do initially, therefore, is -

- (a) to identify the type of violence requiring the multiparty forum's attention;
- (b) to identify the causes of such violence;
- (c) to identify solutions to each of these causes and to formulate time-scales regarding the implementation of each solution. When formulating the time-scale and plan of action, nothing should be done which may lead one to believe that emphasis is being placed on the eradication of one cause of violence as against another. For

example, the future of the military wings cannot be finalised separately from the future of the security forces of the homelands and those of the South African Government; and

- (d) the introduction of independent monitoring mechanisms and an identification of the best way of establishing trust as between the major political players and the Government. As long as there remains, within the South African security structures, persons who were involved in counter-revolution, there will never be peace in South Africa. Also attached is a letter dated 28 April 1993 relating to the composition of the structures which have to formulate recommendations on the violence issue.

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9 September 19 91

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The National Peace Initiative

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JEPPESTOWN

2043

Dear Sirs

COMMENTS ON DRAFT NATIONAL PEACE ACCORD : YOUR MINUTE OF THE 26TH OF AUGUST 1991 REFERS

A. OPENING REMARKS

The Transkei Government thanks you most sincerely for the opportunity afforded to it to contribute towards the promotion of peace and stability in Southern Africa. The Government of Transkei agrees with the view that urgent steps need to be taken to bring the incidence of violence in the country to an end. The country is on the threshold of bringing about a constitutional dispensation which will bring the rigours of the past to an end. For this dispensation to succeed economic growth must be promoted and violence has a number of effects some of which impact negatively on economic growth.

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Having said all this we however wish to record that we need to be careful when devising methods aimed at achieving or giving effect to this noble objective. We should satisfy ourselves right at the outset that the methods that have been devised to curb the incidence of violence in the country will succeed, that such methods have been designed and agreed upon after a thorough study has been conducted into the causes of violence and the defects inherent in the security system of the country and that they are generally acceptable to the inhabitants of the country.

In our view the formal drafting of a peace accord ought to be preceded by in-depth discussions and planning centering around the following:

- (a) the identification of the problem(s) sought to be addressed;
- (b) the consideration of the reasons for violence;
- (c) an identification of the type of violence which needs to be addressed, the definition thereof and the identification of the persons who are, or are thought to be, involved in it or instigating it;
- (d) the defects inherent in the current law enforcement mechanisms;
- (e) an outline of the modus operandi to be invoked in addressing the problem;

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- (f) the identification of the participants to an eventual accord, the effect of the exclusion of some parties or organisations, the reasons for the involvement of each of such persons in the signing of the accord as well as an analysis of the role which each party ought to play in the enforcement and implementation of the accord;
- (g) a consideration of the objectives which the participants of the accord seek to attain as well as an analysis of the negative factors which may result from the adoption of a particular objective or modus operandi;
- (h) a consideration of the advantages expected to flow from the incorporation of each of the provisions which will be embodied in the accord and the political and legal implications of incorporating such provisions;
- (i) the advisability of referring in the accord in specific terms to certain political parties or organisations and the inferences to be drawn therefrom;
- (j) a consideration of the efficacy of the structures which are meant to enforce the provisions of the accord particularly the need to avoid creating cumbersome structures;
- (k) the creation of independent investigating mechanisms which will ensure that investigations will be conducted in a professional and unbiased way and with the objective of removing the mistrust and suspicion of the past;

- (l) the timing of the accord with due regard being had to the constitutional developments in the country including the need to proceed with the steps aimed at solving the constitutional impasse in a properly coordinated, clear, forward-looking and consistent manner;
- (m) the need for the involvement of all the key players in the constitutional scenario in decision-making on security at the highest level (e.g. State Security Council level), for purposes of ensuring that the recommendations made by proposed structures will be given effect to and also of ensuring that the security establishment does not take any decision or action which may lead to destabilisation;
- (n) the need for the removal from office of certain persons who may have committed acts which may lead to the objectives of the accord being hijacked;
- (o) an identification of the precise role which government or governments are supposed to play and the necessity for their involvement in a joint accord particularly in view of the fact that law enforcement is, after all, their duty and the political implications for their involvement; and
- (p) the impact which the signing of the accord will have on the individual policies pursued by the parties thereto and the need to have independent persons monitoring the implementation of the accord.

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It is against this background that what is set out hereunder must be analysed. We will first comment on the provisions of the accord and thereafter a critical analysis of the provisions thereof will be made. Such critical analysis will be accompanied by firm proposals or recommendations. Whilst we do not object to the idea of an accord we are of the view that the present draft will not solve the problem which the parties seek to address. Secondly, a lot of debate is still required on some of the specific proposals embodied in the accord.

B. COMMENTS/QUESTIONS ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACCORD:

(a) Preamble:

- (i) What is the meaning of the term "political violence"?
Why is it not defined?
 - (ii) Is the term "political violence" meant to embrace the train massacres, incidents of random shooting by unidentified persons, the killing of people by hit squads and also the activities of the so-called "third force"? If so, why are these not detailed in the preamble?
 - (iii) Why are the causes of violence not identified and then set out in the preamble?
 - (iv) Why is the preamble drafted in such an unconventional manner? Why is it worded in the manner of a press statement or a speech?
- (the preamble is an important component of an accord and serves as a key to open the minds of the drafters thereof and the mischiefs which they intended to

redress)

- (v) Should more general wording meant to cover not only "political parties and organisations" but also governments, not be used in the preamble?
- (vi) Has the involvement of the organs of State in violence been considered? (note recent report of the Human Rights Commission on this) If so, why are such reports not referred to in the preamble?
- (vii) Have any deficiencies been identified within the present system of law enforcement? What are these? Why are these not referred to in the preamble?
- (viii) Is the accord also meant to address right-wing violence?
- (ix) What is the term "past role of police" meant to refer to? Why is nothing said about the "past role" of those organs of State which have been involved in covert operations in the past?
- (x) When is the accord meant to take effect and are there any time-limits in respect of any matters covered therein? (this should appear in the Preamble as an indication of the commitment of all concerned)
(Note that legislation will have to be introduced before some of the provisions of the accord can be implemented)
- (xi) Will the "white" political parties sign the accord? What will the effect be should some of such parties not accede to the accord?

- (xii) Does the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act No. 139 of 1991 address in full the objective set out in paragraph five of the preamble?
- (Note that the Act refers to a "phenomenon" as opposed to "incidents" of violence)
- (xiii) Why is there no reference in the preamble to the fact that certain political parties have access to State machinery which may be utilised with negative effects on the political climate in the country?
- (xiv) Is it correct to say that the accord is "intended to promote peace and prosperity in violence - stricken communities"? What about violence occurring in areas which are otherwise not "violence - stricken"? (e.g. Ventersdorp)
- (see paragraph seven of the preamble) (See also paragraph 3.2.3.1. - "major political parties involved in the conflict".)
- (xv) Since the PAC will not be signing the accord as reported in the New Nation, would it be correct to use the words "all key players" which appear in the last line on page 3 of the accord?
- (xvi) In the last paragraph the words "undertake to pursue the objectives of this accord", appear. Are these words wide enough to ensure that proper control and discipline will be maintained in respect of the security forces?

Should the relative portion of the said paragraph not be altered to read as follows:

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"WE, THE GOVERNMENT SIGNATORIES, UNDERTAKE TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER AT ALL TIMES, TO EXERCISE PROPER AND EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER THE SECURITY FORCES, TO ENSURE THAT ALL THE ORGANS OF STATE GIVE EFFECT TO THE PROVISIONS AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS ACCORD, INTER ALIA, BY WAY OF THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND BUDGETING PROCEDURES TO WHICH WE HAVE ACCESS"?

(b) Chapter 1:

(i) Is the term "political participants" meant to cover independent and self-governing homelands as well as the South African Government? (see paragraph 1.1)

(ii) Why is there no code of conduct for the various governments to complement the principles set out in this chapter?

(we have noted that there are very few references in this accord to the government/s)

(iii) What will the impact and consequences be of the introduction of primary legislation on these principles?

(see paragraph 9.6 of the accord)

Is there any precedent for such legislation?

(iv) Regarding paragraph 1.11 we merely wish to enquire whether the present chairperson and vice-chairperson are not neutral.

(c) Chapter 2:

Clause 2.3. contains very important provisions - why can't we have a similar commitment in respect of all the security forces?

(see clause 3.1.5)

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(d) Chapter 3:

- (i) The terms "endeavour to" and "attempt" appear in a number of places in this chapter. Why have they been used?
(contrast this with the positive language used in chapter 2)
- (ii) Why is the word "belief" used in clause 3.1.3.? Why can't we merely state that police are accountable to society?
- (iii) Why should police be required to act only when "violent clashes occur"?
(see paragraph 3.2.2.1)
- (iv) Act 139 of 1991 does not define the term "political violence". Why is there no provision for the establishment of an impartial investigative unit to assist the Commission?
(see paragraphs 3.2.2.6 and 6.1)
- (v) Why does paragraph 3.2.2.6 (ix) not address the situation where police themselves are alleged to be actively involved in violence? Why should an impartial body not be set up to deal with that aspect and conduct the required investigations?
(note that the ombudsman and the Standing Commission rely on the police for investigations)
- (vi) In what situation is the Commissioner of the SAP enjoined to have regard to the recommendations of the National Peace Committee?
(see paragraph 3.2.2.6 (xi))

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- (vii) In paragraph 3.2.3.1 political "organisations" should also be covered.
- (viii) Are we certain that Act 139 of 1991 is wide enough to cover the hearing of "complaints against the SAP"?
(see paragraph 3.2.3.2 and also note the wording used therein) (see also section 7(5) of the Act)
- (ix) Has the definition of "misconduct" applicable in respect of the SAP been altered to cover what is contained in the draft accord? How will this definition read like in the future? What about the SADF?
- (x) Is the term "other appropriate body" meant to refer to a body set up in terms of the accord?
(see paragraph 3.2.3.3)
- (xi) Why are the important matters covered in paragraph 3.2.4.1 left to the police?
(this is a very important matter)
- (xii) Regarding paragraph 3.2.4.2 (i), what will happen if the Minister rejects each recommendation?
- (xiii) What is understood by the term "senior police official"?
(see paragraphs 3.2.2.6 (iii) and 3.2.5.1 and also see paragraph 3.2.3.1 (ii))

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- (xiv) Is there anything special about what is set out in this chapter?
Is this not merely a repetition of what already pertains
within the Police Force?
- (xv) Will legislation be introduced in respect of the Police Ombuds-
man and will the parties to the accord formulate the draft
legislation?
- (xvi) Instead of using the term "legible external form of identifi-
cation", is it not possible to be more prescriptive?
- (see paragraph 3.2.4.5)
- (xvii) Will the guidelines referred to in paragraph 3.2.5.1 be
approved by the signatories to the accord?
- (xviii) Why should persons attacking others be ordered to "disperse"?
Why should the Police "endeavour" to disarm aggressors?
- (see paragraph 3.2.5.1 (iv))
- (xix) Are we certain in our minds as to what should be done by the
Police Ombudsman as against what should be done by the Standing
Commission?
- (the accord is equivocal on this)
- (xx) Why are covert activities aimed at general destabilisation
and the disbandment of the CCB and Askaris not dealt with
in paragraph 3.5?

(note the findings of the Human Rights Commission)

- (xxi) Why should the prohibition on fire-arms and dangerous weapons hinge on talks between the Government, the ANC and the IFP? Why is this linked only to certain activities?
(see paragraph 3.6)
- (xxii) Will the self-protection units referred to in paragraph 3.7. not lead to faction fights in rural areas?
- (xxiii) Are we satisfied that chapter 3 is comprehensive enough and covers all the complaints made about the Police in the past?
- (xxiv) Who will formulate the legislation referred to in paragraph 3.8.1.?
- (xxv) Who is involved in the negotiations relating to a code of conduct for the SADF? Will that code be discussed by the parties to the accord?

(e) Chapter 4:

- (i) The Commission on violence is referred to in page 16 of the accord. Will the commission be empowered to discipline the Police or will this be left to the Commissioner and the Minister?
(see third paragraph from the bottom)

- (ii) Are we here dealing with a "code of conduct" or just a set of principles, and should all these be incorporated into a peace accord?

(see the word "principles" in page 17)

- (iii) Have the police always upheld their motto:

"We protect and we serve"? If not, why should it be included in the accord?

(f) Chapter 5:

- (i) Paragraph 5.5 falls short of committing the Government to observing the principles enshrined in chapter 5 of the accord. Is there no conflict between the proposals contained in this chapter and the functions of the Standing Commission as set out in paragraphs 6.6.3.4 and 6.10.5?

- (ii) Are paragraphs 5.7 and 5.8 meant to alter the current structure on regional and local development?
(see paragraphs 5.10, 5.11, 5.12, 5.13 and 5.14)

Will there be no need to revamp the existing structures to avoid duplication?

- (iii) Paragraphs 5.15 - what is the term "The Group" meant to refer to?

(g) Chapter 6:

- (i) Do the functions of the Commission, as presently formulated, tie in with the overall objectives of the parties hereto?
- (ii) The provisions of paragraph 6.73, 6.24 and 6.26 are not as explicit as those of paragraph 3.2.4.2(i). In view of the importance of this matter why should we not have an explicit statement thereon in the accord? These appointments are crucial to the efficacy of the commission.
- (iii) Are the contents of paragraph 6.13 a true reflection of what appears in the Act?
- (iv) What meaning should be attached to what appears in the second line of paragraph 6.14?
- (v) Why is it necessary to repeat in the accord what already appears in the Act? *NB - when Act is amended accord will have to be amended too.*
- (vi) What is the meaning of the term "mechanisms" which appears in paragraph 6.20?
- (vii) Regarding the advice referred to in paragraph 6.25, one would like to know what the Commission would do about impending violence. What is the role of the Police in this regard? What is the problem which is sought to be addressed here?
- (viii) Is the statement made in paragraph 6.27 correct? Do the participants not think that it is necessary to amend the Act?

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(h) Chapter 7:

- (i) Regarding paragraph 7.2, what meaning ought to be given to the term "State involvement"?
- (ii) Will these structures be established in respect of the whole country?
- (iii) Since these structures appear to be permanent, to what extent does this violate the principle of an interim government or other interim governmental arrangements?
- (iv) In paragraph 7.3.5 the word "may" should be altered to read "shall".
- (v) Why are members of the SAP and SADF included in the RDRC's?
(see paragraph 7.4.5.5)
- (vi) Regarding the constitution of LDRC's, is there no conflict between the provisions of paragraphs 7.4.8 and 3.2.3.1?
- (viii) Regarding paragraphs 7.4.9.8 and 7.4.9.9, one would like to know what the law is with regard to rallies, marches and gatherings and also what type of amendments are contemplated.

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- (ix) Do the provisions of this chapter not give credence to the assertion by the Government that the violence being witnessed is not planned and also that the State is not involved in such violence?
- (x) Are these structures not too cumbersome? Will they not lead to polarisation?
- (xi) Will these structures not promote ethnicity?
- (xii) Who will provide the State with intelligence reports regarding violence and who will do the same in respect of the structures being created now?
- (xiii) Would it not be wise to have an international body overseeing the functioning of the proposed structures?
- (xiv) Should the peace accord not be referred to the United Nations for approval?
- (xv) Will the persons who will be part of the proposed structures be persons with knowhow on security and intelligence matters?
- (xvi) Does the accord with its structures not suggest that there is a civil war in South Africa? What effect would the introduction of legislation on these structures have on world opinion?
- (xvii) Why is there no structure for the political leaders themselves?

- (xviii) Paragraph 7.12. - "LDRD's" should be altered to read "LDRC's".

(i) Chapter 8:

- (i) Who are the members of the "Preparatory Committee"?
- (ii) What will the relationship be between the NPC and the Commission on Violence?
- (iii) In paragraph 8.3.1 the word "may" should be altered to read "shall".
- (iv) In paragraph 8.4.1.3 are we dealing with the "constitution " or "composition" of the NPC? If it is the former, who will draft it and who will approve it?
- (v) Is there no conflict between the provisions of paragraph 8.6.3. and the provisions of chapter 9?

(j) Chapter 9:

Is there a precedent for the provisions set out in this chapter?
We are particularly concerned about the provisions of paragraph 9.6.

(k) Chapter 10:

No comments.

C. PROPOSALS, COMMENTS AND CRITICISM:

- (i) It is clear from the foregoing that a lot of work still needs to be done. There are at least three provisions which hinge on further consultation (e.g. the SADF code of conduct, the position of the homeland police and the question of the carrying of dangerous weapons). There are other areas which require further debate. We therefore recommend that the date of the signing of the accord be altered and that the convention scheduled for the 14th be utilised for the purpose of exchanging views on various matters.
- (ii) At the ⁿconvention it is proposed that clear guidelines should be formulated as to how the question of violence should be addressed. Members of the working group will then be in a position to identify the parameters within which they must work.
- (iii) The alleged involvement of the police in violence as reported by such bodies as the Human Rights Commission should be considered thoroughly by the convention and clear guidelines as to the specific role of the police in the accord should thereafter be formulated.
- (iv) The position of political parties with access to State machinery should be considered and clear guidelines should thereafter be drawn up.
- (v) The type of violence sought to be covered should be identified and discussion should centre around the causes thereof.

Thereafter clear guidelines should be drafted.

- (vi) Discussion should also concentrate on the mistrust the disenfranchised public has on the police. Specific recommendations should therefore be made on how such mistrust should be eliminated.
- (vii) The convention should also tackle the position of the ASKARIS and the CCB and should make specific recommendations thereon.
- (viii) The role of the Government in the process of socio-economic reconstruction must be identified clearly.
- (ix) The role of chiefs and headmen in the enforcement and implementation of the accord should be identified clearly.
- (x) The Government must be made aware that it is primarily responsible for the maintenance of law and order and this truism must be brought out clearly in the accord.
- (xi) The accord must address the question of violence in its totality. A peace accord not supported by some major players has little prospect of success.
- (xii) A code of conduct for all the governments should be prescribed.
(note the recent visit to Ciskei by high-ranking RSA officers on the continued existence of International Research)

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It is the view of the Government of Transkei that, for the accord to succeed, the following specific matters should be given effect to and addressed in a meaningful way if we are to succeed in our ultimate objectives. These are-

- (a) the formulation of a code of conduct for the State-controlled media. The State-controlled media has tended to report the negative aspects of violence;
- (b) the accord should be part of a package leading to the enfranchisement of the disadvantaged citizens. A clear direction should be given and suitable time-limits and time-tables prepared. Violence is also occasioned by the high expectations of all concerned and the accord should, for that reason, only be signed after the all-party conference has been convened;
- (c) the infrastructural and other logistical problems relating to equipment, i.e. transport, radios, etc, for the security forces in the homelands has not been addressed and is a major problem which deserves attention in the accord;
- (d) the structures being created are not in a position to influence the formulation of a national security policy on a meaningful basis. One of the most viable options to render

the work of the National Peace Committee meaningful and make it bear fruit is to involve all leaders of political organisations/parties and Heads of Governments in South Africa's context in decision-making on matters related to security at the highest level, for example, the State Security Council level, for purposes of ensuring that the recommendations made by the National Peace Committee will be given effect to ^{that} and the security establishment does not take any decision or action which undermines the spirit and letter of the accord. The involvement of all at State Security Council level will eliminate fears and suspicions, and dissipate charges and allegations of hidden agendas.

- (e) Our observations are that the Peace Accord revolves too much around the Ministry of the South African Police with the Minister, the Commissioner of Police and Police Ombudsman being the pivot of the proposed arrangements. Since the South African situation is so complex, it is imperative that a way be found for people have constantly pointed to police complicity in the violence. We accordingly recommend that a new forum consisting of all the Ministers of Police/Defence, all Commissioners of Police/Defence Chiefs and Security Chiefs of all liberation movements be established to deal with security matters emanating from the National Peace Committee.

This arrangement will facilitate sound decision-making by the revamped State Security Council; *and*

- (f) the accord does seem to suggest that it addresses solely the problem of "Black on Black" violence. If this remains so the chances of the accord being accepted by all are slim. It is therefore recommended that this aspect be addressed. ~~and~~

In conclusion we wish to state that we appreciate the efforts of those who prepared the accord. We also hope that our contribution will be of immense assistance to you. We, however, wish to record that an acceptable accord cannot only be based on the views of only three political organisations or parties but on the views of everyone who ought to play a role in the paving of the way to a new, just and democratic social order. This is a truism which should always be borne in mind.

For any peace proposals to be effective we have to reckon with the indivisibility of South Africa and bar reference to independent homelands which at all costs suffer the slings and arrows of the outrageous fortune of violence raging in South Africa. The mingling of the security families from all corners of the future Greater South Africa will enable them to draw on the experience of their colleagues who have managed the process of transition without bias for any political formation and whose result is enhanced political stability and tolerance among rival groups.

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We will welcome your comments on this presentation and we will also be awaiting copies of the further proposals relating to the SADF, dangerous weapons and the homeland police forces to which reference has already been made herein.

Kindly advise.



(H.B. HOLOMISA)

Maj Gen

CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL : MAJOR-GENERAL

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**PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE
HOLIDAY INN, PORT ELIZABETH,
BY MAJOR-GENERAL H.B.
HOLOMISA ON 11 MARCH 1993.**

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REFERENCES: Documents marked **A** : Main Plan by Brig. v.d. Westhuizen
B : Main Plan by Brig. v.d. Westhuizen
C : Important Minutes of Mslkaba
meeting
D : Signal to Pretoria
E : Gen. Reid Daly prepares to "take
out/remove" L Sebe permanently.
F : Press Cuttings : Attack on Sebe's
house.

Last year I unambiguously intimated to the broad South African public that I had in my possession a secret file detailing the tactics and strategies of the Nationalist Party Government of South Africa for destabilising black communities throughout the country. My disclosure of the possession of the file was preceded by the exposé of the signal message to the New Nation emanating from the Eastern Province Command ordering the "permanent removal from society" of the Cradock four, Matthew Goniwe et al.

Both the file and the signal message saw their way through to my desk anonymously, a rare mystery in the history of mankind in the twentieth century.

Let me address myself to the contents of the file and thereafter it will be apparent to all why the black communities are plagued by internecine civil strife costing thousands of lives. This cancer has from time to time reared its ugly

head even in the rank of the Cape whose indigenous people are reputed for the click sounds. When they indulge in the use of the click sounds, it is an indication that they are engaging in the battle of wits for the common good of their communities and an agreement beneficial to all is often clinched without too much fuss. But, alas! the hidden hideous hand has made it possible that we do not click.

The social instability engendered by apartheid conditions in the Eastern Cape assumed frightening levels and inspired awe in the already panic-stricken P.W. Botha regime. The Eastern Cape was regarded as a fertile breeding ground for the groundswell of discontent still rippling beneath the surface in many parts of South Africa. The sheer determination and courage of the region to defy the regime's security apparatus notorious for the unrestrained use of brute force against its antagonists remained a festering sore to boardroom planners.

The deteriorating situation in the Eastern Cape compelled the State Security Council under the Chairmanship of President P.W. Botha to hold its meeting in Port Elizabeth in 1985 a few weeks before the dispatching of the signal to Pretoria about Goniwe et al. All members of the State Security Council including the current State President, Mr F.W. de Klerk attended the meeting. A gloomy picture of the increasingly unstable social situation with its direct bearing on the security of the Eastern Cape was painted. A resolution to stabilise and normalise the situation was taken.

I wish to leave the question to this audience to approach Mr De Klerk and find out whether they were briefed on the political situation in the region and the resolutions they took as members of the State Security Council.

In the aftermath of the evaluation of the situation in the Eastern Cape and the meeting of the State Security Council, Lieutenant-General van der Westhuizen, then Brigadier and Commander of the Eastern Province Command produced a plan detailing the course of action to be pursued in attempts at permanently normalising and stabilising the Eastern Cape situation.

The contents of the file are expressed in Afrikaans and has 141 folios. I have taken the trouble to translate into English some of the main folios which are attached to the document to be made available to you. The plan by General van der Westhuizen was code-named "Operation Katzen". According to General Westhuizen the aim of this plan was "TO DEVELOP THE EASTERN CAPE INTO AN INDEPENDENT POWER BLOCK AGAINST THE ANC AND UDF BY DECEMBER 87."

This plan was characterised by the following points:

- a. The plan must entail minimum political risk for the RSA.
- b. Actions must not be traced back to the RSA.

- c. The Xhosa struggle for unity as a nation (particularly in Transkei) must be exploited or taken advantage of.

To achieve the nefarious objectives cited above, the plan entails the pitting of some blacks against others so that South Africa's conduct remains above board in the eyes of the international community. He boastfully states that his "plan contains winning recipe ingredients and the implementation thereof can wind up the Eastern Cape Case." The success of executing the plan hinges on four phases:

1. PHASE 1 (Hard Military Phase)

- a. The establishment and expansion of the Xhosa Resistance Movement in the Eastern Cape, primarily among township blacks, under the leadership of Charles Sebe and under covert control of the RSA security forces. This XRM (XWB) must in nature - and even extent - be similar to Inkatha and must together with our security forces form a counter-revolutionary front.
- b. The co-option of existing (struggling) black resistance movements into the ranks of the XWB. This makes one think among others of the Kakanes of Cookhouse, Memese of Somerset East and Maqina's Black Crisis Centre of Port Elizabeth.

- c. The freeing of Charles Sebe and his son from gaol.
- d. Coup d'Etat against Sebe.
- e. Security alliance between Eastern Province Command, TDF and CDF.

2. PHASE 2

- a. To join together Eastern Cape, Ciskei and Transkei in a Confederation of State according to the KwaZulu-Natal concept.
- b. Removal of Lennox Sebe and his followers from the political scene.

3. PHASE 3

- a. The Xhosa Resistant Movement plays a principal role in the unification of the Ciskei and Transkei security forces and also work together with the RSA security forces to establish general stability of the Eastern Cape.
- b. The big stumbling block is Lennox Sebe and therefore he must be removed.

4. PHASE 4

The establishment of the Xhosaland State is realized.

The plan was vigorously pursued and phase 1 was implemented with a good measure of success. General Sebe was sprung from gaol on 25 - 26 September 1986. The nucleus of the would-be Xhosa Resistance Movement started receiving training in Transkei under the name "Iliso Lomzi".

On 10 November 1986 the following army officers met at Msikaba Military base in Lusikisiki, Transkei : Gen Reid Daly, the adviser to the TDF; Gen. Charles Sebe; Chief Namba Sebe; Brigadier v.d. Westhuizen; Col. van Rooyen and Major v.d. Merwe (SAP). See the document marked "C". It was confirmed that phase 1 has been implemented, for example, Charles Sebe was out, Lennox and Kwane Sebe must be permanently "taken out or removed". The minutes of this meeting were conveyed to Chief of the SADF via Col. L.J. More in Pretoria. See the document marked "D".

This is a terse account of what is contained in the translated version. What emerges with occult potency is that use of hard military force is easily resorted to give effect to the political agenda of the Nationalist Party Government as patently stated in Phase 1 of the main plan. The use of force permeated the execution of phase 1 according to the plan. The use of the term "permanent removal" or "take out" or "must be taken out" seems to be a common jargon

with far-reaching implications for the lives of the persons concerned. It is employed in the signal message about Goniwe et al. It is also used with regard to Lennox Sebe who narrowly escaped death when the plan to have a change of leadership in Ciskei was executed on 19 February 1987. Transkei's Image suffered as a consequence of Pretoria's machinations. We were portrayed as politically immature and incapable of harmonious and peaceful co-existence as Lennox Sebe's wrath was visited upon Transkei residents both inside and outside Transkei. Pretoria escaped all blame and remained "Mr Clean" when in fact she was responsible for the Bisho saga.

The strategy of pitting black against black, it seems, still continues unabated in South Africa as evidenced by the unravelling of the activities of the International Research in Ciskei a year ago wherein the entire region teetered on the brink of violent conflict ever since its presence in Ciskei. The dirty tricks campaign against the liberation movements is waged through the use of reactionary homeland leaders buttressed by white SADF soldiers. Any irresponsible and reckless conduct boomerangs on these leaders while Pretoria is saved from direct responsibility in outrageous acts.

We have also observed that the formation of the Xhosa Resistance Movement was two-pronged, that is, to be instrumental in counter-revolutionary activities against the ANC/UDF in the Eastern Cape, thereby emulating Inkatha in KwaZulu-Natal. Reference to the use of Inkatha from 1985 onwards in undermining the ANC and UDF in KwaZulu Natal abounds in the file. The Xhosa Resistance

Movement would also be used to counterbalance Inkatha in case the latter's ambitions grew, became boundless and threatened the very white domination it is meant to protect against threatening advances by the revolutionary forces. It is a case of pitting Xhosa against Xhosa, Zulu against Zulu, Xhosa against Zulu and vice versa - and then white supremacy is guaranteed and given another long lease of life.

When Pretoria is diametrically opposed to anyone, she does not hesitate to act. We nearly became victims of their machinations in 1990 when the group trained and funded by her attempted to topple the Transkei Military Council. The abortive coup left in its wake a number of killed and wounded recruits.

What we must accept is that Pretoria carried out these diabolical schemes through the zealous collaboration of some of us - the oppressed. Now that an expose of its agenda which has resulted in the death of tens of thousands of our people has been made, sanity must prevail in the ranks of the dispossessed.

When you read the documents you will note that Brigadier van der Westhuizen prepared the document, outlined the course of action and made submissions after the State President ordered that the situation be normalised - whatever this meant. What is clear is that the normalisation of the situation has been accompanied by bloodshed and loss of lives. Once reference to the State President is made by a junior like Brigadier van der Westhuizen, it is always

TOP SECRET

- (5) The freeing of the Sebe Group (Charles and Sebe children) and the appointment of Charles Sebe as leader of the Xhosa Resistance Movement (XWB);
- (6) Training and organisation of smaller moderate groups for takeover of third level authorities;
- (7) "Coup d Etat" (replacement of Lennox Sebe and his colleagues by moderate pro-RSA members like Lent Maqoma (CPRPP) Namba Sebe, Charles Sebe, etc.);
- (8) Conclusion of a security alliance between EP Command, the TDF and CDF.

b. Phase 2

- i. Aim. To set up an Eastern Cape Confederation of States before January 1987.

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uppermost in our minds that he does not only run the show but collectively with his Cabinet colleagues if the ethics of good governance apply. We are however very fortunate in this case because some of the Ministers who served in the State Security Council under ex-State President P.W. Botha like President De Klerk, Messrs. P.K. Botha, Kobie Coetzee, Adriaan Vlok, etc., are still alive and kicking. They will be expected to shed light on the murky activities of their Government.

The filmsy excuse that such horrors took place under the reign of P.W. Botha holds no water as thousands of blacks have died more under the rule of President De Klerk. The question to be asked is whether the strategy of killing blacks still remains in force.

According to these documents submissions about the said plan relating to stability and state security were forwarded to seniors at the Army and Defence Headquarters for their approval or endorsement. For instance, Brigadier van der Westhuizen mentioned a number of persons who knew about this plan like General Gleeson, then Deputy-Commander of the SADF; and a mysterious Professor Delport who was Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Port Elizabeth in 1986. Hopefully he is not the one who is now Minister of Local Government in President De Klerk's Cabinet who contributed to Codesa II deadlock. If he happens to be the one, he should seriously consider quitting the Ministerial position as his public role will become highly contentious.

The position of Minister of Local Government, it is observed, is a crucial one because the incumbent will be charged with ensuring that the National Party plans on regions will form the basis for a new constitution. I will leave it to South Africans to compare the Government's proposals on regions and those hatched by the security establishment and analyse how they differ.

Perhaps this explains why the economy of the Eastern Cape cum Transkei has been relegated to backwaters with little, if any, tangible evidence of seriousness about their development.

This presentation must be analysed in the light of -

- (a) the secret investigations currently being conducted by General Pierre Steyn into the affairs of the SADF and the failure by the South African Government to approve of a more open investigation;
- (b) the claims by C.C.B. members that if they are not paid out fully or reimbursed by the State they will reveal certain information which will rock and shock the whole country;
- (c) the manner in which P.W. Botha was removed from the RSA Cabinet through the machinations of his colleagues in the State Security Council and who are now seen as the champions of the

negotiations process despite their involvement in a Council which was anti-Black and actually sanctioned the use of violence against Blacks;

- (d) the scandal involving the use of secret accounts by the State in funding organisations such as the IFP;
- (e) the revelations relating generally to the use of secret funds by the State to promote the top-secret policies hatched by the State security apparatus; and
- (f) the allegations that there may be a third force in operation in the country.

This presentation adds to the previous debate on these issues. It is clear that one still needs to dig deeper into the files of the State in order to establish what has been going on. I wish to emphasise that all what is contained in the documents I am handing out should not be labelled merely as "history" or the "past" as is always the case when Government is confronted with this situation. All the schemes worked out in the past and the plans set out in these documents have, by their nature, a direct bearing on the current negotiations process. One may, for example, ask the question: why is the former head of the National Intelligence Service, Dr. Niel Barnard, who was also a permanent member of the State Security Council, now representing the South African

political intolerance amongst party supporters. The idea behind the Xhosa Resistance Movement clearly shows that the SADF has been involved in "third force" activities. The documents reveal that in one instance General van der Westhuizen wrote:

"The plan must entail minimum political risk for the RSA. Actions must not be traced back to the RSA."

It would also be interesting to find out what the State Security Council's plans about other regions is. The documents deal solely with the Eastern Cape. It is also clear that Dr Lennox Sebe and Paramount Chief K.D. Matanzima were ill-informed about the NP Government's true intentions about Transkei and Ciskei.

It is clear that Charles Sebe was to have played an important role in Brigadier van der Westhuizen's grand plan who was also involved in planning Charles' springing from jail. He was later killed by Ciskeian soldiers. It is however interesting to note that the SADF were not only involved in his escape from jail but also involved in his killing. The International Research Unit which planned connections, through such officers as Nlewoudt, with the SADF Military Intelligence. The same Unit, International Research, spread rumours about Transkei wanting to overthrow Gqozo's Government. It is clear that continuous rumours of this nature are meant to promote the master plan set out in these documents - i.e. pitting one brother against another. It is also interesting to note that the ultimate objective of the Xhosa Resistance Movement was to form

a power bloc against the ANC. The Bisho massacre adds a new dimension to this scheme and raises, once more, the involvement of the SADF in schemes meant to cripple liberation movements.

Finally, a word on the meaning of the words "permanent removal from society taken out/disappear". The documents are clearly words which have a special meaning to the SADF and the State Security Council. In the documents I am handing out they are always put within inverted commas. It is also clear that they involve the use of violence. In the case of L.L. Sebe it was resolved at a meeting in Mskaba (Transkei) on 10 November 1986 that a coup de tat be launched against him. The words "permanently taken out/removed" appear under the heading: Phase 1 - "hard military phase". These minutes are based on a master plan formulated by General van der Westhuizen. He owes it to the public to explain what he meant by this term in the Sebe context, how many times he has used it and whether he has recently used it. His reaction will be checked carefully to determine whether he has revealed the whole truth.

I humbly request you to peruse the documents thoroughly to acquaint yourselves with the thinking and planning of the RSA Government.

LAST WORD: I am now left with other 12 secret files on covert activities by South African Government.

Thank you.

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FIRST ATTEMPT

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13 June 1986

Chief of the Army : Personal

SUBMISSION : PLAN

INTRODUCTION

1. **Perspective.** This submission is not preceded by a written appreciation. This is also not a detailed plan which can stand on its own. Only an idea is tossed in this submission and if accepted, the following ideas must:

- a. **Be analysed and appreciated by experts;**
- b. **Be cleared at the highest level;**

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- c. Be aligned with existing national and regional plans; and
- d. Be transformed in detail for execution.

2. **Emphasis.** This document addresses the problem of permanent normalisation of the Eastern Cape situation. Existing written and unwritten plans to halt the onslaught remain in force and shall be executed. This also applies to future, additional or other plans. The ideas in this document must not be seen in isolation but as part of the total counter-revolutionary attempt. In November 85 this Command and GB5 set themselves the target to "win in 1986". It is still our aim to stabilise and normalise the Eastern Cape before 31 December 1986 to such an extent that the current state of emergency regulations can be lifted. It is actually foreseen that the counter-revolutionary task cannot be regarded as having been completed by this step.

AIM/OBJECTIVE

- 3. The aim of this submission is to obtain approval in principle for this plan to permanently normalise the Eastern Cape by December 87.

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4. The plan is based on Xhosa nation unity and pro-RSA resistance movements. Three possible courses of action in sequence of desirability are presented. The discussion sequence is:

a.	Introduction	:	P1
b.	Aim/Objective	:	P2
c.	Scope	:	P3
d.	Background	:	P4
e.	Personalities	:	P5
f.	Course of Action 1	:	P8
g.	Course of Action 2	:	P14
h.	Course of Action 3	:	P14
j.	Implications	:	P15
k.	Conclusion	:	P19

BACKGROUND

5. The Eastern Cape revolutionary struggle is well-known and the following issues - there are also many others - are highlighted as a background for this presentation:

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- a. The Xhosa of the Eastern Cape is a strong homogeneous population group with a long history of resistance against the Zulu and white domination. The desire for self-determination is nationwide and deeply rooted. The Xhosa outside the Ciskei and Transkei do not feel less strong about this and the white initiated and controlled Black Councils did not succeed as local form of self-government for them. The breeding ground was created for revolutionary-directed structures to fill the vacuum of the incomplete self-government especially for the township dweller. For the Xhosa nation there are presently just too many authorities - Transkei, Ciskei, RSA Central, quasi-third level and revolutionaries.
- b. The Transkei and especially the Ciskei apparent lack of vitality as fully independent states besmirch the policy of the RSA Government in this regard. The latent instability which prevails in these two states in fact stimulates the revolution country-wide.
- c. The Ciskei and Transkei are an inseparable part of the Eastern Province which is also presently relatively unstable. Together they constitute the Eastern Cape and must be viewed as one front or theatre.

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- d. The apparent inability of the RSA Government - and its instruments - to curb the continually deteriorating riot and unrest situation leads to the growing defeatism among all the people of the Eastern Cape. In addition the economic depression has hit the area hard and an "aura" of bankruptcy is strongly perceptible. A feeling of permanence and trust for the future is missing. Whites are evidently deserting the area.
 - e. Attempts to activate and keep alive the pro-RSA resistance movements, as well as to organise black moderates, do not succeed adequately, mainly because of the intimidation factor and the lack of moderate leaders.
 - f. The Eastern Cape is not blessed with dynamic white politicians.
6. The above-mentioned and other similar issues erode the Eastern Cape's progress. The enormity of the problem is comparable to the invisible part of the iceberg and few people are aware of its magnitude. The situation is serious but not lost - the picture looks much darker to some than it really is. This plan contains winning recipe ingredients and the implementation thereof can wind up the Eastern Cape case.

PERSONALITIES

7. To date the following persons are aware of and endorse the plan:

a. Completely

I. Kol Hall : SSO Ops, EP Command

II. Cmdt du Plessis : SO1 GB5, EP Command.

b. Partly

i. Gen Gleeson : HWS (Deputy Commander of SADF).

ii. Gen van Deventer : Ambassador in Ciskei.

III. Prof. Delport : Dean UPE Faculty of Law.

8. In extent and implementation the following Xhosa leaders are concerned with this plan:

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a. Transkei

- i. Kaizer Matanzima. Old President but still the most powerful man in the Transkei. Has committed himself to the unity of the Xhosa people. He is 71 years old and will thus like to witness the realisation of this life ideal as soon as possible (SSM).
- ii. George Matanzima. Prime Minister and also Minister of Defence. Share his brother's, Kaizer ideal.
- iii. Namba Sebe. Former Ciskeian Minister of Transport and presently a refugee in the Transkei. Charles' brother and Lennox Sebe's half-brother whom he hates intensively.
- iv. Reverend Xaba. Former Vice-President of the Ciskei. Transkei had granted him asylum.

b. CISKEI

- i. Lennox Sebe. President. Thorn in the RSA flesh. Fears Charles.

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- ii. Charles Sebe. Former Chief of the Security forces. Lennox's half-brother. Would together with Xaba and brother Namba in August 83 depose Lennox and landed thereafter, without a prima facie case proved, for twelve years in gaol. Is actually a powerful leader and still enjoys great following. Strong pro-RSA Inclined and hates Lennox.
- iii. Lent Magoma. Blue-blood chief and held various Cabinet posts. Lennox regards him actually as a threat and booted him out in 1985. Magoma establishes in 1986 the "CPRPP" as opposition to Lennox. Pro-RSA Inclined and esteemed Xhosa leader.
- iv. Ray Mali. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs. Presently detained by Lennox Sebe. Moderate, very capable and pro-RSA.
- v. Sandile. Future Paramount Chief and confidante of Magoma. (This is not major Sandile of the CDF).

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COURSE OF ACTION 1

9. General Outline. Execution occurs in three phases, which overlap and extend from date to Dec. 87.

a. Phase 1

i. Aim/Objective. To activate a pro-RSA resistance movement among the Eastern Cape Xhosas before Dec 86.

ii. Execution in broad outline

- (1) The freeing of Charles Sebe and identified co-prisoners, be it through negotiations or covert security force action;
- (2) The image-building of Charles Sebe to previous levels. The image of other anti-Lennox leaders is likewise and simultaneously restored in honour;

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- (3) The concurrent subtle psychological breakdown of Lennox Sebe and his colleagues. The power bases of Lennox, with the exception of the security forces, are attacked and made suspicious;
- (4) The establishment and expansion of the XWB (Xhosa Resistance Movement) in the Eastern Cape, primarily among township blacks, under the leadership of Charles Sebe and under covert control of the RSA security forces. This XWB must in nature - and even extent - be similar to Inkatha and must together with our security forces form a counter-revolutionary front;
- (5) The co-option of existing (struggling) black resistance movements into the ranks of the XWB. This makes one think among others of the Kakanes of Cookhouse, Memesé of Somerset East and Maqina's Black Crisis Centre of Port Elizabeth;
- (6) Influential actions to bring Ciskei and Transkei security forces closer together in preparation for the next phases;

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- (7) The XWB can possibly be elevated in status to the "security wing" of Lent Maqoma's CPRPP, depending upon his party's gained successes.

b. Phase 2

- I. Aim to unite the Ciskei and Transkei politically before June 87.

II. Execution in broad outline

- (1) In alignment with phase 1, which lays the foundation;
- (2) The Xhosa Resistance Movement (XWB) plays a principal role in the unification of Ciskei and Transkei security forces and also work together with the RSA security forces to establish general stability of the Eastern Cape Front. An Eastern Cape Military Treaty Organisation is formed (OKMVO). The RSA, Ciskei and Transkei unite formally on security foundation;

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- (3) The Idea of Xhosa unity is roused (The Matanzimas need little or no motivation for this. Ciskei's deposed leaders will support the Matanzimas to carve for themselves again a political niche for the future);
- (4) Support will be lent to Maqoma and his party. This party must unite the moderates, Ciskei eligible voters in its ranks. Because of the nature of the Xhosa distribution, this party is not limited to the Ciskei and together with the Xhosa Resistance Movement (XWB) can play a major role to effect Xhosa unification. It has to be noted that the successful implementation of this phase is independent of the CPRPP's successes;
- (5) The big stumbling block is Lennox Sebe and therefore he must be removed as a step of this phase or even earlier. This can be effected through one or a combination of the following methods:
 - (a) Maqoma defeats Lennox in an election;
 - (b) Charles threatens and "removes" him;

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- (c) Matanzimas get rid of him;
 - (d) RSA security forces covert action;
 - (e) Lennox is "placed on pension" by the RSA.
- (6) Pro-RSA and pro-Transkei/Ciskei leaders reconcile themselves formally with the Xhosa unity idea primarily under the Transkei leadership. "Xhosa-land is born and is recognised by the RSA as an Independent state;
- (7) The political process carries on;
- (8) Preparing the Corridor Population for phase 3.

c. **Phase 3**

- I. **Aim.** To incorporate the corridor (border area) into the united Ciskei and Transkei.

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TOP SECRET**11. Execution in broad outline**

- (1) In alignment with phase 2, which lays the foundation;**
- (2) Further and follow-up climate creation;**
- (3) The building of the area (Ciskei, Transkei and Corridor) as the fatherland of the Xhosa wherever he finds himself: - "One nation one land". This Xhosaland must address once and for all the age-old and embarrassing Xhosa land claims;**
- (4) The present three areas find it difficult economically. Together and possibly with East London as a free harbour they can possess the power to become economically stronger. The RSA must be prepared to provide injections necessary;**

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COURSES OF ACTION 2

10. General Outline: Aim and execution occur as for phases 1 and 2 of course of action 1. Phase 3 thereof will be frozen for possible later application. Course of action 2 makes provision for white reaction to the incorporation of the Corridor into Xhosaland. This further implies that such incorporation shall occur only when the population is ready therefor and thus prevent that this aspect places our government in an embarrassment with the voter ("sell out" - idea. Phases 1 and 2 (of course of action 1) are powerful enough though to let this course of action work.

COURSE OF ACTION 3

11. General Outline. Execution occurs in two successive phases which starts today till June 87.

a. Phase 1. Same as for phase 1, course of action 1 (XWB).

b. Phase 2.

i. Aim. To establish a "Confederation of States" in the Eastern Cape before June 87.

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TOP SECRET**ii. Execution in broad outline**

- (1) "Copycat" exercise to join together Eastern Cape, Ciskei and Transkei in a "Confederation of States" according to the Kwa-Natal concept;
- (2) Influencing actions;
- (3) The Eastern Cape acquires provincial status and second-tier government (this step puts the Eastern Cape in a position to become a fully fledged member of the confederation);
- (4) Lennox Sebe and his colleagues are removed from the (political) scene. (See Phase 2, course of action 1);
- (5) Lent Maqoma and his party colleagues can replace the above-mentioned. (See Phase 2, course of action 1);
- (6) A "Xhosa Cape" confederation comes into being. Treaties and co-operation agreements are mutually concluded.

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TOP SECRET**IMPLICATIONS**

12. Various variations, adjustments and the combination of the three above-mentioned courses of action are possible. It shall be noted that the first phases of the courses of action are the same. This then underlines the importance of a strong pro-RSA XWB in the Eastern Cape as a prerequisite for permanent stability and normality.

13. With this plan a condition of permanent normality in the Eastern Cape can be attained. Our existing plans are good but cannot guarantee it. Therefore this plan is also an extension of our existing plans.

14. Lennox Sebe has for a long time been an embarrassment to our government - the SP (State President) has himself said so. He will be got rid of with the implementation of this plan. Naturally this action is not tied to any phase or plan and can even take place now. It can facilitate the execution of this or similar plans of this kind.

15. The proposed unification of Ciskei and Transkei is possibly the best logical means to satisfy the aspirations of the Xhosas in an orderly manner. The general feeling in the Eastern Cape is for Xhosa unity - the question is how and when must it come.

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16. The inclusion of the Corridor area into Xhosaland will upset whites in the area. Especially the rightwing may attempt to make political gain out of this step. There is actually a common factor that makes incorporation more acceptable to the concerned and this is greater economic growth for all the people in the area. Our government must be prepared to pay for the incorporation. Such an investment contains economic advantages for the RSA.

17. A formidable Xhosa ally for the RSA is not to be scorned. Such a Xhosa Government can be further asked to keep its people (within or outside their land) in check. Together we can better combat the ANC/UDF onslaught.

18. Charles Sebe

- a. Charles is the XWB (Xhosa Resistance Movement logical leader. He still enjoys the status in the Eastern Cape, especially among the security forces of the Ciskei and Transkei. He definitely has the background, ability and stature to activate and lead the XWB. He shall have to be strictly controlled to ensure that the RSA aims/objectives according to this plan are realised.

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c. Phase 3

i. Aim. To unite the Ciskei and Transkei politically by June 87.

ii. Execution

(1) Alignment with Phase 1 which lays the foundations;

(2) Xhosa Resistance Movement (XWB) plays a principal role in the unification of the Ciskei and Transkei security forces and also work together with RSA security forces to establish general stability of the Eastern Cape Front, an Eastern Cape Military Treaty-Organisation is formed (OKMVO). The RSA, Ciskei and Transkei unite formally on security foundation;

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- b. Charles projects traditional authority. Consequently it can be expected that the security forces and the older generation will support him. Opposition can be expected from the left, the youth and Lennox supporters. Such opposition must be wisely and schematically turned around.
- c. In case Charles, for one or another reason, cannot establish and command the XWB, suitable Ciskei and Transkei security force officers like Brigadier Holomisa and Major Sandile must be employed.
- d. Charles' physical and psychological health condition must be strengthened after his freeing.

19. The XWB

- a. This Movement's Headquarters shall be established in the Command area, probably Port Elizabeth, so that a controlled power base can be built up.
- b. Reasonable accommodation, facilities and support staff will be made available.

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- c. **Sufficient operations capital must be provided.**
- d. **Covert, Xhosa-speaking forces (troops) must be assigned to the XWB so that the movement, especially in the beginning can have "teeth".**
- e. **The XWB shall operate under the cover of a front organisation.**

CONCLUSION

20. **Course of action 1, as set out above, or variations thereof, is presented as a cardinal idea to fight the revolution permanently in the Eastern Cape. both courses of action 2 and 3 are watered down models and shall consequently not have the same degree of impact and success as course of action 1.**

21. **Approval in principle for course of action 1, alternatively for courses of action 2 or 3, is requested. In the event of such approval being granted it is suggested that a team is assembled to transform this submission in detail for execution.**

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9 July 1986

Chief of the SA Army : Personal

Annexure A : Personalities
B : Considerations
C : Diagrammatic outlay of Plan

SUBMISSION : OP KATZEN (OPERATION)

INTRODUCTION

1. The SP (State President) has given an order that the situation countrywide be normalised by the end of December 1986. This implies that the situation between now and the end of October 86 be stabilised. (Complete Law and Order restored).

2. It is very clear that the current unrest situation cannot be permanently stabilised and normalised through the current conventional method of action against the background of the state of emergency.

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3. **Emphasis.** This writ addresses the problem of permanent normalisation of the Eastern Cape situation. Existing written and unwritten plans to prevent the onslaught remain in force and shall be carried out. This applies also to future, additional or other plans. The ideas in this document must not be viewed in isolation but as part of the total counter-revolutionary endeavour. This Command and GB5 set themselves the objective in November 1985 to "win in 1986". It still remains our objective to stabilise and normalise the Eastern Cape before 31 December 1986 such that the current state of emergency regulations can be lifted. It is however foreseen that the completion of this task must not be viewed as an end to the counter-revolutionary effort.

AIM/OBJECTIVE

4. To develop the Eastern Cape into an independent power block against the ANC and UDF by December 87.

STARTING POINTS (POINTS TO BE CONSIDERED)

- 5. The plan must entail minimum political risk for the RSA.
- 6. Actions must not be traced back to the RSA.

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7. The Xhosa struggle for unity as a nation (particularly in Transkei) must be exploited or taken advantage of.
8. There must be maximum use of traditional leaders.
9. The present Ciskei Government must be replaced with a pro-RSA Government.
10. Elements of the execution of the plan need not be dependent of each other.

SCOPE

11. The plan is moulded on the unity of the Xhosa nation and on pro-RSA resistance movements and set out in four phases. The phases are set out in sequence of execution and importance. It must be noted that each phase can stand on its own and is preceded by a separate aim/objective:

- a. Introduction
- b. Aim
- c. Scope
- d. Background

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- e. **Method**
- f. **Implications**
- g. **Conclusion**

BACKGROUND

12. **The Eastern Cape revolutionary struggle is well-known and the following issues - there are also many others - are highlighted as a background for this presentation:**

- a. **The Xhosa of the Eastern Cape is a strong homogeneous population group with a long history of resistance against the Zulu and white domination. The desire for self-determination is nation-wide and deeply rooted. The Xhosa outside the Ciskei and Transkei do not feel less strong about this and the white initiated and controlled Black Councils did not succeed as local form of self-government for them. The breeding ground was created for revolutionary-directed structures to fill the vacuum of the incomplete self-government especially for the township dweller. For the Xhosa nation there are presently just too many authorities - Transkei, Ciskei, RSA Central, quasi-third level and revolutionaries.**

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- b. The Transkei and especially the Ciskei apparent lack of vitality as fully independent states besmirch the policy of the RSA Government in this regard. The latent instability which prevails in these two states in fact stimulates the revolution country-wide.
- c. The Ciskei and Transkei are an inseparable part of the Eastern Province which is also presently relatively unstable. Together they constitute the Eastern Cape and must be viewed as one front or theatre.
- d. The apparent inability of the RSA Government - and its instruments - to curb the continually deteriorating riot and unrest situation leads to the growing defeatism among all the people of the Eastern Cape. In addition the economic depression has hit the area hard and an "aura" of bankruptcy is strongly perceptible. A feeling of permanence and trust for the future is missing. Whites are evidently deserting the area.
- e. Attempts to activate and keep alive the pro-RSA resistance movements, as well as to organise black moderates, do not succeed adequately, mainly because of the intimidation factor and the lack of moderate leaders.

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f. The Eastern Cape is not blessed with dynamic white politicians.

13. The above-mentioned and other similar issues erode the Eastern Cape's progress. The enormity of the problem is comparable to the invisible part of the iceberg and few people are aware of its magnitude. The situation is serious but not lost - the picture looks much darker to some than it really is. This plan contains winning recipe ingredients and the implementation thereof can wind up the Eastern Cape case.

METHOD

14. General Draft: Execution to occur in four phases that overlap and stretches from today to December 87.

a. Phase 1

i. Aim. To stabilise the Eastern Cape (including Ciskei) by November 86.

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II. Execution

- (1) Creation of climate for Namba Sebe and traditional Ciskei leaders for the establishment of Xhosa Resistance Movement (XWB) and the acceptance thereof by Transkei leaders;
- (2) The establishment of the Xhosa Resistance Movement (XWB) and the extension thereof in the Eastern Cape;
- (3) The Image-building of the Ciskei People's Right Protection Party (CPRPP) in the Eastern Cape and the involvement of the smaller moderate groups;
- (4) Climate creation for Xhosa nation unity by all involved groups (Transkei, Ciskei and Eastern Cape);

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ii.

Execution

- (1) "Copycat" exercise to join together Eastern Cape, Ciskei and Transkei in a "Confederation of States" according to the Kwa-Natal concept;
- (2) Influencing actions;
- (3) The Eastern Cape acquires provincial status and second-tier government (this step puts the Eastern Cape in a position to become a fully fledged member of the confederation);
- (4) Lennox Sebe and his followers are removed from the political scene (see phase 1);
- (5) Lent Maqoma and his party colleagues can replace the above-mentioned (see phase 1);
- (6) A "Xhosa Cape" confederation comes into being. Treaties and co-operation agreements are mutually concluded.

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- (3) The idea of Xhosa unity is roused (The Matanzimas need little or no motivation for this. Ciskei's deposed leaders will support the Matanzimas to carve for themselves again a political niche for the future);
- (4) Support will be lent to Maqoma and his party. This party must unite the moderates, Ciskei eligible voters in its ranks. Because of the nature of the Xhosa distribution, this party is not limited to the Ciskei and together with the Xhosa Resistance Movement (XWB) can play a major role to effect Xhosa unification. It has to be noted that the successful implementation of this phase is independent of the CPRPP's successes;
- (5) The big stumbling block is Lennox Sebe and therefore he must be removed as a step of this phase or even earlier;

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- (6) Pro-RSA and pro-Transkei/Ciskei leaders reconcile themselves formally with the Xhosa unity idea primarily under the Transkei leadership. "Xhosa-land is born and is recognised by the RSA as an independent state;
- (7) The political process carries on;
- (8) Preparing the corridor population for phase 4 (RSA white spot between Ciskei and Transkei).

d. Phase 4

I. Aim. To incorporate the corridor (border area) into the united Ciskei and Transkei before December 87.

II. Execution

- (1) In alignment with Phase 2 which lays the foundation;
- (2) Further and follow-up climate creation;

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- (3) The building of the area (Ciskei, Transkei and Corridor) as the fatherland of the Xhosa wherever he finds himself: - "One nation one land." This Xhosaland must address once and for all the age-old and embarrassing Xhosa land claims;
- (4) The present three areas find it difficult economically. Together and possibly with East London as a free harbour they can possess the power to become economically stronger. The RSA must be prepared to provide injections necessary;
- (5) The projection of the Xhosaland to the world as a successful story of the RSA's policy of independent states. The envisaged Xhosaland can become an African Power and earn international recognition in the end;

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- (6) As an example King Willlam's Town can be incorporated first with the rest to follow. The Berlin area must be promoted greatly as an industrial growth point;
- (7) The above-mentioned steps will arrest the influx into urban areas (especially into Port Elizabeth and Cape Town);
- (8) A Xhosa election (with the participation of whites) must be held to establish the first fully representative parliament;
- (9) Functioning of the State.

IMPLICATIONS

15. Various variations, adjustments and the constitution of the above-mentioned phases is possible.

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16. With this plan a condition of permanent normality in the Eastern Cape can be attained. Our existing plans are good but cannot guarantee it. Therefore this plan is also an extension of our existing plans.
17. Lennox Sebe has for a long time been an embarrassment to our government - the SP (State President) has himself said so. He will be got rid of with the implementation of this plan. Naturally this action is not tied to any phase or plan and can even take place now. It can facilitate the execution of this or similar plans of this kind.
18. The proposed unification of Ciskei and Transkei is possibly the best logical means to satisfy the aspirations of the Xhosas in an orderly manner. The general feeling in the Eastern Cape is for Xhosa unity - the question is how and when must it come.
19. The inclusion of the Corridor area into Xhosaland will upset whites in the area. Especially the rightwing may attempt to make political gain out of this step. There is actually a common factor that makes incorporation more acceptable to the concerned and this is greater economic growth for all the people in the area. Our government must be prepared to pay for the incorporation. Such an investment contains economic advantages for the RSA.

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20. A formidable Xhosa ally for the RSA is not to be scorned. Such a Xhosa Government can be further asked to keep its people (within or outside their land) in check. Together we can better combat the ANC/UDF onslaught.

21. Charles Sebe

- a. Charles is the XWB (Xhosa Resistance Movement) logical leader. He still enjoys the status in the Eastern Cape, especially among the security forces of the Ciskei and Transkei. He definitely has the background, ability and stature to activate and lead the XWB. He shall have to be strictly controlled to ensure that the RSA aims/objectives according to this plan are realised.
- b. Charles projects traditional authority. Consequently it can be expected that the security forces and the older generation will support him. Opposition can be expected from the left, the youth and Lennox supporters. Such opposition must be wisely and schematically turned around.
- c. Charles' physical and psychological health condition must be strengthened after his freeing.

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22. The XWB

- a. This movement's Headquarters shall be established in the Transkei territory.
- b. Reasonable accommodation, facilities and support staff will be made available.
- c. Sufficient operations capital must be provided.
- d. Covert, Xhosa-speaking forces (troops) must be assigned to the XWB so that the movement, especially in the beginning can have "teeth".
- e. The XWB shall operate under the cover of a front organisation.

CONCLUSION

23. The course of action as set out above, or variations thereof, will be regarded as a model to permanently clamp down on the revolution in the Eastern Cape.

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24. In principle approval for the plan is being sought.

OFFICER COMMANDING EASTERN PROVINCE COMMAND : BRIG

See signature of General van der Westhuizen in the attached copy written in Afrikaans.

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ANNEXURE A TO OPERATION KATZEN

PERSONALITIES INVOLVED

1. TRANSKEI

- a. Kaizer Matanzima. Old President but still the most powerful man in the Transkei. Has committed himself to the unity of the Xhosa people. He is 71 years old and will thus like to witness the realisation of this life Ideal as soon as possible (SSM).
- b. George Matanzima. Prime Minister and also Minister of Defence. Share his brother's, Kaizer Ideal.
- c. Namba Sebe. Former Ciskeian Minister of Transport and presently a refugee in the Transkei. Charles' brother and Lennox Sebe's half-brother whom he hates intensively.
- d. Reverend Xaba. Former Vice-President of the Ciskei. Transkei had granted him asylum.

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ANNEXURE B TO OPERATION KATZEN

SOME CONSIDERATIONS

1. Step 1. Discussions already held with Namba Sebe. He is the senior Sebe. Old Minister of Ciskei. Brother of Charles Sebe. Supporter of Maqoma (CPRPP). Charles Sebe's wife already in Transkei - convenient post for actions from the Transkei seen from a family point of view. Com Ops (Communication Strategy of the RSA to project and promote itself as friendly) can be founded thereon.
2. Step 2. Transkei is the logical place for Charles Sebe's exile. Transkei enjoys relative stability. Logical place to start the XWB - largest population group.
3. Step 3. CPRPP is acceptable party and Maqoma is acceptable as leader for the Xhosa - enjoys the support of Namba who will accept his authority. Is seen by the Ciskei Xhosa as a political alternative. (Especially after the burial of his fore-father's remains).
4. Step 4. Promotion of inherent Xhosa endeavours for unity as bulwark against SACP/ANC/UDF revolutionary onslaught.

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5. Step 5. Charles Sebe plays key role. Personifies traditional leaders' authority. Has the loyalty of Ciskei and Transkei security forces' pro-RSA. Has status with moderates and older generation. Sees the interests of Ciskei linked to the RSA. Strongly anti-communist, against trade union actions, subversion, etc. Shall not only exercise a very strong anti-communist influence in Ciskei but this will also obtain in the periphery - to the advantage of the RSA.
6. Step 6. Small moderate groups form the basis for the fruition of the idea of the Xhosa nation unity but also serve as a structure (third-tier) in the permanent stabilisation of the area. Cannot stand on their own under the present circumstances.
7. Step 7. It is imperative that the vacuum left by Lennox Sebe and his followers be immediately filled to prevent counter-organisation. The freeing of Charles must simultaneously happen with the ousting of Lennox. Blame for this must not be laid at the door of the RSA but ascribed to Transkei.
8. Step 8. An alliance exists already. It must acquire meaning and form. Can form basis for the idea of unity.

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No. PM10/11/11

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OFFICE OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL
UMTATA

28 April 1993

The Planning Committee
Negotiating Forum
World Trade Centre
JOHANNESBURG

IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION ON VIOLENCE

1. I refer to the Negotiating Forum's resolution of the 1st of April 1993 relating to the violence issue. The Transkei Government is not opposed to the idea of setting up special committees to deal specifically with the various aspects of that resolution.

2. There are, however, two important issues which we wish to raise. Firstly, we wish to reiterate that the mandate of the special committees should address "causes of violence" for the purpose of identifying appropriate solutions. In its inputs to the committees the Transkei Government will identify each of the aspects which it feels are contributory causes to violence and then recommend a solution thereto. Secondly, although we are happy with the idea that the violence issue be handled by politicians at the multilateral level it is also the Government's view that the heads of the security forces in the SATBVC States,

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self-governing States and military wings of the liberation movements should also be involved in the consideration of this issue. We therefore recommend that the said heads be brought in as an additional component of the proposed special committees on violence. There are enough precedents in this regard. General Geldenhuys of the SADF, for example, formed part of the team which sought to find a solution to the Angolan conflict.


(H.B. HOLOMISA)

May'een
CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL : MAJOR-GENERAL

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28 April 1993

The Planning Committee
Negotiating Forum
World Trade Centre
JOHANNESBURG

RECOMMENDATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE FORMULATION OF A NEGOTIATIONS AGENDA

1. I have received a report from the two delegates who represented the Transkei Government at the meeting of the Negotiating Council held on the 26th of April 1993. After analysing the report of the two delegates it became clear to me that two fundamental issues need to be considered first before any further deliberation takes place within the Negotiating Council. These are:

- i. the formulation of an appropriate modus operandi regarding the implementation of the resolutions adopted on the 1st of April 1993 by the Negotiating Forum;
- ii. the identification of the basic issues on which the participants in the Negotiating Council differ with a view to devising a plan of ensuring that these issues are dealt with

effectively right at the outset.

2. It is clear from the information available to me that the question which needs to be answered here is, "where do we start?" Since all of us are concerned about the constitutional situation in the country, it is obvious that our ultimate objective should be the ushering in of a new democratic order for South Africa. This can only come about through the adoption of a new constitution for South Africa including the TBVC States. Who will consider and adopt this constitution? In our view, as the Transkei Government, this question should be the focal point of attention before anything else is resolved. Issues like "Form of State" cannot be resolved fully without first having addressed the question relating to the identification and nature of the body which is to adopt the constitution.

3. It is the view of the Transkei Government, therefore, that, if we are to make progress at the negotiations, we need first to agree on the need for a new constitution for the whole of South Africa and immediately thereafter go on to consider the nature and character of the body which is to draft and adopt that constitution. After agreement has been reached on this basic issue matters pertaining to the transition process, the resolutions of the Negotiating Forum adopted on 1 April 1993, transitional arrangements, joint control of security forces and other armed formations, levelling of the playing field, preparations for elections and the interim constitution can then be dealt with. It is the view of the Transkei Government that, unless an appropriate mechanism for

Implementing the resolutions of the 1st of April is agreed upon, the negotiations process will get bogged down. There is a very important lesson to be learnt from the debate which took place on the 26th of April - the lesson is that an appropriate way of implementing the resolution of the 1st of April should be agreed upon first.

4. Once agreement has been reached on the issue of elections and also on the date of such elections, then a clear programme with agreed time-frames should be drafted. This programme will, inter alia, deal with the dissolution of the Tricameral Parliament and self-governing territories and the re-incorporation of the TBVC States. These two issues cannot be separated. All these are apartheid structures and they must therefore be dismantled simultaneously. Amongst a number of reasons behind this resolution is the lack of trust in the South African Government's total commitment to change and the fact that the process cannot be said to be irreversible. The recent call by the South African Government for the "urgent re-incorporation" of the TBVC States coupled with -

- a. the rejection of the notion of joint control of security forces;
- b. the return of exiles;
- c. covert operations; and
- d. the lack of protection of the returnees,

leaves one with the impression that we are about to witness the results of a strategy aimed at the luring of exiles from abroad and the imposition of total

control over the whole of South Africa including the TBVC States. The aims and objectives of the assumption of total control over the whole of South Africa prior to the adoption of substantive agreements at the negotiating table leaves one with the impression that we are headed for a big deadlock at the negotiations, but that this will only be engineered after the TBVC States have been placed under the control of the South African Government.

5. The Transkei Government has also analysed the concept of special technical subcommittees which are to draft legislation based on the reports/agreements reached at Codesa. Whilst the Government of Transkei is not opposed to some of these agreements it wishes to indicate that, taking into account the events of the 26th, the consolidated report should not be regarded as the breaking point for negotiations. The four issues which are to be considered by the technical subcommittees can be referred to draftsmen later. Draftsmen need to be guided by politicians on matters of principle. The consolidated report as it stands now does contain enough information to enable the Negotiating Council to take decisions on matters of principle following an agreed order of priority. The Transkei Government, therefore, is of the view that the time for the appointment of draftsmen has not arrived yet. Draftsmen will be given full instructions later after matters of principle have been agreed upon. This approach, we believe, will save time and money.

6. The Transkei Government has noted the remarks of various participants with regard to the urgency of the negotiations process. It must be emphasised

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that a speedy and urgent solution needs to be found to the constitutional problems facing South Africa. We therefore urge the Planning Committee to consider the above proposals with this idea in mind. We are submitting this proposal at this stage so as to enable the Planning Committee to ensure that the views expressed herein are accommodated when the agenda of the next meeting of the Negotiating Council is compiled. We are doing this also for purposes of ensuring that our delegates will not delay the next Council meeting through the raising of matters which are procedural in nature. In a word, the Transkei Government is recommending that a pointed agenda which is designed to bring about results and ensure good progress, be formulated.

7. Finally, we urge the Planning Committee to ensure that the issue relating to the role of the international community in the negotiations process and also in the shaping of a new South Africa, is disposed of urgently. It is the view of our Government that South Africans on their own cannot manage the process of transition effectively and peacefully. The lack of trust prevailing amongst some of the participants is one of the reasons for this assertion.


(H.B. HOLOMISA) Maj' Gen
CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL : MAJOR-GENERAL

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ANNEXURE A TO OPERATION KATZEN

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1. TRANSKEI

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- d. Reverend Xaba. Former Vice-President of the Ciskei. Transkei had granted him asylum.

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2. CISKEI

- a. Lennox Sebe. President. Thorn in the RSA flesh. Fears Charles.
- b. Charles Sebe. Former Chief of the Security forces. Lennox's half-brother. Would together with Xaba and brother Namba in August 83 depose Lennox and landed thereafter, without a prima facie case proved, for twelve years in gaol. Is actually a powerful leader and still enjoys great following. Strong pro-RSA inclined and hates Lennox.
- c. Lent Magoma. Blue-blood chief and held various Cabinet posts. Lennox regards him actually as a threat and booted him out in 1985. Magoma establishes in 1986 the "CPRPP" as opposition to Lennox. Pro-RSA inclined and esteemed Xhosa leader.
- d. Ray Mali. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs. Presently detained by Lennox Sebe. Moderate, very capable and pro-RSA.
- e. Sandile. Future Paramount Chief and confidante of Magoma.
(This is not major Sandile of the CDF).

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