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REPORT ON MISSION To MOZAMBIQUE by Maurice F. Strong

.I arrived in Maputo on the morning of Saturday, August 8 and remained through early afternoon, August 12, returning for debriefing meetings in Stockholm on Thursday, August 13 Mr Christensen attended and made notes of all meetings except meetings with the Prime Minister, the dinner hosted by the Ministry Minister, and my discussions with the U.S.A. Charge D'Affaires: and the U.S. AID officials. He will be submitting a separate report including details of the program, a list of persons met and summary notes on the discussions in which he participated.

gnificant emergency and/or development

t:ment available in Maputo at that time. ISweden has been one of
i e strongest and most consistent supporters of Mozambique, dat-
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1 tance especIall useful, and appreCIBt . Th

recent decision to strengthen the relatively small, but obviously effective, staff of the Swedish Embassy in Maputo, particularly in respect of emergency-related programs, is very timely.

This report presents my principal observations, conclusions and recommendations as a result of my mission.

EMERGENCY RELIEF NEEDS AND COORDINATION:

The Mozambican authorities expressed a general sense of satisfaction with the international response to their food aid needs, but were concerned at the difficulties in obtaining

adequate assistance in respect of transport and logistics, and survival items and other priority areas essential to rehabilitation, including rehabilitation of basic health facilities, development and rehabilitation of water supplies, and provision of seeds and other agricultural inputs. They are also concerned about the difficulties in obtaining development assistance from the organizations and agencies providing emergency relief.

Representatives of leading nongovernmental organizations with whom I met, indicated that for the most part funding is not now a major constraint on their emergency relief programs and they shared the concern of the Mozambican authorities as to the importance of reliable long term funding of development needs and stressed the need to focus more donor attention on increasing Mozambique's own capacities. Representatives of bilateral donors generally agreed with this diagnosis, while in many cases making clear the difficulties which they have in translating emergency relief to long term development assistance.

The free distribution of food to some 4.6 million affected people seems to be working quite well and the capacity to distribute food has improved significantly in the past few years.

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independent process of monitoring food and

There does not seem to be an;

even from

There is no

relief deliveries in the field.

demand for such a monitoring process at this point,

donors who usually insist on it in other countries.

degree of trust in the Mozambican government,

There is

generally a high . .

and the government is developing its own capacity to monitor

particularly as to the needs and effects of emergency measures on yr recipient populations. 33Au

There was unanimous agreement amongst the government

authorities and donor community representatives I met with that:

the principal cause of the emergency conditions which exist in

the country is the internal conflict by bands of "bandits"

supported by South Africa whose activities have terrorized the

civilian population and seriously dislocated the economic life of

the country, and that the inability to deal effectively with the

widespread security challenge which this represents constitutes

the most serious impediment to both emergency relief and long

term development efforts. The emergency situation can be ex-

pected to continue as long as the current state of internal con-

flict and insecurity persists and, while it is exacerbated by

recurrent drought conditions, it is not the product of drought.

It, thus, cannot be dealt with effectively purely by ad hoc,

short term relief measures and it is clear that emergency pro-

grams must be primarily of a longer term and continuing character

and much more fully integrated with ongoing rehabilitation and

development efforts than is normally the case in respect of short

term emergencies. I found the Mozambican government authorities

particularly mindful of this and of the need for emergency

relief, rehabilitation and development to be closely coordinated.

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The recently created Operational Committee For The Emergency (EOC) seems to be off to a good start and all donor representatives with which I consulted agreed it had already significantly improved the processes of consultation and coordination. The process of regular meetings a considerable amount of its capacity to expedite solutions to the problems it discusses. This remains to be seen.

The relationship between EOC and the Department for Prevention and Control of Natural Calamities (DPCCN), seemed not to be posing any significant problems at this point, although responses to questions I raised about this left me with the impression that there are still uncertainties and a certain lack of clarity as to their respective responsibilities which could be 'a source of difficulty in future.

The EOC is primarily directing its attention to improving the quality of information concerning affected populations, pointing up priorities, removing impediments to relief operations such as improving logistics and transport and expediting customs clearance of emergency supplies. They have also taken the initiative to set up a special "emergency equipment and materials fund" to permit rapid response to especially urgent relief needs. It is clear that one of the most effective operations for delivery of emergency relief supplies is the Marine Supply Operation of the World Food Program which delivers supplies to communities 'Elong the coast and rivers and estuaries accessible from the coast. It reaches some 70% of the needy population in these areas .

Another essential operation which is widely regarded as being quite effective is the Logistical Support Unit within DPCCN which is receiving strong support from CARE, but its responsibility does not extend to distribution at the provincial and district levels where it is said that logistical support and information is still very inadequate. CARE officials indicate that the responsibilities of the Logistical Support Unit may be extended to help meet needs at the provincial and district levels.

Improvement of ports and railways is an urgent priority to which EOC is addressing its attention. At a meeting of EOC, the National Director of Ports and Railways indicated that, at this stage, a large part of the most urgent requirements have been still shortage of palettes, nylon rope, grabs and discharge equipment. On the whole, it is clear that the establishment and initial functioning of the EOC has been an important step forward in respect of emergency coordination but that its success will clearly require covered, but performance is impaired by 'strong donor Support.

ECONOMIC REHABILITATION PROGRAM (ERP):

The government's strong commitment to the ERP was evident in all of my discussions. I was highly impressed with the consistency with which this commitment was manifest in everyone I met, 'including the Prime Minister, together with the fact that it was accompanied by notable absence of ideological rhetoric and a very pragmatic and realistic approach both to the imperative nature of the changes they are making and appreciation of the political

costs it entails. The donor community is also generally impressed with the degree of the government's commitment to the ERP while expressing concerns over its capacity to deal with some of the very great difficulties they face in implementation of the program. Some of the short term results of the ERP are in evidence in the local markets where fruits and vegetables are in food supply at prices, which I understand are for the most part, a good deal less than they were a few months ago. There has been a significant increase in the availability of imported consumer goods. I was told that a similar situation exists in other accessible areas of the country.

tributed largely to the ERP, although some of the increase in supply of fruits and vegetables may be due to seasonal factors. A number of donor representatives expressed considerable concern about the medium term impacts of ERP, and one experienced representative described the loss of purchasing power by the urban populations as a potentially "explosive" issue. Concern was particularly focused on the forthcoming increase in rental rates which is likely to force a substantial number of people out of their current housing as well as the impact of substantial layoffs of personnel by government departments, agencies, and state corporations. Donor representatives expressed the view that while the plans of the government to resettle in the rural areas people from the urban centers made redundant by the austerity program, they were highly skeptical as to the degree to which this could be accomplished successfully. Accordingly, while I was not made aware of any evidence that the ERP has thus far not produced any significant resistance or unrest amongst the urban populations, the real test will come when austerity measures such as rental increases and layoff are implemented. Although I did not have an opportunity to visit other urban centers, or the countryside, except in the immediate vicinity of Maputo, I made every effort to ascertain what is happening as a

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These improvements are at result of ERP? in the rural areas. I was told that the situation is still very spotty, that there is still a considerable degree of apathy and skepticism amongst the rural peoples concerning ERP, and an understandable tendency to make their judgments based on what is happening to their own immediate situation. I was told by donor representatives that there seems to have been some improvement recently in the degree to which the consumer goods; and food aid are reaching the rural populations, it is still - quite spotty and there are many areas not receiving supplies because of the security situation. However, everyone I discussed this with strongly made the point that the ability to move basic consumer goods into the rural areas was essential to the success of ERP and to restoring the incentive of farmers to increase their production beyond their own immediate subsistence needs. This, in turn, is highly dependent on improvements in the security situation and in logistics and transport facilities. On querying government officials, including the Prime Minister, concerning these difficulties, I was impressed with the degree to which they were well aware of them but had a strong sense of their absolute necessity and a commitment to accepting the necessary short term political and social costs. The government expressed great satisfaction with the recent consultative group meeting in Paris organized by the World Bank and is clearly pleased at the leadership the World Bank is now presenting in providing in mobilizing support for the ERP. However, there is both in the government and donor community, a real concern about the tendency to institutionalize emergency measures and the difficulty, already noted, of translating short term commitments to emergency relief into longer term commitments to rehabilitation and development. There is a broad recognition of the priority which needs to be accorded to rehabilitation of the agricultural economy and the

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particular importance of support for the small farmer as the key to this. The drastic decline in the cattle population, from some 1,200,000 to some 400,000 since 1980 and severe reductions in the production of most food grains and agricultural commodities, has severely increased the food deficit, deepened the dependence of the country on food aid and severely reduced foreign exchange earnings from exports. The country now grows less than half of the food grain it needs.

The government appreciates the dilemma that arises from this situation and is strongly committed, despite the current emergency, to proceed with its longer term plans to rehabilitate and strengthen the agricultural sector.- It is introducing new land laws giving individuals lifetime rights to land and the right to pass it on to heirs. It is anxious to attract foreign investment into larger scale agricultural projects which can complement and support the emphasis on the small farmer. Large scale ranching operations can, for example, play an important part in increasing both livestock quality and numbers and provide a supply of animals to the small farmer. They expressed special interest in integrated projects which include large farms as well as support to small farmers.

I was impressed with the emphasis placed by government officials on the need to commercialize the rural economy and make more consumer goods available on terms which provide a positive internal balance of trade in favor of the rural areas. It is recognized that this is imperative to the success and full rehabilitation and development of the agricultural economy.

The security situation, transport difficulties, chronic shortages of seeds and inputs will continue to constrain agricultural rehabilitation and development despite the creation of new market incentives. The need for seeds is particularly acute and this was stressed as a high priority by Vice Minister Ratilal at

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the EOC Meeting which I attended on Monday, August 10.

is clearly not going to be

While it

feasible for donors to respond

adequately to this need for the current planting season, it clearly deserves high priority for next year and this is an area in which there is a great need for donor leadership and priority.

. while I had little opportunity to investigate the industrial situation in any detail, a tour of the industrial areas of Maputo makes it dramatically clear that the most immediate needs are for rehabilitation of existing industrial plants and facilities, many of which are in near derelict condition, and others operating sporadically at very low capacities. The government is vigorously seeking foreign private corporations to play an important role in the rehabilitation of existing industrial capacity as well as new initiatives. This clearly offers the most promising prospect for revitalizing the industrial sector.

has an agreement with O.P.I.C.

sector investors,

expressed by them;

While the government now

for insurance of U.S. private

there has so far been very little interest

. Host interest manifest to date seems to be

coming from European countries.

ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS:

My first meeting after my arrival in Maputo was with representatives of the U. N. organizations and agencies under the auspices of UNDP. The Emergency Operations Program recently set up is beginning to function, but has so far been very limited in its capacities as most of the new personnel assigned to it are _ not yet in place. Emergency operations have also been handicapped by lack of the discretionary funds which most bilateral and nongovernmental donors have available.

with the donor meeting on

emergency needs

Government officials expressed a high degree of satisfaction

convened by the

Secretary General in Geneva. Some of the individual programs of

U.N. organizations and agencies are also highly appreciated, notably the ecoastal Transport Operation mounted by World Food ,Program, for delivery of relief sqpplies to needy populations in the. coastal and estuarial areas," and UNICEF's providing health care, food and water supplies to especially needy and vulnerable populations.

programs of

However, it seems clear from

my discussions with government and donor rehrepresentatives that the U.N. has not played a significant overall leadership role at the country level in respect of efforts to deal with the emergency.

Nor does there seem to be any sense of real need at this point .

for 'overall U.N. leadership in support of the government's efforts for coordination of emergency assistance.

Even within the UaN. family, I found strong resistance to centralized coordination of programs and operations although recognition of the need for the U.N. to do a more effective job of' leadership and coordination in respect of mobilization of resources and assimilation and dissemination of information.

Donor community representatives also made the point that the U.N.'s contribution could be greatly improved if it were to concentrate on effective coordination amongst U.N. organizations and agencies, providing .

support for EOC and, at the headquarters level, assisting with ithe mobilization of external resources.

increased logistics

and information

The reasons for lack of U.N. leadership at.the country level derive, I believe, more from the lack of adequate headquarters support and resources in respect of the emergency functions of the UNDP representative, the fact that his appointment as gnergency Coordinator came only recently and was not aocompanied by the kind of increase in status required to assert effective leadership over other local heads of organizations and agencies, as well as the kind of personnel and local funding authority re-quired to back up an effective leadership and coordination role.

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degree the government desires it,

'of the Resident Representative,

similar to the arrangements which were made in

Ethiopia and Sudan for the appointment of a Special Representa-

As the result of my probing of

. A contributing factor seems also to have been the normal reluetf-ance of bilateral and nongovernmental donors to be coordinated by

' act as

, tcoordinator.

In situations like this, it is, of oourse, of prime impor- tance that the U.N. be coordinated within itself, something that is almost 'invariably difficult to achieve except under the that _prevailed during the

the U.N. can and should, to the

cooperate closely with and

exceptional rcircumstances

emergency in Ethiopia. However,

recent.

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provide strong support for the government's own overall co-" ordinating efforts, as was the case in respect to the U.N.

Emergency Operations Groups in Ethiopia and Sudan. I was sur-

prised that in Hozambique the government does not appear to look

ltO'the U.N. in any significant degree for this kind of support;

nor does the U.N. seem to have a noticeably different or closer relationship with the government than other donors.

Donors were especially critical of the U.N.'s inability to coordinate its information gathering efforts saying that they continuously receive different questionnaires from individual

I U.N. organizations and agencies requesting essentially the same kind of information in different forms. They expressed con-

siderable frustration that the U.N. could not get together on a

tingle coordinated program for collecting information.

Before I set out on my mission, I had been made aware of the
mfeeling on the part of at least one major donor that U.N. leader-
ship in Mozambique might require upgrading of the status and role
in his capacity as Emergency

Coordinator,

tive of the Secretary General.

this matter during my mission, I am of the opinion that special

arrangements of this kind are not needed at the present time in Mozambique, particularly as there seems no great sense of need for them on the part of the Mozambican government or donor representatives in the country, including representatives of U. N. organizations and agencies.

What faces is the fact that while there is a very considerable degree of interaction in respect to the emergency situation across the borders of Mozambique with its neighbors, the jurisdiction of the U.N. representatives in Mozambique is confined to their country of assignment and there was little evidence of cooperation with their counterparts in the neighboring countries on these matters. Personnel on this, they assured me that a good deal of consultation, but admitted funds and

In querying the U.N. there was, in fact, that this had been limited by difficulties of communication. inadequate travel

An important issue for the U.N. is the need for integration of its rehabilitation and long term of emergency measures with I sense that there is a high development plans and program. Su degree of awareness of this on the part of U.N. particularly as many of the development activities are now suspended as a result of the security personnel,

severely constrained or However, this emergency is of a structural and and I have the strong impression that the U. N. I would strongly situation.

continuing nature, has not yet accommodated adequately to this. urge that the U. N. give high priority to providing leadership and i. an example to other donors in this respect.

It is evident that the problems facing Mozambique are very intimately related to the overall political issue of South Africa and the impact of its aggressive policies on the "front line" states. It is also evident that the Mozambican African

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My belief there is a strong case for the U.N. to consider strength government looks to SADCC as the principle forum for regional cooperation, and I know from prior discussions with other governments in the area that they generally share this view. While they appreciate the efforts made by the U.N. to focus and develop support for the tremendous problem of the "front line" African states, there seems to be a high degree of skepticism and frustration concerning the actual effectiveness of U.N. efforts in this area. As indicated above my discussions in Mozambique led me to believe that there is no a compelling case at this time for upgrading the status and mand

ate of the U.N. Emergency Coordinator in Mozambique. But in giving its support of the African "front line" states, and providing more coordinated and concerted support for them and for SADCC by establishing in southern Africa a small office headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary General with broad responsibilities for leadership and coordination of U.N. agency programs and activities in the region. 'emer

ROLE OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS:

About fifty external nongovernmental organizations are now active and they play an extremely important role in emergency assistance as well as, to an increasing extent, in respect of rehabilitation and development. There has

be ' i '

although such a rapid growth of NGO activity that there has only been
a gutted degree of communication and coordination amongst them

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and, either on their own initiative or through the government
or the United Nations.

However, the fact that NGO representa-
tives participate in the Weekly meetings of EOC has clearly
brought the nongovernmental organizations into much closer
communication with the remainder of the donor community and
provides a promising mechanism for relating their emergency-
related programs and activities to the priority needs of the
Mozambican government and the programs of other donors. e

SECURITY SITUATION:

My meetings with NGO representatives proved to be a very important source of information and insights and I was impressed with already indicated, the security situation in the country with the high degree of unanimity of their views with those is the principal source of the continuing emergency conditions, representatives of the bilateral and multilateral donor community the devastating state of the economy, the displacement of large numbers of people, and the obstruction of humanitarian relief and the government on such issues as the priority that needs efforts as well as rehabilitation and development programs. to be accorded to assistance in respect of security. Representatives of agencies which are normally highly sensitive to any evidence of relief supplies going to the military express strong support for the need to ensure that the military forces protect the corridors and other strategic development infrastructures and Mozambican officials made it clear that their need for assistance to defend vulnerable populations, the transport and other basic development infrastructures, to receive food and other essential supplies of a non-lethal nature? Projects from terrorist attack is their immediate priority.

I - There is considerable frustration on the part of the government at the inability or unwillingness of donors to provide even non-lethal assistance, particularly as it is universally acknowledged there was also a very strong feeling on the part of NGOs amongst donor representatives that this is a priority need. representatives of concern at the rapid build up of food aid and the relative ease with which it is being obtained in relation to the difficulties of obtaining sufficient support for other urgent needs, e.g. in the health field, and for rehabilitation and long term development.

Nevertheless, most donor representatives made it clear that because of policy constraints and political sensitivities, it is not likely that their government or organization can now, or will be able in the foreseeable future to provide such assistance.

... in that it has

The Mozambican Red Cross, which started six years ago, now, The United Kingdom is an important exception -

undertaken a program of training for the Mozambican Army in Zimbabwe. It is designed to train Mozambican personnel, who will in turn train their own personnel, although the Mozambican government is now proposing that graduates of the O.x. Training Program be constituted as a special force. This program is highly appreciated by the Mozambican government, although it is modest in scale and will take some time before it can have a major impact.

has a countrywide network which, I was told, works quite well and is receiving support from a number of other national societies, through the League of Red Cross Societies. The other two main indigenous NGOs are CARITAS and the Christian Council of Mozambique, both of which I was told are quite effective, although I had no opportunity to meet individually with them.

My visit coincided with the visit of the representative of the Zimbabwe Army, I am told, is also carrying out a program for Africa, of which I am a member of the Board, and provided of training for the Mozambican Army, as is the Soviet Union, an opportunity to discuss their proposals for emergency whose training programs are principally directed to technical and development.

When she was there to evaluate training in use of weapons and equipment provided by the D.S-S-R-

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. del iberate encounters .

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The Defense Attache at _the UlK._ Embas_y gave me a briefing on the overall security situation in the country which was broadly consistent with what I had heard from others. He said that it was no worse than it has been in the past several years, although there has been a recent upsurge in attacks on "soft" targets, principally civilian populations. The Mozambique Army has been unable either to defeat or to contain the terrorists, although the counter offensive undertaken by the Army last January in central and eastern provinces was quite successful. He described this as a "low intensity" war characterized by brief skirmishes, some of which are based on accidental rather than. Nevertheless, the number of attacks on strategic targets seemed to imply some larger sense of strategy, probably provided by, or with the support, of South Africa. The prospect is for a long period of stalemate as there seems little likelihood of major improvement in the performance of the Army in the short term without the kind of external support which is not, at the moment, forthcoming.

Mozambican officials make a very strong case for the incorporation of security measures into development projects, as virtually all projects outside of the major urban areas remain vulnerable to terrorist attack. They seem to be very flexible about this and willing to cooperate in arrangements in which the external party responsible for implementing the project provides their own security. This can be done, and apparently in some cases has been done, both by providing their own security personnel entirely separate from the Mozambique forces or by arranging for Mozambique forces to do the job, maintained and supplied by the organization managing the project.

Amongst the donor community, there seems to be universal agreement that this is needed, but varying opinions as to the degree to which it is feasible. Some donor representatives

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.1. 1, _1_1_____. ____- _____. _ s... _-_- lw... ,____-__1 r..._1-__v._____. indicated that their organizations' would not find this political-ly feasible to accept and indicated that it would probably be feasible principally in respect of projects of a commercial nature.

It is paradoxical that despite the almost complete-unanimity within the donor community in agreement with the Mozambique ' government that this is its most urgent need, and that which I would represent the most cost- -effective investment by donors, there seems to be no evidence, with the exception of the U. K. military training program, of any movement towards meeting this need. It would not be reasonable to expect leadership in this .respect to come from those responsible for emergency or development assistance in the field. It is clear that most of these are I already doing everything they can withinltheir own authorities and mandates by tacitly acquiescing in the movement of food aid and other relief supplies to troops involved in defending basic transport and development infrastructures. "The issue is primarily a political one and can only be resolved by initiative at the political level in donor countries. While there are clearly 'precedents for the provision of non-lethal assistahce, this is ,nevertheless ._a Ahighlydensitive.Jssue_iorJiItH311JJ.Q_mcE____. governments, and there is an understandable reluctance for them to take the initiative in this case.

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In my view, the case for non-lethal security assistance is a compelling one and I am convinced that those governments genuinely committed to assisting Mozambique can no however,

TBnger'esCape radiaa"a5"toi itTlmThere can"be notquestionithatsuenevv this is the most urgent and important assistance Mozambique now requires. While it is politically easier to continue to provide emergency relief to deal with the consequences of banditry and insecurity, it is not fundamentally logical to do so when the

same or even lesser resources devoted to security assistance
could have a much greater and more immediate impact in human as
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I strongly recommend that the government -
ments of those countries with a special interest in assisting
.1, Jielles economic system
Mozambique take the lead in rethinking this matter and finding
politically acceptable ways of providing non-lethal security
assistance.

POLITICAL SITUATION: I

The Prime Minister, and other senior officials I met, made
it very clear that they regarded the political situation vis-a-
vis South Africa, as the overriding priority for Mozambique, and
the resolution of the current political impasse as the only
fundamental answer to the long term problems of Mozambique and
. South Africa. I

political dimensions of the crisis in southern Africa was a
The sense 'of priority which they accorded to the
recurrent theme in all my discussions.

I was very much 'impressed with the candor and the pragmatism with'
. which they discussed this issue.

the struggle against- apartheid in South Africa is immutable but
Their 'absolute commitment to

their sense of realism in dealing with it is equally manifest.

The Prime Minister and others made the point that while they

., .strongly oppose .the- policies at the 40th --Affi0an --government , - ----- 1

they had no sense of permanent hostility to the people of South
Africa and regarded South Africans as "Africans." who are entitled
to a place in African society; They seem to have 'a keen apprec-
.iation of internal South African politics, and of the differences
and tensions between the Defense Ministry and the Foreign

They make the

point that the peace; \$e'ch'rlty, and economic prosperity of allw "
southern Africa depends on a change in South Africa' 5 present
Ministry and their respective constituencies.

internal policies of apartheid and their related policies of
aggressive intervention in the affairs of their .neighbors, the
promotion of instability and insecurity and the undermining of.
their economic life.

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"They believe that 'only' it is the 'haja' of the 'sterh' of the 'fg; 'parytiaul-ar: _
ly the United States, can bring to bear the kind of influence
that will convince South Africa that such policies are counter-
productive to its own interests and must be changed. It is
apparent that they are giving very high priority to their
relations with the United States at this stage, as evidenced by
the importance they attached to the visit which occurred just
'before mine, of the delegation of senior advisors to some of the
most prominent Republican political leaders, including those who
have taken a hard line on Mozambique. While concerned and
frustrated to a degree by U.S. attitudes, and the complexity and
occasional ambiguities manifest in the U. S. political process,
.they remain, I believe, firmly committed to forging a strong and
workable relationship with the United States, and continue to
hope that this will help produce a resolution of the major
political issues that are the prime source of. the current crisis
.in southern Africa; and of Mozambique's problems.

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When they learned that I am a resident in the United States,
and have 'some involvement with and access to the political
leadership in the United States, as well as some of the media
channels which influence public opinion, they 5'12!EL95.ELW-__-
A\$ih'tmn my own views as to how best to influence the U. S.
position... I made it clear that I was very limited in what I
could do personally, but nevertheless, I would certainly make an
effort to try and communicate with the various people I know that
a better understanding of the Mozambique situation could well be
helpful to Mozambique. In particular, when they found that I was
on ,the ,Board 415 JUSA for Africa .with Harry :elafonte and other Mum-
leading artists, they urged me to do what I can to have Belafonte
full and some of his artist colleagues visit Mozambique, and, as well,
I intend to

to encourage leading U. S. media people to do so.

follow this up.

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I mentioned that the fact that Mozambique was now engaging a
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Prime Minister to take advantage
could, and should, be turned into an important advantage for
of Mr. Clark's Visit and the current high level of public
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._ Mozambique in getting across its principal messages, e. 9 I 'tha ! interest in Mozambi
que in Canada to seek a decismn on the part
wiitiundamental salutions t0 the): tang tfm problem: are a of the Canadian government to
designate Mozambique as a "category
p0 cal settlement or the aparthe d SSue n South Afr ca, and l" country for purposes of de
velopment assistance. This would
th J . . -

b: restor::ion Ot :ositive and iconstnctive relationships ' enable Canada to follow up o
n the significant emergency asszs-
e ween Sou Africa an the neighbor ng Afr can states, and thaL tance it. is now providing
by initiating a long term program of

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the most urgent and immediate needs are for securityassistance. development assistance th
rough the Canadian International
I pointed out that the high visibility tha't Mozambique is now
Development Agency.
receiving 'in the media could not be expected to ,last long and
that every effort should be made to take full advantage of it
while it lasts.

, ' They fully understand that Mozambique is caught up in the i (
dynamics of presidential politics in the United states at this
.time in which the attitudes of. political leaders, particularly !
those that arecontending for the presidential nomination, will '
be primarily dictated by their sense of how their attitude .
towards Mozambique may' effect their prospectsir %
My visit preceded, by a few days, that of Canadian Minister
of External Affairs, Joe Clark, and Canadian Ambassador, Roger
--Bul-lT-who was -there-to-prepare -the'visit7-andjoined -lne femu-
infomal dinner with the Prime Minister and several Senior
Hinisters. The invitation which Hr. 'Clark was to convey was for
. Mozambique to send a ministerial level observer to the forth-
coming Commonwealth Conference in VancouverFCanada. This will
provide an important and timely opportunity for Mozambique to
obtain nsupport from the Commonwealth countries, which could also
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help influen mprovement in 11.5. politicaf. attituaes.